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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: RECORDS
COUNTRY FILE

Archivist: cas/cas

File Folder: Iraq Vol 1 1/20/81 - 12/31/83 [2 of 4] Box 91352

Date: June 16, 1998

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. cable	081045z 2 p. R 2/8/05 NLSF96-127/1 # 315	11/8/81	P1
2. cable	271106z 2 p. P 2/8/05 NLSF96-127/1 # 316	10/27/81	P1
3. cable	051147z 3 p. R 2/8/05 NLSF96-127/1 # 317	8/05/81	P1
4. cable	220915z 1 p. R " " # 318	7/22/81	P1
5. cable	151230z 1 p. R " " # 319	7/15/81	P1
6. cable	161544z 2 p. R " " # 320	7/16/81	P1
7. cable	132107z 2 p. R " " # 321	7/13/81	P1
8. cable	111017z 1 p. R " " # 322	7/11/81	P1
9. cable	111120z 1 p. P 2/8/05 NLSF96-127/1 # 322A	7/11/81	P1 / B2, B6
10. cable	091017z 3 p. P 2/8/05 NLSF96-127/1 # 322B	7/09/81	P1 / B2, B6
11. cable	060600z 2 p. R 2/8/05 NLSF96-127/1 # 323	7/06/81	P1
12. cable	211117z 2 p. R 2/8/05 NLSF96-127/1 # 324	6/21/81	P1
13. cable	151050z 2 p. P 2/8/05 NLSF96-127/1 # 325	6/15/81	P1
14. cable	111500z 3 p. R 2/8/05 NLSF96-127/1 # 326	6/11/81	P1
15. cable	111440z 2 p. R 2/8/05 NLSF96-127/1 # 327	6/11/81	P1
16. cable	101122z 2 p. P 2/8/05 NLSF96-127/1 # 328	6/10/81	P1
17. cable	081845z 3 p. P 2/8/05 NLSF96-127/1 # 329	6/08/81	P1
18. cable	081116z 2 p. P 2/8/05 NLSF96-127/1 # 330	6/08/81	P1
19. cable	081114z 2 p. R 2/8/05 NLSF96-127/1 # 331	6/08/81	P1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: RECORDS
COUNTRY FILE

Archivist: cas/cas

File Folder: Iraq Vol 1 1/20/81 - 12/31/83 [2 of 4] Box 91352

Date: June 16, 1998

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
20. cable	080647z 2 p. R 2/8/05 NLSF96-1271 #332	6/08/81	P1
21. cable	041058z 2 p. R " " #333	6/04/81	P1
22. cable	281255z 6 p. R " " #334	5/28/81	P1
23. cable	171228z 3 p. D 2/8/05 NLSF96-1271 #335	5/17/81	P1
24. cable	171120z 3 p. D 2/8/05 NLSF96-1271 #336	5/17/81	P1
25. cable	231100z 5 p. R 2/8/05 NLSF96-1271 #337	4/23/81	P1
26. cable	231008z 2 p. P 2/8/05 NLSF96-1271 #338	4/23/81	P1
27. cable	230730z 2 p. R 2/8/05 NLSF96-1271 #337	4/23/81	P1
28. cable	121650z 6 p. R " " #348	4/12/81	P1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
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- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/10/81//314

SITUATION: CL
SUBJECT CATEGORY: 11/10

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE329
STU4984
OO RUEHC
OF RUEHAD #2899 3121115
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 081045Z NOV 81
FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2527
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 3495
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 988
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ BAGHDAD 2899

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 11/08/01 (EAGLETON, WILLIAM L.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, IZ

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN'S INTERPRETER

1. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT)~~.
2. ON NOVEMBER 6 I HAD A LUNCH MEETING (HIS INVITATION) WITH PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S INTERPRETER AND INFORMATION ADVISOR, MAZEN ZAHAWI. I HAD NOT SEEN ZAHAWI SINCE AN ABBREVIATED DINNER MEETING WITH IRAQI DESK OFFICER WIZNITZER SEPTEMBER 17. ZAHAWI WAS MORE RELAXED THAN LAST TIME AND UPBEAT ON US-IRAQI RELATIONS.
3. AT ONE POINT ZAHAWI REMARKED THAT HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR THE WAR IRAQI WOULD HAVE RENEWED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. BY THIS TIME. (COMMENT: MORE LIKELY, IRAQ WOULD STILL HAVE WAITED FOR THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION TO REVEAL MORE OF ITS MIDDLE EAST POLICY BEFORE RENEWING. NEVERTHELESS, ZAHAWI WAS PROBABLY REPEATING SOMETHING HE HAD HEARD FROM THE LEADERSHIP, POSSIBLY SADDAM HUSSEIN.) ZAHAWI ASKED WHETHER SADDAM HUSSEIN'S INSTRUCTIONS THAT I BE TREATED AS OTHER CHIEFS OF MISSION WAS BEING IMPLEMENTED AND I REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. WHEN I MENTIONED OUR INITIAL APPROACH TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY RE THE POSSIBILITY OF GROUPING U.S. FIRMS IN AN AMERICAN PAVILION IN THE 1982 TRADE FAIR, ZAHAWI SEEMED TO THINK THIS WAS APPROPRIATE AT THE PRESENT STAGE OF U.S.-IRAQI RELATIONS (THOUGH, OF COURSE, HE DOES NOT MAKE POLICY ON SUCH MATTERS).
4. ZAHAWI SAID HE HAD HEARD "WE HAD BEEN ASKED TO BUILD A NEW EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD." I FILLED HIM IN ON PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS OF PROPERTY ISSUES WITH CHIEF OF PROTOCOL NABIL NAJIM, NOTING THAT WE WERE AWAITING FURTHER REACTION FROM THE DEPARTMENT. HE SUGGESTED WE GO AHEAD

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F96-127/1 # 315

BY Amf, NARA, DATE 2/8/05

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/10/81//314

SITUATION: CL
SUBJECT CATAGORY: 11/10

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

AND PLAN ON AN EMBASSY-SIZE INSTALLATION.

5. ZAHAWI SEEMED SATISFIED WITH IRAQ'S MILITARY POSITION VIS-A-VIS IRAN PARTICULARLY AIR SUPERIORITY WHICH HAD RECENTLY RESULTED IN THE DOWNING OF ALL THREE IRANIAN PLANS ENGAGED IN AN AIR STRIKE. (ACCORDING TO ONE SOURCE MIRAGE AIRCRAFT ACCOUNTED FOR TWO). MEANWHILE IRAQI PLANS WERE SUCCESSFULLY OPERATING OVER IRAN. ON THE QUESTION OF PEACE, HE REFLECTED THE PREVAILING PESSIMISM IN THE FACE OF IRANIAN REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE OR AGREE ON A CEASE FIRE. HE REFERRED TO SADDAM HUSSEIN'S SUGGESTION THAT BOTH SIDES OBSERVE A CEASE FIRE FOR THE HOLY MONTH OF MUHARRAM BUT HE ASSUMED THE IRANIANS WOULD REFUSE.

6. ZAHAWI, WHO HAD JUST BEEN INTERVIEWING FOR THE VISITING BRITISH MINISTER OF ENVIRONMENT, TOM KING, INDICATED THAT IRAQ WAS QUITE PLEASED WITH THE EUROPEAN POSITION ON MIDDLE EAST PEACE. HE THOUGHT LORD CARRINGTON MIGHT BE VISITING IRAQ IN THE NEAR FUTURE. (BRITISH AMBASSADOR EGERTON SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD ME THAT LORD GEORGE BROWN WOULD BE IN BAGHDAD FOR ONE OF HIS PERIODIC EXCHANGES WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN SOMETIME MID-NOVEMBER.

7. ZAHAWI INDICATED THAT IRAQ'S LEADERSHIP IS LOOKING CLOSELY AT U.S. MOVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST FOLLOWING PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SUCCESS ON THE AWACS VOTE WHICH THEY CONSIDER A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT. HE NOTED THAT "IRAQ HAS SAID IT WOULD SUPPORT THE FAHD PLAN." WHEN I ASKED WHEN THIS HAD BEEN DONE, HE BACKTRACKED A BIT. (COMMENT: IT IS POSSIBLE THAT HE HEARD SOME SUCH REMARK IN A PRIVATE CONVERSATION WHICH HE THOUGHT HAD BEEN MADE PUBLIC. ALTHOUGH IRAQ HAS TAKEN NO OFFICIAL POSITION ON THE PLAN AND HAS AVOIDED PRESS SPECULATION, IT IS OUR ASSUMPTION THAT IRAQ WILL GO ALONG WITH ANN ARAB CONSENSUS IN FAVOR OF THE PLAN DURING THE FEZ SUMMIT.)

EAGLETON

BT

#2899

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SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/10/81/314

SITUATION: MID
SUBJECT CATEGORY: EAST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE074
STU6760
DD RUEHC
DE RUEHAD #2819 3001109
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 271106Z OCT 81
FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2492
BT

~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 2819

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 10/27/01 (EAGLETON, WILLIAM L.) DR-M

TAGS: PFPF, EG, IZ, XF, EEC, IZ

SUBJECT: MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS: POSSIBLE IRAQI
PRESSURES

REF: STATE 284926

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. CONVERSATIONS WITH WESTERN AMBASSADORS DURING RECENT WEEKS, INCLUDING WITH THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR OCTOBER 25 FOLLOWING HIS TRIP TO ROME FOR THE HAMMADI VISIT, HAVE PRODUCED SOME INDICATIONS OF HOW THE IRAQIS ARE DEALING WITH THE ISSUE OF PARTICIPATION IN THE SINAI MULTINATIONAL FORCE. THE IRAQIS HAVE NOT YET LAUNCHED A PUBLIC CAMPAIGN OR SYSTEMATIC DIPLOMATIC DEMARCHES AGAINST PARTICIPATION, BUT THEY HAVE ON A SELECTIVE BASIS MADE KNOWN THEIR OPPOSITION.

3. ABOUT A MONTH AGO THE [REDACTED] AMBASSADORS WERE CALLED IN SEPARATELY BY THE HEAD OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY TO BE TOLD THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HOPED THEIR GOVERNMENTS WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE FORCE. THE IRAQI POSITION WAS STATED TO BE A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE BASED ON THE OPPOSITION OF IRAQ AND OTHER ARAB STATES TO THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS. IT DOES NOT APPEAR THAT ANY DIRECT THREAT WAS MADE AGAINST COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE FORCE. HOWEVER, BOTH THE [REDACTED] AMBASSADORS HAVE APPARENTLY ADVISED THEIR GOVERNMENTS THAT THEY BELIEVE PARTICIPATION IN THE FORCE WOULD HAVE

A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON BILATERAL RELATIONS, INCLUDING TRADE, BETWEEN THEIR COUNTRIES AND IRAQ. THE [REDACTED] AMBASSADOR, ON INSTRUCTIONS, RECENTLY TOLD THE MFA HIS COUNTRY WOULD PARTICIPATE IF THE [REDACTED] DID.

4. DURING FOREIGN MINISTER HAMMADI'S RECENT VISIT TO

FOIA(b) (1)

FOIA(b) (1)

FOIA(b) (1)

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IN PART

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NLS E96-127/1 #316

By Amf

2/8/05

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/10/81//314

SITUATION: MID
SUBJECT CATEGORY: EAST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

ROME (ROME 24626 AND 24812) THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF ITALIAN PRESS INTEREST IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENTS OCTOBER 21 WHICH WAS INTERPRETED AS A WARNING THAT PARTICIPATION IN THE SINAI MULTINATIONAL FORCE COULD HARM ITALY'S RELATIONS WITH IRAQ.

FOIA(b) (1)

[REDACTED] NOTED THAT AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE IT WAS A LEFT WING JOURNALIST WHO HAD RAISED THE QUESTION OF ITALIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE MFO. HAMMADI HAD NOT TAKEN THE INITIATIVE IN PUBLICLY EXPRESSING IRAQ'S NEGATIVE POSITION.

5. THE [REDACTED] AMBASSADOR RECENTLY TOLD ME HE HAS NOT DISCUSSED THE MFO WITH IRAQI AUTHORITIES. OUR IMPRESSION FROM THE ABOVE IS THAT THE IRAQIS INITIALLY TRIED TO APPLY SOME PRESSURE ON TWO OF THE SMALLER POSSIBLE PARTICIPANTS, BOTH OF WHOM HAVE RECENTLY BEEN WORKING HARD TO INCREASE THE LEVEL OF THEIR COMMERCIAL CONTACTS WITH IRAQ. ALTHOUGH THE IRAQIS HAVE MOVED CAUTIOUSLY IN THEIR CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE MFO, THEY MIGHT BE MORE INCLINED TO APPLY ADDITIONAL PRESSURES IF THERE IS WAVERING ON THE PART OF POSSIBLE PARTICIPANTS OR IF OPPOSITION TO THE MFO BUILDS UPE ELSEWHERE IN THE ARAB WORLD. OUR WESTERN COLLEAGUES HERE HAVE APPARENTLY MADE STRONG CASES AGAINST PARTICIPATION, BASED ON POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH IRAQ. THEIR CONCERNS ARE PROBABLY EXAGGERATED IF A LARGE ENOUGH GROUP WILL STICK TOGETHER AND JOIN THE FORCE. HOWEVER, THEIR CONCERNS MIGHT BE JUSTIFIED IF ONLY ONE OR TWO COUNTRIES PARTICIPATE.

FOIA(b) (1)

6. SUGGEST THE DEPARTMENT REPEAT THIS MESSAGE TO ADDRESSEES IN STATE REFTEL.

EAGLETON

BT

#2819

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/11/81//223

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

MESSAGE:

HCE281
STU7694
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHAD #2053 2171150
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 051147Z AUG 81 ZFF4
FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2136
BT

N: F96-127/1 # 317

BY smf, ARA, DATE 2/8/05

~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 2053

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS1,3 8/5/01 (BODINE, BARBARA K.) DR-M

TAGS: PEPR, MILI, IZ, US, IS, IR

SUBJ: IRAQI DEMARCHE RE: ARGENTINIAN PLANE CRASH

REF: A. STATE 206196, B. BAGHDAD 1996

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. UPON RECEIPT OF REF A I CALLED SAHHAF, HEAD OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT, MFA, WHO AGREED TO SEE ME AT ONCE.

3. SAHHAF BEGAN BY THANKING US FOR RESPONDING PROMPTLY TO IRAQI CONCERNS RAISED IN OUR MEETING OF LAST FRIDAY. I THEN REVIEWED THE POINTS CONTAINED PARA 3, STRESSING THOSE ACTIONS WE HAVE TAKEN TO EFFECT OUR STATED NEUTRALITY IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR AND OUR SUPPORT FOR THOSE EFFORTS UNDERTAKEN BY OTHERS TO BRING THE CONFLICT TO A PEACEFUL END AT THE EARLIEST MOMENT. I NOTED THAT AS A PART OF OUR NEUTRALITY WE HAD RECEIVED ASSURANCES FROM ISRAEL THAT IT WOULD NOT TRANSFER ANY U.S.-ORIGIN EQUIPMENT TO IRAN AND WE HAD NO GROUNDS TO BELIEVE THAT ISRAEL HAD VIOLATED THOSE ASSURANCES OR OUR ARMS EXPORT CONTROL LAWS. I CONCLUDED WITH OUR CONCERN THAT IRAQI PUBLICITY OF THE FRIDAY MEETING DID NOT SERVE OUR MUTUAL INTEREST IN A FRANK AND OPEN DIALOGUE.

4. SAHHAF RESPONDED FIRST TO THE LATTER POINT. THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF OUR MEETING WAS NOT, IN HIS VIEW, A CONTRAVENTION OF NORMS ON THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES, BUT SIMPLY A STATEMENT OF FACT THAT THE GDI IS CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBLE ARMS TRANSFERS TO IRAN (WHICH HAD RECEIVED WORLD-WIDE PRESS COVERAGE) AND THAT AS A RESULT OF THESE CONCERNS, RAISED THE ISSUE WITH THE USG REPRESENTATIVE IN BAGHDAD. HE NOTED THAT THE PRESS RELEASE CAREFULLY AVOIDED A DIRECT CHARGE OF USG COMPLICITY, USING INSTEAD THE FORMULATION THAT THE "LEAKAGE" MIGHT REPEAT MIGHT BE WITH THE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/11/81//223

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

KNOWLEDGE OF THE US. SAHHAF ALSO SAID THAT THIS FORMULATION WAS USED IN BRIEFING ARAB, ISLAMIC AND NON-ALIGNED AMBASSADORS ON THE SAME SUBJECT. THE GOI HAS NOT RULED OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A LACK OF USG "PRIOR KNOWLEDGE" NOR HAS IT PREJUDGED THE OUTCOME OF DISCUSSIONS WITH US HERE, AT NO POINT IN THE DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHERS OR IN THE PRESS HAVE THE IRAQIS GONE BEYOND WHAT IS, IN THEIR VIEW, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE. HE DID INDICATE THAT TODAY'S MEETING AND ANY SUBSEQUENT EXCHANGES WILL NOT BE IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.

5. WHEN ASKED THE PURPOSE OF THE OTHER AMBASSADORIAL BRIEFINGS, OF IRAQ'S CONCERN OVER ARMS RESUPPLY EFFORTS TO IRAN. HE STATED FURTHER THAT DISCUSSION OF ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN THE EVENT THIS RESUPPLY IS NOT HALTED WAS ALSO DISCUSSED, BUT REFUSED TO BE DRAWN OUT OF WHAT SPECIFICALLY THE GOI, (OR THEIR FRIENDS), HAD IN MIND.

6. TURNING TO THE ALLEGATION OF US-ORIGIN ARMS BEING SENT TO IRAN BY ISRAEL, SAHHAF, ACKNOWLEDGING OUR NEUTRALITY AND OUR ACTIONS TO DATE, QUESTIONED THE VERACITY OF OUR STATEMENT THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO VIOLATION BY ISRAEL OF OUR LAWS. THE GOI IS CONVINCED THAT ISRAEL IS SUPPLYING AMERICAN-MADE SPARES, AMMUNITION AND EQUIPMENT TO IRAN. IF THE ARMS INVOLVED ARE NOT US-EQUIPMENT SOLD TO ISRAEL, WHERE COULD THEY COME FROM? WOULD NOT A BLACKMARKET OPERATION INVOLVING US EQUIPMENT ALSO BE A CONTRAVENTION OF OUR LAWS? IF THE ARMS/SPARES WERE ISRAELI-MANUFACTURED, WOULD THIS NOT BE A CONTRAVENTION OF OUR LICENSING AGREEMENTS? WHY HAS THE USG NOT PUBLICLY ADDRESSED THESE QUESTIONS?

7. THE FUNDAMENTAL IRAQI CONCERN IS THAT ISRAELI VIOLATIONS RESULT FROM INADEQUATE US SUPERVISION. THE IRAQIS BELIEVE WE HAVE BOTH THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL MEANS TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH OUR POLICIES AND LAWS, BUT WE ARE NOT USING THEM ADEQUATELY.

8. IF, AS WE SAY, THERE HAS BEEN NO ISRAELI VIOLATION OF OUR LAWS, AND THIS IS UNLIKELY, THERE REMAINS THE FACT THAT ISRAELI ACTIONS ARE COUNTER TO OUR STATED POLICIES AND HARM OUR INTERESTS. IF THE USG DOES NOT REPEAT NOT BELIEVE THE PROLONGATION OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR IS IN OUR INTEREST OR IN THE INTERESTS OF OUR FRIENDS IN THE GULF, THE OUR PERCEPTION OF ISRAELI-IRANIAN COLLUSION MUST RISE ABOVE MERE LEGAL TECHNICALITIES AND INCLUDE THE BROADER POTENTIAL POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF ISRAELI ACTIONS ON THE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF THE MIDDLE EAST. ALL THE GOI WANTS IS SOME AMERICAN ACTION TO STOP THE FLOW OF ARMS TO IRAN FROM ISRAEL IN RECOGNITION

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/11/81//223

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

OF OUR BROADER REGIONAL INTERESTS AND THE INTEREST OF OUR FRIENDS, NOT JUST IN THE GULF, BUT ELSEWHERE,
9. COMMENT: THE MEETING LASTED NEARLY AN HOUR AS WE DISCUSSED THE VARIOUS POINTS PROVIDED REF A AND THE IRAQI REACTION. WHILE SAHHAF, AND THE GOI, MAY BE WILLING TO ACCEPT THAT THERE IS NO DIRECT USG COMPLICITY INVOLVED, THEY ARE FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT COLLUSION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND IRAN EXISTS AND WILL VONTINUE DUE TO A LACK OF US WILL TO STOP IT. SAHHAF HINTED STRONGLY THAT THE POINTS IN REF A DID NOT ADEQUATELY ADDRESS GOI CONCERNS NOR ANSWER LEGITIMATE IRAQI QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SOURCE OF THE ARMS BEING TRANSFERRED. UNLESS FURTHER INFORMATION IS FORTHCOMING WHICH DIRECTLY AND FRANKLY ANSWERS GOI QUESTIONS, WE CAN EXPECT THE LOBBYING EFFORTS WITH THEIR FRIENDS AND ALLIES TO INTENSIFY. SO FAR THE IRAQIS DO APPEAR TO BE MOUNTING A PROPAGANDA EFFORT DESIGNED BOTH TO DISCREDIT AND ISOLATE ISRAEL FURTHER INTERNATIONALLY, AND TO LEGITIMIZE THE CONFLICT WITH IRAN BY LINKING TEHRAN AND TEL AVIV. USG SILENCE ON THIS ISSUE WILL ONLY CONVINCCE THE IRAQIS THAT THEY ARE RIGHT AND, AT THE SAME TIME WILL HAND THE GOI JUST THE TYPE OF WEAPON THEY ARE LOOKING FOR ON THE EVE OF THE UPCOMING UNGA SESSION, WHERE IRAQ IS SEEKING BROAD SUPPORT.

BODINE

BT

#2053

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SENSITIVE

81T721 R

*****~~SECRET~~*****

DATE 07/28/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
FOBI KEMP
WHBR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHAD #1921 2030920
O 220915Z JUL 81 ZFF4
FM URINT BAGHDAD

DECLA / RELEASED

F96-1271 #318

BY snf

12 2/8/05

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2084

~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 1921

NOPIA
F.O. 120651 RDS-2 7/22/91 (BODINE, BARBARA K.) OR-M
TAGS: ASEC, OVIP (MRS. SADDAM HUSSEIN), IZ, US
SUBJ: HOSPITAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE IRAQI
FIRST LADY
REF: STATE 192254

1. (R - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. I BRIEFED MAZEN ZAHAWI ON THE CURRENT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE IRAQI FIRST LADY, AS OUTLINED IN REPTEL. ZAHAWI WAS PLEASED AND SAID SINCE HE HAS HEARD NOTHING FROM THE PARTY RECENTLY HE ASSUMES ALL IS WELL. I ALSO IMPRESSED UPON HIM THE NEED FOR SEVERAL DAYS ADVANCE NOTICE ON MRS. HUSSEIN'S DISCHARGE DATE IF WE ARE TO MAINTAIN THE LEVEL OF SECURITY DESIRED AND AVOID ANY MISSTEPS. ZAHAWI SAID HE WOULD PASS THE WORD TO NEW YORK TO KEEP US INFORMED.

3. DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO USUN.
BODINE

USINT BAGHDAD 1921

DTG: 220915Z JUL 81 PSNI 037186
TOR: 203/1607Z

*****~~SECRET~~*****

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 07/29/81//210

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE620
UTS9600
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHAD #1880 1961253
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 151230Z JUL 81
FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2056
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ BAGHDAD 1880

E.O. 12065; GDS 7/15/87 (BODINE, BARBARA K.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, IZ, US, IS

SUBJ: RELEASE OF THE F-16'S TO ISRAEL

1. (2 - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. THE STORY IS OUT IN BAGHDAD, ENGLISH AND ARABIC PRESS AS WELL AS THE BBC AND OTHER RADIO SERVICES, THAT THE DECISION HAS BEEN MADE TO RELEASE THE F-16'S TO ISRAEL. WHETHER TRUE OR NOT, THAT IS THE PERCEPTION AND EXPECTATION. WITH THE IRAQI NATIONAL DAY TWO DAYS AWAY, AND OFFICIAL DELEGATIONS BEGINNING TO GATHER, I WOULD REQUEST THAT GUIDANCE ON WHAT TO TELL THE GOI BE SENT SOONEST.

3. SEVERAL FRIENDLY DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES (INCLUDING THE BRITISH, PROTECT) HAVE SUGGESTED, BY THE WAY, WE WITHHOLD FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT UNTIL JULY 18 AT THE EARLIEST, THEREBY SAVING SADDAM HUSSEIN THE EMBARRASSMENT OF THE NEWS IN THE MIDST OF THE REVOLUTIONARY FESTIVITIES AND THUS POSSIBLY AVOIDING A SHARPER PUBLIC RESPONSE FROM HIM THAT MIGHT BE FORTHCOMING IF DONE AT A DIFFERENT, LESS EMOTIONAL TIME.

BODINE

BT

#1880

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NIS F96-127/1 #319

BY anj,

DATE 2/8/05

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE069
UTS1081
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHAD #1887 1971547
ZNY SSSSS ZZM
O 161544Z JUL 81
FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2061
BT

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F96-12711 #320

BY smf, DATE 2/8/05

~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 1887

E.O. 12065; RDS-1 7/16/01 (BODINE, BARBARA K.) DR=M

TAGS: PEPR, IZ, US

SUBJ: F-16 DELIVERIES TO ISRAEL

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. THE HEAD OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL DIVISION, MFA, SAHHAF (PROTECT), DURING MY CALL ON HIM THIS MORNING TO DELIVER THE SECRETARY'S LETTER TO FOREIGN MINISTER HAMMADI, RAISED INFORMALLY AND APPARENTLY WITHOUT INSTRUCTION THE QUESTION OF F-16 DELIVERIES TO ISRAEL. SAHHAF HAS OBVIOUSLY BEEN CLOSELY MONITORING REPORTS OUT OF ISRAEL THAT THE DECISION HAS BEEN MADE TO RELEASE THE AIRCRAFT. HE SAID, HOWEVER, HE HAS SEEN NOTHING FROM WASHINGTON. DRAWING ON OUR NOON PRESS BRIEFINGS, I TOLD SAHHAF THAT NO FINAL DECISION HAS BEEN MADE AND THAT COUNSELOR MACFARLANE IS CONSULTING WITH THE PRESIDENT AND WITH CONGRESS FOLLOWING HIS MEETINGS WITH ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER BEGIN.

3. SAHHAF SEEMED RESIGNED TO THE INEVITABILITY OF THE AIRCRAFT BEING RELEASED BUT WAS NONE THE LESS DISAPPOINTED. HE SAID HE WOULD NOT CHARACTERIZE THE DECISION AS "HOSTILE" BUT AS "AN UNFRIENDLY MOVE" THAT DEMONSTRATED ONCE AGAIN THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY AGAINST THE ARABS, WHILE NOT PREDICTING DIRE CONSEQUENCES FOR U.S.-IRAQI RELATIONS, AND NOTING THE SUPPORTIVE AND FRIENDLY TONE OF THE SECRETARY'S LETTER TO HAMMADI, HE VIEWED THE DELIVERY OF THE F-16'S AS CONFIRMATION THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT YET PREPARED TO RE-ASSESS THE LIMITS OF ITS SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL. HE REGRETTED IT WOULD OFFSET MUCH OF THE PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN MADE IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS.

5. RETURNING TO THE SECRETARY'S LETTER TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER, SAHHAF SAID HE WOULD CONVEY IT TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER TODAY AND HE WAS SURE THAT WE COULD EXPECT AN

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 340

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 07/29/81//210

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION

EARLY REPLY.
BODINE
BT
#1887
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SENSITIVE

DATE 07/21/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: NAN COL JP VP
EOB: KEMP
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHAD #1876 1942110
O 132107Z JUL 81 ZFF6
FM USINT BAGHDAD

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

N^o F96-127/1 #321

BY smf, IE 2/8/05

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2050

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK NIACT IMMEDIATE 654
BT

~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 1876

NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-2 7/13/91 (BODINE, BARBARA K.) OR-M
TAGS: OVIP (MSRS, SADDAM HUSSEIN)
SUBJ: TRAVEL BY IRAQI FIRST LADY
REF: STATE 182969

1. (S - ENTIRE TEST)

2. FROM CONVERSATIONS WITH ZAHAWI MY UNDERSTANDING IS THAT FIRST SECRETARY HUSSEIN HASSAN IS PREFERRED AND KNOWLEDGEABLE POINT OF CONTACT IN PARTY AND THAT PLANS ON MEDICAL TREATMENT AND OTHER DETAILS OF ITINERARY WILL BE MADE IN NEW YORK, NOT BAGHDAD.

3. I APPRECIATE THE FRUSTRATION OF TRYING TO PROVIDE SECURITY AND OTHER ARRANGEMENTS IN THE FACE OF IRAQI RETICENCE. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS WITH ZAHAWI PREVIOUSLY AND WILL TRY AGAIN AS SOON AS I CAN REACH HIM. TOMORROW, UNFORTUNATELY IS A NATIONAL HOLIDAY AND CONTACTING ANYONE WILL BE DIFFICULT. IF I DO REACH HIM I WILL STRESS THE NEED FOR GREATER COOPERATION AND FORTHCOMINGNESS FROM EITHER THE PALACE THROUGH ME OR, PERHAPS BETTER, FOR FIRST SECRETARY HUSSEIN TO BE GIVEN A LONGER LEASH.

USINT BAGHDAD 1876

DTG:132107Z JUL 81 PSN: 026306
TOR: 195/0953Z

DATE 07/21/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. ON PRESS GUIDANCE IF/WHEN THE STORY BREAKS IN THE U.S.,
 AT THIS POINT SUGGEST WE NEITHER CONFIRM NOR DENY IRAQI FIRST
 DADY'S PRESENCE IN THE U.S. WE CAN POINT OUT THAT MANY PEOPLE
 AVAIL THEMSELVES OF OUR MEDICAL FACILITIES AND CAN DENY THAT
 ANY IRAQI IS IN THE US IN AN OFFICIAL CAPACITY.
 THAT'S NOT MUCH, BUT AS FAR AS WE SHOULD GO. HAVE ALREADY
 SUGGESTED TO ZAHAWI THAT GOI HAVE ITS OWN PRESS GUIDANCE
 READY IN NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON SHOULD THE STORY BREAK. AM
 NOT SANGUINE THEY WILL GO MUCH BEYOND A CURT "NO COMMENT". THEY
 PREFER TO BELIEVE THAT MAXIMUM PRECAUTIONS WILL PRECLUDE A
 PRESS LEAK.
 RODINE.

USINT BAGHDAD 1876

DTG:132107Z JUL 81 PSN: 026306
 TOR: 195/0953Z

DATE 07/21/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
EOB: KEMP
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

NLS F96-127/1 # 322

MESSAGE:

BY smf, I DATE 2/8/05

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHAD #1844 1921028
O 111017Z JUL 81 ZFF4
FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2040

~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 1844

NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-2 7/11/91 (BODINE, BK) OR-M
TAGS: ASEC, OVIP (MRS. SADDAM HUSSEIN) IZ, US
SUBJ: (S) MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR IRAQI FIRST LADY
REF: A. STATE 181162 B. STATE 182085 AND PREVIOUS

1. WHEN I CALLED ON MAZEN ZAHAWI TO RELAY INFORMATION AND QUESTIONS CONTAINED REF A & B I WAS INFORMED THAT THE FIRST LADY AND HER PARTY WILL DEPART BAGHDAD TOMORROW, SUNDAY, JULY 12 FOR LONDON. THEY WILL STAY THE NIGHT THERE AND FLY TO NEW YORK JULY 13. TRAVEL WILL BE BY PRIVATE AIRCRAFT.

2. I STRESSED THAT, IF HER ARRIVAL IN THE U.S. WAS INDEED SO IMMINENT, WE WOULD NEED THE INFORMATION REQUESTED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. ZAHAWI WILL TRY TO GET IT TO ME THIS AFTERNOON OR FIRST THING TOMORROW MORNING.

3. TWO MORE DOCTORS HAVE BEEN ADDED TO THE PARTY. NAMES AND PASSPORT DATA BY SEPTEL.
BODINE

USINT BAGHDAD 1844

DTG:111017Z JUL 81 PSNI 023728
TOR: 192/1724Z

DATE 07/21/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
EOB: KEMP
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHAD #1846 192112Z
O 111120Z JUL 81 ZFF4
FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2042

~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 1846

NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-2 7/11/91 (BODINE, BARBARA K.) OR-M
TAGS: OVIP (MRS. SADDAM HUSSEIN) IZ, US
SUBJ: TRAVEL OF IRAQI FIRST LADY AND PARTY
REF: BAGHDAD 2040 AND PREVIOUS
ADDITIONAL MEMBERS OF IRAQI FIRST LADY'S PARTY ARE AS FOLLOWS:

- A. DR. YOUSIF DAUD AL-NAAMAN
DPOB: BAGHDAD, 1923
PASSPORT TYPE AND NUMBER: OFFICIAL [REDACTED]
OCCUPATION: DR. OF MEDICINE
- B. DR. SHAHIB AHMED AZAT
DPOB: BAGHDAD, 1941
PASSPORT TYPE AND NUMBER: REGULAR [REDACTED]
OCCUPATION: DR. OF MEDICINE.

FOIA(b) (2) L
(b) (6)

BODINE

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F96-127/1 #322A

By Amf, NARA, Date 2/8/05

USINT BAGHDAD 1846

DTG:111120Z JUL 81 PSN: 023691
TOR: 192/1637Z

DATE 07/29/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
ROB: KEMP
WHR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS.

MESSAGE:

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F96-12711 # 322B

By Amf, NARA, Date 2/8/05

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHAD #1848 100100Z
O 001017Z JUL 81 ZFFA
FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0006

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 1848

NOIS
R.O. 10000; 008 7/29/81 (MORINE, BARBARA K.) OR-M
TAGO: ASEC, OVIP (MRS. SADDAM HUSSEIN), IZ, US
SUBJ: TRAVEL OF IRAQI FIRST LADY
REF: BAGHDAD 1811

1. (X) ENTIRE TEXT)

2. WFA HAS SENT PASSPORTS OF IRAQI FIRST LADY AND HER PARTY TO USINT FOR VISA PROCESSING. NO FINAL TRAVEL PLANS HAVE BEEN MADE PENDING RECEIPT OF DEPARTMENT'S ANSWER TO REPTEL. PARTY WILL TRANSIT LONDON; BRITISH EMBASSY HAS BEEN INFORMED.

3. FOLLOWING IS PASSPORT DATA ON MRS. SADDAM HUSSEIN AND PARTY:

- A. MRS. SAJIDA KHAIRI AL-NASIRI
BAGHDAD, 1944
DIP. PPT [REDACTED]
WIFE OF PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN
- B. IMAN SALAM JAMIL
BAGHDAD, 1976
DIP. [REDACTED]
DAUGHTER
- C. MONO S. JAMIL
BAGHDAD, 1972
DIP PPT [REDACTED]

FOIA(b)(2) &
(b)(6)

USINT BAGHDAD 1848

DTG: 001017Z JUL 81 P001 000481
TOR: 190/13/82

DATE 07/09/61

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

- D. SON,
D. MUNO SAID AL-BALINI
BAGHDAD, 1956
REG. [REDACTED]
GOVERNMENT DOCTOR (PERSONAL PHYSICIAN)
- E. HUSSAIN K. HASSAN
FIRST SECRETARY
TIKRIT, 1954
DIP. [REDACTED]
PERSONAL STAFF
- F. KAKOUD H. AKFI
ATTACHE
DIP. PPT [REDACTED]
BAGHDAD, 1956
- G. DAHAM JARALLAH MAHMOUD
ATTACHE
BAGHDAD, 1956
DIP PPT [REDACTED]
- H. ANTAR M. ABID
ATTACHE
BAGHDAD, 1956
DIP PPT [REDACTED]
- I. FAIK A. K. YASIN
ATTACHE
BAGHDAD, 1956
DIP PPT [REDACTED]
- J. BANJAT GH. KAHAR
ATTACHE
BAGHDAD, 1956
DIP. PPT [REDACTED]
- K. NIZHIR KH. FAISAL
ATTACHE
BAGHDAD, 1957
DIP PPT [REDACTED]
- L. GHALIA A. NAZZAL
ATTACHE
BAGHDAD, 1956
DIP PPT [REDACTED]
- M. AHMED M. ALI
ATTACHE
BAGHDAD, 1956
DIP PPT [REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (2) +
(b) (6)

(NOTE: ATTACHES MOST PROBABLY BODY GUARDS.
BODINE

USINT BAGHDAD 1646

DTG1091017Z JUL 61 RSN1 020401
TOR1 196/1648Z

~~*****CONFIDENTIAL*****~~

DATE 07/09/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE:00

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER.

USRNT BAGHDAD 1840

DTG:0601017Z JUL 81 PGN:020401
TARI:106/1048Z

~~*****CONFIDENTIAL*****~~

DATE 07/09/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SITE: PUBS
EOB: KEMP
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F96-127/1 # 323

BY snf, NARA, DATE 2/8/05

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHAD #1811 1870710
O 060600Z JUL 81
FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2025

~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 1811

NO DIS

E.O. 12065: RDS 7/6/91 (BODINE, BARBARA K.) OR-M

TAGS: ASEC, OVIP (MRS. SADDAM HUSSEIN), IZ, US

SUBJ: MEDICAL TREATMENT AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR WIFE OF
IRAQI PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. I WAS CALLED TO THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE THIS MORNING, JULY 8, BY TARIQ HAMAD ABDULLAH, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL. SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY GENERAL WISHED TO DISCUSS WHAT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WE COULD PROVIDE THE PRESIDENT'S WIFE, SHOULD SHE TRAVEL TO THE US FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT. BECAUSE OF THE ON-GOING WAR WITH IRAN AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A GROUP ALLIED WITH THE IRANIANS OR OTHERWISE OPPOSED TO THE REGIME ATTEMPTING AN INCIDENT AGAINST MRS. HUSSEIN, THE IRAQIS ARE REQUESTING MAXIMUM SECURITY PRECAUTIONS AND ARRANGEMENTS. THEY HAVE ALSO ASKED THAT INFORMATION ABOUT HER VISIT BE VERY CLOSELY HELD. THEY WERE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT LEAKS TO THE PRESS.

3. CURRENT PLANS ARE FOR MRS. HUSSEIN TO TRAVEL TO THE STATES SOMETIME IN THE MIDDLE OF JULY. SHE WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY A PERSONAL PHYSICIAN, HER VALET AND A BODY GUARD. MAZEN ZAH WI, THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL

USINT BAGHDAD 1811

DTG100600Z JUL 81 PSNI 010279
TORI 187/1021Z

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

DATE 07/09/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

INTERPRETER, WILL PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON HER ITINERARY AND PLANS AS THEY EVOLVE. IRAQINT WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH THE DEPARTMENT ON LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS.

4. ONE POSSIBILITY I DID NOT RAISE WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL, BUT I WOULD PROPOSE FOR THE DEPARTMENT'S CONSIDERATION, IS TO OFFER EITHER BETHESDA OR WALTER REED HOSPITALS. EVEN IF NOT ACCEPTED BY THE IRAQIS, IT WOULD INDICATE OUR WILLINGNESS TO ENSURE HER SAFETY AND TO SEEK TO PROTECT THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF HER VISIT.

5. OUR ABILITY TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THIS REQUEST WILL HAVE OBVIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR POLITICAL RELATIONS. IT WOULD NOT BE THE FIRST TIME ASSISTANCE IN MEDICAL TREATMENT HAS SERVED TO FURTHER IMPROVE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH A ONCE HOSTILE GOVERNMENT.

6. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR GUIDANCE ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND POSSIBILITY THAT A MILITARY MEDICAL FACILITY IN THE WASHINGTON AREA MAY BE MADE AVAILABLE.
BODINE

USINT BAGHDAD 1811

DTG100000Z JUL 81 PSN1 010270
TOR1 187/1021Z

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 07/10/81//191

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE393
UTS6705
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHAD #1705 172112Z
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
D 211117Z JUN 81
FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1975
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 3228
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 2313
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 919
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 643
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ BAGHDAD 1705

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 2 6/21/01 (EAGLETON, WILLIAM L.) DR-M

TAGS: UNSC, MOPS, IZ, IS

SUBJ: IRAQI REACTION TO THE UNSC RESOLUTION AND NEXT STEPS

REF: BAGHDAD 1688

1. ~~18~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AS OF JUNE 21 FOREIGN MINISTER HAMMADI AND HIS PARTY HAD NOT RETURNED TO BAGHDAD. A RESPONSIBLE OFFICIAL AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, HOWEVER, HAS GIVEN US WHAT WE BELIEVE TO BE AN AUTHORITATIVE IRAQI GOVERNMENT REACTION TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE AND RESOLUTION (REFTEL).

[REDACTED] TOLD ME TODAY THAT THE SAME SOURCE, MUHAMMAD SA'ID SAHHAF, HAD GIVEN HIM A SIMILAR POSITIVE READOUT.

3. IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH THE [REDACTED] AMBASSADOR JUNE 20, SAHHAF EXPRESSED GREAT SATISFACTION OVER THE OUTCOME IN NEW YORK. HE HAD SPECIAL PRAISE FOR [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WHO HAD HELPED OVERCOME MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND BROUGHT THE U.S. AND IRAQI DELEGATES TOGETHER IN THE PRESENCE OF SECGEN WALDHEIM.

4. THE IRAQI MEDIA HAVE CONTINUED TO REFLECT HAMMADI'S POST RESOLUTION STATEMENT THAT IRAQ IS DISSATISFIED WITH THE FAILURE OF THE RESOLUTION TO INCLUDE SANCTIONS. IN QUOTING COMMENTS FROM ELSEWHERE IN THE ARAB WORLD THE MEDIA HAS HEAPED BLAME ON THE U.S. AND ITS THREAT OF VETO. ACCORDING TO A WELL INFORMED [REDACTED] EMBASSY SOURCE SOME BAI'ATH PARTY LEADERS HAVE BEEN CRITICAL OF PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSAIN FOR HAVING TAKEN SUCH A MODERATE POSITION ON THE RAID AND THE UNSC RESOLUTION. HENCE, IRAQ'S REACTION MUST BE CAUTIOUS, EVEN THOUGH

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS E96-127/1 #324

By smf, NARA, Date 2/8/05

FOI (1)

FOIA(b) (1)

FOIA(b) (1)

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SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 07/10/81//191

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP MIGHT BE PRIVATELY SATISFIED WITH THE UN OUTCOME, THEY WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO USE IT, FOR EXAMPLE, AS A PRETEXT FOR RESTORING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. ANY ADVANTAGES WE MIGHT GAIN WILL HAVE TO BE LESS VISIBLE FOR THE TIME BEING.

5. RECOMMENDATION: AS THE LARGER PARTNER, DEALING WITH A COUNTRY THAT FEELS IT HAS SACRIFICED TO REACH A COMPROMISE, IT IS APPROPRIATE FOR US TO MAKE THE NEXT GESTURE. A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSAIN WOULD NOT ONLY BE RESPONSIVE TO A SAUDI SUGGESTION, BUT WOULD ALSO HELP ESTABLISH RAPPORT AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL AND FILL IN A PERIOD IN OUR DIALOGUE WITH IRAQ IN WHICH GESTURES AND FORM ARE ALMOST AS IMPORTANT AS SUBSTANCE. SUCH A MESSAGE COULD BE DELIVERED TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HERE IN BAGHDAD, IT COULD, AMONG OTHER THINGS, A) REPEAT OUR CONDEMNATION OF THE ISRAELI RAID, B) REFER TO IRAQIS ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENT AND EXPRESS OUR INTEREST IN PLAYING A ROLE THEREIN, C) REITERATE OUR NEUTRALITY IN THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR AND EMBARGO ON ARMS TO THE COMBATANTS AND OUR HOPE TO SEE A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, AND D) PLEDGE TO WORK WITH COUNTRIES IN THE AREA, INCLUDING IRAQ, TOWARD FINDING JUST AND LASTING SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

EAGLETON

BT

#1705

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SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE179
STU9133
NO RUEHC
DE RUEHAD #1638 1661135
7NY SSSSS ZZH
O 151050Z JUN 81
FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO RUFHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1946
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 3211
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 2305
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 913
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 638
BT

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS F96-127/1 #325
By Amf, NARA, Date 8/8/05

~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 1638

FXDIS

F.O. 12065: RDS -1,2,3 6/15/01 (EAGLETON, WILLIAM L.) OR-M

TAGS: UN, IZ

SUBJ: UNSC DEVELOPMENT AND CONCERNS IN BAGHDAD

1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. [REDACTED] AMBASSADOR [REDACTED] CAME BY MORNING JUNE 15 TO EXCHANGE VIEWS AND SHARE HIS CONCERN OVER THE TREND OF DEVELOPMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING. [REDACTED] REPORTING HAS INDICATED A HARDENING OF THE U.S. POSITION IN NEW YORK, INCLUDING OUR OPPOSITION TO SEPARATE RESOLUTIONS COVERING CONDEMNATION AND SANCTIONS. AT THE SAME TIME THE [REDACTED] HAVE INDICATIONS THAT IN THE FACE OF OUR POSITION IRAQ WOULD PRESS ON WITH SANCTIONS IN A WAY THAT WILL ISOLATE ISRAEL AND ITS REMAINING WESTERN FRIENDS. HE WAS CONCERNED THAT [REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (1)

FOIA(b) (1)

[REDACTED] HE SAW NO WAY OUT OF THE DILEMMA UNLESS THE U.S. CAN FIND SOME WAY TO SATISFY MINIMUM IRAQI AND ARAB REQUIREMENTS.

3. THE AMBASSADOR WAS TOLD BY ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER ALWAN THAT SADDAM HUSSAIN IS PERSONALLY EXTREMELY BITTER ABOUT THE ISRAELI ATTACK. [REDACTED] HAVE HEARD FROM ANOTHER SOURCE THAT SADDAM HUSSAIN VISITED THE TUWAITHA PROJECT SEVERAL DAYS AFTER THE ISRAELI ATTACK AND WEPT WHEN HE SAW THE EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE. AT THE SAME TIME HE REPORTEDLY ORDERED THE RELEASE OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT PERSONNEL WHO HAD BEEN DETAINED BECAUSE OF THEIR POOR SHOWING AGAINST THE ISRAELI ATTACK. SADDAM REPORTEDLY SAID THAT NO ONE COULD HAVE DONE ANYTHING AGAINST THE ISRAELI PLANES AND THEIR ADVANCED U.S.

FOIA(b) (1)

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

TECHNOLOGY.

4. IRAQI MEDIA REACTION IN BAGHDAD REMAINS RESTRAINED, WHICH PERHAPS DOES NOT ACCURATELY REFLECT THE DEPTH OF IRAQI FEELING. THIS WAS INITIALLY DIRECTED AT ISRAEL, BUT IF IT BECOMES CLEAR THAT WHAT IRAQIS CONSIDER TO BE THEIR IRONCLAD LEGAL AND MORAL CASE AGAINST ISRAEL IS NOT BEING DEALT WITH SERIOUSLY BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND PARTICULARLY BY THE U.S., WE MUST EXPECT THEIR BITTERNESS TO FOCUS ON ISRAEL'S SUPPORTERS.

5. I AGAIN RECOMMEND THAT A MEETING BE SET UP BETWEEN ONE OF OUR SENIOR PEOPLE FROM WASHINGTON AND IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER HAMMADI. EVEN IF WE CANNOT SATISFY THE ARABS ON SANCTIONS, WE CAN EXPRESS OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE ISRAELI RAID AND SHOW OUR INTEREST IN IRAQ'S SECURITY, LEGITIMATE SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENT, AND A JUST PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. EAGLETON

BT

#1638

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SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

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HCE134
STU2809
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHAD #1607 1621510
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 111500Z JUN 81
FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1930
BT

N F96-127/1 #326

BY and, .. 2/8/05

~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 1607

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS 1 6/11/01 (EAGLETON, WILLIAM L.) OR-M

TAGS: US, IZ

SUBCONVERSATION WITH SADDAM HUSSAIN'S INTERPRETER, MAXEN ZAHAWI

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSAIN'S ENGLISH LANGUAGE INTERPRETER, MAZEN ZAHAWI, CAME TO THE RESIDENCE FOR A PRIVATE LUNCH JUNE 11. ZAHAWI WAS IN HIGH SPIRITS, REFLECTING THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP SATISFACTION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT IRAQ IS RECEIVING IN THE WAKE OF THE ISRAELI RAID ON ITS NUCLEAR FACILITY. HE INDICATED THAT THE POLITICAL ADVANTAGES TO BE GAINED BY IRAQ OUTWEIGHTED THE LOSS OF THE OSIRAK REACTOR WHICH WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN USED FOR MUCH ANYWAY. NEVERTHELESS, IRAQ WAS NOW MORE THAN EVER DETERMINED TO CONTINUE ITS NUCLEAR RESEARCH PROGRAM, THOUGH THEY WERE STUDYING HOW SUCH A PROGRAM COULD BE PROTECTED, POLITICALLY OR MILITARILY, FROM FURTHER ISRAELI ATTACKS.

3. OUR WIDE RANGING CONVERSATION TOUCHED ON IRAN, ABOUT WHICH ZAHAWI POSED QUESTIONS TO WHICH I HAD FEW ANSWERS. THE IRAQIS HAD PREFERRED BANI-SADR BUT ARE TAKING SOME CONSOLATION IN THE HOPE THAT, WITH THE MULLAHS IN CHARGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, IRAQ'S MILITARY PROBLEMS WILL DECREASE. OF THE IRANIAN OPPOSITION LEADERS, IRAQ'S LEADERS HAVE THE HIGHEST REGARD FOR THE MEHDI BAZERGAN.

4. THE CENTRAL THEME OF ZAHAWI'S REMARKS WAS THAT THIS IS A CRITICAL MOMENT AND ONE THAT PROVIDES GREAT OPPORTUNITIES- FOR U.S.-IRAQI RELATIONS. HE INDICATED THAT THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP WAS SATISFIED THUS FAR WITH THE U.S. REACTION, INCLUDING OUR STATEMENTS AND THE DECISION NOT TO DELIVER THE FOUR F-16'S. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS WAS PROBABLY A TEMPORARY SUSPENSION "LIKE THE BOEING'S FOR IRAQ." ZAHAWI REITERATED ARGUMENTS HE HAD USED IN THE PAST TO THE EFFECT THAT IRAQ, UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF SADDAM HUSSAIN,

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

WOULD PLAY AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. IRAQ, HE SAID, COULD BE A RELIABLE PARTNER FOR THE U.S. THOUGH IT WOULD NOT BE IN THE INTEREST OF EITHER COUNTRY FOR IRAQ TO BE A "U.S. LACKEY." HE HAD BEEN WITH SADDAM HUSSAIN WHEN HE HAD ASSURED LORD GEORGE BROWN THAT IRAQ WOULD RECEIVE A HIGH RANKING U.S. EMISSARY WITH ALL APPROPRIATE HONORS. HE IMPLIED THAT THIS WAS A SIGNAL FROM THE PRESIDENT THAT HE WANTED TO RECEIVE SUCH AN EMISSARY. ZAHAWI ALSO REITERATED IRAQ'S DESIRE TO DISTANCE ITSELF FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND PURSUE A GENUINELY NON-ALIGNED POLICY.

5. ZAHAWI SAID THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP WOULD BE WATCHING U.S. STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND DURING SUBSEQUENT DAYS FOR SIGNS THAT WE WERE DEVELOPING POLICIES IN THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST AND NOT AUTOMATICALLY SUPPORTING ISRAEL. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE WERE LIMITS TO HOW FAR WE COULD GO. HE DID NOT EXPECT A LESSENING OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL'S SECURITY OR A BAN ON ARMS FOR ISRAEL. WHAT HE SEEMED TO BE ASKING FOR WAS A CLEAR INDICATION, BACKED BY DECISIONS SUCH AS THE ONE TO SUSPEND DELIVERY OF THE F-16'S, THAT THE U.S. WAS SERIOUS ABOUT ITS CONDEMNATION OF THE ISRAELI RAID.

6. I CALLED ZAHAWI'S ATTENTION TO SOME OF THE CONSTRAINTS ON OUR ABILITY TO SATISFY IRAQ'S MAXIMUM DESIRES, BUT RECIPROCATED HIS HOPE THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ISRAELI RAID THERE WOULD BE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR OUR TWO COUNTRIES TO DRAW CLOSER TOGETHER. HE SAID THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP UNDERSTOOD THAT ISRAEL HOPED IRAQ WOULD REACT HASTILY AND ANTAGONIZE POTENTIAL FRIENDS. IRAQ WAS ON ITS GUARD AND WOULD NOT PLAY INTO ISRAEL'S HANDS. THERE WAS NO NEED TO RETALIATE AGAINST THE ISRAELI RAID. INSTEAD IRAQ WOULD WAIT AND FIND OTHER WAYS.

7. COMMENT: IN TALKING TO ZAHAWI IT IS ALWAYS DIFFICULT TO SEPARATE OUT POSSIBLE HIGH LEVEL "MESSAGES" FROM ZAHAWI'S PERSONAL BELIEFS AND SPECULATION. IN THIS CASE I BELIEVE ZAHAWI WAS CONVEYING A MESSAGE. HE OBSERVED SEVERAL TIMES THAT I WAS THE ONLY DIPLOMAT IN BAGHDAD WHO HAD THIS INFORMAL ACCESS TO THE PRESIDENCY. THIS, HE SAID, WE SHOULD TAKE SERIOUSLY. HE DID NOT ASK FOR ANYTHING SPECIFIC OR MAKE ANY COMMITMENT RE THE RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. THE MESSAGE, HOWEVER, WAS CLEARLY THAT THIS WAS AN OPPORTUNITY THAT MIGHT NOT OCCUR FOR A LONG TIME. I HAVE NO RECOMMENDATION OTHER THAN THAT WE SHOULD BE ALERT FOR OPPORTUNITIES DURING THIS PERIOD TO STRENGTHEN

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

OUR POSITION IN IRAQ. MEETINGS WITH HAMMADI AND MEMBERS
OF HIS DELEGATION IN NEW YORK WOULD GIVE US AN OPPORTUN-
ITY TO EXPRESS OUR CONCERN FOR IRAQ'S LEGITIMATE
INTERESTS, AND EXPAND OUR CONTACTS AND DIALOGUE.

FAGLETON

RT

#1607

NNNN

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE116
STU2481
DD RUFHC
DE RUFHAD #1606 1621444
7NY SSSSS ZZH
O 111440Z JUN 81
FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1929
BT

DECLAS .F. LEASD

NLS F96-127/1 #327

BY amf,

2/8/05

~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 1606

FXDIS

F.O. 12065: RDS 1,2,4 6/11/01 (EAGLETON, WILLIAM L.) DR3M

TAGSLC PAXR, MILI, MOP, IZ, PDDC, US

SUBJ: TRANSMITTAL OF THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE TO FOREIGN MINISTER
HAMMADI

REF: STATE 151386

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. AT 1300 JUNE 11 I CALLED ON HEAD OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, MUHAMMAD SAID AL-SAHHAF, TO TRANSMIT THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE TO HAMMADI. SAHHAF READ THE MESSAGE WITH APPARENT SATISFACTION AND SAID HE WOULD BRING IT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE MINISTER WHO WAS ABOUT TO LEAVE FOR THE ARAB LEAGUE FOREIGN MINISTER'S MEETING.

3. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTIONS, SAHHAF INDICATED THAT IRAQ WAS PLEASED WITH THE WIDESPREAD DENUNCIATION OF THE ISRAELI RAID, INCLUDING THAT OF THE U.S. HE WAS ALSO AWARE OF OUR DECISION TO SUSPEND DELIVERY OF THE FOUR F-16'S FOR ISRAEL. HE SAID IRAQ WOULD NOW BE SEEKING TO GIVE SOME SUBSTANCE TO WORLD OPINION WHICH WAS MOBILIZED AGAINST THE ISRAELI RAID.

4. I OBSERVED THAT WHILE WE FELT STRONGLY ABOUT THE RAID AND HAD DENOUNCED IT, IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR US TO CONSIDER PUNITIVE MEASURES THAT WOULD AFFECT ISRAEL'S SECURITY. SAHHAF SEEMED TO ANTICIPATE THAT THIS WOULD BE THE U.S. POSITION. AT THE SAME TIME HE APPARENTLY ACCEPTED OUR ASSURANCES THAT THE U.S. HAD NOT BEEN AWARE OF THE RAID BEFOREHAND. HE ALSO INDICATED THAT THE IRAQIS ARE EXPECTING STATES OTHER THAN THE U.S. TO PROVIDE MATERIAL EVIDENCE OF THEIR DISAPPROVAL OF THE ISRAELI ACTION.

5. SAHHAF OBSERVED THAT ALL ARAB STATES WOULD BE REPRESENTED AT THE CURRENT MEETING IN BAGHDAD. HE THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE SOME CLOSING OF ARAB RANKS THERE.

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, EXPECT THE MEETING TO HAVE MUCH EFFECT ON THE WAR WITH IRAN GIVEN THE CHAOTIC NATURE OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN TEHRAN. HE SAID HAMMADI AND HIS DELEGATION WOULD ALL ARRIVE IN NEW YORK AS A GROUP ON FRIDAY BEFORE THE AFTERNOON MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

FAGLETON

BT

#1606

NNNN

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE672
STU9582
OO RUEHC
DE RUFHAD #1582 1611145
7NY CCCCC ZZH
O P 101122Z JUN 81
FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1917
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 3200
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 447
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 3567
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 2476
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 164
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 2299
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 906
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1083
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 431
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 906
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 136
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 628
RUFHAU/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 089

DECLASSIFIED PART
NLS F96-12711 # 328
By Amf, NLS, 2/8/05

BT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 1582
FXDIS

F.O. 12065: RDS-1 6/10/01 (EAGLETON, WILLIAM L.) DR-M
TAGS: MNUC, TNUC, PARM, SCSA, MILI, MOPS, IS, IZ, FR
SUBJ: DAMAGE AT IRAQI NUCLEAR FACILITY

1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS FOR THE MOST PART PROVIDED BY [REDACTED] (PROTECT), BY GOOD FORTUNE, ONLY FOUR FRENCH TECHNICIANS WERE IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA OF THE OSIRAK REACTOR WHEN IT WAS ATTACKED BY ISRAELI AIRCRAFT. ONE OF THEM WHO WAS "DOWN VERY DEEP" WAS KILLED BY FUMES. A NUMBER OF IRAQIS WERE INJURED BUT ALL ARE NOW OUT OF HOSPITAL.
3. RADIOACTIVE FUEL RODS HAD NOT BEEN INSERTED INTO THE REACTOR BUT WERE STORED IN A SEPARATE FACILITY WHICH WAS LOCKED. GEIGER COUNTER CHECK DISCLOSED NO RADIOACTIVITY IN THE AREA.
4. ABOUT 150 FRENCH TECHNICIANS (IN ADDITION TO 96 ITALIAN TECHNICIANS AT THEIR SEPARATE FACILITY) HAD RETURNED TO IRAQ A LITTLE MORE THAN A MONTH AGO TO RENEW THEIR WORK ON THE REACTOR. [REDACTED] IMPLIED THAT COMPLETION WAS STILL SEVERAL MONTHS AWAY,

FOIA(b) (1)

FOIA(b) (1)

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

BUT WE NOTE THIS IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH OTHER INFORMATION.
SUNDAY WAS A NORMAL WORK DAY BUT BY 6:30 P.M. NEARLY EVERYONE
HAD RETURNED TO THE NEARBY CAMP.

5. WHEN I ASKED WHETHER WORK WOULD RESUME AT THE SITE
THE AMBASSADOR INDICATED THERE WAS NOT MUCH LEFT TO
WORK WITH AND IN ANY CASE NO FRENCHMAN WOULD BE REMAINING
THERE WHILE A WAR WAS STILL ON. HE DID NOT WISH TO
SPECULATE ABOUT THE FRENCH ATTITUDE AFTER THAT.



EAGLETON

FOIA(b) (1)

BT
#1582
NNNN

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

RCE949
STU4888
NO RUEHC
DE RUEHAD #1560 1891900
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 081845Z JUN 81 ZFF-4
FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO RUFHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1904
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 3195
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKAR 695
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 38
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 2195
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 332
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 444
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 3564
RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1045
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 3564
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 2473
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 740
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 2296
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 3108
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 901
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1080
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 768
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1212
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 425
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 621
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 86
RT

DECLASS: RT

NLS F96-127/1 #329

By AW, ... 2/8/05

~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 1560

FXDIS

F.O. 12065; RDS -1,3 6/8/01 (EALGETON, WILLIAM L) DR-M

TAGS: MOPS MILI IS, IS

SUBJ: IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER RE ISRAELI RAID ON NUCLEAR FACILITY

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER SA'ADUN HAMMADI CALLED ME TO THE MINISTRY AT 1900 JUNE 8. I TOOK NOTES SO FOLLOWING REPORT IS ALMOST VERBATIM, MINUS REPETITIONS.

3. HAMMADI SAID THAT WHEN IRAQ'S NUCLEAR INSTALLATION WAS ATTACHED YESTERDAY IRAQI SUSPECTED ISREAL. NOW ISRAEL HAS ANNOUNCED THAT ITS AIR FORCE CARRIED OUT THE RAID. THIS IS A VERY DANGEROUS AND GRAVE INCIDENT, IRAQ HAS NO BORDER WITH ISRAEL AND THERE IS "NO ACTIVE WAR BETWEEN

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

US." ISRAEL IS USING ITS AIR FORCE TO REACH WHEREVER IT WISHES.

4. HAMMADI CONTINUED THAT THE NUCLEAR PLANT COST IRAQ CONSIDERABLE RESOURCES IN ITS MODEST PROGRAM FOR THE PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY. IRAQ HAS SIGNED THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. HAMMADI SAID I WAS THE FIRST FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVE HE HAD CALLED IN BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES HAS A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY. THE UNITED STATES HAS ALWAYS SAID THAT IT WISHED TO MAINTAIN PEACE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF JUSTICE. THE IRAQIS KNOW OF THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE U.S. AND ISRAEL AND THEY KNOW THAT WHEN THE U.S. HAS WISHED ISRAEL TO REFRAIN FROM CERTAIN ACTIONS IT HAS DONE SO. IT IS THE IRAQI EVALUATION THAT IF THE UNITED STATES HAD WANTED TO RESTRAIN ISRAEL FROM SUCH AN ACTION, IT COULD HAVE DONE SO.

5. HAMMADI ADDED THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS IMPORTANT INTERESTS IN THE AREA ALONG WITH SPECIAL RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL WHICH INCLUDE THE PRACTICE OF CONTINUOUS CONSULTATIONS. U.S. AWACS COVER THE AREA. ISRAEL WOULD NOT TAKE SUCH ACTION WITHOUT CONSULTING THE UNITED STATES.

6. HAMMADI CONCLUDED HIS OPENING STATEMENT WITH A REFERENCE TO IRAQ'S WILLINGNESS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS. IRAQI HAS SHOWN GOOD WILL. NOW THAT SUCH A THING HAS HAPPENED IRAQ WISHES TO EXPRESS ITS SERIOUS CONCERN TO THE UNITED STATES.

7. I THANKED THE MINISTER FOR USING THIS CHANNEL TO BRING AN IMPORTANT MATTER TO THE ATTENTION OF THE USG. I SAID I EXPECTED AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT ON THE RAID OUT OF WASHINGTON. MEANWHILE, I COULD OFFICIALLY ASSURE THE MINISTER THAT UNITED STATES HAD NO FORE KNOWLEDGE OF THE RAID. IT WOULD BE A SERIOUS MISTAKE IF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT CALCULATED OTHERWISE. THE U.S. TOO CONSIDERS THE RAID A SERIOUS DEVELOPMENT. AMONG OTHER THINGS IT HAS COME AT AN INOPPORTUNE TIME WHEN WE WERE MAKING A MAJOR EFFORT TO DEFUSE THE CRISIS IN LEBANON. I PROMISED TO CONVEY THE MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO WASHINGTON.

8. HAMMADI SAID THAT EVEN SUPPOSING THAT ISRAEL DID NOT CONSULT THE UNITED STATES AHEAD OF TIME,

[REDACTED] I OBSERVED THAT EVEN IF WE HAD HAD INDICATIONS OF SUCH FLIGHTS WE WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN IN A POSITION TO DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT.

9. IN CONCLUSION, HAMMADI SAID IRAQ WOULD CALL FOR AN URGENT MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IRAQ HOPES THE U.S. WILL SUPPORT THIS CALL AND OPPOSE THE OBVIOUS ACT OF AGGRESSION. HE HAD PREFERRED TO CALL US IN

FOIA(b)(1)

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

AHEAD OF TIME SINCE WE HAD INDICATED OUR DESIRE TO ESTABLISH FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH COUNTRIES IN THE AREA. "IRAQ TOO IS LOOKING FOR FRIENDS BUT THIS IS A VERY SERIOUS DEVELOPMENT."

10. ON RETURNING TO THE RESIDENCE I WAS TOLD BY A STAFF MEMBER THAT THE VOICE OF AMERICA HAD JUST CARRIED A STATEMENT CONDEMNING THE ISRAELI ATTACK AND REFERRING TO THE POSSIBLE USE OF U.S. EQUIPMENT. I PHONED HAMMADI AND FOUND THAT HE HAD ALREADY BEEN TOLD OF THE REPORT. HE WAS TROUBLED BY OUR SUGGESTION THAT THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN SOME RADIATION FROM THE DAMAGED REACTOR SINCE THIS COULD "CAUSE CONFUSION". HE COULD ASSURE US THERE WAS NO RADIATION.

11. COMMENT: IRAQI REACTION THUS FAR IS THE BEST WE COULD HOPE FOR. A STATEMENT BY THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL WHICH HAS JUST BEEN CARRIED ON IRAQI RADIO DID NOT MENTION THE UNITED STATES BUT INSTEAD RELATED THE ISRAELI ATTACK TO THE CONFLICT WITH IRAN. I SUGGEST THAT THE HEAD OF THE IRAQ INTERESTS SECTION IN WASHINGTON BE CALLED IN AT A HIGH LEVEL AND GIVEN THE OFFICIAL UNITED STATES REACTION. IT WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL HERE IF I COULD HAVE A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO CONVEY TO FOREIGN MINISTER HAMMADI.
FAGLETON.

BT

#1560

NNNN

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE783
STU4060
DD RUEHC
DE RUEHAD #1559 1591125
7NY SSSSS ZZH
O 081116Z JUN 81 ZFF4
FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1903
BT

DECLASSIFIED REPORT
NLS F96-187/L #390
By SM, NARA, Date 2/8/05

~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 1559
MODIS:

F.O. 12065: RDS -1,3 6/8/01 (EAGLETON, WILLIAM L.) DR-M
TAGS: MOPS, MILI, IS, IZ
SUBJ: ISRAELI ATTACK ON IRAQI NUCLEAR FACILITY (SECOND MESSAGE
THIS CHANNEL)

A) STATE 148548, B) BAGHDAD 1551

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AS REPORTED SEPTEL, AS OF 1400 JUNE 8, THERE HAS BEEN NO VISIBLE IRAQI REACTION TO YESTERDAY'S ISRAELI ATTACK ON TUWAITHA. WHEN I SAW [REDACTED] AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY THIS MORNING ON OTHER MATTERS, HE SEEMED GENUINELY PUZZLED ABOUT "WHAT ALL THE FIREWORKS WERE LAST NIGHT" AND OTHERWISE SEEMED IN FINE SPIRITS EXHIBITING HIS USUAL PERSONAL FRIENDSHIP AND WARM FEELINGS TOWARDS THE U.S. A PHONE CALL FROM [REDACTED]

FOIA(b)(1)

[REDACTED] AT 9 A.M. LIKEWISE WAS ROUTINE AS HE ACCEPTED MY INVITATION TO LUNCH ON THURSDAY. WE CAN ASSUME, HOWEVER, THAT THE TOP LEVEL OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT IS NOW AWARE OF THE ISRAELI ORIGIN OF THE ATTACK, IS EXTREMELY ANGRY AND FRUSTRATED BY IT AND IS CONSIDERING WHAT THE IRAQI REACTION SHOULD BE.

FOIA(b)(1)

3. AT USINT WE HAVE TAKEN SECURITY PRECAUTIONS THOUGH WE THINK IT UNLIKELY THAT WE WOULD BE AN IMMEDIATE TARGET IN ANY IRAQI REACTION. NEVERTHELESS, THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP WILL PLACE A GOOD PART OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE RAID ON THE U.S. WHATEVER WE SAY AND BASE THIS ON ISRAEL'S USE OF ADVANCED U.S. AIR TO GROUND WEAPONS, CONSISTENT U.S. SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL, AND A DEEP SUSPICION THAT THE U.S. EITHER STIMULATED THE ATTACK OR ACQUIESED IN IT.

4. ALTHOUGH NOTHING WE CAN SAY WILL COMPLETELY DISSIPATE IRAQI SUSPICIONS AND RESENTMENT, IT IS IMPORTANT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF OUR SECURITY HERE AS WELL AS FOR AMERICANS ELSEWHERE IN THE AREA THAT AS SOON AS ISRAELI RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE RAID BECOMES KNOWN, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT DO EVERYTHING

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

POSSIBLE TO DISASSOCIATE OURSELVES FROM THE ISRAELI ACTION.
AS [REDACTED] SAID THIS MORNING, "YOU HAD
BETTER MAKE AN EARLY AND STRONG DENUNCIATION OF THE RAID
IF YOU WANT TO PROTECT U.S. INTERESTS HERE."
5. DEPARTMENT REPEAT AS APPROPRIATE. EAGLETON
BT
#1559
NNNN

FOIA(b)(1)

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE888
STU4689
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHAD #1558 1591132
7NY SSSSS ZZH
O 081114Z JUN 81
FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1902
INFO RUOMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 1044
RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 616
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 3194
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 694
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 037
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 443
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 3563
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 2472
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE 739
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 161
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 182
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 2295
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 297
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 3107
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 900
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 139
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1079
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT IMMEDIATE 767
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 620
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1211
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 382
RUEHRD/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 424
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 901
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 133
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 559
RUFHAU/AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 085

BT

~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 1558

F.O. 12065: XDS-1 66/8/01 (EAGLETON, WILLIAM L.) DR-M

TAGS: PEPR, IS, IZ

SUBJ: ATTACK ON IRAQI NUCLEAR FACILITY

1. (S) - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAS THUS FAR (1400 HOURS)

JUNE 8 REMAINED SILENT RE AN ATTACK ON THE IRAQI NUCLEAR FACILITY AT TUWAITHA NEAR BAGHDAD AT 1830, JUNE 7.

STREET RUMORS ATTRIBUTE THE AIR RAID ALERT, WHICH WAS

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F96-127/1 #331

BY smf,

2/8/05

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

FOLLOWED AN HOUR LATER BY ANTI-AIRCRAFT MACHINE GUN-FIRE, VARIOUSLY TO THE IRANIANS, THE ISRAELIS, THE SHIA DAWA PARTY, OR IRAQI IMAGINATION. WE KNOW FROM THE ITALIAN AND FRENCH EMBASSIES, HOWEVER, THAT BOMBS FELL ON OR NEAR THE NUCLEAR REACTOR NOW UNDER CONSTRUCTION BY THE FRENCH.

3. PRIMARY SOURCE OF THE FOLLOWING IS THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR (PROTECT): 96 ITALIANS ARE NORMALLY AT THE SITE, THOUGH MOST OF THEM WERE NOT WORKING AT THE TIME OF THE ATTACK. ALL ARE ACCOUNTED FOR. THEY HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT THE ITALIAN LABORATORIES WERE NOT DAMAGED, BUT THEY HAVE NOT YET BEEN ALLOWED TO RETURN TO INSPECT THEM.

4. THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR WAS TOLD BY THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR THAT ONE FRENCH TECHNICIAN IS MISSING, MAJOR BOMB DAMAGE APPARENTLY HAVING BEEN IN THE AREA OF THE FRENCH PROJECT. THE REACTOR WAS NOT YET OPERATIONAL AND INITIAL TESTS INDICATE THERE HAS BEEN NO RADIATION.

6. IT APPEARS THAT THUS FAR ONLY A FEW PERSONS IN THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT ARE AWARE OF WHAT HAPPENED, THOUGH THE NEWS WILL SOON FILTER OUT LOCALLY AND PROBABLY BE PICKED UP THROUGH INDUSTRY SOURCES IN ROME AND PARIS. THERE HAS BEEN NO DISCERNABLE POPULAR REACTION AS YET.
FAGLETON

BT

#1558

NNNN

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

D CLASSIFIED / RELEASED

MESSAGE:

HCE660
STU3189
OO RUFHC
DE RUEHAD #1551 1590650
7NY SSSSS ZZH
O 080647Z JUN 81 ZFF4
FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1901
BT

F96-127/1 # 332

E inf, TE 2/8/85

~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 1551

NODIS

F.O. 12065: XDS-2,3 6/7/01 (EAGLETON, WILLIAM L.) DR-M

TAGS: PFPR, IS, IR

SUBJ: ISRAELI ATTACK ON IRAQI NUCLEAR FACILITY

REF: STATE 148548

1. *IS* - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. UNTIL WE RECEIVED REFTTEL, WE COULD ONLY SPECULATE THAT RAID, WHICH FROM BAGHDAD APPEARED TO BE IN THE DIRECTION OF THE IRAQI NUCLEAR FACILITY AT TUWAITHA, WAS THE WORK OF ISRAELI PLANES. RAID OCCURRED AT 6:25 P.M. LOCAL TIME AND DID NOT APPEAR TO ATTRACT ANY SAM'S OR ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE. HOWEVER, AN HOUR LATER DURING THE ITALIAN NATIONAL DAY RECEPTION BY THE TIGRIS, THERE WAS A 15-MINUTE DISPLAY OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT MACHINE GUN TRACERS FIRING AT NO APPARENT TARGETS.

3. IRAQI MEDIA HAVE NOT MENTIONED THE RAID. FROM OUR LOCAL EMPLOYEES, WE UNDERSTAND THE WORD IS ABOUT THAT SEVEN ISRAELI PLANES WERE INVOLVED. ONE RUMOR HAS IT THAT A BRIDGE ON THE BAGHDAD-CTESIPHON ROAD WAS HIT. WE HAVE NOT YET HEARD LOCAL RUMORS OF DAMAGE TO TUWAITHA.

4. WE ARE IN THE PROCESS OF CHECKING WITH FRENCH AND ITALIAN EMBASSIES. FIRST REPORT FROM ITALIAN AMBASSADOR IS THAT NO FRENCH OR ITALIANS WERE CASUALTIES, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE SOME IRAQI CASUALTIES. APPARENTLY SOME PART OF THE NUCLEAR FACILITY WAS HIT, THOUGH WE HAVE NO DETAILS YET ON DAMAGE.

5. WE ARE TAKING APPROPRIATE INTERNAL SECURITY MEASURES. WE HAVE DISCUSSED THE ISRAELI RAID ONLY WITH THE BRITISH WHO CAME TO US AFTER HAVING BEEN INFORMED BY LONDON.

6. DEPARTMENT REPEAT AS APPROPRIATE.

EAGLETON

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SELECTED SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/19/81//170

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE584
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1890
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~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 1519

FXDIS

F.O. 12065: RDS-1 6/4/01 (EAGLETON, WILLIAM L.) DR-M
TAGS: PEPR, MASS, US, IZ
SUBJ: U.S. POLICY ON ARMS SALES AND TRANSFERS TO IRAQ AND
IRAN

REF: A. BAGHDAD 1446; B. STATE 143542

1. ~~IS~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. DURING A MEETING WITH THE HEAD OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT, MUHAMMAD SA'ID AL-SAHHAF, JUNE 4 I DREW ON STATE REFTEL TO REAFFIRM THE U.S. POSITION PROHIBITING THE SALE OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO IRAQ OR IRAN. I REFERRED TO THE ACTIVITIES OF PRIVATE ARMS MERCHANTS WHO WERE VERY LIKELY CONTACTING BOTH IRAQ AND IRAN AND GIVING FALSE IMPRESSIONS OF U.S. ARMS POLICY IN THEIR PURSUIT OF ADVANTAGEOUS DEALS. I EMPHASIZED THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT SHOULD TAKE CARE IN CONTACTS WITH SUCH INDIVIDUALS AND NOT MISUNDERSTAND U.S. POLICY IN THIS REGARD. SAHHAF TOOK COPIOUS NOTES AND SAID HE WOULD REPORT OUR CONVERSATION IN FULL TO TARIQ AZIZ.

3. DURING THE SAME CONVERSATION, I ASKED SAHHAF WHETHER THERE WAS ANYTHING NEW IN IRAQ'S EFFORT TO END THE WAR WITH IRAN. HE REPLIED THAT THERE SEEMED TO BE CONSIDERABLE OPTIMISM AMONG DELEGATES AT THE ISLAMIC FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFERENCE, THOUGH HE CONCEDED THAT THE ISLAMIC EFFORT MIGHT BE AT LEAST TEMPORARILY SET BACK BY IRANIAN WARNINGS THEY WOULD NOT DEAL WITH COUNTRIES WHICH ATTENDED THE CONFERENCE. HE SAID THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAD REPORTS FROM TEHRAN INDICATING SOME GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN THE IRANIAN POSITION. THEY ALSO HAD REPORTS THAT MANY IRANIAN MILITARY OFFICERS WERE "BECOMING BORED WITH THE WAR." HE THOUGH ALL OF THIS PROVIDED SOME GROUNDS FOR OPTIMISM. YET THE PROBLEM REMAINS THAT THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT DOES NOT SEEM TO BE SUFFICIENTLY ORGANIZED TO REACH A SETTLEMENT.

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NLS F96-127/1 #333

BY anf,

TE 2/8/05

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DATE 06/01/81//152

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

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MESSAGE:

NLS. F96-127/1 4334

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DE RUEHAD #1446 1481303
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 281255Y MAY 81
FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1853
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 3178
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 892
BT

BY smf,

DATE 2/8/05

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 BAGHDAD 1446
EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS 1 5/28/01 (EAGLETON, WILLIAM L.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, US, IZ

SUBJ: MEETING WITH TARIQ AZIZ

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: IN A MEETING WITH RCC IDEOLOGUE AND FOREIGN POLICY SPOKESMAN TARIQ AZIZ, BOTH SIDES EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR EFFORTS TO PROMOTE BETTER US-IRAQI RELATIONS. TARIQ AZIZ GAVE THE IMPRESSION IRAQ WOULD MOVE QUICKLY TO RESTORE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IF A NEW US MIDDLE EAST POLICY WAS, IN THE IRAQI'S VIEW, MORE BALANCED. HE WELCOMED AN INCREASE IN US-IRAQI TRADE AND WIDER CONTACTS IN GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTORS. HE SUGGESTED CONCENTRATING ON PROMOTING US-IRAQI UNDERSTANDING AS A PRELUDE TO DETAILED DISCUSSIONS OF THORNY ISSUES SUCH AS THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. HE SAID USINT'S REQUEST TO OPERATE A TRANSMITTER TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE DEPARTMENT WOULD BE APPROVED. IN CONCLUSION, HE ASKED THAT I CO VY HIS PERSONAL BEST WISHES TO SECRETARY HAIG ALONG WITH IRAQ'S DESIRE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS. END SUMMARY.

3. HAVING MADE THE REQUEST FOLLOWING MY RETURN FROM WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS, ON MAY 28 I HAD A ONE-AND-A-HALF HOUR MEETING WITH RCC MEMBER TARIQ AZIZ. THIS IS HIGHEST LEVEL IN THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT OUR BAGHDAD MISSION HAS MET WITH SINCE THE 1967 BREAK IN RELATIONS. TARIQ AZIZ HAS CONSIDERABLY MORE CLOUT WITHIN IRAQI'S LEADERSHIP THAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAMMADI AND IS THE HIGHEST LEVEL SPOKESMAN ON FOREIGN POLICY AFTER SADDAM HUSSAIN. AS AN IRAQI CHRISTIAN, HE IS NO THREAT TO THE LATER AS HE COULD NOT ASPIRE TO SUPREME LEADERSHIP.

4. AFTER OPENING PLEASANTRIES, TARIQ AZIZ SUGGESTED

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THAT I BEGIN WITH A DESCRIPTION OF THE ATMOSPHERE IN WASHINGTON. I EXPLAINED IN SOME DETAIL THE APPROACH OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION, EMPHASIZING CONSTANCY, RELIABILITY AND BALANCE AND A DETERMINATION TO STRENGTHEN U.S. ARMED FORCES AND PLAY AN APPROPRIATE ROLE IN OPPOSING SOVIET DESIGNS, PARTICULARLY IN THE THIRD WORLD. I ALSO DESCRIBED THE CENTRAL POSITION OF THE TERRORISM ISSUE IN U.S. ATTITUDES. I REFERRED TO SECRETARY HAIG'S RECENT VISIT TO THE MIDDLE EAST AND REPEATED SOME OF THE BRIEFING GIVEN FOREIGN MINISTER HAMMADI BY DAS DRAPER. I EXPRESSED THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S SATISFACTION WITH THE POSITIVE TREND IN U.S.-IRAQI RELATIONS. NOTING THAT WE DID NOT BELIEVE IT WAS NORMAL FOR THESE RELATIONS TO REMAIN SEVERED, I EMPHASIZED THAT WE DID NOT WISH TO PRESSURE THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT ON THIS ISSUE AND THAT MEANWHILE THERE WAS MUCH TO BE DONE WITHIN THE EXISTING FRAMEWORK. I DESCRIBED OUR NEUTRAL POLICY ON THE IRAQ-IRAN CONFLICT, WHICH CAUSED US TO REFRAIN FROM SELLING TO OR LICENSING ARMS FOR EITHER SIDE. I SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THE IRAQI CONCERN OVER HELICOPTER DELIVERIES FROM ITALY, NOTING THAT THESE LICENSES HAD BEEN OBTAINED AND PAYMENT MADE PRIOR TO THE TAKING OF AMERICAN HOSTAGES AND THE OUTBREAK OF THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR.

5. TARIQ AZIZ REPLIED AT LENGTH, OPENING WITH THE STATEMENT THAT IRAQ WOULD CONTINUE TO PROMOTE BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. AND HIGHER LEVEL CONTACTS IN WHICH EACH SIDE COULD EXPLAIN ITS VIEWS. AS IF IT WERE UPPERMOST IN HIS MIND, HE SAID HE HAD HEARD FROM THE HEAD OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT, AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, OF THE UNFORTUNATE CANCELLATION OF A U.S. TRADE MISSION AT THE LAST MOMENT. "WHAT HAPPENED WAS NOT INTENTIONAL," IRAQ WISHED TO INCREASE ITS TRADE WITH THE U.S. AND TRADE MISSIONS WOULD BE WELCOME IN THE FUTURE.

6. TARIQ AZIZ SAID THAT THE NATURE OF THE U.S.-IRAQI RELATIONSHIP NOW SEEMED TO BE UNDERSTOOD ON BOTH SIDES. IRAQ FOR ITS PART SOUGHT A WIDER UNDERSTANDING BASED ON INCREASED CONTACT. IN THE PAST IRAQ HAS BEEN AVAILABLE FOR CONTACTS, FOR EXAMPLE BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER DURING HIS TRIPS TO NEW YORK. IRAQ HAS ALSO WELCOMED U.S. CONGRESSMEN AND OTHER OFFICIALS. NEVERTHELESS CONTACTS HAVE BEEN FEW IN COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES. MORE SUCH CONTACTS WOULD BE USEFUL.

7. ON U.S.-IRAQI RELATIONS, TARIQ AZIZ RECALLED THAT IN 1975 SADDAM HUSSAIN HAD TOLD DAVID ROCKEFELLER

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THAT THE RELATIONSHIP WAS LIKE A DOOR WITH TWO KEYS, THE FIRST INVOLVING IRAQ-U.S. RELATIONS AND THE SECOND, ARAB-U.S. RELATIONS. THE FIRST KEY WOULD TURN WHEN THE U.S. STOPPED INTERFERING IN IRAQI INTERNAL AFFAIRS, SUCH AS COLLABORATING WITH THE SHAH IN SUPPORT OF BARZANI'S REVOLT. HE COULD OFFICIALLY TELL ME THAT THE FIRST KEY WAS NOW TURNING. THE SECOND ONE, HOWEVER, WAS AWAITING THE OUTCOME OF U.S. POLICY DELIBERATIONS. THIS LED TO A LENGTHY DISCUSSION OF THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT WHICH IRAQ CONSIDERED TO BE A CHALLENGE TO ARAB PUBLIC OPINION. HE ARGUED THAT IT WAS NOT IN THE U.S. INTEREST TO MAINTAIN A ONE-SIDED POLICY AND INDICATED THAT IF U.S. POLICIES

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION

MESSAGE:

HCE382
STU2437
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHAD #1446 1481330
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1854
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 3179
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 893
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BAGHDAD 1446
EXDIS

TOOK INTO CONSIDERATION ARAB VIEWS, THE OTHER KEY
WOULD TURN. HIS TREATMENT OF THE SUBJECT SEEMED TO
INDICATE AN IRAQI DESIRE TO RENEW RELATIONS AS
SOON AS SUITABLE MOVEMENT IS FOUND IN THE U.S.-ARAB
CONTEXT.

8. TARIQ AZIZ EMPHASIZED THAT THE ATTITUDE OF THE
U.S. TO THE IRAQ-IRAN CONFLICT IS OF SUPREME IMPORTANCE
TO IRAQ. IRAQ DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE U.S. WAS PRO-
VIDING ARMS TO IRAN, BUT SOMEHOW THE IRANIANS WERE
GETTING SOME U.S. ARMS AND SPARE PARTS. I INVITED
TARIQ AZIZ TO PROVIDE US ANY INFORMATION HE HAD IN
THIS REGARD SINCE IT WAS OUR POLICY TO OPPOSE SUCH SALES
OR LICENSES.

9. TARIQ AZIZ THEN TRACED THE DEVELOPMENT OF IRAQI
POLICY FROM ITS PRO-WESTERN ORIENTATION UNDER THE
MONARCHY TO AN ANTI-U.S. REACTION THERAFTER AND
FINALLY A BALANCED POLICY UNDER THE PRESENT REGIME
WHICH HAS EMBARKED UPON A NATIONALIST, SOCIALIST
AND INDEPENDENT COURSE HOSTILE ONLY TO THOSE WHO
THREATEN IRAQI VITAL INTERESTS. IRAQ, HE ARGUED,
IS A FACTOR FOR STABILITY IN THE AREA AND THIS IS
IN THE INTEREST OF THE U.S. AND WESTERN EUROPE. IRAQ
DOES NOT WANT THE SPREAD OF SOVIET INFLUENCE, NOR
DOMINATION BY THE U.S. IT WOULD BE IN THE U.S.
INTEREST, HE SAID, TO PROMOTE AN INDEPENDENT TREND IN
THE AREA AS REPRESENTED BY IRAQ. ALTHOUGH IRAQ WOULD
MAINTAIN ITS GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES,
IRAQIS WERE AWARE THAT WESTERN EUROPE AND THE U.S
WERE MORE TECHNOLOGICALLY ADVANCED AND AFFLUENT.
SINCE IRAQ IS PAYING THE PRICE, THEY WANT THE BEST
PRODUCT. THUS, THERE IS AN OBJECTIVE GROUND FOR

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CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. AND EUROPE.
10. IN REPLY, I REITERATED OUR POSITION ON ARMS AND TOOK ISSUE WITH HIS STATEMENT THAT THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY DESIGNED TO ANTAGONIZE THE ARAB MAJORITY. I EXPLAINED THE PROCESS WE EXPECTED TO FOLLOW IN THE COMING MONTHS TO DEVELOP AN ARAB MAJORITY. I EXPLAINED THE PROCESS WE EXPECTED TO FOLLOW IN THE COMING MONTHS TO DEVELOP A MIDDLE EAST POLICY. SINCE IRAQ HAS JOINED THE GROUP REPRESENTING THE ARAB CONSENSUS AND BASED ITS ATTITUDE TOWARD MIDDLE EAST PEACE ON THE BAGHDAD SUMMIT PROPOSALS, WE WOULD AT SOME POINT WANT TO EXPLORE IN MORE DETAIL IRAQI THINKING IN THIS REGARD.
11. TARIQ AZIZ REPLIED THAT IT WOULD BE BEST FIRST TO PROMOTE GREATER UNDERSTANDING AND A MORE FIRM RELATIONSHIP BEFORE TACKLING DIFFICULT QUESTIONS LIKE THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. "WHEN THE TIME IS RIPE, HOWEVER, IRAQ WILL BE READY TO ENGAGE IN A DISCUSSION OF DETAILS."
12. TARIQ AZIZ THEN REVERTED TO HIS HOPE FOR BETTER RELATIONS AND WIDER EXCHANGE OF SCHOLARS, JOURNALISTS, ETC. HE SUGGESTED WE WORK TOGETHER TO PROMOTE THE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP IN WHICH U.S. INSTITUTIONS WOULD PLAY A MAJOR ROLE. U.S. BUSINESS REPRESENTATIVES, HE SAID, WOULD BENEFIT FROM THE CLEAN BUSINESS PRACTICES IN IRAQ WHERE THERE WAS NO CORRUPTION AS IN SOME OTHER COUNTRIES. IN THIS CONTEXT, I SAID THE U.S. GOVERNMENT SUPPORTS THE PARTICIPATION OF AMERICAN FIRMS IN PROJECTS DESIGNED TO RESTORE IRAQ'S OIL FACILITIES AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE AFTER THE WAR. TARIQ AZIZ SEEMED PLEASED WITH THIS POSITION. HE THEN REFERRED TO "SOME KIND OF A TELEX PROBLEM AT USINT." I EXPLAINED OUR DESIRE TO UPDATE COMMUNICATIONS BY THE INSTALLATION OF A RADIO TRANSMITTER. HE ASKED WHETHER OTHER MISSIONS IN BAGHDAD HAD SUCH FACILITIES. WHEN I REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE, HE SAID "THEN THERE WILL BE NO PROBLEM IN YOUR HAVING A TRANSMITTER -- I WILL SPEAK TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER ABOUT IT."
13. IN THE CONTEXT OF INCREASING TRADE, I MENTIONED THE PARTICIPATION OF U.S. FIRMS IN THE BAGHDAD INTERNATIONAL FAIR AND SUGGESTED THAT NEXT YEAR PERHAPS U.S. EXHIBITIONS SHOULD BE GROUPED IN A NATIONAL PAVILION AS ARE THOSE OF OTHER COUNTRIES. TARIQ AZIZ SAID THIS SEEMED LOGICAL AND SHOULD BE LOOKED INTO. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE MEETING, HE

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ASKED THAT I CONVEY HIS BEST WISHES TO SECRETARY HAIG
ALONG WITH IRAQ'S DESIRE TO PROMOTE BETTER RELATIONS.
14. COMMENT: IN THIS FIRST ACCESS TO THE INNER CIRCLE OF
IRAQI LEADERSHIP, TARIQ AZIZ WAS OBVIOUSLY TRYING
TO PUT THE MOST POSITIVE LIGHT ON FUTURE PROSPECTS
FOR U.S.-IRAQI RELATIONS WHILE MAINTAINING IRAQ'S
POSITION THAT A NEW U.S. APPROACH TO
MIDDLE EAST PEACE WOULD BE NECESSARY IF OUR RELATIONS
WITH IRAQ AND WITH THE REST OF THE ARAB WORLD WERE
TO HAVE A SOLID BASIS. WHILE THE MEETING WILL
PROBABLY NOT BE PUBLICIZED BY IRAQI MEDIA, ITS OCCUR-
RENCE WILL BECOME KNOWN AND SHOULD BE HELPFUL TO OUR
POSITION AND THAT OF U.S. BUSINESS INTERESTS IN
IRAQ. WITH THE OPENING OF THIS CONTACT, WE ARE IN A
POSITION TO COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH THE LEADERSHIP
SHOULD WE HAVE ANY SENSITIVE OR PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT
MESSAGE TO CONVEY.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

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EOB: AFRECON,EURE, EA,WEUR
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHAD #1082/1 1131115
O R 231100Z APR 81
FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1708

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 3107
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 684
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 2429
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 3074
AMEMBASSY LONDON 871
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1066
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 BAGHDAD 1082
E.O. 120651 GDS 4/22/87 (BODINE, BARBARA K.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, IZ, US, SU
SUBJ: CONVERSATION WITH SOVIET DCM IN BAGHDAD

1. (2 - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: IN THE COURSE OF A TWO AND ONE-HALF HOUR CONVERSATION DURING A COURTESY CALL BY DCM BODINE, SOVIET DCM TCHERNYCHEV EXPOUNDED AT LENGTH ON THE CURRENT STATE OF IRAQI-SOVIET RELATIONS, ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND MILITARY, THE SOVIET UNION'S RELATIONS WITH IRAN, THE TUDEH PARTY, THE SOVIET VIEW OF IRAQ'S CALL FOR THE DISMEMBERMENT OF IRAN, THE IMPROVEMENT IN IRAQI-US RELATIONS, AND THE FUTURE OF THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR AS IT MAY AFFECT SADDAM HUSSAIN'S FUTURE. END SUMMARY.

3. TCHERNYCHEV EXPRESSED A KEEN INTEREST IN DAS DRAPER'S APRIL 12 VISIT TO BAGHDAD. HE SPECULATED THAT THE VISIT,

USINT BAGHDAD 1082

DTG:231100Z APR 81 PGN: 035905
TOR: 113/1511Z

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BY smf, 1 . IE 2/8/05

DATE 04/27/81

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PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED)

WHICH HE TERMED A "TURNING POINT", WAS WELCOMED BY THE IRAQIS AS A WAY OF INCREASING THEIR INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE CONTINUED WAR WITH IRAN, AND AS A MEANS OF PRE-EMPTING A RENEWAL OF THE US-IRANIAN MILITARY RELATIONSHIP. HE ALSO SAW IT AS AN ATTEMPT BY THE IRAQIS TO IMPROVE THEIR NON-ALIGNED STATUS BY DISTANCING THEMSELVES FROM THE SOVIETS AND MOVING TOWARD THE MIDDLE OF THE SPECTRUM. DCM EXPLAINED THAT DRAPER'S VISIT WAS MORE ACCURATELY A STARTING POINT, A BEGINNING OF A DIALOGUE. THE VISIT WAS TO BRIEF IRAQI OFFICIALS ON SECRETARY HAIG'S MIDDLE EAST TRIP, TO EXPLAIN US MIDDLE EAST POLICY UNDER THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, TO ELICIT IRAQI VIEWS ON VARIOUS REGIONAL ISSUES OF COMMON CONCERN AND TO CONFIRM CONTINUING US NEUTRALITY IN THE WAR.

4. TCHERNYCHEV COUNTERED THAT IT IS EASIER FOR THE US TO REMAIN NEUTRAL WHEN IT HAS NO RELATIONS WITH ONE SIDE OF THE CONFLICT, IRAN, AND ONLY IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE OTHER, IRAQ, THE SOVIET UNION, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAS RELATIONS WITH BOTH AND THUS A NEUTRAL STANCE IS THAT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT. WHEN ASKED ABOUT REPORTS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE ATTEMPTING TO PATCH UP THEIR STRAINED RELATIONS WITH IRAQ, THROUGH THE PROVISION OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT, SPARES AND AMMUNITION, AND BY SENDING SEMEN SKACHKOV, CHAIRMAN OF THE SOVIET STATE COMMITTEE FOR FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS, AS HEAD OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO THE ANNUAL JOINT ECONOMIC COMMISSION MEETING. TCHERNYCHEV ADAMANTLY DENIED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS SENT OR WILL SEND ANY MILITARY EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING AMMUNITION OR SPARE PARTS, TO IRAQ FOR THE DURATION OF THE WAR. IRAQ IS ABLE TO SATISFY ITS REQUIREMENTS THROUGH THE BLACK MARKET, HE SAID, AND WHEN PRESSED, THROUGH PURCHASES FROM VARIOUS EAST EUROPEAN SOURCES. TCHERNYCHEV ALSO DENIED THAT THERE IS ANY SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE TO SKACHKOV'S VISIT: FIRST, NOT BEING A MEMBER OF THE POLITIBURO OR THE PARTY, HE CAN NOT PROPERLY BE DESCRIBED AS A RANKING OFFICIAL; SECOND, THE MEETINGS OF THE JOINT COMMISSION HAVE OCCURRED REGULARLY OVER THE PAST TWENTY YEARS AND THIS MEETING IS A NATURAL CONTINUATION OF THAT RELATIONSHIP. CITING AS EXAMPLES THE THREE SOVIE BUILT POWER PLANTS- NASIRIYAH, NAJABIYAH AND DOKAN DAM- AND THE WADI THAR THAR CANALS, HE SAID THAT TECHNICAL AND TRADE COOPERATION

USINT BAGHDAD 1082

DTG:231100Z APR 81 PSN: 035905
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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ARE CONTINUING AND THE SOVIET UNION IS SEEKING TO MAINTAIN ITS GOOD RELATIONS WITH IRAQ. GIVEN THE CHILL IN THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE IRAQIS AS A RESULT OF THE CUTOFF OF ARMS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR, THIS ATTEMPT AT "BUSINESS AS USUAL" WOULD INDICATE A SOVIET DESIRE TO RETURN THE RELATIONSHIP TO THE PRE-SEPTEMBER LEVEL.

5. TCHERNYCHEV ASKED WHAT CURRENT US POLICY IS TOWARD IRAN, PARTICULARLY ITS DISMEMBERMENT OR DISINTEGRATION THROUGH INTERNAL CHAOS, POSSIBLY WITH THE ACTIVE ASSISTANCE OF IRAQ. HE CITED THE FACT THAT ALTHOUGH THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION PUBLICLY STATED ITS SUPPORT FOR THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF IRAN, THE REAGON ADMINISTRATION HAS YET TO MAKE ANY STATEMENT. HE WONDERED IF THIS INDICATES A SHIFT. DCM RESPONDED THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE IN US POLICY TOWARD IRAN AND THAT WE WOULD NOT SUPPORT ANY ATTEMPT TO DISMEMBER IT.

6. TCHERNYCHEV SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION FEELS THAT GIVEN TIME IT CAN DEVELOP A GOOD WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CURRENT TEHRAN REGIME. THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC DOES NOT POSE A THREAT TO THE SOVIET UNION OR TO ITS BORDER REGIONS. THROUGH ITS SUPPORT OF THE REGIME'S ANTI-IMPERIALISM, THE TUDEH PARTY HAS REACHED A MODUS VIVENDI WITH THE KHOMENINI REGIME. UNLIKE OTHER LEFTIST GROUPS WHICH HAVE CHOSEN A PATH OF OPEN OPPOSITION, AND HAVE THUS BEEN SEVERELY SUPPRESSED, THE TUDEH ACTIVELY COOPERATES. SINCE THE TEHRAN REGIME NEEDS ALL THE ALLIES IT CAN MUSTER, IT HAS ACCEPTED THE TUDEH'S SUPPORT. TCHERNYCHEV ADMITTED, HOWEVER, THAT IT IS QUESTIONABLE HOW LONG THIS RELATIONSHIP CAN LAST, GIVEN THE MULLAHSI FUNDAMENTAL ADHORRENCE OF COMMUNISM.

USINT BAGHDAD 1082

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHAD #1082/2 1131145
O R 231100Z APR 81
FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1709

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 3108
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 685
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 2430
AMEMBASSY LONDON 872
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 3075
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1067
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 BAGHDAD 1082

7. ON THE PROGNOSIS FOR THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, TCHERNYCHEV BELIEVES THAT ALTHOUGH IRAN IS IN A POORER POSITION THAN IRAQ IN TERMS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND FINANCIAL VIABILITY, THE FANATICISM OF THE REGIME, AND THE IRANIANS AS A WHOLE, WILL ALLOW IT TO CONTINUE THE WAR FOR SOME TIME. IRAQ'S STRENGTH IS ITS WELL-PROVISIONED ARMY AND ITS BASICALLY HEALTHIER ECONOMY, ADMITTEDLY ASSISTED BY GENEROUS LOANS FROM OTHER ARAB STATES. IRAQ THEREFORE ALSO HAS THE CAPABILITY TO MAINTAIN A PROLONGED WAR AT THE CURRENT LEVEL OF INTENSITY. TCHERNYCHEV DOUBTED THAT IRAQ WILL LAUNCH AN OFFENSIVE THIS SPRING, IF ONLY BECAUSE OF THE HIGH POLITICAL COSTS INVOLVED IN THE PROJECTED CASUALTIES, AND THE LATER POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS WHEN AND IF THE ADDITIONAL TERRITORIES OR TOWNS ARE RETURNED TO IRAN AS PART OF A PEACE AGREEMENT.

USINT BAGHDAD 1082

DTG:231100Z APR 81 PSN: 035901
TOR: 113/1509Z

~~*****CONFIDENTIAL*****~~

~~*****CONFIDENTIAL*****~~

DATE 04/27/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

8. TCHERNYCHEV SEES SADDAM HUSSAIN IN A POLITICAL AND MILITARY BIND, ABLE NEITHER TO MOVE FORWARD WITH A MAJOR OFFENSIVE NOR RETREAT UNILATERALLY WITHOUT INCURRING A GREAT, IF NOT POLITICALLY FATAL COST. SHORT OF THAT HOWEVER, TCHERNYCHEV BELIEVES THAT SADDAM HAS THE POLITICAL, AS WELL AS MILITARY, WHEREWITHAL TO CONTINUE THE WAR ALMOST INDEFINITELY.

9. COMMENTS: AT THE START OF THE WAR, TCHERNYCHEV PERSONALLY PUSHED THE THESIS, AT TIMES NOT FULLY SUPPORTED BY HIS EASTERN EUROPE COLLEAGUES, THAT SADDAM WOULD PROBABLY FALL IF THE WAR COULD NOT QUICKLY BE BROUGHT TO A SUCCESSFUL (FOR BAGHDAD) CONCLUSION. MANY OBSERVERS IN BAGHDAD WERE PUZZLED BY THIS RATHER STRIDENT SOVIET LINE, WHICH WAS SURELY ALSO PICKED UP BY THE IRAQIS. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE SOVIETS WISHED AT THAT TIME TO DETER WESTERN EUROPEAN STATES FROM RUSHING IN TOO QUICKLY TO FILL THE GAP CREATED BY THE SOVIET ARMS EMBARGO DURING A WAR WHICH ALL CONSIDERED WOULD BE OF SHORT DURATION. THE WAR HAS DRAGGED ON AND THE WESTERN EUROPEANS HAVE TAKEN FULL ADVANTAGE OF THE SOVIET EMBARGO. IT IS THUS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT TCHERNYCHEV WOULD NOW WISH TO CLIMB DOWN FROM THIS UNREALISTIC LIMB. EAGLETON

USINT BAGHDAD 1082

DTG1231100Z APR 81 P3N: 035901
TOR: 113/1509Z

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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NRTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: SA, NAN, COL, VP
RDS: EUR, NEA, WEUR
NRSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEKAD #1261 1131638
O R 231000Z APR 81
FM USINT BAGHDAD

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS F96-127/1 # 338
By Amf, NARA, Date 2/8/85

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1707

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 6166
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 2426
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 2274
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 3873
AMEMBASSY LONDON 878
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1005
AMEMBASSY PARIS 1190
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 035
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 688
BT

~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 1881
E.O. 12958: RDS 4/22/81 (BRUNER, WHITLEY) OR-P
TAGS: PEP, XZ, FR, UR
SUBJ: VIEWS ON IRAQ-SOVIET RELATIONS

FOIA(b) (1)

1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. (PROTECT) INFORMED POLOFF EVENING OF APRIL 21 THAT IS "WELL AWARE" OF A RECENT SOVIET DECISION TO RESUME, TO A LIMITED DEGREE, ARMS SHIPMENTS TO IRAQ. STATED THAT, IN THE VIEW, ONLY "VERY, VERY LIMITED" QUANTITIES OF SOVIET ARMS AND/OR SPARE PARTS AND AMMUNITION WILL BE INVOLVED. ADMITTED, HOWEVER, THAT AS YET HAVE NO FIRM IDEA WHAT TYPE OF EQUIPMENT THE SOVIETS ARE WILLING TO PROVIDE TO THE IRAQIS.

FOIA(b) (1)

USINT BAGHDAD 1881

DTG:231000Z APR 81 FSN: 035872
TOR: 113/1452Z

*****SECRET*****

*****S E C R E T*****

DATE 04/27/81

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. [REDACTED] STRESSED THAT [REDACTED] VIEW THIS SOVIET MOVE AS "VERY OMINOUS," BECAUSE [REDACTED] IS CONVINCED THAT THE SOVIETS WISH TO PROLONG THE IRAQ-IRAN CONFLICT AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. [REDACTED] BELIEVE THAT THIS SOVIET AIM STEMS FROM MOSCOW'S BELIEF THAT THE JUDEI PARTY IN IRAN IS GAINING INCREASING GROUND AGAINST THE ISLAMIC FANATICS AND, IF THE CONFLICT WITH IRAQ IS PROLONGED, THE JUDEI COULD EVEN SHARE POWER IN IRAN AFTER THE INEVITABLE COLLAPSE OF THE ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST ESTABLISHMENT. THIS [REDACTED] PERCEPTION OF SOVIET INTEREST IN PROLONGING THE CONFLICT HAS BEEN REINFORCED BY RECENT NEWS [REDACTED] DID NOT STATE FROM WHERE, THAT THE SOVIETS WILL ALSO STEP UP ARMS DELIVERIES TO THE IRANIAN SIDE.

FOIA(b) (1)

FOIA(b) (1)

4. [REDACTED] DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE CURRENT VISIT TO BAGHDAD BY SEMEN SHACHKOV, SOVIET DELEGATE TO THE JOINT SOVIET-IRAN ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, WOULD INVOLVE DISCUSSION OF ARMS DELIVERIES IN ANY SPECIFIC WAY. RATHER, THE [REDACTED] BELIEVE THAT INDIRECT ARMS SHIPMENTS, VIA EASTERN EUROPE, ARE LIKELY TO INCREASE AND THE FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER TARA YASIN RAMADHAN, CURRENTLY VISITING PRAGUE, WILL INITIATE A DIALOGUE ON THE ARMS QUESTION. EAGLETON

(b) (1)

USINT BAGHDAD 1001

DTG: 231000Z APR 81 PSN: 035872
TOR: 113/1452Z

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DATE 04/27/81

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RA, NAN, COL, VP
EOB: EURW, NEA, WEUR
WHAR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHAD #1076 1130800
O 230730Z APR 81
FM USINT BAGHDAD

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS E76-127/1 # 339

BY anj, NARA,

2/8/05

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1704

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 3103
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 2425
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 2273
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 3072
AMEMBASSY LONDON 869
AMEMBASSY ROME 404
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 1076
E.O. 120651 GDS 4/23/87 (BODINE, BARBARA K.) DR-M
TAGS: PEPR, IZ, '18
SUBJ: IRAQI REACTION TO DAS DRAPER VISIT TO BAGHDAD

1. (2 - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. DAS DRAPER'S APRIL 12 VISIT TO BAGHDAD CONTINUES TO BE THE SUBJECT OF COMMENT AND QUERIES WITHIN THE DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY WHERE IT IS LOOKED UPON AS A CONSIDERABLE CONTRIBUTION TO THE WESTERN POSITION IN IRAQ. WE HAVE TRIED TO PUT THE VISIT IN THE PROPER PERSPECTIVE AS A SINGLE, BUT POSITIVE STEP IN UPGRADING THE DE FACTO U.S.-IRAQI RELATIONSHIP, WHILE STRESSING THAT RENEWAL OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WAS NOT ITS PURPOSE. SEVERAL AMBASSADORS HAVE TOLD US THEY UNDERSTAND THE IRAQIS WERE PLEASED WITH THE VISIT.

3. FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE COURSE OF A DINNER CONVERSATION

USINT BAGHDAD 1076

DTG: 230730Z APR 81 PSN: 036027
TOR: 113/1400Z

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

APRIL 22, THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR TOLD DCM HE HAD ASKED THE HEAD OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT, DURING A RECENT CALL, FOR HIS ASSESSMENT OF DRAPER'S VISIT TO IRAQ. SAHHAF IMMEDIATELY REPLIED "VERY CONSTRUCTIVE" AND WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE GOI APPRECIATED THE FACT THAT A RANKING AMERICAN OFFICIAL FROM SECRETARY HAIG'S PARTY CAME TO BAGHDAD TO BRIEF MFA OFFICIALS ON THE RESULTS OF THE SECRETARY'S MIDDLE EAST TRIP AND TO SHARE WITH THEM THE EVOLVING OUTLINES OF US MIDDLE EAST POLICY. SAHHAF ALSO EXPRESSED IRAQ'S PLEASURE WITH OUR IMPROVING RELATIONS, PARTICULARLY IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD, BUT, ACCORDING TO THE AMBASSADOR, ALSO IN THE BROADER CONTEXT OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS AND AN INCREASED DIALOGUE, ALBEIT WITHOUT FORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. EAGLETON

USINT BAGHDAD 1076

DTG: 230730Z APR 81 PSNI 036027
TOR: 113/1400Z

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/17/81//107

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

MESSAGE / AUTOMATIC:

NLS F96-127/1 # 340

MESSAGE:
IMMEDIATE

BY anf, NARA, DATE 2/8/05

U 121650Z APR 81 ZFF4
FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC RIACI IMMEDIATE 1666

INFO USMISSION USIN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 602

- AEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 3076
- AEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 2168
- AEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 3531
- AEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 2412
- A CONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 172
- AEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 2263
- AEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 659
- AEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 883
- AEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 3060
- AEMBASSY WASHINGTON IMMEDIATE 1061
- AEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 373
- AEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 546

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 BAGHDAD 0972

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: ROS 1,3,4 4/12/2001 (DRAPER, MORRIS) OR-M

TAGS: IX, LS, XF, PLD, TE, SA, JS, FGH, IR

SUBJ: MEETINGS IN BAGHDAD WITH FOREIGN MINISTER HAMMADI

1. (S -1 ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: NEA DAS DRAPER ON APRIL 12 MET WITH SENIOR FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS INITIALLY AND THEN WITH FOREIGN MINISTER HAMMADI FOR ONE HOUR TO DISCUSS INTER ALIA HIGHLIGHTS OF SECRETARY'S MIDDLE EAST VISIT, THE ADMINISTRATION'S BASIC POLICIES TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST, AND U.S.-IRAQI RELATIONS. IRAQ PROVIDED A WARM AND CORDIAL RECEPTION. HAMMADI WAS VISIBLY PLEASED BY THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE TO HIM. IRAQ IS NOT YET PREPARED TO RESUME FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BUT WILL RESUME AND ENCOURAGE A MORE SYSTEMATIC AND MORE INTIMATE DIALOGUE AT SENIOR LEVELS. END SUMMARY.

***** HSR COMMENTS *****

FA,NAK,C,L,VP
ASIMET,EUFE,NEA,WEUR

PSN:022415

DTG:121650

TR:1030017

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ABSTRACTION:

3. JOINED BY INTERESTY SECTION CHIEF FACLETON AND DCM BODINE, NEA DRAPER MET ON APRIL 12 WITH SENIOR IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTRY TEAM HEADED BY MUHAMMAD AL-SAHHAF, CHIEF OF FIRST INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT, FOR OVER AN HOUR AND ONE-HALF, AND SUBSEQUENTLY WITH FOREIGN MINISTER HANNADI FOR AN HOUR. DRAPER EARLIER HAD BEEN OFFICIALLY WELCOMED TO BAGHDAD RESERVATIONS AT A LUXURY HOTEL, WITH A FOREIGN MINISTRY PROTOCOL OFFICER WHO ACCOMPANIED HIM ON ALL TRAVELS, A CAR AND DRIVER, PLUS A FOUR-MAN SECURITY DETAIL WHICH PROVIDED SIREN ESCORT ON THE WAY TO APPOINTMENTS. HIGHLIGHTS OF MEETINGS FOLLOW. MORE DETAILED RECORDS BY POUCH.

4. AT THE INITIAL MEETING WITH SENIOR FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS, DRAPER REVIEWED IN SOME DETAIL THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE SECRETARY'S MIDDLE EAST TRIP -- INCLUDING THE SPECIAL ATTENTION GIVEN TO THE SERIOUS LEBANESE SITUATION -- AND THE BASIC POLICY APPROACHES OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTHWEST ASIAN REGION. DRAPER PARTICULARLY STRESSED TO BOTH THE MINISTR TEAM AND TO HANNADI THAT THE TWO U.S. OBJECTIVES OF IMPROVING THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THE REGION AGAINST OUTSIDE THREATS AND CHALLENGES AND MOVING FORWARD ON THE PEACE PROCESS WERE INTER-LINKED, CO-EQUAL IN PRIORITY, AND MUTUALLY REINFORCING; PROGRESS TOWARD ONE OBJECTIVE, WOULD HELP PROGRESS IN THE OTHER AND VICE VERSA.

5. THE SECRETARY HAD INSTRUCTED HIM TO GO TO IRAQ, DRAPER SAID, OUT OF RECOGNITION THAT IRAQ WAS AN IMPORTANT COUNTRY AND HAD THE CAPACITY TO INFLUENCE TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REGION AND BEYOND. HE DESCRIBED THE SECRETARY'S STRONG CONVICTION THAT THE U.S. MUST PURSUE A POLICY OF RELIABILITY AND CONSISTENCY WITH ITS HISTORIC FRIENDS, PARTICULARLY IRAQ, AND SAID THAT THE U.S. WAS BUILDING UP ITS BASIC MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT WHILE IMPROVING ITS DOMESTIC ECONOMY.

6. THE MINISTRY TEAM WAS SOMEWHAT RELIEVED AT THE CO-EQUAL PRIORITY BEING GIVEN TO THE PEACE PROCESS, HAVING SENSED THAT THE U.S. WAS LOOKING AT THE MIDDLE EAST IN EAST-WEST TERMS EXCLUSIVELY. SAHHAF, HOWEVER, MADE IT CLEAR THAT A FORMAL RESUMPTION IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE UNTIL THE U.S. ALTERED ITS BASIC MIDDLE EAST POLICIES, BUT HE NEVERTHELESS WELCOMED A MORE SENSIBLE LEVEL AND EXPANDED SUBSTANTIVE DIALOGUE. HE ALSO MADE CLEAR IRAQ WELCOME IMPROVED ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS.

7. HANNADI SAID HE WELCOMED DRAPER'S VISIT. HE READ

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

WITH VISIBLE SATISFACTION THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE AND SAID THAT HE WOULD LOOK FORWARD TO AN OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH THE SECRETARY AT THE JNGA OF EARLIER. HE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN BRIEFED FULLY BY SAHAF ABOUT THE EARLIER MEETING WITH DRAPER; FOR THAT REASON, DRAPER SAID HE WOULD NOT REVIEW IN DETAIL WHAT HE HAD DISCUSSED EARLIER BUT SAID HE WANTED TO STRESS AGAIN THE CO-EQUAL NATURE OF THE TWO BROAD U.S. OBJECTIVES: AN IMPROVED SECURITY POSITION WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE STATES OF THE REGION TO MAKE INDEPENDENT DECISIONS OF THEIR OWN IN THE COMMON GOOD, PLUS PROGRESS ON THE PEACE FRONT WITH REVEIVED VIGOR FOLLOWING THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS. DRAPER ALSO REITERATED BASIC U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN-IRAQ WAR, SAYING THAT U.S. WOULD NOT SEND LETHAL EQUIPMENT TO EITHER SIDE, HAVING MADE THIS POSITION CLEAR TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS, BUT NONETHELESS BELIEVED THAT IT WAS IN THE WORLD'S OVERALL INTEREST THAT THE WAR BE CONCLUDED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. B. NAMRADI DESCRIBED THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE AS THE KEY TO STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE MEANS THROUGH WHICH THE SOVIETS WERE GAINING INFLUENCE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE U.S. HE CHARACTERIZED THE U.S. POSITION TOWARD ISRAEL AS ONE-SIDED AND HE RULED OUT ALL SETTLEMENT ACHIEVED THROUGH THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS. THE U.S. CANNOT HAVE BOTH ISRAELI ALLIANCE AND THE FRIENDSHIP OF THE ARABS AT THIS TIME AND HE STRESSED THAT, WHILE IRAQ WAS NOT COMMUNIST, IT COULD HARDLY BE SURPRISING THAT THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO EXPLOIT THE ORIGINAL OPPORTUNITY

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SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / AMMUNITIES:

MESSAGE:
IMMEDIATE

O 12165Z APR 81 ZFF4
FM USINT WASHDC

TO SECSTATE WASHDC VIACR IMMEDIATE 1669

INFO US ISSIO USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 103
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 3077
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 2169
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 3532
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 2413
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 173
AMEMBASSY JEDDAH IMMEDIATE 2264
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 860
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 884
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 3061
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT IMMEDIATE 1062
AMEMBASSY NABAT IMMEDIATE 374
AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 547

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 BAGHDAD 097

EXDIS
THEY GAINED FROM THE CZECH ARMS DEAL WITH EGYPT THROUGH
AN INDISPERENT U.S. POLICY
9. DRAPER COUNTER ARGUED THAT, WHATEVER CRITICISMS
MIGHT BE LEVELLED AT THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS, IT WAS A
FACT THAT U.S. POLICIES HAD HELPED CHANGE THE STATUS
QUO IN A WAY THAT WAS ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE ARAB WORLD;
FOR EXAMPLE, ALL OF THE EGYPTIAN TERRITORIES WOULD BE
EVACUATED BY THE ISRAELIS BY APRIL, 1982. WE WOULD BE PLEASED,
DRAPER SAID, IF IRAC WOULD LOOK WITH AN OPEN MIND
AT THE PROCESS IN OUR EFFORTS EVEN IF THE ULTIMATE RESULTS
ARE DELAYED. AS FOR BALANCE IN U.S. POLICIES, DRAPER
DREW ATTENTION TO OUR DETERMINATION TO ASSIST OUR
HISTORIC FRIEND, SAUDI ARABIA, WITH THE F-15 ENHANCEMENT
PACKAGE DESPITE SIGNIFICANT ISRAELI AND DOMESTIC OPPOSITION.

PSN: 022440

DTG: 121651

TOR: 1022217

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

WE INTEND TO MAINTAIN CLOSE TIES WITH JORDAN, LEBANON, MOROCCO, TUNISIA, SUDAN AND EGYPT AND, OF COURSE, ISRAEL, AND BROADEN RELATIONS AND ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN SUCH KEY COUNTRIES AS PAKISTAN AND TURKEY. HAMMADI SAID-- AS REGARDS U.S.-IRAQI RELATIONS -- THAT IRAQ WILL "WAIT AND SEE" WHETHER THE U.S. DOES SOMETHING BASIC, AND THEN EXAMINE QUESTION OF RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. IN A MANNER THAT WAS DISTINCTLY WARY AND FORTHCOMING, HOWEVER, HAMMADI SAID IRAQ WAS READY TO RAISE THE LEVEL AND INTENSIFY ALL CONTACTS WITH THE U.S. AND IMPROVE COMMUNICATIONS. HE REITERATED IRAQ'S WISH TO EXPAND ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND SAID U.S. COMPANIES WERE WELCOME TO COMPETE. HE SAID THAT THE INTERESTS SECTION COULD BE EXPANDED IN SIZE ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS. "SEVERED RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES ARE NOT NORMAL AND SHOULD NOT REMAIN FOREVER".

10. AS FOR IRAN, HAMMADI SAID THAT HE APPRECIATED THE PRESENT U.S. POSITION, BUT WOULD CONSIDER ANY CHANGE IN THE FORM OF SELLING ARMS TO IRAN AS AN UNFRIENDLY MOVE. HE THOUGHT THAT THE ISLAMIC MISSION WAS MAKING MODEST PROGRESS AT THE MOMENT BUT MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE IRANIAN REGIME WAS STILL SPLIT ON THE PEACE ISSUE. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS, HAMMADI SAID HE THOUGHT THE WAR COULD BE CONCLUDED BEFORE THE END OF 1981. WHEN HE ASKED OUR POSITION ON SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION, DRAPER RESPONDED THAT WE DID NOT WANT TO BE UP FRONT OR JOIN IN ANYTHING PREMATURE, AND WERE KEEPING IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE UN ABOUT THE PROGRESS OF THE PALME MISSION.

11. IN BOTH MEETINGS, DRAPER CLARIFIED THE U.S. POSITION ON THE SALE OF ARMS AND AIRCRAFT, AND IN THE FIRST MEETING DISCUSSED IRAQ'S SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM. WITH HAMMADI, DRAPER QUOTED THE WHITE HOUSE APRIL 3 STATEMENT, DRAPER CLARIFIED THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION TOWARD PREEMPTIVE STRIKES BY ISRAEL.

12. FINALLY, DRAPER REFERRED AGAIN TO HAMMADI'S POINT THAT BASIC CHANGES IN U.S. POLICY WERE NEEDED AND ASKED THAT IRAQ NOT EXPECT MIRACLES BUT BE APPREHENDED IF U.S. EFFORTS TO CHANGE -- POSITIVELY -- THE STATUS QUID. HAMMADI SAID THAT HE WOULD LOOK AT SUCH DEVELOPMENTS WITH AN OPEN MIND.

13. COMMENT: AS THE MORE DETAILED REPORTS SHOULD MAKE CLEAR, THE ATMOSPHERICS WERE GOOD AND THE WELCOME WAS GENUINE, AND THE STAGE WAS SET FOR A SIGNIFICANTLY EXPANDED DIALOGUE ON GLOBAL AS WELL AS REGIONAL AND BILATERAL ISSUES. FAGLETON SHOULD BE GIVEN A BROADER

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

RANGE OF INFORMATION CABLES AND OTHER GUIDANCE SO AS
TO BE ABLE TO TAKE UP WITH THE IRAQIS ON SUITABLE
OCCASIONS A WIDE ARRAY OF ISSUES OF MUTUAL INTEREST.
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