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Report (11/13/1982-12/04/1982)

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: AGENCY FILE

Withdrawer

RBW 5/10/2013

File Folder SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S WEEKLY REPORT
(11/13/1982-12/04/1982)

FOIA

M453

Box Number 7

SHIFRINSON

91

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
159195	MEMO	CASPAR WEINBERGER TO RR RE. WEEKLY REPORT OF DEFENSE ACTIVITIES R 1/26/2016 M453/6	6	11/12/1982	B1
159196	MEMO	CASPAR WEINBERGER TO RR RE. WEEKLY REPORT OF DEFENSE ACTIVITIES [COPY OF DOC. 159197]	7	11/19/1982	B1
159197	MEMO	CASPAR WEINBERGER TO RR RE. WEEKLY REPORT OF DEFENSE ACTIVITIES	7	11/19/1982	B1
159198	MEMO	CASPAR WEINBERGER TO RR RE. WEEKLY REPORT OF DEFENSE ACTIVITIES PAR 12/15/2022 M453/6	5	11/26/1982	B1
159199	MEMO	CASPAR WEINBERGER TO RR RE. WEEKLY REPORT OF DEFENSE ACTIVITIES [COPY OF DOC. 159201]	5	12/3/1982	B1
159200	MEMO	CASPAR WEINBERGER TO RR RE. WEEKLY REPORT OF DEFENSE ACTIVITIES [COPY OF DOC. 159198] PAR 12/15/2022 M453/6	5	11/26/1982	B1
159201	MEMO	CASPAR WEINBERGER TO RR RE. WEEKLY REPORT OF DEFENSE ACTIVITIES PAR 12/15/2022 M453/6	5	12/3/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

November 13, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Secretary Weinberger's Weekly Report

Attached is Cap Weinberger's Weekly Report dated November 12, 1982.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008
BY NARA RW, DATE 5/10/13



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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

159195

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DECLASSIFIED

REF ID: A615316 #159195

BY: RW NARA DATE 11/26/16

November 12, 1982 82 NOV 12 P 7: 46

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SUBJECT: Weekly Report of Defense Activities

Meeting with Federal Republic of Germany Minister of Defense Dr. Manfred Woerner: I met with Minister Woerner on Tuesday after he was afforded a full honors ceremony. We discussed Kohl Government defense policy and a number of specific defense issues. Dr. Woerner assured me that the clear priority of the Kohl Government's foreign and security policy is the NATO Alliance and close relations with the United States. He indicated they fully realize that German security and freedom depend on such a policy and, while they will pursue a realistic policy toward the East, they clearly will maintain a Western orientation. In short he will abandon the Schmidt idea that Germany should serve as a mediator between an "equally bad" USA/USSR.

I welcomed his Government's increase in the defense budget, particularly those parts of the budget that increase NATO infrastructure funding.

Minister Woerner reaffirmed his government's support for the NATO dual-track Intermediate Range Nuclear Force decision. He believes the German elections next March will give the Kohl Government the backing it needs to help carry out the decision. But, he added, the Chancellor had asked him to discuss in Washington, press disclosures that we would deploy in Germany more than the 108 PERSHING IIs to which they had agreed. He made it clear that they could accept only 108 missiles and 108 warheads. The German debate on PERSHING II deployment is already beginning, and the Government does not want to make the issue even more difficult. I suggested the problems over PERSHING II deployments need not be an obstacle and could be dealt with by our staffs.

Dr. Woerner expressed the German wish that efforts to improve NATO's conventional defense not be presented as changes in strategy, but as efforts to improve existing strategy. I readily agreed. We also agreed to hold bilateral staff talks on conventional defense, especially on air-land battle doctrine. He indicated that the question had been raised during his talks with members of Congress of our buying an air defense system to defend U.S. air bases in Germany with Germans manning the

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Sec Def Cont Nr. X-22878

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system. He was prepared to talk about this, provided collocated operating bases would be included. We will be examining this proposal in detail in the coming weeks.

I stressed the importance we attach to the Master Restationing Plan (MRP) and the contribution German support would make to defusing Congressional criticism of lack of Allied burdensharing. Woerner cited positive German steps on NATO Infrastructure and Wartime Host Nation Support and Germany's financial contribution to each of these. He had not been able to persuade his finance minister to do more by helping to finance MRP, but he did give me the welcome news that Germany will at last start financing the vitally needed infrastructure for NATO.

The meeting went very well despite the difficulty of the issues. It was clear that both sides wanted to start the relationship off on a positive footing and I believe we succeeded in doing this. (C)

F/A-18 Aircraft Program: As you know, recent media reports regarding the Navy's F/A-18 aircraft have been highly critical and, in some articles, assertions have been made that the entire program may have to be scrapped. In view of these false reports, you may wish to have additional information on the program.

The F/A-18 is the first aircraft that was designed (several years ago) specifically to serve in the dual fighter and attack roles of Navy and Marine carrier air units. Our objectives in seeking to fill both roles with a single aircraft were to reduce procurement costs, enhance Navy and Marine airwing mission flexibility, and reduce maintenance costs through much greater reliability and maintainability. We recognized from the start that in designing such a dual role aircraft, some capabilities in each role would be reduced.

Our experience in operational evaluations of the aircraft has shown that, as a fighter, the F-18 is clearly superior to the F-4 Phantom it is intended to replace and, as an attack aircraft, it is clearly superior to the A-7E, the attack aircraft that we had planned for it to replace, except with respect to unrefueled combat radius. We have also found it fully suitable for the Marine fighter/attack mission ashore. In the very important area of attack combat radius, the aircraft indeed fell short of our expectations, and we will be examining alternative means of resolving this problem.

Previous and current budgets have allotted procurement funds for starting purchases of F/A-18s for the Marines and for the Navy fighter mission on our smaller carriers that are not capable of operating F-14s. These procurements are not affected by issues that were raised in the attack role operational

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evaluation last month. Thus, the value of the airplanes procured to date and those for which we have budgeted funds is not in question by anyone, although you would never guess that from the news stories. Concurrent with our efforts to resolve the combat radius problem through modification of the F-18, we will also be examining carefully the precise mix and number of F-14, F/A-18, and A-6 aircraft we may wish to request in future budgets. (U)

Supreme Court Action in Military Subordinate vs. Superior Case: Early this month, the Supreme Court agreed to review a Ninth Circuit Federal Court decision in a case involving allegations of racial discrimination by black Navy enlisted men against their shipboard superiors. The plaintiffs' allegations held that these superiors had violated the plaintiffs' Constitutional rights in discriminating against them by "denying them training and promotion opportunities." The Ninth Circuit Court departed from established case law in holding that the sailors could, in some circumstances, sue their military commanders in their personal capacity for actions of an official nature.

I am very pleased by the Supreme Court's willingness to review this decision and I hope it will be reversed. It is essential that our military leaders be free to perform their military duties without fear of having to defend against legal actions by their subordinates arising from their performance of those duties. I will follow developments in this case carefully and advise you of any significant findings. We will also consult fully with Justice to see if we can help them with the arguments to the Supreme Court. (U)

Exercise KERNAL POTLATCH 83: The joint U.S./Canadian amphibious and sea control exercise KERNAL POTLATCH 83 will commence next week and will run past mid-December. With an amphibious objective area of Amchitka Island in the Western Aleutians, the U.S. Amphibious Task Force, with U.S. and Canadian troops embarked, will conduct an opposed transit from San Diego and Long Beach with support from U.S. and Canadian Navy, Coast Guard, and Air Force units.

The exercise will afford our forces an opportunity to assemble, embark, and transport a joint/combined amphibious task force to seize, occupy, and defend airfields on Amchitka Island; and be prepared to receive follow-on reinforcement forces, while defending the force to, in, and from the amphibious objective area. The exercise will involve some 7300 U.S. and Canadian personnel, less aircrews and other shore-based assets.

This will be the first significant naval and ground force exercise activity in the Aleutians in several years. Because of this, the Soviets are expected to demonstrate a higher than normal degree of interest in the exercise. We will make some inquiries and if it appears that there would be very high Soviet

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alarm, we will talk to Bill Clark before proceeding, in view of the potential tensions in connection with Brezhnev's death, etc. (S)

PERSHING II Missile Program Status: As you know, we halted the PERSHING II Missile flight test program after a failure on the initial test flight July 22 that resulted from a high pressure gas leak in the first stage rocket motor. In recent static firing tests of the first stage motor, we duplicated the high vibration conditions of the early part of the initial test flight and the motor performed satisfactorily in all respects. Having taken corrective actions to eliminate the cause of the initial test flight failure through new tooling to control more acutely the motor insulator installation, we feel confident that the initial problem will not recur.

You may have seen media accounts of failure of the second PERSHING II test flight last week. While it is indeed true that the test did not progress as planned, the missile was not launched, as a battery shutdown was experienced during the launch sequence. The test missile is still operational and after we are confident that we have corrected the battery problem, we will proceed with the second test flight at White Sands. (U)

Espionage Trial--U.S. Navy Petty Officer: In August of this year, we became aware that a Navy Second Class Intelligence Specialist, Brian P. Horton, assigned to the Fleet Intelligence Center in Norfolk, Virginia, had made telephone contact with the Soviet Military Office here in Washington. Horton's normal duties gave him access to Top Secret, Special Intelligence information. Subsequent investigation revealed that he had made attempts to establish contact with the Soviets as early as mid-May and had been successful in talking with them in June, as well. Horton also wrote a letter to the Soviets, attaching to it an unclassified index of classified publications he could provide to them.

Horton is currently in pre-trial confinement and, with the concurrence of Justice, he will be tried by General Court-Martial under classified conditions. He will be charged with providing information helpful to a foreign power, solicitation to transmit classified information to a foreign power, four counts of failing to report contacts with representatives of a hostile nation, and failing to store classified information properly (classified office safe combinations were found in his apartment).

We have made no public announcement of this matter and do not plan such an announcement. We will, however, be prepared to respond to press queries if information about the trial leaks. (S)

Launching of the USS GEORGIA (SSBN 729): The third of our nuclear powered OHIO Class nuclear ballistic missile submarines,

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USS GEORGIA (SSBN 729), was launched last Saturday at Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics Corporation at Groton, Connecticut. The GEORGIA follows OHIO and MICHIGAN and, like them, will carry a deterrent load of 24 TRIDENT-1 (C-4) missiles, until the new, more accurate, and heavier yield D-5, is ready. (U)

Armored Equipment Contract: Monday, we awarded Pacific Car and Foundry Company a contract for almost \$29 million for the M9 Armored Combat Earthmover (ACE). Subcontractors in Massachusetts, Michigan, and Indiana will build components of the equipment.

The M9 will be fielded in combat engineer units in forward battle areas and it will give the Army an important new battle-field capability. Previously, we have relied on commercially available earthmoving vehicles that had limited mobility and no armor. The M9 is a vehicle that has the speed and mobility to keep pace with the fighting force, protection against small arms fire and artillery fragmentation, and chemical/biological protection for the operator. Thus, it will provide a rapid digging capability where and when it is needed by combat units, increase all-terrain mobility of the combat force, and provide the capability to create obstacles and fighting positions as needed on the battlefield. (U)

ANZUS Corridor Dedication: On Wednesday, we dedicated the ANZUS Corridor here in the Pentagon, in ceremonies with the two Ambassadors, and with representatives of the Australian and New Zealand Ministers of Defense. The dedication was held to commemorate the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) Security Treaty. In addition to the traditional ribbon-cutting ceremony to open the corridor officially, we also unveiled a new ANZUS emblem to serve as a visible reminder of the commitment of the three member Allies to peace and freedom. The ANZUS Corridor has been decorated somewhat like the MacArthur Corridor, the dedication of which you participated in last Spring. (U)


Industrial Modernization Incentives Program: In an effort to encourage industry to make productivity enhancing capital investments, we recently authorized testing of certain incentives, to include shared savings rewards and contractor investment protection. This Industrial Modernization Incentives Program (IMIP) encompasses and expands on previous programs practiced by the Military Services and will implement our Acquisition Improvement Program Initiative on "encouraging capital investment to enhance productivity." Success of the program will result in substantial benefits for both the Department and the contractors involved.

In order to encourage innovation and experimentation, our contracting Components have been authorized to make reasonable

deviations from existing Defense Acquisition Regulation coverage. After appropriate testing and examination of relevant issues, specific recommendations for changes to the Defense Acquisition Regulations and proposed IMIP policy will be developed based on our experience during this test period. I believe this is an important step in upgrading the quality of our plant facilities and in improving the productive capacity of our industrial base. (U)

Fraud Indictments Against Contractor Employees: Our continuing efforts to eliminate waste, fraud, and abuse have led to indictments against two Defense contractor employees in connection with a scheme to defraud the government. The Luzerne Outerwear Manufacturing Company, a subsidiary of Huntingdon Apparel Manufacturing, held a contract to produce trousers for the Navy from government furnished material at its Elysburg, Pennsylvania plant. The contract required the Department to reimburse the company if the cloth provided by Defense was too narrow.

Charges recently filed by U.S. Attorneys claimed that in November 1980, company personnel intentionally shrunk government-furnished material and concealed this fact from Defense representatives in a scheme to obtain fraudulently a government reimbursement for approximately \$128,000. The contractor employees both pleaded guilty to charges levied against them, one for preparing the fraudulent document that was submitted to us in support of the false claim; the other for concealing from us the fact that the material had been improperly shrunk. Neither of them has yet been sentenced but, as felonies under Federal law, the offenses carry maximum penalties of imprisonment for five years and/or \$10,000 fines. (U)



The President has seen _____

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET ATTACHMENT

NOVEMBER 19, 1982

PC

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Secretary Weinberger's Weekly Report

Attached is Cap Weinberger's Weekly Report dated November 19, 1982.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

SECRET ATTACHMENT

*RW
5/10/83*

THE PRESIDENT, THE WHITE HOUSE

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

NOVEMBER 19, 1981

SECRET ATTACHMENT

SP

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SP

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SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S WEEKLY REPORT (11/13/1982-12/04/1982)

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SHIFRINSON

Box Number

7

91

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i>
	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>
159196	MEMO	7	11/19/1982	B1
	CASPAR WEINBERGER TO RR RE. WEEKLY REPORT OF DEFENSE ACTIVITIES [COPY OF DOC. 159197]			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Sent to P.P.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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NOVEMBER 19, 1982

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SUBJECT: Secretary Weinberger's Weekly Report

Attached is Cap Weinberger's Weekly Report dated November 19, 1982.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ED SENT TO:
RANCA
SANTA B
CAMP - VP IS THERE
LB

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

November 26, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Secretary Weinberger's Weekly Report

Attached is Cap Weinberger's Weekly Report dated November 26, 1982.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

RW ~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT
5/10/13

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10



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

159198

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR M453/L6 #159198

BY RW NARA DATE 12/15/2022

82 NOV 26 P 2: 34

November 26, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Weekly Report of Defense Activities

Fall NATO Defense Ministers Meetings: I will leave for Brussels on Sunday to join the NATO Ministers of Defense for the semi-annual meetings of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) and the Defense Planning Committee (DPC). At the NPG I plan to stress the consistency of U.S. and Allied deterrent strategy and will report your decision on MX, and your arms control proposals. Our major effort at the DPC will be to obtain a positive outcome in tone supporting a continuing effort by Europe to improve its defense efforts in spite of current economic difficulties. Additionally, as a follow-up to the NATO Summit, I plan to present a paper designed to gain alliance support for taking full advantage of emerging technologies to improve NATO's conventional defense. While in Brussels, I will meet privately with most of my colleagues to discuss bilateral issues.

I believe it is necessary to acknowledge the contribution of Luxembourg (a NATO member from the beginning) to the common defense, so I plan a brief stopover there on the way home. At the urgent request of State, I will also go to Yugoslavia to hold discussions with several key officials to assure them of U.S. friendship during this time of economic crisis, and to emphasize our desire for a continuing military relationship.
(C)

Lebanese Armed Forces Modernization: In past reports I discussed the preliminary findings of the Defense Survey Team I sent to Lebanon to determine requirements for upgrading Lebanese Armed Forces so that the Multi-National Force might be withdrawn. I am pleased that the Team's final reports have now been submitted. The views of the Joint Chiefs have been added. There are two reports, one of which we will provide to Lebanon as a guide for their defense planning. We will use the other to structure our security assistance program for Lebanon.

Modernization of the Lebanese Armed Forces is beginning to pick up momentum, with fourteen of our first fifteen Letters of Offer and Acceptance being accepted by the Lebanese Government last week. We will begin shipments as soon as possible.

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The first twenty-four Armored Personnel Carriers were released by the Army on November 5, and they are enroute to ports for shipment in early to mid-December. We also have selected personnel to provide initial Security Assistance Augmentation to the Embassy in Beirut, and they are on-station.

The Lebanese Internal Security Force (ISF) continues to be an unresolved issue. Our laws forbid us to provide direct training and equipment support to this internal constabulary which is under the Lebanese Ministry of the Interior. If combat elements of the ISF were assigned to the Lebanese Armed Forces, we could provide assistance; however, we understand that this would not be politically acceptable to President Gemayel.

3.3(b)(1)
6.2(d)

The British will be sending a team to Beirut to examine the role they might be able to play in reconstituting the ISF. We will continue to monitor this issue closely, and I will advise you of significant developments. (S)

Meeting with Egyptian Minister of Defense Abou Ghazala: Monday I met with Field Marshal Mohammed Abdel Abou Ghazala, Egypt's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense and War Production, after affording him a full honors ceremony here at the Pentagon. Minister Ghazala's primary item of interest was Egyptian concern over the level of U.S. security assistance funding for FY 1983 and FY 1984. He made a strong plea for Administration support of the requested \$1.3B level in FY 1983 and requested a level of \$1.7B in FY 1984. We of course told him how strongly we support the 1983 requests. We can expect additional emphasis on military assistance funds when President Mubarak visits you in January. We also discussed the possibility of F-5G aircraft coproduction, the situation in Lebanon and the need to improve Lebanese Armed Forces, and the on-going Iran-Iraq war. He is particularly interested in establishing a factory (with Saudi help) to build the F-5Gs and then sell them to various Arab states.

Abou Ghazala, who was in a particularly friendly and outgoing mood, confided to me privately that he believed he had convinced President Mubarak to sign a letter amounting to a commitment to let us establish an RDJTF facility at Ras Banas, which we need to secure funding from Congress. He also predicted that by next January the Egyptians may permit our nuclear powered warships to transit the Suez Canal. This prohibition has heretofore severely hampered the Navy's ability to surge forces from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean. He also told me Egypt would cooperate with us fully in strategic and other contingencies, and in planning, although they want to minimize any visible joint military planning or activity.

He went out of his way to assure me that the Mubarak government is stable, firm and in control and will remain so.

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In addition to my discussions with Minister Ghazala, he also met with George Shultz, Bill Casey, and Bill Clark to discuss a wide range of economic and security interests. (S)

Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany -- an Update: Last week, in two separate operations, German authorities captured three of the four leading members of the terrorist Red Army Faction. This group is the single most dangerous terrorist group indigenous to Europe, and the capture of these three leaders is a most important achievement. Brigitte Mohnhaupt, one of those captured, has been the de facto leader of the RAF since its evolution from the Baader-Meinhof Gang in 1977. She and another of those arrested, Christian Klar, planned and executed the near-successful attack on General Kroesen in 1981.

We currently expect compensation of U.S. personnel whose property has been damaged in recent terrorist bombings to be accommodated through insurance. Discussions of this issue with our personnel security people at EUCOM reflect a consensus that the Federal Republic is extremely attentive to U.S. interests in this regard. It has been discussed informally with the German Government, and they are making every effort to improve their coverage. (S)

Defense Support of Drug Interdiction Efforts: In my Weekly Report of August 13, I listed specific measures I had approved for the Navy to undertake in assisting the South Florida Crime Task Force to stem the flow of illegal drugs into the country, including the embarkation of Coast Guard detachments on Navy ships for boarding U.S. flag and stateless vessels. This measure paid off Saturday night when an eight-man Coast Guard team, operating from the Navy's nuclear guided missile cruiser USS MISSISSIPPI, boarded and seized a vessel (a converted shrimp boat, the RECIFE) laden with approximately 30 tons of marijuana. The Coast Guard detachment, originally assigned to the nuclear carrier USS NIMITZ, was flown to the MISSISSIPPI Saturday evening when NIMITZ aircraft located the RECIFE in a position from which MISSISSIPPI could best make the intercept. After determining the vessel was stateless, the boarding party arrested the eleven-man crew for drug smuggling and altered course for San Juan, Puerto Rico, for follow-on actions. (U)

Visit of Spanish Under Secretary of Defense: Frank Carlucci met with Spanish Under Secretary Eduardo Serra on Tuesday. Serra indicated that they are concerned about the problems in the Navy's F/A-18 attack aircraft program, and that if our Navy does not buy the attack model of the aircraft, neither will they. He also asked for a waiver of non-recurring research and development (R&D) cost recoupment on their potential purchase of AV-8B Harrier airplanes. Frank pointed out that this was a joint venture with the UK, that we have asked the UK for their views on a waiver, and that since Spain wishes to delay a possible commitment to this program, there is time to work on the issue. Secretary Serra emphasized that the new government

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will not want to change the basic cooperative thrust of U.S.- Spanish relations, and Frank assured him of our on-going commitment to pursuit of mutual security interests. (C)

LASER MAVERICK Missile Program: As you may remember from my September 10 Weekly Report item, the Marine Corps' LASER MAVERICK relies on reflected laser beam information for guidance to its target, as opposed to the infrared threat information radiated by a target used by the Infrared (IR) MAVERICK.

Modular Universal Laser Equipment, operated by Marines from simulated ground combat positions, was used as the target designator for six of the fifteen missiles fired in the laser missile test series. The A-6E attack and OV-10D reconnaissance aircraft airborne designators were used to designate for eight firings, including a ripple launch of two missiles against a moving seaborne target. All of the targets in the series were difficult and included moving targets on both land and sea. The land targets were obscured by the smoke and dust of a battlefield environment, and attacks were made from high and low altitudes at high speed. The missile proved particularly effective in the close air support role, in which targets must be carefully selected in areas where friendly troops are also located. The fifteen missiles fired achieved 13 direct hits on targets, one very close hit, and one warhead that dudded due to an interruption of power to the laser target designator. The LASER MAVERICK is scheduled for initial limited production in 1983, and it will undergo additional operational testing prior to a full-rate production decision. (C)

Defense Use of Polygraphs: Due to numerous substantive and technical changes in the use of polygraph examinations since our directive was issued in 1975, we are currently revising our directive governing its use. Under our existing personnel security programs, personnel with access to certain types of extremely sensitive classified information may be required to take a counterintelligence polygraph examination as a condition of continued access. We plan to keep this requirement in the new directive. It will apply to military and contractor personnel as well as civilian personnel. Under our new directive, no adverse action may be taken against any person for refusing to take a polygraph examination, with the exception of persons employed or seeking employment in positions requiring access to extremely sensitive classified information. Of course if they prefer not to take the polygraph test, they would not be employed in sensitive posts. The new directive is still circulating for comment in the Department. Press reports you may have seen are the result of leaks of preliminary drafts. (U)

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No -- per
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of PDB.

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JS

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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December 4, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Weekly Report of Defense Activities

Attached is Cap Weinberger's weekly report dated December 3, 1982.

V

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA *rw* DATE *5/10/13*

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SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S WEEKLY REPORT (11/13/1982-
12/04/1982)

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
159199	MEMO CASPAR WEINBERGER TO RR RE. WEEKLY REPORT OF DEFENSE ACTIVITIES [COPY OF DOC. 159201]	5	12/3/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

RW

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

November 26, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Secretary Weinberger's Weekly Report

Attached is Cap Weinberger's Weekly Report dated November 26, 1982.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

RW
5/10/13

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

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159200

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRM 453/6 #159200

BY RW NARA DATE 12/15/80



November 26, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Weekly Report of Defense Activities

Fall NATO Defense Ministers Meetings: I will leave for Brussels on Sunday to join the NATO Ministers of Defense for the semi-annual meetings of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) and the Defense Planning Committee (DPC). At the NPG I plan to stress the consistency of U.S. and Allied deterrent strategy and will report your decision on MX, and your arms control proposals. Our major effort at the DPC will be to obtain a positive outcome in tone supporting a continuing effort by Europe to improve its defense efforts in spite of current economic difficulties. Additionally, as a follow-up to the NATO Summit, I plan to present a paper designed to gain alliance support for taking full advantage of emerging technologies to improve NATO's conventional defense. While in Brussels, I will meet privately with most of my colleagues to discuss bilateral issues.

I believe it is necessary to acknowledge the contribution of Luxembourg (a NATO member from the beginning) to the common defense, so I plan a brief stopover there on the way home. At the urgent request of State, I will also go to Yugoslavia to hold discussions with several key officials to assure them of U.S. friendship during this time of economic crisis, and to emphasize our desire for a continuing military relationship.
(C)

Lebanese Armed Forces Modernization: In past reports I discussed the preliminary findings of the Defense Survey Team I sent to Lebanon to determine requirements for upgrading Lebanese Armed Forces so that the Multi-National Force might be withdrawn. I am pleased that the Team's final reports have now been submitted. The views of the Joint Chiefs have been added. There are two reports, one of which we will provide to Lebanon as a guide for their defense planning. We will use the other to structure our security assistance program for Lebanon.

Modernization of the Lebanese Armed Forces is beginning to pick up momentum, with fourteen of our first fifteen Letters of Offer and Acceptance being accepted by the Lebanese Government last week. We will begin shipments as soon as possible.

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The first twenty-four Armored Personnel Carriers were released by the Army on November 5, and they are enroute to ports for shipment in early to mid-December. We also have selected personnel to provide initial Security Assistance Augmentation to the Embassy in Beirut, and they are on-station.

The Lebanese Internal Security Force (ISF) continues to be an unresolved issue. Our laws forbid us to provide direct training and equipment support to this internal constabulary which is under the Lebanese Ministry of the Interior. If combat elements of the ISF were assigned to the Lebanese Armed Forces, we could provide assistance; however, we understand that this would not be politically acceptable to President Gemayel. [REDACTED]

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The British will be sending a team to Beirut to examine the role they might be able to play in reconstituting the ISF. We will continue to monitor this issue closely, and I will advise you of significant developments. (S)

Meeting with Egyptian Minister of Defense Abou Ghazala: Monday I met with Field Marshal Mohammed Abdel Abou Ghazala, Egypt's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense and War Production, after affording him a full honors ceremony here at the Pentagon. Minister Ghazala's primary item of interest was Egyptian concern over the level of U.S. security assistance funding for FY 1983 and FY 1984. He made a strong plea for Administration support of the requested \$1.3B level in FY 1983 and requested a level of \$1.7B in FY 1984. We of course told him how strongly we support the 1983 requests. We can expect additional emphasis on military assistance funds when President Mubarak visits you in January. We also discussed the possibility of F-5G aircraft coproduction, the situation in Lebanon and the need to improve Lebanese Armed Forces, and the on-going Iran-Iraq war. He is particularly interested in establishing a factory (with Saudi help) to build the F-5Gs and then sell them to various Arab states.

Abou Ghazala, who was in a particularly friendly and outgoing mood, confided to me privately that he believed he had convinced President Mubarak to sign a letter amounting to a commitment to let us establish an RDJTF facility at Ras Banas, which we need to secure funding from Congress. He also predicted that by next January the Egyptians may permit our nuclear powered warships to transit the Suez Canal. This prohibition has heretofore severely hampered the Navy's ability to surge forces from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean. He also told me Egypt would cooperate with us fully in strategic and other contingencies, and in planning, although they want to minimize any visible joint military planning or activity.

He went out of his way to assure me that the Mubarak government is stable, firm and in control and will remain so.

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In addition to my discussions with Minister Ghazala, he also met with George Shultz, Bill Casey, and Bill Clark to discuss a wide range of economic and security interests. (S)

Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany -- an Update: Last week, in two separate operations, German authorities captured three of the four leading members of the terrorist Red Army Faction. This group is the single most dangerous terrorist group indigenous to Europe, and the capture of these three leaders is a most important achievement. Brigitte Mohnhaupt, one of those captured, has been the de facto leader of the RAF since its evolution from the Baader-Meinhof Gang in 1977. She and another of those arrested, Christian Klar, planned and executed the near-successful attack on General Kroesen in 1981.

We currently expect compensation of U.S. personnel whose property has been damaged in recent terrorist bombings to be accommodated through insurance. Discussions of this issue with our personnel security people at EUCOM reflect a consensus that the Federal Republic is extremely attentive to U.S. interests in this regard. It has been discussed informally with the German Government, and they are making every effort to improve their coverage. (S)

Defense Support of Drug Interdiction Efforts: In my Weekly Report of August 13, I listed specific measures I had approved for the Navy to undertake in assisting the South Florida Crime Task Force to stem the flow of illegal drugs into the country, including the embarkation of Coast Guard detachments on Navy ships for boarding U.S. flag and stateless vessels. This measure paid off Saturday night when an eight-man Coast Guard team, operating from the Navy's nuclear guided missile cruiser USS MISSISSIPPI, boarded and seized a vessel (a converted shrimp boat, the RECIFE) laden with approximately 30 tons of marijuana. The Coast Guard detachment, originally assigned to the nuclear carrier USS NIMITZ, was flown to the MISSISSIPPI Saturday evening when NIMITZ aircraft located the RECIFE in a position from which MISSISSIPPI could best make the intercept. After determining the vessel was stateless, the boarding party arrested the eleven-man crew for drug smuggling and altered course for San Juan, Puerto Rico, for follow-on actions. (U)

Visit of Spanish Under Secretary of Defense: Frank Carlucci met with Spanish Under Secretary Eduardo Serra on Tuesday. Serra indicated that they are concerned about the problems in the Navy's F/A-18 attack aircraft program, and that if our Navy does not buy the attack model of the aircraft, neither will they. He also asked for a waiver of non-recurring research and development (R&D) cost recoupment on their potential purchase of AV-8B Harrier airplanes. Frank pointed out that this was a joint venture with the UK, that we have asked the UK for their views on a waiver, and that since Spain wishes to delay a possible commitment to this program, there is time to work on the issue. Secretary Serra emphasized that the new government

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will not want to change the basic cooperative thrust of U.S.-Spanish relations, and Frank assured him of our on-going commitment to pursuit of mutual security interests. (C)

LASER MAVERICK Missile Program: As you may remember from my September 10 Weekly Report item, the Marine Corps' LASER MAVERICK relies on reflected laser beam information for guidance to its target, as opposed to the infrared threat information radiated by a target used by the Infrared (IR) MAVERICK.

Modular Universal Laser Equipment, operated by Marines from simulated ground combat positions, was used as the target designator for six of the fifteen missiles fired in the laser missile test series. The A-6E attack and OV-10D reconnaissance aircraft airborne designators were used to designate for eight firings, including a ripple launch of two missiles against a moving seaborne target. All of the targets in the series were difficult and included moving targets on both land and sea. The land-targets were obscured by the smoke and dust of a battlefield environment, and attacks were made from high and low altitudes at high speed. The missile proved particularly effective in the close air support role, in which targets must be carefully selected in areas where friendly troops are also located. The fifteen missiles fired achieved 13 direct hits on targets, one very close hit, and one warhead that dudded due to an interruption of power to the laser target designator. The LASER MAVERICK is scheduled for initial limited production in 1983, and it will undergo additional operational testing prior to a full-rate production decision. (C)

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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December 4, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Weekly Report of Defense Activities

Attached is Cap Weinberger's weekly report dated December 3, 1982.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver / VB

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 34(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008
BY NARA RW, DATE 5/10/13

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

159201



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December 3, 1982

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Weekly Report of Defense Activities

Legislative Affairs: In a major victory for our Defense program, the House Appropriations Committee failed yesterday to kill funding for the MX/Peacekeeper missile when the vote on Defense Subcommittee Chairman Joe Addabbo's amendment to cut \$988 million for MX production resulted in a 26-26 tie. The close vote, which was expected, came only as a result of a concerted team effort. Your participation and personal telephone calls were the major factors. In addition to the calls which I made from Europe, Vice-President Bush, Frank Carlucci, John Lehman, Verne Orr, and Dick DeLauer were all key players in contacting reluctant committee members. As approved by the House Appropriations Committee, Congress will have until March 15 to review the MX missile and our proposed "Dense-Pack" basing mode before funds are available. The Senate Appropriations Committee has provided a similar restriction limited to 30 legislative days following our basing mode announcement.

Our firm opposition to Defense reductions was also responsible for rejection of other amendments in the House Committee which would have cut key weapon systems. The committee handily rejected Addabbo amendments to cut the B-1B strategic bomber and two nuclear aircraft carriers by votes of 15-29 and 18-34, respectively.

There certainly will be challenges to the MX missile and other major items on the House floor in actions that could occur as early as next week. Given the close House committee results, we are already preparing an intense effort to build a winning coalition in the full House. Again, your personal effort will be immensely helpful to our case. Assistant Secretary Rourke is already consulting with Ken Duberstein to coordinate this action.

As part of our effort to secure Congressional approval of the MX missile, I will be appearing before John Tower's Senate Armed Services Committee next Wednesday. My testimony will lead off a series of hearings to establish a record on the technical merits of the missile and the "Dense-Pack" basing option. John has been very cooperative in our efforts to keep MX alive in the lame-duck session of Congress. He, along with

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Senators Warner, Stevens, and Jackson, sent a letter to Congressional colleagues to urge that MX be studied until an informed final decision can be made in the next session of Congress.

Finally, as you know, Jack Edwards was singularly responsible for leading our MX battle in the House committee. He worked tirelessly throughout the week and at all times carefully coordinated vote counts with us on a very regular basis. Jack will clearly be our major supporter and worker in the upcoming full House battle. Once again, your telephone call to Jack thanking him was very timely and well received. (U)

CH-47 Helicopter Readiness Update: In my October 15 Weekly Report, I discussed the actions we were taking to rectify the CH-47 helicopter transmission lubrication problems that resulted in the fatal crash of one of these aircraft in the Federal Republic of Germany in September. As you know, we grounded the entire CH-47 fleet after that crash and, as a result, the readiness of U.S. and NATO Allies' forces suffered a significant adverse impact, although, of course, it was an absolutely essential step to restore safe flying conditions.

I am happy to report that over 120 of the 397 helicopters affected now have serviceable transmissions installed, and all active and reserve CH-47 operating units have some complete sets of serviceable transmissions available for installation. This will enable all units to return to a normal training tempo as the installations are completed. We expect steady improvements in readiness as units resume training activities and as continued inspection, cleaning, and repair of the remaining transmissions progresses. We also expect to increase our rate of providing serviceable transmissions as a result of successfully contracting last week with an Italian firm to assist in the inspection and cleaning process of transmissions in Europe. I believe this will also enable us to complete the overall fleet repair effort in a little less than the three months we originally estimated it might take. (U)

Secure Communications for Saudi Arabia: In response to a request from the Saudis, we have been working to develop alternative means of establishing secure communications between our two governments. We have developed four possible alternatives that would provide the desired secure voice capability, all of which would involve providing them with high-quality U.S. secure communications equipment. Because of the sensitivity of this equipment, we believe that if we are to proceed with any of the alternatives, it should be predicated solely upon use of the equipment for voice communications between the very highest levels of our governments. While the initiative is yet in an early stage, we are proceeding with discussions with State, White House Communications Agency, and Defense Communications Agency to work out details, including estimated costs, physical security controls, and delivery/installation lead times. I

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believe, however, that we should respond quickly to the Saudi request, so we are pursuing the effort as rapidly as we can while assuring security of the information and equipment involved. (S)

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Fiscal Year 1982 Recruiting Results: The final statistics of our FY 1982 recruiting efforts have been determined and I am very pleased to report that it was one of the best recruiting and retention years the Department has experienced since the inception of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF). Not only were we successful in recruiting 100% of our planned end-FY 1982 strength level, but nearly 86 percent of our new enlisted accessions had high school diplomas--the highest proportion ever under either conscription or the AVF. Nearly nine percent had attended or graduated from college, the highest level since 1973. The percentage of enlistees scoring average and above on the enlistment test was over 87 percent, which was greater than any year under conscription.

The high quality of our new recruits, combined with record-breaking first-term reenlistment rates (52 percent of those eligible) and an overall reenlistment rate of over 68 percent, greatly enhance the quality of our services and will go far toward providing the defense capability we need. (U)

Wartime Host Nation Support (WHNS): In preparation for the NATO Ministerials, I reviewed our arrangements with nations worldwide for WHNS, and I believe you may find some of this information interesting.

We have completed and are seeking additional WHNS agreements to support operations in all three areas in which we consider conflict most likely. In Korea we have eased the great difficulty of rapidly deploying support units through the development of extensive WHNS arrangements including assignment of Korean military personnel to U.S. units, ammunition transport, and wartime facilities. In Southwest Asia lack of indigenous civil or military support limits our potential for WHNS; however,

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both Egypt and Oman have agreed in principle to provide WHNS. We also are discussing prepositioning with Sudan and are pursuing possible support from Saudi Arabia in the future. In NATO the written rule for support is that "logistics is a national responsibility." However, we now depend on such extensive WHNS that "coalition logistics" better describes the actual support structure.

Currently we have three major WHNS programs with our NATO allies. The oldest agreements are the Benelux Lines of Communication Agreements under which the Benelux countries receive and transship people and supplies arriving from the U.S. Other major agreements are those for collocated operating bases. Our Air Force has agreements to use the excess capacity of 49 allied airfields to receive reinforcing tactical aircraft squadrons. The newest major agreement is the recently signed agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany to provide 93,000 reservists and a substantial amount of civilian support. This agreement is unique in the type of support provided (by involving reserve personnel the support can include combat zone functions not normally considered for WHNS) and in the joint cost-sharing arrangement. As you know, we are currently working to gain essential Congressional approval for the first installment of these costs. (S)

Prisoner of War/Missing in Action (PW/MIA) Technical Talks:
Next week Defense PW/MIA technical experts will meet with the Vietnamese in Hanoi to discuss the MIA issue. This will be the first of four PW/MIA meetings a year our representatives will have with them. The Vietnamese agreement to hold four meetings a year was a result of an initiative we presented in Hanoi last February. At that time we invited the Vietnamese to Hawaii to discuss the PW/MIA issue and they accepted our invitation and visited Hawaii in August. During both the February and August meetings we stressed the need for regularly scheduled PW/MIA talks and proposed four meetings a year. In September the Vietnamese agreed, and we are currently planning for two meetings per year in Hawaii and two in Hanoi.

During the National League of Families recent trip to Laos, the Lao allowed the league delegation and U.S. officials to visit the location of two U.S. aircraft crash sites. These events and subsequent Lao conversations with the U.S. Charge' to Laos indicate possible movement on their part regarding the PW/MIA issue. One possible outcome of this movement is the establishment of a regular dialogue between representatives of the U.S. Joint Casualty Resolution Center and a Lao committee charged with investigating the MIA problem. In coordination with State we are seriously considering an invitation to the Lao to visit our PW/MIA facilities in Hawaii as a prelude to possible regular periodic discussions of this critically important issue. (C)

Defense Policy on Driving While Intoxicated (DWI): Last year almost 500 servicemembers died as a result of accidents in which a driver was intoxicated, and injury and property damage costs were estimated to be between \$110 and \$150 million. Because of this I issued a memorandum last Friday stressing that any servicemember, dependent, or civilian employee convicted of DWI by civil court, court-martial, or punished under Article 15, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), will be prohibited from operating a private motor vehicle on a military installation or facility for a minimum of one year. Only installation commanders may grant exceptions, and offenders will be required to complete an alcohol education program as a prerequisite to reinstatement of base driving privileges.

The UCMJ currently proscribes drunken driving, but does not specify a particular blood-alcohol content level as conclusively establishing intoxication. I have therefore directed the Joint Service Committee on Military Justice to study the various State laws that make it an offense to drive with a specified blood-alcohol content level and to draft an appropriate amendment to the code. This action will aid in the enforcement effort. Additionally, the Military Departments are to promote public awareness by conducting an intensified public education effort through the media, with special emphasis on the high risk of apprehension, the negative consequences to the person caught, and the adverse impact of such irresponsible behavior on local commands.

I issued this direction by memorandum in order to ensure that our servicemembers are reformed of the danger of DWI prior to the forthcoming holiday season. I plan to follow up this action with a formalized Defense Directive in the next few months. (U)

NATO Defense Ministers Meetings: You will have seen my separate cable reporting on these meetings. (U)

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Lay".