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**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC:  
Agency File  
**Folder Title:** Secretary of State's Evening Reports  
(06/01/1984-06/29/1984)  
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*Last Updated: 6/6/2024*

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: AGENCY FILE

**Withdrawer**

RBW 4/24/2013

**File Folder** SECRETARY OF STATE EVENING REPORT (06/01/1984-06/29/1984)

**FOIA**

M453

**Box Number** 7

SHIFRINSON

71

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
157960	MEMO	KENNETH DAM TO RR <b>PAR 1/25/2016 M453/5</b>	1	6/1/1984	B1 B3
157968	CABLE	WH05092 <b>R 1/25/2016 M453/5</b>	2	6/4/1984	B1
157972	MEMO	KENNETH DAM TO RR [SAME TEXT AS DOC. 157968] <b>R 1/25/2016 M453/5</b>	1	6/4/1984	B1
157976	MEMO	DAM TO RR <b>R 1/25/2016 M453/5</b>	1	6/5/1984	B1
157977	MEMO	DAM TO RR <b>R 1/25/2016 M453/5</b>	1	6/6/1984	B1
157978	MEMO	DAM TO RR <b>R 1/25/2016 M453/5</b>	1	6/7/1984	B1
157979	MEMO	DAM TO RR <b>R 1/25/2016 M453/5</b>	1	6/8/1984	B1
157981	CABLE	WH05221 [SAME TEXT AS DOC. 157979] <b>R 1/25/2016 M453/5</b>	2	6/9/1984	B1
157984	MEMO	GEORGE SHULTZ TO RR <b>R 1/25/2016 M453/5</b>	1	6/11/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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157987	MEMO	GEORGE SHULTZ TO RR <i>R 1/25/2016 M453/5</i>	1	6/12/1984	B1
157989	MEMO	GEORGE SHULTZ TO RR <i>R 1/25/2016 M453/5</i>	1	6/13/1984	B1
157991	MEMO	GEORGE SHULTZ TO RR <i>R 1/25/2016 M453/5</i>	1	6/14/1984	B1
158027	CABLE	WH05315 <i>R 1/25/2016 M453/5</i>	2	6/16/1984	B1
158028	MEMO	DAM TO RR [SAME TEXT AS DOC. 158027] <i>R 1/25/2016 M453/5</i>	1	6/15/1984	B1
158029	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR <i>R 1/25/2016 M453/5</i>	1	6/18/1984	B1
158030	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR <i>R 1/25/2016 M453/5</i>	1	6/19/1984	B1
158031	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR <i>R 1/25/2016 M453/5</i>	1	6/20/1984	B1
158032	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR <i>R 1/25/2016 M453/5</i>	1	6/21/1984	B1
158034	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 158033] <i>R 1/25/2016 M453/5</i>	1	6/22/1984	B1

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158033	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR <i>R 1/25/2016 M453/5</i>	1	6/22/1984	B1
158035	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR <i>R 4/27/2022 M453/5</i>	1	6/25/1984	B1
158036	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR <i>R 1/25/2016 M453/5</i>	1	6/26/1984	B1
158037	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR <i>R 1/25/2016 M453/5</i>	1	6/28/1984	B1 B3
158038	MEMO	MICHAEL ARMACOST TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 158039] <i>R 1/25/2016 M453/5</i>	1	6/29/1984	B1
158039	MEMO	MICHAEL ARMACOST TO RR <i>R 1/25/2016 M453/5</i>	1	6/29/1984	B1

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157960

84 MAY 2 AIO: 10

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

June 1, 1984

13524  
E.O. 12958  
As Amended  
Sec. 3.3 b(1)

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM : Kenneth W. Dam, Acting *KWD*

1. Dutch Cabinet Decision. Preliminary reaction to the Dutch Cabinet decision on GLCM basing in the Netherlands from other basing countries suggests general agreement with the line established in the White House and State Department statements earlier today. The UK has told us that they plan to say that, if the Dutch decision is a move to a firmer Dutch commitment to deploy, it is a step in the right direction. Senior levels of the Italian Foreign Ministry have said they agree with our approach. We have not heard from the FRG or Belgium. Washington journalists so far appear to be taking an upbeat approach, emphasizing the positive aspects in the Dutch decision. At the same time, we must remain conscious of the potential unraveling effects in other countries of the Dutch decision. We thus believe we should continue to walk the very narrow public line we have adopted.

2. Security Council Approves Arab Resolution on Gulf Situation. The UN Security Council approved the Arab draft resolution on the Persian Gulf by a vote of 13(US) - 0, with two abstentions (Zimbabwe, Nicaragua). Zimbabwe explained that it considered the resolution insufficiently balanced between Iran and Iraq. Nicaragua complained that the resolution did not adequately reaffirm the principle of free navigation, using the mining of Nicaraguan harbors as a case in point, and that it was ambiguous in rejecting the possibility of outside intervention in the Gulf. Several other states, notably India, said that they were not entirely happy with the final text but could interpret it in a way enabling their favorable votes.

3. Iraqi Attack on Iranian Oil Facilities. The Iraqi attack on Iranian oil refineries at Tabriz on May 31 marks the first such attack since the early stages of the war in 1980. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] damage to warehouses and piping at the refinery, but the full extent of that damage is still to be determined. If such attacks continue successfully, they could impair the Iranian war effort as well as domestic consumption. This attack might also serve as a prelude to air strikes on the Kharg Island facilities. In either case, the Iranian response could well be further escalation in the Gulf. Iranian political leaders in the last few days have again warned the Gulf Arab states against continuing their support of Iraq. Iran can be expected to retaliate for the Iraqi attacks and may strike oil facilities across the Gulf, in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

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BY RW NARA DATE 1/25/16

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SITTO # 110  
ROBERT KIMMITT FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
MR. MCFARLANE  
TOM SHULL  
MR. BAKER  
MR. DEAVER  
ROBERT KIMMITT

6/6/84

JUNE 4, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: KENNETH W. DAM, ACTING

1. SAKHAROV: DEAD OR ALIVE? SINCE SATURDAY, THERE HAS BEEN A SPATE OF CONFLICTING REPORTS AS TO WHETHER SAKHAROV IS DEAD OR ALIVE. TODAY THE FRENCH ANNOUNCED THAT MITTERRAND WILL GO TO MOSCCOW AT THE END OF THE MONTH. SINCE MITTERRAND WAS DELAYING A DECISION ON HIS TRIP PENDING DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SAKHAROV CASE, IT MAY BE THAT THE FRENCH HAVE RECEIVED BELIEVABLE ASSURANCES THAT SAKHAROV IS STILL ALIVE. WE WILL BE CHECKING WITH THE FRENCH ON THIS; ON THE BASIS OF THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE THUS FAR WE ARE UNABLE TO DETERMINE DR. SAKHAROV'S PRESENT CONDITION.

2. FORMER JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH UNDER SECRETARY ARMACOST. ZAID RIFAI, FORMER JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER AND CLOSE ADVISOR TO KING HUSSEIN, ON A PRIVATE VISIT TO THE U.S., MET WITH MIKE ARMACOST THIS AFTERNOON TO SHARE HIS VIEWS ON THE MIDDLE EAST. HE WAS FRANK ABOUT JORDAN'S HOPE FOR A LABOR VICTORY IN ISRAEL AND FOR YOUR REELECTION, ARGUING THAT ANY HOPE FOR PROGRESS FOR MIDDLE EAST-PEACE HINGED ON AT LEAST THESE TWO EVENTS. HE ALSO ARGUED THAT PRODUCTIVE EFFORTS MUST BE BASED ON AN APPROACH FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT (I.E. INCLUDING SYRIA) TO IMPLEMENT THE FUNDAMENTAL TERRITORY FOR PEACE PRINCIPLE OF UNSC RESOLUTION 242 ("TOTAL WITHDRAWAL FOR TOTAL PEACE" ALLOWING FOR MINOR BORDER RECTIFICATIONS ONLY). HE SAID HE HAD COUNSELLED HUSSEIN NOT TO DO ANYTHING PRECIPITOUS WHICH WOULD FURTHER AGGRAVATE THE US-JORDANIAN RELATIONSHIP (SUCH AS PURCHASING ARMS FROM THE SOVIETS).

3. CONGRESSIONAL REACTION TO SECRETARY'S MANAGUA VISIT. CONGRESSIONAL REACTION TO GEORGE'S MANAGUA VISIT WAS LARGELY POSITIVE AMONG THE 40

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BY RW NARA DATE 1/25/16

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MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WHOM WE BRIEFED. WE RECEIVED SUPPORT FROM, AMONG OTHERS, SENATORS BAKER, PERCY, MOYNIHAN, STENNIS, STEVENS, INOUE, ROTH, AND JOHNSTON. SENATOR KASTEN AND CONGRESSMAN LIVINGSTON WERE THE ONLY TWO OUT OF FORTY TO REACT NEGATIVELY, OPINING THAT IT WAS INAPPROPRIATE AND WOULD APPEAR OVERLY SOLICITOUS. PRESS WRAPUP OF CONGRESSIONAL SENTIMENT WAS ALMOST UNIFORMLY POSITIVE, ALBEIT WITH SOME WAIT-AND-SEE SKEPTICISM.

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157972

84 JUN 5 A 9: 34

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

June 4, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting *KWD*

1. Sakharov: Dead or Alive? Since Saturday, there has been a spate of conflicting reports as to whether Sakharov is dead or alive. Today the French announced that Mitterrand will go to Moscow at the end of the month. Since Mitterrand was delaying a decision on his trip pending developments in the Sakharov case, it may be that the French have received believable assurances that Sakharov is still alive. We will be checking with the French on this; on the basis of the evidence available thus far we are unable to determine Dr. Sakharov's present condition.

2. Former Jordanian Prime Minister's Meeting with Under Secretary Armacost. Zaid Rifai, former Jordanian Prime Minister and close advisor to King Hussein, on a private visit to the U.S., met with Mike Armacost this afternoon to share his views on the Middle East. He was frank about Jordan's hope for a Labor victory in Israel and for your reelection, arguing that any hope for progress for Middle East peace hinged on at least these two events. He also argued that productive efforts must be based on an approach for a comprehensive settlement (i.e. including Syria) to implement the fundamental territory for peace principle of UNSC Resolution 242 ("total withdrawal for total peace" allowing for minor border rectifications only). He said he had counselled Hussein not to do anything precipitous which would further aggravate the US-Jordanian relationship (such as purchasing arms from the Soviets).

3. Congressional Reaction to Secretary's Managua Visit. Congressional reaction to George's Managua visit was largely positive among the 40 members of Congress whom we briefed. We received support from, among others, Senators Baker, Percy, Moynihan, Stennis, Stevens, Inouye, Roth, and Johnston. Senator Kasten and Congressman Livingston were the only two out of forty to react negatively, opining that it was inappropriate and would appear overly solicitous. Press wrapup of Congressional sentiment was almost uniformly positive, albeit with some wait-and-see skepticism.

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NLRR M453/5 # 157972  
BY RW NARA DATE 1/25/16



84 JUN 6 A 9: 38

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

June 5, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting *KWD*

1. Kasten Subcommittee Hearing on Stinger. Today Mike Armacost testified before Senator Kasten's Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee on the Persian Gulf and the Stinger sale to Saudi Arabia. Mike was questioned very aggressively, particularly on the use of the President's emergency authority for the Stinger sale. All Senators attending -- Kasten, Rudman, D'Amato, Specter, Inouye, and DeConcini -- opposed the sale. Members asked why the number of missiles was raised from 200 to 400, why the decision was made while Congress was on recess, and whether the situation in the Gulf justified use of the emergency authority. Some Members thought we have too clearly taken sides in the Gulf War, and that we should make greater efforts to involve the EC nations and Japan in the search for a solution. All expressed fear that the war might broaden and directly involve the U.S. Kasten warned that Congress would look unfavorably on any future Stinger sales, especially to Kuwait. He also said we can expect legislative efforts to block further Stinger sales and, more comprehensively, to augment the authority of Congress in overseeing arms sales.

2. Meeting with Senator Baker. I briefed Senator Baker today on the Secretary's trip to Managua, the Middle East and other subjects. We also discussed a possible dialogue on war powers legislation between members of the Executive and Legislative Branches and problems which have arisen in connection with the nuclear agreement with the PRC. On Iran/Iraq, Baker speculated whether the Saudi action in shooting down Iranian aircraft would involve the United States in a war powers problem. Baker said Percy was pressing him to bring up the foreign assistance authorization bill. Baker had said at a policy luncheon today that he would bring it up before the July 4 recess but had declined Percy's request to have it follow immediately the defense bill. Baker believes the Jerusalem resolution is certain to come up as an amendment to the foreign assistance authorization bill, although he specifically asked at the luncheon that this not be done. As for the problem involving Turkish aid, Baker doubts that Byrd will be active on compromise language to make it acceptable since there is too much opposition in his own party.

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NLRR M453/5 #157976  
BY RW NARA DATE 1/25/10

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S/S 8416571

84 JUN 7 AIO: 32

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

June 6, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting *KWD*

1. Latin Letter on Economic Problems. I met June 6 with Ambassadors of Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, and the Charge of Brazil to receive a letter addressed to you and signed by the Presidents of the respective countries. The Argentine Ambassador, as spokesman, said they had instructions to convey to you their common concern about the social impact of the economic crisis on their countries. He added that the letter, which raises the issues of debt, finance and trade, was meant to be delivered in time for its consideration at the London Summit. I assured the Ambassadors the letter would be sent forward and that the debt issue would form an integral part of the London agenda.

2. Briefing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Gulf. Under Secretary Armacost, accompanied by Assistant Secretary Murphy, General Gast, and Assistant Secretary Armitage gave a closed briefing to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on developments in the Persian Gulf. The hour and a half session was a thoughtful and polite exchange of views.

Senator Boschwitz questioned at length what effect a crimp in the flow of Gulf oil would have on world oil supply, and he urged that we try to persuade the French to cease supplying arms to Iraq. Senator Mathias made a strong appeal for the Administration to consult early with the Congress, and before decisions are made, if it appears that a further U.S. involvement in the Gulf conflict may be necessary. He also said he is concerned that there is still a large flow of dual-use parts and equipment to Iran from the United States. Both he and Senator Glenn agreed that we are on a thin line by not reporting under the War Powers Resolution in this situation.

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NLR 10453/5 # 157977  
BY RW NARA DATE 1/25/16

157978

84 JUN 8 AIO: 41

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

June 7, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting *KWD*

1. Soviet Reaction to Your Dublin Speech. In the most authoritative Soviet commentary to date, Pravda June 7 carried an editorial denouncing the Dublin speech as a cynical effort to calm public anxieties in Europe and "another portion of pseudo-peaceful rhetoric." The editorial dismisses the President's offer on non-use of force as an effort "to create a semblance of the readiness" for talks on the Soviet proposal. It claims (incorrectly) that, "in reality, the American representatives at Stockholm are unwilling to discuss this issue today," but are instead "doing their utmost to persuade the socialist states to agree to NATO's espionage program, which has nothing to do with the task of building confidence." The editorial also criticizes claims that the speech contained a "new initiative" on INF, noting that the U.S. is adhering to the same "zero" and "interim" options which it allegedly used to bring the talks "into a blind alley." The Soviets are obviously not prepared to say anything positive about U.S. initiatives, but feel the effect of those initiatives on public opinion.

2. Meeting with Senator Nunn. Under Secretary Armacost paid a courtesy call on Senator Nunn. The discussion focused on the upcoming Senate debate on the DOD Authorization Bill. Senator Nunn predicted that much of the debate would be on arms control issues, particularly ASAT. He characterized space arms control as the most glaring gap in the Administration's arms control policy. Nunn also discussed at length his concern about what he described as woefully inadequate defense efforts by our NATO allies.

3. Legislation to Move Our Embassy to Jerusalem. Ed Derwinski had a friendly meeting today with Senator Moynihan, who confirmed that he now has 51 co-sponsors for his bill mandating the move of our Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Moynihan believes that a floor vote on this bill and a similar measure in the House are now certain. Moynihan did not suggest a compromise in the form of a non-binding resolution, an approach now gaining favor on the Hill as many Congressional "supporters" of the bills recognize the political and foreign policy disadvantages of this legislation. Extensive calls to Senators show few enthusiastic supporters but few strong opponents, and extensive support for a diplomatic solution in the form of a non-binding resolution. The same situation prevails in the House.

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BY *RW* NARA DATE 1/25/16

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

June 8, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting *KWD*

1. PRC Nuclear Agreement: Discussion with Ambassador.  
 Since we hope to raise the question of Chinese reluctance to provide clarification on the nonproliferation issue during Defense Minister Zhang Aiping's call on the Secretary, Paul Wolfowitz called in Ambassador Zhang Wenjin today. Paul said that while we genuinely welcome Premier Zhao's statement of China's policy not to assist others, there is no prospect of sending the agreement forward for Presidential approval without the requested clarification. He suggested that China agree to discussions with Dick Kennedy to ensure that we understand each other's nonproliferation policy. Ambassador Zhang said he will report this to his government and to Minister Zhang, but he hopes the issue will not overshadow the Minister's visit. Paul said he is giving some thought to how we should handle the issue if public attention focusses on the delay in signing the agreement; we will consult with the Embassy on this.

2. Kuwaiti Ambassador's Meeting with Under Secretary Armacost. Kuwaiti Ambassador Shaikh Saud Nasir Al Sabah met with Under Secretary Armacost June 8 to discuss U.S.-Kuwaiti military cooperation and specifically to press for a decision on Kuwait's request for Stinger. Armacost said that we are urgently reviewing Kuwait's air defense requirements in light of the recent CENTCOM survey team's report. Certain factors had facilitated use of the emergency waiver provision in selling Stinger to Saudi Arabia. However, Congressional reaction to this emergency waiver had been strong, and if it were used again at this time, this could provoke stringent legislative restrictions. Ambassador Al Sabah said the Government of Kuwait did not wish to be subjected to critical comment and examination in the Congress and the press. He said Kuwait had turned to the United States for its air defense needs because of its wish to have a closer military supply relationship. Under Secretary Armacost mentioned several recent remarks by senior Kuwaiti officials that had further complicated the matter. He reminded the Ambassador that availability of Stingers in the U.S. military inventory would also be an important consideration in our final decision.

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BY *RW* NARA DATE 1/29/16

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FM THE SITUATION ROOM  
TO MR. KIMMITT/LONDON  
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~~TOP SECRET~~ WH05221

PLEASE PROVIDE COPIES FOR: THE PRESIDENT, MR. MCFARLANE, MR. MEESE, MR. BAKER, MR. DEEVER, MR. KIMMITT AND MR. SHULL

ATTACHED IS ACTING SECRETARY DAM'S EVENING REPORT FOR FRIDAY, JUNE 8, 1984.

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: KENNETH W. DAM, ACTING

1. PRC NUCLEAR AGREEMENT: DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADOR. SINCE WE HOPE TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF CHINESE RELUCTANCE TO PROVIDE CLARIFICATION ON THE NONPROLIFERATION ISSUE DURING DEFENSE MINISTER ZHANG AIPING'S CALL ON THE SECRETARY, PAUL WOLFOVITZ CALLED IN AMBASSADOR ZHANG WENJIN TODAY. PAUL SAID THAT WHILE WE GENUINELY WELCOME PREMIER ZHAO'S STATEMENT OF CHINA'S POLICY NOT TO ASSIST OTHERS, THERE IS NO PROSPECT OF SENDING THE AGREEMENT FORWARD FOR PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL WITHOUT THE REQUEST CLARIFICATION. HE SUGGESTED THAT CHINA AGREE TO DISCUSSIONS WITH DICK KENNEDY TO ENSURE THAT WE UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER'S NONPROLIFERATION POLICY. AMBASSADOR ZHANG SAID HE WILL REPORT THIS TO HIS GOVERNMENT AND TO MINISTER ZHANG, BUT HE HOPES THE ISSUE WILL NOT OVERSHADOW THE MINISTER'S VISIT. PAUL SAID HE IS GIVING SOME THOUGHT TO HOW WE SHOULD HANDLE THE ISSUE IF PUBLIC ATTENTION FOCUSSES ON THE DELAY IN SIGNING THE AGREEMENT; WE WILL CONSULT WITH THE EMBASSY ON THIS.

2. KUWAITI AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH UNDER SECRETARY ARMACOST. KUWAITI AMBASSADOR SHAIKH SAUD NASIR AL SABAH MET WITH UNDER SECRETARY ARMACOST JUNE 8 TO DISCUSS U.S.-KUWAITI MILITARY COOPERATION AND SPECIFICALLY TO PRESS FOR A DECISION ON KUWAIT'S REQUEST FOR STINGER. ARMACOST SAID THAT WE ARE URGENTLY REVIEWING KUWAIT'S AIR DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS IN LIGHT OF THE RECENT CENTCOM SURVEY TEAM'S REPORT. CERTAIN FACTORS HAD FACILITATED USE OF THE EMERGENCY WAIVER PROVISION IN SELLING STINGER TO SAUDI ARABIA. HOWEVER, CONGRESSIONAL REACTION TO THIS EMERGENCY WAIVER HAD BEEN STRONG, AND IF IT WERE USED AGAIN AT THIS TIME, THIS COULD PROVOKE STRINGENT LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS. AMBASSADOR AL SABAH SAID THE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT DID NOT WISH TO BE SUBJECTED TO CRITICAL

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NLRR M453/5 #157981  
BY RW NARA DATE 1/23/16

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COMMENT AND EXAMINATION IN THE CONGRESS AND THE PRESS. HE SAID KUWAIT HAD TURNED TO THE UNITED STATES FOR ITS AIR DEFENSE NEEDS BECAUSE OF ITS WISH TO HAVE A CLOSER MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP. UNDER SECRETARY ARMACOST MENTIONED SEVERAL RECENT REMARKS BY SENIOR KUWAIT OFFICIALS THAT HAD FURTHER COMPLICATED THE MATTER. HE REMINDED THE AMBASSADOR THAT AVAILABILITY OF STINGERS IN THE U.S. MILITARY INVENTORY WOULD ALSO BE AN IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION IN OUR FINAL DECISION.

DECL: OADR

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157984

BY

DATE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

June 11, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz

1. French to Propose Sharp Limits on SDI, ASAT at Geneva CD. Ambassador Vernier-Palliez called on Mike Armacost to present an advance copy of a French position paper on "Military Uses of Space," to be presented to the Conference on Disarmament later this week. It expresses concern over efforts by both the US and USSR to develop new anti-ballistic missile technologies, which it sees as threatening the stability of deterrence, and calls for negotiations to limit these now, "before irreversible developments occur." It calls for a ban on high-altitude ASATs, a renewable five-year ban on testing and deployment of ASAT- and BMD-capable directed energy weapons, and "rules of the road" for space. This French initiative will gain significant publicity if we cannot persuade them to postpone and moderate their announcement. (C)

2. Chernenko "Interview" on Space Weapons. In an effort to capitalize on growing Congressional pressures to restrict U.S. ASAT funds, the Soviet press today published Chernenko's answers to questions from American journalist J. Kingsbury-Smith. Chernenko praised Congressional opponents of U.S. ASAT programs and reiterated the intention of the Soviet Union to respect its own unilateral ASAT moratorium as long as the United States did likewise, as a first step toward a total ban on all ASAT systems. He also suggested that national technical means are wholly adequate for monitoring a freeze on ASAT weapons; although he claimed the USSR could consider "other forms" of verification, his intention was to dismiss US concerns on this issue. (C)

3. Italy: Implications of Berlinguer's Death. Italian Communist leader Berlinguer was long identified with "Eurocommunism," occasionally sharp differences with Moscow, and the concept of governing in limited cooperation with Italy's Christian Democrats. With no established or obvious successor, the PCI will probably drift for a period under a collegial leadership likely to continue the party's current policy lines. Most observers expect that an eventual successor will come from the ideological center of the party. A special Party Congress may be necessary before a successor is clearly identified. (C)

4. Contadora Foreign Ministers Deliver Draft Agreement. The Contadora Four foreign ministers met June 8 in Panama to review the draft agreement prepared by the vice ministerial team; they then travelled to Central American capitals on June 9 and 10 to deliver the agreement. We have not seen the draft agreement, and we do not know how closely it follows the 21 points of the Contadora Document of Objectives. The draft reportedly calls for verifiable limitations on arms levels, the withdrawal of foreign advisors, the cessation of support to subversive and terrorist elements, and for the establishment of democratic and pluralistic political systems. (C)

5. Murphy Testimony on Gulf War. Dick Murphy testified today before the Hamilton Middle East Subcommittee on our Gulf policy. Questioning followed three basic lines: what was the nature of the emergency; was the Administration making a pretext to circumvent notification procedures; and if the Gulf were closed, would we intervene only if asked? Murphy characterized the waiver use as a prudent judgment to help the Saudis to act in their own self-defense. Steve Solarz asked mischievously why we sold Stingers only to Saudi Arabia, if Kuwait is just as vulnerable. Murphy said we were not drawing lines around Saudi Arabia at the expense of Kuwait or other Gulf states. (U)

DECL:OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

S/S 8417128

157987

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

June 12, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz

1. PRC Defense Minister Rejects Nuclear Approach. I met briefly with PRC Defense Minister Zhang Aiping and then left him with Ken Dam to discuss the nuclear non-proliferation problem. Ken explained that we wanted to take the opportunity of the Minister's presence here to raise the issue again of Chinese personnel at the Kahuta uranium enrichment facility. Ken passed the Chinese a paper outlining our views, welcomed PRC policy statements on nuclear non-proliferation, and made the point clearly that we are seeking clarification of Chinese policy, not questioning their word. The Minister reiterated the PRC's policy on non-proliferation but said the nuclear cooperation agreement was not within his area of responsibility. Ambassador Zhang added that China had made its policy clear and there was nothing further to add. The Minister then noted that he was here primarily to meet with Weinberger and that as an old friend he had called on me, but he was not authorized to accept the paper Ken had presented. The meeting ended with the Minister's expression of regret that the subject had been raised. Although Zhang became very stiff and the atmosphere remarkably chilly for this heatwave, it was noted that Ambassador Zhang read completely through the paper that was offered before handing it back, and the message clearly got through. (TOP SECRET)

2. French Table Position Paper on ASAT, SDI at CD. Mike Armacost called in Ambassador Vernier-Palliez to urge that the French not proceed with their plans to table their unhelpful paper on space arms control in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD). Mike stressed that we had consulted fully with the French, would continue to do so, understood their concerns, and were working to advance Alliance security interests in these areas. However, this public French initiative would only serve to give an impression of Alliance disunity, and help shift the spotlight from the Soviet failure to respond to our arms control initiatives. The French nevertheless tabled their position paper in the CD this afternoon. I have sent a strong letter to the French Foreign Minister expressing our disappointment and concern over the French action. (C)

3. Meeting with Jesse Jackson. Mike also met with Jesse Jackson today, at Jackson's request, to discuss his planned June 22-28 trip to Panama, Nicaragua and Cuba. Hinting at "overtures" he has received from the Salvadoran guerrillas and others in the region, Jackson sought a full briefing so that his conversations would complement and not undercut ongoing diplomatic efforts. Jackson clearly hopes that his trip will produce significantly constructive Nicaraguan and Cuban positions in order to have a substantial impact on the peace process. Mike reviewed the general picture, delineating our concerns vis-a-vis Nicaragua and Cuba, and leaving Jackson under no illusions about the seriousness of the points at issue. Jackson also understands our view that the Contadora process coupled with our bilateral efforts provides the best framework for addressing the problems. Jackson says that he is aware of the potential pitfalls of being used by the Nicaraguans and Cubans. The discussion also covered Africa, with Jackson predictably criticizing our policy of constructive engagement in southern Africa. Mike reviewed the solid progress we have made. Following the meeting he stressed to the press a possible role in building regional peace and did not use the comments as a forum for direct criticism. (C)

DECL:OADR



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

S/S 8417262

157989

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

June 13, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: <sup>84 JUN 14 8:02</sup> THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz *GPS*

1. Breakfast Meeting with HFAC. This morning, at the invitation of Chairman Fасcell, I attended a breakfast meeting with the members of HFAC. The meeting, which was attended by more than 20 members, was called to discuss my trip to Nicaragua, talks that took place at the London Economic Summit, US-Soviet relations, and various other foreign policy issues. Members were interested to learn if the issues of the Iran/Iraq War, Central America, and Soviet arms negotiations were discussed at the Summit and they were curious to have reports on the views expressed about these issues by other world leaders. The session was dominated, however, by discussion about Central America. While there was unanimous praise for the initiative to visit Managua, there remained considerable skepticism, particularly among the Democrats, about the sincerity of our effort and where it will lead. (C)

2. Terrorism Testimony Before HFAC. I testified before the HFAC today on international terrorism and the Administration's legislative package. Questioning in this well-attended session focused almost exclusively on the proposed bill which makes it a crime for Americans to provide training or services to nations designated by the Secretary of State as supporting international terrorism. Some members asked for additional evidence that new legislation was needed. Others remarked on the difficulty of defining "terrorist" states and groups. Certain members asked whether particular states (South Africa, Bulgaria) or groups (the PLO) would be designated. I pointed out that prohibiting the supply of American services to states supporting terrorism was a modest but essential step. I agreed that the designation process would be difficult but noted that we now make such designations in other areas, such as export controls. I declined to speculate about which states might be so designated, and underscored for the Committee the importance of the Summit declaration on terrorism. (C)

3. Deputy Secretary's Testimony Before SFRC. Ken Dam testified this morning before the SFRC in an overview hearing on arms control. Senators Percy, Pell and Cranston were present. Ken outlined the Administration's arms control goals and our flexible posture concerning renewed negotiations with the Soviets. Chairman Percy indicated that Senate ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty (PNET) is, in his judgment, a key to getting the Soviets back to the bargaining table; he said it will be top on his legislative agenda. He criticized the fact that no treaty has been ratified by the Senate for 12 years and reiterated his intention to pursue ratification of TTBT/PNET with you if the question cannot be resolved at the interagency level. Percy also asked that the Committee be consulted, on a confidential basis, on any future plans which may work to undercut SALT II. Opening statements by Percy, Pell and Cranston expressed frustration over the Administration's "apparent lack of interest" in arms control. The rather harsh accusations conveyed in the opening statements, however, were not followed up in the subsequent questioning by the Committee. The Senators did not challenge Ken's description of our policy on interim restraint and seemed satisfied with the arrangements worked out yesterday on ASAT. (C)

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BY RW NARA DATE 1/25/16

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BY [Signature] DATE 1/15/86

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

June 14, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: 7:50 THE PRESIDENT

OR

From : George P. Shultz KPS

1. Breakfast With Congressmen. I hosted breakfast today for Congressmen Murtha, Boggs and Hoyer, to argue for revision by the Appropriations Committee of the low Central American figures in Doc Long's subcommittee mark-up of the FY 84 Omnibus Supplemental. All are supportive of adequate funding for Central America, but complained about current Republican tactics. The three charged Republicans are proposing cuts across the board on current appropriations bills and other fiscal measures and that even leaders such as Bob Michel are voting for them. The Democrats are then charged with being "big spenders," for obvious electoral purposes. They said moderate Democrats are angry and unwilling to go on supporting the President's programs in bipartisan spirit while being savaged by such tactics. Lindy Boggs made the point that the House atmosphere is now thoroughly partisan, with negative prospects for foreign aid and other legislation. They urged we take Bob Michel aside and try to get a change of tactics. They made clear we have a great deal of work to get the support of individual Republicans and Democrats on the floor. (C)

2. Meeting with the Israeli Ambassador. I met over lunch today with Ambassador Rosenne for a discussion of Middle East issues. I reviewed for him the London Economic Summit, particularly the discussion on international terrorism. We also discussed the just concluded trip to the Middle East by the United Nations Secretary General. Rosenne made clear Israel's opposition to a UN-sponsored conference on the Middle East both because it would encourage Arab intransigence and because it would provide the Soviets with a greater political role in the region. I noted Hussein's public support for the idea which I interpreted as based in part on his frustration over our security assistance relationship, especially in view of the vast amount of weapons the Soviets are providing Syria. We also touched on the situation in Lebanon and I suggested we should see if there wasn't something we could do jointly which would be more productive than our present course. Finally, I reviewed for Rosenne our stance on the proposed legislation to move our embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. I made the point strongly that the Administration is against compromise in any form and that we will remain in that posture, even if it comes to a veto. (S)

3. Dutch Parliament Approves INF Decision. The Dutch Parliament this morning approved 79-71 the cabinet's June 1 decision that the Dutch would take their share of GLCMs under an arms control agreement or would deploy all 48 if the Soviets raise SS-20 levels beyond the current level. The cabinet's proposal survived despite two days of intense debate and numerous attempts to water down the decision. As specified in the original cabinet decision, the GON will decide November 1, 1985, on an agreement with the US providing for GLCM deployments. During the debate, Prime Minister Lubbers made explicit that the Netherlands would not deploy GLCMs if the Soviets freeze SS-20 levels. He also made commitments to pursue arms control initiatives, study Dutch nuclear tasks, and consult with the US on GLCM command and control procedures. While there are still potential problems, the Dutch have overcome a major hurdle and there is a substantial prospect that they will fulfill their part of NATO's 1979 decision. We are maintaining a reserved public posture while privately expressing appreciation to our friends in the Netherlands for their efforts to sustain Dutch participation in INF deployment. (C)

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CAMP DAVID  
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ATTACHED IS ACTING SECRETARY KENNETH DAM'S EVENING REPORT FOR FRIDAY, JUNE 15, 1984.

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: KENNETH W. DAM, ACTING

1. CONTADORA DRAFT AGREEMENT. THE CONTADORA DRAFT AGREEMENT, DESPITE SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCIES, PROVIDES A BASE FROM WHICH THE DEMOCRATIC CENTRAL AMERICAN STATES CAN NEGOTIATE. THE DOCUMENT CONTAINS A VERIFICATION AND ENFORCEMENT STRUCTURE WHICH COULD BE DEVELOPED INTO AN ACCEPTABLE MECHANISM. THE RELATIVELY STRONG SECTION ON DEMOCRATIZATION SHOULD CAUSE PROBLEMS FOR THE SANDINISTAS.

ONE SERIOUS WEAKNESS IS THE FAILURE TO TREAT SECURITY ISSUES IN A COMPREHENSIVE FASHION. NICARAGUA'S SECURITY OBJECTIVES ARE MET BY THE REQUIREMENTS FOR AN IMMEDIATE END OF SUPPORT FOR ARMED OPPOSITION ELEMENTS AND REMOVAL OF FOREIGN MILITARY BASES AND SCHOOLS. FORCE LEVEL REDUCTIONS AND REMOVAL OF FOREIGN ADVISERS, HOWEVER, WOULD BE DEFERRED, SINCE THEY ARE SUBJECT TO NEGOTIATIONS AFTER THE TREATY IS SIGNED. THIS ARRANGEMENT WOULD DISARM NICARAGUA'S OPPOSITION AND LEAVE ITS MASSIVE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT INTACT. VERIFICATION AND ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES MUST ALSO BE BEEFED UP BEFORE THE AGREEMENT IS SIGNED.

AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN WILL MAKE THE DRAFT DOCUMENT AND OUR SUGGESTIONS FOR STRENGTHENING IT THE FOCUS OF DISCUSSIONS IN HONDURAS, EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA AND COSTA RICA NEXT WEEK.

2. SUDAN'S NEW IMF PROGRAM IS SALVAGED. A SERIES OF EXTRAORDINARY U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS, INCLUDING LAST MINUTE ACCELERATION OF \$30 MILLION OF U.S. AID TO SUDAN, ALLOWED THE IMF TO DECIDE TODAY TO GO FORWARD WITH SUDAN'S BADLY STALLED IMF PROGRAM ONCE SUDAN CLEARS UP ITS ARREARS TO THE IMF. THE NEW IMF PROGRAM IS NECESSARY TO KEEP INTACT SUDAN'S COMPLEX INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SAFETY NET, WHICH INVOLVES AID AND DEBT RELIEF AMOUNTING TO OVER \$1.5 BILLION ANNUALLY. THE POLITICAL INSTABILITY OF THE NIMEIRI REGIME WOULD HAVE BEEN EXACERBATED HAD SUDAN'S IMF PROGRAM COLLAPSED.

3. UN MONITORING IN IRAN AND IRAQ. IRAN HAS NOW ACCEPTED UN MONITORING OF THE RECENTLY AGREED CESSATION OF ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN CENTERS. UNLIKE IRAQ, IRAN REJECTS A LONG-TERM UN OBSERVER PRESENCE ON ITS TERRITORY. THE SECRETARY GENERAL IS FORMING TWO TEAMS, DRAWN FROM UN OBSERVERS

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CURRENTLY WORKING IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI ZONE. ONE TEAM WILL BE SENT TONIGHT TO IRAQ FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD, AND THE OTHER WILL BE KEPT IN READINESS TO TRAVEL TO IRAN ON REQUEST. GEORGE WILL DISCUSS THIS FURTHER WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON MONDAY.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

84 JUN 16 P 3: 58  
June 15, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM : Kenneth W. Dam, Acting

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

1. Contadora Draft Agreement. The Contadora draft agreement, despite significant deficiencies, provides a base from which the democratic Central American states can negotiate. The document contains a verification and enforcement structure which could be developed into an acceptable mechanism. The relatively strong section on democratization should cause problems for the Sandinistas.

One serious weakness is the failure to treat security issues in a comprehensive fashion. Nicaragua's security objectives are met by the requirements for an immediate end of support for armed opposition elements and removal of foreign military bases and schools. Force level reductions and removal of foreign advisers, however, would be deferred, since they are subject to negotiations after the treaty is signed. This arrangement would disarm Nicaragua's opposition and leave its massive military establishment intact. Verification and enforcement procedures must also be beefed up before the agreement is signed.

Ambassador Shlaudeman will make the draft document and our suggestions for strengthening it the focus of discussions in Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala and Costa Rica next week.

2. Sudan's New IMF Program is Salvaged. A series of extraordinary U.S. Government efforts, including last minute acceleration of \$30 million of U.S. aid to Sudan, allowed the IMF to decide today to go forward with Sudan's badly stalled IMF program once Sudan clears up its arrears to the IMF. The new IMF program is necessary to keep intact Sudan's complex international economic safety net, which involves aid and debt relief amounting to over \$1.5 billion annually. The political instability of the Nimeiri regime would have been exacerbated had Sudan's IMF program collapsed.

3. UN Monitoring in Iran and Iraq. Iran has now accepted UN monitoring of the recently agreed cessation of attacks on civilian centers. Unlike Iraq, Iran rejects a long-term UN observer presence on its territory. The Secretary General is forming two teams, drawn from UN observers currently working in the Arab-Israeli zone. One team will be sent tonight to Iraq for an indefinite period, and the other will be kept in readiness to travel to Iran on request. George will discuss this further with the Secretary General on Monday.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

June 18, 1984

84 JUN 19 10:47:40  
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz *GPS*

1. Armacost Meets with French Ambassador on SDI/ASAT, Central America. Mike Armacost met today with Ambassador Vernier-Palliez to follow up on earlier ASAT/SDI discussions. Vernier-Palliez proposed US-French consultations on SDI/ASAT be held in Washington at a time and level to be soon determined. Armacost said he was glad to see that the French were returning to confidential discussions. He agreed that such discussions would be useful, noting that they would not prosper, however, if the French were seen to be pushing their initiative in the CD. Vernier-Palliez said the French intend to keep their initiative in Geneva at a low key. Armacost raised the issue of French perceptions of Nicaragua and the subject of Central America during the Mitterrand visit to Moscow. Vernier-Palliez responded that as the elections approached, the French saw a struggle between the Ortega-led moderates and the Borge-led radicals. The French would continue to pressure the Nicaraguans to hold free, fair elections and were considering the provision of technical assistance for the upcoming election. Armacost cautioned that the Nicaraguans might use French assistance to try and lend legitimacy and respectability to their elections, a danger which Vernier-Palliez acknowledged. (S)

2. Meeting with Perez de Cuellar. Perez de Cuellar briefed me today on his visit to Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Israel. He said all the leaders were serious and non-polemical in discussing the Middle East; the Syrians surprised him by not referring to Israel as "Zionist, racist or imperialist" but as a legitimate country with legitimate interests. He floated the idea of informal Security Council sessions with all parties, including Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Syria and the PLO, for a long-term study of the problem. He said all the Arabs agreed and even Israel did not object. I said we could not sit down with the PLO in any setting resembling a study or conference. He had little hope for early progress on Lebanon, especially in the South. He said all Lebanese parties want the UN, the US, or France to help them. I pointed out that no party seems interested in negotiating with Israel, but that such negotiations would be needed to achieve withdrawal of all foreign forces. The SYG played down his work in getting Iran-Iraq agreement to stop shelling civilian targets. I said it was a first step. On Cyprus, the SYG was pleased with the June 15 UNFICYP renewal and with what appears to be a more forthcoming attitude by the Turkish Cypriots. He plans to make some new proposals to the two sides, probably in the second half of July. (S)

3. Local Elections in Poland. First indications are that both the Polish Government and Solidarity will claim success. According to Western news reports, 75% of the eligible electorate cast ballots, considerably less than the 99% customary in Communist elections. Thus many Poles heeded Solidarity's call and abstained from voting. The Government, noting that voting is no longer compulsory in Poland, can assert that more people voted than is usual in US elections. The voting was virtually without incident, although Polish security forces broke up a crowd of 1000 rock-throwing youths in the industrial city of Nowa Huta (near Krakow), reportedly without recourse to force. (C)

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BY RW NARA DATE: 1/25/16

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04 JUN 20 A 7:50

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

June 19, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz *gps*

1. Meeting With Speaker O'Neill. I met alone with Speaker O'Neill for over an hour this morning to talk about Central America, with particular emphasis on El Salvador and the issue of the Contras in Nicaragua. Our conversation was frank and serious. I explained the progress underway in El Salvador with the newly-elected government and the need for security assistance as well as the funds we are making available for economic development. On Nicaragua, I shared information with the Speaker regarding the continuing support by the Nicaraguan government of the Salvadoran insurgency, and related to him actual examples of weapons and other equipment being supplied to the guerrillas. I argued the need for measures to cut off the flow of supplies to Salvadoran guerrillas and for continued support to the Contras as a means of influencing the Nicaraguan government and supporting the Contadora process. The Speaker received my presentation seriously and said he would discuss the matter with Representatives Boland and Hamilton. Later in the day, however, he called to report that he, Boland, and Hamilton nonetheless saw no way to back away from their current position, especially since the House has "voted three times against the Contra program." (C)

2. Lunch With the Republican Policy Committee. I lunched with Senator Tower and the Republican Policy Committee. The Vice President and some 45 Senators were present. Senator Tower had invited me to speak on the Nunn Amendment to the Defense bill, calling for progressive withdrawal of US troops from Europe unless NATO allies increase their contributions to NATO defense. There was general agreement that the Europeans should be doing more on defense but that the Nunn amendment is the wrong way to go about achieving that objective. Senator Thurmond characterized the Nunn approach as a partisan one, and said that all Democrats would be supporting it; he called on all Republican Senators to oppose it in support of Administration NATO policy. Senators Cohen and Roth argued that concern over the European effort is bipartisan, however, and Roth announced he is co-sponsoring with Nunn. Senator Tower argued eloquently that the Nunn amendment is wrong, but made clear his view that it would have wide appeal. After further discussion, Senator Cohen urged that compromise language calling on the Europeans to do more be worked out in a positive tone and we understand that Senator Tower's staff is working on such a compromise. (C)

3. EC-10 Agree to Formulate European Policy on Space Arms Control. The British have informed us that, at last week's meeting of Political Directors from the 10 European Community governments, the French sought European support on their CD initiative on space arms control. All the participants at this meeting expressed sympathy for the French objective of securing an arms control agreement on space weapons, but the British, Germans, Dutch and Italians all criticized French tactics, which they said were annoying Washington and inhibiting the prospect for forward movement within the US Government on the issue. Nevertheless, the Dutch proposed and all agreed that a working group of the EC-10 should be formed to seek a common EC policy on space arms control which might be announced at September's UN General Assembly. In conveying this information to us, the British Embassy here expressed the hope that there would be a NATO position on this issue well before September, thus rendering it unnecessary to pursue an effort to formulate a separate European view. (S)

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SENSITIVE

158031

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

June 20, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz

1. Allied Ambassadors Discuss Nunn Amendment. At lunch today with Mike Armacost, the British, French, and West German ambassadors underscored their intense concern about the Nunn Amendment. The British and German ambassadors noted that they had already lobbied against the amendment with a number of Senators. German Ambassador Hermes acknowledged that Congressional dissatisfaction with European defense efforts were justified, but the Nunn Amendment was not the way to rectify the situation. Passage of the amendment, he thought, would be a cause for jubilation in the Kremlin. French Ambassador Vernier-Palliez commented that forces in Europe hostile to the US could be expected to interpret both the Nunn Amendment and the Strategic Defense Initiative as evidence of declining US reliability in supporting Europe's security. All of the Europeans agreed that a more active "two-way street" in defense procurement would be a more effective spur to European efforts than the Nunn Amendment. Mike underlined our determination to resist the Nunn Amendment, emphasized that most Congressmen who supported it were less interested in pulling out troops than in seeing more substantial European defense efforts and noted that this issue will be with us and we will have to cooperate closely to deal with it.

(SECRET/SENSITIVE)

2. Jesse Jackson's Latin American Trip. Jesse Jackson called on Mike Armacost this afternoon for a second time regarding his forthcoming trip to Cuba and Central America. He plans to meet with Castro, Ortega, Duarte and major factions in each country, including the Salvadoran guerrillas. Jackson probed repeatedly for what our demands were--in Cuba, in Nicaragua and elsewhere--and what we would do if the other side made a significant gesture. We refused to discuss quid pro quos, pointing out it was a complex situation in each country, and that we had had a series of emissaries talk to Castro and the Nicaraguans over the years and one gesture by itself would solve nothing. We made it clear that the basic problem was Cuban subversion in Central America and elsewhere, the Cuban military presence in Nicaragua and Cuba's very active support for guerrillas throughout the region. Jackson seemed to get the point, but also made clear he would try for a homerun ball while there. (S)

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NLRR M453/5 # 158031

BY RW NARA DATE 1/25/16



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S/S 8418030

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

June 21, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: George P. Shultz

1. Meeting with the SFRC. On invitation from Percy, I met in his Capitol office informally this afternoon with 11 ranking members of the SFRC. They were interested in my recent trip to Managua, and this led on to discussion of the Nicaraguan problem and its relation to El Salvador. Pell saw little difference between "our terrorists" operating from Honduras into Nicaragua and "their terrorists" operating from Nicaragua into El Salvador. Mathias said he was "marginally more hopeful" than a week ago about prospects for the Jackson plan; we should stress that it is a five-year economic program, not a military one. Percy appealed for bipartisan support of the Central America plan. Percy stressed the importance of the 77-22 vote urging you to call for the ratification of the test ban treaty. He was disappointed in the negative response by the White House spokesman. He argued that we should attach an updated verification protocol and send it on to the Soviets--put the responsibility on them for a response. The possibility of a US-Soviet summit was raised. Percy said Dobrynin asked him whether you would prefer a summit before or after the election. Cranston asked why do we not take up Chernenko's seeming offer to negotiate on space arms control; he felt there was an implied Soviet readiness to go ahead here without the condition of our withdrawing our INF deployment. I warned that this might be evidence of a Soviet negotiating tactic of seeming to offer something and then asking more if we respond. (C)

2. HFAC Testimony. Mike Armacost testified on the Jerusalem Bill before a joint session of the Hamilton and Mica Subcommittees of the HFAC. Attendance was lighter than expected, and the viewpoints represented were more balanced than at past hearings. Hamilton, Winn, and Zschau assisted the Administration's presentation; the bill's co-drafters, Ben Gilman and Tom Lantos, argued strongly in its favor, claiming that failure to move the Embassy to Israel's declared capital discriminates against Israel and constitutes a "double standard". Mica emphasized his desire to avoid confrontation with the Administration on this issue and said he was frustrated by our repeated refusal to even discuss a compromise. He said that unless some signal were forthcoming from us the bill would be marked-up in full Committee in late July and sent to the floor for consideration in early August. Armacost responded that we have carefully studied the various ideas for altering the current bill which have been proposed. Unfortunately, our belief was that they would all have a similar and harmful effect on the central issue--the US ability to maintain its role as honest broker in the peace process, thus helping to achieve long range security for Israel. (U)

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

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June 22, 1984  
84 JUN 23 A 8: 47

PN

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz *GPS*

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

1. Meeting with Saudi Ambassador. During our meeting today Prince Bandar expressed the King's appreciation for the timing and speed of US support. Bandar said that the June 5 downing of an Iranian F-4 demonstrated Saudi resolve. The Saudis will engage an Iranian intruder again if necessary, and the King has ordered full retaliation against specific Iranian land targets if Saudi installations are attacked. Bandar also told me that Kuwait has demonstrated uncommon support in GCC meetings for cooperation with the US; that he received Hussein's commitment to postpone his trip to Moscow at least until October; and that we needed to keep Hussein involved and feeling part of the team. Bandar conveyed Fahd's appreciation for the Administration's position on the Jerusalem legislation and stressed the importance the Saudi Government attaches to this issue. I expressed our resolve not to move our Embassy. (S)

2. Shlaudeman Visit to Central America. On each stop of his trip to the four Central American capitals, Ambassador Shlaudeman explained the state of play with respect to our contemplated talks with the Sandinistas, the general approach we have in mind and results we hope to achieve. He emphasized that we will keep our friends closely and currently informed and that we will not negotiate any bilateral accords with the Nicaraguans. The Costa Ricans in particular welcome our talks, feeling that only we have the weight and capacity to move the Sandinistas on key issues. Harry also discussed the Contadora draft agreement. The Hondurans and Costa Ricans, who have analyzed it thoroughly, are in substantial agreement with us on its strengths and deficiencies. The Salvadorans and Guatemalans have yet to consider it fully. We are encouraged by Guatemala Foreign Minister Andrade's indication that he intends to coordinate strategy on next steps closely with the other Central American governments. (S)

3. Visit with Eugenia Charles. Dominican Prime Minister Charles asked me this morning for more assistance to alleviate her island's heavy debt. She emphasized that she has imposed considerable sacrifices on the country's economy, balancing the budget for the first time in many years. I said we viewed her as a friend and would try to be as responsive as possible. Prime Minister Charles was concerned about the Grenadian political situation, fearing that the democratic center forces were so divided that former Prime Minister Eric Gairy's superior organization would overcome unpopularity. She plans to work with other Caribbean leaders to encourage Grenada's democratic center to unify before the elections, and will visit Grenada in August to help the process along. (C)

DECL:OADR

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NLRR M453/5 #158034

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BY *AW* NARA DATE 1/25/14

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

S/S 8418190

158033

June 22, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz *ups*

84 JUN 23 A 8:46

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DECL:OADR

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NLRR M453/5 #158033

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NIP M453/5 #158035

BY RW NARA DATE 4/27/2022

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

June 25, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz *JS*

84 JUN 26 A 8: 04

*PC*

1. Meeting with Egyptian Ambassador. I met today with Ambassador Ghorbal to review regional issues. Commenting on my speech about terrorism, Ghorbal admitted no one could support the actions of some PLO factions, but he urged that we avoid pinning the entire PLO with a terrorist label, since we will need its help at some point to solve the Palestinian problem. Ghorbal said that regardless of who wins the Israeli elections, I should proceed to the area immediately afterward either to capitalize on a Labor Party victory or for damage control, as he put it, should Likud win. I told him not to underestimate Shamir's flexibility. On Lebanon, Ghorbal supports a larger UN role in the south and believes the new Lebanese Government would be even less able to accept a residual Israeli activity or presence in southern Lebanon than its predecessor. Discussing the peace process, I said I hoped no one was going to get hung up on the idea of returning all territory occupied since 1967. Ghorbal indicated he foresaw minor border rectifications, asserting that outright annexation of large hunks of territory would prove unacceptable. On Jerusalem, he urged that we maintain our firm opposition to moving the embassy. I said your position is firm. (S)

2. French Read-Out on Mitterrand in Moscow. Ambassador Vernier-Palliez came in this morning to brief Mike Armacost on the highlights of the visit. It was very much along the lines of what Mitterrand reported in your call to him with the following additional points of interest. First, the French thought the Soviets went out of their way to keep it a good visit despite the blunt things Mitterrand said about Sakharov and other disagreeable topics. Second, on arms control the Soviets stressed outer space and chemical weapons. According to the Ambassador's report, on ASAT the French told the Soviets that their own low-altitude system made a high-altitude ban the only way to go, and on Chemical Weapons the Soviets seemed to be encouraging the French to come up with language on verification that could be worked in the Geneva negotiations. On Iran-Iraq, Gromyko claimed he had made it very clear to the Iranians that the Soviets consider them responsible for continuation of the war. (S)

3. Controlling Libyan Official Activities in the United States. We have taken further action to control improper Libyan government activities in the US. The staff of the Libyan UN Mission will be limited to its current size, subject to further adjustments to accommodate legitimate needs. Personnel assigned to the Libyan UN Mission will not be authorized to travel outside of the five boroughs of New York City (instead of the former 25-mile radius limitation) without specific approval. The Libyan UN Mission was required to comply with the provisions of the Foreign Missions Act prior to occupying its new 24-story office building in New York City. It has now complied. In addition, the People's Committee for Libyan Students (PCLS) in McLean, Virginia, an organization which the FBI reports is engaged in carrying out intelligence and terrorist activities against Libyans, has been determined to be subject to controls under the Foreign Missions Act. We are in the process of consulting with other agencies to decide what sanctions we might impose on the PCLS. (S)

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S/S 8418456

158036

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

June 26, 1984

84 JUN 27 10:10

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz

GPS

RR

1. Agreement Reached on EC Budget. The ten European Community States reached agreement today on the rebate to be paid the British on their net EC contribution opening the way to new efforts towards political and economic integration. The ten also raised the ceiling on the value added tax paid to the Community to 1.4%, removing the budgetary barrier to Spanish/Portuguese accession. London will receive a flat rebate of about \$800 million this year, and thereafter receive a rebate of two-thirds of its net payment to the Community, which is disproportionately large because of relatively low agricultural payments to Britain. (LOU)

2. Meeting with Arens and Rabin. In our meeting today Moshe Arens was relatively upbeat about Israel's policy in South Lebanon, stating that the local population, including the Shia, were showing a greater willingness to cooperate with Israel on security matters. The Israeli backed militia, the Army of South Lebanon, was making progress. Yet Arens continued to be deeply pessimistic about the ability of the Lebanese government to reestablish security. I raised with Arens the question of press leaks on JPMG activities, stating that maintaining confidentiality worked to both of our interests. I also pressed Arens on concrete Israeli steps to improve the economy of the West Bank, mentioning in particular the establishment of an Arab bank there. Arens appeared to have an open mind on this proposal.

My meeting with Arens followed one Monday with Yitzhak Rabin, Labor's candidate for Defense Minister. Rabin suggested that Israel should withdraw its forces from Lebanon, while reserving the right to reenter if necessary; UNIFIL would be deployed from the Awali River South. On the peace process, he said that Israel should concentrate on drawing Hussein into negotiations. Israel's economy would decide the election, Rabin felt; he suggested that money could be saved by cutting assistance to settlements and by ending the occupation of Lebanon. (S)

3. Congressional Meeting on Narcotics. I met today with members of the House Select Committee on Narcotics, Abuse and Control and the Task Force on Narcotics of the HFAC to stress our concern about the international narcotics problem. They argued that the Department has not given the narcotics problem high enough priority, they stressed the need to raise this issue at the UN, and drew the connection between narcotics trafficking and Cuba's and Bulgaria's financing of terrorism. I underlined the commitment of both the Department and the Administration to this problem, noting the progress that has been made in both Pakistan and Colombia, and suggested that I hope to make a major address on this issue in the near future. (C)

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NLRR 11453/5 #158036  
BY RW NARA DATE 1/25/16

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158037

BY RW

NARA DATE 1/25/16

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

June 28, 1984

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR: 84 JUN 29 THE PRESIDENT 7:42

From : George P. Shultz GPS

RR

1. Cheysson on Mitterrand's Trip to Moscow. Cheysson today sent me his observations on Mitterrand's trip to Moscow. He said the Soviets had insisted on the visit, though they were, of course, not pleased with Mitterrand's public remarks on Sakharov. The conversation was relatively free flowing and never threatening or aggressive. Criticism of you was "generous and freely given," but never attained "an elevated level." Cheysson came away believing that the Soviets want to negotiate one day, but not yet, and they are not sure when. The Soviets did not raise the issue of counting French weapons in the INF negotiations and did not talk much of nuclear arms. Chernenko, Cheysson reports, was livelier than expected and enjoyed the discussion though he was visibly limited by asthma. Cheysson found Gromyko "marvelously at ease" and talking with "assurance and intelligence." Gorbachev, the youngest Politbureau member, impressed the French as of a completely different style from his senior colleagues and potentially formidable partner--animated, talking on many subjects, and aware of his authority. (S)

2. Iraq-Iran Update. The Iraqi strike Wednesday on the Swiss-owned tanker, Tiburon, seems to have done more damage than any previous attack on tankers in the Gulf. An Exocet missile hit the engine room, setting fires and causing massive damage. The ship was abandoned, seven crewmen are missing, and fire-fighters are at work. If the blaze spreads to the main oil reservoirs, the cargo of the 260,000 ton vessel could be lost. In other attacks, there has been no major loss of oil cargoes, which are more valuable than tankers. Yesterday AWACS data suggested an Iranian F-4 might have downed an Iraqi plane flying cover for the Super Etendard which attacked the Tiburon. New intelligence indicates the Iraqi aircraft, a MIG, was not shot down. It deflected the Iranian pursuit plane and then escaped. (S)

3. Visit of Roberto D'Aubuisson. D'Aubuisson met here today with Dick Walters for over an hour and with Tony Motley for a half hour. In both meetings, he stressed that he fully intended to work in loyal opposition to the Duarte government and to be as cooperative as possible without compromising his party's philosophy. He did not raise charges of CIA support for the Duarte campaign. He also asked for a visa to attend a dinner on his behalf on August 29, and Motley promised to look into it and answer promptly. D'Aubuisson left with Motley a bound copy of El Salvador's Constitution and asked that it be forwarded to you. We will do so. (S)

4. Bombing Incident and Plots in Sri Lanka. A hotel bombing which killed one person and injured many in Colombo today apparently was aimed at the senior Israeli diplomat who heads the Israel Interests Section of the US Embassy. He was out of town at the time of the blast. The interests section, which will not be housed in our chancery, opened in temporary quarters in the hotel about one month ago. The public announcement that the government had invited the Israelis to open an office triggered violent protests both by those who questioned a renewed Israeli-Sri Lankan relationship (especially Muslims) and those in the Tamil community troubled that the interests section would assist the Sri Lanka Government in its effort to combat Tamil separatism. No group has claimed responsibility for today's attack. We are in touch with the Sri Lankan Government, and our embassy has taken extra security precautions. (C)

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158038

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON  
June 29, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : Michael H. Armacost, Acting Secretary *MH*

1. ASAT: Response to the Soviets. Early this evening I called in Soviet Minister-Counselor Isakov and presented the U. S. statement responding to the Soviet proposal on space arms control which Dobrynin conveyed to the Secretary earlier in the day. When Isakov asked why we were linking talks on nuclear arms and space weapons, I pointed out that this was appropriate because space activities have important implications for nuclear deterrence. Predictably, Isakov concluded that the U. S. statement meant that the U. S. disagreed with the Soviet proposal. He added that it didn't seem practical to "add together" the nuclear and space arms questions, each of which was complicated enough. The U. S. statement appeared to throw Isakov off balance. After reading it he admitted to me that he had "lost a bet." I think our linking the nuclear and space issues is a wise tactical move that makes it harder for the Soviets to gain propaganda advantage from their space initiative without calling attention to their walkouts from START and INF.

2. Meeting with Rev. Jesse Jackson. I met with Jesse Jackson this morning to discuss the results of his trip to Cuba and Central America. Jackson expressed appreciation for the rapid provision of travel documents to both American and Cuban prisoners. He took credit for having secured Castro's agreement to discuss the Mariel issue before our elections. I informed him that we had already followed up with a proposal for an early date, and had requested that Castro accept some Marielitos on the return Cubana airline flight as an earnest of his good will on this issue, noting that we were sorry that Castro had turned this latter proposal down.

Jackson detailed his discussion with Castro and other Central American leaders along the lines that have already appeared in the press. I told Jackson that we had taken umbrage at his criticism of American policies while on foreign turf. In particular I emphasized our fundamental conflicts of interest with Castro arising out of his support for subversion in the hemisphere. Jackson reiterated his request for a meeting with you or the Secretary.

3. Jerusalem Bill. Under Secretary for Management Spiers, with three of our Ambassadors to the Islamic world, briefed the Hamilton and Mica Subcommittees on Thursday on security aspects of the bill. They emphasized that the basis for our unambiguous opposition is the damage it would do to our foreign policy interests, not our security concerns. Rep. Lantos hinted at putting the legislation off for a year or two, presumably in return for eventual Administration support. Steve Solarz suggested changing the bill to a resolution calling for the Jerusalem issue to be settled through negotiations, after which we would move our Embassy.

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DECLASSIFIED  
NLRP M453/5 #158038  
BY RW NARS DATE 1/25/16



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

JUN 29 11:06

June 29, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : Michael H. Armacost, Acting Secretary

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

1. ASAT: Response to the Soviets. Early this evening I called in Soviet Minister-Counselor Isakov and presented the U. S. statement responding to the Soviet proposal on space arms control which Dobrynin conveyed to the Secretary earlier in the day. When Isakov asked why we were linking talks on nuclear arms and space weapons, I pointed out that this was appropriate because space activities have important implications for nuclear deterrence. Predictably, Isakov concluded that the U. S. statement meant that the U. S. disagreed with the Soviet proposal. He added that it didn't seem practical to "add together" the nuclear and space arms questions, each of which was complicated enough. The U. S. statement appeared to throw Isakov off balance. After reading it he admitted to me that he had "lost a bet." I think our linking the nuclear and space issues is a wise tactical move that makes it harder for the Soviets to gain propoganda advantage from their space initiative without calling attention to their walkouts from START and INF.

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NLRRM453/5 #158039  
BY RW NARA DATE 1/25/16