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Intelligence Advisory Board
(05/19/1981-07/22/1983)

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: AGENCY FILE

Withdrawer

RBW 11/6/2013

File Folder PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD (05/19/1981-07/22/1983)

FOIA

F03-011/3

Box Number 6

SKINNER

123

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
162737	MEMO	SVEN KRAEMER TO WILLIAM CLARK RE. PBIAB	2	6/28/1982	B1
162738	LETTER	LEO CHERNE TO BILL	2	7/22/1983	B1
162739	REPORT	RE. PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF FOREIGN POLICIES	13	7/12/1983	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 19, 1981

Dear Ed:

Governor Scranton has written me concerning plans for reestablishment of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). He suggests a number of criteria for consideration in selecting new members which I agreed to bring to your attention.

Sincerely,



Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

cc: Mr. Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

The Honorable
Edwin Meese, III,
Counselor to the President,
The White House

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RDS-2 4/30/2001

DECLASSIFIED
Dept of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
BY RW NARA, DATE 11-6-13

2

8112118

William W. Scranton
Scranton, Pennsylvania 18503

DETERMINED TO BE
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.3(c)
BY NARA rw DATE 11-6-13

March 27, 1981

~~PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Honorable Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Al:

The current information indicates that the Administration plans to re-establish the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) and assign three members of same to handle the oversight work now being done by the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB). This is good news, indeed; it should be a very workable and highly effective way of handling an important task.


From my experience on the Intelligence Oversight Board, I have two constructive suggestions for your consideration. First, it is important to have as the head of the PFIAB an individual who is truly dedicated to a sound and workable intelligence system for the United States rather than somebody whose primary interest is a personal political ambition. Second, the members of the PFIAB who are to handle the oversight work should be individuals who are not publicity prone.

The IOB has functioned over the last four years without any leaks whatsoever - a record for a government agency. In oversight work (and in the best interest of the Administration) that practice should continue. Consequently, the oversight members of PFIAB must be dedicated to achieving a workable, effective intelligence system first and foremost, rather than to publicity and personal interests.

Pardon my intrusion on this matter, but I understand that the decision as to the memberships of the PFIAB is in the offing. These suggestions, believe me, are offered for the workability of a good intelligence system and to avoid public embarrassment for the Administration.

With all best wishes always.

Most sincerely,



William W. Scranton

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

JANET -

I PRESUME THE
ENVELOPE CONTAINS
MR. MRESE'S COPY OF
THIS HAIG-SCRANTON
CORRESPONDENCE - ~~FRANK~~
ONLY BUD HAS A COPY.
FRANK

4

RECEIVED

81 MAY 20 A 9: 50

*that's what
my clock says?*

gr 20/0948

JANET COLSON

Jan 20/1302

BUD NANCE

RWA 25/2303

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

rgd 26/0842

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

R 26/0136

KAY

CY TO VP

SHOW CC

CY TO MEESE

SHOW CC

CY TO BAKER

SHOW CC

CY TO DEAVER

SHOW CC

CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

RECEIVED

81 JUL 15 AM 11:32

JANET COLSON

JC

BUD NANCE

X

DICK ALLEN

✓

IRENE DERUS

IR

JANET COLSON

JC

BUD NANCE

X

KAY

CY TO VP

SHOW CC

CY TO MEESE

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CY TO BAKER

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CY TO DEEVER

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CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

*Copy to [unclear]
for info [unclear]*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 15, 1981

To : Jim Baker
Ed Meese
Bill Casey

From : Pen James *Pen*

Subject: President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

In reading Fred Fielding's memorandum of July 2 regarding the initial draft of the Executive Order to recreate PFIAB, I would like to draw your attention to the last two paragraphs on page 5 which I think merit particular interest that may have been overlooked in our discussions.

Fred's suggestion that we give serious consideration to changing the name of the proposed Advisory Board I think, would give added impetus to the impression that this is President Ronald Reagan's Board, as opposed to reconstituting President Nixon's.

"Since the President would be creating a new Advisory Board by this Order, no reference to the Carter Order abolishing the prior Advisory Board is necessary. Theoretically, the President could re-establish the old Advisory Board by revoking the Carter abolition Order. However, this seems rather a backward way to proceed, and would make it more complicated to make any changes in the Nixon Order. Also, it would virtually invite media coverage (some of which will undoubtedly appear in any event) citing the President's action as a 'throwback to the Nixon era' or something of the sort.

"The last point also suggests that we may want to give serious consideration to changing the name of the proposed Advisory Board. The name is not particularly significant, and using something other than the exact name used by President Nixon may be marginally helpful in terms of limiting possible adverse media reaction."

EPJ:vad

cc: Fred Fielding
Dick Allen ✓

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 17, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: NORMAN A. BAILEY *NB*

SUBJECT: Appointment to PFIAB

Anne Armstrong called to say she has the "perfect" candidate for the No. 2 slot at PFIAB. This individual is Cmdr. Fred R. Denech, Jr., U.S. Navy. His current supervisor is Admiral Dillingham (John Poindexter knows Adm. Dillingham).

Anne has checked him out with Inman, Lehman, Moore, Abshire and Olmer and they all give Cmdr. Denech top rating. She says Pen James' office has his bio, but in any case she's sending you another.

cc: Don Gregg

PFIA B

237
8

National Security Council
The White House

RECEIVED

Package # 4412

02 JUN 28 P 2: 29

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>[Checkmark]</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[Checkmark]</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver

Other _____

COMMENTS

Recommend you meet with
Foster. JH
JH walk out term w/ Key

7/6
F10
informed JH

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) *rw*
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ *1/6/83*

ID 8204412

RECEIVED 28 JUN 82 16

TO CLARK

FROM KRAEMER

DOCDATE 28 JUN 82

BOVERIE

28 JUN 82

KEYWORDS: START

SALT

FOSTER, JOHN

INTELLIGENCE

VERIFICATION

COMPLIANCE

AC

SUBJECT: APPT REQUEST FOR FOSTER W/ CLARK ON 15 JUL RE PFIAB MTG

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 29 JUN 82 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

LINHARD

DE GRAFFENREID

TANTER

RYE

RUSSELL

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG *400184*

NSCIFID

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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>C 7/16</i>	<i>Clark approved</i>		<i>LL, RB</i>

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE *PA* (CW)

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 16 APR 83 12

TO CLARK

FROM DE GRAFFENREID

DOCDATE 14 APR 83

TYSON

14 APR 83

DE GRAFFENREID

20 APR 83

KEYWORDS: AP

PFIAB

LEGAL ISSUES

CENTRAL AMERICA

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR APPT W/ PRES FOR MEMBERS OF IOB 13 MAY

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 19 APR 83 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

KIMMITT

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(N / H)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

Clark

x
C
Z
Z

4/20
4/25
5/9
5/26

Re-open for decision
Prindley disapproved recon
Lead Ryan Memo
Lead Armstrong Ltr

CD, CT
Kd, RKCT
td

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

PA *H*
(C)

C. F. Sullivan

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

May 18, 1983


#139523

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for meeting with PFIAB at our May meeting. We appreciated both the opportunity to present our views to you personally and to receive your candid remarks and response to our concerns.

Let me assure you that you have the undivided support of all the members of PFIAB and that we will continue our efforts to ensure that the Intelligence Community properly supports your national security policies.

Most respectfully,



Anne L. Armstrong
Chairman

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

id

THE WHITE HOUSE

PFIAB, 340 OEOB

The President
The White House

OK
CNS

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

5/6/83

MEMORANDUM

TO: WILLIAM P. CLARK
FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR. *FJR*
SUBJ: APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY

MEETING: with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

DATE: May 12, 1983

TIME: 10:45 am

DURATION: 30 minutes

LOCATION: Cabinet Room

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be provided by NSC

MEDIA COVERAGE: White House photographer only

FIRST LADY PARTICIPATION: No

NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST

cc:	A. Bakshian	M. McManus	J. Poindexter
	R. Darman	J. Rosebush	C. Tyson
	R. DeProspero	B. Shaddix	
	K. Duberstein	W. Sittmann	
	D. Fischer	L. Speakes	
	C. Fuller	WHCA Audio/Visual	
	W. Henkel	WHCA Operations	
	E. Hickey	A. Wrobleski	
	G. Hodges	Nell Yates	

NSC/S PROFILE

SECRET

ID 8302534

RECEIVED 16 APR 83 12

TO CLARK

FROM DE GRAFFENREID

DOCDATE 14 APR 83

TYSON

14 APR 83

KEYWORDS: AP

PFIAB

LEGAL ISSUES

CENTRAL AMERICA

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR APPT W/ PRES FOR MEMBERS OF IOB 13 MAY

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 19 APR 83 STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

KIMMITT

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

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	C 4/18	Pomdexter 862 SP		EA, CT, TIC

~~DISPATCH~~ 116.4/18

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National Security Council
The White House

624 17

Package # 2534

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	1	m	_____
Jacque Hill	2	_____	_____
Judge Clark	3	✓	_____
John Poindexter	4	✓	A
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Imp - pls. sign - Done

National Security Council
The White House

63018

1600P

Package # 2534

APR 20 1983

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
<u>DE GRAT.</u>	<u>2</u>	_____	_____

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DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

National Security Council
The White House

630

1600P
APR 20 1983

Package # 2534

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
<u>DE GRAT.</u>	<u>2</u>	_____	_____

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 20, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR REAR ADMIRAL JOHN POINDEXTER

FROM: KENNETH deGRAFFENREID *kd*
SUBJECT: Intelligence Oversight Board

John,

Spoke with Glenn Campbell, IOB Chairman, day before yesterday on the phone to try to straighten out any misperceptions he might have concerning our efforts on behalf of IOB. He seemed quite relaxed, very different from Bob Turner's discussion with me. I told Campbell we were trying to arrange for the IOB to meet with the President, perhaps at the 0930 on May 13. He asked if the Board could bring its two consultants, Law Professor John Norton Moore who has helped them with legal questions, and Ed Hennelly who appears to be an old crony.

I told Campbell that if the meeting was at 0930, then space would preclude consultants, but that I would see about them if the meeting were another place. Bob Kimmitt and I believe that while John Norton Moore himself would be okay, we don't see the need to have Hennelly attend, and it is pretty hard to draw the line at only one consultant. Procedurally, Bob and I agree that it is probably not a good idea to have the consultants because it could raise a problem with PFIAB, who might ask to bring their consultants to future meetings (of which there are a goodly number). On balance, therefore, we think it probably is not a good idea, but in the finest tradition of staff work, I leave it to your judgment.

Recommendation

That the IOB consultants join the Board if it meets with the President other than in the Oval Office.

Approve _____

Disapprove *J*

It will be in Oval Office anyway.

THE WHITE HOUSE

2534

WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

April 18, 1983

TO: FRED RYAN, DIRECTOR
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

REQUEST: That the President meet with his Intelligence Oversight Board at their May Board meeting.

PURPOSE: To permit the President's Intelligence Oversight Board (PIOB) to report on its activities and observations during the past year.

BACKGROUND: The PIOB was first established in February 1976 and the current Board was established by Executive Order 12334 on December 4, 1981, and is charged with overseeing the activities of the intelligence community and reporting directly to the President about any activity which any Board member believes to be unlawful. The Board has been operational for one year, and its Chairman (Dr. Glenn Campbell) has requested a brief meeting to report to the President.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: The President met with two PIOB members (Campbell and Tyroler) on January 13, 1982, the day they were sworn in.

DATE AND TIME: Friday, May 13, 1983 DURATION: 10 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office or other White House site convenient to the President.

PARTICIPANTS: PIOB Members, PIOB Counsel, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, NSC Staff

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Brief report by the Board.

REMARKS REQUIRED: Brief remarks by the President.

MEDIA COVERAGE: Announcement to press, but no direct coverage. White House photo only.

RECOMMENDED BY: Chairman, PIOB, and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

OPPOSED BY: None

PROJECT OFFICER: Charles P. Tyson
Robert F. Turner, Counsel, PIOB
Kenneth deGraffenreid, NSC Staff

Attachment
Participants List

MW
am
22

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

April 14, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON *ent*

FROM: KENNETH deGRAFFENREID *kd*

SUBJECT: IOB Request to Meet with the President

The IOB is requesting to meet with the President during their Board meeting on May 13. The IOB, named over a year ago at the same time as PFIAB, has yet to meet with the President. One of the three members has not met the President. The IOB Counsel recently completed a paper on legal issues relating to Central American activities and the Board would like to briefly offer their views at the meeting. In order to further the effective functioning of the Board and particularly so that it is seen to have access to the President, I recommend that you endorse this request, but that the meeting occur as part of the scheduled 0930 on Friday, May 13. No schedule proposal would need to be forwarded. (The PFIAB has asked to meet with the President on May 11 or 12.)

BK Bob Kimmitt concurs.

Recommendation

That you approve this request.

Approve

Disapprove

Attachment

Tab I Schedule Proposal

cc: Bob Kimmitt

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED 13526
Sec. 3.4(D), E.O. 13526, 13526
With House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2003
BY NARA RW DATE 11-16-13

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Dr. W. Glenn Campbell (Chairman)
Charles Jarvis Meyers, Esq. (Member)
Charles Tyroler, II (Member)
Robert F. Turner (Counsel)

24

**National Security Council
The White House**

Package # _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	1	<i>[Signature]</i>	
Bud McFarlane	2	<i>[Signature]</i>	
Jacque Hill	3	<i>[Signature]</i>	
Judge Clark	4	<i>[Signature]</i>	I
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

has happened

25



THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 13, 1983

Dear Mr. President:

I have just received a note from Gene Rostow saying, "On reflection, I have decided to accept the President's invitation to serve on the PFIAB." I believe this is a favorable development and demonstrates Gene's positive attitude. I think he has carried off this moment with good grace which reflects his high regard for you.

Warm personal regards.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "G. Shultz".

George P. Shultz

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

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A Fact Machine Won't Work

MEG GREENFIELD

The document in front of me—71 pages long, age-worn, bearing a warning that it is not to be published before 6 p.m. on Feb. 27, 1965—is called “Aggression From the North.” I went looking for it and, uncharacteristically, found it, in one of my files recently. This is not the final, printed version of the paper, but rather a rough, mimeographed copy handed out to reporters at a State Department briefing that winter morning almost 20 years ago, a session that I attended. William Bundy, the assistant secretary for Far Eastern affairs, stood before us in an auditorium and presented the government’s case—based on captured documents, weapons and so forth—that the war in South Vietnam was not a local insurgency; rather, he said, it was a Hanoi-supplied and -directed assault.

Waves of journalistic skepticism undulated through the room. Querulous, disbelieving questions were put. Earnest, I-swear-to-God answers came back. News clips from the period feature a photo of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara displaying a captured Viet Cong rifle to a delegation from Congress. Does any of this remind you of anything?

What interests me especially about both that bygone presentation and the current, analogous ones concerning the warfare in Central America is the American government’s misplaced confidence in the power of its documentary findings. Other governments, I note, publish their factual white papers after a foreign-policy disaster. We publish ours before. They are intended to persuade the unpersuadable—the beyond-reach domestic opponents and the completely intractable skeptics.

“Evidence”: “Aggression From the North” has a lot to say about political direction, about the origins and supply routes of weapons, about the training sites of military personnel—in short, many of the same things we are hearing about in Central America today. But to me, the most revealing word it uses—and the word appears again and again, just as it does today—is this one: “evidence.” Our government constructs a kind of legal brief for its foreign-policy actions on the assumption that dispassionate, right-minded jurors (that’s us) cannot fail to be swayed. The lengths to which it will go can be amazing. Can you think of another nation

where (as was reported here last week) the so-called secret intelligence agency would offer to fly legislators to the scene of its so-called secret war to see for themselves the merit and restraint of the operation?

“Fact-finding” is a governmental passion. From found facts all else is stubbornly expected to flow; I say “stubbornly” because the desired result almost never materializes. For the first thing that happens (this was true of “Aggression From the North,” as it has been of most similar white papers ever since) is that a journalist or a congressman will assert that *some* of the evidence is either overstated or untrue. The errors cited may have been a result of haste or zeal, as distinct from a clear intent to

Our government constructs a legal brief for its foreign policy, but the jury is not impartial.

mislead, or they may not be errors at all. But that doesn’t usually matter: right or wrong, the whole paper will be seen to have been discredited. By the time its major premise has been vindicated, or at least shown not to have been completely crooked or mad (and this happens too), only history will be interested anymore. Those surviving doubters and others who actively resisted the “evidence” of the other side’s various depredations will observe only, if they trouble to observe at all, that the other side may well have done these things, but probably wouldn’t have felt the need to if we had not driven them to it.

The point is that all this case-making and courtroom argument and laying out of certain facts is a mugs game, a no-win proposition. This is because a lack of “evidence” is usually not the problem. What is preventing the acceptance of government’s argument by those it seeks to convince is a disposition not to accept it. You can’t really argue that out of existence. And even if some part of the factual presentation is accepted, the policy implications government sees in it will

not be. “Yes”—the rejoinder will come to an assertion of Soviet or Cuban or North Vietnamese involvement in the civil strife in some country where we seek to help the government—“Yes, they are certainly mucking about there. But who cares?” Or: “Do we want to start World War III over that?” Or: “Aren’t they a bunch of crooks and despots themselves?”

The rejoinder, in other words, will be that any engagement with the defending government is either too dangerous in terms of a potential for military escalation or morally unjustifiable as the government is not worthy of our help. The alternative—letting nature take its course—is preferred, and it is this instinct not to engage in certain places that government keeps trying unsuccessfully to overwhelm with its presentations of yet more “evidence.” The people in office seem unable to accept that they are contending with something other than a want of information in their critics. They are contending with a sentiment against engagement of the kind being promoted. It is this which they must overwhelm if they really hope to convert their opposition.

Resistance: I don’t think they can do it—not now, not in the current political atmosphere. I would divide the hard-core opposition roughly into those who are honestly and openly opposed to thwarting left-revolutionary movements or Soviet intervention wherever they occur around the world and those who always assert that there certainly are places where they would favor American action, although they never can seem to think of one this side of San Diego. But besides this kind of resistance, there is the resistance of many, many other Americans who have just become too skeptical of government’s ways and too unconvinced of the importance of the dangers government cites and too ambivalent about what, if anything, we owe our various friends, allies and acquaintances in the world to rally to government’s call.

These last are the people that government must move if it is to create any kind of consensus on foreign policy in Central America and elsewhere. What it must do is to present a cogent and persuasive rationale—moral, practical, political—for its desired course of action. People will not be moved by its facts, not even real ones.