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Last Updated: 01/12/2024

NSC
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

575191
C0172 4061
FG006-11
FG006-12

June 3, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR RONALD K. PETERSON

FROM: PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS *Paul
fn*

SUBJECT: State Draft Report on H.Con.Res. 271, "Expressing the Sense of Congress that the President Should Negotiate with the Government of Vietnam to Establish Interest Sections in the Capitals of both Countries for the Purpose of Resolving Specific Issues Between the Countries"

The NSC has reviewed and concurs in the State draft report on H.Con.Res. 271 with the fixes as noted on page 2.

Attachment

Tab A OMB Incoming Correspondence

NSC#8804061



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your request for State Department comments on House Concurrent Resolution 271, which would express "the sense of the Congress that the President should negotiate with the Government of Vietnam to establish interest sections in the capitals of both countries for the purpose of resolving specific issues between the countries."

The Department opposes this legislation. We believe that its passage would undermine efforts to secure the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia and an acceptable end to that conflict.

The illegal Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia is the central issue in our relationship with Vietnam. The United States, along with most nations of the world, supports the struggle for a free and independent Cambodia. We are committed to the political and economic isolation of Vietnam as a way of forcing Hanoi to negotiate an acceptable settlement. We have made clear that we are prepared to discuss normalization only in the context of an acceptable settlement in Cambodia which includes the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese troops. We believe that this policy has effectively driven home to Hanoi the cost of its Cambodian aggression and we are encouraged by indications that Hanoi may be rethinking its policies.

Were the United States to establish reciprocal interest sections, as is called for in the proposed legislation, this would represent a clear change of the policy, which we have adhered to since the invasion of Cambodia, of supporting the economic and diplomatic isolation of Vietnam. Hanoi would see this change as an important political gesture -- and as a significant political triumph. To those committed to the struggle for a free and independent Cambodia, including our ASEAN allies, most nations of the world, and the Cambodian noncommunist resistance led by Prince Sihanouk, the establishment of interest sections would be viewed as a signal of weakening American resolve to stay the course until all of the Vietnamese occupation troops have left.

The Honorable
Dante B. Fascell,
House of Representatives.

THROUGH linkage of humanitarian and political issues, the

Passage of the proposed legislation could also have an adverse effect on urgent humanitarian concerns related to Vietnam, including the question of the unaccounted for Americans lost during the Indochinese war (POW/MIAs), Vietnamese family reunification under the Orderly Departure Program (ODP), Amerasian children and re-education camp prisoners incarcerated by Hanoi because of their previous association with us or the regime we supported. These are all *priority* ~~important~~ humanitarian issues which the Administration is committed to resolve, and on which we have achieved significant progress in several areas.

We believe this progress has derived from our policy of holding these humanitarian issues separate from the broader political and economic issues which divide Vietnam and the United States. While reciprocal interest sections would do little to enhance operational cooperation with Hanoi (there is no dearth of communications between us, on both policy and operational levels), their establishment would, regardless of legislative language to the contrary, be seen as an important political act directly related to our desire to resolve urgent humanitarian issues. Therefore, by establishing a relationship between political concerns and humanitarian issues, this resolution would, we believe, work directly against our interests in those important humanitarian areas. Vietnam should resolve those issues, with no regard to Cambodia or other political considerations, through the mechanisms already in existence.

The Department of State believes strongly, therefore, that the proposed legislation would be detrimental to United States' interests and objectives and we urge that it not be enacted.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that from the standpoint of the Administration's program there is no objection to the submission of this report.

Sincerely,

J. Edward Fox
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

100TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. CON. RES. 271

Expressing the sense of the Congress that the President should negotiate with the Government of Vietnam to establish interest sections in the capitals of both countries for the purpose of resolving specific issues between the countries.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 23, 1988

Mr. RIDGE (for himself and Mr. MRAZEK) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the Congress that the President should negotiate with the Government of Vietnam to establish interest sections in the capitals of both countries for the purpose of resolving specific issues between the countries.

Whereas fifteen years have passed since the United States withdrew its Armed Forces from Vietnam, and thirteen years have passed since the conclusion of the Vietnam conflict;

Whereas issues of concern between the United States and Vietnam remain unresolved, including the fullest possible accounting for Americans missing in action during the Vietnam conflict, the resettlement of Amerasian individuals still in Vietnam, the release of political prisoners in Vietnamese reeducation camps, the departure of Vietnamese who wish to emigrate from their country through the Orderly Depart-



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

June 1, 1988

4061.
SPECIAL

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer -
✓ National Security Council
Department of the Treasury
Department of Defense
Department of Health & Human Services
Department of Justice

SUBJECT: State draft report on H.Con.Res. 271, "Expressing the sense of Congress that the President should negotiate with the Government of Vietnam to establish interest sections in the capitals of both countries for the purpose of resolving specific issues between the countries."

The Office of Management and Budget requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

A response to this request for your views is needed no later than THURSDAY, JUNE 16, 1988.

Questions should be referred to Annette Rooney/Sue Thau (395-7300), the legislative analyst in this office.

RONALD K. PETERSON for
Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference

Enclosures

CC: B. Sasser/T. Davis
J. Eisenhower
L. Guzzi
T. Treacy

SPECIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 2, 1988

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS

FROM: RICHARD CHILDRESS 

SUBJECT: State Draft Report on H.Con.Res. 271

Recommend you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve  Disapprove _____

(OUT OF TOWN)

Fortier and J. Kelly concur. 

Attachments

- Tab I Stevens/Peterson Memorandum
- Tab A OMB Incoming Correspondence

cc: Fortier
J. Kelly

**National Security Council
The White House**

88 JUN 3 All: 35

System # _____
 Package # 4061
 DOCLOG ← AIO

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Perito	<u>1</u>	<u>RP</u>	<u>A</u>
Marybel Batjer	_____	_____	_____
Paul Stevens	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	_____
John Negroponte	_____	_____	_____
Colin Powell	_____	_____	_____
Paul Stevens	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>A</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>	<u>5/6/3</u>	<u>D</u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Baker Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)



UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8804061
RECEIVED: 02 JUN 88 09

TO: PETERSON, R

FROM: STEVENS

DOC DATE: 03 JUN 88
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: VIETNAM CAMBODIA
LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: STATE DRAFT RPT RE HCR-271 EXPRESSING SENSE OF CONGRESS THAT PRES
SHOULD NEGOTIATE W/ VIETNAM TO ESTABLISH INTEREST SECTION IN CAPITAL

ACTION: PERITO SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 06 JUN 88 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CHILDRESS LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCIF: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
CHILDRESS
FORTIER
KELLY, J

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY  DATE 6/13 W/ATTCH: YES NO

OPENED BY: NSEF CLOSED BY: NSSRF DOC 3 OF 3

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 8804061

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 CHILDRESS
002 STEVENS
003

Z 88060209 MEMO STEVENS TO PETERSON
Z 88060312 FOR SIGNATURE
X 88060317 PERITO SGD MEMO

ture Program, the protection of the health and safety of Vietnamese refugees living in camps throughout Southeast Asia and the continued Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia;

Whereas these unresolved issues between the United States and Vietnam have caused great distress and hardship to people of both countries, and it is in the interest of both countries that the issues be resolved as soon as possible;

Whereas increased channels of communication and cooperation between the United States and Vietnam will be necessary to address and to resolve these issues in an expeditious and comprehensive manner;

Whereas the countries could facilitate the process of resolving these issues by establishing an interest section of the United States in the capital of Vietnam and an interest section of Vietnam in the capital of the United States to provide unofficial representation of interests of each country; and

Whereas the establishment of Interest Sections should not be construed as willingness, interest, or intent of the United States to extend or to promote improved economic or diplomatic relations between the countries: Now, therefore, be it

1 *Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate*
2 *concurring)*, That it is the sense of the Congress that the
3 President should negotiate an agreement with the Govern-
4 ment of Vietnam for the establishment of interest sections in
5 the capitals of the United States and Vietnam for the sole
6 and exclusive purpose of resolving the aforementioned issues.

○



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

July 25, 1988

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

5448
591641
00172
URGENT

FG013
FG006-12

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer -

- ✓ National Security Council
- Department of State (Bachrach 647-4463) 25
- Department of Justice (Perkins 633-2113) 17
- Department of the Treasury (Carro 566-8523) 28
- Department of Health & Human Svcs. (White 245-7750) 14

SUBJECT: Defense draft testimony on H.Con.Res. 271, expressing the sense of Congress that the President should negotiate with Vietnam to establish interest sections.

The Office of Management and Budget requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

A response to this request for your views is needed no later than C.O.B., TUESDAY, JULY 26, 1988.

Questions should be referred to **Annette Rooney/Sue Thau** (395-7300), the legislative analyst in this office.

Ronald K. Peterson

RONALD K. PETERSON for
Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference

Enclosures

cc: B. Sasser L. Guzzi
 J. Eisenhower T. Treacy

URGENT

NSC # 8805448

88 JUL 25 P 7: 09

THE QUESTION OF INTEREST SECTIONS

INTRODUCTION

ON THE QUESTION OF US-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS, ALLOW ME TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT ON HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 271, WHICH WOULD EXPRESS "THE SENSE OF THE CONGRESS THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD NEGOTIATE WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM TO ESTABLISH INTEREST SECTIONS IN THE CAPITALS OF BOTH COUNTRIES FOR THE PURPOSE OF RESOLVING SPECIFIC ISSUES BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES."

WE OPPOSE THIS LEGISLATION ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WOULD COMPLICATE ONGOING EFFORTS TO SECURE THE WITHDRAWAL OF VIETNAMESE TROOPS FROM CAMBODIA AND POSE PROBLEMS FOR INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A NEGOTIATED RESOLUTION TO THE CAMBODIAN WAR.

THE POLICY CONSEQUENCES OF OVER-FLEXIBILITY

THE US HAS A LONG RECORD OF POST-WAR COMMUNICATION WITH VIETNAM ON A VARIETY OF HUMANITARIAN ISSUES-- REFUGEES, POW/MIA'S, VIETNAMESE INCARCERATED IN REEDUCATION CAMPS, THE ORDERLY DEPARTURE PROGRAM. BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS OF THE HUMANITARIAN ISSUES HAVE BEEN DISCHARGED IN AS EFFICIENT AND RAPID A MANNER AS THE VIETNAMESE ARE PREPARED TO ALLOW. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INTEREST SECTIONS IS LIKELY TO BE SEEN BY HANOI AS A WEAKENING OF US RESOLVE. THIS, IN TURN, RISKS PROMPTING INTRANSIGENCE ON HANOI'S PART REGARDING THE WHOLE PANOPLY OF REGIONAL ISSUES. OFFERING TO ESTABLISH INTEREST SECTIONS BEFORE VIETNAM HAS AGREED TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY WITH SIHANOUK ABOUT

Dr. Karl Jackson
July 28, 1988
H.F.A.C.

THE FUTURE OF CAMBODIA WOULD BE THE WRONG SIGNAL, IN THE WRONG PLACE, AT THE WRONG TIME. IT WOULD SEND THE MESSAGE TO HANOI THAT AMERICAN AND ASEAN RESOLVE WAS COLLAPSING AND THAT HANOI NEED ONLY PERSEVERE IN ORDER TO ATTAIN VICTORY ON ITS OWN TERMS.

HANOI WOULD REGARD A PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH INTEREST SECTIONS AS AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL VICTORY, WHICH WOULD SIGNAL A WEAKENING IN OUR COMMITMENT TO THE CAMBODIAN CAUSE. THE PROPOSAL FOR ESTABLISHING INTEREST SECTIONS WOULD NOT SIGNIFICANTLY ASSIST THE US IN DEALING WITH THE VIETNAMESE ON THE SEVERAL HUMANITARIAN INTERESTS THAT OCCUPY OUR ATTENTION. RATHER, THE OBVIOUS LINKAGE BETWEEN HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS AND POLITICAL ISSUES WOULD GREATLY DIMINISH THE PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER PROGRESS. I THEREFORE URGE THAT THE SUBCOMMITTEE NOT SUPPORT THE PROPOSED RESOLUTION.

WEAKNESSES IN THE PRO-INTEREST SECTION ARGUMENT

THE MAJORITY OF THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTEREST SECTION

A. OVERSTATE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE VIETNAMESE ARE THEMSELVES INCLINED TO A FULL-FLEDGED RELATIONSHIP

B. IGNORE THE ENDURING HALLMARKS OF THE VIETNAMESE MODE OF OPERATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA

C. EXAGGERATE THE DIMENSIONS OF LEADERSHIP CHANGE AT THE TOPMOST LEVELS OF THE INTRICATE VIETNAMESE DECISION MAKING APPARATUS, IN THE CONTEXT OF MAKING THE CASE THAT THE NEW LEADERS ARE PREPARED TO DEPART FROM THE ARTICLES OF FAITH BY WHICH THEIR PREDECESSORS LIVED

HANOI'S CONCEPTION OF A "RELATIONSHIP"

THOUGH THE VIETNAMESE HAVE ESSENTIALLY SIGNALLED THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO TALK ABOUT A RANGE OF ISSUES, INCLUDING CAMBODIA, IT APPEARS THAT HANOI IS NOT PREPARED TO TAKE THE BILATERAL CONTACTS TO THE NEXT LEVEL, A RELATIONSHIP BASED ON MUTUAL INTERESTS IN WORKING TOWARD GOALS LARGER THAN SIMPLY COMMUNICATING; PONDERING THE ENDURING ISSUES OF REGIONAL STABILITY, DECIDING THE DISPOSITION OF DISPLACED INDOCHINES, INSURING THE SOVEREIGNTY OF A POST-SETTLEMENT RECONSTITUTED CAMBODIA. THAT IS TO SAY, THE RELATIONSHIP THAT WOULD RESULT FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTEREST SECTION WOULD BE ONE-

11

SIDED, AND POTENTIALLY MORE COSTLY FOR THE USG. HANOI IS NOT PREPARED TO THINK OF AN ONTOLOGY OF A US-VIETNAMESE LINK, AND FRAMES ITS CLAIM TO A NEW VISION OF WORLD RELATIONS AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO OPEN THE FLOODGATES TO AGGRESSIVE TRADERS TO RELIEVE THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE PINCH. THAT DOESN'T DESCRIBE A WORKING RELATIONSHIP, MERELY ANOTHER LINK, VERY REMINISCENT OF THE SHAPE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH SOUTH VIETNAM IN THE SIXTIES -- UNDEFINED, LARGELY FOCUSED ON ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES, NON-RECIPROCAL IN NATURE.

THE ENDURING NATURE OF HANOI'S FOREIGN POLICY RULES

THE LESSONS THAT THE VIETNAMESE LEARNED FROM THE WAR, AND THE MANNER IN WHICH THEY CONTINUE TO PRACTICE DIPLOMACY, ALSO SUGGEST THAT THEY ARE NOT OF ALL OF THE MIND TO TAKE THE PLUNGE TOWARD A FULL-FLEDGED RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US, IN SPITE OF PROTESTATIONS TO THE CONTRARY FROM HANOI.

THE VIETNAMESE CONTINUE TO PRACTICE THE TALK-FIGHT STRATEGY THAT SERVED THEM WELL DURING THE LONG CONFLAGRATION: KEEP ADVERSARIES OFF GUARD AND CONFUSED BY OFFERING TO ENGAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS WHILE PERSISTING IN AGGRESSIVE MILITARY ACTIONS AND/OR CLINGING UNCOMPROMISINGLY TO POLITICAL GOALS.

THE VIETNAMESE ALSO PLAY BY THE RULES OF DIPLOMACY THAT SERVED THEIR WARTIME ENDS: DIPLOMACY IS A TACTICAL TOOL, AND

DUPLICITY SHOULD NOT BE RULED OUT AS A MEANS OF MANEUVERING IN AND OUT OF COMPLEX AND VEXING INTERNATIONAL SITUATIONS.

THE QUESTION OF THE "NEW LEADERSHIP" AND THE "NEW POLICIES"

MANY OF THE ARGUMENTS FAVORING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTEREST SECTION MAKE SEVERAL ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT CURRENT POLITICAL TRANSITION IN VIETNAM WHICH OVERSTATE THE DIMENSIONS OF THE TREND TOWARD A MORE REASONABLE LEADERSHIP AND A MORE AMENABLE REGIME. IN SHORT, THESE ARGUMENTS TEND TO OVERSTATE LINH'S GORBACHEVIAN PERSONALITY, IN ORDER TO SUGGEST THE EXTENT TO WHICH WE HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DEAL WITH A LEVEL-HEADED, PRACTICAL AND DISTINCTLY UNIQUE VIETNAMESE POLITICIAN.

IT IS QUITE TRUE THAT IN HIS INCARNATION AS GENERAL SECRETARY, LINH HAS DEMONSTRATED FLEXIBILITY AND ADAPTABILITY, A PENCHANT FOR THE UNORTHODOX TWIST TO POLICY-MAKING AND AN APPARENTLY RESPECTED NOSE-TO-THE GRINDSTONE STYLE. HOWEVER, LINH ACCEPTS THE NEED FOR CHANGE AND SEES ROOM FOR ARGUMENT OVER METHOD, BUT ALSO INSISTS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF MAINTAINING THE CONTOURS OF THE BASIC FOREIGN POLICY AND ECONOMIC PRACTICES INTACT.

IN FOREIGN POLICY, THOUGH CERTAINLY DISTINCT FROM THE PRE-SIXTH PARTY CONGRESS LEADERSHIP, VIETNAM'S CURRENT RULERS ARE STILL PLAYING BY ESSENTIALLY THE SAME RULES AND ADHERING TO A FAIRLY STABLE PROGRAM OF LONG-TERM FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES.

A. VIETNAM STILL THINKS OF THE SOVIET UNION AS ITS BENEFACTOR AND IS STILL COMMITTED TO THE VIEW THAT THE LONG-

RUN COSTS OF A SOVIET PRESENCE IN INDOCHINA MORE THAN OFFSET THE FIRM COUNTERBALANCE TO A CHINESE REGIONAL PRESENCE.

B. AT THIS POINT IN TIME VIETNAM HAS PROVIDED NO FIRM INDICATION THAT IT COULD ACCEPT ANYTHING OTHER THAN A REGIME IN PHNOM PENH WELL DISPOSED TO VIETNAMESE IMPERATIVES ON REGIONAL AND BILATERAL ISSUES, THOUGH HANOI IN THE END MAY BE FORCED TO SETTLE FOR SOMETHING LESS THAN THIS.

C. VIETNAM ALSO SUSTAINS A PROGRAMMATIC COMMITMENT TO A SPECIAL SET OF INDOCHINA RELATIONSHIPS, NOW DESCRIBED AS AN INNOCUOUS COMPLEX OF BILATERAL AND TRILATERAL ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS AND CONTINUING CROSS-BORDER RELATIONSHIPS.

D. VIETNAM CONTINUES TO STAND FIRM IN ITS VIEW THAT CHINA POSES A MAJOR THREAT, EVEN AS HANOI SOFT-PEDALS ITS ANTI-CHINESE RHETORIC TO POSITION ITSELF ADVANTAGEOUSLY AS SINO-SOVIET CURRENTS FLOW WITH THEIR OWN LOGIC.

THERE ARE ALSO MAJOR LIMITS TO LINH'S POWER; THE SYSTEM HAS NOT CHANGED THAT MUCH THAT A SINGLE LEADER CAN PUSH AHEAD OF THE CONSENSUS OF HIS COLLEAGUES.

A. LINH SUFFERS FROM A WEAKER BASE OF SUPPORT THAT HAS BEEN TRADITIONALLY THE CASE FOR PREVIOUS PARTY GENERAL SECRETARIES, AND HE HAS BEGUN TO TAKE THE HEAT FOR THE FAILURE OF THE ECONOMIC REFORMS TO PRODUCE ECONOMIC RESULTS.

N 1987, ESPECIALLY AT THE END-OF-YEAR CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENARY SESSION, LINH TOOK SHARP CRITICISMS FOR THE REGIME'S PERFORMANCE IN THE ECONOMIC REALM.

B. THE GENERAL SECRETARY HAS SUBTLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE LACKED SOME OF THE STRONG INSTITUTIONAL CONNECTIONS AND PERSONAL LINKS THAT HAD BONDED PARTY CAREERISTS WHO ARE HIS SENIOR. IN PARTICULAR, HE CANNOT CLAIM A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MILITARY, AND HAS HAD TO SCRAMBLE TO MAKE ACCOMMODATIONS AND CUT DEALS WITH THE HIGH COMMAND TO OBTAIN A SYMBOLIC SUPPORT FROM THE PEOPLE'S ARMY.

C. LINH HAS ALSO RECENTLY ENCOUNTERED GROWING OPPOSITION TO PORTIONS OF HIS PROGRAM OF INTERNAL PARTY AND ECONOMIC REFORM, AS COMPETING INTERESTS TEST THEIR INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES TO BROADCAST THEIR POLICY PREFERENCES, AND BUILD SUPPORTED POSITIONS IN A SYSTEM PLAYING ACCORDING TO NEW YET STILL ILL-DEFINED RULES.

THE DIPLOMATIC ANGLE

MOST OF THESE CASES FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTEREST SECTION ASSUME THAT A DIPLOMATIC LINK WOULD MAKE COMMUNICATION EASIER, SUGGESTING THAT THE EXISTING OF A FORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONSHIP DOES NOT REPRESENT ONE REGIME'S IMPRIMATEUR ON THE ACTIVITIES AND POLICIES OF ANOTHER, BUT MERELY STANDS AS A MEANS OF FACILITATING COMMUNICATIONS.

IT WOULD SEEM, THOUGH, THAT NEIGHBORS DO NOT GO THROUGH THE EXPENSE OF INSTALLING TELEPHONES IN ONE ANOTHERS HOMES MERELY TO FACILITATE THE POSSIBILITY OF COMMUNICATION. ONE PARTY TO A NEIGHBORLY RELATIONSHIP, WITH INDIVIDUAL EQUITIES AND INTERESTS, WOULD CERTAINLY NOT TAKE THAT STEP WITHOUT A GOOD REASON FOR BELIEVING THAT THE NEXT DOOR RESIDENT WAS PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN MORE THAN PLEASANT AND SOCIAL INTERCOURSE. COMMUNICATION OF THE SORT REPRESENTED BY THE TWO-WAY COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM INVOKED BY AT LEAST ONE OF THE MORE PUBLIC EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT FOR AN INTEREST SECTION IS AN IDLE REMINDER OF PROXIMITY, UNTIL ACTIVATED BY AN ACTUAL DESIRE TO ACT ON THE POTENTIAL FOR A RELATIONSHIP, EXCHANGE IDEAS, AND ENGAGE IN A PRACTICAL INTERCHANGE WITH MUTUALLY SATISFYING PAYOFFS.

AT THIS POINT, THOUGH THE VIETNAMESE HAVE NOT TAKEN RAPID STEPS TO INDICATE THAT WE ARE CLOSER TO TANGIBLE POLICY PAYOFFS IN BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS, THE CURRENT STATUS QUO HAS ACTUALLY IMPROVED TO THE POINT WHERE WE CAN DETECT:

A. A RENEWED WILLINGNESS ON THE PART OF THE VIETNAMESE TO ADHERE TO SIMPLE PROMISES.

B. AN UNSTATED AND PARTIAL COMMITMENT TO SUSTAINING ATTENTION TO CORE ISSUES, WITHOUT DERAILING THE PROCEEDINGS BY RESORTING TO SPECIOUS ARGUMENTS, AND THE ASSERTION OF UNTENABLE LINKAGES.

C. THE SLOW EMERGENCE OF A CONSTITUENCY FOR A MORE EVEN-KEELED RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US AND A MORE SERIOUS EFFORT TO IRON OUT INTRACTABLE PROBLEMS-- CAMBODIA, POW/MIA ACCOUNTING< AND REFUGEE MATERS.

THAT MUCH HAS BEEN ACHIEVED WITHOUT A RELATIONSHIP, THROUGH SIMPLE BILATERAL CONTACTS FOCUSED ON HUMANITARIAN DEALINGS. THAT MUCH REQUIRED NO MORE THAN A FUNCTIONAL LEVEL OF COMMUNICATION, AND WAS ACTUALLY FACILITATED WITH THE MOST MINIMAL POLICY INTERVENTION ON THE VIETNAMESE SIDE OF THE EQUATION.

TO: ~~NSC~~ NSC SECRETARIAT

OBB,

Dul

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

TIME STAMP

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 5448

88 JUL 25 P 8:15

ACTION OFFICER: Childress DUE: ASAP

- Prepare Memo For President
- Prepare Memo Stevens to Peterson/ Murr
- Prepare Memo For Powell/Negropte
- Appropriate Action
- Prepare Memo _____ to _____

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. x 3576

- | FYI | FYI | FYI |
|---|-------------------------------------|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Andricos | <input type="checkbox"/> Grimes | <input type="checkbox"/> Popadiuk |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Batjer | <input type="checkbox"/> Heiser | <input type="checkbox"/> Porter |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Brooks | <input type="checkbox"/> Henhoeffer | <input type="checkbox"/> Reger |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Burns | <input type="checkbox"/> Herbst | <input type="checkbox"/> Rodman |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Childress | <input type="checkbox"/> Jameson | <input type="checkbox"/> Rosenberg |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cobb | <input type="checkbox"/> Kelly, B. | <input type="checkbox"/> Ross |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cockell | <input type="checkbox"/> Kelly, J. | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Rostow |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cohen | <input type="checkbox"/> Kimberling | <input type="checkbox"/> Saunders |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Collins | <input type="checkbox"/> Ledsky | <input type="checkbox"/> Scharfen |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Curtin | <input type="checkbox"/> Levin | <input type="checkbox"/> Seiber |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Danzansky | <input type="checkbox"/> Lewis | <input type="checkbox"/> Snider |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Dean | <input type="checkbox"/> Linhard | <input type="checkbox"/> Sorzano |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Dekok | <input type="checkbox"/> Mahley | <input type="checkbox"/> Steiner |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Donley | <input type="checkbox"/> McCue | <input type="checkbox"/> Tahir-Kheli |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Douglass | <input type="checkbox"/> McNamara | <input type="checkbox"/> Tice |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Ermarth | <input type="checkbox"/> Melby | <input type="checkbox"/> Tillman |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Farrar | <input type="checkbox"/> Miskel | <input type="checkbox"/> Tobey |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Flower | <input type="checkbox"/> Oakley | <input type="checkbox"/> _____ |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Fortier | <input type="checkbox"/> Paal | <input type="checkbox"/> _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Frazier | <input type="checkbox"/> Perina | <input type="checkbox"/> _____ |

- INFORMATION Stevens Perito Secretariat
 Powell (advance) Negropte (advance) _____

COMMENTS

Logged By mc

Return to Secretariat

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 8805448

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 CHILDRESS
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 88072520 MEMO STEVENS TO PETERSON
X 88080809 NFAR PER CHILDRESS

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8805448
RECEIVED: 25 JUL 88 20

TO: STEVENS

FROM: PETERSON, R

DOC DATE: 25 JUL 88
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: VIETNAM
LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL

CONGRESSIONAL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: HCR-271 PRES SHOULD NEGOTIATE W/ VIETNAM TO ESTABLISH INTEREST
SECTIONS

ACTION: NFAR PER CHILDRESS DUE DATE: 26 JUL 88 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CHILDRESS LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCIF: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
CHILDRESS

FOR CONCURRENCE
FORTIER

FOR INFO
PERITO
ROSTOW
STEVENS

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ W/ATTCH: YES NO

OPENED BY: NSMDC CLOSED BY: NSAPK DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED