Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: North, Oliver L.: Files, 1982-1986 Folder Title: Incoming Cables (06/20/1985) TWA #847 (2 of 3) Box: RAC Box 89

To see more digitized collections visit: <u>https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material</u>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Inventories, visit: <u>https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories</u>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <u>https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-</u> <u>support/citation-guide</u>

National Archives Catalogue: <u>https://catalog.archives.gov/</u>

Last Updated: 12/15/2023

WITHDRAWAL SHEET Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: NORTH, OLIVER L.: Files

File Folder: Incoming Cables (Jun 20) TWA #847 [2 of 3] Box 89 Archivist: rfw FOIA ID: F99-046-2, Wills Date: 08/01/2000

DOCUMENT SUBJECT/TITLE DATE RESTRICTION

1. Cable	2010587 Jun 85, 11p R 1/11/02 F97-046/2 # 384	6/20/85	P1/F1
SCable		6/20/85	-P1/F 1
3 Cable	201140Z Jun 85, 1p	6/20/85	P1/F1
4. Cable	201231Z Jun 85, 3p	6/20/85	P1/F1
5. Cable	R 201338Z Jun 85, 4p D 11/30/00 NLSE97-046/2 #388 P2001-021 1/11/02	6/20/85	P1/F17F3
6. Cable	D 11/30/00 NI3F97-046/2 #388 P2001-021 111102 201357Z Jun 85, 2p D 1-11102 - h #389	6/20/85	P1/F1
7. Cable	2014037 Jun 85. 10	6/20/85	- <u>P1/F1</u> >
8. Cable	201409Z Jun 85, 2p	6/20/85	P1/F1
9. Cable	$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	6/20/85	P1/F1
10. Cable		6/20/85-	-P1/F1
11. Cable	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	6/20/85	P1/F1
	·		

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA]. P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]. P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].

P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].

P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]. F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].

F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].

F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information J(b)(4) of the FOIA].

F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].

F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].

F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].

iff. F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

na na serie de la companya de la comp



PAGE Ø1 OF Ø4 SIT377	BE I R U T A N Ø Ø 5 2					2Ø1Ø58 171/1		85	PSN: ØØØ739
DISTRIBUTION: WHSR COMMENT:		MART	СОУҮ	TEIC	<u>NORT</u>	PUBS	SIT	ЕОВ	/011

OP IMMED UTS3314 DE RUEHBL #3637/Ø1 17111Ø2 O 2Ø1Ø58Z JUN 85 ZFF4 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3623

SECRET SECTION Ø1 OF Ø3 BEIRUT Ø3637

NODIS

N

0 D |

Ś

N O D

Ś

N O D I S

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, CASC, EAIR, LE, US. SP SUBJECT: TWA HIJACKING: CONTACT WITH NABIH BARRI

REF: BARTHOLOMEW/PELLETREAU JUNE 19 TACSAT TELCON

1. S-ENTIRE TEXT

2. AMBASSADOR CALLED NABIH BARRI AT 2045 HOURS LOCAL JUNE 19 (GIST OF CONVERSATION REPORTED REFCON). SEE COMMENT PARA 18-20.

3. AT THE OUTSET, AMBASSADOR ASKED BARRI ABOUT THE SITUATION WITH THE HOSTAGES. BARRI REPLIED, "THEY'RE

F97-046/2 #384	
BY CH NARA, DATE 1/11/02	-SECRET

PAGE Ø2 OF Ø4 BEIRUT 3637

K

0 D I S

N D D S

N

0 D

S

N D I DTG: 201058Z JUN 85 PSN: 000739

O.K.. NO PROBLEM. WHY. DID YOU HEAR ANYTHING>" AMBASSADOR RESPONDED NO. TO THE CONTRARY, HE HAD SOME INDICATIONS THAT THEY WERE BEING TREATED WELL, SUCH AS THE DELIVERY OF MEDICATIONS. BARRI STATE THAT ON JUNE 18 HE HAD MET WITH "THE OTHERS" (THE TERM HE CONSISTENTLY USED TO REFER TO THE HIJACKERS/HIZBALLAH) AND ASKED ABOUT THE HOSTAGES' MENU AND TRIED TO ARRANGE PERIODIC MEDICAL VISITS FOR ALL OF THEM.

4. BARRI THEN REMARKED THAT THE CREW WAS IN THE PLANE AND WOULD STAY THERE. HE SAID THAT FIVE REPEAT FIVE HOSTAGES, WHO WERE DEPLANED BEFORE THE AIRCRAFT WENT TO ALGIERS THE LAST TIME, REMAINED ALONE WITH THE HIJACKERS. BUT "THE OTHERS." HE SAID, HAVE GUARANTEED HIM THAT THESE HOSTAGES WILL NOT BE HURT. BARRI SAID HE HAD DIRECT CONTROL OVER "THE MAJORITY" OF THE HOSTAGES BUT "THE OTHERS" (REFERRING AGAIN TO THE HIJACKERS) ARE THERE, TOO. ASKED IF HIS PEOPLE PREDOMINATED IN CONTROLING "THE MAJORITY" OF THE HOSTAGES, BARRI SAID, "YES, WE (AMAL) ARE THE STRONGER."

5. BARRI THEN SAID WITH CONSIDERABLE VEHEMENCE THAT HE WAS "VERY ANGRY" WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN'S AND HENRY KISSINGER'S REMARKS WHICH, IN EFFECT, PLACED ALL THE RESPONSIBILITY ON HIM. "WHAT IS THIS>" HE ASKED. "THIS IS NOT GOOD. I AM ONLY PART OF THIS. I AM ONLY THE MEDIATOR."

6. THE POINT, THE AMBASSADOR TOLD BARRI, IS THAT WHAT HE (BARRI) IS DOING AND SAYING PUBLICLY MAKES HIM RESPONSIBLE. THE AMBASSADOR STRESSED THAT "IF THE HOSTAGES ARE NOT RELEASED UNHARMED, QUICKLY,

SHORFT

MAINTE HOUSE SHUATION ROOM

PAGE Ø3 OF Ø4 BEIRUT 3637

N

0 D I S

N D D S

N D I

Ś

DTG: 201058Z JUN 85 PSN: 000739

AND WITHOUT CONDITION. EVERYBODY IN THE WORLD WILL COME DOWN ON YOU. COME DOWN ON THE SHIA COMMUNITY. AND COME DOWN ON ALL OF LEBANON. "THE WHOLE OUTSIDE WORLD WILL SAY THAT YOU AND LEBANON ARE HOPELESS."

7. BARRI REPLIED, "LET'S BE CLEAR. I AM RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PEOPLE, BUT ONLY ON CONDITION THAT ISRAEL RELEASES THE ATLIT KIDNAPPEES." "I AM NOT," HE ADDED, "RESPONSIBLE IF THEY ARE NOT RELEASED." "I AM THE MEDIATOR," HE REITERATED, "AND BEFORE I WAS, AMERICANS WERE BEING KILLED." "SINCE I STEPPED IN," HE EMPHASIZED. "I HAVE GAINED THE RELEASE OF FOUR PEOPLE."

8. THE AMBASSADOR RESPONDED THAT WHETHER BARRI THINKS IT IS RIGHT OR WRONG, THE WHOLE WORLD WILL HOLD HIM RESPONSIBLE, AND HE KNEW THAT. BARRI COUNTERED THAT THIS WAS SO BECAUSE THE U.S. JOURNALISTS WERE WRITING IT THIS WAY. NO, THE AMBASSADOR REPLIED, IT IS NOT JUST THE U.S. PRESS BUT ALL THE WORLD PRESS AND WORLD OPINION. HE ASKED, FOR EXAMPLE, IF BARRI HAD SEEN WHAT THE SWISS PRESS (BARRI FEELS HE HAS CLOSE RELATIONS

WITH THE SWISS) WAS WRITING ABOUT HIM AND THE LEBANESE SHIA. WORLD OPINION HELD HIM RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAFETY AND RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES BECAUSE OF THE FACTS AND HIS ACTIONS AND STATEMENTS.

9. THE AMBASSADOR TOLD BARRI FLATLY AGAIN THAT ONE COULD NOT TRADE THE INNOCENT PASSENGERS FOR THE ATLIT PRISONERS. BARRI INTERJECTED THAT THE PEOPLE FROM ATLIT WERE NO LONGER "PRISONERS." WHEN THEY WERE TAKEN ACROSS THE BORDER BY ISRAEL, HE SAID,

SECRET

VEHIL HUELL CHUAMON ROOM

PAGE Ø4 OF Ø4 BEIRUT 3637

DTG: 201058Z JUN 85 PSN: 000739

THEY BECAME "KIDNAPPEES."

N D D S

N D D S

N D D S

N D D S 10. THE AMBASSADOR STATED THAT THE USG HAD ALREADY EXPRESSED ITS OPINION THAT THE TRANSFER OF THE PRISONERS TO ISRAEL WAS AGAINST THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION. BE THAT AS IT MAY, IT DOES NOT MAKE IT RIGHT TO HOLD INNOCENT PEOPLE AND TRY TO USE THEM BT

SECRET

SECRET

· · ·

N D D S

N O D I S

N D D S

> N D I S

> > •

DISTRIBUTION: <u>JP</u> /Ø WHSR COMMENT: REDTAG	7 1 1 1 Ø 2 4		
OP IMMED STU8476 DE RUEHBL ≠3637/Ø2 1 O 2Ø1Ø58Z JUN 85 ZFF FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC N SECRET SECTION NODIS E.O. 12356: DECL: TAGS: PTER, CASC, E	7 1 1 1 Ø 2 4		
STU8476 DE RUEHBL #3637/Ø2 1 O 2010587 JUN 85 ZFF FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC N SECRE T SECTION NODIS E.O. 12356: DECL: TAGS: PTER, CASC, E	4		
STU8476 DE RUEHBL #3637/Ø2 1 O 2010587 JUN 85 ZFF FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC N SECRE T SECTION NODIS E.O. 12356: DECL: TAGS: PTER, CASC, E	4		
DE RUEHBL #3637/Ø2 1 0 2010582 JUN 85 ZFF FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC N SECRET SECTION NODIS E.O. 12356: DECL: TAGS: PTER, CASC, E	4		
O 201058Z JUN 85 ZFF FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC N SECRE T SECTION NODIS E.O. 12356: DECL: TAGS: PTER, CASC, E	4		
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC N SECRET SECTION NODIS E.O. 12356: DECL: TAGS: PTER, CASC, E			
TO SECSTATE WASHDC N SECRET SECTION NODIS E.O. 12356: DECL: TAGS: PTER, CASC, E	IACT IMMEDIATE 3624		
SECRET SECTION NODIS E.O. 12356: DECL: TAGS: PTER, CASC, E	IACT IMMEDIATE 3624		
NODIS E.O. 12356: DECL: TAGS: PTER, CASC, E			
E.O. 12356: DECL: TAGS: PTER, CASC, E	Ø2 OF Ø3 BEIRUT Ø363	3 7	
E.O. 12356: DECL: TAGS: PTER, CASC, E	بر و میں		
TAGS: PTER, CASC, E			
	0 A D R		
SUBJECT: TWA HIJACK	AIR, LE, US, SP		
	ING: CONTACT WITH N	IABIH BARRI	
TO FORCE THE LIBERAT	ION OF THE PRISONERS	S. BARRI	
RESPONDED IMMEDIATEL			
PERCENT." BUT, HE C	ONTINUED, "I AM FACE	D WITH A	
SITUATION IN WHICH '			
CAUSE OF ALL THEIR P			
REITERATED THAT IS W			
RELEASE OF THE HOSTA PRISONERS. "TWO WRO	GES TO THE RELEASE O		

11. BARRI SAID HE UNDERSTOOD, HE UNDERSTOOD. BUT

SAID, "AND THE U.S. WILL NOT MAKE CONCESSIONS TO

TERRORISTS. YOU HEARD PRESIDENT REAGAN."

.

PAGE Ø2 OF Ø4 BEIRUT 3637

I O D I S

N O D S

N O D I S

NODIS

DTG: 201058Z JUN 85 PSN: 000741

WHY NOT DO SOMETHING INDIRECTLY, WHY NOT ASK ISRAEL TO RELEASE THE ATLIT KIDNAPPEES THROUGH THE RED CROSS> THE AMBASSADOR RESPONDED THAT THIS WOULD STILL LINK THE TWO ISSUES. HE TOLD BARRI THAT INSTEAD OF SPEEDING THE RELEASE OF THE ATLIT PRISIONERS THE HIJACKING HAD PROBABLY DELAYED IT.

12. AMBASSADOR SAID HE SHOULD CHANGE HIS FOCUS AND WORK ON CONVINCING THE HIJACKERS TO GIVE IT UP. HE SHOULD TELL THE HIJACKERS THAT THIS AFFAIR HAS TURNED THE WHOLE WORLD AGAINST THE WHOLE SHIA COMMUNITY, INCLUDING THEM AND HIM. AND THAT IT IS NOW CLEAR IT WILL NOT WORK. HE COULD TELL THEM THAT FOR FIVE DAYS NOW THE HIJACKERS HAVE GOTTEN A LOT OF ATTENTION; THE ATLIT PRISONERS HAVE GOTTEN A LOT OF ATTENTION; THEY HAVE HEARD U.S. STATEMENTS ON THE ATLIT PRISONERS; THEY HAVE HEARD ISRAEL'S STATEMENTS. HE SHOULD TELL THEM THAT IS ENOUGH.

13. BARRI RESPONDED SHARPLY, "YOU TALK AS IF THE OTHERS AUTOMATICALLY BELIEVE ME, AS IF THEY WILL DO WHAT I TELL THEM." "THEY MUST BE MADE TO UNDERSTAND," THE AMBASSADOR REJOINED. "I AM CONFRONTED WITH A SICKNESS," BARRI SAID. "I AM THE DOCTOR, BUT THE PATIENT MUST HELP ME. IF NOT, I WILL END MY SERVICES." THE AMBASSADOR TOLD BARRI SHARPLY THAT HE KNEW HE COULD NOT DO THIS; THE WHOLE WORLD WOULD HOLD HIM RESPONSIBLE FOR WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE HOSTAGES. AMBASSADOR ALSO STATED THAT GIVING IN TO THE HIJACKERS' DEMANDS MAY SAVE THE "PATIENT" THIS TIME, BUT MANY MORE "PATIENTS" WOULD DIE IN THE FUTURE.

14. ALMOST PLEADING, BARRI STATED, "I CANNOT, I

PAGE Ø3 OF Ø4 BEIRUT 3637

N D

Ś

N

0 D I S

N

D

S

N

D D S DTG: 201058Z JUN 85 PSN: 000741

CANNOT LIBERATE THE PEOPLE WITHOUT THE AGREEMENT OF THE OTHERS." "IF I COULD." HE CLAIMED, "BELIEVE ME, I WOULD DO SO IN TWO MINUTES." "IT WAS TOUGH TO CONVINCE 'THE OTHERS' TO RELEASE THE THREE YESTERDAY." HE SAID. "MAYBE I COULD RELEASE THOSE WITH ME, BUT WITH SOME DANGER. BUT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO THE FIVE HELD BY THE OTHERS>" BARRI SAID THAT HE HAD TRIED TO BRING THE FIVE HOSTAGES TOGETHER WITH THE MAIN GROUP: "BUT 'THE OTHERS' DID NOT ACCEPT. THEY DO NOT TRUST ME."

15. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASSAD HAD COME OUT AGAINST HOSTAGE TAKING LAST WEEK. BARRI REPLIED, "I AM MORE AGAINST IT THAN HE." HE THEN REITERATED THAT BEFORE HE HAD INTERVENED, AN AMERICAN HAD BEEN KILLED AND OTHERS HAD BEEN ON THE VERGE OF BEING KILLED, AND THAT SINCE HE HAD INTERVENED, FOUR PEOPLE HAD BEEN LIBERATED. "RATHER THAN THANKING ME," HE SAID, "THE AMERICANS HATE ME."

16. THE AMBASSADOR TOLD BARRI AGAIN THAT HE MUST CONVINCE THE HIJACKERS THAT IT WILL NOT WORK, THAT IT IS ONLY DELAYING RELEASE OF THE ATLIT

PRISONERS. THE ANTI-SHIA OPINION WHICH IS DEVELOPING IN THE WORLD IS CONTRARY TO THE INTERESTS OF THE SHIA COMMUNITY. THEY WILL BE HELD RESPONSIBLE. BARRI RETORTED THAT HE AND THE U.S. AND SYRIA HAD BEEN TRYING FOR OVER A YEAR TO FREE THE OTHER AMERICAN HOSTAGES BUT HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO.

17. THE AMBASSADOR TOLD BARRI IT WAS IMPERATIVE

PAGE Ø4 OF Ø4 BEIRUT 3637

N O D I S

N D S

N O D I S

N O D I S

DTG: 201058Z JUN 85 PSN: 000741

THAT HE CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS, AND THE TWO AGREED TO REMAIN IN TOUCH.

18. COMMENT: BARRI IS FEELING THE HEAT. HE IS TRYING TO SCRAMBLE BACK TO THE ROLE OF MEDIATOR TO LIGHTEN THE RESPONSIBILITY ON HIM. HIS BT

SECRE

PAGE Ø1 OF Ø3	BEIRUT 3637	DTG: 201058Z JUN 85	PSN: ØØØ742
SIT378	ANØØ5210	TOR: 171/1228Z	
DISTRIBUTION: WHSR COMMENT:			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

OP IMMED

I CODIS

NOD-S

Ś

NOD-S

UTS3315 DE RUEHBL #3637/Ø3 17111Ø3 O 2Ø1Ø58Z JUN 85 ZFF4 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3625

SECRET SECTION Ø3 OF Ø3 BEIRUT Ø3637

NODIS

.

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, CASC, EAIR, LE, US, SP SUBJECT: TWA HIJACKING: CONTACT WITH NABIH BARRI

PROTESTATION THAT HE CANNOT SIMPLY IMPOSE HIS WILL ON THE "OTHERS" WITHOUT RISK TO THE HOSTAGES IS AT LEAST IN PART A NEGOTIATING TACTIC, AND A WAY TO HEAD OFF BLAME IF THINGS TURN OUT BADLY. HE IS CLAIMING THAT HE HAS TO HAVE SOMETHING ON THE ATLIT PRISONERS TO "CONVINCE THE OTHERS," AND THAT HE CANNOT SIMPLY FORCE THEM TO LET GO WITHOUT LIKELY RETALIATION AGAINST AT LEAST SOME OF THE HOSTAGES. AT THE SAME TIME, WHAT HE SAYS ABOUT THE EXTENT OF HIS CONTROL GENERALLY FITS WITH INFORMATION ON BARRI'S POSITION WITHIN AMAL. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN SOME AMAL FACTIONS AND HIZBALLAH, AND THE FACT THAT THE FIVE HELD

PAGE Ø2 OF Ø3 BEIRUT 3637

N D D I S

N D I

Ś

N D D S DTG: 201058Z JUN 85 PSN: 000742

SEPARATELY FROM THE MAIN GROUP OF THE HOSTAGES DO APPEAR TO BE ESSENTIALLY IN THE HANDS OF "THE OTHERS." WE THINK THAT WHEN HE SAYS HE MIGHT BE ABLE TO RELEASE THE MAIN BODY "BUT WITH SOME DANGER," THAT IS PARTLY TO INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON US. WE CANNOT, HOWEVER, TOTALLY DISMISS THE STATEMENT ABOUT DANGER BECAUSE THERE ARE "THE OTHERS," AND WE CANNOT BE CERTAIN THAT BARRI WOULD RETAIN CONTROL OVER THE AMAL FORCES AROUND THE MAIN BODY IF IT CAME TO A CRUNCH.

19. WHATEVER THE ASSESSMENT OF BARRI'S DEGREE OF CONTROL, WE MUST KEEP THE BURDEN OF RESPONSIBILITY FIRMLY ON HIM IN ORDER TO PRESSURE HIM TO DO THE MAXIMUM TO PROTECT AND RELEASE THE HOSTAGES WITHOUT CONDITION. THE SYRIAN FACTOR BECOMES EVEN MORE IMPORTANT AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND. THE STRONGER AND THE MORE VISIBLE SYRIAN BACKING FOR RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES WITHOUT REPEAT WITHOUT CONDITION, THE MORE PRESSURED AND ENCOURAGED BARRI WILL BE TO PUSH IN THAT DIRECTION; THE MORE COVER HE WILL HAVE POLITICALLY VIS-A-VIS "THE OTHERS" ("IT IS NOT ME, IT IS THE SYRIANS WHO WANT THIS"); AND THE MORE WILLING HE WILL BE TO PUSH FOR CONTROL AND TO TAKE THEM ON IN A BIG WAY IF NECESSARY.

20. THE SYRIANS CAN ALSO SQUEEZE "THE OTHERS"--BOTH THE IRANIANS AND HIZBALLAH, STARTING WITH FADLALLAH--AND WE SHOULD BE PUSHING THEM TO DO SO DIRECTLY. IT IS CRITICAL FOR THEM NOT TO WORK SIMPLY ON BARRI. IRAN WOULD BE NOWHERE IN LEBANON WITHOUT SYRIAN TOLERANCE AND SUPPORT. ALL OF HIZBALLAH LINES AND SUPPORT BASE LEAD BACK TO THE BIOA' WHICH IS OCCUPIED BY SYRIA. END COMMENT.

.

PAGE Ø3 OF Ø3 BEIRUT 3637

. .

DTG: 201058Z JUN 85 PSN: 000742

BARTHOLOMEW BT

N D S

-, -

.

ATTALT T

LANDER CHUNKING



PAGE Ø1 OF Ø	4 BEIRUT 3638	D T	G:201104Z JUN	N 85 PSN:000658
SIT382	ANØØ5214	T C	OR: 171/1128Z	
DISTRIBUTION	: MCF JP MART (COVY VP TEIC	<u>NORT</u> PUBS	SIT EOB
	/013			
WHSR COMMENT	: REDTAG			

OP IMMED UTS3319 DE RUEHBL #3638/Ø1 17111Ø5 O 2Ø11Ø4Z JUN 85 ZFF4 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3626

INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 1197 AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 5769

SECRET SECTION Ø1 OF Ø2 BEIRUT Ø3638

TERREP

DEPT FOR OPSCENTER TASK FORCE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, CASC, EAIR, LE, US, SP SUBJECT: TWA HIJACKING: PUSHING CAMILLE CHAMOUN; - CHAMOUN'S CALL TO BARRI

REF: BEIRUT 3599

1. SENTIRE TEXT

NLS F97-046/2 #385 BY C4N, NARA, DATE 1/11/02

اليوني والدينية المراجع العربي من المراجع المراجع المراجع المراجع المراجع المراجع المراجع المراجع المراجع المر مراجع المراجع ال

PAGE Ø2 OF Ø4 BEIRUT 3638

DTG: 201104Z JUN 85 PSN: 000658

2. AS PART OF CAMPAIGN TO PUSH LEBANESE LEADERS TO SPEAK OUT PUBLICLY AND PRESSURE BARRI AND OTHERS FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF HOSTAGES UNHARMED AND WITHOUT CONDITIONS (REFTEL), AMBASSADOR MET AT RESIDENCE WITH FORMER PRESIDENT CAMILLE CHAMOUN. AT Ø83Ø ON JUNE 2Ø. AND DREW ON POINTS CONTAINED REFTEL, EMPHASIZING DANGERS FOR LEBANESE AND CONTRIBUTION CHAMOUN COULD MAKE WITH HIS GREAT MORAL AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY.

3. CHAMOUN'S FIRST REACTION WAS THAT U.S. CANNOT WALK AWAY FROM LEBANON AND LEAVE IT IN THE HANDS OF SYRIANS AND COMMUNISTS. HE SAID IT WOULD BE "THE BIGGEST MISTAKE YOU COULD DO," AS IT WOULD MAKE LEBANON A PRISONER OF SYRIANS AND MUSLIM EXTREMISTS. AMBASSADOR AGREED THAT DAMAGE LEBANON WOULD SUFFER WOULD NOT BE A GOOD THING, AND EXPLAINED THAT IT WOULD NOT RESULT FROM U.S. OR WESTERN POLICY DECISIONS. BUT FROM THE REVULSION WORLD OPINION FEELS AT THE TAKING. BEATING, SYSTEMATIC ROBBING, TERRORIZING, AND EVEN MURDERING OF INNOCENT PEOPLE. HE NOTED THAT PROCESS HAD ALREADY BEGUN WITH DEPARTURE OF CANADIAN EMBASSY STAFF AND TALK OF BOYCOTTING BIA AND AIRCRAFT FROM BEIRUT.

4. CHAMOUN ASKED RHETORICALLY IF OUTSIDE WORLD APPROVED OF NEGATIVE U.S. ATTITUDE TOWARD ITS PROBLEMS IN LEBANON. HE ASSERTED THAT PEOPLE NO LONGER RESPECT U.S. AND AMERICAN PEOPLE BECAUSE WE HAVE NOT REACTED TO PREVIOUS TERRORIST ATTACKS, SUCH AS BOMBING OF EMBASSY IN APRIL 83. ACCORDING TO CHAMOUN, U.S. MUST REACT NO MATTER WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES. U.S. CANNOT RELY ON LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO ACT ALONE BECAUSE LEBANON IS DOMINATED BY SYRIANS AND COMMUNISTS.

5. AMBASSADOR INSISTED THAT ALL LEBANESE LEADERS MUST

SEGRET



PAGE Ø3 OF Ø4 BEIRUT 3638

DTG: 201104Z JUN 85 PSN: 000658

SPEAK OUT PUBLICLY TO DEMONSTRATE TO OUTSIDE WORLD THAT THIS EVENT HAS NO GENERAL SUPPORT IN LEBANON. SUCH STATEMENTS, HE CONTINUED, WOULD ALSO HELP CREATE A CLIMATE WHICH WOULD ENCOURAGE BARRI AND OTHERS TO MOVE IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.

6. CHAMOUN QUESTIONED WHETHER SUCH STATEMENTS WOULD EXERT ANY INFLUENCE ON TERRORISTS, BUT ADDED HE WOULD SPEAK TO BARRI AND TELL HIM HE MUST LIBERATE HOSTAGES UNCONDITIONALLY. HE WOULD ALSO PROMISE BARRI THAT HE WOULD USE ALL HIS INFLUENCE TO WORK FOR RELEASE OF ATLIT PRISONERS ONCE HOSTAGES WERE SAFELY RELEASED. AMBASSADOR STRESSED TO CHAMOUN THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO BARRI THAT HE DID NOT HAVE ANY COMMITMENT FROM THE AMERICANS. ONLY CHAMOUN'S PROMISE THAT HE WOULD USE HIS CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE ON BEHALF OF ATLIT PRISONERS.

7. CHAMOUN VEHEMENTLY ASSERTED THAT MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE WAS WHETHER MIDDLE EAST WOULD FALL TO COMMUNISM COUNTRY BY COUNTRY. HE STATED THAT OUTSIDE FORCE MUST BE USED TO DISARM LEBANESE FACTIONS AND PROVIDE PEACEFUL INTERVAL FOR DISCUSSIONS AMONG LEBANESE LEADERS AND THAT THIS WAS THE THEME OF HIS JUNE 19 INTERVIEW WITH "NEWSWEEK." AMBASSADOR RESPONDED THAT IF LEBANESE DO

NOT UNDERSTAND THEIR OWN INTEREST IN DEVELOPING A MODUS VIVENDI, OUTSIDE MILITARY FORCE CANNOT PROVIDE A SUBSTITUTE FOR THAT UNDERSTANDING. HE ALSO NOTED THAT IT WOULD BE UNREALISTIC TO BUILD A STRATEGY ON THE PROSPECT OF OUTSIDE INTERVENTION.

8. CHAMOUN REITERATED HIS PLEDGE TO CONTACT BARRI TO PRESS FOR UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE OF HOSTAGES AND PROMISE HIS ASSISTANCE IN FREEING OF ATLIT PRISONERS. HE



MIND PRICE OTWANDLE ROOM

PAGE Ø4 OF Ø4 BEIRUT 3638

DTG: 201104Z JUN 85 PSN: 000658

EXPLAINED THAT BARRI MUST BE APPROACHED EITHER WITH HOPE OF LIBERATION OF ATLIT PRISONERS. OR WITH THREAT THAT HE WILL BE CRUSHED. CHAMOUN PROMISED TO USE "A SIMPLE LANGUAGE" TO TELL BARRI HE WOULD INTERVENE TO HELP LIBERATE BARRI'S PEOPLE ONCE THE AMERICANS WERE UNCONDITIONALLY RELEASED.

9. AMBASSADOR AGAIN EMPHASIZED THAT CHAMOUN COULD SPEAK BT

PAGE Ø1 OF Ø2	BEIRUT 3638	DTG: 201104Z JUN 85	PSN: 000660
S T 3 8 3	ANØØ5215	TOR: 171/1129Z	
DISTRIBUTION:	<u>JP</u> /ØØ1		
WHSR COMMENT:	REDTAG		

OP IMMED STU8487 DE RUEHBL #3638/02 1711106 O 201104Z JUN 85 ZFF4 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3627

INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 1198 AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 5770

SECRET SECTION Ø2 OF Ø2 BEIRUT Ø3638

TERREP

DEPT FOR OPSCENTER TASK FORCE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, CASC, EAIR, LE, US, SP SUBJECT: TWA HIJACKING: PUSHING CAMILLE CHAMOUN;

ONLY FOR HIMSELF AND HIS OWN EFFORTS. CHAMOUN COULD SAY NOTHING THAT WOULD IMPLY ANY U.S. COMMITTMENT OR LINKAGE BETWEEN THE ISSUES. WE WERE FIRM ON OUR POLICY OF NO CONCESSIONS TO TERRORISTS. AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HOSTAGE TAKING HAS NOT ENCOURAGED EFFORTS TO RELEASE ATLIT PRISONERS, BUT HAS HAMPERED THEM. SINCE NO GOVERNMENT WILL ACT WITH A GUN AT ITS HEAD, ANY PLANS OR EFFORTS ON RELEASE OF ATLIT PRISONERS HAVE BEEN DISCOURAGED NOT

PAGE Ø2 OF Ø2 BEIRUT 3638

DTG: 201104Z JUN 85 PSN: 000660

ENCOURAGED. AS A RESULT OF THE HIJACKING, THE TERRORISTS' GOALS ARE FURTHER OFF THAN BEFORE.

10. AT 1245 LOCAL, CHAMOUN CALLED AMBASSADOR TO REPORT HE HAD CALLED BARRI. CHAMOUN SAID HE DID NOT WANT TO GIVE BARRI ALL THE DETAILS OVER THE PHONE, BUT URGED BARRI TO TERMINATE THE HIJACKING AND FREE THE HOSTAGES UNCONDITIONALLY. CHAMOUN REPORTED THAT HE TOLD BARRI THAT ONCE THE HOSTAGES WERE FREED, HE WOULD INVOLVE HIMSELF WITH THE PROBLEM OF THE ATLIT PRISONERS. CHAMOUN SAID HE HAD MADE NO PROMISES ON USG BEHALF CONCERNING THE ATLIT PRISONERS ON HIS OWN. HE HAD ONLY PROMISED TO WORK FOR THEIR RELEASE. CHAMOUN TOLD BARRI TO THINK ABOUT THIS PROPOSITION FOR A FEW HOURS AND THAT HE WOULD CALL BARRI AGAIN THIS AFTERNOON.

11. BARRI SAID THAT HIZBALLAH WERE THE REAL PEOPLE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE HOSTAGES. CHAMOUN SAID HE TOLD BARRI THAT THIS CONTRADICTED HIS OWN CLAIMS OF RESPONSIBLITY AND THAT HE COULD NOT BACK AWAY. CHAMOUN CHARACTERIZED BARRI'S RESPONSE TO HIS OVERTURE AS "NOT BAD." CHAMOUN PROMISED TO CALL AMBASSADOR AFTER THIS AFTERNOON'S CALL TO BARRI. BARTHOLOMEW BT

Pup register

VINE HOUSE CONTRACTOR

 PAGE Ø1 OF Ø2
 SAN SALVADOR 7766
 DTG: 201129Z JUN 85
 PSN: ØØØ718

 SIT374
 ANØØ52Ø6
 TOR: 171/1200Z

 DISTRIBUTION:
 VP
 MENG
 NORT

OP IMMED STU854Ø DE RUEHSN #7766 1711129 O 2Ø1129Z JUN 85 ZFF4 FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6094

INFO USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PN IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA IMMEDIATE 5671 AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA IMMEDIATE 4903 AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE IMMEDIATE 8274 AMEMBASSY MANAGUA IMMEDIATE 9401 AMEMBASSY PANAMA IMMEDIATE 4487

UNCLAS SAN SALVADOR Ø7766

TERREP

•

CA/OCS/EMR

E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: PTER, ASEC, ES, CASC SUBJECT: TWO PRIVATE AMERICAN CITIZENS ALSO KILLED IN TERRORIST ATTACK

REF: SAN SALVADOR 7760

1. ACCORDING TO INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM SALVADORAN AUTHORITIES AND A PRIVATE COMPANY, INTER-DATA, TWO PRIVATE AMERICAN CITIZENS WERE ALSO KILLED DURING THE JUNE 19 TERRORIST ATTACK WHICH TOOK THE LIVES OF FOUR EMBASSY MARINES.

2. A REPRESENTATIVE OF INTER-DATA TOLD US THE TWO MURDERED AMERICANS WERE EMPLOYED BY WANG, INC., OF MIAMI AND OF BOSTON. AN INTER-DATA EMPLOYEE WHO WAS WITH THE TWO WHEN THE ATTACK OCCURRED IDENTIFIED THE BODIES. THEY WERE ATTENDING AN INTER-DATA CONFERENCE IN SAN SALVADOR.

3. THE TWO MURDERED AMERICANS WERE IDENTIFIED AS:

- GEORGE VINEY 7875 S.W. 146 ST. MIAMI, FLA. 33158 PPT. NO. Ø4Ø479636 DPOB NOV. 4, 1936 UNITED KINGDOM

- ROBERT ALVIDREZ WILWOOD RD. 3 LEXINGTON, MA. Ø2173 DPOB NOV. 13, 1937 CALIFORNIA

4. THE OCS DUTY OFFICER HAS SPOKEN WITH NEXT OF KIN. AN EMBASSY OFFICER HAS TAKEN POSSESSION OF THE PASSPORTS.

5. IN ADDITION TO THE FOUR MARINES AND THE TWO AMERICAN CIVILIANS, WE HAVE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS THAT BETWEEN SEVEN AND NINE SALVADORANS AND GUATEMALANS WERE ALSO KILLED BY THE TERRORISTS.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE Ø2 OF Ø2 SAN SALVADOR 7766

DTG: 201129Z JUN 85 PSN: 000718

PASSAGE B⁻⁻

UNCLASSIFIED

en en l'éga d'anna anna air an maiseach an saoisteachta anna an Stèireachta

 PAGE Ø1
 TEL AVIV 9185
 DTG: 20114ØZ JUN 85
 PSN: 001375

 SIT519
 AN005344
 TOF: 171/1754Z

 DISTRIBUTION:
 COVY
 TELS
 NOFT

OP IMMED STU8577 DE RUEHTV #9185 1711141 O 2Ø114ØZ JUN 85 FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE Ø389

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE Ø826

CONFIDENTIALIEL AVIV 09185

EXDIS

E X D I S

EXD D S

EXDIS

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PGOV, IS, US SUBJECT: RABIN REMARKS ON HIJACKING

REF: TEL AVIV 9181

1. C<u>onfidentia</u> entire text.

2. I HAVE HAD FURTHER CONVERSATIONS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER'S POLITICAL ADVISOR, NIMROD NOVIK, CONCERNING THE RABIN REMARKS ON THE HIJACKING MADE TO THE NIGHTLINE BROAD CAST LAST NIGHT, WITHOUT SUGGESTING ANY SPECIFIC FORMULAS I URGED NOVIK TO DO WHATEVER HE COULD TO HAVE THE RABIN COMMENTS PUT IN A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE CONTEXT. T SATD WE COULD NOT SEE ANYTHING USEFUL THAT COULD COME OUT OF A PUBLIC SHOUTING MATCH BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND JERUSALEM ON THIS SUBJECT. REFLECTING EARLIER CONVERSATIONS ON THE SUBJECT, NOVIK COMPLETELY AGREED. HE UNDERTOOK TO URGE SOME CORRECTIVE ACTION ON THE PRIME MINISTER. NOVIK HAS JUST CALLED BACK TO SAY THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WILL MAKE A STATEMENT THIS EVENING LOCAL TIME WHICH WILL CONFIRM THAT U.S. AND ISRAELI POLICY ON YIELDING TO THE DEMANDS OF TERRORISTS ARE THE SAME. SINCE THE STATEMENT HAS NOT YET BEEN DRAFTED, WE ARE UNSURE WHAT ELSE IT WILL CONTAIN, BUT ITS PURPOSE IS TO CALM THE TROUBLED WATERS AND PREVENT THE CONTINUATION OF A PUBLIC SHOUTING MATCH BETWEEN THE U.S. AND ISRAEL ON THIS ISSUE.

3. IN AN ATTEMPT TO PREVENT THIS TYPE OF INCIDENT, I HAD SPOKEN AT LENGTH WITH NOVIK YESTERDAY, JUNE 19. I TOLD NOVIK I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE HOT POTATO ATMOSPHERE THAT WAS BEING GENERATED BY THE PRESS AND WANTED TO CON-FIRM THAT OUR POLICY LINES WERE STILL THE SAME. NOVIK SAID YESTERDAY THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE TROUBLESOME PRESS SPECULATION, BUT HE AND THE PRIME MINISTER WERE COMFORT-ABLE WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL CONFORMITY OF OUR POLICY POSITIONS ON NOT YIELDING TO TERRORIST DEMANDS. HE WAS OBVIOUSLY TAKEN BY SURPRISE BY RABIN'S REMARKS LATER LAST NIGHT. IT WAS IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS EARLIER CONVERSATION THAT I PRESSED NOVIK FOR THE CORRECTIVE ACTION WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER HAS NOW AGREED TO TAKE. FLATIN BT

7-046/2 7380 NARA, DATE 1/11/02 CONFIDENTIAL

 PAGE 01 OF 02
 BEIRUT 3642
 DTG: 201231Z JUN 85
 PSN: 000764

 IT3:5
 ANC05217
 TOA 17, 11243Z

 ISTRIBUTION: CO/M TEIC NORT FLES SIT ECE 300

CF IMMEC UTS3438 DE RUEHBL #3642/01 1711232 O 201231Z JUN 85 ZFF4 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3632

INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDATE 1:99 Amembassy tel aviv immediate 5 ti

S E C R F T SECTION Ø1 OF Ø2 BEIRUT Ø3642

TERREP

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER. CASC. EAIR, LE. US SUBJECT: TWA HIJACFING: PRESSING MU'AWWAD

REF BEIRUT 3598

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AS PART OF CAMPAIGN TO PUSH LEBANESE LEADERS TO SPEAK OUT PUBLICLY AND TO PRESSURE BARRI AND OTHERS FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF HOSTAGES UNHARMED AND WITHOUT CONDITIONS (REFTEL), AMBASSADOR MET AT THE YARZE RESIDENCE WITH RENE MU'AWWAD, A LEADING CHRISTIAN MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT

3. RECALLING AT THE OUTSET MU'AWWAD'S REPUTATION AND AUTHORITY AS A POLITICAL LEADER AND HIS CONTACTS AMONG ALL CONFESSIONAL GROUPS. THE AMBASSADOR STRESSED THAT MU'AWWAD MUST HELP MAKE OTHER LEBANESE LEADERS UNDERSTAND THAT THEY HAVE THE RIGHT AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO INTERVENE IN FAVOR OF THE RELEASE OF THE AMCIT HOSTAGES AND TO SPEAF OUT PUBLICLY AGAINST THIS HIJACKING. MU'AWWAD INTERJECTED THAT IT WAS HIS "DUTY" AND THAT OF OTHER LEBANESE LEADERS TO DO SO.

4. THE AMBASSADOR EMPHASIZED THAT, IF THE HOSTAGES WERE NOT RELEASED UNHARMED, QUICKLY, AND WITHOUT CONDITION, LEBANON RISKED ISOLATION FROM THE OUTSIDE WORLD, WHERE PUBLIC OPINION WAS ALREADY HOLDING THE LEBANESE IN CONTEMPT.

5. MU'AWWAD SAID HE FULLY REALIZED THIS AND WAS GRAVELY CONCERNED. HE MENTIONED THAT HE WAS GOING TO SEE JUMBLATT IN MUKHTARAH THE NEXT DAY, JUNE 20. AND WOULD PROBABLY TRAVEL THERE IN THE COMPANY OF JUMBLATT SENIOR ADVISOR MARWAN HAMMADA. THE AMBASSADOR AND MU'AWWAD AGREED THAT THIS WOULD BE AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY TO PUSH HAMMADA AND JUMBLATT TO MAKE APPROPRIATE PUBLIC STATEMENTS AGAINST THE HIJ DEING AFFAIR. THEY ALSO AGREED THAT BARRI WOULD PAY EXTRA CLOSE ATTENTION TO ANY STATEMENTS COMING FROM JUMBLATT HIS FOLITICAL AND SOMETIMES MILITARY ALLY.

17-04/2 #387 MARA, DATE 1/11/02

SEGREL



PAGE Ø2 OF Ø2 BEIRUT 3642

DTG: 201231Z JUN 85 PSN: 000764

.

6. MU'AWWAD STATED THAT HE WOULD ALSO TRY TO SEE BARRI DIRECTLY. HE SAID BARRI AFPEARED TO BE "NAVIGATING" BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. I.E. HIZBALLAH AND THE U.S. AND WEIGHING THE POSSIBLE POLITICAL BENEFITS AND LOSSES HE MIGHT REAP FROM THIS AFFAIR. BARRI MUST BE MADE TO UNDERSTAND, MU'AWWAD AFFIRMED. THAT THIS HIJACKING IS NOT AN ORDINARY POLITICAL GAME AND THAT BARRI. THE SHIA, AND ALL LEBANESE RISKED LOSSING GREATLY. AMBASSADOR FULLY CONCURRED WITH THIS LINE. MU'AWWAD ADDED THAT OTHER SHIA LEADERS SUCH AS SHEIKHS SHAMSADDIN AND KABALAN WERE WAITING FOR BARRI TO MAKE A MISSTEP IN HANDLING THIS AFFAIR SO THAT THEY COULD GAIN THE POLITICAL BENEFITS. HE NOTED THAT NO SHIA LEADER, HOWEVER MODERATE, WOULD LIKELY SPEAK OUT AGAINST BARRI IN THE AFFAIR SINCE SHIA OPINION WAS WITH HIM.

7. MU'AWWAD ASKED IF THE HIJACKING HAD BROADER OBJECTIVES THAN JUST THE LIBERATION OF THE ATLIT PRISONERS. THE AMBASSADOR REPLIED THAT BARRI SPOKE ONLY OF THE ATLIT ISSUE AND THAT HE HAD NO EVIDENCE AT THIS POINT THAT THE HIJACKING HAD BEEN ORDHESTRATED FOR "BROADER PURPOSES." NONETHELESS IT COLLD HAVE A BROADER IMFACT.

8. MU'AWWAD NOTED THE IMPORTANCE OF GETTING HIZBALLAH SPIRITUAL GUIDE SHEIKH FADLALLAH TO CONDEMN THE HIJACKING AND TO CONVINCE THE RADICAL SHIA TO RELEASE THE AMERICANS. HE SUGGESTED THAT SYRIA HAD INFLUENCE OVER FADLALLAH, WHOSE RELATIONS WITH IRAN HAVE COOLED RECENTLY, AND THAT THE SYRIANS MUST BE ASKED TO INTERVENE WITH HIM. MU'AWWAD ALSO MENTIONED THAT, STRANGE AS IT MAY SEEM, JUMBLATT AND FADLALLAH MAINTAINED GOOD RELATIONS. MU'AWWAD SAID THAT THE NEXT DAY HE WOULD ASY JUMBLATT TO INTERVENE WITH FADLALLAH. THE AMBASSADOR SUPPORTED THIS IDEA.

9. COMMENT. MU'AWWAD NEEDED NO CONVINCING OF THE URGENCY OF THIS AFFAIR AND ITS IMPORTANCE FOR ALL OF LEBANON. HE WILL LIKELY USE HIS POLITICAL BT

.

ANNUL HOUSE CITUATION ROOM

 PAGE Ø:
 BEIRUT 3642
 DTG: 201231Z JUN 85
 PSN: 000765

 SIT386
 AN005218
 TOR: 171/1243Z

 DISTRIBUTION: COVY
 TEIC
 NORT
 PUBS SIT
 EOB
 006

OF IMMED UTS3437 DE RUEHBL #3642/02 1711233 O 201231Z JUN 85 ZFF4 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDO NIACT IMMEDIATE 3633

INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDATE 1200 Amembassy tel aviv immediate 5772

S.E.C.R.E. SECTION Ø2 OF Ø2 BEIRUT Ø3642

TERREP


*

~

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER. CASC. EAIR, LE, US SUBJECT: TWA HIJACYING: PRESSING MU'AWWAD

WEIGHT AND PRESTIGE TO ITS FULLEST IN SUPPORT OF OUR LINE. BARTHOLOMEW BT

SECRET



WHITE HOUSE STIUATION TOOL

PAGE Ø1 SIT50s	VIENNA 8887 ANØØ5335	DTG: 201403Z JUN 8 TGF: 171 1752Z	35 PSN: 001372
DISTRIBUTION: C	COVY TEIC <u>nort</u> pue	BÊ SIT EOB ,026	
OP IMMED STU8938 DE RUEHVI #8887 O 201403Z JUN 8 FM AMEMBASSY VI	35		
TO SECSTATE WAS	HDC IMMEDIATE 8535		
INFO AMEMBASSY AMEMBASSY AMMAN AMEMBASSY BEIRU AMEMBASSY BONN AMEMBASSY DAMAS AMEMBASSY LONDO AMEMBASSY LONDO AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY RIYAD AMEMBASSY TEL A USMISSION USUN	N 0794 JT 0021 2724 GCUS 0766 DN 9818 5 1881 DH 0285 AVIV 2624 NEW YORF 9933		
EXDIS			
E. O. 12356: DE TAGS: PTER, EAI	R, LE. AU King of twa 847: MOBI Bih barri	ILIZING PRESSURE ON	

2. WHILE AT MFA JUNE 20 ON OTHER BUSINESS, DCM WAS INFORMED BY DEPUTY POLITICAL DIRECTOR TSCHOFEN THAT AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR TO LEBANON ZNIDARIC HAD RETURNED TO BEIRUT ON JUNE 19. ZNIDARIC WENT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO MAKE STRONGEST POSSIBLE APPEAL, ALSO PERSONALLY ON BEHALF OF FOREIGN MINISTER GRATZ, TO BARRI USING SEVERAL OF THE POINTS MADE IN EMBASSY'S DEMARCHE OF JUNE 19. TSCHOFEN EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT COMPLEMENTARY EFFORTS OF SEVERAL NATIONS WOULD HAVE DESIRED RESULT.

3. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. VON DAMM-GUERTLER BT

NIS DATE 1/11/02 BY CAJ

E X D I S

MANUE NOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE Ø1 OF Ø2 DTG: 201409Z JUN 85 PSN: 001370 RIYADH 5671 SIT5Ø8 AN005334 TOR: 171/1752Z DISTRIBUTION: COVY TEIC NORT PUBS SIT EOS /006 _____ _____ OP IMMED STU896Ø DE RUEHRH = 5671 1711410 O 201409Z JUN 85 FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4449 INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE Ø522 AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 2498 AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE Ø11Ø AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0505 AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 1818 AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1369 AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE ØØ86 AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1255 AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE Ø157 USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE Ø268 SECRET RIY4DH 05671 EXDIS E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, EAIR, LE SUBJECT: TWA HIJACKING: PUBLIC STATEMENT REF: A) STATE 188572, B) RIYADH 5661 2. I CONTACTED FOREIGN MINISTER SAUD IN TAIF JUNE 20 AND URGED THAT THE SAG CONSIDER ISSUING PUBLIC CONDEMNATION OF TWA HIJACKING AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME. I NOTED THAT OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS WERE MAKING PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT CLEAR STATEMENT FROM SAG WOULD ADD MEASURABLY TO THE MOUNTING PRESSURE ON LEBANESE TO EFFECT THE RELEASE OF THE TWA HOSTAGES. I ALSO NOTED WIDESPREAD, INTENSE INTEREST IN US, INCLUDING CONGRESS, REGARDING EFFORTS BEING MADE BY ALL GOVERNMENTS TO SEE THAT THE LATEST ACT OF TERRORISM DOES NOT SUCCEED OR END IN DISASTER. FOIA (b)(1)

NARA, Date

E X D I

S

EXDIS

EXDIS

E X D

Ī


SECRET.

PAGE 02 OF 02 RIYADH 5671 DTG: 201409Z JUN 85 PSN: 001370

•

5. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. CUTLER BT

SECE



MARTE HOUCE CHUATION ROOM

notin in the state

 PAGE Ø1 OF Ø2
 ATHENS 1512
 DTG: 2Ø1424Z JUN 85
 PSN: ØØØ96Ø

 SIT432
 ANØØ5259
 TOR: 171/144ØZ

 DISTRIBUTION:
 COVY
 TEIC
 NORT
 PUES
 SIT
 EOE
 ØØ6

OP IMMED UTS36Ø9 DE RUEHTH #1512/Ø1 1711427 O 2Ø1424Z JUN 85 ZFF4 FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1377

INFO EC COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0666 AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE 1628 USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 3089 AMCONSUL MONTREAL IMMEDIATE 0434 AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI IMMEDIATE 7542 AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 5200 AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 5796

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION Ø1 OF Ø2 ATHENS 11512

BRUSSELS ALSO FOR FAA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, PREL, EAIR, ASEC, US, GR SUBJECT: AIRPORT SECURITY: GOG AGREES TO INITIAL - IATA REQUEST

REF: ATHENS 11417

1. ____ ENTIER TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: INITIAL PROPOSAL AIMED AT IMPROVING SECURITY AT ATHENS AIRPORT HAS BEEN MADE TODAY BY IATA OFFICIAL VISITING ATHENS. GOG HAS AGREED TO CONTINUANCE OF SECONDARY SCREENING BY FOREIGN AIRLINES, TO VISIT NEXT WEEK OF IATA SECURITY SURVEY TEAM AND TO NEW CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN AIRLINE INDUSTRY AND THE GOVERNMENT. THIS COULD BE IMPORTANT FIRST STEP IN MOVING PAST CONFRONTATION STAGE TO OBJECTIVE OF IMPROVED AIRPORT SECURITY. END SUMMARY.

3. AS A FOLLOW-ON TO THE DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADOR YESTERDAY (PARA 6 REFTEL), AMBASSADOR MET TODAY (JUNE 2Ø) WITH JOHN TOELAER, KLM'S SECURITY CHIEF, WHO IS IN GREECE AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF IATA. TOELAER, WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY ANDREAS POTAMIANOS, TOLD THE AMBASSADOR HE HAD HAD MEETINGS EARLIER TODAY WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER PAPOULIAS AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE GREEK TOURIST ORGANIZATION SKOULAS CONCERNING THE SECURITY SITUATION AT THE ATHENS AIRPORT. HE SAID THAT IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH GREEK OFFICIALS HE HAD EXPLAINED THAT THE PURPOSE OF HIS VISIT WAS THREE FOLD:

A) HE WAS SEEKING AN UNDERTAKING BY THE GOG THAT THE SECONDARY SCREENING WHICH WAS BEING CONDUCTED BY MOST FOREIGN AIRLINES REMAIN IN PLACE UNTIL ALL PARTIES AGREE THAT GREEK SCREENING IS ADEQUATE SO THAT IT CAN BE DISCONTINUED.

15 197-046/2 #393 NARA, DATE 1/1 02

CONFIDENTIAL

COPPER TIME

WHITE HOUSE STRUATION ROOM.

PAGE Ø2 OF Ø2 ATHENS 1512

~ >

DTG: 201424Z JUN 85 PSN: 000960

B) TO CONFIRM THAT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT IS INVITING, AND WILL WELCOME AN IATA SECURITY TEAM IN ATHENS NEXT WEER.

C) ESTABLISH A CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY AND THE GOVERNMENT ON AIRPORT SECURITY MATTERS. TOELAER SAID HE WAS SCHEDULED TO HAVE ANOTHER MEETING LATER TODAY WITH PAPOULIAS, TOGETHER WITH THE MINISTERS OF COMMUNICATIONS AND PUBLIC ORDER.

4. TOELAER NOTED THAT SO FAR HE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE RESPONSE HE HAD RECEIVED AND BELIEVED THAT SENIOR GREEK OFFICIALS WERE SEEKING A SOLUTION TO POTAMIANOS INTERJECTED THAT HE FELT THE PROBLEM. THE GOVERNMENT WOULD AGREE TO THE THREE PART IATA TOELAER SAID THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S REQUEST. SPEECH HAD ENABLED IATA TO BREAK THROUGH THE BUREAUCRATIC SCREEN AND HAD RIVETED THE ATTENTION OF THE SENIOR LEVEL OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT ON THIS LONG STANDING PROBLEM. THE AMBASSADOR AGREED THAT THERE WAS INTEREST AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE GOG, NOTING THAT IT WAS CLEAR THAT MANY IN THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WERE REACTING DEFENSIVELY. FOR THIS REASON, IATA WAS PROBABLY IN THE BEST POSITION AT THIS TIME TO ENGAGE THE GREEK GOVERNMENT ON RECOMMENDA-TIONS FOR IMPROVING AIRPORT SECURITY. 5. IN COMMENTING ON PASSENGER SCREENING, TOELAER INDICATED THAT THERE WERE OTHER AIRPORT DEFICIENCIES SUCH AS AIRPORT PERIMETER SECURITY AND ACCESS TO THE APRON. HOWEVER, HE FELT THAT THE LATTER TWO AREAS Could be solved more easily. The more difficult iproblem involved screening passengers and baggage WHICH REQUIRED A CHANGED OUTLOOK FROM THE "COP MENTALITY. " THE AMBASSADOR INDICATED WE WANTED TO STAY IN TOUCH WITH IATA AND TO SUPPORT ITS EFFORTS ΒТ

CONFIDENTIAL

A CONTRACTOR

VALUE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

 PAGE Ø1
 ATHENS 1512
 DTG: 2Ø1424Z JUN 85
 PSN: ØØ961

 SIT434
 ANØØ5261
 TOR: 171/1441Z

 DISTRIBUTION: COVY
 TEIC
 NORT
 PUBS
 SIT
 EOE
 /ØØ6

OP IMMED UTS3613 DE RUEHTH ≠1512/02 1711429 O 201424Z JUN 85 ZFF4 FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1378

INFO EC COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0667 AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE 1629 USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 3090 AMCONSUL MONTREAL IMMEDIATE 0435 AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI IMMEDIATE 7543 AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 5201 AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 5797

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION Ø2 OF Ø2 ATHENS 11512

BRUSSELS ALSO FOR FAA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, PREL, EAIR, ASEC, US, GR SUBJECT: AIRPORT SECURITY: GOG AGREES TO INITIAL

TO SOLVE THIS NUMBER ONE PROBLEM ASAP.

6. LATER, BY TELEPHONE, TEOLAER REPORTED THAT "EVERYTHING IS SETTLED." HE ELABORATED THAT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT AGREED TO THE PRELIMINARY STEPS PROPOSED BY IATA, I.E.. CONTINUANCE OF SECONDARY SCREENING; WELCOMING AN IATA SECURITY SURVEY TEAM (TO TAKE PLACE ON JUNE 26, 27, 28); AND ESTABLISHING A NEW CHANNEL FOR COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY AND THE GOVERNMENT (SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATIONS). WE HAVE ALSO SUBSEQUENTLY LEARNED THAT THE GOG MINISTERS ALSO AGREED THAT PAN AMERICAN COULD BRING IN AND SET UP ITS X-RAY MACHINE FOR HOLD BAGGAGE AS IT HAD EARLIER REQUESTED.

7. COMMENT: TOELAER TOLD US THAT SENIOR GREEK OFFICIALS WITH WHOM HE MET WERE QUITE FORTHCOMING AND READILY AGREED TO IATA PROPOSAL. GREEK AGREEMENT TO THESE INITIAL MEASURES MAY BE IMPORTANT FIRST STEP IN MOVING PAST CONFRONTATION STAGE TO OBJECTIVE OF IMPROVED AIRPORT SECURITY. END COMMENT. STEARNS BT

CONFIDENTIAL

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER LISTED ON THE WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.