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Transcript of Proceedings

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

MILITARY MANPOWER TASK FORCE MEETING

Washington, D. C.

October 30, 1981

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

MILITARY MANPOWER TASK FORCE MEETING

Room 3E490
The Pentagon

Friday,
October 30, 1981
4:00 p.m.

PRESENT:

HON. CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, Secretary of Defense

MARTIN ANDERSON, Assistant to the President for Policy
Development

GEN. DAVID C. JONES, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
DR. LAWRENCE KORB, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower,
Reserve Affairs, and Logistics)

DR. JOHN F. LEHMAN, JR., Secretary of the Navy

JOHN O. MARSH, JR., Secretary of the Army

EDWIN MEESE, III, Counselor to the President

REAR ADM. JAMES W. NANCE, Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

VERNE ORR, Secretary of the Air Force

DR. HERBERT C. PUSCHECK, Associate Director for Planning
and Operations, Selective Service System

WILLIAM E. SCHNEIDER, Associate Director for National
Security and International Affairs, Office of Management
and Budget

MAJ. GEN. THOMAS K. TURNAGE, Director, Selective Service
System

MURRAY L. WEIDENBAUM, Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers

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PRESENTATION BY:

PAGE:

Dr. Herb Puscheck

3

P R O C E E D I N G S

4:00 p.m.

DR. KORB: I'd like to welcome each of you to the third meeting of the Military Manpower Task Force. As you can see, our agenda today was to discuss four issues. Because of the fact that we may run into time problems we thought we would change the agenda and discuss registration first since that is the issue which the President has to make a decision on. It is most urgent we get that information to him.

I will be briefing the first two subjects. Herb Puscheck who is one of Tom Turnage's men will brief the Selective Service registration issue. So if there are no questions I think it best that we go right into the discussion of the registration issue.

DR. PUSCHECK: Jim, would you put the first slide on.

(Pause)

DR. PUSCHECK: For the past several weeks the registration study team composed of members of your staff have studied this issue. We summarized what we considered to be the relative factors in the decision and recommendation and presented it to the working group two weeks ago and summarized those views in the paper distributed a few days ago.

1 During the next 15 minutes or so I will walk
2 through the highlights of the paper and discuss pertinent
3 selective service background during the deep standby period;
4 discuss how Defense determines the inductee delivery
5 schedule; and comment briefly on several factors including
6 the time saved on mobilization by peacetime registration;
7 the impact in delay on inductees on defense, particularly as
8 training base capacity and output from that training base;
9 comment on the impact or the relationship between that and
10 the assumed number of volunteers. We will look at four
11 different levels of volunteers and discuss the equity issue,
12 the equity of the mobilization draft as a function of
13 peacetime registration, and comment on a few other factors,
14 risks, and the matter of perception.

15 The two fold mission of the Selective Service is
16 as shown in the next viewgraph. The decision that you reach
17 on this issue can impact on both parts of that mission.
18 Historically more problems have risen with regard to the
19 second part of the mission than the first.

20 As you may know, Selective Service is not a part
21 of the Defense Department. Legislative oversight in the
22 Congress comes under the Armed Services Committees and for
23 appropriations purposes, Selective Service is under HUD, and
24 independent agencies.

25 It may be worth a moment to review pertinent

1 history of Selective Service over the five or six year
2 period. The five year period during which registration was
3 stopped. Registration was stopped in April of 1975 after
4 27 years. Three years later in the 1978 mobilization exercise
5 demonstrated that Selective Service could not meet the
6 defense inductee delivery schedule specified at that time.
7 In 1979 GAO and CBO confirmed those conclusions.

8 In 1980 following the invasion of Afghanistan, the
9 President ordered a revitalization of Selective Service and
10 a resumption of registration. Congress debated the decision
11 for about six months. During that debate Selective Service
12 worked with the Postal Service and the State Department, the
13 Internal Revenue Service, DOD, the Social Security
14 Administration, to develop a new registration system. Each
15 agency and department mentioned played a role in that multi-
16 agency effort.

17 In July of '80 the first of two catch-up registra-
18 tions was conducted. In November of 1980 the Defense
19 Department changed its preferred inductee delivery schedule.
20 Later that month, November of '80, the exercise Proud Spirit
21 was conducted. That exercise demonstrated the Selective
22 Service could at that time maintain the delivery schedule for
23 inductees. However, several parts of the Selective Service
24 were not yet in place, basically those dealing with
25 adjudication of claims.

1 In January of '81, the second of the two catch-up
2 registrations was conducted and continuous registration was
3 begun. Now our young men register when they turn 18. They
4 do that by going to one of 35,000 post offices in this
5 country or one of the embassies overseas. The registration
6 process has proceeded generally as planned. A summary of the
7 results is in the paper. I will comment on that in a
8 moment. About 6.5 million young men have registered since
9 it was resumed in July of '80.

10 Revitalization of Selective Service is now nearly
11 complete. Two actions bear comment. In the past few months
12 50 governors and senior officials and the District of
13 Columbia, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, Guam, assisted in
14 naming about 11,000 unpaid local board members. These are
15 the individuals who would adjudicate claims in the event of
16 emergency. Claims for conscientious objection, hardship and
17 the like. About 25,000 people applied for those positions.

18 And the last point, joint computer center. In
19 September of this year, the Defense Department and
20 Selective Service opened for operation a computer center at
21 Great Lakes. It's shared jointly with the military enlist-
22 ment processing command.

23 MR. MEESE: How many people are employed by the
24 Selective Service now?

25 DR. PUSCHECK: 243.

1 Earlier this year there was some concern over the
2 apparent decline of continuous registration and that decline
3 is shown in this chart. And we have read figures in the order
4 of 60 to 69 percent of the estimated turnouts were complying
5 with registration. Since that time we seemed to have turned
6 the corner. The bottom line here shows 1981 results
7 compared with the two years for which we have computerized
8 data, 1973 and '74.

9 During '73 and '74 years about 90 percent of the
10 estimated eligible population registered, during the 12 to
11 14 months they were expected to register. By carrying that
12 on and considering more late registrations, by the time
13 registration was stopped in 1975, approximately 98 or 99
14 percent of the estimated population had registered. That may
15 suggest a position that does not exist in that there is
16 some uncertainty in the Census Bureau estimates.

17 I now shift to a discussion of how registration
18 relates to mobilization manpower, the item that you will be
19 discussing next in this meeting. The Defense Department
20 desired inductee delivery schedule has changed over recent
21 years as shown on this chart. Both because of continuing and
22 increased shortfall in the individual ready reserve and also
23 because peacetime registration has made it possible for
24 Selective Service to meet an accelerated delivery schedule.
25 I would note that the improved Selective Service delivery

1 capability confirmed in exercise Proud Spirit occurred against
2 a backdrop of an accelerated inductee delivery schedule.

3 This graph shows, on the next viewgraph, shows the
4 relationship between the supply of pre-trained and post-
5 trained individuals for the Army. The registration study
6 team concentrated on the Army and assumed that the other
7 services would get sufficient volunteers. Larry Korb will
8 have more to say about the requirement and supply of trained
9 soldiers in a moment.

10 The part shown in red here shows the potential
11 contribution to Army trained manpower of registration.

12 MR. ANDERSON: I think that chart more than any-
13 thing sums up what the basic problem is here. Let me make
14 sure I understand it correctly.

15 First of all the top line is your requirement --

16 DR. PUSCHECK: In 1981.

17 MR. ANDERSON: So you've got a shortfall from zero
18 to M+90 which is a very significant one of a couple of
19 hundred thousand people. And then if you had inductees at
20 M+13, you would start to increase the supply at that point.
21 If you had them at M+58 it would be at the latter point, the
22 red line showing the difference in those two particular
23 extreme registrations. But in all cases you still have the
24 shortfall.

25 DR. PUSCHECK: That is correct.

1 MR. ANDERSON: Which is primarily due to the lack
2 of Reserve?

3 DR. PUSCHECK: Pre-trained individuals or individual
4 ready reserves. The mobilization manpower issue that Larry
5 will address in a few minutes.

6 DR. KORB: We will show you where the requirement
7 is derived, how it is derived, and also the fact that we do
8 have a shortage and the steps that we are taking to improve
9 this increasing selective reserve. We're going to present
10 you with a couple of options for increasing individual
11 ready reserves.

12 DR. PUSCHECK: This shows a 1981 projected demand
13 and supply.

14 MR. ANDERSON: And by, you have those two lines
15 close together --

16 DR. PUSCHECK: By 1986 Larry will point out a change
17 in both of those.

18 DR. KORB: There will be a change. The Army is
19 estimating because of earlier deployment and increasing
20 lethality of the Warsaw Pact weapons the overall manpower
21 requirements are going to increase. The supply increases
22 faster than the demand if the options that were selected, or
23 proposed, are taken.

24 DR. PUSCHECK: Mobilization manpower will address
25 ways of reducing this in the out years. I believe the

1 proposals to be presented will reach a peak contribution of
2 that in Fiscal Year '89.

3 MG TURNAGE: But there is no immediate solution.
4 The deficiency will continue for some time.

5 MR. ANDERSON: I would like to suggest that we
6 consider some way to close that gap because that seems to be
7 a problem.

8 SEC. WEINBERGER: There are two problems. We need
9 them as soon as possible, and the difference between 13
10 and 58 days is, well there are new factors.

11 MR. ANDERSON: No, no. I'm not talking about that.
12 I'm talking about at M+1, the gap between --

13 SEC. WEINBERGER: That's right, and that again is
14 why we are doing the rather intensive recruiting and
15 attempts to increase the ready reserve and National Guard
16 and all the rest.

17 DR. PUSCHECK: None of those options could
18 affect this. This is fiscal 81. The first that it could
19 affect would be the out years. The peak contribution would
20 be in fiscal 89.

21 SEC. WEINBERGER: The thing that is helping us the
22 most now is the fact that the reenlistment, the retention
23 rate is much better, and that has taken place largely since
24 January, and is up at least 15 percent.

25 DR. LEHMAN: But theoretically if we're going to

1 follow the traditions of this country there should always be
2 that gap between the supply and the potential demand in a
3 full conflict. Because unless we're going to adopt the
4 posture that we will now go to having a standing army to deal
5 with the worst case contingencies, you will always have a
6 shortfall.

7 MR. ANDERSON: That bottom line theoretically
8 includes your people from the Reserves also.

9 DR. LEHMAN: I know, but, to say only people in
10 the Reserves or in the active forces are the ones that are
11 going to fight the war, that you're not going to go through
12 a peacetime --

13 MR. ANDERSON: It's not saying that. What it's
14 saying that is if you've got an emergency you need people.
15 In the first couple of weeks the only way to get those people
16 in line is to have strong ready to go reserve force.

17 DR. PUSCHECK: There is no way that volunteers and
18 inductees can ^{provide} effectively manpower in the first 12 weeks of
19 war.

20 MR. MEESE: This assumes the basic combat training
21 of 12 weeks?

22 DR. KORB: That's the law. You've got to train them
23 for 12 weeks before you can deploy them overseas.

24 Now I put ^{up} that other chart in terms of requirement,
25 we picked M+120 days using, that's the peak shortfall. That

1 is the requirements going up, supplies also going up. The
2 shortfall is going down somewhat over the next seven years
3 assuming we can continue the way we have this particular
4 year and assuming the options that we proposed are accepted
5 and then enacted into law by Congress. It will help somewhat.
6 You still will have a shortfall there by 1987 after 120 days.

7 MR. MARSH: You know there is an area in the IRR
8 and in the Selective Reserve that we should be very very
9 careful that we take into account and that is the role of the
10 National Guard. Because I think at times we assume the
11 Guardsmen you get a one for one replacement with the IRR.
12 We have to be cognizant of the 1933 Defense Act which says
13 that National Guard units shall be retained as units insofar
14 as practicable.

15 Now insofar as practicable, the National Guard
16 takes the position that that really means unit integrity and
17 you cannot take those units and break them up for replacements.

18 DR. KORB: But we have the active and selective
19 reserve together up there, talking about available for man-
20 power pools down there, would be all the individual National
21 Guard and that is a small number. It's only about 10,000.
22 Most of that is what we call the individual ready reserve
23 and military retirees who have been pre-notified that they'll
24 be coming back to backfill.

25 MR. MEESE: Is the formula you've got at the bottom

1 for yield your assumption that only three-quarters of the
2 IRR would be available?

3 DR. KORB: Yes, because of the fact that they may
4 have had physical problems come up. Some address problems.
5 Because these people don't drill every month.

6 There is also a factor in there for the selective
7 reserve and National Guard, we assume 95 percent of them.

8 MR. WEIDENBAUM: What cost effect is it to do
9 something to increase the yield of the independent ready
10 reserve?

11 MR. ANDERSON: You mean to get it up to 80 or 85?

12 DR. KORB: It's very cost effective. We're going
13 to propose a couple of options to you here to deal with the
14 IRR problem.

15 MR. MEESE: I would suggest if you have anybody in
16 the IRR which is going to be hard to do, it shouldn't be too
17 hard to get it up to a higher level now than you would have
18 in a draft situation where people join the reserves and the
19 IRR to get away from the draft. Whereas here they would be
20 joining the IRR for whatever incentive you have.

21 MR. ANDERSON: What do we have, about 220,000
22 people now?

23 DR. KORB: It has come up. It's up maybe 75,000.

24 MR. ANDERSON: What you're talking about is a
25 potential 55,000 people that are lost for lack of addresses

1 and not keeping up to date which is more than the total of
2 your volunteers and inductees.

3 MR. ORR: Let me make clear. The IRR is not
4 composed of people who volunteered. It's the final two
5 years of a fellow that served four years --

6 DR. LEHMAN: And most of them don't even know they
7 have the obligation.

8 MR. MEESE: Once you have a non-draft condition,
9 reserve, and people go into the IRR, they're doing that
10 voluntarily.

11 MR. ORR: No, that's what I'm trying to say. They
12 go in for six years, of which four years are active duty.

13 MR. MEESE: Why do they go into the Reserves at
14 all?

15 MR. ORR: Why do they drop out after four years?
16 It may be because they didn't like it.

17 DR. LEHMAN: This is the tail of their active duty
18 requirement. Many of them don't even know they have it. I
19 think the estimates of the take are wildly overoptimistic.

20 MR. MEESE: Again my question, why do people go
21 into the Reserves in the first place? They go in presumably
22 because they want to go in.

23 DR. LEHMAN: No, they have no choice.

24 MR. MEESE: When you don't have a draft, people
25 join the Reserve because they want to join the Reserve.

1 DR. LEHMAN: Not true with the IRR.

2 MR. MEESE: Except when they join the Reserve
3 they join for six years of which they are active reserves
4 or selective reserves, right?

5 MG. TURNAGE: When they join now, even in a volun-
6 tary mode, they still end up with the residual obligation that
7 they must fulfill in the IRR, and a lot of them don't even
8 know that.

9 MR. MEESE: Well that's a matter of bad explanation
10 when they first enlist.

11 DR. LEHMAN: It's not unintentional in many cases.
12 It's a disincentive to enlisting. The people that want to
13 join the reserves, want to join the selective reserves by
14 and large. The people that we count in IRR are people that
15 join the Army to get two years, three years, active duty,
16 and they don't really know, most of them that they also,
17 after they leave, are still carried on the IRR roles.

18 MR. MEESE: When they come off of active duty
19 they're carried on the IRR roles?

20 DR. LEHMAN: Yes. The experience that we've had,
21 for instance the Berlin call-up, even the selective reserves
22 had a higher percentage than we care to admit of people who
23 got their lawyers and said I'm sorry, I'm busy. And these
24 people are going to have even a much higher --

25 MR. ANDERSON: Of the 220,000 there now, what

1 percentage of those are serving out the last part of their
2 term? In other words, they have an obligation.

3 DR. KORB: Just about all of them now, because we
4 had a program that Congress allowed us for a couple of months
5 and then killed it, as one of the options where you could
6 get people to extend.

7 MR. ANDERSON: What percent of those in the active
8 reserves have never received a notification?

9 DR. KORB: Let's put it this way. The IRR people
10 can come back, the law allows us to call them back to train.
11 Congress, about three years ago when the Army started sending
12 out notices to people to show up for training, they started
13 complaining to Congress, and Congress didn't change the law,
14 but they said make it only on a volunteer basis. So now the
15 people in the IRR that come back for refresher training do
16 so only on a voluntary basis.

17 Now the 220,000 is Army Individual Ready Reserve.
18 Total individual ready reserve for all the services is a
19 little bit over 400,000.

20 MR. ORR: The answer is, that is not those who
21 voluntarily come back, that is the total package?

22 DR. KORB: That is the total package, but we
23 cannot order them to come back.

24 MR. ANDERSON: There is a critical need for
25 finding the IRR reserves. It's a key problem here.

1 MR MARSH: You have to recognize that the 220,000,
2 I think around 50,000 of them are officers and we don't
3 want them anyway. Only a few of them. So that reduces
4 substantially that 220,000. In that 220,000 you will find a
5 significant number of people with some esoteric MOSs that
6 we don't need or don't want. What we want are combat
7 arms people.

8 If you analyze the IRR that way, it will look a
9 little different.

10 MR. ANDERSON: In other words, that shortfall
11 problem is even worse than it looks on the chart.

12 MR. MEESE: But I think --

13 SEC. WEINBERGER: That one reflects the yield of
14 the IRR.

15 DR. KORB: At that rate. But remember the IRR,
16 from our manpower pools, that is not a large number because
17 we have retirees, for example, we have individual National
18 Guard people who are not part of units. They are also
19 included in there. And what we're going to have to do if
20 we're serious about this, the things we're going to have to
21 do to deal with the IRR including exercising it during these
22 mobilization exercises. This problem, the whole reserve
23 problem, particularly the IRR, was not paid very much
24 attention to until really Nifty Nugget.

25 MR. MEESE: I think what we're saying is if the

1 IRR is going to mean anything at all you're going to have to
2 have some incentives and a sense of identity that isn't there
3 now. And then you should be able to get a higher yield.

4 DR. KORB: That is one of the options we're
5 proposing, to give people who stay in like a \$900 bonus, and
6 then you require them to come back and train.

7 DR. PUSCHECK: Let's go to the next chart.

8 Factors that the study team, that the Defense
9 Department considers in determining inductee delivery
10 schedule as shown here, the study team did not address the
11 first three at all but looked only at the last three, and
12 I'll go on to those in a moment.

13 Those bottom three factors were analyzed by
14 examining the specific issues shown on this chart. We
15 emphasize these, and there are three or four lesser factors
16 I'll mention briefly at the end of the section.

17 Now the first of these is time saved. These save
18 about six weeks during mobilization as compared to the
19 Post-M day registration. This is generally consistent with
20 the testimony of the previous director. It ranged between
21 four and eight weeks. Four weeks if everything went as
22 planned and no unforeseen delays occurred.

23 MR. WEIDENBAUM: How much time is involved in
24 getting the forms to the post office?

25 DR. PUSCHECK: Last year when registration began in

1 1980 we knew when registration would start and had 22 trucks
2 of materials loaded out here and addressed, the farthest
3 locations first, and waited for final approval by the
4 Congress. It took three and a half weeks to get materials
5 distributed and confirmed. There were a number of goofs that
6 occurred.

7 For the 58 day plan we've assumed two and a half
8 weeks, and that the materials would enter the mail stream
9 or the distribution scheme not from the East Coast, but from
10 Great Lakes and go through the management sectional centers.
11 There are 250 management sectional centers in the postal
12 service where there are management people and then into the
13 35,000 post offices.

14 MR. WEIDENBAUM: Would it be practicable to
15 accomplish that and store that stuff on a decentralized
16 basis?

17 DR. PUSCHECK: At the sectional centers? We've
18 discussed it with the postal service and their preference is
19 that it remain under the control of someone else and not under
20 them.

21 MR. ANDERSON: I had someone call the Postmaster;
22 Mr. Bolger claims he can do it.

23 MR. MEESE: Maybe what you ought to do is get them
24 out by United Parcel Express to the post office. That might
25 speed things up.

1 MR. ORR: I think if you label it junk mail it
2 would get there faster.

3 MR. ANDERSON: The six week period, the Selective
4 Service back in January 1980 had a plan which they had a
5 seven day difference. I don't know if that is a more complex
6 plan.

7 DR. PUSCHECK: That plan was prepared in the first
8 couple of weeks before the experience of registration. The
9 58 day plan is based on experience of inducting into the
10 registration. Those times experience were reduced as I
11 indicated in the distribution scheme. Even though materials
12 were pre-stored in the starting blocks, it took three and a
13 half weeks to get the materials to locations. The materials
14 did not arrive in Puerto Rico, they did not arrive at
15 Minneapolis. There were a number of places they did not
16 arrive even within the three and a half weeks, but for the
17 58 day plan, or the 17 day assumed distribution.

18 MR. ANDERSON: If you had a plan where the
19 materials were actually at the post office you could save up
20 to, what, 15 days?

21 SEC. WEINBERGER: It depends on what means you use
22 to get the forms to the post office. The savings then would
23 depend on the length of time it would take to get them to
24 the post office.

25 MR. ANDERSON: In some cases it would be maybe

1 seven or eight days. In some places like Puerto Rico, it
2 would be longer.

3 The other question is in terms of the length of
4 time, how much time is allowed from the time a person, say an
5 18 year old, received notification in the morning, how many
6 days does he have to report?

7 DR. PUSCHECK: Ten days. The individual would have
8 ten days from the time an induction order was sent to him to
9 report for examination.

10 MR. ANDERSON: Any consideration for shortening
11 that to three or four days?

12 SEC. WEINBERGER: It's a matter of compliance. Ten
13 days from what? From date of mailing? Or from date of
14 receipt?

15 DR. PUSCHECK: It was a telegram.

16 SEC. WEINBERGER: It's basically on the idea that
17 a certain number of people are away and a certain number of
18 people don't get their mail the first day, etc. You could
19 set it earlier, a five day. You would probably not get a
20 great deal of difference in the bottom line final result.
21 There would be more people --

22 MG. TURNAGE: There is a real issue that should be
23 accounted for and that is the fact that initially even if it
24 worked as well as we would hope with a ten day delay, that
25 you're going to have, and justifiably so, a great deal of

1 screaming because when the people this time report to the
2 station in ten days, if they are successful, then they don't
3 go back home for delay. They go straight to the training
4 station. The 50 percent who don't pass, or the 40 percent
5 who don't pass, based on historical experience, that means
6 they have closed out their businesses, they've quit their
7 jobs, they've said goodbye to their families and the rest of
8 it and they get there and they fail and they go home. So
9 you've really created some great inequities here for a lot
10 of the people.

11 So it seems to me that when you talk in terms of
12 ten days, that's just about a minimum you expect. I think
13 it's a reasonable time.

14 MR. MEESE: Is that the assumption, that people
15 will go --

16 MG. TURNAGE: Yes Sir. They will report to the
17 training station within the 13 days.

18 SEC. WEINBERGER: That is the whole point of the
19 thing. You can't get them there and go home and then get
20 them back again unless you really want tremendous delays.
21 They report, they are ready to go. And they're supposed to
22 have had their farewell parties and everything the night
23 before that.

24 MG. TURNAGE: If you don't, you extend the other
25 end.

1 MR. ORR: In that sixth week, what do you envision
2 has to occur? Is that assuming that you have legislation or
3 you have to get legislation?

4 DR. PUSCHECK: It assumes that when mobilization is
5 ordered we would get Congressional approval the first day.

6 DR. LEHMAN: That's impossible.

7 SEC. WEINBERGER: Well if so, then it would be
8 more than six weeks. The theory is that if you've got a
9 Congressman that agreed to a declaration of war, you've
10 got a Congress that agrees to expedite the committee process
11 and get this thing through.

12 MR. MEESE: Well you will have standby legislation
13 that leaves it within the province of the President.

14 MR. MARSH: But if it lapses you then have to get
15 an appropriation to reactivate it. And you can address the
16 whole issue again on the appropriation process.

17 MR. MEESE: But a scenario would be at least that
18 you have an ongoing registration authority in the President.

19 What do we have now? What is the legislation
20 right now? Registration authority but not draft authority?

21 DR. PUSCHECK: That's correct. The study team
22 considered the range of response of 36, the 36 was an updated
23 version of the accelerated plan you mentioned a few moments
24 ago. One distributed or prepared in early January 1980.

25 I was going to mention one other comment that came

1 up on having materials distributed or decentralized. The
2 study team did look at three of those, enemy alien registra-
3 tion program, emergency welfare registration program, and
4 the federal employee, displace federal employee registration
5 program. The last of those was scrubbed about two years ago
6 in part because of the difficulty in controlling the
7 materials that were distributed.

8 The next item is how would a delay in the delivery
9 of inductees affect the Defense Department. Would it matter
10 if inductees were delivered on an M+58 or M+36 instead of
11 the current capability which is to deliver inductees within
12 13 days. Ten of the 13 days is the alert time available to
13 individuals.

14 Obviously it will have no effect in the first three
15 months or so, trained manpower available in the first three
16 months of a conflict. The impact on trained manpower avail-
17 able after M+90 days, there will be fewer trained people
18 depending upon assumption from volunteers, size of the
19 individual reserve and training base capacity. And I'll
20 discuss those next.

21 The study team examined four different levels of
22 volunteers and carried those through the analysis. We looked
23 at the impact on the training base and assumed the volunteers
24 and other obligated individuals would go first before the
25 draftees would be called. The four estimates assumed are as

1 shown. The low level was the Vietnam level of volunteers
2 of 16,000.

3 MR. WEIDENBAUM: You refer to that as the Vietnam
4 level.

5 DR. PUSCHECK: It was the average 1965.

6 MR. WEIDENBAUM: If you use 66 or 67 would it be
7 different?

8 DR. PUSCHECK: It would have been lower. I just
9 don't know.

10 86,000 World War II was the number of individuals
11 that volunteered for the ground forces in December and
12 January after Pearl Harbor.

13 And the third item is that figure adjusted for the
14 change in the 18 to 30 year old population since 1940. And
15 the World War I figure shows the number of individuals who
16 enlisted April and May of 1917.

17 63 percent of those enlisted in the Guard and
18 Reserves and were not called up until two months later.

19 Now I'll walk through this slide briefly. It shows
20 the Army training base capacity in 1981 and what it's
21 projected to be in 1986.

22 MR. MEESE: Is this in thousands?

23 DR. PUSCHECK: Yes. We've discussed four different
24 numbers of volunteers. Low from average in 1965 and the max
25 being World War I, and we've carried those figures through

1 for '81 and '86. Those are the volunteers shown here.

2 We also assumed that a demand upon the Army training
3 base with the number of individuals awaiting training, those
4 in the delayed entry program and in the pool of reserves, and
5 those numbers are shown here.

6 And finally, some individual ready reserves would
7 require additional training. Principally those in the
8 training discharge program who have been out more than two
9 years. And those numbers are shown here.

10 That all led down to a number of training seats
11 available and not filled by those available demands,
12 volunteers and previously obligated individuals, and that
13 would be the total down here. We then looked at the three
14 levels of Selective Service responsiveness, current capability
15 with peacetime registration, a post-M day, and then the 36,
16 which is an updated version of the 16 January report.

17 MR. ANDERSON: That means if as many people volun-
18 teer as in World War II then you'd have 47,000 more people
19 than you could handle?

20 DR. PUSCHECK: What that would mean is that if
21 high numbers of volunteers are obtained, it would not affect
22 the training base output today.

23 MR. ANDERSON: If as many people volunteered as in
24 World War II you would have 47,000 more people than you would
25 be able to handle. You really need more training capacity.

1 DR. PUSCHECK: That is one reason why it is
2 increasing from '81 to '86. Without registration we lose
3 mobilization capability if the volunteers does not exceed the
4 number who joined after Pearl Harbor, regardless of Selective
5 Service responsiveness. And in the out years, when we look
6 at '86, given increased training base capacity, regardless
7 of the number of volunteers assumed and regardless of
8 Selective Service capability, there would be training seats
9 lost. That's what that chart is intended to show, and it's
10 shown graphically in the next viewgraph.

11 This chart shows previous information but in
12 graph form. This is the training base capacity for the Army
13 now and in '86. The left hand side is shown with peacetime
14 registration in this column, and the post-M day registration
15 is shown in the right hand column. The middle one shows the
16 updated 16 January assumed responsiveness. In one we have
17 volunteers and other previously obligated individuals. Blue
18 inductees, and orange is unused training base capacity.
19 This is that M+60.

20 What this means is that given at today's level of
21 training capacity, people that receive high numbers of
22 volunteers, we could fill the training base without peacetime
23 registration, but that moderate and lower levels of
24 volunteers at the training base could not be filled.

25 Training base capacities expand in '86, regardless

1 and we would fail to fill the training base causing a loss
2 of mobilization capability, and a loss of inductees
3 available almost immediately after mobilization.

4 I want you to also note I think that the individuals
5 who register today in fiscal 82, that registered when they
6 were 18, they would be eligible for mobilization draft in the
7 year in which they turn 20, or two years later. They would
8 be available for induction in fiscal 84. So we talk about
9 registration today, we're talking about individuals who
10 would be available for induction midway between those two.

11 MR. WEIDENBAUM: Would it take using up all the
12 unused training base capacity to meet the military
13 requirements?

14 DR. PUSCHECK: They would not meet the military
15 requirement. This provides the upper supply level which was
16 below the projected Army requirement. And Larry Korb will
17 say more about that.

18 One last item, I think it may be worth noting that
19 an unused training base capacity is somewhat analogous to
20 the seats on an airliner. Seats not sold are losses not
21 recoverable.

22 The second part of the Selective Service relates
23 to equity. The relationship between the peacetime registra-
24 tion and the fairness of wartime draft is summarized here.
25 People will generally register late and that was summarized

1 in the chart of result described earlier, about 20 percent
2 register about one to 20 months late, within two years nearly
3 everyone registers. People also make errors and there
4 are about 15 percent --

5 SEC. WEINBERGER: How could you make an error on
6 that registration form? What sort of errors?

7 DR. PUSCHECK: We have address errors. We have
8 some write down female, we have some date of birth errors,
9 and incompletes.

10 MR. WEIDENBAUM: Does anyone look over these
11 forms?

12 DR. PUSCHECK: Yes, the post office checks each
13 form and it gets a postal date stamp.

14 SEC. WEINBERGER: The individual that fills this
15 out themselves, the postal clerk doesn't fill it out.

16 DR. PUSCHECK: That's correct. He fills it out,
17 shows it to a postal clerk, shows identification to the
18 postal clerk, the postal clerk checks it, date stamps it, and
19 submits it to the Selective Service system. With that control
20 there is about 15 percent errors. Some of those errors are
21 more important than others.

22 SEC. WEINBERGER: Social security numbers? Is that
23 the source of error?

24 DR. PUSCHECK: That's one source of error. About
25 9 percent are address and zip code errors. About five

1 percent are in date of birth, sex.

2 MR. ANDERSON: What is the equity issue here?

3 DR. PUSCHECK: It's basically, peacetime registra-
4 tion and a fair wartime draft. With peacetime registration
5 the list of individuals from whom draftees will be called is
6 essentially complete because these errors can be eliminated
7 and because the 20 percent who tend to register later in
8 the file with a post-M day registration either the 36 or the
9 58, there would be late registration not included in that
10 list. The errors would probably not be corrected and
11 therefore some individuals would be excluded.

12 MR. ANDERSON: I understood that the post
13 mobilization registration within a couple of weeks after
14 registration, that they expected the error rate to be down
15 to less than five percent. So it would be pretty much
16 comparable.

17 DR. PUSCHECK: After some time those errors would
18 be corrected.

19 MR. ANDERSON: How long?

20 DR. PUSCHECK: I would guess in a month or two.
21 I don't have hard numbers on that.

22 SEC. WEINBERGER: How would the errors be corrected
23 more quickly that way?

24 MR. ANDERSON: I guess the idea would be if people
25 came in and they found an error on the form then they would

1 call the people in and within a week or two you start
2 correcting most of your errors. That is the idea.

3 MR. MEESE: In a post mobilization situation you
4 have an attention to detail and an overall morale factor
5 that is probably different than you have at the present
6 time. Now it's just like sending the mail. They don't do
7 it any better.

8 DR. PUSCHECK: A high portion of those errors could
9 be corrected in a few weeks and those people then would enter
10 the file. I think the equity question is in the early
11 call for draftees after mobilization. Those people would be
12 excluded.

13 Another factor that the study team addressed or
14 considered was the matter of risk. That is a risk of delay
15 in delivering inductees and the risk that a plan would not
16 perform as well as advertised. They did not assess the
17 consequences of such a delay.

18 Post-M day options assume numerous concurrent
19 actions, so failure or delay in any of those actions would
20 be likely to delay the delivery of inductees. No one
21 could perceive with certainty the exact nature of the
22 next mobilizations. The study team generally considered
23 with peacetime registration the risk of delaying or delay
24 beyond the M+13 delivery rate was low. That risk of delay
25 beyond 58 in the event of a post mobilization registration

1 was moderate. And the 36 day registration you have a
2 relatively high risk that that would not be met.

3 The fifth and final major factor that the study
4 team addressed was a matter of perceptions. It was
5 difficult to quantify the signals generated by Presidential
6 decision or to assess with precision the matter of
7 perceptions. The Harris Poll of September 24th of this year
8 was considered to be revealing in regard to acceptance and
9 general perceptions. That is summarized here.

10 Also noted that Congress has addressed this issue
11 at some length last year and has voted twice within the last
12 year to provide funds to Selective Service to continue
13 registration. The present and immediate past -- have
14 supported registration. Some have noted that most of our
15 allies support registration. Some others believe that there
16 is a danger that peacetime registration would divert
17 attention away from perhaps more significant manpower
18 problems.

19 The team very briefly addressed four final and
20 perhaps less important factors. The matter of cost was
21 considered generally minor, about \$4 million per year to
22 continue registration. There is one difference there in
23 that the Congress has noted that in the event registration
24 is stopped Selective Service budget would be reduced to
25 \$1 million per month, reverting it to the deep standby

1 status.

2 Recruiting, men who register may indicate a desire
3 to receive recruiting information. In the last year about a
4 million such names have been turned over to the Defense
5 Department. About 20 percent of registrants indicate they
6 would like information from defense recruiters.

7 MR. MEESE: Do you have any indication as to what
8 percent of those actually do enlist?

9 MR. ORR: We have an indication of figures, but
10 I don't know how many of them came in.

11 DR. KORB: It's hard to get them.

12 DR. PURSCHECK: There is some discussion of
13 flexibility, with flexibility being will this decision on
14 registration affect the options that the Administration may
15 have available downstream? The study team did not get a
16 consensus on that item. There was a brief discussion of
17 actions to be taken if registration was stopped.
18 Presidential proclamation would be required and some action
19 would be taken to lift the \$12 million ceiling that would be
20 imposed by Congressional action. No special action would
21 be required if the registration is continued.

22 I've tried to summarize these points on the next
23 viewgraph. This viewgraph is intended to summarize the
24 major points I've tried to make with regard to responsiveness.
25 The current plan with continuing registration, inductees

1 would arrive at M+13 and 100,000 within 30 days. With
2 post mobilization registration it would be 58 and 73. And
3 the updated 16 January would be as on there.

4 The current schedule is in part governed by
5 Selective Service capability. Continuing would not aggravate
6 the current shortfall of pre-trained manpower, the difference
7 that exists in the first 90 days. Delay in delivery of
8 inductees could increase the maximum shortfall of pre-trained
9 individuals.

10 We discussed a bit the matter of equity and as
11 summarized here, data accuracy and compliance as being a
12 quantitative attempt to assess the matter of equity. Risk of
13 delay, this was a judgement call by the study team.
14 Signals and perceptions, this is the chart I mentioned a
15 moment ago.

16 Are there other questions I could try to address?

17 MR. ORR: If you have the information readily, I
18 would be interested in which of our NATO allies --

19 DR. PUSCHECK: The United Kingdom and Canada do
20 not. I believe the other NATO allies do.

21 GEN. JONES: Essentially those who have military
22 around the world, substantial military, have conscription
23 except the English speaking nations. Germany, France, all
24 the continental nations except Luxembourg.

25 DR. KORB: Let me make a point on that. A lot of

1 those don't conscript for very long. Like Belgium is eight
2 to ten months. West Germany just cut theirs from 18 months
3 to 15 months.

4 MR. MEESE: It's universal military training
5 rather than a draft as we know it.

6 DR. KORB: More or less. They don't take everybody
7 though. For example, Belgium, they take about 50 percent of
8 the people. West Germany takes a higher percentage.

9 SEC. WEINBERGER: Sweden is 11 months, and they
10 take just about everybody.

11 MG. TURNAGE: They can build up a good IRR that
12 way.

13 SEC. WEINBERGER: They retain a residual obliga-
14 tion and they have of course their names, addresses, and
15 social security numbers.

#2 16 MR. MARSH: It's interesting to note that if you're
17 a citizen of Berlin, you may not be conscripted by the
18 Federal Republic of Germany. We have some West Germans
19 that want to evade the draft go and become students in
20 West Berlin. That may have a little to do with some of the
21 demonstrations we've been getting in Berlin.

22 ADM. NANCE: I might have missed it, but in your
23 requirement for trained soldiers, did industrial base
24 capacity go into that?

25 DR. PUSCHECK: No Sir.

1 ADM. NANCE: The point is in some of the previous
2 ones, even if we had soldiers, we wouldn't have guns for
3 them to shoot or trucks for them to drive or tanks or
4 airplanes for them to fly. so I think this may not be the
5 limiting factor. It may be industrial base capacity.

6 SEC. WEINBERGER: It's industrial base in the
7 decision as to where the available equipment should be
8 placed. The standard problem is that you can't get enough
9 of the equipment for training purposes because it's either
10 to Pakistan or someplace like that that has considered for
11 the moment to have a higher priority.

12 ADM. NANCE: I think it's worse now because of
13 the complexity of the equipment.

14 DR. KORB: We have a tough problem with our
15 Selective ^{ED} ~~Service~~ ^{RESERVE} equipment.

16 SEC. WEINBERGER: You rotate it.

17 MR. ANDERSON: Has anyone begun to do an analysis,
18 for example using the same basic format, how many guns would
19 be available at M+30 and M+60?

20 SEC. WEINBERGER: If the Army had that, Jack, you
21 probably had an indication what unit is to be equipped with
22 how much.

23 MR. MARSH: Yes, we have inventories like M-1
24 rifles. I can get you that.

25 DR. LEHMAN: That's not a limiter. The goal is

1 60 days of a fully engaged unit. 60 days equipment including
2 weapons and rifles and ammunition and so forth. But a unit
3 engaged loses 40 percent a day of men.

4 MR.ANDERSON: Doesn't it make a difference as to
5 what happens between zero and the 60th day?

6 DR. LEHMAN: Like all of these things there are
7 numbers. The fact is, it varies. Some types of weapons we
8 only have ten days, but the goal is 60. And the Marine Corps
9 we're 45 days. The problem is that we don't have the fillers
10 to replace. You take an infantry unit engaged with an
11 infantry unit of a similar size, it loses 40 percent casual-
12 ties per day. We've got the guns. We don't have the men
13 to pick up the guns for at least 60 days. Once you bring
14 on the sustainability, then you've got --

15 ADM. NANCE: That's what we're looking at. After
16 you get below filling up your holes. What drives the problem?
17 Is it equipment or manpower?

18 DR. LEHMAN: It continues to be both.

19 SEC. WEINBERGER: This item might take a little
20 more time and we should shortly decide what we plan to do
21 with it. This poll that you just distributed on another
22 point is really quite interesting.

23 MR. ORR: I take it that's draft?

24 MR. ANDERSON: That's draft.

25 SEC. WEINBERGER: So we have a problem here as we

1 come down to the wire on some sort of a report for the
2 President. The question would be what we should include
3 in that report with respect to this subject and any others
4 that we would be taking up I presume now at some subsequent
5 meeting. I think one of the things we would want to know on
6 a practical basis, or on a basis that could be accepted by
7 all, is what is the benefit of registration? The benefit
8 that seems to be on a basis of these figures, the ability
9 to get people in in ~~18~~¹³ as opposed to 58 days, and that is a
10 significant number.

11 I am sure there will be people who may want to
12 challenge that or who don't accept it or think it can be
13 shortened with other methods or whatever. The other thing
14 we would want to consider is what are the demerits, or what
15 is the detriment to having registration? Is it sufficiently
16 accepted so that its continuation doesn't really bother any-
17 body very much, or is it causing us some kind of vibrations
18 that we might want to consider moving if they are serious
19 enough.

20 Another question would be what is the signal that
21 is sent around the world by a change in the existing status?
22 And another question would be whether or not the maintenance
23 of it is cost effective at this point. Or whether it would
24 be better to change?

25 Assuming we would want to keep the method of

1 administering it or the questions that are asked, I've always
2 thought that if you had those forms and had all those people
3 coming in and had that opportunity, it would be a little
4 better to get a little more information than just what you
5 have, and that would be a question. That would be based on
6 the assumption that you decided you might want to keep it.

7 There are other issues, so perhaps what we ought
8 to do is get some of those other questions that people here
9 would like to have considered in a final paper for a
10 recommendation as to what we want, you know, what position
11 we want to take on this issue. I guess it's rather apparent
12 we're not going to run through the rest of the agenda today.

13 I was just sort of picking out of the air a few
14 of the kinds of questions that we would still want to have
15 answered.

16 MR. MEESE: If I understand the budget for
17 Selective Service at the present time in a registration mode
18 is \$4 million a year?

19 DR. PUSCHECK: It's \$20 million a year.
20 Registration amounts to \$4 million of that \$20 million.

21 MR. MEESE: And if there was no registration,
22 what would the budget be?

23 DR. KORB: It goes down to \$12 because Congress
24 says if you don't have registration the Selective Service is
25 limited to \$1 million a month. So then they have to decide,

1 I guess it would be up to Tom and his people to decide what
2 to do within that which would prevent them from doing a lot
3 of other things that they're doing now.

4 DR. PUSCHECK: That would stop not only the
5 registration but the revitalization that I was talking
6 about.

7 MR. MEESE: Now what is our --

8 SEC. WEINBERGER: If you drop the registration then
9 you lose the four of that and four more.

10 MR. MEESE: Bur presumably the four is consumed in
11 the registration process so you wouldn't have that cost.

12 Now the compliance with registration, what do you
13 figure it is? What percentage?

14 MG. TURNAGE: We have no dollars in for compliance
15 now.

16 MR. MEESE: What is the percent of compliance with
17 those required?

18 DR. PUSCHECK: In the four year groups that are
19 registering now, '60 to '61 registered last summer,
20 compliance on that is over 90 percent. Men born in '62
21 registered in January. Compliance for that group is about
22 87 percent. We are in continuous registration now so men
23 born in '63 are registering this year and that at this point
24 in time is about 77 percent.

25 That chart you were just given shows the receipts

1 of registration forms, and that is plotted in two-week
2 increments, so you can see in recent weeks and months the
3 number of receipts have gone up considerably. That reflects
4 the increase in compliance from 60 to 69 percent to the
5 current 77 percent.

6 MR. MEESE: Have you noticed those stories up here
7 that the Justice Department is going to do something, whether
8 they're true or not the compliance goes up. Is that true?

9 DR. PUSCHECK: Yes, Sir, it is.

10 DR. KORB: I think there has been some uncertainty
11 about whether it would continue which I think had an impact
12 on the people.

13 MR. MEESE: We've been talking here about
14 registration. There is really three types of things short
15 of a draft. There is registration on a continuing basis;
16 there is registration on a standby basis which can be
17 invoked by a President at any time, and depending on the type
18 of emergency or the warning time that we would get, that's a
19 possibility; and then there is a higher degree of readiness
20 short of a draft which is a standby registration authority
21 and standby physical requirement, which of course give you
22 your optimum non-draft readiness doesn't it?

23 DR. PUSCHECK: Yes Sir. There could be a matter of
24 classification that comes in there as well.

25 MR. SCHNEIDER: You have to redo it after about

1 six months.

2 MR. MEESE: I'm positing these really on the
3 situation of where you wouldn't do it more than six months
4 before you go to war anyway, presumably.

5 SEC. WEINBERGER: Are there other questions or
6 things that should be considered in the preparation of the
7 final paper for a decision on this? Is anybody dissatisfied
8 or have any question about the methodology?

9 MR. MEESE: There is one question. In May of
10 1980, the President, now President, then candidate got a
11 report, there was supposedly a report by the Selective
12 Service Director that registration would only save seven
13 days.

14 DR. PUSCHECK: That's the 16 January report I was
15 referring to.

16 MR. MEESE: That is the report that was later
17 repudiated?

18 DR. PUSCHECK: Yes Sir.

19 MR. MEESE: Could you explain what all happened
20 there?

21 DR. PUSCHECK: The 16 January report was prepared
22 the first two to three weeks, at a time when policy in the
23 government was to not support registration. That report,
24 put in draft form dated 16 January, said that without
25 registration the first inductee could be delivered within

1 17 days.

2 Now with registration we say we can deliver and
3 we confirmed it through mobilization exercise assessments,
4 and inductees can be delivered within 13 days. That would
5 suggest a savings of only about four or five days from
6 registration.

7 The principle author of that report has testified
8 a number of times since, that given the experience in 1980
9 and the experience of earlier this year, it is, his best
10 assessment is, it would take about four to eight weeks to
11 reach the point where induction orders could be given. Four
12 weeks if nothing went wrong, but certainly some things always
13 do. I think the 58 day plan that reflects a six and a half
14 week savings is totally consistent with earlier testimony.

15 MR. ANDERSON: But that six week plan also
16 includes no repositioning material at the post offices?

17 DR. PUSCHECK: It includes having things at Great
18 Lakes for rapid phase distribution. It does not have
19 materials at individual post offices at peacetime.

20 MR. MARSH: I want to be certain that you are
21 certain and comfortable with these figures, particularly on
22 post mobilization registration plans, because in '76, we
23 were expecting 60 days and 58, I mean in '81 we're down to
24 13. You were figuring in '76 for the first inductee would
25 take you 110 days, and now you are down to 58 days. Your

1 first 100,000 inductees which will be 150 days, and now
2 you're down to 73. You've made some very substantial changes
3 in your suppositions as to where you will be, and I'm not
4 sure I understand just how you were able to get those
5 reductions.

6 DR. PUSCHECK: Based on a plan somewhat similar
7 to but with lessons learned from registrations last summer,
8 it could be done considerably faster than registration was
9 done last summer, and we've assessed the risk of that as
10 being moderate as opposed to a low risk of delivering on
11 schedule now.

12 I think your main point is that a few years ago
13 a 58 day delivery schedule in the absence of peacetime
14 registration would have been considered extremely optimistic.

15 MR. MARSH: The other one I mentioned, even though
16 you have Presidential authority if that registration lapsed,
17 you do not reinstitute it without going back to the
18 appropriations.

19 DR. PUSCHECK: That's right.

20 MR. MEESE: Unless you change the law.

21 MR. WEIDENBAUM: I would appreciate it if you'd
22 do a quick check of the enlistments during Vietnam and '65
23 is not a representative year.

24 MR. MEESE: What were the enlistments during Korea?

25 DR. PUSCHECK: 52,000 enlisted in the first, I have

1 some data on that. I think the first year if we put it on the
2 spectrum it ranged from 16,000 to 206,000. A comparable figure
3 for Korea would have been about 50,000.

4 DR. KORB: One thing that ought to be considered.
5 The President has received several letters already from
6 members of Congress on this subject saying that they wanted
7 to continue it and it's pretty much bipartisan.

8 DR. LEHMAN: In the last tab here there is a draft
9 interim report to the President, what is going to be the
10 procedure for a decision paper on this or a recommendation to
11 the President? How do you plan to proceed?

12 DR. KORB: That was one of the things I wanted to
13 discuss today. We were going to put up there what we would
14 include which would have been all the issues discussed by
15 the task force really up through today. And then we would
16 run it through the working group and through the task force
17 again before it went to the President, but it would summarize
18 the best we can in discussions that have gone on in these
19 meetings up to now.

20 MR. MEESE: Tom, how do you see the process for the
21 report to the President?

22 MG. TURNAGE: At this stage of the game it seems to
23 me there is really only one pressing subject, and that is
24 this one because you have budget implications for December.
25 The President doesn't have to act further if he wants to

1 extend it, but you do have to go through the budget process.
2 It seems to me we have to get that to him by late November
3 or early December.

4 In order to do that I would hope that we could
5 meet again in mid-November, and then as a result of the
6 deliberations at that time and the recommendations, then I
7 guess it is my responsibility to prepare the draft of that
8 report, coordinate it with the Chairman and with you on a
9 one-to-one basis or in another meeting with the group to get
10 a buy-off and then have that as a one-subject interim report
11 to them to meet that deadline. And then point out that the
12 other things would be forthcoming.

13 SEC. WEINBERGER: I think the General is right.
14 This is the only real item of which there is going to be any
15 major question. I think the other items, the draft material
16 and the various research data and all the things that have
17 been presented before and are in the book for today's meeting
18 are as far as I know, not controversial. I think that we
19 could be working on, with Larry, a form of report that does
20 not make a recommendation on this particular subject but
21 includes a lot of the data that we have on it. And then
22 after the task force has acted, why that section to be
23 put into final form. Does that sound agreeable?

24 MG. TURNAGE: Yes Sir. We could have that by the
25 next meeting.

1 SEC. WEINBERGER: I think what we would like to see
2 is the draft of the other part of the report so the task
3 force would have an opportunity to look that over. While I
4 don't think the material is controversial, there are bound
5 to be people who will have different ideas on how it ought
6 to be presented. But that I don't think is a big problem.

7 The big problem is how, or what we want to say on
8 this and whether there are going to be minority views or
9 whether we are able to get a unanimous view or whatever. So
10 I think we could set a meeting in mid-November and we could
11 hope to have prior to that time a proposed report with
12 either a blank on this subject or with alternates from which
13 we could choose. And then at that meeting we could
14 presumably devote most of the time to this question or other
15 questions about other parts of the report. So hopefully by
16 that meeting we would have a very good clear set of
17 instructions to staff to complete what would then be a final
18 report which could be circulated, and we could sign it.

19 Does that sound like a good timetable?

20 MG. TURNAGE: Yes Sir.

21 MR. MEESE: I think one of the things we need to
22 do is to review at the next meeting what are the subjects
23 that we haven't covered yet that we might want to cover. In
24 our original charts to the President we had a number of
25 things that we haven't gotten to more to maintaining the

1 qualitative incentives for manpower, the leadership, morale,
2 and the things that happen once you get in, and some other
3 factors like that. I think we've got some pretty good stuff
4 on getting people in, how they're coming in and that sort of
5 thing.

6 SEC. WEINBERGER: On this draft here we have such
7 things as proposed education benefit incentives, how to cope
8 with shortages of NCOs, discipline, living and working
9 conditions, what to do with proposals on the draft when they
10 are introduced in Congress.

11 MR. MEESE: The other thing is there are some
12 things like military personnel on this list. I would say
13 that our mission is two-fold. One, to present kind of a
14 state of the art of military manpower as of this point, to
15 provide a true picture of what the situation is. I think
16 that's important thing to do both for the President and
17 for the public. And secondly, to make recommendations in
18 these various fields on what needs to be done and in this
19 issue of registration, a particular policy recommendation
20 that affects the immediate decisions the President has to
21 make.

22 Going to that first because it is the most time
23 urgent. We've heard basically the overall situation, the
24 background of registration. We've heard at least implicitly ✓
25 why registration would be a good idea. We haven't really

1 addressed the negatives of registration.

2 SEC. WEINBERGER: That's what I asked for a moment
3 ago.

4 MR. MEESE: I think we ought to do that, but let me
5 just mention one big demerit which is not to be conclusive
6 of our deliberations by any means, but it has been a
7 philosophical approach, that peacetime registration, first of
8 all that peacetime draft is a bad thing and not a desirable
9 thing. And peacetime registration is an aspect of that.
10 And that has been something the President has been pretty firm
11 on before. He based his position in part on the now repudiated
12 statement of what the time savings is, but I think we ought
13 to look at other aspects, or the other negatives to
14 registration.

15 SEC. WEINBERGER: One aspect about the letter of the
16 President of last May was, at that time we were talking about
17 a proposal. We now have an enactment and some months and a
18 year plus experience, and that is something that we ought
19 to consider, the actual experience during that period. And
20 the percentages of compliance. We certainly ought to have a
21 consideration and the best way to get that would be to ask
22 people who feel that there is a down side to this, to let us
23 have it. Ed has indicated that it could be considered part
24 of a draft apparatus.

25 I would certainly feel, well, I think draft and

1 registration are two very different subjects, and the
2 position of the Administration on draft is quite unequivocal
3 and very clear, and at this point there is no suggestion of
4 anything that there is any indication of a need to change it.
5 Registration is in a different form because it is in effect
6 and not producing an awful lot of negative aspects in the
7 country, and we are told it has quite an affirmative effect
8 in the number of days saved, and we ought to examine that
9 and see if it's valid or not and see if there are other
10 demerits of which people might not have been aware.

11 MR. MEESE: One negative is that if we are going
12 to continue with registration then we are going to have to
13 increase enforcement, and we have not examined as yet the
14 cost of that either in terms of dollar costs and resources
15 and the Department of Justice presumably or wherever we get
16 the people or what this does to public attitudes. I'm not
17 sure until you try it. Maybe we ought to go ahead and be
18 more vigorous in the next few months to get some experience.

19 SEC. WEINBERGER: The suggestion you made a moment
20 ago is a pretty good one, that the Department of Justice
21 concern that it's split to 80 percent or whatever, and to
22 see if that pulls it into the 90s again.

23 MR. MEESE: You can't fool them forever. I mean
24 sooner or later you're going to have to try somebody and
25 send them to jail.

1 DR. KORB: We also have a couple of bills before
2 the Congress that want to give Selective Service access to
3 social security numbers which we're going to have to confront,
4 because right now the only people that get prosecuted are people
5 whose neighbors have turned them in. So it's selective
6 prosecution basically.

7 MR. ANDERSON: I would mention that we spend an
8 awful lot of time arguing and talking about the lists and
9 debating it, but it seems to be the critical issue when you
10 look at those charts are the reserve forces, and how do you
11 get your active people in a number ready to fight up to the
12 level you need, not within a matter of three or four or
13 five months, but during the first ten days?

14 SEC. WEINBERGER: That is a different question and
15 it's a very important question, and it's one that we are
16 certainly working on and one to continue to work on. And
17 part of it I guess is a wider appreciation of the fact that
18 this is a remaining obligation of people who have volunteered.

19 MG. TURNAGE: The obvious is even if you were up
20 to strength with your reserve, your selective reserve, and
21 the active establishment as we perceive now, you can't fight
22 a major war on that basis. Ultimately you have to have man-
23 power coming from --

24 SEC. WEINBERGER: There is no question if there's
25 a war situation.

1 MR. ANDERSON: Then you can easily use the post
2 mobilization registration procedure. And then you have no
3 problem.

4 DR. KORB: I would suggest that before we send a
5 recommendation to the President on this subject we also make
6 sure that we've taken a look at this pre-training mobilization
7 manpower which is also on the agenda. I think that shows why
8 you need them and where they're coming from, and that
9 clarifies it and frames the issue, I think.

10 MR. MEESE: We may also want to consider that on
11 this particular issue that we may not want to send a
12 recommendation to the President. We might want to send a
13 series of options with the pros and cons of each option, and
14 let the recommendations come through other vehicles such as
15 for example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that sort of thing.

16 The Defense Department has been very good about
17 providing a variety of options to the President on the
18 strategic forces modernization, leaving him a great deal of
19 flexibility, and he usually manages to make a decision and
20 fills his own inclinations as well as the needs. That is at
21 least a consideration as opposed to a recommendation.

22 MR. ORR: I think it's a good one. I think this
23 is a case where you could easily get into one of those
24 public commissions that Presidents have a habit of forming
25 and then they come out with a recommendation that is

1 unacceptable. I can see that the press knows the meaning
2 of this, and if we were to make a recommendation he didn't
3 want to buy, it only increases the adverse publicity. I
4 think if the recommendation were oral and the pros and
5 cons were written --

6 MR. ANDERSON: How do you determine the M in all
7 of these equations?

8 SEC. WEINBERGER: It's a very good question,
9 because it may not be anything like any of us have
10 experienced or studied in the past, and it may be, you know,
11 normally you expect that you will have some time and there
12 would be a sufficient warning so that some kind of orderly
13 process can start, but it is one of the arguments that people
14 who favor draft and other things say. We will never know
15 and we've got to have it in place. It's a different world,
16 and you just don't know what it will be.

17 We talk about a mid-November date. Would that be
18 agreeable with the work that we've indicated to be done
19 ahead of time? That would be the preparation of a draft
20 report, minus registration. A separate paper on registra-
21 tion, and a point that it might be well to offer up a number
22 of possibilities for the President rather than making a
23 formal recommendation. That too can be discussed next time,
24 but we want to get things to him in time to be useful and
25 so if we could have a draft of the whole report minus

1 registration, a separate registration paper, and discussion
2 next week, or in mid-November, merely revolving around the
3 determination of the registration issue and the form in which
4 that is to be given to the President. And also consideration
5 of course of changes in the other portions of the report that
6 the members would like to make.

7 MR. MEESE: I assume we will pick up the two
8 issues that we were unable to get to today, the selective
9 reserve and the mobilization manpower?

10 DR. KORB: We will have to have those in draft
11 form, assuming you want to have those --

12 SEC. WEINBERGER: They will be presented in draft
13 form and will be available for consideration next time. But
14 probably wouldn't have a formal presentation made of them in
15 view of the time. We could have the material.

16 MR. WEIDENBAUM: Would the staff group have
17 reviewed them before?

18 DR. KORB: Selective reserve is really nothing
19 for the group to decide on because basically what we are
20 saying is we think given this year's experience, that the
21 services can meet what they've told us is available and the
22 working group went through it and by and large all of your
23 subordinates said it seemed to be a reasonable thing. So we
24 can basically say that is good news.

25 The individual ready reserve that we presented

1 here, we put that up there to show how the requirements
2 were computed. What we basically need is some discussion
3 only on the options to deal with the individual ready
4 reserve which we'll have to deal with regardless of what you
5 do with registration, and our basic thrust was to give a
6 bonus and to extend the obligation of people in there to
7 begin to close that, and it will take some period of time.
8 that is basically what we're talking about.

9 MR. MEESE: We could have a draft report that would
10 incorporate that information but I think it probably would be
11 worth discussion here.

12 SEC. WEINBERGER: The whole draft report would be
13 for discussion and then we could highlight particular items.

14 MR. MEESE: I think these are two of the kinds of
15 issues which the President would want to know whether the
16 selective reserve can meet its manpower needs and whether
17 there is enough manpower for mobilization.

18 DR. KORB: Do you want your working group to
19 meet? You're talking two weeks. That's a pretty compressed
20 thing. There is no way we can get, for example, a report
21 next week to a working group. I assume you want to bypass
22 that if you want to get together in two weeks here.

23 MR. MEESE: What I would suggest is this. Perhaps
24 we could meet our requirements if we met, say two weeks from
25 today, just to pick a day, that's Friday the 13th, I think,

1 we could do these things, number one, we could pick up these
2 two items and have the briefing which is prepared now and
3 wouldn't require any further activity by the working group.
4 We could have a draft of the interim report to the President
5 on the registration issue. We could have, I don't know
6 whether you have a draft report --

7 DR. KORB: I have an outline of what would be
8 included for the rest of the report.

9 MR. MEESE: I would think that maybe we could go
10 into that outline and provide some guidance to the working
11 group, but at the same time of the special matter, the
12 selective service registration taken as a separate matter
13 so we could be sure it gets to the President in plenty of
14 time so that we would have a briefing on these two items.

15 A decision on the format and content of the
16 report on registration, and then adoption of an outline for
17 the interim report that could then go to the working group
18 for their flushing out.

19 SEC. WEINBERGER: That would include registration?

20 MR. MEESE: That would include registration. We'd
21 have registration ready.

22 SEC. WEINBERGER: And we would approve that report
23 presumably on an individual basis?

24 MR. MEESE: Or have a meeting at whatever time the
25 working group has the draft report ready.

1 SEC. WEINBERGER: That would still get us into the
2 December 1 delivery date.

3 DR. KORB: It would be. Again, if you have to have
4 a formal meeting of the working group, it might be a little
5 bit of a delay to get the papers and have time to read them.

6 DR. LEHMAN: I would suggest that we might save
7 ourselves a bit more time to focus for discussion in the
8 next meeting better by having the working group work over
9 your draft interim report.

10 DR. KORB: They've already gone over the outline.

11 DR. LEHMAN: My people tell me they have not had
12 a chance to have an input on it.

13 DR. KORB: They've had two weeks since the meeting.
14 We had a meeting with them two weeks ago and told them if
15 you didn't get your comments in, send them in within the
16 next two weeks.

17 DR. LEHMAN: John Harrington, our assistant
18 secretary, and your assistant secretary, have not had a
19 crack at it and I think they should before we get into a
20 meeting.

21 MR. MEESE: As far as we are concerned, the magic
22 date of the first of December is important only for one
23 issue, and that is the registration. And so if we took
24 longer than that to get a good quality report on aspects of
25 mobilization and mobilization manpower then that is more

1 important. If we can put the two of them together and have
2 them ready, fine, but I'd rather have a quality report that
3 presents a case persuasively as to where this country is
4 right now in manpower through mobilization than try to
5 hurry it up just so we can put the two together.

6 SEC. WEINBERGER: You're suggesting by the end
7 of the next meeting, some time in mid-November, we would
8 have reached a conclusion on what and how we wanted to
9 present to the President on registration, that we would have
10 laid the groundwork for the balance and that we would get
11 the approval of the balance of the report sometime between
12 mid-November and the first of December?

13 MR. MEESE: Yes.

14 MG. TURNAGE: I'm presuming the registration
15 portion of this would be my responsibility? And that I'll
16 coordinate with Larry regarding the balance of the report?

17 MR. MEESE: Yes.

18 (Whereupon, at 5:40 p.m. the meeting was adjourned.)
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2 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
3

4 DOCKET NUMBER:

5 CASE TITLE: Military Manpower Task Force Meeting

6 HEARING DATE: - October 30, 1981

7 LOCATION: Washington, D. C.
8

9 I hereby certify that the proceedings and evidence
10 herein are contained fully and accurately on the tapes and
11 notes reported by me at the hearing in the above case before
12 Military Manpower Task Force
13 and that this is a true and correct transcript of the same.
14
15

16 Date: November 3, 1981
17

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RICHARD A. HAUSER - FILES

MILITARY MANPOWER TASK FORCE

UNITED STATES VS. WAYTE

TO CENTRAL FILES
TERRY GOOD
FEB. 24, 1983