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Transcript of Proceedings

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

MILITARY MANPOWER TASK FORCE

Washington, D. C.

November 30, 1981

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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MILITARY MANPOWER TASK FORCE

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Old Executive Office Building
Room 305
Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

4:07 p.m.
Monday, November 30, 1981

1 MEMBERS OF THE TASK FORCE:

2 CASPAR W. WEINBERGER (Chairman)
3 Secretary of Defense

4 EDWIN MEESE, III
5 Counselor to the President

6 WILLIAM SCHNEIDER
7 Associate Director
8 Office of Management and Budget

9 MURRAY L. WEIDENBAUM
10 Secretary, Council of Economic Advisers

11 JAMES NANCE
12 Acting Assistant to the President
13 for NSA

14 MARTIN C. ANDERSON
15 Assistant to the President
16 for Policy Development

17 JOHN O. MARSH
18 Secretary of the Army

19 JOHN F. LEHMAN
20 Secretary of the Navy

21 TY McCOY
22 Assistant Secretary of the Air Force

23 GENERAL DAVID JONES
24 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

25 THOMAS K. TURNAGE
Director, Selective Service System

26 OTHER PARTICIPANTS:

27 LARRY J. KORB
28 Assistant Secretary of Defense

29 HERBERT PUSCHECK
30 Selective Service System

31 MR. GREENBERG
32 Office of the Secretary of Defense

33

P R O C E E D I N G S

1
2 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: We have three or four
3 principal items today, and one of them is a presentation.
4 That is on the Reserve. I think that at the end does
5 require a consideration of the possibility of extending the
6 time for the future, not a retroactive thing, but for the
7 future, and also we have the possibility of a presentation
8 with respect to pre-trained manpower, and then we would have
9 a consideration of the outline of the report to the
10 President and the way in which we would want to present
11 conclusions to him concerning registration.

12 David's letter to me urges that we stay in
13 business long enough to address compensation questions, and
14 I am not entirely sure what is meant by that because I
15 thought we were on pretty good grounds on compensation at the
16 moment with such items as educational benefits to be
17 considered next year, but we can talk about that perhaps in
18 a minute.

19 Meanwhile, if everybody is agreeable, Larry can
20 present the Selected Reserve slides and presentation and so
21 forth and so on.

22 DR. KORB: What we are going to do today is talk
23 about the non-active duty manpower going from Selected
24 Reserves to individual ready reserve to those who would be
25 available to the Selective Service System, and so we will

1 start down selected, pre-trained, individual ready reserve,
2 consider the draft report to the President on registration,
3 and if we have time, we will talk about the outline of the
4 interim report to the President.

5 Taking a look at Selected Reserve, let me point
6 out a couple of things. When we went into the all-volunteer
7 force, we were a little bit over 900,000 people because of
8 the fact that we had a lot of people in there who were into
9 avoiding going on two years of active duty. As we no longer
10 had conscription, the numbers began to fall and we get to a
11 low point below 800,000. As you can see, at the end of
12 Fiscal '81, the very excellent recruiting retention year
13 that the President spoke about which affected not only
14 active duty but reserve forces, the numbers have come back
15 up to where we have made up most of the loss that was
16 suffered as we entered into the all-volunteer force.

17 (Showing slides) Now if you take a look for the
18 next six months you see that the Services have come in for
19 an increase of some 215,000 people. In the Selected Reserve
20 these are the people who drill one weekend a month and spend
21 a minimum of two weeks of active duty each year, most of
22 the increase to come in the Army Reserve and the Army National
23 Guard.

24 The reason for this increase is reassigning a lot
25 of new missions to the Reserves. We have some 80 Reserve

1 components identified as Rapid Deployment Force.

2 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: Could you get that up just
3 again for a second? There, you see how badly things fell
4 off between '74 and '78 with only one exception--Air Force
5 Reserve, and how it bounced back up again in '81, and yet
6 there is quite a fair distance to go; 215,000 is not an
7 insuperable number because we have got six years to do it
8 and it is perfectly doable, but it is terribly important
9 not to have any of the factors which gave rise to that,
10 caused that big drop between '74 and '78.

11 DR. KORB: A lot of the factors that affected this
12 also affected the active duty which you remember also
13 experienced a bout of trouble.

14 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: Part of it is the general
15 impression the country had of uniformed personnel, and the
16 other was the pay.

17 DR. KORB: Just change the vu-graphs--all right.
18 Now as you can see, as I have pointed out before, the
19 program strength is scheduled to increase, but so is the
20 wartime requirement because we are asking the Reserve to
21 take on more missions, and we are also increasing our
22 commitment, so even though we program an increase of 215,000,
23 the wartime requirement will go up and we will be closer to
24 but not all the way to meeting what we want for our wartime
25 requirement by Fiscal Year 1987, but the picture will be

1 appreciably better than it is today if we can meet the
2 totals.

3 MR. MEESE: Is that wartime required for Selected
4 Reserves or does that include your IRR?

5 DR. KORB: Just Selected Reserves; we also have
6 a wartime requirement for active duty, Selected Reserve,
7 and individual ready reserve which we will be getting to.

8 MR. MEESE: What is the anticipated plan then to
9 meet the wartime requirement? Will that remain constant as
10 you go forward and then you will increase your program
11 strengths in subsequent years?

12 DR. KORB: That is correct. We intend to increase
13 our program strength today from a little bit below 900,000
14 to over 1.1 million by Fiscal Year 1987.

15 MR. MEESE: How do you get to 1163?

16 DR. KORB: This is based upon the analysis of the
17 Joint Chiefs of Staff as they anticipate the threat with the
18 lethality of the weapons in the future, in 1987.

19 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: From '80, something to 96
20 percent?

21 MR. MEESE: But what you are doing, you have
22 programmed a calculated strength?

23 DR. KORB: That's right, because what we are looking
24 at is the market as we see it based upon the way we can go.
25 Now sometimes if we have a good year, providing we can

1 reprogram the money, get authorization from the Congress,
2 we can come closer and the requirement may go up or down,
3 depending upon as the DIA comes in with new intelligence
4 data, but this is basically where we are.

5 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: I can't feel the wartime
6 requirement is absolutely accurate down to the last man, so
7 if we got within the 96 percent of it, I think we would be
8 in awfully good shape.

9 DR. KORB: A question arises of whether we can do
10 it. In other words, can we grow the Reserve from where you
11 are today to where you want to be in 1987, and remember, most
12 of the increase is going to come in the Army Guard and
13 Reserve because they are the largest components compared,
14 for example, to the Navy Reserve, the Marine Corps. They
15 are much larger, and we are optimistic because of the fact we
16 do not have to do in any of the subsequent years any better
17 than we did in Fiscal Year 1981 or Fiscal Year 1980. This
18 was the increase, 38,000 and 33,000, and we are not program-
19 ming a larger increase in the Army Guard and Reserve, higher
20 than that number at any time during this particular period.

21 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: This is important in the
22 sense that a lot of people when we boast of the virtues of
23 the all-volunteer system and the results say yes, but that
24 is just because there is a big depression and everybody is
25 joining to have a job.

1 That is not true with this. This is not
2 economically driven. These are people who really want to
3 be in these Reserve activities and don't them for economic
4 reasons. We think a lot of the volunteer people don't join
5 for economic reasons either, but this is--in other words,
6 the '80, '81 bars are extremely encouraging, and while it
7 isn't in any sense conclusive that we can get that much
8 newer in the out years, it looks as if that is quite possible.

9 DR. KORB: One cautionary thing I think I have to
10 point out is that we are also, you may remember, increasing
11 active strengths and the population from which we draw is
12 declining, and if we improve retention in the active forces
13 it may hurt this because a lot of our people come from the
14 active sources into the Reserve, so we are optimistic, but
15 I think you ought to keep that caution in mind. We have to
16 continue to provide funds for recruiting and advertisement
17 and enlistment and retention centers for the Guard and
18 Reserve as well as the active force.

19 That takes care of the Selected Reserve. Let's
20 move into the next issue which is pre-trained manpower, and
21 the question is do the military Services have enough manpower
22 in trained and obligated manpower pools to meet their
23 mobilization requirement?

24 We are stepping down. We had active Reserve,
25 Selected Reserve. Now we are moving down to the next. Now

1 I think it is important to very briefly point out where we
2 get these people who come in for the mobilization pools.
3 We have individual ready reserves and individual National
4 Guard. Reserves are primarily people who are in there who
5 do not drill. We have got the stand-by reserve, and military
6 retirees who we have given orders to report to active duty
7 sort of as a backfill, and this is what they will do. They
8 will fill up active and Selected Reserve units.

9 Remember, as Secretary Marsh pointed out a couple
10 of times, state law in many cases prevents us from breaking
11 up Selected Reserve units to fill up the active, so we want
12 them to fill up the active, Selected Reserve units, and the
13 very important point, to replace the battlefield casualties,
14 so this is where they are coming from, individual ready
15 reserve, stand-by reserve, and military retirees.

16 MR. MEESE: What is the stand-by reserve?

17 DR. KORB: These are people who were in the ready
18 reserve who no longer want to be affiliated and go into the
19 stand-by reserve. They don't get pay, but they are able to
20 be called up. It is an S-1 type of category.

21 MR. MEESE: It is different than the IRR?

22 DR. KORB: Yes. It is different from the
23 individual ready reserves. These are people who have a
24 military service obligation that they didn't fulfill by
25 going on active duty. These are people who fulfill their

1 obligation, but say look, I don't want to drill every
2 weekend but I will go into the stand-by reserve and come back
3 if there is an emergency. They don't have to. Many times
4 you incur this when you join up. This you do on a volunteer
5 basis.

6 MR. MEESE: It is a higher level of readiness
7 basically by one, is that it?

8 DR. KORB: Some of the people in the stand-by
9 reserve do come on to training.

10 MR. GREENBERG: One of the more popular groups in
11 the stand-by reserve would be members of Congress who still
12 want to maintain the reserve affiliation but obviously are
13 in a group that would be the last to be called.

14 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: Under the new statutes.

15 MR. GREENBERG: So the stand-by reserve is quite
16 slim now. There was an effort to move as many people from
17 the stand-by reserve to the IRR as possible. What remains
18 are people who would have certainly a lesser obligation to
19 come in.

20 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: The degree of their training,
21 in answer to Mr. Meese's questions, depends on how frequently
22 they take a training which is volunteer for them as opposed
23 to obligated for others.

24 DR. KORB: That is correct, and it also happens
25 with the individual ready reserve. Up until this year, it

1 was only on a volunteer basis. Congress has now given us
2 permission to order the people back.

3 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: Right.

4 DR. KORB: Okay. Now here is the individual ready
5 reserves, which is our main problem. We are going to be
6 talking primarily about this. The source is those who don't
7 complete their six year obligation and those who agree--when
8 a person joins the Service, they incur a six year obligation.
9 If they don't serve all of it on active duty, they are then
10 put into the individual ready reserves if they don't join
11 the Selected Reserve or Guard. Those who come in, the
12 losses, those who complete MSO, if you leave the IRR to go
13 back on active duty, and in some we just looked at it.
14 administratively. We will talk about that in a second.

15 Now the problem is AVF with longer active service,
16 we now have people serving on active duty for the initial
17 obligations, about 3,8 years, and so we don't have as much
18 turnover, and we also reduce the size of the active force,
19 so therefore, the IRR goes down, and we will show you the
20 extent to which it went down.

21 When we ended conscription, the individual ready
22 reserve, because of the fact that conscripts served only for
23 two years, you had a higher turnover, was a little over a
24 million. This fell, and down to below 200,000. This is for
25 the Army. We are going to focus primarily on the Army

1 because it is primarily an Army problem, and it has come
2 back up a little bit now to 220,000 as particularly the Army
3 has taken certain administrative actions to clean up their
4 list, and to make sure that people go into the individual
5 ready reserve.

6 Now the question is how many do we have and how
7 many do we need? The requirements are active forces at
8 wartime strength; we just talked about Selected Reserve
9 the wartime requirements; the casualty requirements. This
10 tells you how many you need. This is your supply--active,
11 Selected Reserve, new volunteers, and inductees after their
12 training, and your manpower pools. We are focusing on IRR,
13 stand-by reserve, and retirees. Now throughout the rest of
14 this discussion, we are focusing--this is the scenario,
15 Warsaw Pact attack on NATO, conventional weapons, little
16 warning time. This is the most demanding scenario, and this
17 is the requirements for it, and here is the supply.

18 Okay. This is the picture. You may remember at
19 our last meeting when we were discussing registration we put
20 this up and said okay, here is a requirement. Now notice
21 again the wartime requirement is going up over the next
22 seven years as we increase our commitments. The establishment
23 of the Rapid Deployment Forces as a separate command, for
24 example, and here is your active and Selected Reserve supply.
25 That is going up. Remember we spoke about the increase in

1 the active and Selected Reserve. Volunteers and inductees
2 for M plus 120 will remain basically the same because of
3 the fact that you must train a person for at least 12 weeks
4 before you send them into combat and have them available
5 from the manpower pools. We expect a raise from about
6 200,000 in '80 to a little bit over 400,000, basically a
7 doubling.

8 Now you have a shortfall now of about a quarter
9 of a million. It will go down to a little bit over 100,000
10 if this projected increase comes true. Now again we
11 emphasized the last time this is not how many there are in
12 there. We are adjusting that number. We basically figure
13 we only get 75 percent of them. In other words, there are
14 more people than this, but that has been adjusted to say
15 that, and this is what the Services tell us they expect to
16 get in their manpower pools, about 75 percent of the people.

17 Now we have got a shortfall, and what I would like
18 to propose, what was proposed to the working group that was
19 in your papers are a couple of options to deal with the
20 situation.

21 The first option basically is to change the MSO
22 possibly up to eight years, make it mandatory for all the
23 Services. If you went to eight years, for example, you would
24 add 144,000 to the Army. It would take you a while to see
25 those improvements because you couldn't start it until this

1 year, legislation was sent over and people who enlisted
2 after this. We don't know the effect on recruiting. It
3 could increase recruiting costs. In a young person, say
4 you have got an eight year obligation, we might have to
5 increase bonuses. You might turn off certain people, and
6 it could require an adjustment back if you found out it
7 caused trouble. There are some risks if you do this, but
8 the payoffs are certain. If you do this, you can add
9 almost 150,000 to the Army which has the biggest problem.
10 It would require legislation, and we could let the period
11 be set by the Secretary of Defense.

12 If you got legislation to permit you to do it and
13 you found out you had problems, the Secretary of Defense
14 could change the obligation.

15 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: Larry, you have got the fact
16 that it might increase recruiting costs.

17 Do we have any studies that indicate whether the
18 longer requirement would discourage a significant number of
19 people who are now enlisting?

20 DR. KORB: Based on the best evidence we have,
21 there would be very little impact. That is the best evidence
22 we have right now.

23 However, it has not been tried for an extended
24 period.

25 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: People tend to view the

1 period after they get out of active service as more or less
2 a possibility anyway, and the fact it is stated in definite
3 number of years doesn't seem to have much effect.

4 DR. KORB: No, it does not.

5 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: Any other questions?

6 MR. ANDERSON: In computing the shortfall for
7 FY '87, you have got available for manpower 190,000.

8 What kind of a yield factor do you use in the IRR?

9 DR. KORB: Basically the 75 percent.

10 MR. ANDERSON: How many people are you losing
11 because of the yield factor?

12 DR. KORB: Twenty-five percent, so you have to
13 multiply that number by 1.25 basically.

14 MR. ANDERSON: This means almost your entire
15 supply shortfall is due to the fact that your yield factor
16 is 75, so whatever you can do to bring the yield factor
17 up like a more sophisticated tracking system, might do away
18 with a lot of problems.

19 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: It isn't all people who are
20 lost. It is people who are no longer physically able.

21 DR. KORB: Physically, or they might have committed
22 a crime.

23 SECRETARY LEHMAN: That is optimistic; the 75, you
24 are doing real, real well.

25 MR. ANDERSON: You have really got some administrative

1 work.

2 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: You shouldn't lose anybody
3 in the sense that you ought to know that certain numbers
4 can't be taken because their physical condition has
5 deteriorated. Certain people have moved out of the country
6 or whatever, but there are some people who are indeed lost,
7 and to the extent that you can reduce this, you are absolutely
8 right. That helps enormously, but you are not going to
9 get 25 percent of them. That's the only problem. You will
10 get some.

11 DR. KORB: You do notice, remember back, Marty,
12 one of the other charts where we showed the increase, a lot
13 had been due to the fact that it has taken a lot of
14 administrative actions to get them.

15 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: Some of them are former
16 air traffic controllers. There are a whole raft of
17 classifications that means you can't use them all, but one
18 way or another we can do better.

19 DR. KORB: Now before we get to the second thing,
20 I think it is important to keep in mind that if you take a
21 look at our allies, what their military service obligations
22 are for people who either volunteer or were conscripted, the
23 average age of our allies is higher than ours. Ours is
24 about 25.5. In other words, a person comes in roughly about
25 19 and has an obligation until they are a little bit over 25,

1 and some of our NATO, particularly our NATO allies, they
2 incur much longer obligations, so we would not be doing
3 anything that would be much different from our allies if
4 we extended it.

5 For example, you see a lot of these countries is
6 45. The lowest is in Germany where it is 32. If we put it
7 up by two years we would still be at about 27.

8 The second option that we have is now to, now to
9 offer as a proposal, is to give the obligation to those who
10 re-enlist. Now this would be applied to those who re-enlist
11 in active and Selected Reserve because right now if you
12 re-enlist and then you decide not to make it a career, you
13 have no more obligation than the individual ready reserve
14 because re-enlists, once you passed six year military
15 service obligation--now the proposal that was put before the
16 working group and sent up to you would make it optional by
17 Service and skill. There would be no change in the law,
18 and the yield could be up to 60,000 for the Army.

19 If the Task Force adopts this you can experiment
20 with this to evaluate the impact on re-enlistments which
21 let me emphasize is optional by Service, and still the Army
22 having the biggest problem, we would expect that they would
23 be the ones who would want to use this the most.

24 The third option would be to offer a bonus for
25 those who agree to extend in the individual ready reserves.

1 We did have in Fiscal '81 a \$600.00 bonus for those who
2 agreed to extend in the manpower pool, and we are proposing
3 to make it up to \$900.00 or about \$300.00 a year, make it
4 optional by the Service. If they had the problem, and if
5 this proposal were adopted, you could get about 70,000
6 more people in the Army, IRR, at a cost of about \$32 million
7 a year.

8 Now if you take a look at those three proposals,
9 this is what you are talking about. Option one, we extended
10 the military service obligation, it can't do you any good
11 for quite a few years because you couldn't start it until
12 you changed the law.

13 Option two where you have the, you put in IRR
14 obligation on those who re-enlist would take a couple of
15 years before you would start seeing the results of that, and
16 then Option No. 3 where you pay the bonus, you would have
17 some immediate payouts which we estimate this way.

18 Now if all of those three steps were adopted and
19 they all achieved their desired results, what you would
20 see by the close of the decade, you would begin to see this
21 gap close.

22 Now these are not completely administrative.
23 There would be some duplication, but basically remember the
24 shortfall was about 100,000. You begin to see a closeage as
25 you go out.

1 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: All right. Are there
2 questions? Yes, Marty?

3 MR. ANDERSON: Is there any possibility of recruit-
4 ing people into the IRR who have had previous military
5 service, left, and they want to come back in? Is there any
6 independent way of doing that?

7 DR. KORB: Yes, you can do that.

8 MR. ANDERSON: Is that a viable option?

9 DR. KORB: That would be included among these.
10 Normally what you would probably do is offer them a bonus.
11 Normally what happens when a person--it is active, Selected
12 Reserve, individual ready reserve, and you could offer this
13 person a bonus that would be included in here. We do have
14 a program that is already in our budget, okay, of taking
15 people to enlist directly into the IRR. We are trying it
16 out on an experimental program. The Army will start it in
17 Fiscal '83.

18 MR. MEESE: What about providing an educational
19 incentive to either go from active or Selected Reserve in
20 the IRR with some kind of an educational incentive, long-
21 term loan or GI Bill type of this?

22 DR. KORB: This is being considered in our educational
23 package.

24 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: We believe that the dollars
25 the Congress has now voted in the second time has largely

1 eliminated the really shamefully low rate that they had in
2 effect and the failure to consider inflation over all those
3 years, so we think that is reasonably well caught up now.

4 The next thing that would be the most helpful and
5 the most equity is educational benefits. That is the thing
6 that apparently people in the Service are most interested in,
7 and interestingly enough to anyone who is familiar with the
8 old GI Bill, the thing that is of most interest now are
9 educational benefits for dependents, and that has a much
10 longer payout period, of course, so these are things that
11 we will be looking at from a compensation point of view
12 and can do it in the context of this commission, or in the
13 normal way in which we do it or any one of a number of ways.

14 Yes, sir?

15 SECRETARY MARSH: May I speak to that for a moment?
16 I have got a chart here, two charts I would like to show you.
17 About two weeks ago I was in Wyoming and attended a briefing
18 of the Wyoming National Guard, and three years ago the
19 Wyoming National Guard started an educational program. They
20 are in their third year, and the State of Wyoming will pay
21 half of the tuition, one half of the tuition of any youngster
22 who attends a college in Wyoming who joins the Wyoming National
23 Guard. If they are from Texas or Montana, if they join the
24 Wyoming National Guard they can still go and get half their
25 tuition paid.

1 The Wyoming National Guard has only about 2600
2 people, and it has only 1600 people in the Army National
3 Guard, so you see these figures, you see this shows in this
4 period of time how many applicants we had--1,780 applications
5 in the program, 1,065 the Army, 700 for the Air Guard, and
6 then the other statistics show you how many of their new
7 recruits of the people taking the educational benefits are
8 in what semester.

9 They have gotten 473 recruits which represents
10 64 percent of their total. Now what amazes us is the cost.
11 I said they pay half the tuition. Those are the colleges in
12 Wyoming. Half the tuition is \$80.00 a semester in the State
13 of Wyoming. This costs the State of Wyoming about \$131,000.

14 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: You just got OMB with that
15 one!

16 MR. SCHNEIDER: Nineteen twenty-six prices!

17 SECRETARY MARSH: If somebody tells you they will
18 pay half the college tuition, that sounds like a whole lot.

19 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: Every survey we had, and we
20 are doing one very large one as you know, has come out so
21 far with the idea that there is a tremendous interest in
22 educational benefits of all kinds, and particularly for
23 dependents.

24 MR. MEESE: The interesting thing is the IRR, those
25 are the kind of people you like to have because it shows a

1 certain dedication to improve their own situation. They
2 are probably in the right age group you would need for
3 filler personnel.

4 SECRETARY MARSH: They would raise the quality of
5 your force.

6 DR. KORB: In the Selected Reserve we already have
7 a program where the person can join the Selected Reserve
8 and sort of on the come get his college loan forgiven for
9 Reserve and National Guard, and we just started that. That
10 appears to be a very successful program perfectly tailored
11 to the college person who can do his two weeks training when
12 school is not in session, and we are actively working with
13 several states on this particular program.

14 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: All right. Have we got one
15 that will help us decide about these options? Do you have
16 a chart that will help us decide?

17 DR. KORB: Basically this is what we are talking
18 about. . If you extended MSO, okay, for six to eight years
19 for the Army, you will begin to get this many more people--
20 70,000 in '89. If you take the given IRR obligation to
21 those who re-enlist, make it optional by Service, we estimate
22 it will build up to a steady state of about 60,000, and the
23 bonus we estimate will have immediate payoffs. Based on our
24 '81 experience, that will build up along those lines.

25 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: Each one of these, you are not

1 changing the obligation of anybody.

2 DR. KORB: You change the obligation here.

3 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: It is prospective.

4 DR. KORB: Right.

5 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: We are not changing the
6 obligation of anybody now in this, in any category.

7 DR. KORB: No.

8 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: That is important I think.

9 DR. KORB: This would require legislation. This
10 would require legislation to get the money, and this the
11 Service Secretaries could do by themselves.

12 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: What do you have about the
13 bonus thing? Do you have any feelings about that?

14 MR. SCHNEIDER: It looks like it would be a good
15 program from what one can tell if that small amount of money
16 would have that great an effect. It seems to me like a
17 viable option.

18 DR. KORB: We have a \$600.00 bonus this year, and
19 we are talking about a \$900.00 bonus, and the yield, we are
20 not estimating at least the beginning to be tremendous. It
21 would take a while to get the program going.

22 MR. SCHNEIDER: It is hard to believe that the
23 300 bucks a year, that that would be a motivator to get people
24 to do it.

25 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: You are dealing with a special

1 group of people here who already have demonstrated some
2 high degree of motivation.

3 MR. SCHNEIDER: It would be a good scheme.

4 MR. MEESE: And barring a wartime situation, there
5 is almost nothing required other than turning in a change
6 of address form every year.

7 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: The assumption pretty
8 basically is among these people I think that the length of
9 time of their obligation in quotes is not all that important
10 because if anything happened, everybody would be put under
11 a much greater obligation, so this is not a very large factor,
12 and that I think is why the \$300.00 is felt to have quite
13 a multiplier effect here.

14 MR. MEESE: Would there be any value to increasing
15 the things that an IRR member ought to do during his year
16 to have more importance attached to it; in other words, that
17 it is not an onerous thing but also must be regarded by
18 most of these members as not very important either if they
19 don't have to do anything?

20 I am just wondering whether there would be any
21 value to having them do some things during that period of
22 time so they at least know they are members.

23 DR. KORB: Up to now we have been in a strange
24 situation. The law allows us to call IRR people back for
25 refresher training, but the Congress in a report about five

1 years ago when the Service went and called, we got a lot of
2 letters from people who didn't know they were in the IRR
3 and they told us don't do it anymore.

4 Except for volunteer, they have taken that
5 prohibition away this year and we are now allowed to do it.
6 I think that is the key point. We just don't want bodies.
7 We want people who know what they are doing. That is really
8 the thing, and so it is not just a question of growing. It
9 is to make sure it can do what you want it to do.

10 MR. MEESE: That is really I guess the question
11 I am raising, whether there shouldn't be at least something
12 a couple of times a year, send them a copy of Soldiers
13 Magazine or something, let them know that they still belong.

14 DIRECTOR TURNAGE: First of all, you have got a
15 skill problem. After so long these people have to have
16 some kind of training or they lose it.

17 The second thing is that based on the experience
18 before, in all candor, the program was administrated very
19 poorly and at one time we called them in every three years for
20 two weeks in the summer and you got them without uniforms
21 or one that didn't fit or they are overweight or misplaced
22 as far as skill was concerned, and it was not in good shape
23 as it is now.

24 We have got fewer numbers, but I think that they
25 guy that is joining it knows what he is doing and has greater

1 potential, but I don't think you are going to get that for
2 the dollars you are speaking of here.

3 MR. MEESE: That is what I am wondering, whether
4 it wouldn't be a worthwhile investment to spend more.

5 MR. McCOY: It might be worth more to have them
6 show up once a year like almost a welfare requirement where
7 people have to do it twice a year, show to get Medicaid, to
8 get recertified.

9 SECRETARY LEHMAN: What would be your guess as
10 to the estimation of people who actually are aware of the
11 implications of what their IRR membership is?

12 SECRETARY MARSH: I think most of them know that
13 they are probably in it because they get correspondence. Is
14 that right?

15 MR. GREENBERG: Yes.

16 SECRETARY MARSH: Annually they get some
17 correspondence, but they are probably not aware of how long
18 they are going to be in there. They probably don't know
19 when they get out.

20 MR. GREENBERG: In fact, the Navy is doing a very
21 effective job in communicating its IRR, and that is helping
22 them keep the address lists current because they can tell, the
23 mail that comes back, and they can find out who they are
24 losing and try to attract more people.

25 SECRETARY LEHMAN: One of the things we have found

1 is that in itself loses people--gee, am I still in this?

2 Let me out!

3 MR. MEESE: But on the other hand, if you expect
4 those folks to come at a time of emergency, you don't want
5 to trap them unwarily because then you are going to get the
6 letters to Congressmen, the failures to report, and you
7 really can't do it that way.

8 DR. KORB: I think that is a key point. We are
9 not just looking for bodies. We are going to need these
10 people, and remember the shortages here because if you bring
11 in new people, no matter how you get them, you can't send them
12 into battle right away, and you are going to have to get
13 people you want, make sure they have the skills that you
14 need.

15 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: Other discussion on these
16 three options? Any of them, or all three of them?

17 SECRETARY MARSH: Some could be combined.

18 MR. MEESE: You could combine all this.

19 DR. KORB: We need all three to close the gap.

20 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: And you don't get the numbers
21 any too soon even at that. Two of them, one and three,
22 require legislation. Two could be done administratively.

23 MR. ANDERSON: Are the numbers additive?

24 DR. KORB: Not quite, because you have got a
25 certain amount of--

1 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: You are going over 200,000
2 in '89, and somewhere in that range is what you would get.

3 DR. KORB: It is not a big, significant thing.

4 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: Well, let's put that then
5 temporarily aside and go on with the rest of it.

6 DR. KORB: Let's move on to the question of
7 registration. I won't go over the report. We have circulated
8 it and we have provided it, basically the options were boiled
9 down to four--to continue the registrations as we have it
10 now, to move toward a post-mobilization registration after,
11 depending on how much warning you have. It would depend on
12 how much time you have to do it; and accelerated post-
13 mobilization registration or pre-mobilization registration
14 where if in fact the President decided that the relations
15 were deteriorating, he could order registration, so you
16 basically have a continuum where you are now to after
17 mobilization to accelerated post-mobilization and pre-
18 mobilization.

19 Here are the factors that this group and the
20 President must evaluate as you make your decision. First
21 of all, we have the impact on the Department of Defense, how
22 quickly will we get the people? The Army's training base,
23 how quickly can we train them? Do we want to leave the
24 training base with less than optimum utilization when we are
25 going to need the people. The wartime volunteer assumptions,

1 which you may remember from our last discussion, vary from
2 something like 16,000 to 200,000 in the event of a national
3 emergency, the impact on manpower availability until M plus
4 100 which would be very slight, and that is why we need the
5 Selected Reserve and individual ready reserve, and after M
6 plus a hundred when you begin to get the conscripts eligible
7 to go into battle, and of course, the risk of delay, that
8 if you don't have registration in-tact and you have an
9 emergency, you have a bolt out of the blue attack and your
10 system doesn't work like you think it would because you have
11 never been able to test it under those conditions, what
12 risks are you taking, so that is the first group of factors
13 you want to consider.

14 SECRETARY WEIDENBAUM: Are you going to be using
15 the same set of numbers that you used at the preceding meeting?
16 The reason I ask was you know a few of us asked some questions
17 about them and you were kind enough to provide some answers.

18 DR. KORB: That's right.

19 SECRETARY WEIDENBAUM: Are those answers going to
20 be, have they been cranked into the analysis or is that the
21 original numbers?

22 DR. KORB: You mean in terms of how long will it
23 take? Okay. We tried the best that we could to say how it
24 varies, and we have one that says it would be about 58 days
25 to a minimum of around 30 to 36 days, and we can't be sure.

1 The analysts disagree on exactly how much time would be
2 required, and basically we can tell you the assumptions on
3 which those are based.

4 I don't know if you were at the last meeting.
5 Marty passed out some things we put in, and Ed corresponded
6 with the Postmaster General.

7 SECRETARY WEIDENBAUM: I have in mind specifically,
8 Larry, a discussion about using the Vietnam base for the
9 volunteers.

10 DR. KORB: That is a different question now. I
11 thought you were talking about the delivery times. Okay.

12 SECRETARY WEIDENBAUM: The application makes it
13 quite clear the results were very sensitive to which of those
14 years you used and you all used, well, representation,
15 representativeness I question.

16 MR. KORB: What we did was basically to provide
17 you with a range of the thing from a low to the high, and
18 there is a risk. We just don't know. It would depend upon
19 the nature of the attack, all kinds of assumptions that you
20 have to make.

21 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: I think what we have to do
22 here is put in a range all the way through. There is not
23 agreement that it takes, that registration saves us 52 days.
24 Some people think it would. Some people think it is 36 or
25 something. I think we would have to put it in that there is

1 general agreement that registration if continued would save
2 between 36 and 52 days or something like that. People who
3 feel 52 think so and so the people who pick 36 think so,
4 and at least it is within this range.

5 We are all agreed on volunteer assumptions. You
6 have got a lot of different things here. If there were a
7 Pearl Harbor situation, you would probably get a lot more
8 than if there was a situation in which we were suddenly
9 advised it was necessary to invade Nicaragua, so you are
10 again going to have to pick up some kind of differences, and
11 the best assumptions that we can get even though they
12 involved a range, I think that is what we ought to give the
13 President.

14 Does anybody have any question?

15 DIRECTOR TURNAGE: There is another factor that
16 perhaps should have been included in the response to you,
17 Murray, when we sent that information.

18 There is a direct correlation between the level of
19 volunteers and the level of the draft that is going on at
20 the time. For example, during those same years when the
21 draftees were going to a higher level, from '65 they went,
22 we had 103,000 drafted. You had 98,000 who joined, and in
23 '66 you had 343,000 drafted, and it jumped to 166,000 volun-
24 teers, so that correlation is very clear, and there is the
25 rest of it if you would like to see it.

1 MR. MEESE: Is that for volunteers for active
2 duty?

3 DIRECTOR TURNAGE: That is for war^{time} for active duty.

4 MR. MEESE: These are guys who volunteered for
5 the Navy and Air Force that wouldn't go in the Army.

6 DIRECTOR TURNAGE: That is what it amounts to.

7 MR. ANDERSON: It is not a question that you are
8 going to use past experience of any kind relative to
9 projecting into the future. It might be more relevant to look
10 at the experience of World War II and the Korean War. The
11 Vietnam War was a very special, very unpopular kind of war.

12 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: Yes. There is no question.
13 You can't rely only on what happened during that time, but
14 even given those facts, that degree of wartime volunteers
15 is pretty impressive because it was a very unpopular war,
16 and the draft was very unpopular, too.

17 Now Ed suggests that maybe the volunteers were
18 entirely to give the person volunteering a higher degree of
19 choice. Maybe that was part of it. I don't really know, but
20 I can't understand why anybody would prefer anything to the
21 Army myself!

22 MR. MEESE: I agree with you, but there is also
23 115,000 misguided souls!

24 DIRECTOR TURNAGE: It is a very sensitive thing.
25 If you look back at the time President Carter opened up

1 registration again and started in July of '80, you had an
2 increase in volunteers in the active service just because
3 of registration, not because of the draft.

4 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: There is a correlation I
5 think without any question, and there is also a factor of
6 what are the alternatives to volunteering, and so all of
7 those are things we have to again try to get ranges and
8 things that affect the assumptions before the President.
9 All right.

10 DR. KORB: So you have to sort of look at the
11 national security aspect of it, and you have also got to
12 take a look as we tried in the paper to talk about the
13 domestic impact of the acceptance on the part of the general
14 population, and we included the Harris poll. Marty passed
15 out another poll at the last meeting. The questions of
16 equity to do it in peacetime, you can be more sure you have
17 got most of the people whereas you can do this in a hurried
18 manner, you might not get all of the people.

19 The question of compliance, if you have registration,
20 what do you do with the 10 percent who don't register, and
21 of course, the reactions of Congress. As we have pointed
22 out in the paper, a lot of people in Congress who support a
23 strong national defense also are in favor of conscription.
24 We have included letters from them. There is another group
25 of letters from people who have also written to the President

1 saying they want him to discontinue it. Most of those would
2 not be classified as strong supporters, but you have got kind
3 of a couple of different factions in Congress, and then
4 finally, of course, you have the international reaction, what
5 kind of signal would it send to the Soviet Union? What kind
6 of signal would it send to our allies?

7 Those are the factors that we feel that the group
8 ought to consider as it deliberates and makes its recom-
9 mendation to the President.

10 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: We have had a draft report
11 that has been circulated, and there have been some comments
12 on that, and some things received that are being ground into
13 the second draft, and what I think would be most profitable
14 to do now would be perhaps since this is I guess the major
15 question is to consider the form in which this should go to
16 the President, and there are a number of different ways.
17 There are a number of different options.

18 There are four options on what we could do. You
19 don't have any other slides?

20 DR. KORB: No, I do not.

21 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: Does anybody else have any
22 slides they want to show? If not, there are four options
23 generally, and I think those four options summarize pretty
24 clearly what the different possibilities are now, and one of
25 the ways we could send it to the President would be to list

1 briefly the background and the factors that are involved in
2 each of these, and the arguments that are made by those
3 who feel that Option A should be the one recommendation and
4 B, C and D.

5 We could then stop there. We could also present
6 to the President the raw vote so to speak among the members
7 of the commission. We could have individual reports to the
8 President, or we could list the people who have voted for,
9 people who voted against various options.

10 The thing that we ought to think about I think is
11 what would be most helpful to him, and in the final analysis,
12 of course, it is completely a Presidential decision, so that
13 I think is the way, some of the things we want to think about
14 now.

15 We do have a desire to summarize and set forth
16 the various options and the arguments and the points to be
17 made as conveniently as, as briefly and as usefully as possible
18 for the President, and we also have in this report some
19 various Congressional letters indicating the potential
20 Congressional reaction. I don't know how we document what
21 the allied or the enemy reaction might be, but I suppose we
22 could make some kind of estimates on that. It may be that
23 CIA in a declassified way could help us with some of those.
24 I don't really know, but one way or another these would be
25 things we want to think about getting into the report, and

1 the form of the report itself. We would be open to dis-
2 cussion now.

3 MR. NANCE: I would sure recommend we put this
4 in one report, not a group, and give him options.

5 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: That is physically much
6 easier for him.

7 MR. SCHNEIDER: I think the model of the way we
8 present decision papers in the NSC environment, suggesting
9 a single report with a limited number of well-explained
10 options, is probably the best way for the President to come
11 to grips with the problem with the least demand on his time.

12 SECRETARY LEHMAN: I think the idea of listing the ✓
13 votes is a good idea, too, or just say the Army favors this.

14 SECRETARY MARSH: It is frequently that way and
15 those papers would probably go in that way anyway, wouldn't it?

16 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: Anybody have any comments
17 or different views?

18 GENERAL JONES: I agree with that. I would like ✓
19 to cast five votes!

20 SECRETARY MARSH: In that regard, Mr. Chairman, I
21 think that General Meyers spoke to me last week and
22 indicated that if possible he for one on behalf, as a member
23 of the Joint Chiefs, would like to express a view or have
24 an opportunity to express it to you or to the commission,
25 and maybe some of the other members of the Joint Chiefs.

1 GENERAL JONES: We would like to request before
2 a decision is made that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have an
3 opportunity to let's say write the President with our strong
4 views on why it should be retained.

5 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: Should that be part of the
6 report?

7 MR. MEESE: How about include that as an appendix
8 of the report, a verbatim copy of your letter?

9 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: In the interest of getting
10 one document to the President, that might be the best way to
11 handle it, but surely the views of the Joint Chiefs are of
12 great importance to be before the President.

13 GENERAL JONES: We will write a letter to you asking
14 it be forwarded to the President. It is up to you to figure
15 out how to do it. You can put it in the report or whatever.

16 MR. MEESE: Does everybody agree the Joint Chiefs
17 of Staff be unanimous in their views?

18 GENERAL JONES: Yes, sir.

19 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: So there will be a Joint
20 Chief viewpoint then, and it will be expressed by General
21 Jones and make the comment that they are free to vote five
22 times! That report would be an appendix or be incorporated
23 in the body or one way or another, the views of the Joint
24 Chiefs as such would be before the President.

25 MR. MEESE: Could I ask, is there anybody--I have

1 tried to find it in the report, but I am not sure I have--
2 is there anything that talks about the cost of the peacetime
3 registration? What was the annual cost?

4 DR. KORB: Four million dollars for registration,
5 and if you discontinue it because of the law, you would lose
6 another \$4 million because Selective Service would be
7 limited to a million dollars a month, so you basically, if
8 you went into it, you would save \$8 million unless, of course,
9 you went back to change the law and said we would want
10 Selective Service to continue with the local Board.

11 MR. MEESE: What does Selective Service cost now
12 total?

13 DIRECTOR TURNAGE: This year we asked for \$20
14 million to do the job we have to do. However, there are a
15 couple of things that still haven't been done, Ed, that have
16 to be done and starting in '83 if we are going to have a
17 viable program. However, we are the cheapest thing in town.

18 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: Least expensive is the
19 proper way to put it.

20 MR. MEESE: I guess the real question that we
21 need to, one that we need to address is the whole issue of
22 prosecution and enforcement or I should put it the other way,
23 enforcement and prosecution.

24 DIRECTOR TURNAGE: May I please make a couple of
25 comments with regard to that?

1 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: Yes, sir.

2 DIRECTOR TURNAGE: Registration has never been an
3 issue. Never. As a matter of fact, it has been so
4 successful it is embarrassing. It leads you to believe the
5 figures we get from the Census are poor because year after
6 year we go over 100 percent of registration, and what I have
7 here, I just happen to have a report of that over the last
8 few years.

9 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: It so happens I brought my
10 organ with me!

11 DIRECTOR TURNAGE: And if you will note from 50 on
12 through for which we have reflective records here, that gives
13 us the percent of compliance.

14 What happened, however, if you will recall, in
15 July, what happened is that you know this is based on
16 estimates only from the Census figures that are available to
17 us, and then we follow through from that.

18 MR. MEESE: What is our current situation?

19 DIRECTOR TURNAGE: The current situation is that
20 in July of 1980 when we had the first two cohorts, that is,
21 the '60 and '61 people, born in '60 and '61 registered, we
22 ended up with two figures over 90 percent. The figure that
23 we are doing now for the next figure that we had when they
24 were registered in January of 1981 ran around 87 percent,
25 and where we are right now for the current cohort which is

1 the first time that we have had the continuous registration
2 since '73 and '74, we are running about 77 percent.

3 However, if you look at that figure alone, that
4 tells one story, but come 31 December, the number of
5 eligibles for that stops, but the number who continue to,
6 historically who have been late continue to register,
7 indicates that we are on the same track that the data shows
8 for '73 and '74, and will go something over 90 percent, so
9 while they are slow, recall that we have been at a period
10 where there has been no real enticement, no real program to
11 cause them to be concerned about it, and I have no concern
12 that if the President were to announce this is in the
13 national interest to do this, I think we would have con-
14 siderable trouble trying to comply.

15 MR. MEESE: Are these numbers perhaps 1980,
16 '81, '82, '83 on the second page--

17 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: That is year of birth.

18 MR. MEESE: Oh, year of birth; I see.

19 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: What is the figure that
20 is being battered around in the various columns about 800,000
21 people?

22 DIRECTOR TURNAGE: What happened, sir, is that
23 based on the four cohorts that we had registered up at this
24 time, that the cumulative figure or estimate of those who
25 have failed to register, we have about six and a half million

1 in the computer bank. We have got about 800,000 who haven't
2 registered according to our best guess.

3 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: Percentage?

4 DIRECTOR TURNAGE: Overall, 90 percent.

5 MR. PUSCHECK: Pretty much a figure that you
6 just mentioned, over 90 percent in the first two, 87 and
7 about 77 now; for cumulative I would say 88 to 90 percent.

8 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: But the 800,000 is--

9 MR. PUSCHECK: Two million each, that would be
10 8 million; 10 percent of that is 800,000.

11 MR. MEASE: So we do have some cases where
12 neighbors have turned these kids in, say they didn't like them.
13 How many cases do we have pending for investigation and
14 prosecution now?

15 DIRECTOR TURNAGE: The initial group was about 134
16 names. The second group that was sent in was something like
17 70 names.

18 MR. MEESE: What has been the experience with those
19 when they get their notice to show up in the district court?
20 Do they register then?

21 MR. PUSCHECK: I don't think it is that far along.

22 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: There may well be--let me
23 put it this way. Is there any pattern to the ones to whom
24 notices have been sent because if you are sending notices
25 to people who have announced probably to the neighbors they

1 aren't going to register and the neighbors turn them in,
2 you are dealing with a somewhat specialized group of the
3 population who would probably be much more resistant than
4 people who just forget all about it, so I think we would
5 need to know a little bit more about this, these 130 or
6 whatever, why were they chosen for prosecution?

7 DIRECTOR TURNAGE: Simply because they were turned
8 in and we couldn't ignore the fact that they were violating
9 the law.

10 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: It is pretty hard for a
11 neighbor to follow a chap around all day for a year and know
12 whether he has or hasn't.

13 DIRECTOR TURNAGE: As a matter of fact, there were
14 more than 134 initially turned in, but after the list was
15 scrubbed, they found out a lot of those had in fact
16 registered or when they got the first notice they did register
17 or were aliens that didn't require to register--variability
18 in the system.

19 MR. PUSCHECK: We contacted those people when the
20 names were provided. They were contacted.

21 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: There hasn't been anything
22 like a dragnet sent out or anything I take it?

23 MR. MEESE: Who is the rat fink back here?

24 MR. ANDERSON: If you go back to the '70's, you
25 had a situation where you had a draft and registration. As

1 I understood them, the majority of cases, the biggest
2 problem was prosecuting people who were trying to dodge the
3 draft per se.

4 DIRECTOR TURNAGE: That is correct; 13 percent we
5 figure were prosecuted because of failure to register. The
6 balance were because of failure to be drafted.

7 MR. ANDERSON: What you are really talking about,
8 while there are 800,000, I am not sure that the vast majority
9 if they were asked to show up wouldn't just come and sign the
10 register.

11 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: That is the assumption.

12 MR. ANDERSON: You are talking about substantial
13 numbers of people who have to be somehow taken care of in
14 the system. I think the real question is what kind of cost
15 will that impose on the Justice Department? I don't think
16 there is anything in the budget now.

17 MR. McCOY: I wonder about the possibility of using
18 some sort of negative kind of incentives in that if you
19 don't go down and register for the draft and have a draft
20 card you have problems doing such things as getting un-
21 employment compensation, Social Security card, being able to
22 vote.

23 In other words, you don't really have to go after
24 them with the Justice Department. You don't have to go after
25 them. They are prevented from certain other privileges.

1 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: You are into some pretty
2 substantial statutory changes if you do that. Eight percent,
3 7, 8 percent is a pretty small figure. What it is trans-
4 lated into, 800,000 people, is a very large figure, and the
5 worst factor, of course, is that if there is a general
6 perception that nothing happens to you if you don't register,
7 why you are going to have a lot more than 8 percent pretty
8 soon I suspect.

9 DR, KORB: One factor, probably a lot of young
10 people think the President already cancelled it.

11 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: There is no way of estimating
12 what a simple statement from General Turnage with wide
13 publication from the President perhaps or from any one of
14 a number of other possibilities, what that would do. It
15 would probably reduce a big chunk of the 800,000, particularly
16 when the lack of major obligation is made known.

17 I am sure there are a lot of people that confuse
18 registration with the imminent obligation of reporting to
19 the Army and taking the terrible oath and going to work,
20 and that would have to be disabused, so we are in a very
21 problematical area. There is no question about that, and
22 I guess there has never been, well, never, but since the
23 1980 revival of it there hasn't been any kind of enforcement
24 activity to speak of.

25 DIRECTOR TURNAGE: That is correct, sir. That is

1 part of the difficulty.

2 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: Beyond enforcement, there
3 hasn't been all that much publication.

4 DIRECTOR TURNAGE: And there was a cloud which was
5 placed over it because of the Supreme Court action relating
6 to it. Other people thought we don't have to do it because
7 they are going to declare it unconstitutional, that sort of
8 thing.

9 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: That is now clear.

10 DIRECTOR TURNAGE: All the factors have opted
11 against it. I am convinced it will go the other way with
12 the proper support.

13 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: We are back on the question
14 of how do we present what to the President, and I guess what
15 we would want to try to do would be to summarize this data
16 in suitable form and perfectly fair form after listing the
17 options, and I take it nobody has thought of any more than
18 these four options, have they?

19 SECRETARY LEHMAN: What is Option C? What does
20 that involve?

21 DIRECTOR TURNAGE: I have to tell you that I am
22 not happy with those two options either.

23 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: All right. Let's nail the
24 options down before we do anything else.

25 DIRECTOR TURNAGE: What happened in the determination

1 of this paper as I understand it, the original paper, is
2 that we had the option of first going with what we do now,
3 or secondly, having the post-mobilization the rest of the
4 time given by Selective Service, what would be required in
5 order to conduct a reasonable, conservative, successful
6 conscription, and they came up with 58 days, and the guy who
7 came up with it is sitting here, Dr. Puscheck, and my
8 guidance to him was based on your experience that you had
9 in the System during the ^{period} ~~war~~ between when President Carter
10 made the decision, give us your best guess of what can be
11 done.

12 Later with the help of other people from OMB and
13 Dr. Anderson's office, and so forth, they came up with a
14 lesser figure. I am not sanguine about that figure, the 36
15 day thing, and quite frankly, if it reaches that point, I
16 would have to be a dissenter from that aspect because I
17 want to give the President what I know that I can do in some
18 logical way; so when they say an accelerated mobilization or
19 registration, I think from day one if I am given the word
20 to conduct a registration, it is going to be the fastest
21 thing you can do, the most accelerated you can do, and
22 there is some options that are built into their proposal
23 which are less than desirable from my point of view.

24 Obviously we want to take advantage of everything
25 that there is to expedite it so I think that there is probably

1 not any difference from my point of view and my concern of
2 the two, the accelerated versus the non-accelerated.

3 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: I take it obviously if
4 we got into a mobilization situation we would certainly want
5 you to do that.

6 I don't know. Is there anybody who would be for
7 post-mobilization, non-accelerated or post-mobilization
8 accelerated?

9 MR. ANDERSON: Can I comment on C? I have got
10 some problems with C, too. I think 36 is probably con-
11 siderably higher than it should be. I think the basic
12 question is not one of whether one, as a judgment based on
13 experience, is correct or not, but those two options differ
14 not on the basis of judgment, but on the basis of fact, and
15 I think that is why they are presented as different options.

16 In one, for example, pre-positioning of the
17 materials, that is the very point we brought up last time.
18 You could save a considerable amount of money by doing that
19 and it was generally agreed that is a viable option to the
20 Postmaster General. It seems to me that was simply not
21 incorporated, and that is one of the reasons why you have 58
22 days.

23 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: I thought 36 days was the
24 one that applied to the pre-positioning of materials?

25 MR. ANDERSON: Some pre-positioning, but not full.

1 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: What does that cost us?

2 MR. ANDERSON: You might pick up three or four
3 days.

4 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: In the way of dollars.

5 MR. ANDERSON: I am not sure. The options differ
6 not because of someone's judgment, but because they are
7 factually different.

8 SECRETARY LEHMAN: It is certainly a judgment on
9 the effectiveness of the Post Office to keep track of and
10 manage those pre-positioned assets. I think at least it
11 ought to be, the assumptions ought to be--

12 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: If they handle it the way the
13 Civil Defense people used to handle the pre-positioning of
14 water and biscuits, we would be in serious trouble.

15 MR. ANDERSON: The alternative is you trust them
16 with a one-shot distribution which may be worse.

17 DIRECTOR TURNAGE: May I?

18 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: Sure.

19 DIRECTOR TURNAGE: First of all, President Carter
20 called for registration on January the 23rd. Registration
21 occurred on July the 22nd. Six months went by. That is, ^{yes} one
22 day, and they were going full force to get that done.

23 Obviously there has been a lot of success in
24 establishing the system in that period of time. However,
25 we did notice a lot of other problems that occurred just

1 based on facts of life. Right now we deal with 35,000
2 Post Offices, and our error rate in answering eleven
3 questions on the form runs something like 15 percent.

4 Now on the accelerated form that they are discussing
5 here, it is to have these people go and register at a local
6 Post Office, then have all the registration cards sent to
7 250 centers where they would be sorted and then from there
8 they would go to IRS centers where they would be key punched,
9 and from there they would come to our location where they
10 would be finally processed for the notification, the tickets
11 and the rest of it.

12 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: What this is, what you are
13 describing is the accelerated?

14 DIRECTOR TURNAGE: The accelerated; now somewhere
15 between there and the system that we have where the
16 registration forms are sent from the Post Offices to our
17 location and go through the batching and the sorting and
18 the key punching and the processing and so forth, there have
19 got to be some days that can be saved. We subscribe to that,
20 so it seems to me based on what my predecessors said and
21 what my best operations guy said who was involved in it, knows
22 about it, there would be some kind of timeframe based on a
23 four to eight week period that would be required in order to
24 conduct a post-mobilization registration program.

25 Now if we are lucky and everything went well, we

1 think we could get it at four weeks, but we think that is
2 optimum.

3 On the other hand, if we are not lucky based on
4 some of the things they encountered when they did it before,
5 we are talking more like eight weeks, but I don't want to
6 put before you gentlemen or the President some Pollyanna
7 view about this problem because it is too vital.

8 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: What were some of the problems
9 in 1980 that took from January to July?

10 MR. MEESE: The Carter Administration!

11 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: I'm trying to discount that.

12 (A discussion was held off the record.)

13 MR. MEESE: I think that what is meant here by
14 C, accelerated post-mobilization register, means that the
15 registration itself can take place post-mobilization, but
16 the pre-positioning and so on could be taking place in
17 advance of mobilization so that you are saving whatever
18 period of what you are talking about for your running in
19 time which is what differentiates that from item B which
20 assumes that you don't start until--

21 DIRECTOR TURNAGE: To the extent the budget would
22 support that and any other action, Ed, we would be pleased
23 to take that action now.

24 MR. MEESE: It is something that a President could
25 order, in other words, if there was an imminent national

1 emergency, or in his mind there was an imminent national
2 emergency. Conceivably it is the kind of thing where the
3 stuff would go out to the Post Offices.

4 Let's take an example. Let's suppose that it
5 looked like the Russians were going to invade Poland here
6 and the President at this point says I think we ought to
7 go to Stage A for registration which means get all the stuff
8 out, now this does a couple of things. One is it gives you
9 some leadtime on registration.

10 The other thing is that it gives a signal. He
11 can use this for national security purposes. and he is
12 going to commence registration without commencing it as
13 Carter did in Afghanistan.

14 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: It is a very big signal.
15 There is no question about that.

16 MR. MEESE: What we are trying to suggest here is
17 that there are more options than just having registration or
18 not having registration.

19 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: Well, again, in pursuit of
20 the problem of what to present to the President, can we say
21 something to the effect either leaving it with these four
22 options as such and say post-mobilization registration which
23 would mean that we would, without pre-positioning materials
24 and what other else is involved in C, we would advise the
25 Selective Service System to be prepared to the extent they

1 could to implement post-mobilization registration, that
2 therefore we could say under that the concensus, if this is
3 true, feels that this would take roughly 50 days or
4 whatever to accomplish. If, however, we went to Option C
5 which would mean pre-positioning the materials, that would
6 require an appropriation of blank dollars. We believe that
7 number could be reduced to 30 days, 32 days.

8 If there is pre-mobilization registration which
9 is the possibility of registering before mobilization when
10 a President determines that there is some crisis, that would
11 still take roughly the length of time it took in B, but
12 since we have not by definition reached a mobilization
13 decision, we could be ready somewhat sooner, but we would be
14 sending a very powerful signal around leading to some
15 inattentive editors saying U. S. mobilizes, and otherwise
16 requiring a lot of various explanations and so forth and so
17 on, and I think all of those things are things that ought
18 to be before him.

19 Now we go back to the basic question. Do these
20 four options correctly state the available range of
21 decisionmaking for the President?

22 MR. MEESE: I would like to make one word change,
23 and that is in C, on the third line where it says, "post-
24 mobilization registrations through pre-positioning," ~~add the~~
25 ~~word "through pre-positioning prior to mobilization of~~

1 materials.

2 MR. ANDERSON: What page?

3 SECRETARY LEHMAN: It is on page 2.

4 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: I think that is what pre-
5 positioning means.

6 MR. MEESE: Pre-positioning means before you
7 start the registration.

8 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: In military parlance I
9 gather it means getting your guns in the warehouse much
10 closer to where you think the action is going to be before
11 there is action.

12 MR. MEESE: In other words, it puts it during the
13 period prior to the mobilization day.

14 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: We could certainly add that
15 because that is what we are talking about.

16 MR. MEESE: It distinguishes it from post-
17 mobilization.

18 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: Anybody have any other word
19 changes or options or less options?

20 MR. McCOY: One thing I was thinking might be of
21 some use, particularly as it relates to the other issues in
22 this that we are considering today, is perhaps along with
23 the options that might be available to the President on
24 mobilization decisions that he could make in the other areas,
25 that in effect we provide a package for presentation to the

1 Congress.

2 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: If he chooses A, for example,
3 you ought to have a proposed press release and a proposed
4 message to Congress?

5 MR. McCOY: Yes, sir, particularly as it relates
6 to the Selected Reserve buildup and the IRR. We are not
7 going to registration, but I am taking action to increase
8 the military service obligation, to do this, that, and the
9 other, so that he can take more of an, he can take some
10 of the sting out of not going forward.

11 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: If you are going to use B or
12 C you would suggest that the statement of those options
13 indicate some other actions he could take that would increase
14 the IRR, et cetera, et cetera?

15 MR. McCOY: Right.

16 MR. ANDERSON: Let me second that. If you are
17 talking about any kind of signals on the international scene,
18 I really think that taking active steps to bring in real men
19 who are going to be trained and combat ready is going to mean
20 more in terms of signals.

21 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: Well, I have a little
22 quarrel with that because of the perception correct or
23 otherwise with which these things are discussed abroad in
24 NATO meetings, and I have never yet started a discussion of
25 why they should be giving, individual countries should be

1 doing more without some tiresome staff pounding on the table
2 and saying but you do not draft people and we draft people.

3 MR. ANDERSON: I was talking about registering.

4 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: All right, but in the
5 European eyes it is all mixed up, and if we stop registration,
6 why then they are going to say you don't even register
7 people, and we are going to go all through that again. I
8 think the international is a very significant part of it,
9 frankly. That is more on the merits than the form. At the
10 moment we are talking form, so let me ask again if with the
11 change that was suggested of adding the various things that
12 could be done by the President in either B, C or I take it D,
13 or in any of the events--

14 MR. ANDERSON: Or in A also.

15 MR. McCOY: Toughened up, particularly if he doesn't
16 go--

17 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: Yes. Independent of this
18 decision, that it is his desire to do one, two, three, four
19 on the ready reserve and so on, I think that is a good point.
20 That still leaves us with four, with presumably some
21 supporting statement of a broad range of findings with
22 respect to saving time, somewhere between 30 to 52 days or
23 31 to 58 days or 29 to 58 days or whatever, something that
24 we could ultimately get agreement on, there is that kind of
25 range of different estimates.

1 SECRETARY MARSH: You know, I am not just sure
2 where this comes down, but I am pretty sure we have got to
3 think about it as if he were not to continue the registration
4 and were to assume the Congress would not rescind it--

5 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: Would not?

6 SECRETARY MARSH: Take away the basic authority for
7 him to do it, assuming they wouldn't do that, but nevertheless
8 when you sought to do either of the other three options, you
9 are going to have to have an appropriation for this.

10 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: Oh, indeed.

11 SECRETARY MARSH: If you look at the history of
12 the manner in which, how difficult it was to get registration
13 to begin with, you may not get that appropriation that
14 readily. It may not be that easy to do.

15 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: I think it certainly is fair
16 to say the Armed Services Committee, and I haven't
17 canvassed the House, but the Armed Services Committee is
18 very strongly for registration at the very least, and a
19 great many of them are talking about reviving the draft.

20 GENERAL JONES: At least for some of these other
21 options, they were the ones that put in restrictions on the
22 funding, and if you cancel registration, you now lose 4 million
23 for that, that you lose an additional \$4 million.

24 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: We had some problems with
25 people on the pay raise who wanted to keep the pay low so

1 you would force a draft which was extremely troublesome to me.

2 GENERAL JONES: The point is very valid. You will
3 have great difficulty in getting some of the options through
4 Congress.

5 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: That should be before the
6 President as to what Congressional action is needed and an
7 estimate of the chances or at least an estimate that many
8 people on the committee feel that there would be quite a bit
9 of difficulty in doing that.

10 MR. SCHNEIDER: Senator Hatfield is very negative
11 on anything to do with sustaining registration.

12 MR. MEESE: On the other hand, if registration is
13 to be stopped, he might be more willing to go for a stand-by
14 appropriation.

15 MR. SCHNEIDER: That is possible also.

16 MR. MEESE: If the alternative is to continue
17 registration.

18 SECRETARY MARSH: You would have to package it.

19 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: My understanding is any
20 military appropriation stand-by or otherwise is something he
21 would oppose.

22 MR. MEESE: Then the alternative is the President
23 put it to him I just have to continue peacetime registration,
24 and you are the man making it possible.

25 GENERAL JONES: Hatfield is not going to be a

1 problem.

2 GENERAL JONES: Even though he doesn't want
3 registration, if the Congress supports the registration, what
4 they have said is if we don't have registration we are not
5 going to give you the money to do some of the other things.

6 MR. MEESE: What other things?

7 GENERAL JONES: They say if you stopped registration
8 you not only can't spend the money for registration, 4 million,
9 you cannot spend an additional \$4 million for Selective
10 Service work.

11 DR. KORB: It goes back to a million dollars a
12 month.

13 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: I would suspect some of you
14 would have problems getting the pre-positioning appropriation
15 out. I don't know, but I think that ought to be before the
16 President that that is something that we would have to worry
17 about.

18 Well, any other? What we want to do now, and we
19 have got some drafts ready, and I don't think it will take
20 very long, what we want to do is draft a piece of paper. I
21 would guess if that is the will of the commission that does
22 list options with the emanations and decisions we have
23 suggested that attempts to summarize the arguments and the
24 background as succinctly as possible, that attempts to give
25 the President an idea of what happens if various options are

1 selected and indicate the support that each option has and
2 get it before him.*

3 MR. MEESE: I think there are two things needed
4 to be done. One of the things is the summary that precedes
5 the report here I think should go toward the end so that it
6 addresses--and should be somewhere in the body of the report.

7 Secondly, I think that the summary of the options
8 which is on the last page of the report just before the
9 appendix needs to be flushed out with two more columns so
10 you take each of the four options. This only has two.

11 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: Which is this? On which page?

12 MR. MEESE: It is an unnumbered page that follows
13 page--

14 DR. KORB: Page 6; it follows page 6.

15 MR. MEESE: You need to have four columns.

16 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: Oh, I see. Yes. All right.
17 Any other questions about that?

18 DR. KORB: Might I suggest that people send their
19 comments in to me and I will send them to you for final.
20 We have incorporated most of them.

21 MR. MEESE: Shouldn't they go to Mr. Turnage as
22 Executive Secretary of the commission?

23 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: Right, and he can get them
24 then to me and we can grind them into a final report which
25 would be sent on an "Eyes Only" basis to the members, and

1 if people were satisfied with it and with the expression of
2 their views, if they were satisfied their views had been
3 properly represented, they could initial it, and we could
4 bundle it off to the White House and I would ask only that
5 objections not be captious, some equal consideration argued
6 over at great length, and perhaps with considerable validity,
7 but let us object to, if we have to object at all, to things
8 that are really meritorious and that seriously interferes
9 with the President's getting a proper view of our general
10 viewpoint.

11 DIRECTOR TURNAGE: Sir, would you give me a clue
12 about when I should expect to receive these? I think time
13 is--

14 MR. MEESE: What is the date that the President's
15 order runs out?

16 DIRECTOR TURNAGE: It doesn't run out, sir.

17 MR. MEESE: I thought it had a--

18 DR. KORB: That is a budgetary decision.

19 MR. MEESE: I see.

20 DIRECTOR TURNAGE: Unless he takes action, it will
21 continue.

22 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: I guess ASAP is probably
23 our guide, as it usually is, and we would like to get
24 everything done here as quickly as we could.

25 MR. MEESE: How about close of business Thursday,

1 which is three days away?

2 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: Are we in a position to
3 circulate a draft that incorporates all the good ideas we
4 have had today by Thursday?

5 MR. WEIDENBAUM: Very short.

6 SECRETARY MARSH: You are just referring to the
7 Selective Service option, registration option and not to
8 the other matters?

9 MR. MEESE: Right. I am talking about the
10 Selective Service registration issue. In other words, if
11 we take this report that says, that is dated the 23rd of
12 November or which is really dated, the draft, 19 November I
13 guess, and use that as a guide to add in the comments that
14 have been made today plus whatever additional comments we
15 have, and if that is determined by the close of business on
16 Thursday, he could then give you a revised draft I would
17 assume that could go to you for your look.

18 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: I will not be able to
19 review it effectively until about the 14th of December
20 because I will be wandering around various NATO installations
21 and countries.

22 MR. MEESE: For budget purposes, are there any
23 critical dates here that we have ahead of us in the next 30
24 days?

25 MR. SCHNEIDER: The only critical one is when the

1 President wants to wrap it up.

2 MR. MEESE: If he should decide not to continue
3 peacetime registration, that just means you have got 8
4 million more dollars to squander.

5 MR. SCHNEIDER: We'll find a place for it.

6 DIRECTOR TURNAGE: I hate to hear you put it that
7 way.

8 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: Christmas Eve, perhaps?
9 Well, I think then if we could get copies of that report,
10 of the draft, I ask Larry and Tom to work together to get
11 the suggestions made today incorporated and to keep it as
12 succinct, as accurate and as complete and useful as possible
13 for the President, circulate that around, ~~we can then either~~
14 ~~by phone or otherwise get the actual vote recorded and~~
15 ~~bundle it all off to him, but I would appreciate it if it~~
16 ~~is understood that the date of bundling it off to the~~
17 ~~President is somewhere in the December 15th range.~~

18 MR. MEESE: After you get back?

19 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: Yes. Meanwhile, a lot of
20 preliminaries could be done.

21 MR. SCHNEIDER: May I address one issue that is
22 related to Mr. Stockman's--

23 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: His letter to me.

24 MR. SCHNEIDER: Basically we think this is a very
25 good forum for addressing some of these military manpower

1 issues, and the work that we have done to date represents the
2 key issues that we have had to address, but it may be time,
3 it may be in our interest to have this forum to review
4 other military manpower issues that arise.

5 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: We want to give the President
6 ultimately a more complete report than just on registration.
7 We have done quite a lot of work on other areas, and I
8 would suspect that after December 15th and we have transmitted
9 this and perhaps as part of that report we could advise him
10 that other things are coming, but coming quite quickly so
11 that we don't sort of prolong our life.

12 I think we want to address those issues, but I
13 think we wouldn't want to stay alive indefinitely simply
14 because those will always be major issues. I think we want
15 to give him the benefit of our thinking on compensation and
16 certainly I would like personally to include some things
17 about educational benefits and some comments at the same
18 level as it has now been achieved, some gaps, some problems
19 with the general pay lid that is causing us some pain and
20 suffering among senior officers, and educational benefits,
21 but I don't see any reason why that need be prolonged.

22 MR. SCHNEIDER: I don't have necessarily in mind
23 a permanent body for this purpose, but there are other issues
24 that owing to the pressure of time we haven't been able to
25 address at this juncture.

1 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: I think after the December
2 15th report if we are using that as a convenient date, after
3 that is transmitted to the President, I think then we ought
4 to address with considerable diligence what issues are felt
5 to be left, one of which could certainly be compensation, and
6 wind up our work on that somewhere in mid-January perhaps.

7 MR. SCHNEIDER: That would be fine.

8 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: All right.

9 DR. KORB: We have in our book a copy of the
10 interim report. Do you still want to have the interim
11 report to the President with what we have done up to now?

12 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: In addition to the--

13 DR. KORB: This will not go with it.

14 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: Yes. I think that we could
15 certainly consider whether we would want to send that to him,
16 but also perhaps revise that to indicate some of the things
17 we still have left to do and that we hope to wind that up
18 well, for safety sake, before the end of January.

19 SECRETARY LEHMAN: That would mean you are going
20 to send the interim report December 15th along with the
21 draft on registration?

22 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: We could send him a summary of
23 it, yes.

24 SECRETARY LEHMAN: Because it seems to me it is--I
25 couldn't sign that report the way the draft is.

1 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: The interim report, apart
2 from the registration?

3 MR. LEHMAN: Apart from the registration.

4 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: I didn't think the interim
5 report reached conclusions.

6 SECRETARY LEHMAN: It does. The whole thing is a
7 conclusion--everything is great.

8 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: Well, the all-volunteer
9 Armed Forces are, as the President has said publicly,
10 extremely gratifying.

11 SECRETARY LEHMAN: That's right, but the draft
12 report says that we are all confident that we will for the
13 next ten years meet all of our, we can attract and retain
14 enough of the right kind of people to man the Armed Forces
15 in the next decade without resorting to conscription.

16 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: Parentheses, Secretary
17 Lehman lacks this confidence.

18 SECRETARY LEHMAN: Right.

19 MR. ANDERSON: Always has!

20 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: Let us try, and in the
21 interim portion of the report let's see if we cannot perhaps
22 reach ^{As of R}irreversible decisions since there will be a subsequent
23 final report to the President that would not deal with the
24 registration but would deal with all other matters.

25 DR. KORB: We plan to send that report when it is

1 finalized through the working group for Congress before it
2 goes up.

3 SECRETARY MARSH: I think John's point, I concur
4 in it. If we limit the issue immediately to the Selective
5 Service registration rather than encumber it with an interim
6 report it might be easier to get a decision.

7 SECRETARY LEHMAN: This interim report says that
8 we have looked at all of the issues of the all-volunteer
9 force for the next ten years, funding profiles for the next
10 five years, and we haven't. The working group hasn't done it.
11 At least the working group ought to, and they haven't begun
12 to delve into these issues.

13 How can we send an interim report saying we have?

14 DR. KORB: We don't intend to.

15 SECRETARY LEHMAN: Okay.

16 MR. MEESE: Isn't it correct, Mr. Chairman, what
17 we plan to do is send him on or about the 15th of December
18 the report on Selective Service registration only? Then
19 at our next meeting we should among ourselves discuss what
20 additional topics need to be addressed?

21 CHAIRMAN WEINBERGER: And a timeframe for doing
22 that that would enable us to finish our work by the end of
23 January and so much work has been done on this. Now we may
24 very well need to get some additional views into the various
25 problems involved and require recruiting for the next four,

1 five, six, seven years, whatever, and possibly an estimate of
2 what that costs, but that also would be before him at that
3 time.

4 I don't think we have to do that by December 15th.
5 I think we probably do have to do it, and if there is
6 dissent, so be it, but I don't think we can spend the time
7 necessary to get 100 percent agreement and anybody is
8 perfectly free to file a dissent as I am sure this registration
9 report will have different views. We can call them dissents
10 or majority or minority or separate views or concurring
11 views or whatever anybody wants to call them, but the
12 President ought to know the feeling of the commission, and
13 initially he more or less has to know it on the issue of
14 registration as soon as possible. All right?

15 So we would not, I take it if we can resolve the
16 report by mail so to speak and phone and get all of that
17 lined up, we would not need another meeting before December
18 15th. .

19 We should with any luck have the form of the
20 report ready by maybe ten days, December 10th, and then I
21 would be the only one holding it up while I am working my
22 way back from NATO and even try to get an advanced copy and
23 look at it on the plane, and then we could after that decide
24 when our January meeting should be to look at what is left.

25 All right? That's it. Thank you.
(Whereupon, at 5:37 p.m., the meeting was adjourned.)

1
2 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
3

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
5 CASE TITLE: Military Manpower Task Force

6 HEARING DATE: -November 30, 1981

7 LOCATION: Washington, D. C.
8

9 I hereby certify that the proceedings and evidence
10 herein are contained fully and accurately on the tapes and
11 notes reported by me at the hearing in the above case before
12 Department of Defense
13 and that this is a true and correct transcript of the same.
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