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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name AFRICAN AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE, NSC: RECORDS

Withdrawer

LM 12/12/2023

File Folder TANZANIA - WORKING FILE 04/18/1980-08/06/1980

FOIA

F24-005

Box Number 11

PALLOTTI

1

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
254711	CABLE	030044Z APR 80	2	4/3/1980	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

food

Thank:

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 18, 1980

file
Tanzania

Dear Mr. President:

I am very sorry that Tanzania is among the growing number of nations facing food shortages. Your country's need -- a dramatic reversal of the situation last fall -- is all the more disturbing because food shortages are spreading throughout the world.


The United States is endeavoring to respond to the most pressing needs for food aid, but these exceptional requests have come at a time when the United States' food aid budget is virtually exhausted. Your need is greater than we alone can meet. We are encouraging other governments to do all they can. We are not discouraging any country from making food assistance available to Tanzania or other countries that need it.

Within the severe constraints of our depleted budget, I have directed that a special allocation of \$2.5 million be made available to Tanzania to purchase about 25,000 tons of U.S. corn on concessional loan terms.

By May 1 of this year, we will have completed action on two scheduled food aid programs and shipped over 26,000 metric tons of rice to Tanzania. One program of \$5 million was arranged with you when Andy Young was in Dar es Salaam last fall; the other is in payment for the corn your government provided to Zambia. I have asked Ambassador Viets to discuss with you each of the specific points raised in your letter concerning U.S. food commitments.

Americans are deeply disturbed by the threat of hunger in Tanzania, and I hope our offer of assistance together with food received from other countries will avoid human suffering.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Jimmy Carter". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of the word "Sincerely,".

His Excellency
Julius Nyerere
President of the
United Republic of Tanzania
Dar es Salaam

S/S# 8006691 ^{2340 3}
XR8006805
Date April 18, 1980

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXDIS ATTACHMENT

FOR: Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
National Security Council
The White House

REFERENCE:

TO: The President FROM: President Nyerere
DATE: March 28, 1980 SUBJECT: Food Aid to Tanzania

WHITE HOUSE REFERRAL DATED: _____ NSC# _____
(if any)

THE ATTACHED ITEM WAS SENT DIRECTLY
X TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION TAKEN:

- _____ A draft reply is attached.
- _____ A draft reply will be forwarded.
- _____ A translation is attached.
- _____ An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
- _____ We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below.
- X _____ Other.

REMARKS:

Attached is the original letter from President Nyerere to President Carter dated March 28, 1980.

State's draft reply was sent to the White House on April 11, 1980 SS #8006805.

Michael H. Patten
Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
BY LM NARA, DATE 12/2/83

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GDS 4/18/86
(CLASSIFICATION)

28th March, 1980

President Jimmy Carter,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.,
U.S.A.

Dear Mr. President,

In my discussions or correspondence with you I have usually sought your assistance in Africa's efforts to achieve freedom and independence for the Peoples of Southern Africa. This letter is about Tanzania, and I find it slightly painful. I will try to keep it brief.

We need food. Some weeks back I was led to believe that your Government would give us food according to the following schedule.

- (i) 15,000 tons of rice, promised in 1979 after discussions with Mr. Andrew Young, would be delivered by the end of May 1980.
- (ii) 20,000 tons of sorghum grits would be delivered in August/September this year.
- (iii) 32,000 tons of wheat would be delivered in August/September 1980; we had requested 100,000 tons, but until then had not been given any firm promises of wheat.
- (iv) 25,000 tons of maize (out of 50,000 tons promised for our strategic reserve in 1978 and not delivered then because of our inadequate storage facilities at that time) would be delivered in August/September 1980.
- (v) 25,000 tons of maize (the remainder of that promise) would be delivered in October 1980.

This schedule of deliveries was given to us at about the same time in both Dar es Salaam and Washington.

5

It was on the basis of this information that we have been making plans and discussing our food needs with other friendly countries. On my return from Europe - where, among other things, I was trying to obtain some food, - I was informed that new instructions had come from Washington. Now only the rice would be delivered as promised; the sorghum and wheat will not be sent at all! Half the maize will be delivered in October this year, and the other half possibly some time after April next year although this cannot at present be confirmed.

That is one thing. Further, we have received some rice from Japan and were asking for more. I am now told that your Government has informed the Japanese that Tanzania is eligible for American Food Aid under P.L. 480, was getting it, and that any further supplies to us would disturb American markets! And I am told that the Japanese Government is now hesitating to make any more rice available to us.

Mr. President; I find it difficult to believe these developments, and if they are true I fail to understand them. I am not asking for Arms; I am asking for food. You have food, and we need some. Food is a simple Human Right. It is for this reason that I have decided to overcome my reluctance and write to you personally.

With this letter I send you my good wishes and best regards.

Yours sincerely,

Julius K. Nyerere .

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
April 18, 1980

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Your Response to President Nyerere's Request for Additional Grain (C)

At Tab A is a proposed letter to President Nyerere informing him of the United States' offer to supply Tanzania with \$2.5 million (25,000 tons') worth of corn on concessional loan terms. At Tab B is Nyerere's letter to you describing Tanzania's impending food shortage and his concern about our not fulfilling the requirements of our food agreements with Tanzania. (C)

Although the crisis appears to be partly of their own making, the Tanzanians' need for food is serious. The "agreements" to which Nyerere refers in his letter were in fact "understandings with qualifications." Based on information given to our Embassy that there was a surplus of grain late last year, we used up part of Tanzania's allocated share of the emergency grain reserve for more desperate cases. State drafted the letter, OMB and speechwriters concur. (C)

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to President Nyerere at Tab A. (U)

Approve Disapprove **SIGNED**

Retype 1st page
J done 4/19/80

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC/DOS WAINERS
BY HM NARA DATE 12/10/23

326

*****CONFIDENTIAL***** COPY

OP IMMED
STU251
DE RUTAAM #1839 0911200
O 311155Z MAR 80
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5917

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ L DAR ES SALAAM 1839

EXDIS
E.O. 12065: GDS 3/31/86 (VIETS; RICHARD N.) OR-M
TAGS: EAID, EAGR, TZ
SUBJECT: FOOD AID: LETTER TO PRESIDENT CARTER FROM PRESIDENT
NYERERE

1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER TO PRESIDENT CARTER FROM NYERERE DATED 28 MARCH PROVIDED AMBASSADOR THIS MORNING BY JOAN WICKEN. DURING AMBASSADOR'S LAST CONVERSATION WITH NYERERE ON MARCH 18, LATTER INDICATED HE INTENDED SEND SUCH A MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT. WE ASSUME IT HAS BEEN DELAYED DUE TO NYERERE'S ABSENCE FROM DAR ES SALAAM.

3. FOR SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON FOOD SITUATION IN TANZANIA AND TO NYERERE'S REQUEST PLEASE REFER TO FOLLOWING CABLES FROM THIS MISSION:
DAR ES SALAAM 1774; 1611; 1126; 1034; 901; 821; 820; 543; 409; 280; 266; 13.

4. BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,
IN MY DISCUSSIONS OR CORRESPONDENCE WITH YOU I HAVE USUALLY SOUGHT YOUR ASSISTANCE IN AFRICA'S EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE FOR THE PEOPLES OF SOUTHERN AFRICA. THIS LETTER IS ABOUT TANZANIA, AND I FIND IT SLIGHTLY PAINFUL. I WILL TRY TO KEEP IT BRIEF.

WE NEED FOOD. SOME WEEKS BACK I WAS LED TO BELIEVE THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT WOULD GIVE US FOOD ACCORDING TO THE FOLLOWING SCHEDULE.

(I) 15,000 TCNS OF RICE, PROMISED IN 1979 AFTER DISCUSSIONS WITH MR. ANDREW YOUNG, WOULD BE DELIVERED BY THE END OF MAY 1980.

*****WHHR COMMENT*****

ZB AAR DOD VP
TOB:DEAL,GREGG,FUNK,KIM

*****CONFIDENTIAL***** COPY

(II) 20,000 TONS OF SORGHUM GRITS WOULD BE DELIVERED IN AUGUST/SEPTEMBER THIS YEAR.

(III) 32,000 TONS OF WHEAT WOULD BE DELIVERED IN AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1980; WE HAD REQUESTED 100,000 TONS, BUT UNTIL THEN HAD NOT BEEN GIVEN ANY FIRM PROMISES OF WHEAT.

(IV) 25,000 TONS OF MAIZE (OUT OF 50,000 TONS PROMISED FOR OUR STRATEGIC RESERVE IN 1978 AND NOT DELIVERED THEN BECAUSE OF OUR INADEQUATE STORAGE FACILITIES AT THAT TIME) WOULD BE DELIVERED IN AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1980.

(V) 25,000 TONS OF MAIZE (THE REMAINDER OF THAT PROMISE) WOULD BE DELIVERED IN OCTOBER 1980.

THIS SCHEDULE OF DELIVERIES WAS GIVEN TO US AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME IN BOTH DAR ES SALAAM AND WASHINGTON.

IT WAS ON THE BASIS OF THIS INFORMATION THAT WE HAVE BEEN MAKING PLANS AND DISCUSSING OUR FOOD NEEDS WITH OTHER FRIENDLY COUNTRIES. ON MY RETURN FROM EUROPE - WHERE, AMONG OTHER THINGS, I WAS TRYING TO OBTAIN SOME FOOD, - I WAS INFORMED THAT NEW INSTRUCTIONS HAD COME FROM WASHINGTON. NOW ONLY THE RICE WOULD BE DELIVERED AS PROMISED; THE SORGHUM AND WHEAT WILL NOT BE SENT AT ALL! HALF THE MAIZE WILL BE DELIVERED IN OCTOBER THIS YEAR, AND THE OTHER HALF POSSIBLE SOME TIME AFTER APRIL NEXT YEAR ALTHOUGH THIS CANNOT AT PRESENT BE CONFIRMED.

THAT IS ONE THING. FURTHER, WE HAVE RECEIVED SOME RICE FROM JAPAN AND WERE ASKING FOR MORE. I AM NOT TOLD THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS INFORMED THE JAPANESE THAT TANZANIA IS ELIGIBLE FOR AMERICAN FOOD AID UNDER P.L. 480, WAS GETTING IT AND THAT ANY FURTHER SUPPLIES TO US WOULD DISTURB AMERICAN MARKETS! AND I AM TOLD THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IS NOW HESITATING TO MAKE ANY MORE RICE AVAILABLE TO US.

MR. PRESIDENT; I FIND IT DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THESE DEVELOPMENTS, AND IF THEY ARE TRUE I FAIL TO UNDERSTAND THEM. I AM NOT ASKING FOR ARMS; I AM ASKING FOR FOOD. YOU HAVE FOOD, AND WE NEED SOME. FOOD IS A SIMPLE HUMAN RIGHT. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT I HAVE DECIDED TO OVERCOME MY RELUCTANCE AND WRITE TO YOU PERSONALLY.

WITH THIS LETTER I SEND YOU MY GOOD WISHES AND BEST REGARDS.
YOURS SINCERELY, JULIUS K. NYERERE. END TEXT.

VIETS
BT

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

April 16, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM:

TOM THORNTON
NICK SPILIOTES

SUBJECT:

The President's Response to Nyerere's
Request for Additional Grain (C)

At Tab I is your memo to the President recommending a response to Nyerere's urgent request for additional grain. (C)

State's proposed interim reply (April 11) was not sent because the search for funds / grain was almost complete. On Monday, Rud Poats participated in an IG meeting which found \$2.5 million (25,000 tons') worth of corn to offer Nyerere on concessional loan terms. (C)

Rud Poats concurs in the draft letter. (U)

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign your memo to the President at Tab I.

_____ Approve _____ Disapprove

*DA signed
4/18/80*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

2340
Add-on

April 16, 1980

CONFIDENTIALMEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: Proposed Response for President Carter to
President Julius Nyerere's Letter of March 28

Attached is a revised version of the Department's proposed response for President Carter to use in replying to Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere's letter of March 28. We also propose to have our Ambassador brief President Nyerere on U.S. food assistance when he delivers President Carter's letter. The talking points for that briefing are enclosed.

Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Draft reply
2. Draft Telegram to Dar es Salaam

CONFIDENTIAL
GDS, 4/15/86

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: DOS/NSC WAIVERS
BY: LJM NARA DATE: 12/12/23

Suggested Letter

Dear Mr. President:

I was very disturbed to learn from your recent letter that Tanzania is among the growing number of nations facing severe food shortages. Your country's need, a dramatic reversal of the position which existed last fall, is becoming evident at the same time food shortages and famine are spreading throughout the world.

Because the plight of the Tanzanian people has deteriorated seriously, I have directed that a special allocation of \$2.5 million be made available to Tanzania to purchase corn on concessional loan terms.

By May 1 of this year, we will have completed action on two programs and shipped over 26,000 metric tons of rice to Tanzania. One program of \$5 million was arranged with you when Andy Young was in Dar es Salaam last fall; the other is in payment for the maize your country shipped to Zambia. I have asked my Ambassador to discuss with you personally the specific points raised in your letter concerning U.S. food commitments.

Your need is greater than we alone can meet. We are encouraging other governments to do all they can. We are not discouraging any country from making food assistance available to those who need it.

His Excellency

Julius Nyerere,

President of the United Republic of Tanzania.

Americans are deeply disturbed by the threat of famine anywhere in the world, and I hope our offer of assistance together with what you are receiving from other countries, will help overcome food shortages in Tanzania.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO: DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE

TAGS: EAID, EAGR, TZ

SUBJECT: FOOD AID FOR TANZANIA

REF: DAR 1839 and 1876

1. You should seek an appointment ASAP with Pres. Nyerere to deliver letter from Pres. Carter re Tanzanian food shortages being sent septel. At same time you should provide him with personal briefing on status US food assistance. Talking points are as follows:

--For many years the US has had continuing conversations with Tanzanian officials on food problems and since your independence we have provided about Dols. 113 million in various types of PL-480 assistance. When many discussions are held it is perhaps inevitable that misunderstandings develop over what may have been promised rather than merely considered. In order to clarify some current problems, I wish to explain to you the exact status of our current programs.

--The US has agreed to ship a total of 26,100 MT of rice to Dar es Salaam by June 1, but we hope some of it can arrive earlier. The first shipment of 14,280 MT is our full payment to Tanzania for its shipment of maize to Zambia. We are going ahead with this shipment even though the GOT has provided only three-fourths of the maize agreed upon. We were

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority DOS WAVEK
BY LM NARA DATE 12/12/03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

disappointed that Pres. Nyerere's letter did not note this delivery. The second shipment of 11,894 MT is awaiting arrangements by the GOT Embassy in Washington for purchase and shipment. Although we are assisting the Embassy as much as we can, the expeditious arrival of the rice in Dar es Salaam is basically dependent upon Tanzanian action.

--On January 14 Minister of Agriculture Malecela requested 100,000 MT of wheat. Only five months ago it appeared that Tanzania would again have a surplus production of grain this year, and no additional food aid for Tanzania was included in our budgets. A request has been sent to Congress for a supplemental appropriation to meet unexpected food shortages throughout the world, but no commitments can be made until that legislation is passed. As you know, the US Congress is in the process of cutting the budgets of all government agencies. I am, therefore, not optimistic that additional funds will be made available.

--In 1978 we joined with FAO and World Food Program to provide Tanzania with maize under the terms of a strategic grain reserve agreement which called for the USG to provide 25,000 MT in both FY 79 and FY 80 and was conditioned upon your country's ability to handle, store, and use the commodities. During both years Tanzania appeared to have surplus stocks and was in fact exporting

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

corn. At the same time we were faced with urgent requests from a number of countries experiencing starvation due to drought and refugee problems. We therefore used the funds to meet these urgent needs. (Septel will follow re more detailed discussion this matter with GOT officials.)

--Inasmuch as Tanzania has not been able to ship the final 10,000 MT of corn to Zambia in the triangular agreement, our commitment under the strategic grain reserve program will have to be reduced by that amount.

--On February 26 the GOT requested 20,000 MT of sorghum grits to assist in famine relief efforts in certain parts of the country. That request reached Washington after all funds for famine relief had been exhausted. Pres. Carter has requested Congress to appropriate additional funds, but the legislation has not been passed.

--US has not "blocked" Japanese rice sales or grants to Tanzania. In fact, since last fall we have expressed approval of Japanese aid shipments totalling 34,000 metric tons. Confusion may have arisen in Tanzanian minds from US/Japanese discussions over appropriate UMR level. Most concessional food aid agreements contain such UMR's which are designed to avoid disrupting normal commercial trade and based on five year average of commercial imports.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-4-

UMR's place no restrictions on source of import. We have discussed with Japanese whether UMR for Tanzania is 25,000 (actual 5-year average) or 12,000 metric tons, and Japanese have told us informally that they would not object to higher figure if it were acceptable to Tangov. (Additional info on Japanese rice sales may become available and will be forwarded septel.)

--The US is very much concerned with the food problems faced by Tanzania. We are also faced with urgent requests from other countries and are urgently seeking ways to overcome our budgetary problems. We can not rpt not, however, make any more commitments at this time.

--We urge you to provide as many details as possible to us and other potential donors on the extent of your problems. As you know, there are many potential sources.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 11, 1980

~~CONFIDENTIAL - EXDIS Attachment~~MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: Proposed Response for President Carter to
President Julius Nyerere's Letter of March 28

Attached is the Department's proposed response for President Carter to use in replying to Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere's letter of March 28. We also propose to have our Ambassador brief President Nyerere on U.S. food assistance when he delivers President Carter's letter. The proposed talking points for that briefing are enclosed.

In the meantime we are urgently reviewing the status of our food programs to determine if more assistance can be made available to Tanzania.

P. Tarnoff
for Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Draft reply
2. Draft Telegram to Dar es Salaam

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
GDS, 4/11/86

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DOS WAIVER
BY HM NARA DATE 12/12/23

18

Suggested Letter

Dear Mr. President:

I was very disturbed to read in your letter of March 28 that Tanzania is among the growing number of nations facing severe food shortages. Your need has arisen at a time when food shortages and famine are spreading throughout the world. It has also come at a time when my government's allocations are severely strained.

The needs this year are far greater than we alone can meet and are much larger than predictions made last fall. We are encouraging other governments to do all they can. We are not discouraging any country from making food available to those who need it.

I have instructed appropriate officials in my government to make another thorough evaluation of world needs and our ability to respond. I assure you that Tanzania's problems will be considered thoroughly, and I will advise you as soon as possible on whether we can provide any assistance beyond that which is already agreed upon. In the meantime, I have asked Ambassador Viets to brief you personally on our previous commitments in order to clear up any misunderstandings which may have occurred.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

His Excellency
Julius Nyerere,
President of the United Republic of Tanzania.

Department of State.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

March 31, 1980

~~CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS ATTACHMENT~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: MS. CHRISTINE DODSON
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Alerting NSC on Presidential
Correspondence

Enclosed is a copy of a letter to President Carter from President Nyerere of Tanzania which is transmitted for your information.

This document was received in the Executive Secretariat Information Management Section on March 31, 1980 at 11:15 a.m.

Charles L. Jackson, Jr.
Director, S/S-I
Information Management Section
Executive Secretariat
ext. 23836

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DOS GUIDELINESBY LM NARA DATE 12/12/23

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-4-

tons, and Japanese have told us informally that they would not object to higher figure if it were acceptable to Tangov. (Additional info on Japanese rice sales may become available and will be forwarded septel.)

--The US is very much concerned with the food problems faced by Tanzania and is urgently seeking ways to overcome our budgetary problems. We can not rpt not, however, make any commitments at this time.

--We urge you to provide as many details as possible to us and other potential donors on the extent of your problems. As you know, there are many potential sources.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority DOS/NSC WAIVERS
BY HM NARA DATE 12/12/23

March 27, 1980

TO: Executive Secretariat
Room 7241
Department of State

FROM: Robert T. Hall, Assistant Secretary
of Commerce for Economic Development *rk*

SUBJECT: Notification of Foreign Travel

Traveller: Robert T. Hall

Date: June 11 - 13, 1980

Purpose of Travel:

To serve in my capacity as Vice Chairman, OECD's Working Party No. 6 of the Industry Committee, which will be meeting in Paris, France during this period.

Principal Topics:

Major issues include urban concerns and regional policy; regional economic dislocation and adjustment; and the role of local community involvement in regional development.

Date APR 11 1980

TO: Economic Development Administration
Room 7800-B, Commerce Department
Washington, D.C. 20230

ATTN: Robert T. Hall (377-5081) re. Paris, France

xx The Department of State has
no objection to this travel.

 Remarks:

for Peter Tarnoff
Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretariat

cc: NSC - Mrs. Dodson ✓

LDX MESSAGE RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

24

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

APR 11 1964
RS

SITE

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S/S #

CO APP 5

MAIL ROOM
TELETYPE ROOM
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION


LDX MESSAGE NO. 122912 CLASSIFICATION _____
FROM: Robert Pringle AF/EPB 632 3504
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension)
No. Pages 3
5242A
(Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION 3 cables

LDX TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>White House</u>	<u>Jerry Funk (NSC)</u>		

REMARKS: FOR: CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

S/S Officer: [Signature]



3

PAGE 01
ACTION SS-30

DAR ES SALAAM 01983 001034Z

05 250
001235Z /17

INFO OCT-31 ADS-02 SSO-02 /031

O 061010Z APR 80
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5996

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ DAR ES SALAAM 1983

~~Exclis~~
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~~AF~~
~~SSO~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIDIS

FROM AMBASSADOR

U.O.: 12265: GDS 4/8/80 (VIETS, RICHARD N.) OR-M
TAGS: ZAID, EAGR
SUBJ: PL-480 AGREEMENT: JAPANESE RICE SALES TO TANZANIA

REF: DAR ES SALAAM 1976

CB

1. WOULD APPRECIATE A RESPONSE TO MY APRIL 1 REQUEST (PARA 5 OF RETELL) FOR INFORMATION ON PRESIDENT NYERERE'S STATEMENT THAT U.S. HAD INTERFERED WITH JAPAN TO INHIBIT OR PREVENT FURTHER SHIPMENT OF RICE TO TANZANIA. WE NEED TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT, ONE WAY OR THE OTHER, WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY. I AM SCHEDULED TO SEE AGRICULTURE MINISTER MALEOGA AT END OF WEEK AND WANT TO BE SURE I HAVE FACTS IN HAND FOR THE MEETING.

2. DO YOU HAVE ANY INDICATION WHEN NYERERE CAN EXPECT A RESPONSE TO HIS LETTER? AS YOU WILL HAVE NOTED FROM MY CONVERSATION WITH NYERERE LAST THURSDAY, THE IMPENDING FOOD CRISIS LOOMS UPPERMOST IN HIS MIND.
VIETS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DO5 WAIVER
BY LM NARA DATE 12/12/23

13

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~INFORMATION~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

2340

April 12, 1980

ZB HAS SEEN

✓

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: JERRY FUNK
SUBJECT: The President's Response to Nyerere's Request for Grain (C)

State sent a suggested interim reply last night, - as it has been impossible to get an interdepartmental decision on what, if anything, we can do in response to Nyerere's request for additional grain. (C)

Henry Owen will attend a committee meeting now scheduled for Monday to sort this out. (U)

Given the fact that we can expect a definitive response to be possible by COB Monday, I agree that it makes little sense to go ahead with an interim response now. We will wait for the committee decision before responding. Henry will call Christopher to inform him of this course of action. Should he fail to reach Christopher, Rud Poats will inform State/SS. (U)

cc: Owen
Poats

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Review on Apr 12, 1986

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NSC/POS WAIVERS
BY WM NARA DATE 12/12/23

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

21

PAGE 01 DAR ES D1E35 311314Z

8636

DAR ES D1E35 311314Z

ACTION ST-38

8006805

INFO OCT-81 ADD-80 SSD-88 /E31 W

-----129899 311319Z /42

O 311155Z MAR 88

FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5917

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAR ES SALAAM 1835

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 3/31/86 (VIETS; RICHARD N.) OR-M

TAGS: EAID, EAGR, TZ

SUBJECT: FOOD AID: LETTER TO PRESIDENT CARTER FROM PRESIDENT NYERERE

1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER TO PRESIDENT CARTER FROM NYERERE DATED 26 MARCH PROVIDED AMBASSADOR THIS MORNING BY JOAN WICKEN. DURING AMBASSADOR'S LAST CONVERSATION WITH NYERERE ON MARCH 18, LATTER INDICATED HE INTENDED SEND SUCH A MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT. WE ASSUME IT HAS BEEN DELAYED DUE TO NYERERE'S ABSENCE FROM DAR ES SALAAM.

3. FOR SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON FOOD SITUATION IN TANZANIA AND TO NYERERE'S REQUEST PLEASE REFER TO FOLLOWING CABLES FROM THIS MISSION:

DAR ES SALAAM 1774; 1611; 1126; 1034; 981; 821; 828; 543; 489; 280; 266; 13.

• BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

IN MY DISCUSSIONS OR CORRESPONDENCE WITH YOU I HAVE USUALLY SOUGHT YOUR ASSISTANCE IN AFRICA'S EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE FOR THE PEOPLES OF SOUTHERN AFRICA. THIS LETTER IS ABOUT TANZANIA, AND I FIND IT SLIGHTLY PAINFUL. I WILL TRY TO KEEP IT BRIEF.

WE NEED FOOD. SOME WEEKS BACK I WAS LED TO BELIEVE THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT WOULD GIVE US FOOD ACCORDING TO THE FOLLOWING SCHEDULE.

(I) 15,000 TONS OF RICE, PROMISED IN 1979 AFTER DISCUSSIONS WITH MR. ANDREW YOUNG, WOULD BE DELIVERED BY THE END OF MAY 1988.

(II) 28,000 TONS OF SORGHUM GRITS WOULD BE DELIVERED IN AUGUST/SEPTEMBER THIS YEAR.

(III) 32,000 TONS OF WHEAT WOULD BE DELIVERED IN AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1988; WE HAD REQUESTED 100,000 TONS, BUT UNTIL THEN HAD NOT BEEN GIVEN ANY FIRM PROMISE OF WHEAT.

(IV) 25,000 TONS OF MAIZE (OUT OF 50,000 TONS PROMISED FOR OUR STRATEGIC RESERVE IN 1978 AND NOT DELIVERED THEN BECAUSE OF OUR INADEQUATE STORAGE FACILITIES AT THAT TIME) WOULD BE DELIVERED IN AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1988.

(V) 25,000 TONS OF MAIZE (THE REMAINDER OF THAT PROMISE) WOULD BE DELIVERED IN OCTOBER 1988.

THIS SCHEDULE OF DELIVERIES WAS GIVEN TO US AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME IN BOTH DAR ES SALAAM AND WASHINGTON.

IT WAS ON THE BASIS OF THIS INFORMATION THAT WE HAVE

BEEN MAKING PLANS AND DISCUSSING OUR FOOD NEEDS WITH OTHER FRIENDLY COUNTRIES. ON MY RETURN FROM EUROPE - WHERE, AMONG OTHER THINGS, I WAS TRYING TO OBTAIN SOME FOOD, - I WAS INFORMED THAT NEW INSTRUCTIONS HAD COME FROM WASHINGTON. NOW ONLY THE RICE WOULD BE DELIVERED AS PROMISED; THE SORGHUM AND WHEAT WILL NOT BE SENT AT ALL! HALF THE MAIZE WILL BE DELIVERED IN OCTOBER THIS YEAR, AND THE OTHER HALF POSSIBLE SOME TIME AFTER APRIL NEXT YEAR ALTHOUGH THIS CANNOT AT PRESENT BE CONFIRMED.

THAT IS ONE THING. FURTHER, WE HAVE RECEIVED SOME RICE FROM JAPAN AND WERE ASKING FOR MORE. I AM NOT TOLD THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS INFORMED THE JAPANESE THAT TANZANIA IS ELIGIBLE FOR AMERICAN FOOD AID UNDER P.L. 480, WAS GETTING IT AND THAT ANY FURTHER SUPPLIES TO US WOULD DISTURB AMERICAN MARKETS AND I AM TOLD THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IS NOW HESITATING TO MAKE ANY MORE RICE AVAILABLE TO US.

MR. PRESIDENT; I FIND IT DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THESE DEVELOPMENTS, AND IF THEY ARE TRUE I FAIL TO UNDERSTAND THEM. I AM NOT ASKING FOR ARMS; I AM ASKING FOR FOOD. YOU HAVE FOOD, AND WE NEED SOME. FOOD IS A SIMPLE HUMAN RIGHT. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT I HAVE DECIDED TO OVERCOME MY RELUCTANCE AND WRITE TO YOU PERSONALLY.

WITH THIS LETTER I SEND YOU MY GOOD WISHES AND BEST REGARDS.

YOURS SINCERELY, JULIUS K. NYERERE. END TEXT.

VIETS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: DOS WANNER
BY: LM NARA DATE: 12/12/23

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

CONFIDENTIAL TELEGRAM TO DAR

SUBJECT: Japanese Rice Sales to Tanzania

(a)

REF: /DAR 1983, (b) Tokyo 4931
(NOTAL)

1. US has not "blocked" Japanese rice sales or grants to Tanzania. In fact, since last fall we have expressed approval of Japanese aid shipments totalling 34,000 metric tons. Confusion may have arisen in Tanzanian minds from US/Japanese discussions over appropriate UMR level which is condition levied by both FAO and PL-480. Most concessional food aid agreements contain such UMR's which are designed to preserve normal commercial trade and based on five year average of commercial imports. UMR's place no restrictions on source of import. We have discussed with Japanese whether UMR for Tanzania is 25,000 or 12,000 metric tons, and Japanese have told us informally that they would not object to higher figure if it were acceptable to TanGov.

2. Since UMR discussion took place serious drought has hit Tanzania and as you are aware USG ability to respond is virtually nil due budgetary constraints. Reftel B notes that Tanzanians have requested additional rice from Japanese. Given emergency conditions which now prevail in Tanzania we strongly recommend that GOJ respond favorably to this request.

3. FOR TOKYO: Please pass substance of para 2 to MOFA as soon as possible.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 1205 WANKER
 BY HM NARA DATE 12/12/23

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~
Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM 26

PAGE 01 TOKYO 04931 210556Z 9983 AF1334

ACTION EB-08
INFO AS-01 EPS-01 AF: P-01 AF: I-01 EXED-01 AFE-01 TUM-01
/007 AI

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 EA-10 ADS-00 AGRE-00 AID-07 OMB-01
TRSE-00 CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 L-03 H-01 HA-05
/056 W

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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO.
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6672
INFO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

-----051784 210707Z /17

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TOKYO 04931.

STATE PASS AGRICULTURE ELECTRONICALLY FOR SAYLOR; ALSO
PASS AID

E. O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: EALB, EAGR; JA, TA
SUBJECT: RICE AID TO TANZANIA

REF: STATE 067008

1. EMBOFF BRIEFED MOFA REGIONAL AFFAIRS SPECIALIST
MARCH 17 ON PROPOSED RICE SALE TO TANZANIA. MOFA
OFFICIAL ASKED WHEN COMMENT PERIOD ENDS. PLEASE ADVISE.

2. UNLESS FORMAL NOTIFICATION OF PROPOSED SALE ALREADY
HAS BEEN MADE TO JAPANESE EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON, WE
REQUEST ALSO INFORMATION TO FILL IN ITEMS 1 (TYPE OF
TRANSACTION), 8 ("TIED" PROVISIONS), AND 9 (COMMENTS)
ON FAO/CSD CONCESSIONAL SALE NOTIFICATION FORM, SO THAT
WE MAY LET MOFA KNOW.

3. MOFA TOLD US THAT TANZANIAN AMBASSADOR HAD TELEPHONED
MARCH 17 TO REQUEST AN ADDITIONAL 30,000 METRIC TONS OF
RICE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN VIEW OF BAD HARVEST PROSPECTS
AND CONSEQUENT EXPECTATION OF SUPPLY SHORTAGE IN TANZANIA.
ACCORDING MOFA, REPLY WAS THAT JAPANESE GOVERNMENT COULD
NOT CONSIDER THIS REQUEST IN CURRENT FISCAL YEAR (ENDING
MARCH 31), AND THAT JAPAN WOULD HAVE TO WORK OUT ITS RICE
EXPORT PLANS IN CONSULTATION WITH OTHER SUPPLIERS BEFORE
MAKING COMMITMENTS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1980. (AMBASSADOR,
PRESUMABLY UNAWARE OF OUR PROPOSED SALE TO TANZANIA
DESCRIBED REFTEL, DID NOT MENTION IT). AMBASSADOR HAD BEEN
VERY URGENT FOR AN EARLY COMMITMENT, AND EVEN HAD SUG-
GESTED THAT THE TANZANIAN MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE VISIT
JAPAN IN APRIL TO FORMALIZE THIS NEW AID PACKAGE.

4. MOFA OFFICIAL COMMENTED THAT GOJ IS ANXIOUS TO COOR-
DINATE WITH US ON RICE SALES, BUT HE ADDED THAT IF FOOD
SHORTAGE IN TANZANIA IS SERIOUS, JAPAN WOULD NOT WISH TO
FAIL TO RESPOND.
MANSFIELD

RP
interesting

and why not?

DECLASSIFIED
Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
BY *LM* NARA DATE *12/12/23*

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

IF Desk G 28

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 8, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: HENRY OWEN
RUD POATS
TIM DEAL

FROM: JERRY FUNK

SUBJECT: Tanzanian Food Request

Attached are two memos for your information, - one dated March 19 on the general situation, and a second dated April 7 addressing three questions I put to State and AID. These memos were provided to me on a preliminary and personal basis, and do not yet represent State's official position. I am pushing State to come up with a firm position and a suggested response asap. Nsdrf on these memos, it would seem that we will have some explaining to do to Nyerere. (C)

Bose

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC/DOS WAIVERS
BY HM NARA DATE 12/12/23



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 7, 1980

INFO ONLY
~~TO~~ ~~FUNK~~

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: AF - Mr. Moose
THROUGH: AF - Ms. Lancaster
FROM: AF/EPS - Carl C. Cundiff
SUBJECT: Food Shortage in Tanzania

1. Is there or is there not a food shortage/drought problem in Tanzania? The answer is yes, but we don't know yet how serious. Much depends on the progress of the main March-to-May rainy season. It appears that there will be drought in some areas. Widespread drought could result in rural famine in some regions.

At the moment the government is giving emergency rations to some 700,000 people in the south, but whether there is famine depends on the definition. There are certainly great difficulties but babies are not dying as in other parts of the world. Much of the problem consists of storage, transportation and processing bottlenecks. For example the government is seeking to export portions of up to 150,000 tons of sorghums, bush millets and other "less preferred" grains at the same time that it has a pending request with us for 20,000 tons of sorghum grits. We don't yet know the reason for this anomaly, but it may be partly lack of milling capacity.

Right now Nyerere is faced not with starvation but with politically embarrassing food shortages in urban areas which are partly the result of transportation and storage problems and poor pricing policies.

The entire question has been muddied by the fact that for the last two years Tanzania was an exporter of food grains, and (until recently) by a shortage of field reporting which pulled together the food situation. Recently, however, the Embassy has been coming in with some excellent analysis (see attached).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
GDS - 4/7/86

DECLASSIFIED
Authority DOS WAIVER
BY LM NARA DATE 12/12/23

2. What precisely were USG promises regarding a Strategic Grain Reserve? What is the status? Did we tell them when the initial tranche was dropped from the FY 80 budget? In 1978 we signed a multi-donor agreement, coordinated by the FAO, to provide Tanzania with 50,000 tons of Title II maize for a strategic grain reserve. Delivery was to be in two tranches in 1979 and 1980, contingent on storage and management capability. Partly because of persistent storage problems and partly because Tanzania was not facing an imminent food shortage, they did not draw down the first tranche in 1979. Last October 25 AID/Food for Peace notified the Mission of intention to drop the program from the FY 80 budget as well (cable attached). Food for Peace maintains that Tanzania still appeared to be in an export position, the storage situation was still not under control and the Title II budget was rapidly running dry. AID/AFR (Africa Bureau) holds that this decision was premature, although they did clear on the cable. In any event the Mission decided not to notify the Tanzanian Government that the grain reserve had been dropped from the FY 80 budget, since there did not appear to be an immediate need for the grain.


3. What exactly have we done vis-a-vis Japanese rice to Tanzania? What would our position be if the Japanese offered more? We did not raise objections last fall when the Japanese gave the Tanzanians 4,000 tons of rice (grant) and sold them 30,000 more on highly concessional terms (equivalent to Title I). We did challenge what appeared to be a low Usual Marketing Requirement (UMR) calculated by the Japanese (12,000 tons vs 25,000) and they accepted our higher figure provided the Tanzanians didn't object (thus far they have not). Last month the Tanzanians asked the Japanese for more rice. They replied that they couldn't consider the request until the beginning of their new fiscal year (which started April 1) and until they had completed international consultations and determined their overall rice export plans. They also told us (according to Tokyo 4931) that "if the need in Tanzania were serious they would not wish to fail to respond." We have heard nothing further on this subject.

EB feels that if there is a genuine emergency we won't invoke the UMR to block additional Japanese rice aid since Tanzania is not a developed commercial market for us. But the situation needs to be seen against our general displeasure with the Japanese for dumping their subsidized rice elsewhere and USDA's keen sensitivity to domestic rice interests. It is quite likely that in the absence of a Presidential decision to actively encourage Japanese rice aid to Tanzania, USDA would interpose objections unless people were starving, by which time it would be too late.

COMMENT

AID's Africa Bureau argues that by the time we determine whether or not there is a genuine humanitarian crisis it will be too late, and that steps should be taken now, including an effort to reprogram some of the \$40 million in Title I that is being held for Pakistan in the reserve. Food for Peace believes that nothing can be done at this time, and plainly does not feel that the recent cable traffic makes the case for immediate emergency assistance. The real question may be whether or not we see Nyerere as being in serious political trouble because of the food situation, and if so whether we want to do anything about it. One option would be reprogramming Title I, another would be an appeal to the Japanese to ship them additional rice immediately. Or we can wait for the initial assessment of a multi-donor team which will issue the first of a series of reports on Tanzania's food needs in about two weeks.

Goler Butcher is embarrassed by the handling of the Strategic Grain Reserve problem, and any reprogrammed grain would probably be used to help to meet an initial commitment to that project.

Drafted by: AF/EPs:RMP /lm
4/7/80 x23503

Clearance: AF/E:MBerry (draft)

return AF/EPD [initials]

32

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3/19/80

TO: P - Mr. Newsom

FROM: AF - Richard M. Moose

SUBJECT: Food Crisis in Tanzania

On January 14 the Tanzanian Minister of Agriculture made an urgent request to our Ambassador for 100,000 tons of wheat to meet an expected shortfall in grain production. We were surprised because in recent years Tanzania has had a surplus in some food grains. The current problem began when excessive rains spoiled much of the corn crop which would normally have been harvested in the fall of 1979. The situation was made worse when the winter "little rains" did not materialize, and it now appears that the major rainy season, which should have started in March, may also fail. Up to now shortages have mainly been felt in urban areas--politically embarrassing to Nyerere but not a disaster in humanitarian terms. However, if the present drought pattern holds, there could be famine conditions in rural areas, although we do not yet know exactly which regions might be affected. On February 26 the Tanzanian Minister of Agriculture also requested 20,000 tons of sorghum grits which could be distributed to areas likely to face famine conditions by April. Seven hundred thousand people in southern Tanzania are already getting emergency food aid from the government.

U.S. Response

By the time the drought situation in Tanzania became clear, our FY 1980 budget for both food and disaster relief was exhausted. Aid has tried to respond to the Tanzanian requests by accelerating programs already funded and underway before the crisis was apparent. Because of the budget crunch, new or enhanced programs have not been possible. What makes this particularly disturbing is the fact that the drought is likely to spread, since the rains normally start in Tanzania and move up the coast of East Africa, affecting Kenya, Uganda and southern Sudan.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GDS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DOS WAIVER

BY AM NARA DATE 12/2/23

The present status of our food assistance to Tanzania is as follows:

✓ (1) An agreement was signed on March 17 for \$5 million in Title I rice with delivery expected about June 1. (This program resulted from Andy Young's visit to Dar es Salaam last fall.)

(2) We are expediting delivery of another \$5 million dollars in rice under Title II which is part of the triangular trade package with Zambia whereby Tanzanian maize is being traded for US rice. The Tanzanians have been unable to delivery the last 10,000 tons of maize, but we are going ahead with the rice shipment after receiving a promise that Tanzania will make the maize shipment as soon as possible (hopefully next fall). The rice is expected to arrive in Tanzania about June 1, but we are trying to speed up the shipment to permit delivery in May.

(3) We have an ongoing Title II program administered by Catholic Relief Services and valued at \$2.5 million. This provides foodstuffs for the maternal and child health programs.

✓ (4) In late 1979 we agreed to participate in a multi-donor project to build up a strategic grain reserve for Tanzania by supplying \$5 million worth of maize over a two year period if adequate transportation and storage facilities were available. This program cannot be funded until the PL 480 supplemental appropriation is passed which is not likely until July (if then).

✓ (5) We had hoped to respond to the January 14 request for 100,000 tons of wheat by providing an additional \$5 million worth of Title I wheat (about 30,000 metric tons). This proposal is also stalled pending passage of the PL 480 supplemental (and because of competing claims it is not clear that it would be approved even with the supplemental).

✓ (6) Lack of money has also prevented our responding to the Tanzanian Government's request for Title II sorghum grits.

(7) The Tanzanians are reportedly attempting to enter the U.S. commercial market to buy 50,000 tons of corn, an action which underlines the severity of their problem. Unfortunately they need credit to do so and there is none in sight. Tanzania does not qualify for available CCC credit which in any case would require them to pay the very high (market) interest rates.

34

CONFIDENTIAL

3

Other Donors

The Tanzanians have also requested food assistance from other donors. We understand that agreement was reached in January whereby Japan is providing 30,000 tons of rice valued at about \$10 million. Canada was asked to provide 55,000 tons of wheat and latest reports are that they will respond with 14,000 tons valued at about \$3.5 million. The Australians are believed to be considering favorably a request for 12,000 tons of wheat, and the EEC may be able to provide about 5,000 tons of flour.

These pledges were taken into account when the Tanzanians made their latest request to us. It now appears unlikely that other donors will come up with additional food aid unless a multi-donor FAO/World Food Program mission, which is going to visit both Uganda and Tanzania, so recommends. It is hoped that this mission will put the food needs of the region in perspective and stimulate an international response.

Next Steps

We are asking Ambassador Viets to clarify the extent of the threatened famine in Tanzania both for us and for other potential donors.

We understand that Henry Owen's people are working on the possibility of breaking loose some Title I resources currently programmed for other countries (Portugal and Pakistan) to meet the Tanzanian emergency (among others). We will be looking into this and report back to you.

AF/E:MBerry:ew 3/19/80

Clearance:AID/EA:HJohnson
AF/EPS:RPringle

Approved:AF/E:GBeyer

CONFIDENTIAL

OP IMMED
STU826
DE RUTAAM #1949 0941215
O 031296Z APR 80
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5976

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (L DAR ES SALAAM 1949)

EXDIS
E.O.: 12065: RDS-1 4/3/00 (VIETS, RICHARD N.) OR-M
TAGS: EAID, EAGR, TZ
SUBJ: MEETING WITH NYERERE: FOOD CRISIS

1. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.)~~
2. NYERERE CALLED ME TO HIS HOME LATE THIS MORNING (APRIL 3) TO MAKE ANOTHER PERSONAL PLEAS FOR FOOD ASSISTANCE. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN INFORMED BY AGRICULTURE MINISTER MALECELA THAT WE WERE BUSY GATHERING DATA ON CROP CONDITIONS AND THAT HE WAS "VERY GLAD TO HEAR YOU ARE CONSIDERING MY REQUEST."
3. CHARACTERIZING THE NATIONAL SITUATION AS "VERY SERIOUS," NYERERE SAID IN HIS LIFETIME HE HAD NEVER KNOWN AGRICULTURAL CONDITIONS TO BE SO BAD. IN HIS OWN HOME DISTRICT IN THE WESTERN PART OF THE COUNTRY WHERE HE HAD TOURED LAST WEEK THERE HAS BEEN ALMOST NO RAIN SINCE LAST YEAR. TODAY THE AREA RESEMBLES A DUST BOWL, HE SAID. OUT OF 2 REGIONS IN MAINLAND TANZANIA, NYERERE THOUGHT FIVE MIGHT PRODUCE A FAIR CROP. THEY ARE SONGEA, MBEYA, RUKWA, PART OF IRINGA, AND PART OF KIGOMA. ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY HE SAID THE SITUATION WAS "DISASTROUS."
4. NYERERE OBSERVED THAT THE TANGOV HAD GROSSLY MISCALCULATED LAST YEAR WHEN IT EXPORTED 90,000 TONS OF MAIZE TO ZAMBIA AND MOZAMBIQUE. IF THIS GRAIN HAD NOT BEEN EXPORTED, THE COUNTRY COULD HAVE SQUEEZED BY THIS YEAR WITH RELATIVELY MINOR IMPORTS OF ADDITIONAL GRAINS. HE SAID BOTH MAIZE AND WHEAT STOCKS ARE NEARLY DEPLETED. THERE IS STILL SOME SORGHUM AND CASSOVA AVAILABLE, BUT THESE STOCKS ARE ALSO BEING RAPIDLY DRAWN DOWN. MINISTER MALECELA HAD TOLD HIM THIS MORNING THAT BECAUSE OF THE EASE WITH WHICH IT COULD BE DISTRIBUTED, HE SHOULD MAKE A SPECIAL PLEA TO US FOR A PRIORITY SHIPMENT OF SORGHUM GRITS.
5. NYERERE CONCLUDED THIS PORTION OF OUR CONVERSATION ON THE

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

HUNT DOD VP
EOB:DEAL,FUNK

PSN:030604 PAGE 01 TOR:094/18:12Z DTG:031205Z APR 80

*****CONFIDENTIAL***** COPY **DECLASSIFIED**
Authority DOS WAVE
BY LM NARA DATE 12/12/23

*****CONFIDENTIAL***** COPY

GRIM NOTE THAT HE HAD NEVER HANDLED A FAMINE BEFORE -- "I AM REALLY FRIGHTENED: I DON'T KNOW WHAT TO DO IF I DON'T GET HELP FROM YOU."

6. COMMENT. AS YOU WELL KNOW FROM OUR RECENT REPORTS, THE SITUATION IN MANY PARTS OF THE COUNTRY LOOKS INCREASINGLY SERIOUS. NYERERE HAS EVERY REASON TO BE WORRIED.

7. IN RESPONSE TO NYERERE'S PLEA I SAID ONLY THAT THE BUDGET SITUATION AT HOME HAD NOT CHANGED. FACT THAT WE WERE BUSILY COLLECTING DATA ON CROP AND STORAGE SITUATION SHOULD NOT BE MISINTERPRETED. WE WERE DOING OUR BEST TO CONVEY ACCURATE PICTURE OF IMPENDING CRISIS TO WASHINGTON. BUT I SAID BUDGET FREEZE CONTINUED IN WASHINGTON AND I HAD NO GROUNDS FOR GIVING HIM OPTIMISM THAT SITUATION COULD SOON CHANGE. NYERERE WANLY REPLIED HE BOTH UNDERSTOOD AND DIDN'T UNDERSTAND.

VIETS
BT

*****CONFIDENTIAL***** COPY

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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AFRICAN AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE, NSC: RECORDS

Withdrawer

LM 12/12/2023

File Folder

TANZANIA - WORKING FILE 04/18/1980-08/06/1980

FOIA

F24-005

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Box Number

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
254711	CABLE 030044Z APR 80	2	4/3/1980	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2129

INFORMATION

April 2, 1980

C

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI 
SUBJECT: Message from President Nyerere

At Tab A is a message from Nyerere, saying that he needs food, and that we are falling down on our "promises" to deliver 117,000 tons of grain by this fall. (C)

State and AID are working on a detailed response on an urgent basis. (U)

Essentially, Nyerere appears to be badly misinformed on our "commitments", some of which were clearly understood to be unlikely at best, and contingent upon development of famine conditions (which did not happen) and upon possible supplemental appropriations. And part of the programmed shipments were delayed due to lack of storage facilities in Tanzania. (C)

Nevertheless, we are presently shipping some 30,000 tons of rice, and 25,000 tons of maize at year's end, another 25,000 tons early next year, - total: 80,000 tons. Not terribly much less than Nyerere's understood level. (C)

Review on Apr 1, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: DOS WAIVERS
BY: LM NARA DATE 12/12/23

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

40

PAGE 01 DAR ES 01839 311314Z
ACTION SS-30

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INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W
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O 311155Z MAR 80
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5917

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ DAR ES SALAAM 1839

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 3/31/86 (VIETS; RICHARD N.) OR-M
TAGS: EAID, EAGR, TZ
SUBJECT: FOOD AID: LETTER TO PRESIDENT CARTER FROM PRESIDENT
NYERERE

1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER TO PRESIDENT CARTER FROM
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(III) 32,000 TONS OF WHEAT WOULD BE DELIVERED IN AUGUST/
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FOR OUR STRATEGIC RESERVE IN 1978 AND NOT DELIVERED THEN BE-
CAUSE OF OUR INADEQUATE STORAGE FACILITIES AT THAT TIME)
WOULD BE DELIVERED IN AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1980.

(V) 25,000 TONS OF MAIZE (THE REMAINDER OF THAT PROMISE)
WOULD BE DELIVERED IN OCTOBER 1980.

THIS SCHEDULE OF DELIVERIES WAS GIVEN TO US AT ABOUT THE
SAME TIME IN BOTH DAR ES SALAAM AND WASHINGTON.

IT WAS ON THE BASIS OF THIS INFORMATION THAT WE HAVE

BEEN MAKING PLANS AND DISCUSSING OUR FOOD NEEDS WITH OTHER
FRIENDLY COUNTRIES. ON MY RETURN FROM EUROPE - WHERE, AMONG
OTHER THINGS, I WAS TRYING TO OBTAIN SOME FOOD, - I WAS IN-
FORMED THAT NEW INSTRUCTIONS HAD COME FROM WASHINGTON. NOW
ONLY THE RICE WOULD BE DELIVERED AS PROMISED; THE SORGHUM
AND WHEAT WILL NOT BE SENT AT ALL! HALF THE MAIZE WILL BE
DELIVERED IN OCTOBER THIS YEAR, AND THE OTHER HALF POSSIBLE
SOME TIME AFTER APRIL NEXT YEAR ALTHOUGH THIS CANNOT AT PRE-
SENT BE CONFIRMED.

THAT IS ONE THING. FURTHER, WE HAVE RECEIVED SOME RICE
FROM JAPAN AND WERE ASKING FOR MORE. I AM NOT TOLD THAT YOUR
GOVERNMENT HAS INFORMED THE JAPANESE THAT TANZANIA IS ELIGIBLE
FOR AMERICAN FOOD AID UNDER P.L. 480, WAS GETTING IT AND THAT
ANY FURTHER SUPPLIES TO US WOULD DISTURB AMERICAN MARKETS!
AND I AM TOLD THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IS NOW HESITATING
TO MAKE ANY MORE RICE AVAILABLE TO US.

MR. PRESIDENT; I FIND IT DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THESE DE-
VELOPMENTS, AND IF THEY ARE TRUE I FAIL TO UNDERSTAND THEM.
I AM NOT ASKING FOR ARMS; I AM ASKING FOR FOOD. YOU HAVE FOOD,
AND WE NEED SOME. FOOD IS A SIMPLE HUMAN RIGHT. IT IS FOR
THIS REASON THAT I HAVE DECIDED TO OVERCOME MY RELUCTANCE
AND WRITE TO YOU PERSONALLY.

WITH THIS LETTER I SEND YOU MY GOOD WISHES AND BEST REGARDS.

YOURS SINCERELY, JULIUS K. NYERERE. END TEXT.
VIETS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DOS/NSC WAIVERS
BY HM NARA DATE 12/12/23

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE
AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

MEMORANDUM

2129

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 1, 1980

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM:

JERRY FUNK *JF*

SUBJECT:

Information Copy of Nyerere Message to the President

At Tab I is your memo to the President forwarding Nyerere's plea that he needs food, and his charge that we are welching on our promises. Not so. (C)

I will push the State/AID bureaucracy for a recommended response. (U)

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign your memo to the President at Tab I.

YES _____ NO _____

Tim Deal memo
D

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC/DOS WAIVERS
BY HM NARA DATE 12/12/23

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
REview on Apr 1, 1986



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 31, 1980

CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR: MS. CHRISTINE DODSON
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Alerting NSC on Presidential
Correspondence

Enclosed is a copy of a letter to President Carter from President Nyerere of Tanzania which is transmitted for your information.

This document was received in the Executive Secretariat Information Management Section on March 31, 1980 at 11:15 a.m.

Charles L. Jackson, Jr. for
Director, S/S-I
Information Management Section
Executive Secretariat
ext. 23836

DECLASSIFIED
Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
BY hll NARA, DATE 12/12/23

ID 8004595

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

H. 43

RECEIVED 07 AUG 80 16

TO PRES

FROM NYERERE, JULIUS

DOCDATE 19 JUL 80

TARNOFF

06 AUG 80

KEYWORDS: TANZANIA

IMF

HS

File Tanzania

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO PRES TELECON RE PLO OBSERVER STATUS AT WORLD BANK & IBRD

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO

DUE: 09 AUG 80 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

POATS

FUNK

DEAL

DODSON

COMMENTS

REF# 8017028 LOG 8004272 8004247 NSCIFID (H /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

8017028

44
4595

August 6, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: MS. CHRISTINE DODSON
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Alerting NSC on Presidential
Correspondence

Enclosed is a copy of a letter to President Carter from President Nyerere of Tanzania which is transmitted for your information.

This document was received in the Executive Secretariat Information Management Section on August 6, 1980.

William E. Brown
Director, S/S-I
Information Management Section
Executive Secretariat
ext. 23836

45
THE STATE HOUSE,
DAR ES SALAAM,
TANGANYIKA.

19th July 1980

President Jimmy Carter,
The White House,
Washington D.C.,
U.S.A.

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your letter of 16th July 1980 and for telephoning me yesterday evening. It was good to hear your voice and I am happy to know that the personal relations between us, and our mutual confidence in the desire of the other for good relations between our countries, does make it possible for us to make direct contact when the occasion seems to require it.

As I told you, I had begun to prepare a letter to you when you telephoned. I had considered your message very carefully; and I have since thought about our discussion. For I realise the problem you have and appreciate your desire to avoid further difficulties for the Administration's proposals about the funding of I.M.F. and I.B.R.D. and about other matters relevant to Third World development. I also would like to avoid giving a further excuse to members of the Senate or House of Representatives who, wittingly or through ignorance, seek to harm the poor of the world. We do recognise political realities; our involvement in the question of Observer status for the P.L.O. at the World Bank and the I.M.F. is therefore not one which we welcome.

The request for Observer status was, however, first made by the P.L.O. last year, and could have been dealt with then. But this was not done. Through the appointment of a Working Party which had to report to the Chairman of this year's meetings, the then Chairman and the other members of the Joint Procedures Committee managed to avoid the embarrassing position we now find ourselves in! The procedural process, whether necessary or simply a device for stalling, has been completed. Mr. Jamal cannot now appoint another stalling Committee.

Mr. Jamal's decision to invite the P.L.O. as Observers - which he communicated to Mr. McNamara and Mr. de Larosiere on 5th July 1980 - was reached after careful consideration of the Report of the Informal Working Party of Governors set up to consider the matter. We noticed that the one thing everyone

was agreed upon was that the final responsibility for extending or refusing an invitation was that of the Chairman. Apart from that, neither the Joint Procedures Committee nor the Working Party was able to give any help to Mr. Jamal. The Working Party - whose membership was decided by the last Chairman - was split equally between those who favoured an invitation and those who thought it should be refused.

We were thus left with the historical facts concerning the P.L.O.'s status internationally, and our own judgement about the relevance to the World Bank and the I.M.F., as well as to the P.L.O. of the latter having Observer status at these meetings. We took account of a number of facts:

- (1) that the P.L.O. has had Observer status at the U.N. General Assembly and in a considerable number of other U.N. Specialised Agencies (without this becoming a major political issue either at the time of their admission or since);
- (2) that the U.N. General Assembly has called upon organisations "within the U.N. system" to consult and cooperate with the P.L.O.;
- (3) that the Bank and the Fund have worked closely with international and regional organisations of which the P.L.O. is a full member;
- (4) that the P.L.O. is intimately involved in expenditures concerning the lives and welfare of more people than many member-states of I.M.F. and I.B.R.D.;
- (5) that the Group of 77 (of which Tanzania is a member) gave unanimous support to the application;
- (6) that Tanzania itself has accorded full diplomatic status to the P.L.O.;
- and (7) that although some 54% of the votes of these institutions would probably be recorded against Observer status for the P.L.O. if the constitutions provided for the decision to be made that way, the vast majority of the member-states are in favour of the application.

In addition to these factors, the application itself does seem to us to demonstrate a recognition by the P.L.O. of the importance of the I.B.R.D. and the I.M.F. to international discussion as a means of working for the well-being and not the destruction of humanity.

In the light of all these considerations and this background it seemed to us that our decision was unavoidable. We could only make one decision, and this was known to those who passed the poison chalice to us. "Passing the buck" was also a decision! Therefore, although in our conversation you suggested that I should ask Mr. Jamal to recall his letters to Mr. McNamara and Mr. de Larosiere, I really cannot find an honourable explanation for doing so. I wish I could!

There is one further point raised in your letter, and that is the need to give full study to the whole question of Observers at the meetings of these financial institutions. I do not disagree that this might be advisable. However I do not feel that we can now use that idea as a way of avoiding a decision on the P.L.O. application. Had such a study been set up last year when the application was first received, it may have been possible to defer a decision on it until the study was concluded. But instead a Working Party was set up to consider this specific application and was "not expected to consider all aspects relating to the extension of invitations to Observers". It therefore seems to me that to use that argument now as a means of further delaying a decision on this application would be to invite renewed allegations of political decision making by I.M.F. and I.B.R.D. Such allegations are always unfortunate in view of the frequent claim that these are non-political international institutions working only for financial stability and development.

Mr. President; my letter has perforce been very long, but I am concerned that you should realise the reluctance with which I find myself unable to help with the very real political difficulties you mention and of which I am very conscious.

I would like to conclude by sending my personal good wishes to you, and to repeat my assurances that my thoughts are with you in the heavy responsibilities you bear for your country and the world.

Yours sincerely,

Julius K. Quinn