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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name AFRICAN AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE, NSC: RECORDS

Withdrawer

LM 3/7/2024

File Folder NIGERIA (LAGOS) 09/16/1987-02/29/1988

FOIA

F12-045

Box Number 8

DEVERMONT

6

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
256341	SUMMARY	RE NIGERIA	1	9/16/1987	B1
256342	SUMMARY	RE NIGERIA	1	9/16/1987	B1
256343	CABLE	STATE 394827	1	12/22/1987	B1
256344	REPORT	DEPARTMENT OF STATE AFRICAN TRENDS	5	12/24/1987	B1
256345	REPORT	PAGES 19-22 ONLY	4	ND	B1
256346	PUBLICATION	NIGERIA	22	ND	B1
256347	REPORT	NIGERIA'S STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT...	2	ND	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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256341	SUMMARY RE NIGERIA	1	9/16/1987	B1

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<DIST>PRT: SIT
SI-T: COHEN VAX

3

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<ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
<TO>TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9977
INFO RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN 6628
RUTAGN/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 1336
RUEHCO/AMEMBASSY COTONOU 2269
RUFHPC/AMEMBASSY LOME 1864
RUFHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2435
RUEHMV/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA 1581
RUTAND/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 1054
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 1436
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3188
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 2300
RUTADD/AMCONSUL DOUALA 0956
RUTAKA/AMCONSUL KADUNA 1829

HE
~~APR~~
File Nigeria

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: BLACK EYE FOR FMG FROM ORGANIZATIONAL FAILURES
- IN LOCAL ELECTIONS

<TEXT>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 LAGOS 15811

LONDON FOR KOLKER
PARIS FOR POPE
YAOUNDE ALSO PASS MALABO
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV NI
SUBJECT: BLACK EYE FOR FMG FROM ORGANIZATIONAL FAILURES
- IN LOCAL ELECTIONS
REF: LAGOS 15060

1. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. FOLLOWING IS EMBASSY'S INITIAL IMPRESSIONS OF DEC. 12 LOCAL ELECTIONS, PRODUCED WITHOUT BENEFIT OF AMCONSUL ADUNA'S OBSERVATIONS. MISSION'S COMPREHENSIVE COUNTRY REPORT ON ELECTIONS WILL BE TRANSMITTED SEPTEL.

~BEGIN SUMMARY~

3. SUMMARY. WIDESPREAD ORGANIZATIONAL SHORTCOMINGS IN THE DECEMBER 12 LOCAL COUNCIL ELECTIONS ADDED UP TO FAILURE FOR THE FMG IN ITS MAJOR OBJECTIVE--ESTABLISHING CREDIBILITY FOR THE POLITICAL TRANSITION PROGRAM. TO THE EXTENT THAT THE ELECTIONS WERE COMPLETED SUCCESSFULLY CREDIT IS DUE LESS TO THE FMG-APPOINTED NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION (NEC) THAN TO THE OLD POLITICAL MACHINERY OF BANNED EX-POLITICIANS OPERATING BEHIND THE SCENES. THE SIGNIFICANT, AND LARGELY POSITIVE, ROLE PLAYED BY THE OLD POLITICAL NETWORKS HIGHLIGHTS TO THE FMG AND THE PUBLIC THE NECESSITY OF THEIR PARTICIPATION IN A SUCCESSFUL RETURN TO CIVILIAN RULE. END SUMMARY.

~END SUMMARY~

4. LOGISTICS.
LOGISTICAL SHORTCOMINGS WERE THE BIGGEST PROBLEM DURING THE NATIONWIDE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS CONDUCTED ON DECEMBER 12. THE GENERAL DISORGANIZATION WAS COMPOUNDED BY HIGH VOTER TURNOUT IN MANY AREAS. NONETHELESS, THE ELECTIONS WERE COMPLETED ON SATURDAY (OR IN THE VERY EARLY HOURS OF SUNDAY) AND RESULTS ARE ALREADY TRICKLING

DECLASSIFIED

Authority POS. WAIVER
BY MM NARA DATE 3/7/24

IN. HOWEVER, THE NEC IS CONSIDERING CANCELLING SOME OF THE ELECTIONS IN SEVERAL SOUTHERN STATES WHICH WERE CONDUCTED ESPECIALLY POORLY. SCATTERED REPORTS OF VIOLENCE, USUALLY SPARKED BY VOTERS' FRUSTRATION WITH LOGISTICAL FAILURES, WERE CONFINED MOSTLY TO THE SOUTHERN STATES, ESPECIALLY LAGOS AND BENDEL.

5. CAMPAIGNING.

SINCE TIME AND FUNDING FOR CAMPAIGNING WAS SCARCE, THE ELECTORATE WAS WELL INFORMED OF THE CANDIDATES ONLY IN AREAS WHERE THE LATENT LOCAL POLITICAL MACHINERY WAS HARD AT WORK. WITH CAMPAIGNING LIMITED TO 11 DAYS AND NO OVERT POLITICAL PARTY MACHINERY TO SUPPORT IT, VOTING WAS BASED NOT ON ISSUES BUT ON PERSONALITIES AND VILLAGE-ORIGIN--AS WELL AS ON THE WORD PASSED DOWN BY THE LOCAL POLITICAL MACHINERY COMPCSED OF EX-POLITICIANS, TRADITIONAL RULERS, AND BUSINESS/COMMUNITY LEADERS. IN AREAS, ESPECIALLY URBAN AREAS OF IBOLAND, WHERE THE OLD POLITICIANS PLAYED MINOR ROLES, VOTERS APPEARED CONFUSED ABOUT WHOM THEY WERE VOTING FOR AND THEREFORE, LESS INCLINED TO BOTHER.

6. RIGGING.

ELECTION-RIGGERS CLEARLY TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE MAJOR LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS IN THE ELECTIONS. BY WITHHOLDING ESSENTIAL VOTING MATERIALS, EFFORTS WERE MADE TO DENY THE VOTE TO CERTAIN AREAS BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION OF WHOM THE AREA WAS LIKELY TO SUPPORT. NONETHELESS, ORGANIZATIONAL SHORTCOMINGS PROBABLY DISENFRANCHISED FAR MORE VOTERS THAN THE RIGGERS DID.

7. PUBLIC PERCEPTION.

THE WIDESPREAD ORGANIZATIONAL CHAOS DURING THE ELECTIONS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 LAGOS 15811
LONDON FOR KOLKER
PARIS FOR POPE
YAOUNDE ALSO PASS MALABO
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV NI

SUBJECT: BLACK EYE FOR FMG FROM ORGANIZATIONAL FAILURES HAS DONE LITTLE TO IMPROVE THE GENERAL MOOD OF CYNICISM TOWARD THE FMG'S POLITICAL TRANSITION PROGRAM. THE NEC'S IMAGE ESPECIALLY HAS BEEN BRUISED BY THE EXERCISE. FOR THE FMG, THE MAJOR DISAPPOINTMENT IS THAT THE ELECTIONS APPEAR NOT TO HAVE BOLSTERED THE CREDIBILITY OF THE TRANSITION PROGRAM.

8. LESSONS.

THE FMG IS LIKELY TO KEEP FORGING AHEAD WITH THE TRANSITION PROGRAM, ESPECIALLY SINCE IT IS ANOTHER TWO YEARS BEFORE THE NEXT ROUND OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS TAKES PLACE. MUCH LESS LIKELY IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE FMG WILL CONCLUDE FROM THE ELECTIONS THAT NIGERIA IS STILL NOT READY FOR RETURNING TO CIVILIAN RULE, AND THAT THE TRANSITION PROGRAM MUST BE REEVALUATED. ONE CLEAR LESSON IS THAT POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE EX-POLITICIANS ARE NECESSARY PARTICIPANTS FOR ORGANIZING ELECTIONS, ESPECIALLY IN TERMS OF FINANCING AND STRUCTURING CAMPAIGNING. THE BAN ON POLITICAL PARTIES IS SCHEDULED TO BE LIFTED SEVERAL MONTHS BEFORE THE NEXT LOCAL ELECTIONS IN 1989. HOWEVER, THE BAN ON EX-POLITICIANS IS TO REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL AFTER 1992.

5
EMBASSY'S INITIAL IMPRESSION IS THAT ELECTIONS PROCEEDED
MUCH MORE SMOOTHLY IN THE NORTH THAN IN THE SOUTH. THIS
SENDS AN IMPORTANT MESSAGE TO SOUTHERNERS REGARDING THE
NORTH'S SUPERIOR ABILITY TO ORGANIZE AND MOBILIZE FOR
POLITICAL PURPOSES.

LYMAN

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02<SSN> 5811<STOR> 871214102039 MSG000187784439
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02<SSN> 5811<STOR> 871214102013 MSG000187784413
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256343	CABLE STATE 394827	1	12/22/1987	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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<i>Document Description</i>				
256344	REPORT	5	12/24/1987	B1
DEPARTMENT OF STATE AFRICAN TRENDS				

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256345	REPORT PAGES 19-22 ONLY	4	ND	B1

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256346	PUBLICATION NIGERIA	22	ND	B1

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256347	REPORT NIGERIA'S STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT...	2	ND	B1

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<DIST>SIT: EOB VAX

<PREC> PRIORITY<CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~<OSRI> RUEHOS<DTG> 131540Z JAN 88
<ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
<TO>TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0520
INFO RUFHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2506
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 3470
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 0753
RUTAKA/AMCONSUL KADUNA 2133

File: Nigeria
~~no stamp~~

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: THATCHER-BABANGIDA TALKS CONGENIAL, AVOID
CONTENTIOUS ISSUES

<TEXT>
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 LAGOS 00495
LONDON FOR KOLKER
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, UK, NI
SUBJECT: THATCHER-BABANGIDA TALKS CONGENIAL, AVOID
CONTENTIOUS ISSUES
REF: LAGOS 327

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
~BEGIN SUMMARY~
2. SUMMARY. '48.3 .8,8534 5#-5:#34'S PRIVATE
DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT BABANGIDA WERE THE BEST THAT
COULD BE HOPED FOR, ACCORDING TO DEPUTY HIGH
COMMISSIONER (DHC). WITHOUT BREAKING ANY NEW GROUND,
THE TALKS COVERED A WIDE RANGE OF BILATERAL AND REGIONAL
ISSUES WHILE AVOIDING THE CONTENTIOUS DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN NIGERIA AND BRITAIN. THE SECURITY INCIDENT SO
WIDELY PUBLICIZED BY FOREIGN PRESS WAS IN DHC'S VIEW
INSIGNIFICANT. WE AGREE WITH A NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY
OBSERVER WHO CONCLUDED THAT THE VISIT SET THE TONE AT
THE TOP -- MODERATION AND TOLERANCE -- FOR OTHER
OFFICIALS TO FOLLOW. IT APPEARS THAT WITH FORMER
FOREIGN MINISTER AKINYEMI OUT OF THE PICTURE, NIGERIA
WILL BE MORE LIKELY TO SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE, I.E., THAT
OF THE PRESIDENT, ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES. END
SUMMARY.

3. DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONER PETER HEAP DEBRIEFED DCM
AND POLOFF ON THE JANUARY 7-8 VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER
MARGARET THATCHER TO LAGOS AND KANO. CONTRARY TO MEDIA
REPORTS IN UK AND U.S. (BBC, CNN, WASHINGTON POST) HEAP
DISMISSED AS ABSURD ATTENTION GIVEN TO A SMALL SECURITY
INCIDENT IN KANO. HE SAID THAT IN THEIR ZEAL TO PROTECT
MRS. THATCHER, SOME NIGERIAN SECURITY AGENTS
INADVERTENTLY BLOCKED HIGH RANKING MEMBERS OF HER
DELEGATION FROM FOLLOWING HER INTO THE REVIEWING STANDS
FOR THE EMIR'S DURBAR, RESULTING IN THE MUCH REPORTED
PUSHING AND SHOVING. HEAP ATTRIBUTED PRESS FIXATION ON
THIS INCIDENT IN PART TO A DECISION TO LIMIT PRESS
CONTACT WITH MRS. THATCHER DURING THE VISIT. (BRITISH
DEFENSE ATTACHE, WHO ACCOMPANIED THATCHER THROUGHOUT THE
VISIT, TOLD AMBASSADOR THAT CROWDS IN KANO WERE
ENTHUSIASTIC AND POSITIVE. DEMONSTRATORS WERE
INVARIABLY PEACEFUL AND KEPT FAR FROM THE MOTORCADE.
MOST CROWDS WERE FRIENDLY.)

4. ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE VISIT, HEAP TOLD DCM AND
POLOFF THAT THE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER

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Authority DOS WAIVER
BY NM NARA DATE 3/7/24

MARGARET THATCHER AND PRESIDENT BABANGIDA WERE FRIENDLY AND AFFABLE WITH CONTENTIOUS ISSUES -- IMMIGRATION POLICY, POLITICAL FUGITIVES -- TOTALLY AVOIDED BY THE NIGERIANS. THE TWO LEADERS TALKED FOR ONE HOUR AND FORTY MINUTES (LESS THAN PROGRAMMED) WITH ONLY MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS NWACHUKWU AND MRS. THATCHER'S SENIOR PERSONAL SECRETARY CHARLES POWELL PRESENT. ALTHOUGH SOUTH AFRICA WAS DISCUSSED, THE LEADERS SPENT MOST OF THEIR TIME REVIEWING RESPECTIVE POSITIONS ON ECONOMIC AND OTHER BILATERAL ISSUES.

A. NIGERIAN ECONOMY. PRESIDENT BABANGIDA THANKED MRS. THATCHER FOR BRITISH SUPPORT OF NIGERIA'S STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ABOUT THE 1988 BUDGET, BABANGIDA DESCRIBED THE DEFICIT AS MODEST AND SAID HE HOPED TO DEAL WITH THE REMOVAL OF PETROLEUM SUBSIDIES WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE GENERAL DECONTROL OF PRICES. HE EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE ABOUT NIGERIA'S ABILITY TO MANAGE ITS ECONOMIC BELT-TIGHTENING. TO ACKNOWLEDGE NIGERIA'S REPAYMENT OF OVERDUE INTEREST ON BRITISH GOVERNMENT LOANS RESCHEDULED BY THE PARIS CLUB IN DECEMBER 1986, MRS. THATCHER ANNOUNCED A FIRST DRAWDOWN ON A LONG-PROMISED 200-MILLION-POUND LINE OF CREDIT, NAMELY, 20 MILLION POUNDS FOR COMPLETION OF A WATER PROJECT IN NIGER STATE. NIGERIA FINALLY AUTHORIZED THE REPAYMENT ON THE DAY OF MRS. THATCHER'S ARRIVAL IN NIGERIA.

B. TRADE. MRS. THATCHER MADE NO REPLY TO BABANGIDA'S APPEAL FOR THE UK TO TAKE STEPS TO REDRESS ITS UNFAVORABLE BALANCE OF TRADE WITH NIGERIA. THERE IS LITTLE IF ANYTHING BRITAIN COULD DO TO ALTER THE IMBALANCE. BRITAIN, WHICH COMPETES WITH NIGERIA FOR OIL MARKETS, DOES NOT IMPORT NIGERIAN OIL AND ALREADY IS THE LARGEST BUYER OF NIGERIA'S SECOND LARGEST EXPORT, COCOA.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 LAGOS 00495

LONDON FOR KOLKER
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, UK, NI

SUBJECT: THATCHER-BABANGIDA TALKS CONGENIAL, AVOID

C. INVESTMENT. BABANGIDA APPEALED TO MRS. THATCHER FOR MORE BRITISH INVESTMENT IN NIGERIA. IN RETURN, MRS. THATCHER STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF NIGERIA SIGNING A LONGSTANDING DRAFT AGREEMENT TO PROTECT INVESTORS AND PROVIDE INVESTMENT INCENTIVES.

D. OIL. BOTH LEADERS AGREED THAT STABLE OIL PRICES WERE NECESSARY. BABANGIDA CLAIMED THAT NIGERIA HAS REMAINED IN COMPLIANCE WITH ITS OPEC QUOTAS.

E. MILITARY TRAINING. MRS. THATCHER OFFERED TO WRITE OFF A LARGE PORTION OF NIGERIA'S MILITARY TRAINING DEBT--ABOUT TWO AND A HALF MILLION POUNDS OF AN APPROXIMATELY NINE MILLION POUND DEBT--AND MOVE AHEAD WITH ITS MILITARY TRAINING PROGRAM (WHICH ITS MINISTRY OF DEFENSE WOULD LIKE TO TERMINATE UNLESS THE DEBT IS PAID) IF NIGERIA WOULD MAKE SOME OF ITS PAYMENTS.

F. AIR AGREEMENT. THE TWO LEADERS DEFERRED DISCUSSION ON A NEW AIR AGREEMENT PENDING THE OUTCOME OF TALKS SCHEDULED TO OPEN JANUARY 11. NIGERIA, WHICH FIRST SIGNALLED ITS INTENTION TO TERMINATE THE AGREEMENT LAST JANUARY, HAS THREATENED TO HALT AIR SERVICE TO BRITAIN IN FEBRUARY UNLESS THE BILATERAL AGREEMENT IS

SATISFACTORILY RENEGOTIATED. APPARENTLY NIGERIA WANTS TO LIMIT BRITISH CALEDONIA SERVICE TO ONLY ONE POINT IN NIGERIA INSTEAD OF TWO TO PARALLEL NIGERIA AIRWAYS SERVICE TO BRITAIN.

G. AFRICA. MRS. THATCHER EXPRESSED CONCERN FOR THE GROWING SOVIET INFLUENCE IN AFRICA. BABANGIDA COUNTERED THAT HE WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED BY THE INCREASE OF SOVIET ARMS IN AFRICA AND BY THE INFLUENCE OF CUBA. HE ASKED THE PRIME MINISTER TO USE HER INFLUENCE TO ELIMINATE THE SOVIET INFLUENCE UNDERMINING STABILITY IN ANGOLA.

H. ANGOLA. BABANGIDA DESCRIBED THE CIVIL WAR IN ANGOLA AS A STALEMATE, ADMITTED TO CONTACTS WITH SAVIMBI AND SAID HE HAD AGREED WITH MOI THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN AFRICAN SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM.

I. SOUTH AFRICA. THE TWO LEADERS AGREED THAT THEY BOTH WANT AN END TO APARTHEID BUT EACH CONTINUED TO SUBSCRIBE TO DIFFERENT MEANS. THATCHER EMPHASIZED HER BELIEF IN THE NEED TO RETAIN CONTACT WITH SOUTH AFRICA IN ORDER TO RETAIN INFLUENCE AND BE ABLE TO USE NATIONAL INTERESTS FOR PROGRESS. BABANGIDA SAID HE BELIEVED SANCTIONS SHOULD BE TRIED SINCE EVERY OTHER STRATEGY HAD FAILED TO BRING ABOUT THE DESIRED RESULT. HE ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED A POSITIVE EVOLUTION IN THE UK POSITION ON THE ISSUE.

J. MIDDLE EAST. BOTH REITERATED THEIR DESIRE FOR PEACE AND PROGRESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

5. A GOVERNMENT PRESS STATEMENT ISSUED FOLLOWING THE VISIT CLAIMED THAT THE TALKS HAD LED TO GREATER UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE TWO LEADERS AND HAD LAID THE FOUNDATION FOR MORE FRUITFUL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MINISTER ECHOED THIS ANODYNE CONCLUSION WHEN HE TOLD REPORTERS THAT THE VISIT HAD BEEN A SUCCESS AND HAD OPENED CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

6. DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONER HEAP CALLED THE RESULTS OF THE VISIT "THE BEST WE COULD HAVE HOPED FOR." THE BRITISH, HOWEVER, WERE "MILDLY ALARMED" BECAUSE NWACHUKWU TOOK ONLY FOUR LINES OF NOTES DURING THE THATCHER-BABANGIDA DISCUSSIONS WHILE THEY, IN CONTRAST, UAD ALREADY PRODUCED AN EXTENSIVE SUMMARY FOR WHAT THEY CONSIDERED A "SERIOUS WORKING VISIT." QUERIED ABOUT EDITORIAL AND OTHER PRESS COMMENTARY ACCUSING MRS. THATCHER OF NOT BEING HERE FOR SERIOUS BUSINESS BECAUSE OF HER LACK OF MINISTERIAL ADVISORS, HEAP CLAIMED IT WAS "HER STYLE" TO TRAVEL WITHOUT ADVISORS ON FOREIGN POLICY MATTERS AND NOTED THAT BRITISH MINISTERS DON'T TRAVEL JUST BECAUSE IT "LOOKS GOOD." COMMENTING ON THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE POPULAR ANTAGONISM AND PRIVATE GOVERNMENT MODERATION DURING THE VISIT, HEAP SAID THAT IT WAS NICE TO KNOW THAT AT THE END OF THE LINE (I.E.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 LAGOS 00495

LONDON FOR KOLKER

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, UK, NI

SUBJECT: THATCHER-BABANGIDA TALKS CONGENIAL, AVOID BABANGIDA) THERE WAS A VOICE OF MODERATION.

7. THE GOVERNMENT-OWNED DAILY TIMES, THE ONLY NATIONAL DAILY THAT DID NOT ISSUE A BLISTERING ANTI-THATCHER COMMENTARY PRIOR TO THE VISIT, EDITORIALIZED AFTERWARD

THAT THE VISIT MEANT "WE CAN NOW BEGIN A MORE MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE" WITH MRS. THATCHER. IT PRAISED THE PROTEST ORGANIZERS FOR THEIR "MODERATION AND MATURITY" AND COMMENDED THE POLICE AND ARMED FORCES FOR THEIR RESTRAINT IN HANDLING THE DEMONSTRATORS. IN KANO, ANTI-THATCHER DEMONSTRATORS WERE EVEN MORE VOCAL AND ANTAGONISTIC THAN IN LAGOS.

8. COMMENT. NIGERIAN PAPERS, WHICH WERE ALMOST UNIVERSALLY AGAINST THATCHER'S VISIT, AND WHICH EXAGGERATED NUMBERS OF DEMONSTRATORS, DID NOT REPORT ANY SECURITY PROBLEMS. ONE PAPER RUEFULLY ADMITTED THAT MOST NIGERIANS WERE MORE CURIOUS AND ENTHUSIASTIC TO SEE THE PRIME MINISTER THAN CONCERNED WITH ANTI-BRITISH ISSUES SUCH AS APARTHEID AND THAT IN ONE CASE DEMONSTRATORS THEMSELVES BROKE OUT IN SMILES AND WAVING WHEN SHE RODE BY. MEDIA IN THE WEST SEEMS TO HAVE DONE WITH THIS VISIT WHAT NIGERIAN PRESS DID TO SECRETARY SHULTZ'S.

9. COMMENT CONTINUED. DESPITE THE ONGOING DISPARITY BETWEEN THE ANTI-BRITISH, ANTI-THATCHER ATTITUDES OF MANY NIGERIANS AND THE MODERATION OF THE PRESIDENT, THE THATCHER VISIT SEEMS TO HAVE PUT TROUBLED ANGLO-NIGERIAN RELATIONS SOLIDLY ON THE ROAD TO RECOVERY. WE AGREE WITH FOREIGN POLICY OBSERVER DR. GABRIEL OLUSANYA, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE NIGERIAN INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, WHO SUGGESTED TO THE DCM THAT THE THATCHER VISIT HAD SUCCEEDED IN SETTING A TONE FOR NIGERIA'S RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN FOR OTHER OFFICIALS TO EMULATE. WITH EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MINISTER NWACHUKWU PUBLICLY REFLECTING THE MODERATE TONE SET PRIVATELY BY DODAN BARRACKS, NIGERIA MAY BE ENTERING A PERIOD WHERE IT WILL TALK WITH ONE VOICE ON FOREIGN POLICY, NAMELY, THAT OF THE PRESIDENT, IN SHARP CONTRAST TO AKINYEMI'S TENURE AS MINISTER WHEN THERE SEEMED TO BE LITTLE IF ANY COORDINATION BETWEEN THE POLICY CONVEYED BY DODAN BARRACKS AND THAT ENUNCIATED BY EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

LYMAN

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 03<SSN> 0495<STOR> 880113123035 MSG000190384235
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03<SSN> 0495<STOR> 880113123200 MSG000190384320
<SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03<SSN> 0495<STOR> 880113123852 MSG000190384732
<TOR>880113130050

<DIST>SIT: VAX

43

<PREC> ROUTINE<CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~<OSRI> RUEHOS<DTG> 211353Z JAN 88
<ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
<TO>TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0650
INFO RUTAKA/AMCONSUL KADUNA 2204

~~APR~~
~~HO~~
Nigeria

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: RESTRICTIONS ON SHAGARI LIFTED: ANOTHER
EX-GOVERNOR RELEASED FROM PRISON

<TEXT>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 02 LAGOS 00840

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PINR, PGOV, PHUM, NI

SUBJECT: RESTRICTIONS ON SHAGARI LIFTED: ANOTHER
EX-GOVERNOR RELEASED FROM PRISON

REF: (A) 87 LAGOS 14218, (B) 87 LAGOS 12407,

(C) 87 LAGOS 1421, (D) KADUNA 682

(E) 87 KADUNA 716

1. (LOU) SUMMARY. ALL RESTRICTIONS ON FORMER
PRESIDENT SHAGARI'S FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT HAVE BEEN LIFTED
AND ANOTHER SECOND REPUBLIC GOVERNOR HAS BEEN RELEASED
BEFORE COMPLETING HIS PRISON SENTENCE FOR CORRUPTION.
ALTHOUGH THESE MOVES DEMONSTRATE GOVERNMENT'S CONTINUED
CONFIDENCE IN ITS ABILITY TO MANAGE FALL-OUT FROM THE
SECOND REPUBLIC, IT ALSO CONTINUES TO SEND MIXED SIGNALS
TO THE NEW GENERATION OF POLITICIANS ELECTED TO LOCAL
GOVERNMENT COUNCILS LAST DECEMBER. END SUMMARY.

2. (U) THE NATIONAL CONCORD REPORTED JANUARY 21 THAT
FORMER PRESIDENT SHAGARI, RESTRICTED TO HIS HOME VILLAGE
IN SOKOTO STATE SINCE HIS RELEASE FROM PRISON IN JULY
1986 (REF E), HAS REGAINED HIS FULL FREEDOM AND CAN NOW
MOVE FREELY ABOUT THE COUNTRY. HE REPORTEDLY MOVED TO
SOKOTO ON MONDAY, JANUARY 18, AND HAS RECEIVED A STEADY
STREAM OF VISITORS AND WELL WISHERS SINCE THEN.

3. (U) ALHAJI BARKIN ZUWO, PEOPLE'S REDEMPTION PARTY
(PRP) GOVERNOR OF KANO STATE, SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER 1983,
LEFT PRISON JANUARY 15 AFTER SERVING NEARLY FOUR YEARS
OF A SEVEN YEAR SENTENCE FOR CORRUPTION. THE ORDER FOR
HIS RELEASE CAME IN NOVEMBER BUT WAS CONTINGENT UPON HIS
REFUNDING NAIRA 370,000 TO THE GOVERNMENT. HE HAS
REPORTEDLY MADE THE REPAYMENT. ZUWO TOLD REPORTERS HE
PLANS TO GO ABROAD FGR MEDICAL TREATMENT BEFORE RESUMING
HIS BUSINESS, BARKIN ZUWO AND SONS: COMMERCIAL
ENTERPRISES.

4. (U) ZUWO, WHO FOLLOWED ABUBAKAR RIMI AS KANO STATE
GOVERNOR, WAS CONVICTED IN JUNE 1984 BY THE KADUNA ZONE
OF THE SPECIAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL ON THE RECOVERY OF
PUBLIC PROPERTY ON SEVERAL CHARGES OF CORRUPTION AND
VIOLATION OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT. HIS 66 YEAR SENTENCE
WAS REDUCED TO 21 BY THE SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL THAT
SEPTEMBER. THE ARMED FORCES RULING COUNCIL FURTHER
REDUCED HIS SENTENCE IN 1986 WHEN IT UPHELD THE JUSTICE
BELLO JUDICIAL REVIEW COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION FOR A
SEVEN YEAR SENTENCE WITH THE OBLIGATION THAT HE REFUND
DIVERTED FUNDS. UPON HIS RELEASE LAST WEEK, ZUWO
CLAIMED THAT THAT NAIRA 800,000 OF THE NAIRA 3.5 MILLION
CONFISCATED FROM HIS HOUSE AT HIS ARREST IN 1984 WERE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DOSS WAIVER
BY LM NAIRA DATE 3/7/24

PERSONAL FUNDS, PROFIT FROM HIS BUSINESS.

5. (U) PRESS REPORTS OF ZUWO'S TUMULTUOUS WELCOME IN KANO HIGHLIGHTED "RECONCILIATION" BETWEEN HIM AND FORMER GOVERNOR RIMI, ALSO CONVICTED FOR CORRUPTION BUT RELEASED IN OCTOBER (REF A). ZUWO WAS THE PRP'S LEADER IN THE SENATE (1979-83) BEFORE A SPLIT IN THE PARTY THAT PITTED RIMI AND BALARABE MUSA, IMPEACHED GOVERNOR OF KADUNA STATE, AGAINST ZUWO AND ACTIVIST AUTHOR CHINUA ACHEBE. RIMI MET ZUWO AT THE PLANE AND WHISKED HIM AWAY IN HIS MERCEDES.

6. (U) ZUWO IS THE FOURTH SECOND REPUBLIC GOVERNOR CONVICTED OF CORRUPTION TO BE RELEASED SINCE OCTOBER WITHOUT COMPLETING FULL PRISON TERMS (REFS A, B). TWO OTHER EX-GOVERNORS CHARGED WITH CORRUPTION HAVE BEEN ACQUITTED WITHIN THE LAST SIX MONTHS BY THE CORRUPTION TRIBUNAL (REFS C, D). TWO REMAIN IN PRISON: JIM NWOBODO, NPP GOVERNOR OF ANAMBRA STATE; AND ALHAJI ADAMU ATTA, NPN GOVERNOR OF KWARA STATE.

7. (LOU) COMMENT. WITH THESE DEVELOPMENTS, THE GOVERNMENT AGAIN SIGNALS ITS BENEVOLENCE AND COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS AS WELL AS ITS CONFIDENCE THAT THESE FORMER POLITICIANS POSE NO THREAT TO THE STABILITY OF THE REGIME. THE PRECEDENT ESTABLISHED BY THIS STRATEGY, HOWEVER, ALSO SIGNALS TO THE RECENTLY ELECTED LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS THAT THE PUNISHMENT FOR SELF-ENRICHMENT AT PUBLIC EXPENSE IS MINIMAL AND FORGIVENESS IS GENERALLY FORTHCOMING. BY QUIETLY LIFTING OF RESTRICTIONS ON SHAGARI, WHICH AT THE TIME OF HIS RELEASE APPEARED TO BE A CONCESSION TO SOUTHERNERS UP IN ARMS OVER THE JUDICIAL REVIEW COMMISSION'S FINDING THAT HE HAD NO CASE TO ANSWER, THE GOVERNMENT HAS APPEASED ITS NORTHERN CONSTITUENCY. UNDOUBTEDLY THE RELEASE OF NWOBODO, AN IBO, AND ATTA FROM KWARA, CANNOT BE FAR AWAY. IT IS UNLIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT BUHARI AND IDIOGBON ARE ANY CLOSER TO FREEDOM.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 02 OF 02 LAGOS 00840

B.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PINR, PGOV, PHUM, NI

SUBJECT: RESTRICTIONS ON SHAGARI LIFTED: ANOTHER LYMAN

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02<SSN> 0840<STOR> 880122101544 MSG000191153743
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02<SSN> 0840<STOR> 880122101554 MSG000191153754
<TOR>880122102325

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

'88 FEB 17 A7:17

UHS 7:17

B

S/S #



88 FEB 16 P7:03

SITUATION ROOM

1/21/88

024429

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL No. Pages 2
FROM: B. LYNN PASCOE S/S 75302 7224
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION LAGOS: BABANGIDA UNABLE TO ACCEPT INVITATION FOR STATE VISIT

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	BOB PERITO	6534	
	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	<u>Cohen</u>		
	<u>P. Stevens</u>		

FOR: CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS: PLEASE CLEAR BY: 2/16

S/S Officer: *Ray Chyngis*
BY: LYNN PASCOE R. W. Mueller

CROSSHATCH

RETURN TIME-STAMPED COVERSHEET TO S/S.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AF/W:RAPROCTOR:0351G
02/16/88 647-3406
AF:CACROCKER

AF/W:RPJACKSON
AF/W:RAMCGUIRE
S/CPR:CMURDOCK
NSCS:

AF/RA:DPASSAGE
S/S:
S/S-0:

IMMEDIATE

LAGOS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OPDC, OVIP, PREL, NI, US

SUBJECT: BABANGIDA UNABLE TO ACCEPT INVITATION FOR STATE VISIT

REF: STATE 45101

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. NIGERIAN AMBASSADOR HAMZAT AHMADU INFORMED AF/W INFORMALLY BY TELEPHONE 2/16 THAT PRESIDENT BABANGIDA REGRETTABLY WILL BE UNABLE TO ACCEPT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INVITATION FOR A STATE VISIT MARCH 21. AHMADU SAID HE HAD RECEIVED WORD SATURDAY, 2/13, IN A TELEPHONE CALL FROM DODAN BARRACKS THAT BABANGIDA'S SCHEDULE FOR LATE MARCH WAS ALREADY FULL WITH PREVIOUS COMMITMENTS AND THAT IT UNFORTUNATELY COULD NOT BE ALTERED AT THIS TIME.

3. AHMADU INDICATED THAT AMBASSADOR LYMAN IN LAGOS WOULD BE CALLED IN BY THE MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS TO RECEIVE THE FMG'S OFFICIAL RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S INVITATION, WHICH SHOULD CONFIRM THE MESSAGE AHMADU WAS RELAYING TO AF/W INFORMALLY. ALTHOUGH NOTING THAT HE RECOGNIZED THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SCHEDULE FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE YEAR WAS LIKELY TO BE EXTREMELY FULL, AHMADU SAID THAT THE FMG

Handwritten notes:
LTC
RAM
DP
RAM
BB
Dy for

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority DOS WAIVER
BY HM NARA DATE 3/7/24

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WAS HOPEFUL THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO RESCHEDULE A STATE VISIT FOR LATER IN THE YEAR. AHMADU STRESSED THAT BABANGIDA'S INABILITY TO ACCEPT THE INVITATION FOR MARCH 21 IN NO WAY REFLECTED NEGATIVELY ON THE VALUE THE FMG ATTACHED TO GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE US AND THE RESPECT WITH WHICH BABANGIDA HELD PRESIDENT REAGAN. 44

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~ABC -~~

Stevens was
anxious to get
this out, so
I cleared. It's
brief, but I think
enough has been said
by phone. ABR

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B



S/S #

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF COVERED ENCLOSURE

SITUATION ROOM

8 FEB 12

PI: 17

WASHFAX RECEIPT

PS

MESSAGE NO. 024331 CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL No. Pages
FROM: R. W. Mueller S/S 647-8448 7224 M
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION MIACI IMMEDIATE LAGOS: INVITATION FROM PRESIDENT
REAGAN TO PRESIDENT BABANGIDA

TO (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No
NSCS	Paul Stevens	2224	GFWW
NSCS	Executive Secretariat		
	<i>Cohan</i>		
	<i>Perito</i>		

FOR: CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS: Please clear by: ASAP 2/12

S/S Officer: *RW Mueller*
RICHARD W. MUELLER

CROSSHATCH

TIME STAMPED COVERSHEET TO S/S

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AF/W:RPJACKSON/RAPROCTOR:03466
02/12/88 L47-3406
AF:CACROCKER

AF/W:FDCKOOK
AF/W:RAMCGUIRE
S/CPR:CMURDOCK
NSCS:

AF/RA:DPASSAGE
S/S:
S/S-0:

NIACT IMMEDIATE LAGOS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OPDC, OVIP, PREL, NI, US

SUBJECT: INVITATION FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO PRESIDENT
BABANGIDA

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE WHITE HOUSE HAS REQUESTED THAT AMBASSADOR LYMAN
EXTEND TO PRESIDENT BABANGIDA AN INVITATION TO MAKE A STATE
VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES, MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT IN
WASHINGTON ON MARCH 23. PLEASE ADVISE URGENTLY WHETHER
PRESIDENT BABANGIDA WILL BE ABLE TO ACCEPT THIS INVITATION
AND WHETHER MRS. BABANGIDA IS LIKELY TO ACCOMPANY. YY

■
BAP for
EX
DP for
B for
B for
B for
B for
RP
NSCS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Sec.3A(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept 11, 2005
CYMAP WM 3/7/24

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 23, 1988

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS

FROM: HERMAN J. COHEN *HJC*

SUBJECT: Proposed Message from the First Lady to the
Women of Nigeria

The Government of Nigeria has requested a message from the First Lady to the women of Nigeria to be read on the occasion of International Women's Day, March 8, 1988.

I have reviewed the draft message submitted by the First Lady's Director of Projects. The anti-drug theme of the message is appropriate because Mrs. Babangida is actively involved in the anti-drug campaign.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to James Manning at Tab I approving his draft message.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Your Memo to James Manning
Tab II Incoming Correspondence

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES F. MANNING
DIRECTOR OF PROJECTS
OFFICE OF THE FIRST LADY

FROM: PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS

SUBJECT: Proposed Message from the First Lady to the
Women of Nigeria

The draft message from the First Lady to the Women of Nigeria attached to your memorandum of February 22, 1988 has been reviewed in the NSC and approved without change.

UNCLASSIFIED

NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8801363
RECEIVED: 22 FEB 88 15

TO: STEVENS
FROM: MANNING, J

DOC DATE: 22 FEB 88

ORIGINAL SUBJECT:
REQUEST FIRST LADY SEND SPECIAL MSG / WOMEN OF NIGERIA ON /
OCCASION / INTL WOMEN DAY 8 MAR

ACTION: MEMO STEVENS TO MANNING DUE DATE: 23 FEB 88
STATUS: S FILES: WH CODES:
STAFF OFFICER: COHEN

D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
COHEN

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS:

OPENED BY
NSEF

CLOSED BY

UNCLASSIFIED

1363
+

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 22, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: PAUL S. STEVENS
 EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
 OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

FROM: JAMES F. MANNING *JFM*
 DIRECTOR OF PROJECTS
 OFFICE OF THE FIRST LADY

RE: Attached Message from Mrs. Reagan

The First Lady has been requested to send a special message to the Women of Nigeria on the occasion of International Women's Day on March 8, 1988. Nigerian First Lady, Maryam Babangida, will participate in the activities marking International Women's Day, and Mrs. Reagan's message, along with others, would be read as part of these activities.

Per that request, could you please review the attached draft letter, and give us your opinion. Due to the time factor, we would appreciate hearing from you as soon as possible.

Thank you.

THE WHITE HOUSE

February 18, 1988

Dear Friends:

This brings my warm greetings to the women of Nigeria on the occasion of International Women's Day. The women of the United States join you in spirit as we celebrate this very special occasion.

Women have played vital roles throughout the course of history. Today this tradition continues as we unite to stop the spread of drug abuse. Your own First Lady, Maryam Babangida, is a wonderful example of the positive impact women are having in the battle against drug abuse. I send Mrs. Babangida and all the women of Nigeria my heartfelt thanks for your many efforts in this international campaign.

With very best wishes,

Sincerely,

International Women's Day
Lagos, Nigeria

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S #

80 FEB 23 P9:07

SITUATION ROOM

9 FEB 23 P9:04

024633

MESSAGE NO. 024633 CLASSIFICATION LIMITED OFFICIAL USE No. Pages 2

FROM: M. KLOSSON S/S 5302 7224
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION CABLE TO LAGOS: MESSAGE OF GOODWILL FROM MRS. REAGAN TO NIGERIAN WOMEN ON THE OCCASION OF INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S DAY, MARCH 8, 1988

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	PAUL STEVENS	2444	GFWW
NSC	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	PERITO		
	COHEN		
	BATJER		
	JACK COURTEMANCHE	456-2957	2 FL/EW

FOR: CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS PLEASE CLEAR BY: COB 2/25/88

S/S Officer: MIKE KLOSSON

CROSSHATCH

RETURN TO STAMPED COVERSHEET TO S/S.

DECLASSIFIED

CROSSHATCH

Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

BY LM NARA, DATE 3/7/24

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AF/W:RPJACKSON:03506
2/12/88 647-3406
AF:CMFREEMAN

AF/W:FBCOOK
AF/W:RAPROCTOR
IO/HU:KANDESON (SUBS)
S/S

AF/W:RAMCGUIRE

S/S-0:
NSCS:

IMMEDIATE LAGOS

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: ODIP, OPRC, PGOV, SOCI, SNAR, NI, US

SUBJECT: MESSAGE OF GOODWILL FROM MRS. REAGAN TO NIGERIAN WOMEN ON THE OCCASION OF INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S DAY, MARCH 8, 1988

REF: LAGOS 2188

~~CMF~~
J
R/C
R/S
R/S
NSCS
S/S
S/S-0

1. FIRST LADY NANCY REAGAN REQUESTS THAT THE EMBASSY DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO NIGERIAN WOMEN ON THE OCCASION OF INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S DAY, MARCH 8, 1988, THROUGH THE MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS:

BEGIN TEXT. ON THE OCCASION OF INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S DAY, I EXTEND TO THE WOMEN OF NIGERIA WARM GREETINGS ON BEHALF OF THE WOMEN OF THE UNITED STATES. AS WOMEN, WE ARE ESPECIALLY CONCERNED WITH RAISING, NURTURING, AND PROTECTING OUR FAMILIES. WITH THESE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES, WE WOMEN ACUTELY FEEL THE SCOURGE OF NARCOTICS ADDICTION. I SALUTE THE EFFORTS OF NIGERIA'S FIRST LADY, MRS. MARYAM BABANGIDA, IN THE FIGHT AGAINST THIS EVIL. I WISH HER AND THE WOMEN OF NIGERIA EVERY SUCCESS IN THIS INTERNATIONAL EFFORT.

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ 12

SIGNED NANCY REAGAN. END TEXT.

2. THE WHITE HOUSE DOES NOT PLAN TO RELEASE THE TEXT, BUT HAS NO OBJECTION TO RELEASE BY THE FMG. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW. YY

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 24, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR HANK COHEN

FROM: TED McNAMARA

SUBJECT: Annual Narcotics
Country Certifications

An advance copy of State's package on certification (minus the INCSR Executive Summary) is attached. Please review and provide any comments to me today. The final package to the President will be sent forward tomorrow morning immediately following the NDPB meeting.

As is noted in Deputy Secretary Whitehead's cover memo, Treasury and Justice want full certification for Mexico. Consequently, we will prepare an amended version of the Presidential Determination to reflect that position.

We regret the short turnaround on this and appreciate your support.

OK to clear
(Nigeria) HJC



S/S 8805144
United States Department of State

60

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 23, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: COLIN L. POWELL
FROM: John C. Whitehead *JCW*
Acting Secretary
SUBJECT: Certification of Narcotics Source Countries

The recommendations of the Department of State to the President on certification of narcotics source and transit countries, under Sec. 481(h) of the Foreign Assistance Act, are contained in the attached memorandum to the President. These recommendations are supported by a briefing document.

Our understanding is that you will not forward these recommendations to the President until the National Drug Policy Board has discussed these issues at a meeting Thursday, February 25. If, as a result of that discussion, I believe the Department's positions should be changed, I will so advise. Note that these recommendations reflect an Administration consensus, with the exception that Treasury and reportedly the Attorney General will advocate a "fully cooperating" certification for Mexico. At this time, we are not aware of any other reservations by the Attorney General.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority DOS WAIVER
BY JM NARA DATE 3/7/24

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 23, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: John C. Whitehead, Acting Secretary

SUBJECT: Presidential Certifications for
Narcotics Source and Transit Countries
Under P.L. 99-570

Section 481(h)(2)(A) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-570), provides that 50 percent of certain types of assistance (as notified to Congress under Section 653(a) of the FAA) must be withheld from major drug producing or trafficking countries. This assistance may not be released unless and until you determine and certify that (1) the country has either cooperated fully, or taken adequate steps on its own, to prevent narcotics production, trafficking and money laundering, or, (2) for countries that cannot qualify under this test, that certification is in the vital national interests of the U.S.

Under Section 481(h)(3), you must consider whether such countries have achieved the maximum achievable reductions in production, which is the statute's highest priority, and whether such countries have taken the legal and law enforcement measures necessary to (a) eliminate illicit cultivation and suppress illicit drug manufacturing and trafficking, and (b) eliminate money laundering to the maximum extent possible.

Our recommendations are well-founded and take all of these matters into consideration, but demand for drugs is increasing worldwide and we are reporting increased production in many countries. These problems will draw Congressional criticism. Under Section 481(h)(4)(A), assistance must still be withheld from a country which has been certified by you if Congress passes a joint resolution disapproving your determination within 45 days of receipt of the certification. We anticipate challenges on Mexico, Bahamas, Laos, and Pakistan, and possibly Colombia. Congress should agree on denying certification to Panama, with full certification for the Bahamas, Colombia and Pakistan, but even the national interest certification for Mexico could be in jeopardy.

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Authority: DOS WAIVER
BY: WM NARA DATE 3/7/24

The Department's annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report which will be submitted to Congress with your Determination provides the basis for your decisions. The Executive Summary of that Report is attached (Tab 1) to assist your review, as well as a briefing memorandum which summarizes the major points in the annual report and indicates the strengths and weaknesses of each country for purposes of decisions on certification (Tab 2).

Section 481(h)(2)(B) requires that each certification of a country on grounds of the vital national interests of the U.S. include a full and complete description of the vital national interests placed at risk, and a statement weighing these risks against the risks posed by the failure of the country to cooperate fully with the U.S. in narcotic control efforts. The information for Laos, Lebanon, Mexico and Paraguay will be transmitted to Congress along with the Presidential Determination.

Attachments:

- Tab 1 - INCSR Executive Summary
- Tab 2 - Briefing Memorandum on Certification
- Tab 3 - Presidential Determination
- Tab 4 - Statements in support of the President's Determinations under Section 481(h)(2)(B) of the FAA, as amended.

RECOMMENDATIONS ON CERTIFICATION

Afghanistan: Deny certification.

The Government of Afghanistan was denied certification in 1987 for failing to act against narcotics production and trafficking. The Soviet-backed regime in Kabul took no actions in 1987 on its own or in cooperation with the U.S. to halt production of opium, now estimated as high as 800 mt, nor are any cooperative actions planned for 1988.

The Bahamas: Certify.

The Government of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas has responded affirmatively to the major recommendations of the United States in 1987 for improving joint drug enforcement activities. A joint drug task force has been initiated, pursuant to statute, and is working effectively. The U.S. notes with genuine appreciation the high-level of continuing cooperation with OPBAT, which expanded in 1987 to seven-day, 24-hour coverage from three separate stations, the sharp increase in seizures, the signing of a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, and other improvements including the addition of another radar balloon and training for a new investigative unit of the Bahamian police. Also noted is the encouragingly stronger anti-narcotics posture of Attorney General Adderley, whose hand has been strengthened with the addition of the defense portfolio. The U.S. continues to believe that The Bahamas, like most source and transit countries, must do more to curb narcotics-related corruption, not only among rank-and-file enforcement officers but among GCOB officials at all levels of government. Greater effort must also be made to arrest and prosecute major traffickers. Moreover, while there has been genuinely good cooperation with U.S. agencies on US-operated enforcement initiatives such as OPBAT, cooperation has been largely limited to those US-directed efforts, and, we therefore applaud plans for establishing a DEA-type investigative capability.

Belize: Certify.

Three aerial eradication campaigns were successful in destroying 80 percent of the marijuana crop in Belize in 1987. Cooperation by the government has been good; more effort is expected in 1988 to ensure that current marijuana routes are not used to smuggle cocaine.

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BY LM NARA DATE 3/7/24

Bolivia: Certify.

Bolivia initiated a long-awaited voluntary eradication program in September 1987, which destroyed more than 1,000 hectares of coca by year's end. Cooperation has been quite good on this phase, but Bolivia must still prove it can manage a program attempting to eradicate 10,000 or more hectares. The critical test will come in August, when the agreement calls for initiation of an involuntary eradication program. U.S. training has improved the quality of narcotics enforcement, as reflected in much improved seizures of coca paste and destruction of more than a 1,000 processing sites. The U.S. is pressing Bolivia to intensify the interdiction campaign to suppress cocaine refining and also keep leaf prices low enough to augment the voluntary eradication program, including improved seizures of base and hydrochloride, as well as precursor chemicals, and destruction of a higher rate of active cocaine labs.

Brazil: Certify.

Despite resource constraints, narcotics enforcement results in 1987 were triple the 1986 level. Police cooperation on interdiction has been quite good, and Brazil is sensitive to the potential for increased drug trafficking across its territory, as well as upward pressure on marijuana and coca production, which it counters with aggressive eradication programs. U.S. officials seek even greater efforts to control the production and flow of precursor chemicals.

Burma: Certify.

Burma is conducting the largest-scale narcotics eradication program in history, destroying some 16,300 hectares in 1987, despite having to curtail spraying to counter a major Communist Party offensive. Burma is sensitive to being the world's largest producer of illicit opium, much of it grown in territory not under the control of the central government, and in 1988 plans not only to increase significantly its eradication program but to intensify its heroin lab suppression program.

Colombia: Certify.

Literally under siege by superbly-armed trafficking and insurgent groups, the Government is endeavoring to strike back at the drug cartels. For many years the most cooperative and critical of the Andean governments,

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Colombia extradited Carlos Lehder to the U.S., but the Supreme Court subsequently struck down the extradition agreement and in December Jorge Luis Ochoa was released. The Government must either find a basis for extraditing major traffickers or arrest and prosecute under Colombian law, or both. The Government must also be more forceful in attacking cocaine labs, many of which are protected by insurgent groups as well as by traffickers, most better armed than government forces. The Government maintained the effectiveness of its marijuana spraying program in traditional growing areas, and in 1988 will expand the spraying program to counter production found in new areas, which drove annual totals up. Colombia continues to cooperate in the search for a herbicide to destroy coca fields.

Ecuador: Certify.

After its successful 1987 coca eradication program, Ecuador is no longer considered a major source country. In addition to destroying much of the remaining coca crop, Ecuador continues its vigorous program of interdicting drug shipments.

Hong Kong: Certify.

Hong Kong Metropolitan Police are cooperating closely with U.S. and other enforcement agencies on interdicting heroin trafficking through the colony, and also on rooting out corruption. Hong Kong, which remains the financial hub for Asian drug traffickers, has begun enforcing its own racketeer influenced criminal organization law, and has revised its banking laws to facilitate release of information for drug-related investigations.

India: Certify.

India is forming an elite investigative unit as part of a more vigorous enforcement campaign, which includes interdiction of trafficking in opiates from both Southwest and Southeast Asia along its western and eastern borders. Indian officials do not agree that illicit cultivation occurs but informally acknowledge diversion from its vast licit production of opium, driven by its burgeoning addiction problem. India has signalled an interest in exploring conversion to the poppy straw process.

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Iran: Deny certification.

Denied certification in 1987, Iran has taken no steps on its own nor any in cooperation with the U.S. on narcotics control. While seen as a net importer of opiates, Iran also exports some part of its domestic production which U.S. officials believe is at the 200-400 metric ton level.

Jamaica: Certify.

Jamaica enforcement agencies drove marijuana production down from 1,755 metric tons in 1986 to 430 metric tons in 1987, one of the more significant reductions in narcotics production achieved through the U.S. assisted program. Jamaica, which is also improving its enforcement efforts, remains an important transit point for cocaine.

Laos: National Interest Certification.

Laos was granted a national interest certification in 1987 on grounds of promised cooperation on MIA/POW issues despite a failure to address narcotics production and trafficking. Lao opium and marijuana production are increasing significantly, and there are reports from multiple sources implicating Communist Party, Lao Army and other officials in managing as well as facilitating the trade. Laos has not accepted offers of U.S. narcotics assistance, nor undertaken any control initiatives. There is little prospect for a reversal of these trends. There is, however, progress on the POW/MIA issue, with remains and aircraft parts having been received by U.S. officials, and pledges of cooperation in early 1988 on joint excavations of crash sites.

Two certifications must be made of Laos, one on March 1 under Sec. 481(h) and another on May 1, under Sec. 2013 of P.L. 99-570, which requires reports on corrupt officials and governments. The decision is to grant Laos a national interest certification, under Sec. 481(h), with an understanding that the issue will be revisited May 1, when we will assess interim cooperation on the POW/MIA issue.

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Lebanon: National interest certification.

Opium, heroin and hashish production abound in the Bekaa Valley, with increasing indications of a flourishing trade in cocaine. However, narcotics trafficking and production occur in areas which continue to be controlled by elements of the Syrian military, with indications that various officers and units profit from the trade and protect it. The U.S. continues to believe it is in our national interest to provide assistance to the central government.

Malaysia: Certify.

Malaysia continues to cooperate effectively with the U.S. and other governments on narcotics enforcement, which it considers to be its principal national security threat. Interest in curbing trafficking in morphine and heroin base, largely controlled by ethnic Chinese, has been heightened by the election of Prime Minister Matathir to the presidency of the UN's International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking.

Mexico: National interest certification.

Mexico has improved its marijuana eradication campaign, but opium poppy eradication, while marginally improved in terms of total hectares eradicated, was woefully short of the effort needed to reduce production. The enforcement situation improved marginally, with some lab busts and increased seizures. The U.S. is still not satisfied with cooperation on the border. The Government has increased the commitment of resources, to both the Attorney General's program and the military program. But, the overall assessment is that Mexico's effort is not adequate, and certainly well below the level of efficiency and effect of which it is capable. Moreover, the Government has not yet successfully completed the trials in the Camarena and Cortez cases which remain underway with the defendants incarcerated, nor has it addressed all allegations of official corruption in a systemic fashion. While appreciative of those efforts that have been made, and taking full note of Mexican casualties, the U.S. believes a higher level of cooperation is in both our interests.

Morocco: Certify.

Morocco is just beginning to undertake narcotics control programs. A 1983 MLAT has not yet been ratified by Rabat and cooperation with the U.S. on narcotics is at the ground floor stage, and a new UN program is not expected

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to make major inroads on cannabis cultivation. But, U.S. officials sense a new determination in Morocco to improve intercepts of narcotics, including cocaine, and believe we should pursue that cooperation in 1988.

Nigeria: Certify.

Nigeria exhibits every intent of coping with both a major trafficking problem and a growing domestic drug problem, despite a lack of resources and weak enforcement agencies. Cooperation with the expanded DEA operation in Lagos has been quite good, and Nigeria is making good use of U.S. training to improve its enforcement.

Pakistan: Certify.

Pakistan's major significance to narcotics enforcement is as a refining center and transit point for Southwest Asian opium products exported to Europe and the United States. Enforcement against major traffickers and heroin labs has been lagging, but, at year's end, the enforcement situation seemed to be improving, a direct reflection of improved cooperation and assistance by U.S. and other agencies. Domestic production of opium is largely driven by the demands of an increasingly large addict population, now estimated at more than 600,000 heroin users. Opium production in 1987 was at the 135-160 mt level, about the same as 1986. The GOP redeemed its pledge to enforce the ban more vigorously in those merged and settled areas which had received development assistance, especially the Gadoon where opium cultivation had sharply expanded in 1986. The problem of reducing overall production levels is related directly to the need to extend the ban on opium production to the tribal areas of Bajaur and Mohmand and to Dir Adanzai. Development funds have not yet been committed by major donors to these areas, but, the GOP has been urged at the highest levels to initiate the planning needed to extend the ban to all growing areas, and we anticipate the government will make those moves in 1988.

Panama: Deny Certification.

As evidence supporting the indictment of Gen. Noriega indicates, narcotics related corruption in Panama is extensive, of long duration, and has served to limit the scope and effectiveness of U.S. directed enforcement operations. Panamanian officials cooperated with DEA on money laundering investigations in 1987, including Operation Pisces, and were successful in reducing marijuana cultivation, and in suppressing traffic in

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cocaine and precursor chemicals. However, other U.S. agencies received cooperation that ranged from good to poor on their investigations.

Clearly, the United States has non-narcotics interests in Panama, including the Canal, military installations, and trade. However, the decision is that the extent of narcotics-related corruption is such that a national interest certification is not warranted.

The decision to deny certification is intended to signal the GOP and especially the PDF that significant improvement is needed in cooperation on narcotics control. In order for Panama to demonstrate its good faith on this issue, the U.S. not only expects current DEA and other investigations to continue, but we will seek assurances that narcotics related corruption is not impeding those investigations. The decision recognizes the cooperation in 1987 on these investigations as well as interdiction efforts. The President has the option at any later time of issuing a statement of certification to the Congress, subject to its concurrence by joint resolution, if there is evidence that Panama has improved cooperation on narcotics control. The immediate decision on certification is taken noting that the certification issue must be revisited in late April, when the Administration files its corrupt officials report (Sec. 2013, PL 99-570). Given the Noriega indictment, certification with denial of aid and other privileges will have to be denied again under Sec. 2013, unless there are new reasons for the President to find it in our national interests to certify Panama.

Paraguay: National Interest Certification.

Paraguay has again become a major player in international narcotics, with indications that officials at various levels of the government are profiting from the trade, especially the production of marijuana and transshipments of cocaine. It is also noted, however, that U.S. officials have established good relations with Paraguayan narcotics officials, and have received pledges to cooperate with the recently reopened DEA office in Asuncion. Given the indications of official corruption, the issue of certifying Paraguay will have to be revisited on May 1 when the President certifies countries under Sec. 2013 of PL 99-570. A national interest certification now advises Asuncion that cooperation on narcotics is not adequate, that improvements are needed in the coming year, and that initial responses of cooperation with DEA will weigh heavily on the May 1 decision.

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Peru: Certify.

Enforcement actions to reduce the world's foremost supply of coca leaf continue to be stymied by the combined effect of attacks on narcotics workers and police alike by traffickers and terrorist groups. Peru did mount renewed versions of its Operation Condor interdiction program, but with mixed results. Similarly, eradication fell far short of the target of 6,000 hectares. Still, given the test of full cooperation as the basis for certification, U.S. officials believe Peru is making every effort to be cooperative, against daunting obstacles.

Syria: Deny certification.

Not only does the Syrian military control the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon, and exert control over the multi-faceted narcotics trade in that area, but Syria itself continues to be a transit country for narcotics. Syria remains under U.S. sanctions for its involvement in both terrorist and narcotics activities; it was denied certification under Sec. 481(h) in 1987. There is little or no progress to report for 1987, nor indications that the situation will change in 1988.

Thailand: Certify.

The effective program to reduce opium cultivation, with emphasis on areas which have received development assistance, continued in 1987, and at year's end, Thai officials were exploring the use of herbicides. RTG forces continued to cooperate closely with U.S. agencies on suppression of heroin refining on the border, as well as intercepts of precursor chemicals.

The requirement of Sec. 481(h) is that State determine which countries meet the Congressional criteria of being major producer and/or major transit countries. Only those countries identified as major are subject to certification. However, other parts of Sec. 481 require State to report on other countries wherein production and/or trafficking are of significant interest to the United States. The following countries are also included in the INCSR but it has been determined that they are not majors: Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, People's Republic of China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Micronesia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Philippines, Senegal, Singapore, Turkey and Venezuela.

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Presidential Determination
No. _____

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Certifications for Narcotics Source and Transit
Countries under P.L. 99-570

By virtue of the authority vested in me by Section 481(h)(2)(A)(i) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-570), I hereby determine and certify that the following major narcotics producing and/or major narcotics transit countries have cooperated fully with the United States, or taken adequate steps on their own, to control narcotics production, trafficking and money laundering:

The Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Colombia, Ecuador, Hong Kong, India, Jamaica, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru and Thailand.

By virtue of the authority vested in me by Section 481(h)(2)(A)(ii) of the Act, I hereby determine that it is in the vital national interests of the United States to certify the following countries:

Laos, Lebanon, Mexico and Paraguay.

Information for these countries as required under Section 481(h)(2)(B) of the Act is enclosed.

I have determined that the following major producing and/or major transit countries do not meet the standards set forth in Section 481(h)(2)(A):

Afghanistan, Iran, Panama and Syria.

In making these determinations, I have considered the factors set forth in Section 481(h)(3) of the Act, based on the information in the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report of 1988.

You are hereby authorized and directed to report this determination to the Congress immediately and to publish it in the Federal Register.

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Authority DOS/IA WAI VERS
BY LM NARA DATE 3/7/24

JUSTIFICATION FOR NATIONAL INTEREST CERTIFICATION

LAOS

Laos is a major drug producing country. Certification is granted to Laos in accordance with the vital national interest provision of Section 481(h)(2)(A)(ii) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1981, as amended by P.L. 99-570.

The Department finds that there are vital national interests which would be placed at risk should certification be denied. This risk has been weighed against the failure of Laos to cooperate fully with the United States on narcotics control or to take adequate steps on its own.

Laos was granted a national interest certification in 1987 on grounds of promised cooperation on MIA/POW issues despite a failure to address narcotics production and trafficking, and indications that local officials and a number of military officials were engaged in narcotics trafficking. Lao opium and marijuana production are increasing significantly, and there are reports from multiple sources implicating Communist Party, Lao Army and other officials in managing as well as facilitating the trade, which is increasingly important to the economy of this cash-poor country. Laos has not accepted offers of U.S. narcotics assistance, nor undertaken any control initiatives. There is little prospect for a reversal of these trends. There is, however, progress on the POW/MIA issue, with remains and aircraft parts having been received by U.S. officials, and pledges of cooperation in early 1988 on joint excavations of crash sites.

Two certifications must be made of Laos, one on March 1 under Sec. 481(h) and another on May 1, under Sec. 2013 of P.L. 99-570, which requires reports on corrupt officials and governments. The decision is to grant Laos a national interest certification, under Sec. 481(h), with an understanding that the issue will be revisited May 1. At that time, the dry season will have ended, and the U.S. will have proof positive (or negative) of the promised further cooperation on the MIA/POW issue. Hopefully, such cooperation will be forthcoming, along with strong indications of an intent to pursue narcotics control.

The President has assigned the highest national priority to obtaining the fullest possible accounting for all Americans lost in Indochina during the war and has pledged the full resources of the U.S. government to this effort. Relations with Laos are linked to the POW/MIA issue; progress on the issue is viewed as the principal measure of Lao sincerity in desiring to improve relations with the United States.

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority DOS WAIVER
BY MM NARA DATE 3/7/24

JUSTIFICATION FOR NATIONAL INTEREST CERTIFICATION

LEBANON

Lebanon is a major drug producing country. Certification is granted to Lebanon in accordance with the vital national interest provision of Section 481(h)(2)(A)(ii) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1981, as amended by P.L. 99-570.

The Department finds that there are vital national interests which would be placed at risk should certification be denied. This risk has been weighed against the failure of Lebanon to cooperate fully with the United States on narcotics control or to take adequate steps on its own.

Opium, heroin and hashish production abound in the Bekaa Valley, with increasing indications of a flourishing trade in cocaine. However, narcotics trafficking and production occur in areas which continue to be controlled by elements of the Syrian military, with indications that various officers and units profit from the trade and protect it. The Government's control over growing areas and transit routes has eroded during the past 12 years of civil strife. As we concluded last year, a comprehensive eradication and interdiction program must await restoration of central government control.

The finding of national interest is unchanged. The United States wants to assist in the re-establishment of peace and stability in Lebanon. Denial of certification would end U.S. assistance to Lebanese government efforts to maintain a professional and well-trained Lebanese Army, a key element in the eventual restoration of government control and stability. U.S. assistance to displaced and injured Lebanese civilians helps minimize the destabilizing effects of continuing civil strife and economic distress.

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Authority DDS WAIVER
BY WM NARA DATE 3/7/24

JUSTIFICATION FOR NATIONAL INTEREST CERTIFICATION

MEXICO

Mexico is a major drug producing and transit country. Certification is granted to Mexico in accordance with the vital national interest provision of Section 481(h)(2)(A)(ii) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1981, as amended by P.L. 99-570.

The Department finds that there are vital national interests which would be placed at risk should certification be denied. This risk has been weighed against the failure of Mexico to cooperate fully with the United States on narcotics control or to take adequate steps on its own.

Mexico has improved its marijuana eradication campaign, but opium poppy eradication, while marginally improved in terms of total hectares eradicated, was short of the effort needed to reduce production. The enforcement situation improved with some lab busts and increased seizures. The Mexican Government has increased the commitment of resources to both the Attorney General's program and the military program. But the overall assessment is that Mexico's effort has not kept pace with the increased flow of drugs, and is below the level of efficiency and effect of which it is capable. Moreover, the Government has not yet completed the trials in the Camarena and Cortez cases which remain underway with the defendants incarcerated, nor has it addressed all allegations of official corruption in a systemic fashion. While appreciative of the efforts that have been made, and taking full note of Mexican casualties, the U.S. nevertheless believes that a higher level of cooperation is in both our interests.

The narcotics issue is of the highest priority, as was evident at the recent meeting of our two Presidents. President Reagan made very clear an expectation that 1988 would be a year of results in the cooperative program.

There are other vital national interests in Mexico, including U.S. efforts to assist Mexico in improving its economy and managing its debt. There is an important interdependence of our economies along our border, as well as many social and cultural ties.

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BY LM NARA DTE 3/7/24

JUSTIFICATION FOR NATIONAL INTEREST CERTIFICATION

PARAGUAY

Paraguay is a major drug producing country. Certification is granted to Paraguay in accordance with the vital national interest provision of Section 481(h)(2)(A)(ii) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1981, as amended by P.L. 99-570.

The Department finds that there are vital national interests which could be affected should certification be denied. This risk should be weighed against the failure to date of Paraguay to cooperate fully with the United States on narcotics control or to take adequate steps on its own.

Paraguay has again become a major player in international narcotics, with serious allegations that officials at various levels of the government may be profiting from the trade, especially the production of marijuana and transshipment of cocaine. It is also noted, however, that U.S. officials have established good relations with Paraguayan narcotics officials, and have received pledges to cooperate with the recently reopened DEA office in Asuncion. A factor in granting national interest certification is to determine more precisely the scope of the problem and the willingness of Paraguay's officials to cooperate with DEA on drug investigations. It is noted that Paraguay has given drug intelligence to U.S. officials.

Given the allegations of official corruption, the issue of certifying Paraguay will have to be reviewed on May 1 when the President certifies countries under Sec. 2013 of P.L. 99-570. A national interest certification now advises Asuncion that cooperation on narcotics is not adequate, that improvements are needed in the coming year, and that Paraguay's cooperation with DEA will affect the May 1 decision.

While the most immediate national interest in Paraguay is the drug issue itself, there are other U.S. interests, including a desire to sustain the Peace Corps operations, and maintain a program presence that could help encourage a peaceful political transition to a post-Stroessner era.

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BY WM NARA DATE 3/7/24