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Collection Name File Folder Box Number	AFRICAN AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE, NSC: RE NIGERIA - GENERAL 01/01/1987-05/31/1987 8	CORDS	Withdrawer LM 3/5/2024 FOIA F12-045 DEVERMONT		
ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	3 Doc Date	Restrictions	
256319 CABLE	SECTO 01074	3	1/13/1987	B1	
256320 REPORT	PAGES 5-6 ONLY, RE NIGERANS	2	ND	B1	
256323 REPORT	PAGE 6 ONLY	1	ND	B1	
256321 REPORT	RE NIGERIA	1	2/12/1987	B1	
256322 REPORT	PAGE 3 ONLY, RE NIGERIA	1	ND	B1	
256324 REPORT	PAGE 3 ONLY	1	5/14/1987	7 B1	

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA] B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S VISIT TO AFRICA

CONFIDENTIAL STATE Ø21229 FOR AMBASCADORS/CHARGES FROM CROCKER E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEDRGE P), XA SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S VISIT TO AFRICA 1. C - ENTIRE TEXT. >BEGIN SUMMARY>

2. SUMMARY: SECRETARY SHULTZ HAS RETURNED FROM HIS FIRST VISIT TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA IMPRESSED WITH AFRICA AND WITH THE EFFORTS AFRICANS ARE MAKING TO DEAL WITH THEIR PROBLEMS, AND HIGHLY PLEASED WITH THE WORK OF OUR MISSIONSTIN ASSISTING THEIR HOSTS AND IN PROTECTING AND FURTHERING U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS. I BELIEVE THE SECRETARY, ARMED WITH WHAT HE HAS SEEN AND LEARNED ON HIS TRIP, WILL BE EVEN MORE INCLINED TO SUPPORT A STRONG AND CLEAR U.S. POLICY TOWARD AFRICA IN THE FUTURE. HE HAS ALREADY ASKED A NUMBER OF SEARCHING QUESTIONS WHICH WILL LEAD TO NEW INITIATIVES AND INNOVATIVE APPROACHES IN OUR ECONOMIC AND FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE REGION. I OFFER MY PERSONAL CONGRATULATIONS AND THANKS TO ALL AF PERSONNEL WHO CONTRIBUTED DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY TO THE SUCCESS OF THE SECRETARY'S VISIT: AF'S PEOPLE - BOTH IN

THE DEPARTMENT AND IN THE FIELD -- DID AN OUTSTANDING JOB. YOU HAVE MY APPRECIATION AND ADMIRATION. END SUMMARY.

3. FDLLOWING IS PRINCIPALLY FOR POSTS' INFORMATION, BUT ALSO MAY BE DRAWN UPON, AS APPROPRIATE, IN BRIEFING HOST GOVERNMENTS AND OTHERS WITH WHOM YOU HAVE CONTACT. 4. SECRETARY SHULTZ WOUND UP A HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL SIX-NATION TOUR OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA ON JANUARY 14 PLEASED AND IMPRESSED WITH WHAT HE SAW. HE RETURNED TO WASHINGTON ARMED WITH FIRST-HAND INFORMATION ABOUT AFRICAN PROBLEMS AND APPROPRIATE U.S. APPROACHES TO ASSIST IN TACKLING THEM. AMONG THE KEY COMMON THEMES FROM ALL STOPS ON THE VISIT WERE THE FOLLOWING:

-- THE U.S. IS A WELCOME FRIEND IN BLACK AFRICA; AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS AND PRIVATE CITIZENS ALIKE MADE CLEAR TO THE SECRETARY THAT THEY WARTED GREATER U.S. INVOLVEMENT --NOT LESS -- AND MORE HELP IN DEALING WITH THEIR PROBLEMS. THEY DO NOT WISH THE U.S. TO PULL BACK FROM

THEIR CONTINENT. -- THE SECRETARY HAS SEEN THAT THE AFRICAN COMMITMENT TO

PRIVATE SECTOR INITIATIVES, LIBERALIZATION AND REDUCING UNPRODUCTIVE "STATIST" INVOLVEMENT IN THEIR ECONOMIES, IS GENUINE AND IS GROVING.

- HIS AFRICAN HOSTS UNIFORMLY EXPRESSED EAGERNESS TO SEE THE U.S. BUILD UPON AND EXPAND ITS DIALOGUE WITH THE ANC, AND WERE ENCOURAGED BY THE SECRETARY'S REAFFIRMATION OF USG INTENT TO COMPLY WITH AND IMPLEMENT THE ANTI- APARTHEID ("CANCTIONS") LEGISLATION ENACTED BY THE LAST CONGRESS, NOTWITHSTANDING THE ADMINISTRATION'S VERY REAL RESERVATIONS ABOUT ITS NEGATIVE OVERALL EFFECT. - BLACK AFRICA DOES NOT WANT TO BE AT ODDS WITH THE

U.S. THE NIGERIANS WERE PERHAPS THE HOST VOCAL IN POINTING TO <u>A NARROWING</u> OF THE GAP BETWEEN U.S. AND <u>AFRICAN POSITIONS ON MAJOR ISSUES</u>. WITH THIS VISIT, I BELIEVE OUR AFRICAN RELATIONS HAVE BEEN STRENGTHENED, CERTAINLY IN THE SIX KEY COUNTRIES THE SECRETARY VISITED.

- <u>WITHOUT EXCEPTION, WE WERE ENCOURAGED TO CONTINUE</u> <u>WORKING WITH THE MOZAMBICAN GOVERNMENT;</u> THE SECRETARY WAS GIVEN ABUNDANT FIRST HAND ANMUNITION BY THE AFRICANS THEMSELVES TO USE IN SUPPORT OF THIS KEY ADMINISTRATION POSITION.

-- I BELIEVE THE SECRETARY WAS IMPRESSED ANEW WITH THE IMPERATIVE OF "KEEPING THE HEAT ON" WITH RESPECT TO AID LEVELS FOR AFRICA. I AM CONFIDENT THAT HE WILL INCOR-PORATE WHAT HE SAW IN AFRICA IN SPEECHES, TESTIMONY, AND IN OTHER OPPORTUNITIES TO INFLUENCE THE AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY OEBATE.

-- FINALLY, I BELIEVE THE SECRETARY WAS THOROUGHLY IMPRESSED WITH MANY OF THE AFRICAN OFFICIALS WITH WHOM HE MET -- ON THEIR HOME GROUND AND IN THEIR OWN MILIEU -- A QUITE DIFFERENT IMPRESSION FROM THAT OERIVED AS A RESULT OF THE HIGHLY RITUALIZED EXPOSURE SECRETARIES OF STATE ARE NORMALLY CONFINED TO ON OCCASIONS LIKE UNGA IN NEW YORK AND OFFICIAL VISITS ON OUR HDME TURF IN WASHINGTON. AS WOODROW WILSON REPORTEDLY WROTE TO AM AGED MAIDEN AUNT IN TRENTON DURING HIS FIRST VISIT TO PARIS, "THERE ARE A NUMBER OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TRENTON AND PARIS, AND THOSE DIFFERENCES ARE MUCH MORE APPARENT WHEN YOU ARE IN PARIS THEN WHEN YOU ARE IN TRENTON." THE SAME CAN BE SAID OF MONROVIA OR ABIDJAN OR NAIROBI.

- ALTHOUGH CHAD AROSE MAINLY IN DISCUSSIONS IN THE FRANCOPHONE STATES, THE UNIVERSALLY EXPRESSED SENTIMENT WAS THAT THIS WAS THE TIME AND CHAD WAS THE PLACE TO

ADMINISTER A CONSPICUOUS REBUKE -- TO LIBYA'S QADHAFL A TROUBLEMAKER WHOSE CREDENTIALS AS A SERIOUS HENACE TO THE PEACE, PARTICULARLY AFTER THE NAM SESSIDNS IN HARARE, ARE BY NOW NO LONGER IN QUESTION; VIRTUALLY EVERYONE THE SECRETARY SPOKE TO URGED THE U.S. NOT TO ABAHDON ITS SUPPORT FOR CHAD.

COUNTRIES VISITED:

5. SENEGAL: PRESIDENT DIOUF AND HIS GOVERNMENT WERE THEIR CUSTOMARY IMPRESSIVE SELVES--ARTICULATE, ELOQUENT ABOUT THE MULTIPLE AND MULTIFACETED PROBLEMS DF THEIR REGION, BUT ANXIOUS TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THEY REGARDED THE U.S. AS A FRIEND WHO THEY HOPED WOULD INCREASINGLY INVOLVE ITSELF IN AFRICA AND AFRICAN PROBLEMS. THE SECRETARY WAS PROFOUNDLY MOVED BY THE PORTION OF AMERICA'S OWN PAST REPRESENTED BY THE SLAVE SHIPMENT BUILDING ON GOREE ISLAND AND ITS AMERICAN CONMECTION. 6. CAMEROON: THE SECRETARY'S BRIEF STOPOVER WAS IN

RESPONSE TO AN INVITATION EXTENDED DURING PRESIDENT BIYA'S VISIT TO THE U.S. LAST YEAR. BIYA REAFFIRMED HIS SUPPORT FOR U.S. POLICY ON BOTH CHAD AND SOUTHERN AFRICA; THE DISCUSSIONS WERE COMPLETELY FRIENDLY SINCE THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT BILATERAL PROBLEMS BETWEEN US, AND PRESIDENT BIYA AND THE SECRETARY AGREED THAT WE SHOULD INCREASE OUR COOPERATION IN THOSE AREAS WHERE WE HAVE COMMON INTERESTS.

7. KENYA: PRESIDENT MOI AND HIS OFFICIALS PUT FORTH AN >END SUMMARY>

AUTHENTICALLY NATIONALISTIC PERFORMANCE. HOI WAS PROUD OF KENYA'S ACHIEVEMENTS AND THE SECRETARY VAS VISIBLY IMPRESSED WITH BOTH THE STRIKING BEAUTY OF EAST AFRICA AND WITH THE DEMONSTRABLE ACHIEVEMENTS OF KENYA. THE KENYANS WERE REMINDED OF THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING THEIR REPUTATION AS AN OASIS OF TOLERANCE, OPENNESS AND -CONFIDENTIAL

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WELCOME FOR PRIVATE INVESTORS, AND THANKED FOR THEIR STRONG COOPERATION WITH US IN MANY AREAS. MOI RAISED A NUMBER OF ISSUES WITH THE SECRETARY, INCLUDING, PREDICTABLY, INADEQUATE AID LEVELS. HE MADE A PITCH FOR THE U.S. TO LOOK FOR "VISIBLE" AID PROJECTS AND PROGRAMS. THE CLEAR IMPLICATION WAS THAT THE U.S. MIGHT BE ENGAGED ACROSS THE BOARD IN WORTHWHILE ASSISTANCE EFFORTS, BUT MAY NOT BE REAPING THE IMPORTANT REWARD OF

ASSOCIATION IN AFRICANS' MINDS COMMENSURATE TO OUR EXPENDITURES AND EFFORTS. THE KENYANS WERE CLEARLY PLEASED TO RECEIVE OUR INVITATION TO PRESIDENT MOI TO VISIT WACHINGTON.

8. NIGERIA: PRESIDENT BABANGIDA WAS EXTREMELY IMPRESSIVE AS WAS HIS ATTORNEY GENERAL (TO WHOM THE SECRETARY EXTENDED AN INVITATION FROM ED MEESE TO VISIT WASHINGTON FOR DISCUSSIONS ON NARCOTICS AND OTHER LEGAL MATTERS) AND OTHERS ON THE GON TEAM. THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY WAS VERY USEFUL; THE CONSENSUS THEY PUT TO HIM WAS THAT NIGERIA HAS TURNED THE CORNER UNDER BABANGIDA'S GOVERNMENT AND WHILE BOTH FINANCIAL PROBLEMS AS WELL AS GENERAL DISORGANIZATION WILL CONTINUE TO BE WITH NIGERIANS FOR SOME TIME TO COME, NIGERIA IS A GOOD PLACE TO DO BUSINESS IN AFRICA. THE SECRETARY HAS ASKED THAT WE ANALYZE THE ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES OF A BILATERAL TAX TREATY WITH NIGERIA. THERE IS ALSO TO BE AN OPIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT MISSION. WE ARE WORKING ON A POSSIBLE BABANGIDA VISIT TO WASHINGTON.

9. COTE D'IVOIRE: THE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY WAS A VINTAGE PERFORMANCE AS WELL AS A CLASS ACT: THE IVORIENS PUT ON A SPLENDID LUNCHEON, AND HOUPHOUET HIMSELF GAVE A MASTERFULLY INCISIVE ANALYTICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES IN AFRICA SINCE THE WAVE OF INDEPENDENCE MORE THAN TWO DECADES AGO, WITH SOME COUNTRIES PURSUING A FREE-MARKET ROUTE TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND OTHERS OPTING FOR EXPERIMENTATION WITH SOCIALIST AND EVEN MARXIST ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS. THE INTERVAL SINCE THE ERA OF INDEPENDENCE BEGAN HAS PROVIDED A DRAMATIC COMPARISON OF THE BENEFITS OF THE TWO ROUTES. AND THE INCREASED TURNING BY AFRICANS AWAY FROM SOCIALIST SYSTEMS IS ELOQUENT TESTIMONY TO THE EFFICACY OF THE WESTERN FREE MARKET APPROACH. HE VERY USEFULLY MADE THE POINT THAT MOST DEVELOPING COUNTRIES REMAIN DEPENDENT ON A HANDFUL OF CASH CROPS FOR THEIR

FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNINGS, AND THAT THOSE EARNINGS ARE SUBJECT TO ENORMOUS FLUCTUATIONS WHICH LEAVE THE PRODUCERS FINANCIALLY AT THE MERCY OF FORCES OVER WHICH THEY HAVE LITTLE INFLUENCE. HOUPHOUET POINTED OUT THAT MOST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES HAVE FOUND WAYS TO INSULATE OR PROTECT THEIR OWN ECONOMIES, WHETHER THROUGH SUBSIDIES OR TARIFF IMPORT RESTRICTIONS AGAINST COMPETITION, BUT THAT THE U.S. HAS STRONGLY OPPOSED EFFORTS BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO SIMILARLY PROTECT THEMSELVES WITH RESPECT TO THE PRICES OF THEIR PRIMARY PRODUCT EXPORTS. THE U.S., AS YOU KNOW, STRONGLY OPPOSES ARTIFICIAL MECHANISMS LIKE PRICE FLOORS/CEILINGS, AND THE SECRETARY GAVE NO REASON FOR HOPE THAT THE U.S. WOULD CHANGE ON THIS. HOWEVER, THE SECRETARY WAS STRONGLY IMPRESSED BY THE IMPACT DECLINING AND UNSTABLE COMMODITY PRICES HAVE ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES' FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT PLANS. 10. LIBERIA: FINALLY, THE SECRETARY'S STOP IN MONROVIA, ALTHOUGH BRIEF, WAS POTENTIALLY EXTREMELY PRODUCTIVE. THE FULL SCOPE OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WAS DISCUSSED BETWEEN THE SEGRETARY AND PRESIDENT DOE: HUMAN RIGHTS, MILITARY COOPERATION, AND THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF THE GOL WERE THREE KEY ISSUES. THE LIBERIAN GOVERNMENT HAS HAD ITS UNDERSTANDING REFRESHED ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE THE U.S. ATTACHES TO IMPROVED HUMAN RIGHTS

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PERFORMANCE AND DEMOCRATIZATION AS WELL AS OUR UNHAPPINESS ABOUT OFF-BUDGET EXPENDITURES. FOR HIS PART, PRESIDENT DOE ENUMERATED THE HANY PROBLEMS HE FACED IN TRYING TO RESTORE ORDER AND RENEW DEVELOPMENT IN A COUNTRY WHICH IS BROKE AND FOR WHOSE FEW EXPORT PRODUCTS THERE IS BOTH A DIMINISHING MARKET AND DECLINING EARNINGS. THE GOL MADE CLEAR ITS OPENNESS TO U.S. MANAGERIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ADVICE IN RESTRUCTURING THEIR BUREAUCRATIC APPARATUS. WE WILL BE LOOKING AT WHAT WE MIGHT DO TO HELP THEM ON THIS SCORE AS WELL AS HOW WE MIGHT GO ABOUT IT. THE MONROVIA VISIT ALSO FEATURED A MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY AND LIBERIAN OPPOSITION LEADERS IN WHICH THE ISSUES OF STABILITY, ECONOMIC POLICY, RECONCILIATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS WERE DISCUSSED IN A CONSTRUCTIVE ATMOSPHERE. THE LIBERIAN STOP WAS, IN ADDITION AND IN A DIFFERENT RESPECT, THE CAPSTONE OF THE TRIP FOR BOTH SECRETARY AND MRS. SHULTZ WHO, BEFORE THEIR DEPARTURE, WERE "GOWNED" BY THEIR HOSTS -- AN EXPERIENCE WITH WHICH NO OTHER BUREAU (EUR, NEA, EA, ARA) CAN POSSIBLY HOPE TO COMPETE.

11. IN CONCLUSION, I BELIEVE WE ACCOMPLISHED EVERYTHING WE HOPED TO WITH THIS VISIT. IT WAS NOT A NEGOTIATING TRIP; THE SECRETARY DID NOT SET OUT TO SIGN AGREEMENTS OR NEGOTIATE UNDERSTANDINGS, BUT, RATHER, TO DEMONSTRATE BY HIS PRESENCE THAT THE U.S. CARES ABOUT AFRICA AND IS INTERESTED IN IT AND ITS PROBLEMS; THAT WE ARE ENGAGED THERE AND INTEND TO REMAIN SO FOR AS LONG AS AFRICANS THEMSELVES WISH US TO BE; THAT OUR POLICIES ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, SOUTHERN AFRICA AND CHAD ARE CLEAR AND DIRECTLY RESPONSIVE TO AFRICAN INTERESTS; AND THAT WE ARE WILLING TO EXPLORE WITH THEM ON A GOOD-FAITH BASIS WAYS IN WHICH THE U.S. CAN CONTRIBUTE POSITIVELY TO FINDING SOLUTIONS TO AFRICAN PROBLEMS. THE SECRETARY WAS UNIFORMLY MET WITH A PRECISE RECIPROCAL OF HIS OBJECT-IVES: A CLEARLY AND OCCASIONALLY EVEN FORCEFULLY-EXPRESSED DESIRE THAT THE U.S. REMAIN ENGAGED IN AFRICA,

THAT WE COMMIT OURSELVES TO HELPING AFRICANS DEAL WITH THEIR PROBLEMS, AND AN ENHANCED APPRECIATION ON THE PART OF AFRICANS THAT SOME OF THE MODELS THEY HAVE USED OVER THE SEVERAL DECADES OF THEIR INDEPENDENCE HAVE BEEN LESS THAN SUCCESSFUL AND THAT THERE ARE VERY REAL BENEFITS FROM LOOSENING UP THEIR INSTITUTIONAL AND GOVERNMENT CONTROLS.

12. KUDOS TO ALL WHO CONTRIBUTED IN ANY WAY, NO MATTER HOW GREAT OR SMALL, TO THE SUCCESS OF THE SECRETARY'S TRIP; YOU HAVE MUCH TO BE PROUD OF AND 1 AM PROUD OF YOU. SHULTZ

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256323	REPORT PAGE 6 ONLY	1	ND	B1

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256321	REPORT RE NIGERIA	1	2/12/1987	B1	

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ROUTINE

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SIT: EOB VAX TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4466

FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS

2506

CONFIDE

SUBJECT: AKINYEMI AND NIGERIA'S TWO-TRACK DIPLOMACY

*** START OF TEXT ***

BT

C G BENTINE SECTION 01 OF 02 LAGOS 02506 LONDON FOR KOLKER PARIS FOR POPE E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL PGOV NI SUBJECT: AKINYEMI AND NIGERIA'S TWO-TRACK DIPLOMACY REF: (A) STATE 61238 (NOTAL), (B) PARIS 10432 (NOTAL) 1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT) SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION: JEAN-CHRISTOPHE 2. MITTERRAND'S COMMENTS ON AKINYEMI AS REPORTED REF B AND REF A'S EXCELLENT ANALYSIS OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NIGERIAN POLICY VIS-A-VIS CHAD PROMPT US TO COMMENT ON THEIR RELEVANCE TO NIGERIA'S BROADER DIPLOMACY AND BABANGIDA'S EFFORTS TO SEPARATE HIS FOREIGN POLICY FROM AKINYEMI'S. END SUMMARY.

3. LIKE MITTERRAND, THE PROSPECT OF AKINYEMI'S DEPARTURE HAS OFTEN PROMPTED "UNCONCEALED SATISFACTION" TO FLEET ACROSS OUR COLLECTIVE FACES. A MULTITUDE OF OUR LAGOS DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES, OF MANY PERSUASIONS, SHARE OUR VIEW. THAT DEPARTURE MAY INDEED BE ON THE NEAR HORIZON (RUMORS HAVE BEEN CIRCULATING THAT BABANGIDA'S RETURN WILL BRING A CABINET RESHUFFLE), 5 AKINYEMI HAS BEEN VERY CLOSE TO THE BRINK ON SEVERAL

OCCASIONS AND MANAGED TO SURVIVE. DESPITE HIS OBVIOUS INEPTITUDE AS A FOREIGN MINISTER AND HIS FREQUENT FAILURE TO REFLECT OR EVEN UNDERSTAND BABANGIDA'S VIEWS ON KEY FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES, AKINYEMI DOES HAVE A CERTAIN DOMESTIC CONSTITUENCY, PARTICULARLY AMONG YORUBA INTELLECTUALS AND MANY JOURNALISTS, A SMALL BUT VERY VOCAL AND ARTICULATE CROWD. (#) DATE, BABANGIDA APPEARS TO HAVE MADE THE JUDGMENT THAT IT IS NOT WORTH THE DOMESTIC PRICE TO REPLACE AKINYEMI. IN ADDITION, THERE ARE NO OBVIOUS REPLACEMENTS, PARTICULARLY REPLACEMENTS WHO FIT INTO THE COMPLEX ETHNIC CALCULUS OF CABINET-MAKING IN NIGERIA.

4. INSTEAD OF REPLACING AKINYEMI, BABANGIDA HAS PURSUED A TWO-TRACK APPROACH TO DIPLOMATIC TACTICS. ON ISSUES OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE THERE IS A TENDENCY TO KEEP AKINYEMI AWAY FROM THOSE WHO ARE IMPORTANT TO BABANGIDA AND WHO ARE KNOWN NOT TO LIKE HIM. THE UNITED STATES IS IN THIS CATEGORY AS DEMONSTRATED BY BABANGIDA'S INITIAL INTENTION TO EXCLUDE AKINYEMI FROM THE SECRETARY'S JANUARY VISIT. THE FRENCH ARE UNDCUBTEDLY IN THE SAME CATEGORY. MEANWHILE, ON ISS5S WHICH ARE OF SECONDARY IMPORTANCE FROM DODAN BARRACKS' PERSPECTIVE, SUCH AS THE NAM, MUCH OF OAU DIPLOMACY AND THE UN, AKINYEMI IS LEFT TO EXERCISE HIS PENCHANT FOR THIRD WORLD RHETORIC AND TO PLEASE HIS LOCAL CONSTITUENCY.

5. OBVIOUSLY, THIS IS A VERY MESSY ARRANGEMENT. MANY ISSUES DO NOT FIT NEATLY INTO ONE TRACK OR THE OTHER (BABANGIDA UNDERSTANDS THAT MANY UN ISSUES ARE OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO THE U.S. BUT HAS HAD LITTLE SUCCESS IN IMPRESSING THIS FACT UPON HIS MINISTER OR HIS AMBASSADOR TO THE UN), AND THE PRESIDENT'S OTHER PREOCCUPATIONS DO NOT PERMIT HIM TO ASSURE THAT AKINYEMI BT

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CONFLODENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 02 LAGOS 02506 LONDON FOR KOLKER

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PARIS FOR POPE E.O. 12356: DECL:

TAGS: PREL PGOV NI

SUBJECT: AKINYEMI AND NIGERIA'S TWO-TRACK DIPLOMACY STICKS TO THIS DIVISION OF LABOR. NOWHERE HAS THIS BEEN MORE OBVIOUS THAN IN CHAD. WE HAVE RECEIVED MANY SIGNALS BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE THAT BABANGIDA AND HIS CLOSEST ASSOCIATES SHARE OUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE LIBYAN PRESENCE IN CHAD AND APPROVE THE U.S. AND FRENCH ROLES THERE BUT THEY HAVE ONLY SLOWLY SHORTENED AKINYEMI'S TETHER ON THIS SUBJECT, AND HE CONTINUES TO FIND OPPORTUNITIES TO OFFEND US AND THE FRENCH, TO SAY

NOTHING OF THE CHADIANS AND OTHER AFRICANS WHO FIND HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROBLEM NAIVE AND HIS ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT NIGERIAN LEADERSHIP PRESUMPTUOUS.

6. AS LONG AS AKINYEMI REMAINS IN OFFICE, WE WILL HAVE TO LIVE WITH THIS CONFUSION. BUT EVEN IF HE DEPARTS WE CANNOT BE TOO SANGUINE ABOUT SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE. THOUGH MANY OF AKINYEMI'S SUBORDINATES AT MEA DISLIKE HIM

PERSONALLY, THEY OFTEN SHARE HIS OPTIC ON THE WORLD AND NIGERIA'S PLACE IN IT. EVEN WITH A NEW MINISTER, BABANGIDA WOULD FIND THINGS HARD TO CONTROL. INTER-GOVERNMENTAL COORDINATION HAS NEVER BEEN A NIGERIAN FORTE, AND BABANGIDA HAS TOO MANY OTHER HIGHER PRIORITY CONCERNS TO FOCUS A CREAT DEAL OF ATTENTION ON PUTTING HIS PERSONAL STAMP ON NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY. LYMAN BT #2506


SECTION: 01 OF 02 SECTION: 02 OF 02

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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WORLD NEWS



PRESERVATION COPY

the scene of weekly sessions setting the value of the naira, the Nigerian currency.



Allied Unity Grows Amid Unease Over U.S. Stance on Missiles Paris, London and Bonn Step Up Behind-the-Scenes Discussions

By Jim Hoagland Washington Post Foreign Service

PARIS, March 7—The Reagan administration's swift moves this week toward an agreement that would eliminate U.S. medium-range nuclear missiles from Europe have provoked fresh concern among West European governments over America's commitment to defend its allies against Soviet attack.

Still shaken by the steady weakening of the Reagan presidency in recent months and the erratic articulation of American arms control goals and procedures at the Reykjavik summit last October, Britain, France and West Germany are intensifying their behind-the-scenes political coordination on defense matters, according to senior allied officials.

It is against this background that France and Britain have decided to swallow serious misgivings about the "zero option" negotiating proposal revived by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev last weekend and to join publicly in the welcome that the West German government has extended to the proposal, these officials indicate.


The new concern about European unity on defense surfaced most clearly this week in France when President Francois Mitterrand demanded that the Cabinet support the zero option despite warnings from Defense Minister Andre Giraud that negotiating away the missiles would represent a nuclear "Munich" for the West. Mitterrand in effect accepted a split with the country's defense establishment—which fears that the zero option will undermine public support for the role of nuclear weapons in national defense—rather than risk a major rift with Chancellor Helmut Kohl's government in Bonn. Traditionally, France has put independence of action in defense above European unity.

SUNDAY, MARCH 8, I

In the week since Gorbachev dropped his condition that an agrees ment to eliminate both Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles be linked to U.S. concessions on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) project to station defensive weapons in outer space, the political implications of the chances for such an accord have prevailed over the kind of

See EUROPE, A34, Col. 5

Pace of Reforms Falters in China As Opposition Campaign Advances Conservative Backlash Forces Deng to Curtail Modernization Plans



Central Bank in Lagos, the capital, is the scene of weekly sessions setting the value of the naira, the Nigerian currency.

Nigeria Embraces Austerity Delighted Lenders Applauding Reforms

By Blaine Harden Washington Post Foreign Service

LAGOS, Nigeria—This is the African country that parlayed a \$100-billion windfall into a national curse.

The oil boom from 1973 to 1981 crippled the livelihoods of the farming majority, hooked city people on subsidized imports and saddled the nation with an estimated \$18-billion debt. As Nigerians have since acknowledged, it was their own inept, corrupt government that squandered much of the oil money.

So it borders on the astonishing that Nigeria, having been jolted by two military coups in the past 38 months, is now being lauded by the World Bank and the United States as a role model in Africa for free



Far-reaching banking, economic measures have surprised western observers.

market reforms and responsible government.

"Nigeria has embarked on the most comprehensive economic adjustment program in Africa so far," said Ishrat Husain, resident representative here for the World Bank. "We were never expecting them to do as much as they have done."

Nigeria's conversion from corrupt profligate to capitalist exemplar was not entirely voluntary. It was forced by last year's collapse of oil prices. Foreign debt became unpayable. Shippers stopped delivering goods. Economic activity in Africa's most populous country almost ground to a halt.

But the past year's radical economic transformation here appears to be more than a last-chance maneuver to avoid default. It derives from the distinctively obdurate nationalism of the Nigerian people and the deft manipulation of that nationalism by Maj. Gen. Ibrahim Babangida, the country's military leader.

"Nigerians are so self-centered that they don't make rational decisions when the choices are imposed on them from the outside," said See NIGERIA, ASK, Col. 1

Allied U Over U.S Paris, London an

By Jim Hoagland Washington Post Foreign Service

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Pace of R As Oppos Conservative Back

By William Drozdiak Washington Post Foreign Service

BEIJING—China's amt economic reform program, signed to propel 1 billion ci into the modern age, appears stalled in its tracks because serious power struggle over ing less than the future po identity of the country.

Two months after a coaliti forces opposed to radical cl succeeded in ousting Comm Party chief Hu Yaobang, senio ernment leaders have soug project an image of stable co sus in an effort to calm forei, vestors as well as a populatio traumatized by the chaotic Cu

Associated Press

President Reagan warned yesterday that despite progress in arms control talks, tensions with the Soviets will continue as long as they make only "cosmetic changes" in their occupation of Afghanistan.

In his weekly radio address, the president also urged Congress to approve his request to release the final \$40 million in aid voted last year for the Nicaraguan contras, saying it is needed to counter "vast Soviet and Cuban help" going to the Marxist-led Sandinista government.

"To abandon them would betray our own principles," he said of the contras. "We must continue, to stand by these brave men and women."

Reagan's comments came one day after he ordered Secretary of State George P. Shultz to go to Moscow next month to "maintain the momentum" of recent advances toward a new arms control pact that would rid Europe of mediumrange nuclear missiles.

Reagan, calling U.S.-Soviet relations "one of the keys to world peace," recalled telling Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that good ties depend on reducing weapons, restoring human rights, resolving regional conflicts and improving contacts between peoples.

"We've seen movement in some of these areas. In one area, however, we're particularly disappointed," he said, citing the continuing occupation of Afghanistan.

Despite the Soviets' contention that they are seeking a political resolution to the Afghan problem, Reagan charged that they had "made no more than cosmetic changes in their puppet regime" in Kabul.

"As long as Soviets keep this up, East-West tension will continue, and that's why it's in the interests of world peace to convince the Soviets to stop it," the president said. sions on the SS20.

Western intelligence services estimate that about 270 SS20s are stationed in the European region of the Soviet Union, as well as 112 remaining single-warhead SS4s. A total of 108 Pershing II and 208 ground-launched cruise missiles, with one warhead each, have been deployed in West Germany, Britain, Italy and Belgium over the past three years. The Netherlands is also to accept U.S. missiles under the 1979 decision.

Nigerian Pride Spurs a Move to Austerity in the Post-Oi

NIGERIA, From A33

Prince Tony Momoh, minister of information and culture. "Nigerians believe there are things superior to reasoning. Things such as pride."

It was pride that kept Nigeria from accepting a loan of \$2.4 billion from the International Monetary Fund in 1985, the year Babangida seized power in a bloodless coup. The money probably would have prevented the debt crunch that brought this country to its knees last year.

Shortly after coming to power, Babangida opened what became known as the "Great IMF Debate." In the debate, a uniquely Nigerian plebiscite-cum-shouting-match that was carried on in the pages of the country's daily press, it soon became clear that the public saw the IMF and its demand for economic reform as insidious instruments of greedy westerners.

In addition, many Nigerians, having watched their leaders waste billions of dollars of oil money, said a loan would only increase the national debt by allowing officials to squirrel away more public funds in foreign banks.

Babangida abided by the public's will and rejected the IMF loan.

Then, he slowly began to put in place what western economists are calling the most rigorous free market reform package ever adopted in an African country. The package meets all of the demands of the IMF. In fact, economists here say it is far tougher than the IMF would have dared to demand.

"It has registered on a lot of people in the U.S. government that this is one of the most exciting economic reforms in Africa," said U.S. Ambassador Princeton Lyman.

The reforms have led to a drastic devaluation of the naira, the currency whose one-to-one parity with the dollar had been considered an inviolate symbol of Nigerian pride. A dollar now buys nearly four naira,

The cherished perquisites of the country's middle class, which had been subsidized by the grossly overvalued naira, fell victim to market forces. Car prices tripled. International air fares, which had been one of the best bargains in the world, doubled. School fees quadrupled for the 100,000 Nigerian families who send their children to study abroad.

The reforms abolished an import licensing system that had made millionaires out of hundreds of Nigerian sharpies who used relatives and friends in the Ministry of Trade to obtain import licenses and resold them to businessmen desperate to import spare parts. Now businessmen simply import what they can pay for,

Also scrapped were the country's six commodities boards, ineffectual agencies that had for years held down the price of farm produce. Abolition of the cocoa marketing board boosted the price of a ton of cocoa from \$400 to \$1,155.

In broad outline, the reform package penalized the urban elite in favor of farmers. This is a risky business in Africa, where political power is concentrated among city dwellers.

And while the reforms embraced the free enterprise theology that the IMF, World Bank and U.S. government are preaching across Africa, Babangida appears to have persuaded a large portion of the Nigerian public that his reforms are "home-grown."

Playing to a nationalism that is more potent here than anywhere else in black Africa, Babangida said in his 1987 budget speech that "our structural adjustment program was produced by Nigerians for Nigerians."

"It is a political masterpiece," said Husain, the senior World Bank official. "If he had done exactly the same thing under the aegis of the IMF, there would have been riots" or a *coup d'etat.*" The economic adjustment package has so pleased defensive creditors that Nigeria has been able to quietly reschedule most of its debt. Two years ago, 44 percent of export earnings went to service foreign debt. This year, the government says, that burden has been cut in half.

While international banks and western governments are delighted with the reform package, it has provoked howls of distress from the country's manufacturers. The reforms sharply reduced the number of imports banned from Nigeria, making local manufacturers vulnerable to world competition for the first time.

"The very existence of the industrial sector is seriously threatened," said Chief Jerome Udoji, president of the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria. He warned of mass unemployment, bankruptcies and "a return to the former colonial days of a trade economy."

Nigerians are paying a painful price for reform. Average per capita income for the country's 105 million people is 25 percent less now than in 1974. College graduates are all but unable to find professional-level jobs, according to recent press reports here. The nation's factories, according to government figures, operate at less than 30 percent of capacity.

These warnings have pushed the

government into some minor policy adjustments. But, according to Information Minister Momoh, the government is determined not to shelter uncompetitive local businesses simply because they are Nigerian.

"The manufacturers have not yet reconciled themselves to the fact that we are trying to force a market economy on everyone. We are telling people that if things are too expensive, don't buy them. The joy is that it hurts everyone," said Momoh.

Homilies on free enterprise and honest government have become standard fare for Nigerian ministers in the past year. But western economists and businessmen say such rhetoric has been slow to change corrupt government contracting methods. Payoffs and kickbacks remain essential ingredients in most government spending processes, these sources say.

In addition, the Nigerian government, despite its professed devotion to marketplace solutions, continues to fund expensive projects that have little chance of clearing a profit.

The grandiose Adjaokuta steel works, for example, already has cost an estimated \$3 billion. Experts say it will never make steel at prices competitive with the world market.

Despite these blemishes, Nigeria has moved faster and further toward fundamental economic reform



eft, and Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega arrive at Jinotega rally.

Occupation, Praises Contras

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publicly that the American rockets provided a direct military counter to the SS20 triple-warhead missile that the Soviets began to target at Western Europe in 1976.

Reagan encapsulated that argument in his presentation of the zero option in 1981, when he offered to give up the deployment in return for Moscow's withdrawing its SS20s and older SS4s. Gorbachev's revival of the proposal now pins Reagan and his European partners to that position, even if many strategists have concluded in the meantime that having American medium-range missiles in Western Europe strengthens the alliance, irrespective of Soviet decisions on the SS20.

Western intelligence services estimate that about 270 SS20s are stationed in the European region of the Soviet Union, as well as 112 remaining single-warhead SS4s. A total of 108 Pershing II and 208 ground-launched cruise missiles, with one warhead each, have been deployed in West Germany, Britain, Italy and Belgium over the past three years. The Netherlands is also to accept U.S. missiles under the 1979 decision.

LADAUG ITAMA WYARAW ITANANA WALLAN Washington at the end of the month.

[Representatives from Britain, West Germany, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands will discuss the issue in Washington next week, the West German Foreign Ministry said Saturday. West German government sources said the one-day consultations were aimed at sounding out NATO views on verification procedures to be-written into a draft treaty that U.S. arms negotiators presented in Geneva last Wednesday, Reuter reported.]

Preferring to stress publicly the close contacts Thatcher has built up with Reagan, British officials have 1 minimized the effect of consulta- B tions within Europe on defense, and W Thatcher has offered noncommittal remarks about the negotiations to remove the missiles on which she spent political capital to deploy in England.

But newspapers that generally 19 express the government's point of view have voiced sharp warnings about Reagan seeming to rush to of agreement, Washington Post correspondent Karen DeYoung reported from London, 13

Iove to Austerity in the Post-Oil Era

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The grandiose Adjaokuta steel works, for example, already has cost an estimated \$3 billion. Experts say it will never make steel at prices competitive with the world market.

Despite these blemishes, Nigeria has moved faster and further toward fundamental economic reform

than most western observers believed possible when Babangida came to power 20 months ago.

Fortunately for the government's survival, the reform has coincided with two years of bumper crops. Local prices of staple foods have fallen in the past year.

Unlike most African countries facing several years of austerity as they rebuild their economies, Nigeria also has oil. Correctly managed, the oil revenue, even in a weak world market, can cushion the transition from an oil-addicted to a mixed economy, according to economists.

Sustained economic recovery depends on the ability of the present government to survive and keep its reforms in place.

"If the government can sustain these changes, Nigeria could be the shining star of Africa," said Husain of the World Bank, which has committed about \$1 billion in loans to support the reform package. The reforms last month earned

the IMF's approval.

A standby arrangement, which triggered a move by Nigeria's creditors to stretch out their loans, gives Nigeria the right to borrow up to \$850 million from the IMF.

Proud Nigeria, however, still hates the IMF. According to. Momoh, Babangida's government has vowed never to borrow a penny.

Ronald Reagan Library

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CONFIDE

SUBJECT: A SOUTHERN MUSLIM'S VIEW ON RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM AMONG NIGERIAN CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS

*** START OF TEXT ***

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r 0 NEIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 LAGOS 03456 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PGOV PINS NI A SOUTHERN MUSLIM'S VIEW ON RELIGIOUS SUBJECT: FUNDAMENTALISM AMONG NIGERIAN CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS A) LAGOS 3019, B) 86 LAGOS 4385 REFS: (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT). 1. SUMMARY. IN THE VIEW OF LATEEF ADEGBITE, LEGAL 2. ADVISOR TO THE NIGERIAN SUPREME COUNCIL FOR ISLAMIC AFFAIRS, THE AGGRESSIVENESS OF CHRISTIAN EVANGELISTS IS TO BLAME FOR THE RELIGIOUS RIOTS IN NORTHERN NIGERIA IN EARLY MARCH. SOUTHERN AND NORTHERN MUSLIMS ALIKE SEE THESE CHRISTIANS AS A NEW, FUNDAMENTALIST FORCE IN THE NORTH, AND PART OF A GROWING CHRISTIAN AGGRESSIVENESS IN NIGERIA. ADEGBITE BELIEVES ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM IS ALSO ON THE RISE IN NIGERIA. CONSERVATIVE MUSLIM LEADERS LIKE HIMSELF, CONCERNED ABOUT THE MORE EXTREME DEMANDS OF THE FUNDAMENTALISTS, HOPE TO "MANAGE" THE FUNDAMENTALISTS, AND HAVE QUIETLY FORMED AN INFORMAL BODY OF CONSERVATIVE AND FUNDAMENTALIST MUSLIMS TO FACILITATE COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS. END SUMMARY.

3. IN A PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH POLOFF ON MARCH 25, DR. LATEEF ADEGBITE, WELL-CONNECTED SOUTHERN YORUBA

MUSLIM LEADER WHO IS LEGAL ADVISOR TO THE SUPREME COUNCIL FOR ISLAMIC AFFAIRS, SPOKE AT LENGTH ABOUT A NEW AGGRESSIVENESS AMONG CHRISTIAN EVANGELISTS IN CERTAIN PARTS OF THE NORTH (SUCH AS SOUTHERN KADUNA STATE) THAT

HE BELIEVES SPARKED THE RELIGIOUS RIOTS THERE IN EARLY MARCH. HE SAID THE VIOLENCE STARTED IN KAFANCHAN, A PREDOMINANTLY CHRISTIAN CITY IN SOUTHERN KADUNA STATE, WHEN CHRISTIAN EVANGELISTS SOUGHT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THEIR SUPERIOR NUMBERS AND PUSH OUT THE MUSLIMS. SUBSEQUENT ANTI-CHRISTIAN VIOLENCE IN OTHER NORTHERN CITIES WAS A NATURAL REACTION TO THIS CHRISTIAN PROVOCATION, HE ADDED.

ADEGBITE CLAIMS THAT A CHRISTIAN EVANGELIST 4. "OFFENSIVE" HAS BEEN TAKING PLACE IN CERTAIN NORTHERN AREAS SINCE LATE LAST YEAR. THESE EVANGELISTS ARE SEEKING TO CONVERT MUSLIMS BY VIGOROUSLY CRITICIZING ISLAM. THE EVANGELISTS HAVE BEEN DISTRIBUTING ANTI-ISLAMIC PROPAGANDA PRINTED OUTSIDE OF NIGERIA (ADEGBITE COULD NOT NAME A SPECIFIC SOURCE). ADEGBITE SAID THAT HIS VIEWS ARE SHARED BY NORTHERN MUSLIM LEADERS, WHO ARE HIS SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON THE EVANGELISTS' ACTIVITIES. SINCE THE EVANGELISTS ARE A SMALL MINORITY OF NIGERIA'S RANK-AND-FILE "ORTHODOX" CHRISTIANS, MUSLIM LEADERS IN THE NORTH DO NOT YET CONSIDER THEM A GREAT THREAT. FURTHERMORE, ADEGBITE EXPECTS THAT THE FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT, CURRENTLY INVESTIGATING THE RIOTING, WILL UNCOVER THIS AGGRESSIVE EVANGELIST MOVEMENT AND DEAL FORCEFULLY WITH IT. 5. CHRISTIAN MISSIONARY SOURCES HAVE IN THE PAST TOLD POLOFFS OF INCREASED EVANGELICAL ACTIVITY IN THE NORTH, AND CLAIM THAT CONVERSIONS TO CHRISTIANITY ARE INCREASING THERE. ONE VEHICLE FOR THIS EVANGELISM IS ALLEGEDLY THE NATIONAL YOUTH SERVICE CORPS (NYSC), WHICH OFFERS COLLEGE GRADUATES FROM THE SOUTH THE OPPORTUNITY TO WORK IN THE NORTH FOR ONE YEAR. SOURCES CLAIM CHRISTIAN FUNDAMENTALISTS IN THE NYSC ARE WELL ORGANIZED IN THEIR APPROACH TO EVANGELISM DURING THEIR SERVICE YEAR, AND OFTEN CHOOSE TO REMAIN IN THE NORTH AFTER THEIR SERVICE ENDS TO CONTINUE THEIR EVANGELICAL WORK. POST HAS NO INDEPENDENT CORROBORATION OF THESE CLAIMS, BUT ADEGBITE'S COMMENTS APPEAR TO GIVE SOME CREDENCE TO MISSIONARY CLAIMS.

6. ADEGBITE CRITICIZES MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE RIOTING FOR BEING BIASED TOWARD THE CHRISTIANS. COVERAGE FOCUSED ON THE ANTI-CHRISTIAN VIOLENCE IN KADUNA AND ZARIA RATHER THAN ON THE ANTI-MUSLIM VIOLENCE IN KAFANCHAN THAT SPARKED IT. HE ALSO CRITICIZED THE POLICE FOR BRUTALITY AGAINST MUSLIMS IN QUELLING THE RIOTS, ADDING THAT THE SUPREME COUNCIL FOR ISLAMIC AFFAIRS WILL PROTEST THIS IN A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT. POLOFF ASKED IF THIS MEANT THE COUNCIL WOULD BE MEETING SOON. ADEGBITE REPLIED THAT INSTEAD OF HOLDING A MEETING, THE COUNCIL'S KEY MEMBERS ARE "KEEPING IN TOUCH." THE COUNCIL BELIEVES A MEETING WOULD BE INTERPRETED BY THE MEDIA AS A PROVOCATIVE ACT. 7. ADEGBITE REJECTS THE GOVERNMENT CLAIM THAT THE RIOTS WERE PART OF AN ORGANIZED, ANTI-GOVERNMENT PLOT. THE BT #3456 BT

GONFTDENTTALSECTION 02 OF 02 LAGOS 03456 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PGOV PINS NI SUBJECT: A SOUTHERN MUSLIM'S VIEW ON RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM AMONG NIGERIAN CHRISTIANS -AND MUSLIMS PRESIDENT'S PUBLIC REFERENCE TO A "CIVILIAN COUP PLOT" (REF A) WAS SIMPLY A SCARE TACTIC TO DISCOURAGE WOULD-BE PLOTTERS. ADEGBITE DOES NOT EXPECT THE INVESTIGATORS TO FINGER ANY IMPORTANT FIGURES. 8. ADEGBITE CONTENDS THAT ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM HAS BECOME MORE PROMINENT IN NIGERIA IN RECENT YEARS. MOST OF THE FUNDAMENTALISTS ARE YOUNG AND HIGHLY EDUCATED (IN NIGERIAN UNIVERSITIES, NOT ABROAD). THE MUSLIM STUDENTS SOCIETY OF NIGERIA (MSS), WHICH ADEGBITE HELPED FOUND IN THE 1950S, IS A LEADING VOICE FOR THE FUNDAMENTALIST MOVEMENT. THE MOVEMENT FEELS THAT OLDER, MORE CONSERVATIVE MUSLIM LEADERS ARE GIVING TOO MUCH GROUND TO THE CHRISTIANS. 9. ADEGBITE, WHO PREFERS TO CALL THE FUNDAMENTALISTS "IDEALISTS," OPPOSES THEIR MOST EXTREME DEMANDS. PURSUIT OF THESE DEMANDS WILL ONLY CAUSE TROUBLE FOR ALL MUSLIMS IN NIGERIA. WHEN ASKED TO IDENTIFY WHICH DEMANDS HE OPPOSES AND WHICH HE THINKS ARE REASONABLE, ADEGBITE SAID HE OPPOSES DEMANDS FOR OUTLAWING BEER HALLS AND BREWERIES. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE SUPPORTS DEMANDS THAT SHARIA (ISLAMIC) CIVIL LAW BE EXTENDED TO THE SOUTH, AND THAT ISLAMIC STUDIES BE ADDED TO PUBLIC SCHOOL CURRICULUMS. 10. CONSERVATIVE MUSLIM LEADERS, ADEGBITE SAID, ARE SEEKING TO "MANAGE" THE FUNDAMENTALISTS. ABOUT A YEAR AGO ADEGBITE FOUNDED THE "SOCIETY OF PAST AND PRESENT MEMBERS OF THE MUSLIM STUDENTS SOCIETY." THIS INFORMAL BODY MEETS TWICE YEARLY TO FACILITATE CONSTRUCTIVE COMMUNICATION BETWEEN CONSERVATIVE AND FUNDAMENTALIST MUSLIMS. THE SOCIETY KEEPS A LOW PROFILE AND HOLDS ITS MEETINGS IN PRIVATE, SO THAT THE MEDIA WILL NOT TAKE THE MEETINGS AS "MUSLIM STRATEGY SESSIONS TO PLAN ISLAM'S NEXT MOVE IN NIGERIA." THE SOCIETY'S NEXT MEETING HAD BEEN SCHEDULED FOR APRIL 19 IN KADUNA, BUT IS BEING POSTPONED UNTIL THE FALLOUT FROM THE RELIGIOUS RIOTS DIES DOWN.

11. DURING THE HEIGHT OF LAST YEAR'S CONTROVERSY OVER NIGERIA'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC COUNCIL, MUSLIM MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO

STUDY THE ISSUE REPORTEDLY WARNED THEIR CHRISTIAN COUNTERPARTS THAT THEY WOULD BE UNABLE TO CONTROL THE POSSIBLY VIOLENT REACTION OF RADICAL FUNDAMENTALIST MUSLIM GROUPS SHOULD NIGERIA WITHDRAW FROM THE OIC (REF B, PARA 9).

12. COMMENT: ADEGBITE'S ALLEGATIONS OF MEDIA BIAS, POLICE FAVORITISM TOWARDS CHRISTIANS, AND CHRISTIAN PROVOCATION OF MUSLIMS REFLECT VIEWS WIDELY SHARED BY MUSLIMS IN THE NORTH. HIS ALLEGATION OF GROWING CHRISTIAN AGGRESSIVENESS MIRRORS CHRISTIAN FEARS OF INCREASING MUSLIM AGGRESSIVENESS. WHEREAS CHRISTIAN LEADERS HAVE RAISED A PUBLIC HUE AND CRY IN THEIR

PROTESTS TO THE GOVERNMENT OVER MUSLIM ACTIONS, MUSLIM LEADERS APPEAR TO FAVOR A QUIETER APPROACH IN MAKING THEIR COMPLAINTS KNOWN TO THE FMG. IF THIS LOW-KEY APPROACH IS INTENDED TO AVOID FURTHER ALARMING THE CHRISTIANS, THEN IT IS AN ENCOURAGING SIGN. ADEGBITE'S COMMENTS ON THE NEED TO MANAGE ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS REFLECTS CONSERVATIVE MUSLIM LEADERS' CONCERN THAT A SPLIT IN ISLAMIC RANKS BE AVOIDED, ESPECIALLY IN THIS TIME OF INTENSE RELIGIOUS RIVALRY, AND ALSO AS THE RETURN TO CIVILIAN RULE IN 1990 APPROACHES. THE TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP OF BOTH MUSLIMS AND 13. CHRISTIANS ARE FACED WITH A GROWING INABILITY TO CONTROL THEIR EXPANSIONIST, EVANGELICAL ELEMENTS. MUSLIM LEADERS ARE RELUCTANT TO DISCUSS THEIR FUNDAMENTALIST FRINGE, BUT CHRISTIAN LEADERS ADMIT THAT EVANGELISTS ARE THE FASTEST GROWING CHRISTIAN GROUP IN THE COUNTRY. FOR BOTH RELIGIONS, NIGERIA'S DIFFICULT ECONOMIC SITUATION IS CONTRIBUTING TO AN UPSURGE IN NEW ADHERENTS TO THE FUNDAMENTALIST MOVEMENT. UNLIKE THE RECENT PAST, WHEN MESSIANIC RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS (LIKE THE MAITATSINE) APPEALED LARGELY TO ROOTLESS, UNEDUCATED MASSES, THE NEW EVANGELISM APPEALS TO UNIVERSITY STUDENTS AND GRADUATES AS WELL. LYMAN

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Alhaji Hamzat Ahmadu (Phonetic: AHM ah doo) - Appointed Ambassador of Federal Republic of Nigeria

<u>Chief of State/Head of Government</u>: Ibrahim Babangida (Phonetic: bah BAN ghee dah), President and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, since August 1985

<u>Biographic Sketch</u>: Ambassador Ahmadu, 57, is one of Nigeria's most senior career diplomats, having previously served as Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Netherlands and Cameroon. Immediately prior to his appointment to Washington, Ahmadu was Permanent Secretary of the Nigerian Ministry of External Affairs, the equivalent of our Deputy Secretary of State. Ahmadu is a devout Muslim. He has close relations to Nigeria's traditional northern elite, as well as to President Babangida. Ahmadu is British-educated, having attended Oxford University 1959-60. He will be accompanied by his wife, Amina, a former special assistant to several prominent Nigerian officials including one Prime Minister, and the couple's youngest child, a daughter, Halimatu, aged 11.

<u>Pertinent Background</u>: Secretary of State Shultz visited Lagos in January 1987. Although an invitation has not yet been extended, an official working visit for President Babangida has been tentatively scheduled for October 1987.

Significant Programs or Issues: With a population of over 100 million, Nigeria is home to one in four black Africans. Nigeria is currently the fifth leading exporter of oil to the United States; its Minister of Petroleum, Rilwanu Lukman, serves as OPEC Chairman. With sub-Saharan Africa's largest economy, Nigeria's traditionally active foreign policy has included financial support for southern African liberation groups. Nigeria considers itself one of the key spokesmen for African concerns in international bodies.

The fall in world oil prices, coupled with prior mismanagement of the economy, has resulted in severe economic dislocations since 1981. President Babangida has launched an ambitious market oriented economic reform program which we have supported in international financial institutions. We are currently in the process of completing negotiations for a rescheduling of official debts and are planning a major investment mission to Nigeria in early 1988. Even after Nigeria completes its rescheduling, debt servicing obligations will require 40 percent of current export earnings in 1987, causing concern that Nigeria may be tempted to abandon its economic reform program before it has had the time to prove its effectiveness.



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Babangida received part of his military training in the United States and has placed a high priority on improving relations with us. He has strongly encouraged new US foreign investment and increased cooperation between US and Nigerian law enforcement officials, particularly in combatting international narcotics traffickers who in recent years have transitted Nigeria and employed Nigerians as couriers. Talks exploring possible new legal agreements between U.S. and Nigerian law enforcement officials took place in early July; both U.S. and Nigerian participants are hopeful that an Executive Agreement improving cooperation can be signed during a future visit of the Nigerian Minister of Justice to the US at the invitation of Attorney General Meese.

President Babangida, who came to power in a military coup in 1985, announced in early July details of plans for a gradual transition to civilian rule, beginning with non partisan local elections in late 1987 and culminating in national presidential elections in 1992.

Issues for Discussion:

- -- We are pleased at your appointment as Ambassador and share your commitment to improving further the excellent relations between the U.S. and Nigeria.
- -- We are impressed at your country's efforts to reform its economy using free-market mechanisms as the driving force for development of Nigeria's tremendous potential. We remain committed to lending appropriate support in international financial institutions and are encouraging US firms to assess new opportunities for investment in Nigeria.
- -- I am glad that our two countries are exploring new arrangements to combat international narcotics traffickers, whose evil work threatens both our nations.
- -- We applaud your Government's commitment to return to democratic civilian rule.

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PROFILE

People

Nationality: Noun and Adjective--Nigerian(s).

Population: 100 million (current estimate).

Annual growth rate: 3.5%.

Ethnic groups: 250 tribal groups; Hausa-Fulani, Ibo, and Yoruba are the largest.

Religions: Muslim, Christian, indigenous African beliefs. Languages: English (official), Hausa, Ibo, Yoruba, others. Education: Years compulsory--6. Attendance--42% (primary). Literacy--25%-35%. Life expectancy--49 years.

Work force: (est. 36 million): Agriculture--60%. Industry, commerce and services--19%. Government--15%.

Geography

Area: 923,768 sq. km. (356,700 sq. mi.); about the size of California, Nevada and Arizona combined.

Cities: Capital--Lagos (pop. est. 8-10 million). Other cities--Ibadan (4-5 million), Kano (1 million), Enugu (500,000). Terrain and climate: Ranges from southern coastal swamps to tropical forests, open woodlands, grasslands, and semidesert in the far north. The highest region is the Jos Plateau, at an elevation of 1,800- 3,000 meters above see level. Annual rainfall ranges from 381 cm. along the coast to 64 cm. or less in the far north. Government

Type: Military.

Independence: October 1, 1960.

Constitution: October 1, 1979 (Amended February 9, 1984).

Subdivisions: 19 states plus Federal Capital Territory (for planned new capital of Abuja); states divided into 301 local government areas.

Central government budget (1986): \$15.6 billion.

Defense: 8.2% of 1986 budget.

Flag: Green, white and green vertical bands.

Economy

GDP (1985 est.): \$58 billion.

1984-85 percent change: 2.4%.

Per capita GDP (1985): \$583.

Avg. inflation (1985-6): 22%.

Natural resources: Petroleum, tin, columbite, iron ore, coal, limestone, lead, zinc.

Agriculture: Cocoa, palm oil, yams, cassava, sorghum, millet, corn, rice, livestock, groundnuts, cotton.

Industries: Textiles, cement, food products, footwear, metal products, lumber, beer, detergents, car assembly.

Trade (1985): Exports: \$10.7 billion; petroleum (98%), cocoa, rubber. Major markets: Western Europe, U.S. Imports: \$7.8

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billion; transport equipment, complete "knock-down" automotive kits, foodstuffs, machinery. Major suppliers: Western Europe, U.S., Japan.

Official exchange rate (October 1, 1986): Varies - first tier

- 1 naira = @\$0.65; second tier auction - 1 naira = @\$0.25 Membership in International Organizations:

Nigeria is a member of the United Nations and several of its specialized agencies, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Organization of African Trade Union Unity (OATUU), the Commonwealth of Nations, INTELSAT, the Non-Aligned Movement, and several other regional bodies in West Africa.

People

The most populous country in Africa, Nigeria accounts for one in four of sub-Saharan Africa's people. Although less than 25% of Nigerians are urban dwellers, at least 24 cities have populations of more than 100,000. The variety of customs, languages and traditions among Nigeria's 250 ethnic groups gives the country a rich diversity.

The dominant ethnic group in the northern two-thirds of the country is the Hausa-Fulani, most of whom are Muslims. Other major ethnic groups of the north are the Nupe, Tiv, and Kanuri.

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The Yoruba people are predominant in the southwest.

Approximately half of the Yorubas are Christian and half Muslim. The Ibos, who are largely Catholic, are the largest ethnic group in the southeast, with the Efik, Ibibio, and Ijaw ethnic groups forming a substantial segment of the population as well. Persons of different language backgrounds most commonly communicate in English, although knowledge of two or more Nigerian languages is widespread. Hausa, Yoruba, and Ibo are the most widely used Nigerian languages.

Geography

Located on the west coast of the African continent, Nigeria is bounded on the south by the Gulf of Guinea, on the east by Cameroon and Chad, on the north by Niger, on the west by Benin. Four main topographical areas can be distinguished in terms of vegetation, altitude and climate.

- The hot, humid coastal belt of mangrove swamp, 16-97 kilometers (10-60 mi.) wide;

- North of this, tropical rain forest and oil palm bush, 80-160 kilometers (50-100 mi.) wide;

- The relatively dry central plateau of open woodland and savanna covering the greater part of the north; and

- the semidesert in the extreme north.

Nigeria has several navigable rivers, notably the Niger, the

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Benue, and the Cross. In addition, the extensive lagoons of the southern coastal area play an important role in transportation and economic activity.

Two seasons, dry and wet, are well marked through most of Nigeria. In the north, the dry season lasts from approximately October to April and in the south, from approximately November to March. The dry season typically includes periods of Harmattan, during which a dense pall of Sahelian dust drifts over sections of the country.

History

Before the colonial period, the area which comprises modern Nigeria already had had a long, eventful history. More than 2,000 years ago, the Nok culture in the present Plateau state . worked iron and produced sophisticated terra cotta sculpture. In the northern cities of Kano and Katsina, recorded history dates back to approximately 1000 A.D. In the centuries that followed, these Hausa kingdoms and the Bornu Empire near Lake Chad prospered as important terminals of trans-Saharan caravan routes. In the southwest, the Yoruba kingdom of Oyo was founded about 1400 and at its height from the 17th to 19th centuries attained a high level of political organization. It encompassed a domain extending as far as modern Togo. In the south-central part of present-day Nigeria, as early as the 15th and 16th centuries, the

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kingdom of Benin had developed an efficient army, and elaborate ceremonial court, and artisans whose works in ivory, wood, bronze, and brass are prized throughout the world today. From the 17th through 19th centuries, the region was drawn into the web of the rapidly growing slave trade and other forms of trade with the European world.

In the early 19th century, the Fulani leader Usman dan Fodio launched an Islamic crusade which brought most of the Hausa states and other areas in the north under the loose control of an empire centered in Sokoto.

Following the Napoleonic wars, the British expanded their trade with the interior of Nigeria. In 1885, British claims to a sphere of influence in that area received international recognition, and in the following year the Royal Niger Company was chartered. In 1900, the company's territory came under the control of the British Government, which moved to consolidate its hold over the area which now constitutes Nigeria. In 1914, the area was formally united as the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria. Administratively, Nigeria remained divided into the Northern and Southern Provinces and Lagos Colony. Western education and the development of a modern economy proceeded more rapidly in the south than the north, with consequences which have been felt in Nigeria's political life ever since. Following

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World War II, in response to the growth of Nigerian nationalism and demands for independence, successive constitutions legislated by the British Government moved Nigeria toward self-government on a representative, increasingly federal basis.

Nigeria was granted full independence on October 1, 1960, as a federation of three regions (Northern, Western, and Eastern) under a constitution that provided for a parliamentary form of government. Under the constitution, each of the three regions retained a substantial measure of self-government. The federal government was given exclusive powers in the fields of defense and security, foreign relations, and commercial and fiscal policy. On October 1, 1963, Nigeria altered its relationship with the United Kingdom by proclaiming itself a federal republic and promulgating a new constitution. A fourth region (the Midwest) was established that year.

From the outset, Nigeria experienced ethnic, regional, and religious tensions, magnified by the significant disparities in economic and educational development between the south and the north. On January 15, 1966, a small group of army officers, mostly Ibos, overthrew the government and assassinated the Federal Prime Minister and the premiers of the Northern and Western Regions. A military government assumed power under the leadership of General J.T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi.

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The military government was unable to quiet ethnic tensions or to produce a new constitution acceptable to all sections of the country. In fact, its efforts to abolish the federal structure greatly raised tensions and led to another coup in July 1966, with Gen. Yakubu Gowon named new head of the Federal Military Government. The massacre of thousands of Ibos in the north prompted hundreds of thousands of Ibos to return to their homeland in the southeast, where the military governor of the Eastern Region, Lt. Col. Emeka Ojukwu, emerged as the leader of an increasingly strong Ibo secessionist sentiment.

In a move that gave greater autonomy to minority ethnic groups, the military replaced the four regions with 12 states. Ojukwu rejected attempts to provide constitutional revisions to quiet Ibo fears and insisted on full autonomy for the east. Finally, in May 1967 he declared the independence of the Eastern Region as the "Republic of Biafra." The civil war which ensued was bitter and bloody, ending in the defeat of Biafra in 1970. Following the civil war, reconciliation was rapid and effective. The country turned to the task of economic development. Foreign exchange earnings and government revenues increased spectacularly with the oil price rises of 1973-74.

On July 29, 1975, Gen. Gowon was overthrown in a bloodless coup by a group of military officers who accused him of delaying the

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promised return to civilian rule and allowing his government to become corrupt and ineffective. The new head of state, Gen. Murtala Muhammed, replaced thousands of civil servants and announced a timetable for the resumption of civilian rule by October 1, 1979. Muhammed also announced the government's intention to create new states and to construct a new federal capital in the center of the country.

Gen. Muhammed was assassinated on February 13, 1976, in an abortive coup. His chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, became head of state. Obasanjo adhered meticulously to the schedule for return to civilian rule, moving to modernize and streamline the armed forces, and seeking to use oil revenues to diversify and develop the country's economy. Seven new states were created in 1976, bringing the total to the current 19. A Constituent Assembly was elected in 1977 to draft a new constitution which was published on September 21, 1978, when the ban on political activity, in effect since the advent of military rule, was lifted. Political parties were formed and candidates nominated for president and vice president, the two houses of the National Assembly, governorships, and state houses of assembly. Five political parties competed in a series of five elections, held July 7-August 11, 1979, in which a northerner, Alhaji Shehu Shagari of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), was elected

president. All five parties won representation in the National Assembly.

In August 1983, Shagari and the NPN were returned to power in a landslide victory, characterized by a higher voter turnout than in 1979 and a change in the composition of the National Assembly from an NPN plurality to an NPN majority. The NPN also won control of 12 state governments, while three other political parties shared the remaining seven states. The elections were marred by violence, and allegations of widespread vote-rigging and electoral malfeasance, which led to legal battles over the results.

On December 31, 1983, the military overthrew the Second Republic. Major-General Muhammadu Buhari emerged as the leader of the Supreme Military Council (SMC), the country's new ruling body. He charged the civilian government with economic mismanagement, widespread corruption, election fraud, and a general lack of concern for the problems of Nigerians. He also pledged to restore prosperity to Nigeria and to return the government to civilian rule when conditions permitted. The government of Major-General Buhari and his Chief of Staff, Major-General Idiagbon, became increasingly authoritarian and proved unable to deal with Nigeria's severe economic problems. In a peaceful coup on August 27, 1985, the Buhari government was

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replaced by the SMC's third ranking member, Army Chief of Staff, Major-General Ibrahim Babangida.

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Babangida cited the misuse of power and the violations of human rights by key officers of the SMC, and the government's failure to deal with the country's deepening economic crisis as justifications for the takeover. During the first few days in office President Babangida moved swiftly to restore freedom of the press and to release political detainees being held without charge. As part of a 15 month economic emergency, he announced stringent paycuts for the military, police, and civil servants and proceeded to enact similar cuts for the private sector. Imports of rice and maize were banned. Later imports of wheat were also banned.

President Babangida demonstrated his intent to encourage public participation in government decision-making by opening a national debate on proposed economic reform and recovery measures. The public response convinced Babangida of intense opposition to an economic recovery package dependent on an IMF loan, and an apparent preference for self-imposed austerity. The President has promised to return the country to civilian rule by 1990, and on January 1, 1986, inaugurated a year long public debate on a viable future political system for the country.

Government

Prior to the military takeover at the end of 1983, Nigeria's constitution of 1979 called for a government closely resembling that of the United States, with a president and vice president elected every four years, a bicameral legislature, and an independent judiciary. Since returning to power in 1983, the military has suspended all sections of the 1979 constitution relating to electoral and legislative procedures at both the federal and state level. The power of the executive was also modified enabling a new ruling body, the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC), to enact decrees which have the force of law. Its 28 members include the president, the chiefs of the military services, and other military commanders. It is the government's . policy making body. The other two major federal institutions are the National Council of Ministers, commonly known as the Cabinet, and the National Council of States consisting of the 19 state military governors under the chairmanship of the president. The 1984 decree modifying the 1979 constitution left the judiciary relatively untouched, although special investigative panels have been established outside the regular judicial system. The judiciary is composed of both federal and state courts and includes procedures for appeals from state high courts to the federal Court of Appeals and to the federal Supreme

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Court. There are also constitutional provisions for Islamic and local customary law in civil cases.

Each of the 19 states receives most of its revenue from the federal government according to a formula based on population and other factors. The states may individually determine expenditures in such policy areas as education, health care, and local industrial development.

Development of a new federal capital at Abuja, begun in the late 1970's has been severely slowed by the economic recession of the early to mid-1980's.

Political Conditions

A series of decrees enacted by the Buhari regime in 1984 restricted political freedom. Soon after the August 1985 takeover, president Babangida abrogated the decree restricting press freedom, but retained a decree granting the government blanket powers of detention on grounds of state security. In May 1986, the AFRC formally amended this decree to grant either the Chief of General Staff or the Inspector-General of Police the power to detain anyone for a period of six months initially. The detention can be indefinitely extended upon review at the end of each six month period.

In January 1986, President Babangida empowered several judicial panels to investigate the cases of former politicians, including

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the former civilian president and vice-president, who had been detained by the Buhari administration. Most of the politicians had been detained on suspicion of illegal use of public funds or enrichment while in office. The panels submitted their findings to the President in May 1986. As of August 1986, the AFRC had acted upon all the panel's recommendations and released several detainees, including former President Shehu Shagari and Vice President Alex Ekwueme, and some of the state governors. Since January 1986, the country has been engaged in a public discussion of its political future, organized by a committee established by the government to solicit the views of all Nigerians who choose to participate. The debate is a prelude to the proposed return to civilian rule in 1990, and is designed to * involve all sectors of the country in the creation of a stable political system. However, all politicians associated with the Second Republic, 1979-1983, have been banned from running for office for 10 years, beginning from 1990.

Economy

The oil boom of the 1970's shifted Nigeria from an agriculturally based economy to an economy that now relies on oil for more than 95% of export earnings and 70% of federal budget resources. The greater opportunities made possible by the oil boom of the 1970's induced massive rural-urban migration which has had a devastating

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impact on agriculture. Fifteen years ago Nigeria ranked as a major exporter of cocoa, peanuts, and palm products. It no longer exports groundnuts, and its exports of cocoa and palm products are limited. In 1985, Nigeria--once a net food exporter--imported more than \$500 million worth of foodstuffs. Nigeria has experienced severe economic difficulties since 1982 because of a dramatic fall in export revenues and heavy debt service payments. Petroleum production fell from 2.1 million barrels a day in 1980 to 1.5 million barrels a day in 1985, while prices fell from \$40 per barrel to \$28 during the same period, reducing total oil revenues from \$26 billion in 1980 to about \$10.5 billion in 1985. Oil prices fell to below \$15 per barrel in 1986.

Despite the fall in oil revenues, Nigerian imports and government spending continued to increase in 1981 and 1982. Nigeria financed the continued high levels of imports by drawing down its foreign exchange reserves from \$10 billion in 1980 to approximately \$1.4 billion at the end of 1982 and by delaying payment of much of its trade debt. When Nigeria could no longer meet its short term external obligations in 1983, the government reached an agreement with commercial banks to reschedule arrears on payments for letters of credit. Payments on the country's medium and long-term debt remained current.

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In an effort to deal with Nigeria's worsening economic problems, the military government of General Buhari presented an austere budget in 1984 and successfully rescheduled its short-term open account trade arrears by offering to convert this debt to dollar-denominated promissory notes. However, the FMG failed to attack some of the fundamental economic distortions such as the overvalued currency, the naira, that lay at the root of the chronic pattern of recession and austerity. The failure of the government to come to grips with the country's economic malaise was a major factor in the overthrow of Buhari by Major General Babangida.

In the wake of the decision not to seek a loan from the IMF, the Babangida government made the 1986 budget the centerpiece of its economic reform package. The budget emphasizes growth led by the private sector, with particular attention given to the revitalization of agriculture and the small-scale farmer, the promotion of non-oil exports, and the privatization of parastatals.

The \$15 a barrel fall in the price of oil in the first quarter of 1986 has hampered the implementation of the 1986 budget and prompted a reconsideration of the country's adjustment strategy. The drop in oil revenues and a sharp decline in the availability of overseas credit due to Nigeria's inability to pay off existing

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obligations has forced Nigeria to negotiate seriously with its creditors to reschedule its official (Paris Club) and private (London Club) debt.

In June 1986, Nigeria announced its decision to create a second tier foreign exchange market (opened on September 27, 1986) in which Nigerian importers of goods and services are obliged to pay market rates for their foreign exchange needs. Under the new system, the second tier and the official foreign exchange markets should be collapsed into one by mid - 1987.

Nigeria's transportation and communications networks are an important part of the country's development plans. Nigeria's principal ports are at Lagos (Apapa and Tin Can Island) and Port Harcourt; other large ports are at Calabar and Sapele. The 8,577 kilometers (5,331 mi.) of navigable inland waterways, utilizing principally the Niger and Benue Rivers and their tributaries, constitute an extensive and important waterway system. Of the 80,465 kilometers (50,000 mi.) of roads, more than 15,093 kilometers (10,000 mi.) are paved. There are 3,508 kilometers (2,180 mi.) of railroad track. Three of Nigeria's airports (Lagos, Kano, and Port Harcourt) have the capability to accommodate international flights. Nigeria Airways flies international routes within West Africa, and to Europe and the United States. Nigeria Airways competes with private

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Nigerian-owned airlines on Nigeria's extensive domestic routes. Increasing demand on Nigeria's telephone system has strained capacity and both external and internal service range from fair to good. A satellite ground station is equipped to relay international television programs. Nigeria has numerous government-owned radio and television stations, transmitting to virtually the entire country.

Nigeria has numerous daily newspapers (both private and government-owned), most of which are distributed nationally. Investment

Although Nigeria has had to adjust to a decline in oil revenue, it continues to represent an important market. Companies interested in long-term investment and joint ventures, especially ventures that use locally available raw materials, will find potential opportunities in the large national market. Most companies face difficulties importing raw materials and remitting profits overseas but these are compensated in part by Nigeria's promising long term commercial potential.

Economic Aid

The United States assisted with Nigeria's economic development from 1954 through June 1974, when concessional assistance was phased out because of a substantial increase in Nigeria's per capita income resulting from rising oil revenue. This increase YD

in per capita income placed Nigeria among the more prosperous sub-Saharan African countries. As of 1974, the United States had provided Nigeria with \$360 million which included technical assistance grants, development aid, relief and rehabilitation grants, and food aid. Ongoing disbursements on loan and grant commitments continued well into the late 1970's, bringing total bilateral economic assistance to roughly \$445 million. Since 1983, grants from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to various private voluntary organizations have been used to assist Federal and State Ministries of Health develop and implement programs in family planning and maternal and child health. \$7 million is budgeted for 1986 with plans for an average of \$10 million budgeted annually over the next five years. An additional \$3 million annually is also expected to be provided to support immunization and oral rehydration programs for children.

Defense

Nigeria's armed forces number about 127,000, down from 225,000 in 1978. The Nigerian Army, the largest of the services, has approximately 110,000 personnel and consists of four infantry divisions: two mechanized divisions, one armored division, and one composite division. It has demonstrated its capability to mobilize, deploy, and sustain battalions in support of peace-keeping operations in Africa and with the United Nations

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Interim Force in Lebanon. The Nigerian Navy, a force of about 6,000 is equipped with frigates, fast attack craft, corvettes, and coastal patrol boats. The Nigerian Air Force, 11,000 strong, flies transport, trainer, helicopter, and fighter attack aircraft. Nigeria purchases military equipment and training from Eastern and Western countries. For security and economic reasons, its military leaders seek greater self-sufficiency in technical training as well as in the production of defense-related material. Currently, Nigeria is producing small arms and light armoured vehicles and is seeking to increase both capabilities. FOREIGN RELATIONS

Since independence, Nigerian foreign policy has been characterized by a focus on Africa and by attachment to several ' fundamental principles, including African unity and independence; peaceful settlement of disputes; nonalignment and nonintervention in the internal affairs of other nations; and regional economic cooperation and development. In carrying out these principles, Nigeria participates in the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Non-Aligned Movement, and the United Nations.

Nigeria strongly condemns apartheid and advocates the imposition of mandatory comprehensive economic sactions against South Africa. Nigeria also has participated in efforts of the

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front-line states of southern Africa (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, and Zambia) to bring about independence for Namibia. Nigeria participated with other African countries in formulating the Lagos Accords, an organized effort to bring an end to the civil war in neighboring Chad. Nigerian troops were dispatched to Chad in December 1981 as part of an OAU-sponsored peacekeeping force.

In pursuing the goal of regional economic cooperation and development, Nigeria helped create ECOWAS, which seeks to harmonize trade and investment practices for its 16 West African member countries and ultimately to achieve a full customs union. Nigeria also has taken the lead in articulating the views of developing nations on the need for modifying the existing international economic order in the context of the North-South dialogue.

Nigeria has enjoyed generally good relations with its immediate neighbors. A longstanding border dispute with Cameroon resurfaced in 1981, but bilateral relations were eased following a visit to Nigeria by the president of Cameroon in early 1982. Similarly, a border dispute with Chad flared in the spring of 1983 but was eased by talks between the two governments. Nigeria's land borders, closed in April 1984, were reopened in March 1986.

U.S.-Nigerian Relations

U.S. relations with Nigeria are cordial and based on various

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political, cultural, and economic ties, as well as an increasing range of individual contacts.

In recognition of the growing importance of Nigeria-U.S. relations, Head of State General Olusegun Obasanjo paid a state visit to the United States in 1977 and President Jimmy Carter paid the first state visit to sub-Saharan Africa by an American president when he traveled to Nigeria in 1978. In July 1980, Vice President Mondale visited Nigeria, and President Shagari paid a state visit to the United States in October 1980. In November 1982, a U.S. delegation led by Vice President Bush visited Nigeria. More recently, several high-ranking members of the Babangida administration have paid official visits to Washington to discuss ways in which the United States might assist with Nigeria's economic recovery program. Nigerians travel to the United States frequently, and some 15,000-20,000 Nigerians are currently studying in the United States. Many Nigerians who studied in the United States have remained to work in the professions such as law, medicine, engineering, and business.

PRINCIPAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

President and Commander-in-Chief

of the Armed Forces--Major-General Ibrahim Babangida Chief of General Staff--

Rear Admiral Augustus Aikhomu

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Ministers

Finance--Dr. Chu S. P. Okongwu Defense--Major-General D. Y. Bali External Affairs--Prof. Bolaji Akinyemi Communications--Lt. Col. A. T. Ayuba Works and Housing--Alhaji Abubakar Umar Mines, Power, and Steel--Alhaji Bunu Sherif Musa National Planning--Dr. Kalu I. Kalu Industries--Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Alani Akinrinade Trade--Alhaji Sumalia Mamman Petroleum--Alhaji Rilwanu Lukman Agriculture, Water Resources & Rural Development--Maj. Gen. Muhammadu Nasko Ambassador to the United States--Ignatius C. Olisemeka

Permanent Representative to the United Nations--Major-General Joseph Garba

Nigeria maintains an embassy in the United States at 2201 M Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20037, telephone 202-822-1500, and consulates general in New York (575 Lexington Avenue, New York, New York 10022, telephone 212-715-7200); San Francisco (369-371 Hayes Street, P. O. Box 3512, Rincon Annex, San Francisco, Ca. 94101, telphone 415-864-8001); and Atlanta (225 Peachtree Street, South Tower, Suite 1010, P. O. Box 4475, Atlanta, Ga. 30303 telephone 404-577-4800).

Travel Notes

Clothing: Tropical wash-and-wear clothing and rainwear are recommended.

Customs: Persons arriving in Nigeria must have valid passports, and visas obtained from the Nigerian Embassy or consulates in the United States.

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Health: Public health facilities, private clinics, dental care, and optical services are available in major cities but most fall short of American standards. Malaria is endemic; malaria suppressants are recommended. Tapwater is not potable. Fruits and vegetables should be carefully prepared and meats cooked until well done.

Telecommunications: Telephone calls to the U.S. and Europe are

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via satellite. Facilities exist for overseas cables, telexes, and radiotelephone messages to ships at sea. Lagos is 6 hours ahead of Eastern Standard Time, and 1 hour ahead of the United Kingdom.

Public Holidays: The U.S. Embassy and Consulate General observe the following American holidays--New Year's Day, Martin Luther King's Birthday, Washington's Birthday, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Columbus Day, Veteran's Day, Thanksgiving, and Christmas.

The Embassy and Consulate General also observe the following Nigerian holidays--Good Friday, Easter Monday, Worker's Day (May 1), National Day (October 1), and Boxing Day (December 26). The Embassy and Consulate General Nigerian offices are also closed for two days each during the Muslim feasts of Id-el-Fitr and Id-el-Kabir, and on the Prophet's birthday. (The exact dates of the Muslim feasts depend upon the sighting of the moon.) Transportation: Several international airlies provide regular service to Nigeria. Nigeria Airways and private carriers provide domestic air service. About 16,000 kilometers of paved roads, including some four-lane highways, provide the main basis for surface travel by bus or car. Railways are used primarily to transport agricultural and commercial goods. Passenger service is available but it is very slow. Within cities and towns, taxis and buses are commonly used.

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Principal U.S. Embassy Officials:

Ambassador - Princeton N. Lyman Charge - Warren Clark Counselor for Political Affairs - Peter R. Chaveas Counselor for Economic Affairs - Richard Bash Counselor for Commercial Affairs - Norman Glick

Counselor for Agricultural Affairs - Thomas Pomeroy Consul General - Bobby Watson Defense Attache - Colonel Thomas E. Leverette Public Affairs Officer - Bruce Koch

Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate General, Kaduna: Consul General - Harlan Lee

The U.S. Embassy in Nigeria is at 2 Eleke Crescent (P.O. Box 554), Victoria Island, Lagos. (Tel. 610005, 60117, 611303.) The U.S. Consulate General is at 2 Maska Road (P.O. Box 170), Kaduna. (Tel: (062) 201070, 201071, 201072.)

The United States Information Service (USIS) has offices in Lagos, Ibadan and Kaduna. They are at the following locations:

Lagos: 1 Kings College Road, Lagos. (Tel: 634689, 635611, 633713.)


Kaduna: 2 Maska Road (P.O. Box 170), Kaduna.

(Tel: (062) 201070, 201071, 201072.)

Ibadan: 4B Rotimi Williams Avenue, Bodija Estate, Ibadan. (Tel: (022) 412802, 410775).

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THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY TO THE REMARKS OF THE NEWLY APPOINTED AMBASSADOR OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA ALHAJI HAMZAT AHMADU UPON THE OCCASION OF THE PRESENTATION OF HIS LETTER OF CREDENCE

Mr. Ambassador:

I am delighted to welcome you to Washington as you assume your new assignment as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. I accept with great pleasure the Letter of Credence and the message of personal greetings from your most distinguished President, His Excellency Major-General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida. I also acknowledge the Letter of Recall of your distinguished predecessor.

The United States values very highly the close ties that have bound our two peoples together for many years. Our relationship is a deep one rooted in history, cultural heritage, commercial ties and dedication to shared values, including respect for fundamental human rights. In recent years the mutual understanding between our countries has been furthered especially by the contributions to American society of thousands of Nigerians who are currently resident in the United States, as well as those who have studied at U.S. universities and have now returned to Nigeria to assume positions of importance in your society. 52

My Government has followed with great interest the Republic of Nigeria's far-reaching structural adjustment program. I applaud President Babangida's determination to undertake serious economic reform measures designed to reduce government intervention in the marketplace. Nigeria's program is a reflection of President Babangida's leadership, courage and vision.

The United States is pledged to lend its support to Nigeria's economic reform program. We will continue to work through international financial institutions and our own assistance programs to lend appropriate support to the program which your nation has freely chosen and adopted for itself. Further, we are planning to continue our support for your Government's efforts in combatting communicable childhood diseases, family planning, agricultural research and vocational education.

I am committed to continuing to encourage the American private sector to assess the new trade and investment opportunities created by Nigeria's structural adjustment program. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) is presently organizing a U.S. investment mission which we hope will lead to an expanded role for our private sector in contributing to Nigeria's economic growth.

The United States is also following with interest your nation's plans for a return to democratic civilian rule. We applaud your Government's commitment to improving respect for fundamental human rights, due process and an eventual return to a freely elected Government. As a nation with a fundamental commitment to democracy, the United States looks forward to the establishment in the years ahead of a vibrant and just democracy in Nigeria. 53

I am pleased that our two Governments are moving to improve cooperation in law enforcement efforts, in particular in respect to narcotics trafficking. Current efforts to expand our cooperation in this area have my full support. It is only through international cooperation that we can effectively combat the heinous activities of narcotics traffickers, whose evil work respects no national boundaries and targets the most vulnerable in both our societies.

It is my nation's hope that in the years ahead, the United States and Nigeria will also expand our cooperation in international fora in finding solutions for the most pressing problems of mankind. Only through joint efforts can we face the threats posed to civilized society by terrorist activities, the dilemmas of the Middle East, the necessity of ending the illegal occupation of countries such as Afghanistan and Cambodia by the armed forces of neighboring powers, the promotion of equitable and free international trade, and the special challenges of promoting justice and equality for all the peoples and nations of southern Africa. Our two nations are committed to the same goals of freedom, justice and peace. On that basis I am convinced that there is much room for us to expand cooperation in finding genuine lasting solutions to international problems, rather than permitting rhetorical excess to shift the focus from constructive measures.

Please extend my personal greetings to President Babangida and assure him of my desire to further strengthen the warm and cooperative relations between our two countries.



Mr. President,

It is a great honour and privilege for me to be appointed Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the United States of America. Such an appointment, especially, at this time, carries with it an enormous challenge and an historic responsibility. It is, therefore, with pleasure and a great sense of humility that I present to you, Mr. President, the letter from my President, Major-General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Commander-in-Chief of the Nigerian Armed Forces, accrediting me as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the United States of America. Permit me Mr. President to also deliver the Letter of Recall of my distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Ignatius C. Olisemeka who has been reassigned.

In doing so, I bring you Mr. President, the high regard and warmest personal greetings of His Excellency Major-General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and the Government and people of Nigeria.

I consider it a great privilege to have been honoured with this Mission at this crucial moment in the history of my country. For, we are on the threshold of momentous changes in our political and economic life. I come therefore with great enthusiasm to further explain these constructive changes, to mediate our interests and concerns with the United States, to assist in carrying further the vision of the architects of this change.

My country, Nigeria, is currently preoccupied with laying the foundation for self-sustaining economic growth through

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self-reliance, and for a steady improvement in the standard of living of our peoples. We are doing so through a far-reaching structural adjustment programme, freely adopted by us, to confront our economic problems and create the conducive environment for our people to realize our country's enormous potentialities. We are pleased to note with appreciation the positive role which the United States is playing in support of the smooth implementation of this programme. And it is our hope that even more intensive American support for these bold efforts would be forthcoming to the mutual benefit of our two peoples.

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Mr. President, my mission is to continue in the path chartered by my illustrious predecessors, and distinguished citizens of our two countries, but more than that, also maintain and keep the strong ties of friendship that happily characterise our bilateral relations. I shall do so strengthened in the confidence that my government and people are desirous of exploiting to advantage the goodwill and understanding which similarities in historical background and experience have created in these relations.

For, beyond the distinction of having the greatest concentration of the black race in our respective countries, our two peoples have a number of shared values including respect for human dignity and fundamental human rights. These values are reflected in the democratic way of life and the yearnings of our two peoples for freedom, the most explicit demonstration of which is the vigour and freedom of the press in our respective countries. They are values that, in the case of Nigeria, have survived the vicissitudes of military rule, and today, constitute a source of inspiration behind determined efforts of the present Nigerian Administration to establish a firm and sound foundation for a stable political order on our return to civil rule. Towards this end, the appropriate machinery has been set in motion to guarantee that the political system and constitutional arrangement that will

eventually be instituted would be based on our realities as a nation.

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It is in this regard that we note with satisfaction and encouragement the stirrings within the United States for numerous possibilities for constructive co-operation and genuine partnership with us. We are conscious of the difficulties now confronting developing countries, like Nigeria, in meeting the challenges of the present times. Some of these problems such as the crippling debt, and discriminatory trade practices require imaginative and global approach. Nevertheless, I wish to express the hope that we still can count on the leadership role of the United States in the search for solutions that would prove beneficial to the world economy, and lead to the improvement in the lots of mankind within the context of a true spirit of interdependence.

Against this background I look forward, during the period of my assignment, to a period of fruitful co-operation between Nigeria and the United States in all spheres and particularly in developing the key sectors of agriculture and agro-allied industry. Co-operation in science and technology will also be in our mind in the course of our interaction with officials of your Administration, and with private American entrepreneurs. It is my hope that, as in the past, I can count on your ready support.

Nigeria has followed, with great interest, your recent efforts in support of world peace through disarmament. We are encouraged by the momentum already created in that regard, although we are not oblivious of the hurdles that still have to be overcome. I wish to assure you of our continuing determination to work closely with the United States of America towards the reduction in world tension, and the creation of an international environment for the promotion of orderly social and economic growth, and eventual realisation of the goal of peace and harmony among all peoples.

It is in this connection, that we followed very closely and with great interest the strides made by the international community, in the recent past, concerning the situation in apartheid South

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Africa. Although a lot still remains to be done before the apartheid system will be completely dismantled and replaced by one that satisfies the aspirations of all its people, we are nevertheless reassured that the inherent threat which the apartheid system poses to regional peace and stability is now fully recognized, and that current efforts will be consolidated. That the United States of America and Nigeria should, despite differences over tactics, be counted on the side of this movement for change is a reflection of the belief which our two countries share that all peoples, irrespective of their colour, race or religion, have an inalienable right to self-determination. It is also my hope that our two governments will continue to co-operate in this historic venture including an early resolution of Namibian independence issue.

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Mr. President, our concerns in these matters reflect our abiding faith in the capability of independent Africa to develop on its own, albeit, with the support and encouragement of the developed and developing nations and to chart a course in the international community, based on the interests of our peoples. That faith, expressed twenty-four years ago, in the creation of the Organisation of African Unity, remains unshaken. It continues to express itself in our active role in, and support for our sub-regional economic organisation, the Economic Community for West African States, symbol of our collective commitment to meet the challenges of independence and satisfy the expectations of our peoples. It is our hope that Africa's modest efforts within these organisations and institutions will continue to receive the support of your Administration especially at this time when Africa had made careful determination to reverse the economic misfortune of the past decade and return its peoples to the path of dignity.

I wish to assure you that, during my assignment in this country, I shall conduct my country's relations with the United States of America with honesty and candour, two virtues which

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you are known to hold dear. I trust that in my task of promoting and strengthening my country's relations with the United States, I can count on the support of your Administration. 58

Mr. President, may I avail myself of this opportunity to convey once again the warm wishes of my President to you personally, members of your family and our sincere wishes for your continued health and happiness as well as the progress and presperity of the government and people of the United States of America.

Embassy of Nigeria Washington, D.C.

22nd May, 1987