

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Department of State: Office of the Historian:
Records, 1981-1989

Series: IV: PRESS RELEASES

Folder Title: June 1984

Box: 26

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Inventories, visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-support/citation-guide>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

Last Updated: 02/07/2024

PRESS DEPARTMENT OF STATE

June 4, 1984
No. 145



FOR RELEASE 6:00 P.M., E.D.T., THURSDAY, JUNE 7, 1984
NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED, QUOTED FROM, OR USED IN ANY WAY

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

1952-1954

VOLUME XV: KOREA (IN TWO PARTS)

The Department of State today released Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume XV, Korea. The volume presents almost 2000 pages of previously highly-classified and unpublished documents on the policy deliberations and diplomatic negotiations which ended the Korean War.

By 1952, America's first limited war of the 20th century had become a military stalemate. Approximately the first 700 pages of the volume deal with the Truman Administration's efforts to resolve the last remaining issue preventing peace in Korea, the conflict with the Communists over voluntary return of prisoners of war (POWs). Having made the difficult decision in early 1952 not to use force to repatriate captured Chinese and North Korean prisoners, Truman and his advisers faced an agonizing and unsuccessful search for a formula to resolve the POW deadlock. Casualties continued on the battlefield, as American and allied POWs languished in Communist POW camps. Truman was unable to secure peace at Panmunjom, at the United Nations, or through indirect diplomacy. Adding to the President's frustrations, were the increasingly authoritarian methods used by the President of the Republic of Korea, Syngman Rhee, against his elected political opponents.

President Eisenhower came to office committed to end the war. His administration considered very tentatively the use of tactical atomic weapons if it could not achieve peace at the negotiating table. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles passed the hint of such a strategy to the People's Republic of China. The new American determination, as well as other considerations, moved the Communists closer to de facto acceptance of the American position on the POW question. But President Rhee believed the impending armistice would mean the end of his dream of a unified Korea, and resisted it. The U.S. Government successfully embarked on a diplomatic campaign to obtain from Rhee a promise not to obstruct the armistice.

For further information contact:

Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, Volume XV, Korea, was prepared in the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. Copies of Volume XV (Department of State Publication Nos. 9347 and 9348; GPO Stock No. 044-000-02010-6) may be purchased for \$29.00 (domestic postpaid) from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C, 20402. Checks or money orders should be made out to the Superintendent of Documents. The Foreign Relations series has been published continuously since 1861 as the official record of United States foreign policy. The volume released today, which is published in two parts, is the eighth of sixteen covering the years 1952-1954.

The Office of the Historian has prepared a brief summary of the volume.

For further information, contact:
John P. Glennon (202) 632-7768
David W. Mabon (202) 632-3518

PRESS DEPARTMENT OF STATE



June 7, 1984
No. 146

PC #12

PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA
JUNE 1, 1984

SECRETARY SHULTZ: President Reagan sent me to Central America on a mission of peace. I went to El Salvador and witnessed the inauguration of the new President -- an inspiring event. And I have come to Nicaragua for a meeting with Comandante Daniel Ortega, Foreign Minister D'Escoto and their colleagues.

Our discussions here were quiet, direct, candid, and frank. Having met last night with the Foreign Ministers of eight of the nine Contadora countries, and now here with the leaders of Nicaragua, I have met with all of the representatives of the Contadora countries.

Reflecting the discussions here, I can say that we, as the other countries involved, support the Contadora process as the basic way to resolve regional issues.

During the discussions here, I expressed the United States concerns and summarized them under four headings:

- A. An end to the export of subversion;
- B. the restoration of a reasonable military balance;
- C. the importance of removing Central America from the East-West confrontation, by taking foreign advisors that represent that confrontation out of the picture;
- D. The importance of the implementation of the Sandinista statements to the OAS some years ago promising free elections, political and democratic pluralism, and concern for human rights.

For further information contact:

After the presentation of the United States views and the views of Nicaragua, and some discussion, we agreed that further discussions would take place. The U.S. designated Ambassador Harry Shlaudeman to represent us in these discussions.

As I said earlier, both countries support the Contadora process, representing as it does the fact that the problems and, therefore, the solutions to a considerable degree are regional in nature. We expect that the discussions between our two countries will make a contribution to the Contadora process. The discussion here in Nicaragua has been a constructive one and the meeting was worthwhile.

QUESTION: Is the U.S. planning to withdraw military advisors from Honduras and El Salvador and cease support to the "Contras"?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The points I made about United States problems in the area represent a statement of our views. Beyond that, whatever may come up in the discussions between Ambassador Shaludeman and the Nicaraguan representative, we will discuss. Our plans are for discussion.

QUESTION: The U.S. has demands; does the U.S. have any offers?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I have given you a report on the meeting and its content reflecting the United States' views. Among the things I reported is that there will be further meetings and further discussions in those meetings. The nature of those discussions remains to be seen.

PRESS DEPARTMENT OF STATE



June 5, 1984
No. 147

INTERVIEW WITH
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
ON ABC-TV'S "GOOD MORNING, AMERICA"
WITH BARRIE DUNSMORE
London
June 5, 1984

MR. DUNSMORE: Secretary Shultz, it is being reported this morning that the President will ask the leaders of the six industrialized nations to go ahead and use the reserves we have in the event that there is a shutdown of oil because of the Iran-Iraq war. What indication do you have from the other countries that you can go ahead and implement the plan?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Everyone is concerned about the situation. The big point to keep in mind is that we're much better prepared now than we were in 1973 or 1979. We have a very large amount of oil in our strategic petroleum reserves. So, we have the capacity to manage the situation if there is some halt in shipments or cut down in the shipments. We'll have a discussion of it, I'm sure.

MR. DUNSMORE: Some of the other industrialized countries are more dependent on oil from the Gulf than the U.S., yet they seem unwilling to take steps that might have to be done to prevent a disruption. What are you going to ask of these countries in terms of participating with us in the event of problems in the Gulf?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think everyone will have to participate and coordinate somewhat together in how the reduction would be handled. There is an organization set up to do that - the IEA. At any rate, there is a mechanism for coordination and there are a lot more stocks. I would expect that there will be some focus on that. We have a lot to work with and so it ought to be possible to manage it so it won't cause the crisis condition we've had before.

MR. DUNSMORE: How close are we to a major escalation in the Iran-Iraq war?

For further information contact:

-2-

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There have been back and forth attacks for some time. The war has essentially been stalemated for a little while now. The Iranians have said a number of times that they intend to launch a major attack but they have not done so. We'll just have to see about that.

MR. DUNSMORE: Would you anticipate that that would bring about the kind of crisis we've feared for the last four years?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I don't know if that would necessarily spill itself over into the Gulf which is what we've been concerned about lately. The amount of slaughter in the war is appalling. It would be a blessing for humanity to have it end.

MR. DUNSMORE: Realistically, how likely is it that the U.S. and Nicaragua can come to a peaceful accommodation in the near future?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It's possible and we thought there was a chance it might be possible. That is why the President sent me there. The discussion I had with Commandante Ortega was a straightforward, candid, and on the whole, constructive discussion. And there will be some further dialogue, I'm sure. We arranged for that. We will just have to see.

MR. DUNSMORE: We will agree with the Sandinistas and bring a third party into the conversation?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: That was discussed and we discussed a method for handling that problem. From our standpoint, we prefer to have direct discussions whenever we're talking with another country.

MR. DUNSMORE: On the one hand, we are willing to talk to the Sandinistas yet we continue trying to get money to support the contras. How do you reconcile those two tracks of policy?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I was very clear with Commandante Ortega about what our view of the problem is. We think there needs to be an end to subversion from one country to another and the Nicaraguan Government has been actively engaged in supporting and directing -- and their command and control system -- over the Salvadoran guerrillas. So stop. Second, we think the Central American situation ought to be taken out of the East/West conflict. That means getting Cuban troops and military type people and the Soviets out of there. Normal diplomatic relations are one thing, military contact is something else again. Third, Nicaragua's military buildup is just way beyond anything that has been seen in Central America. It ought to be brought down to size so that it isn't a threat to its neighbors. Fourth, we want to see progress toward pluralism, democracy and respect for human rights. You might say a return to the announced goals of the Sandinista revolution. So we laid those points on the table. That is our agenda.

-3-

MR. DUNSMORE: What do you say to Administration critics who charge that your trip to Nicaragua was largely political to ease criticism of U.S. policies in Central America?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I can't help people speculating about reasons. I know what my reasons were and the President's were. We thought there was a possibility of an opening here. So we suggested there be a meeting and they agreed. We presented our point of view and they did the same.

MR. DUNSMORE: Any indication of whether Mr. Sakharov is alive or dead?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't know any more than the information that we see here publicly. You hear rumors but the Soviets have denied them. But they have not allowed Sakharov to be seen by a credible person from the West. We just don't know.

MR. DUNSMORE: Thank you.

PRESS DEPARTMENT OF STATE



June 8, 1984
No. 148

INTERVIEW WITH
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
ON THE NBC-TV "TODAY SHOW"
WITH ANDREA MITCHELL
London
June 8, 1984

MS. MITCHELL: Administration officials here in London have been saying that they do not expect Iran to be able to defeat Iraq and that Iran does not seem to have the military supplies or the technology to be able to win this war. Is that correct?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I don't know about that. What I do know is that it's a tragic war. There are a million people arranged against each other. There have been untold deaths already and the main thing is (transmission break) of that happening because all of the people who have a capacity to talk to either side just get no where with Iran in terms of trying to get it worked out.

MS. MITCHELL: Are we going to see that offensive or are we now beginning to believe it's not going to take place?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: All I know is that the Iranians keep talking as though they are about to launch one but they haven't done so as of yet.

MS. MITCHELL: The Administration's position seems to be to try to reassure people possibly to avoid a panic of buying on the spot market. The President is talking here in London about sharing supplies. Are we going to be sending our oil over to the western Allies?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, the main point insofar as the oil side of this is concerned is we don't want to get so preoccupied with oil that we forget about the human tragedy going on on the ground; but nevertheless on the oil question, the reality is that we are much better off. We, the West -- we, the United States, are much better off than we were back in 1973 or in 1979 when we had episodes of strife-induced shortages. There is more supply around the world and we have very substantial stocks of oil and so do other countries --

For further information contact:

-2-

MS. MITCHELL: Are we going to sell that?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: -- so if we manage things well -- well, what we are trying to work out and, of course, the IEA based in Paris is an organization that's long been --

MS. MITCHELL: The International Energy Group.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: -- that's right -- for a collaborative effort to manage any situation that arises and we ought to be able to do so and keep things reasonably stable. We have the resources to do it.

MS. MITCHELL: There was an official here last night who told us that even if Iran tries to close the Gulf, it could not keep it closed. Is that our military analysis?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, actually closing the Straits of Hormuz is difficult to do and we do have a naval presence as do other countries nearby and I think to close it for any extended period of time would be very difficult, at least so I'm told by our military people.

MS. MITCHELL: And, how concerned should Americans be about becoming militarily involved in this? We've already become involved as a support mechanism for the Saudis with our AWACS.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, no one wants to become involved and I just refer you to the President's own statements. We have supported our friends in the area, intend to continue doing so, but basically we'd like to see it settled and also, of course, to see any tendency to escalate the whole conflict into the Gulf area itself eliminated and limited.

MS. MITCHELL: Is this an area where we and the Soviets have a mutual interest in trying to keep both sides apart?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I think we can say that the Iran-Iraq war is one very large conflict that hasn't become sort of part of the East/West conflict. We have some differences of interest but basically both we and the Soviets want to see international waters remain open and things like that.

MS. MITCHELL: Apparently the United States has been assured that the Sakharovs are safe, speaking of East/West relations. Do we have any leverage to get them released and get Mrs. Bonner out for her medical health?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I think the -- I wouldn't say we're assured that they are safe. The Soviet Union has said they are safe and I hope that's true. We have no basis for knowing

-3-

whether it's true or not and it seems to me, you have just another instance of a very tragic situation involving two tremendous people and at a minimum, the Soviet Union ought to allow some independent observer such as yourself or some reporter at least to see them, if not interview them and, of course, to let them immigrate if they want to or let Mrs. Bonner seek medical treatment elsewhere if she wants to, which she apparently does.

MS. MITCHELL: Thank you very much for being with us, Mr. Secretary.

PRESS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



June 12, 1984
No. 149

STUDY GROUPS A AND B OF THE U.S. ORGANIZATION
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE
CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE (CCITT)

Notice of Meeting

The Department of State announces that Study Groups A and B of the U.S. Organization for the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT) will meet on July 9, 1984 from 9:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. in Room 1408, Department of State, 2201 C Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.

Study Group A deals with U.S. Government aspects of international telegram and telephone operations and tariffs; Study Group B deals with international telegraph operations.

The purpose of the meeting is to bring together the members of the Study Groups to review the progress of the past plenary period, examine and discuss new and/or revised recommendations; examine the proposed new questions for the plenary period 1985-1988; and develop the Study Groups' reports to the National Committee meeting on the following day. It is requested that all appropriate U.S. and international chairmen and rapporteurs be in attendance.

Members of the general public may attend the meeting and join in the discussion subject to instructions of the Chairman. Admittance of public members will be limited to the seating available. In that regard, entrance to the Department of State building is controlled and entry will be facilitated if arrangements are made in advance of the meeting. It is requested that prior to the meeting, persons who plan to attend, so advise Mr. Earl Barbely, Department of State; telephone (202) 632-3405. All attendees must use the C Street entrance to the building.

For further information contact:

PRESS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

June 12, 1984
No. 150



STUDY GROUPS C AND D AND INTEGRATED SERVICES DIGITAL NETWORK (ISDN)
JOINT WORKING PARTY OF THE U.S. ORGANIZATION FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE (CCITT)

Notice of Meeting

The Department of State announces that Study Groups C and D and the ISDN Joint Working Party of the U.S. Organization for the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee will meet July 9, 1984 from 1:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. in Room 1408, Department of State, 2201 C Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.

Study Group C deals with telephony; Study Group D deals with matters in telecommunication relating to the development of international digital data transmission.

The purpose of the meeting is to review the progress of the past plenary period, examine and discuss new and/or revised recommendations; examine the proposed new questions for the plenary period 1985-1988; and develop the reports of the Study Groups and Joint Working Party to the National Committee meeting on the following day. It is requested that all appropriate U.S. and international chairmen and rapporteurs be in attendance.

Members of the general public may attend the meeting and join in the discussion subject to instructions of the Chairman. Admittance of public members will be limited to the seating available. In that regard, entrance to the Department of State building is controlled and entry will be facilitated if arrangements are made in advance of the meeting. It is requested that prior to the meeting, persons who plan to attend, so advise Mr. Earl Barbely, Department of State; telephone (202) 632-3405. All attendees must use the C Street entrance to the building.

For further information contact:

PRESS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



June 12, 1984
No. 151

NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE U.S. ORGANIZATION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE (CCITT)

Notice of Meeting

The Department of State announces that the National Committee of the U.S. Organization for the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT) will meet on July 10, 1984 starting at 9:30 a.m. in Room 1408, Department of State, 2201 C Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.

The National Committee assists in the resolution of administrative/procedural problems pertaining to U.S. CCITT activities; provides advice on matters of policy and positions in the preparation for CCITT Plenary Assemblies and meetings of the International Study Groups; provides advice and recommendations in regard to the work of the U.S. CCITT Study Groups; and recommends the disposition of proposed U.S. contributions to the international CCITT which are submitted to the Committee for consideration.

The National Committee will continue its examination of issues related to the upcoming VIIIth CCITT Plenary Assembly now scheduled for October 8-20, 1984 in Malaga-Torremolinos, Spain. The Committee will receive and discuss the reports of U.S. Study Groups A, B, C and D and the Joint Working Party on Integrated Services Digital Networks; receive and discuss the report of the ad hoc group which was established at a previous meeting to advise the Committee on issues relating to the election of international Study Group chairmen/vice chairmen, review the CCITT Study Group structure as well as perhaps review the U.S. counterpart structure and the Study Group questions. It is requested that all U.S. and international CCITT chairmen and vice chairmen be in attendance.

Members of the general public may attend the meeting and join in the discussion subject to instructions of the Chairman. Admittance of public members will be limited to the seating available. In that regard, entrance to the Department of State building is controlled and entry will be facilitated if arrangements are made in advance of the meeting. It is requested that prior to the meeting, persons who plan to attend, so advise Mr. Earl Barbely, Department of State; telephone (202) 632-3405. All attendees must use the C Street entrance to the building.

For further information contact:

PRESS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



June 13, 1984
PR #152

REMARKS AND Q&A SESSION BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE
OVERSEAS WRITERS CLUB
AT THE
FOREIGN SERVICE CLUB, WASHINGTON, D.C.
TUESDAY, JUNE 12, 1984, 1:15 P. M.

MR. ROY GUTMAN: While we're waiting for dessert to be served -- and I hope we can avoid the clinking of too many sherbet cups -- I will make my brief remarks.

Secretary Shultz is a hard man to catch. I've been trying for over a year to have him come to the Overseas Writers, and the fact that he's here today is quite fortuitous. I don't want to take any of the credit. That goes to some other people in this town who I'd now like to thank, in order of their responsibility: President Reagan (laughter), Ambassador Robert McFarlane, Karna Small, and John Hughes. We can reverse that if you like.

But it is Secretary Shultz, himself, who we must thank the most for jumping in at short notice to be with us here in replacement of Ambassador McFarlane.

Jumping amid crisis -- that's a transition -- is how George Shultz got his job in the first place. Though from his studied approach, his measured statements, his air of calm, you would think he'd been in the job for many, many years. In fact, it's a shade under two years. Many things he expected to happen while in office didn't come true. For example, he hoped to direct foreign policy from Washington and not be forever a traveler on the Air Force plane.

Well, 220,000 miles and 39 countries later, I think we can say, "So much for that goal." He's about to take his third Asian trip. He did a Middle East shuttle; he's been to South America, twice to Central America; he was in West Africa; not to mention numerous trips to Europe.

For further information contact:

In a former incarnation, a former job, in Washington, George Shultz once described the way he thinks policy really works here. He compared it to sailing. "To get from Point A to Point B, you never go in a straight line," he said. "You must measure the wind, you must measure the tides, you must be prepared to tack, sometimes even go backwards, retreat, and then tack and tack again until you reach your destination."

With that in mind, one must listen with care to his assessment of the U.S. role in the world. "The predominant position of the United States after World War II has eroded, as it was bound to," he said on April 3 in a speech to the Trilateral Commission. I quote, "It seems to me that in this disorderly and dangerous new world, the loss of American predominance puts an even greater premium on consistency, determination, and coherence in the conduct of our foreign policy. We have less margin for error than we used to."

I read this as saying that much of the work you must do, Mr. Secretary, is in the margins. Many of the games will be marginal, and with a reduced tolerance for error we had better get it right. This is where the press comes in. You can depend on us, Mr. Secretary, to play our part, which is to let you know if you don't get it right. (Laughter) That may be the message you don't always want to hear.

Occasionally the press also has some good news to convey, and in that capacity today I'd like to tell you that Secretary Shultz has just become a grandfather for the third time, which is why his wife was not with him on his European trip. So congratulations. (Applause)

Because of the short notice to our event today, Secretary Shultz does not have the lengthy prepared remarks he might ordinarily have, but I think he has a few introductory remarks, and I ask him now to speak. As usual, I will designate the questioners. If you just raise your hand, I will take a list and do it in order. Secretary Shultz.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Thank you. This did come up all of a sudden yesterday afternoon, I think, so here I am with this terrific audience, and I don't have my usual terrific speech (laughter) to give. However, the State Department's powers of production are such that they produced a speech for me, and as I was leaving the office somebody handed it to me. I'm not going to read it, but I glanced at the first paragraph. It's not bad. (Laughter)

I'll read it to you. A couple of weeks ago I read an article in The New York Times which said that the "Season of slow, dreary diplomacy has begun at the State Department a few months earlier than usual."

Since that piece was published, we've had a meeting of 16 NATO Foreign Ministers in Washington. I've been to President Duarte's inauguration in El Salvador, met with Nicaraguan leaders in Managua, and we just got back from a hectic and highly successful trip to Ireland, Normandy, and the London Summit. Next month I'm off on a long trip through Southeast Asia and Australia and New Zealand for meetings with the ASEAN and ANZUS Foreign Ministers. If this is what you fellows call the "slow season," heaven keep me from a busy one. That's a pretty good opener. (Laughter) Well, that's all there is. (Laughter).

Bud told me that it was the Summit meeting that you wanted to hear about, and my colleagues at lunch assured me that that was not so. (Laughter) Nevertheless, let me make a quick comment about some aspects of the Summit meeting. It really started, in a sense, in Dublin with the President's speech there, and his comments and phraseology did seem to strike a remarkable resonance throughout Europe and in the Japanese delegation that came to the Summit. So it got a great deal of commentary.

The Summit was also preceded by the events in Normandy, and I think in the light of them it was especially important that the first thing that emerged from this Summit was a ringing declaration of values in which the Germans and Japanese and Italians, who weren't represented at Normandy, were able to join. It was kind of interesting to me. You look at a statement like that, and to a certain extent you can say, "Well, so what's new?"

On the other hand, it was greeted very warmly and seriously, I thought, particularly since you see that there are so many places that don't have the capacity to honor these values. So it seemed to take on a meaning in the Summit, and in a sense you could say that the economic discussions were a way of examining problems that have to be dealt with in the support of those values. The statement on East-West relations the same way; even the comments on the Iran-Iraq war, and the energy aspects of it; and, most interestingly in some ways to me, the short statement about terrorism. I think this is the first time that that subject has been treated with the comprehensiveness of concept as in the Summit. There have been more particular things, particularly on hijacking and things like that, but that takes a specialized type of terrorist act, whereas this treated it across the board and did provide an occasion where all the countries assembled there expressed their concern about the problem and at least gave some hints of the kinds of things that they're prepared to do about it in collaboration with each other.

So I thought that was a rather significant development, and I'm sure the Foreign Ministers, as we got together -- and I guess we discussed the subject for two, two and a half, hours or something like that ourselves, let alone the heads of

state. We intend to have some further conversations and structured better than the kind of conversation you have when you just take up a topic and everybody kind of pitches in. So I think that was a little different kind of subject for the agenda and, unfortunately, a kind of note of the times.

Having said that, let me see if there's anybody who wants to make an observation or a question or whatever. I take it the spirit of this occasion is you're really not interested in hard news; you're interested in more of the (laughter) philosophical, longer-term kind of thing.

MR. JIM ANDERSON: Mr. Secretary, I'd like to paraphrase a statement by the President three and a half years ago and ask you to look around the world and tell us where you think the United States, in terms of national security, is better off than it was four years ago.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think in a broad sense, everywhere. That is, in the sense that we are stronger, better able to defend our interests and our values, that our strength is better militarily, certainly a lot better as an economy, and I think the economies of our allies and friends are, while having difficulty, nevertheless improving. Inflation is a problem you never lick, but it is more under control now. So I think the growth pattern we're seeing is healthier, and I think we're stronger in our sort of outlook as Americans -- we're a little more self-confident -- and this is very much to the good. So that's a general overlay that kind of goes across the board.

If you go around the world -- well, I could go around the world and it will sound self-serving to you, so I won't. But I think that whether you look at the situation in Asia, which is on a much better footing, a more stable footing; South America, which is plagued by debt problems, nevertheless, our relationships are strong. The problems there that went along with the Falklands seem to have faded, and our relationship with Brazil, for instance, is once again the strong kind of relationship it has been.

I think we can take some satisfaction from the fact that democracy is really sweeping our hemisphere and been quite a notable development. African problems are great problems. We are addressing them. I think our programs now or our effort is better poised than it has been, and some progress surely is being made in southern Africa. As with everything, it's fragile. It moves slowly. Sort of two steps forward, one step back kind of process, but I think we're ahead of the game there.

If you look at the Middle East, we have not made headway in the peace process, I'm sorry to say, and Lebanon has not developed in the way that we would have chosen. I can't help but wonder if some of those who were so anxious to abrogate the agreement with Israel and reduce the level of our presence aren't having some second thoughts about the situation, given what is taking place there now. It's not so easy to put that together. But certainly there are problems there, and the Iran-Iraq war continues to be a tragedy for the people involved and a threat to third-party interests that we're all familiar with.

In Europe, I can't help but contrast what I found when I arrived, which was a very tense and difficult situation with the last meeting of the NATO Foreign Ministers and the London Summit, and the general atmosphere was very, very positive. I think the Williamsburg Summit statements, combined with those in London, are a clear kind of affirmation of the fact that Japan has kind of arrived into the scene in a stronger and more forthcoming way and I think a very healthy way.

Our relationships with the Soviet Union are certainly not the kind of warm and close relationships that one would like to have with a major power, and, while there are discussions going on in a great many fora of all kinds of issues, the discussions of nuclear issues are not going forward now, so that's unfortunate.

I think the President, however, is right in his basic stance that the United States must always look, first of all, to its strength, and it has to be realistic about the situation, and it has to be ready to engage in reasonable and constructive discussions whenever the Soviet Union is prepared to do that. I must say that that stance, as expressed again in the Dublin speech, as I said at the beginning, has had a very strong resonance with all the people that we met.

Central America -- I think that things have changed in El Salvador, and the situation is much more positive, much more positive. There was a genuine air of celebration about the inaugural festivities with, I think, 45 nations represented there. It still is very much the case that the Government of Nicaragua is supporting daily, supplying, controlling, communicating with the guerrillas in El Salvador, and that will continue to be a problem. But there is a certain momentum that I think is good, and I also have the feeling that the Contadora process, while still well short of accomplishing the ends that they sought, or are seeking, has very much in mind the right issues and are pushing them. Of course, we're trying to be as helpful as we can in that, in every way that we

can think of, primarily ways that are relatively quiet, but we hope effective.

MR. EDWARD MORGAN: Mr. Secretary, a former official of the CIA with expertise in Central America recently made headlines just a few days ago with a flat statement, after having been recently in Managua, that the Nicaraguans were not sending anything to San Salvador -- to El Salvador now, and the implication was, if not the declaration, that, if this is so, it destroys one of the main raisons d'etre of the United States in pressing Nicaragua. What is your reaction?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It is inconceivable that an informed, honest person could make that statement, because the evidence is just everywhere. I've looked at a lot of it, and I think it is totally and absolutely convincing that the direction and the supplying of the guerrillas in El Salvador comes from Nicaragua.

Of course, it originates elsewhere, from Cuba and the Soviet Union and Soviet satellites, but Nicaragua is the base, and sometimes in backhanded ways the Nicaraguans acknowledge that. Whoever this is can say whatever he wants to say, but it is not correct, I'm absolutely positive.

MR. ROY GUTMAN: Mr. Secretary, I have a follow-up question myself on Nicaragua, which is that in The Washington Post this morning Philip Geyelin wrote that U.S. policy toward Nicaragua is either to remove, reform, restrain, or inconvenience the Nicaraguan Government, if not all of the above.

He said there was some confusion in the public mind about American policy. I can see that we're tacking quite a bit, to use a sailing term, as we move off of Point A, but I'm not quite clear myself where Point B is, what our goal is.

I have two questions in this connection. If elections are held in Nicaragua later this year and the government wins -- which seems to be a reasonable assumption -- can this Administration live with a Marxist-Leninist-run country in this hemisphere, provided that no Soviet missiles are installed or bases set up?

Related to this, what standards are to be applied to the Nicaraguan election process? Many people in this town predict that no matter what the results in October or November, that the State Department will come out the next day and say that the elections were stacked.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Which of those questions would you like me to answer? First of all, what is our policy with respect to Central America and Nicaragua? People are mystified. I don't know why they're mystified. The President set it out in a speech to a joint session of the Congress a year ago last April, and it is a multi-faceted program based on our analysis of what the problems are. The underlying problems are problems of political and social elements, of economic problems, with a very strong security overlay derived from the emergence in Nicaragua of a Soviet-sponsored state -- that's the problem. What we are trying to do is encourage political changes that will make for healthier societies, and we seem to be having a fair amount of success in that, but lots of room to go: democracy, the rule of law, some sort of arrangement for sharing more widely the fruits of economic development, of encouraging economic development.

We know very well that economic development can't succeed when there are constant guerrilla efforts to blow up infrastructure, and so on, so if you don't have a security shield and can't contend with those guerrilla efforts, you can't achieve the other purposes. So you've got to have that, and, beyond that, in terms of implementation, that if we can bring all the relevant parties into a sort of negotiating posture, the problems being regional, it's desirable to try to bring about a more stable situation in Central America through that means and stop the subversion and the military effort. That's basically the program.

The Contadora process fits that very well because it is essentially a regional process, so we have encouraged it and have been glad to see that develop.

Insofar as Nicaragua is concerned, I'll just state what I've stated in Managua, both privately and publicly: That what we would like to see changed in Nicaragua is, number one, they have involved themselves in the East-West conflict by the very large-scale presence of Cubans especially, but also Soviets and other Soviet-bloc nationals, and with the materiel that comes with it, and they ought to get themselves out of the East-West conflict. That doesn't mean they shouldn't have diplomatic relations with these countries, but when you have thousands and thousands of their nationals there in a military or semi-military capacity, that's something else again.

We saw in Grenada what clearly was being thought about in terms of the number of uniforms captured and all that kind of thing. So that's number one.

Number two, they have an armed force that is just totally out-sized from the standpoint of Central American standards. There's no reason to have an army when you add up the regular army, the reserves, and the militia, all of which are more or less full-time duty -- over 100,000 -- with all of the ancillary things that go with it. It is not an army needed to defend themselves by Central American standards; it must have some other purpose. So cut it down to size so it doesn't threaten neighbors.

Number three, stop subverting the people in your neighborhood with a pattern of guerrilla activity, which your ex-CIA man says doesn't exist and I can tell you it absolutely does.

Number four, live up to the undertakings you made to the OAS that you wanted to create in Nicaragua: The other side of the Somoza coin, namely, a regime that is based on democratic ideas, on pluralism, on the rule of law, and respect for the rights of individuals -- human rights. That's what we believe they should do.

-- MORE --

MR. ROY GUTMAN: My question was, can the United States live with a Marxist-Leninist-run Nicaragua provided there are no Soviet bases or Soviet missiles there?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I tried to give the program. If people, with all of the evidence around, elect a government committed to Marxism-Leninism, as the way they want to run their economy and society, I suppose it's conceivable they might do that but it hasn't happened anywhere. And the record -- and this is certainly one of the problems that the Soviet Union faces -- the record of that system is terrible. So let's have a genuinely open election and see what happens.

MR. BILL BEECHER: Mr. Secretary, I would like to follow up on something you said a moment ago. Obviously, when an ex-analyst of the CIA comes out and gets so much attention with his charges that the evidence inside does not substantiate the conclusion being made by the Administration on the supply of materiel from Nicaragua to El Salvador, does it not behoove the Administration to come out with some evidence, as it once tried to do in a White Paper?

Whatever happened to the idea of bringing out another White Paper at this point?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We have presented convincing evidence to the relevant bodies of the Government. I don't think there's some necessity to respond to every ex-CIA agent or ex-anything. They're not running the Government.

The evidence is there; we presented it to the relevant units of the Government. And to the extent it's appropriate, given the problems of gathering material, no doubt it can be made public.

MR. BILL BEECHER: But you don't intend to bring it forward?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I haven't considered the question of whether there should be some big White Paper on the subject. In fact, guess I've got to the point where I think the question is sort of trivial, in the sense that it is so obvious and clear. And anybody who, at this stage of the game, is arguing that the Nicaraguans aren't really supporting the Salvadoran guerrillas, they must be living in some other world.

I'm just astonished that we're taking up time here at a luncheon of people who are as informed as this on such an open-and-shut question.

MR. WALT FRIEDENBERG: Roy, can I follow up on that.

MR. ROY GUTMAN: Yes, Walt.

MR. WALT FRIEDENBERG: Mr. Secretary, it's not a room full of ex-CIA agents.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I know it.

MR. WALT FRIEDENBERG: We're members of the press. We represent the American public.

Now, you've released information about Soviets dropping munitions in Afghanistan, poison gas in -- wherever -- southeast Asia; we're talking Nicaragua and El Salvador and the America taxpayers and voters. Where is the evidence?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There is lots of evidence, and my impression is that there is a lot of it around and on the record.

In response to your question, "are we in the process of getting up some White Paper on the subject," not that I know of; maybe we should. But I think, as I said, that it is astonishing to me that this question is put forward seriously by a group like this as a question. It's obvious to everybody. The question is, what to do about it. Even the Nicaraguans don't deny it.

MR. WALT FRIEDENBERG: Can I have just one more crack at that?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Sure.

MR. WALT FRIEDENBERG: What you're asking us to do, and the American public to do, is to trust you.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, no. No, I think there is a lot of public evidence and to the extent I'll go back and examine this issue. I had really felt that we were way beyond that point.

But, really, everytime some person who used to be in the Government gets up and says something, I don't think you can expect the Government to respond to it. We wouldn't have anything else to do.

MR. HANK TREWHITT: Mr. Secretary -- Senator Shultz. Senator Shultz -- right.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Never! (Laughter)

MR. HANK TREWHITT: Not yet. Senators Percy and Baker left the White House this morning suggesting, in effect, that summitry should be institutionalized. That whole question has a long history, which I'm sure you're familiar with. I wonder if you see any merit in it? Is there any inclination on the part of the Administration to get away from the familiar two conditions that there be a concrete prospect for success, essentially?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The subject of meetings with the Soviet Union has been thought about, worked on a great deal. Our problem right now is not a lack of willingness on our part to discuss large and small issues, but an apparent unwillingness on their part to do so.

Of course, one of the things that happens is that the more intransigent they become, the more there is a tendency to suggest additional things that we should do to overcome their intransigence. We have to be careful about that because one needs to recognize that in a broad sense we're engaged in a process of negotiation with the Soviet Union. And, as you know, the bulk of negotiating that goes on in practically any complicated negotiation goes on within each constituency, not across the bargaining table.

We have an asymmetry here in that we have very little access to their constituency, so to speak, but they are constantly bargaining with us through the body politics of our various nations. I think we need to see the process of withdrawal that they seem to be engaged in -- perhaps it'll change; we can hope so -- as a part of a tactic. It's clear that they have made a decision that they're going to behave in a certain way; and they chop things down right and left. So that is a tactic on their part, a design to see what kind of response they get. Maybe they will scare people or in some other way change their behavior.

I think it is for us to be confident, strong, and reasonable, but not to give the store away in order to have a discussion. Be ready for a discussion on reasonable terms and equitable terms as equals.

Whether a proposal of a summit meeting as a get-acquainted meeting, which seems to be what gets proposed all the time -- never mind the substance, just meet and get to know the other guy -- would do any good or not, well, I think it's questionable. My guess is that if the President proposed it, all of you would immediately write a story about an election-year ploy, and probably the Soviets would evaluate it that way.

So I think if something like this is to be done, it has to somehow be arranged in a manner, whether it is an election year or any other year, that kind of stands on its feet and has merit on its own terms and for its own rationale.

From the standpoint of President Reagan, of course, he once did propose a meeting with Brezhnev. But in the first couple of years of his Presidency, there wasn't a Soviet leader there for him to meet with, really, as it's turned out; and the same for the third year of his Presidency.

There is a new head man in the Soviet Union, and time will tell about the appropriateness of a meeting. We can certainly all hope that there will be one, because it ought to be a sign that things are improving.

People would assume, if a meeting were arranged, that there was some good reason for it no matter what you say. So they would find that very encouraging. In the event it turned out that there wasn't, that it was just a get-acquainted session, it would lead to a great letdown. I think that happened at Glassboro, as a matter of fact.

I'm not trying to talk in categorical terms here, but just in the spirit that you described this luncheon in -- sort of talk around the subject with you and see some of these pros and cons.

MR. BARRY SCHWEID: I was going to ask you pretty much along the same lines, so let me cover a couple of points that you haven't covered yet.

The President now is taking the tack that the Soviets are confused, they're a confused leadership, they can't make decisions. That was the tack he took in his farewell news conference in London.

I wonder if you could amplify that a bit? Are you saying, or is the President saying -- because I've heard other people in the Administration saying it's the line now -- are they saying that Chernenko isn't in charge, or that there's rivalry between him and Ustinov?

In your description of how you don't want to give away the store just to get to the table, in that great array of problems that both countries have, aren't there some issues where it could be mutually beneficial to come to an agreement

where nobody gets anything at the advantage of the other guy but maybe everybody benefits, including the world? And there was a real proposal through the Hearst Newspapers just yesterday Mr. Chernenko proposed opening ASAT talks, and the Administration apparently doesn't want to because it's embarked in a problem that it doesn't want to interrupt. Isn't that a real proposal?

Isn't that a place to begin? What's wrong with that?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There are lots of specific things that can be worked on. For example, the Hot-Line upgrade talks are virtually completed. There is something that is specific, that has moved along. Presumably anytime it's wanted, it can be completed, and there are quite a number of things of that character, larger/smaller, that could be addressed.

The subject of arms control in space is a great big broad subject. We have thought about that a great deal. A report was made to Congress which, among other things, brought out some of the difficulties involved in verifying whatever it is you might agree to.

Of course, it is the case that the Soviet Union does have now a deployed and tested anti-satellite system. It's a little disingenuous to say to us under those circumstances, "If you don't test anymore, we won't." That is by way of saying that "We've got something, we've tested it out, we've got it deployed now, we want to deal where you don't do that."

We believe the system that we have under very strong development is better than the one that they have. So, presumably, what they're interested in is blocking that. That doesn't mean that we shouldn't be searching for ways to discuss these issues. But I think that people shouldn't sort of blithely assume that it is easy.

One has to say, given the difficulties of verification, if the Soviet Union were to say to you, "Here's a blank piece of paper and our signature is on the bottom of it; you write down what would be a suitable agreement," it wouldn't be that easy to do, because of the inherent difficulties in this field. So I think those things need to be thought about and considered, and they are.

But there are a lot of things that could be worked at. The problem is to break through this atmosphere that the Soviet Union seems to have decided to create, that there really can't be any discussions.

I think, judging from reactions we've had around, that the posture of the United States -- that we're prepared for reasonable discussions -- is a much better posture than theirs, which is that they aren't, really. It may be that a shift of some kind will take place. I don't know.

MR. BARRY SCHWEID: This notion that -- you see, you're describing them as decisively unwilling to negotiate. The President has now injected the notion that they're so confused, they can't even make up their mind if they want to come to the table, which is a kind of a wrong way to describe the leadership of another country.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think you're overdoing what the President said by quite a bit. Clearly, people speculate about the decision-making process and allocation of power, and so on. The fact of the matter is that nobody knows very clearly just how things are done. It does seem to be a little different from many past times, but I think it's speculation. And the best thing for us to do, as I've said many times before, is to concentrate on our position and what we will do, and then we'll just have to see what kind of response they make.

MR. JOHN WALCOTT: Mr. Secretary, if I can return for a second to the spirit of Jim Anderson's first question. The relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, a lot of people are finding it's worse than it has been in years -- the nuclear arms talks are broken off, there have been a number of incidents at sea between the two countries, there's a war in the Persian Gulf that I suppose threatens to drag both superpowers into it at a time when communications between them are poor.

Is the world a safer place now than it was four years ago?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Infinitely. (Laughter)

MR. DANIEL SCHORR: Mr. Secretary, maybe the best way I can find to ask you this question is the way it was asked of me on a call-in show last night.

It went like this: When it becomes officially clear from an Italian investigative report that Bulgaria's Secret Service, and probably the KGB behind them, tried to kill the Pope, what will be the state of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union thereafter? Can it be compartmentalized? Can we maintain relations with the state; can you describe the

man's talk -- have they got something to talk about, or has that become such an overriding event that public opinion will inevitably force a different attitude on the United States Government towards the Soviet Union?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It is horrible to contemplate that a state could make a calculated effort to murder the Pope. I think that one of the words connected with the Western relationships with the Soviet Union that's been controversial has always been the word "linkage." But, it seems to me, it shouldn't be a particularly controversial word. It's inevitable that there's linkage.

I think you only have to recall that President Carter withdrew the SALT II Treaty from the Senate upon the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. So these things do affect people deeply, and the problems of Dr. Sakharov and Mrs. Bonner are very much on people's minds as well.

MR. BERNARD KALB: Mr. Secretary, that remark about being "horrible to contemplate," did the state make a calculated effort to kill the Pope?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I'm not accusing anybody of anything. We have taken the position that we respect and want to cooperate in any way we can with the Italian investigation. They have been pursuing it very thoroughly, carefully, over quite a period of time, and it is moving along apparently toward a climax. We'll have to see what the results of that investigation turn out to be.

But in response to Dan's question, I think that just as a generalization, that is a very tough one.

MR. ABDUL SALAM: A couple of questions on the Middle East, Mr. Secretary. How can you explain the United States Government's current position about the Iran-Iraq war of no-win policy, which was enunciated yesterday by Mr. Murphy on Capitol Hill?

And the second question, could you please elaborate more or shed some light on the strategic agreement between the United States and Israel in light of the fact that the Israeli press has been wide open on the subject and the United States press, or the United States Administration has been tight-lipped on the matter of the strategic agreement?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: On the Iran-Iraq war, our policy is one of neutrality. Beyond that, of wanting to see the war ended, it's been a very catastrophic war from the standpoint of the deaths of human beings.

We have tried to support efforts to mediation and negotiation in that war. They haven't gotten any place, but maybe they will. Perhaps this move on bombing against population centers that was taken in response to the Secretary General of the U.N., maybe that will start something. We can certainly hope so.

So contrary to, I guess, the sense of your question, that we don't care, we care a lot and go out of our way, along with our Summit partners in what was labeled the Chairman's Statement to supplement statements about oil resources in the Gulf with a statement about our concern for the loss of life and all of the damage being done by that war. So we care a lot about it. We're not able to do that much about it.

As far as the relationship -- strategic cooperation with Israel is concerned, I think the operative aspect that people have in mind must be the joint political/military group that was created during Prime Minister Shamir's visit to Washington -- whenever that was -- last fall, I guess, sometime.

That is an organized and systematic way of examining together conditions in the area, particularly in the light of the Soviet buildup in Syria and the threat that that poses, not only to Israel but in the Middle East generally; to examine that and all aspects of it. There's been a meeting and there have been some follow-up meetings. The first one was in Washington, I think in January or so. There will be another one in a week or so in Israel. That process of exchange is going along very well.

We agreed at the time that group was set up that we would make public the fact that meetings were being held and who was present at the meetings, and we would have nothing further to say about the content of the meetings. We have been faithful to that commitment, and I believe the Israelis have as well.

MR. ROY GUTMAN: Mr. Secretary, we understand you're rushed on time. We have about six more questioners who would like to ask you questions but I think we might have to save them.

I want to thank you again for coming. Please consider this an open invitation to return any time.

(Applause)

(Luncheon meeting concluded at 2:05 p.m.)

PRESS DEPARTMENT OF STATE



June 13, 1984
PR #153

PROGRAM FOR THE STATE VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA OF
HIS EXCELLENCY MR. J.R. JAYEWARDENE,
PRESIDENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA
AND MRS. JAYEWARDENE.

June 16-23, 1984

Saturday, June 16

| | |
|------------|--|
| 8:45 a.m. | His Excellency Mr. J.R. Jayewardene, President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Mrs. Jayewardene and their party arrive John F. Kennedy International Airport via Air France Concorde Flight # 001. |
| 9:45 a.m. | Departure from John F. Kennedy International Airport via U.S. Presidential Aircraft for Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. |
| 10:50 a.m. | Arrive Langley Air Force Base. |
| 11:35 a.m. | Arrival Lightfoot House, Colonial Williamsburg, Virginia. Private luncheon. |
| 4:00 p.m. | President Jayewardene, Mrs. Jayewardene and their party will take a Carriage Sightseeing Tour of Colonial Williamsburg. |
| 7:30 p.m. | Mr. Charles H. Longworth, President of Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, and Mrs. Longworth will host a dinner in honor of His Excellency the President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and Mrs. Jayewardene at Carter's Grove Plantation. |

Dress: Business suit.

S/CPR - Mary A. Masserini
Vista International Hotel -
Protocol Office,
429-1700 Ext. 1205

For further information contact:

Sunday, June 17

- 10:00 a.m. President Jayewardene, Mrs. Jayewardene and their party depart Langley Air Force Base via U.S. Presidential Aircraft for Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland.
- 10:40 a.m. Arrival Andrews Air Force Base.
- The Honorable Michael H. Armacost, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs will greet the party at the Airport.
- 11:00 a.m. Arrival Washington Monument Grounds (Reflecting Pool Side).
- 11:10 a.m. Arrival Vista International Hotel, 1400 M Street, Northwest.
- Private afternoon and evening.

Monday, June 18

- 10:00 a.m. Arrival at the White House where His Excellency Mr. J.R. Jayewardene, President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, and Mrs. Jayewardene will be greeted by the President and Mrs. Reagan, The Honorable George Bush, Vice President of the United States, The Honorable George P. Shultz, Secretary of State, and Mrs. Shultz, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Mrs. Vessey and others.
- 10:30 a.m. President Jayewardene will meet with President Reagan at the White House.
- 12:30 p.m. The Honorable George P. Shultz, Secretary of State, and Mrs. Shultz will host a luncheon in honor of His Excellency the President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and Mrs. Jayewardene, Department of State, Thomas Jefferson Room.
- At the conclusion of luncheon, President Jayewardene and Mrs. Jayewardene will witness the signing of the U.S.-Sri Lanka Science and Technology Agreement, signed by Secretary Shultz and Minister de Mel, Finance Minister, John Quincy Adams Room.

Monday, June 18 (continued)

Private afternoon.

7:30 p.m.

The President of the United States and Mrs. Reagan will host a dinner in honor of the President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, and Mrs. Jayewardene at the White House.

Dress: Black Tie/ National Dress.

Tuesday, June 19

President Jayewardene will meet with the following at the Vista International Hotel, Presidential Suite:

10:30 a.m.

The Honorable M. Peter McPherson,
Administrator, Agency for International
Development (AID)

11:30 a.m.

The Honorable Charles Z. Wick,
Director,
United States Information Agency.

PHOTO COVERAGE OF ABOVE MEETINGS. Photographers to be on 12th floor of Vista International Hotel 15 minutes prior to scheduled meeting.

12:30 p.m.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee will host a luncheon in honor of President Jayewardene of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, U.S. Capitol, Room S-116.

2:15 p.m.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee will host a Coffee in honor of President Jayewardene, Rayburn House Office Building, Room 2200.

4:30 p.m.

President Jayewardene will meet with The Honorable A. W. Clausen, President, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Vista International Hotel, Presidential Suite.

PHOTO COVERAGE: Photographers to be on 12th floor no later than 15 minutes prior to scheduled meeting.

Tuesday, June 18 (continued)

6:00 p.m. - His Excellency Ernest Corea, Ambassador
8:00 p.m. of the Democratic Socialist Republic of
Sri Lanka, and Mrs. Corea will host a
reception in honor of His Excellency the
President of the Democratic Socialist
Republic of Sri Lanka, and Mrs. Jayewardene,
Ballroom, Vista International Hotel.

Dress: Business suit.

PRESS CONTACT: Mr. Naren Chitty,
Embassy Counselor,
483-4025

Wednesday, June 20

8:30 a.m. President Jayewardene, Mrs. Jayewardene
and their party arrive Washington Monument
Grounds for the Departure Ceremony.

8:50 a.m. Arrival Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland.

8:55 a.m. Departure from Andrews Air Force Base via
U.S. Presidential Aircraft for New Mexico-
Santa Fe County Municipal Airport, New Mexico.

10:45 a.m. Arrival Santa Fe County Municipal Airport,
departing via motorcade for Santo Domingo
Pueblo, Santo Domingo, New Mexico.

President Jayewardene, Mrs. Jayewardene and
their party will meet with the Governors
of the All Indian Pueblo Council and other
Tribal Leaders, Santo Domingo Pueblo.

12:30 p.m. The Honorable Ramon Garcia, Governor,
Santo Domingo Pueblo, will host a luncheon
in honor of the President of the Democratic
Socialist Republic, and Mrs. Jayewardene
at Santo Domingo Pueblo.

PRESS CONTACT: Mr. Benny Atencio,
505 465-2214.

2:45 p.m. Departure from Santo Domingo Pueblo for
Rancho Encantado, Tesuque, New Mexico.

3:30 p.m. Arrival Rancho Encantado.

Wednesday, June 20. (continued)

Private dinner and evening.

Thursday, June 21

8:55 a.m. President Jayewardene, Mrs. Jayewardene and their party depart Santa Fe County Municipal Airport, New Mexico via U.S. Presidential Aircraft for Texas-Sheppard Air Force Base, Wichita Falls, Texas.

11:10 a.m. Arrival Wichita Falls, Texas-Sheppard Air Force Base.

11:55 a.m. Depart Wichita Falls, Texas-Sheppard Air Force Base for New York-Niagara Falls International Airport, Niagara Falls, New York.

3:35 p.m. Arrival New York-Niagara Falls International Airport.

4:25 p.m. President Jayewardene, Mrs. Jayewardene and their party arrive Prospect Park, Niagara Falls State Park, where they will sign the Guest Book and take a boat tour of Niagara Falls. At the conclusion of the boat tour they will take a Viewmobile to Terrapin Point proceeding to the Scenic View of Horseshoe Falls.

PRESS CONTACT: Ms. Maura McCarthy,
Information Officer,
(716) 278-1780

5:25 p.m. Departure from Niagara Falls State Park for New York-Niagara Falls International Airport for departure to La Guardia Airport, New York, (Marine Air Terminal),

6:25 p.m. Arrival La Guardia Airport, New York, New York.

7:00 p.m. Arrival Waldorf Towers, 100 East 50th Street.

Private dinner and evening.

Friday, June 22

8:30 a.m.

The Foreign Policy Association will host a Breakfast in honor of His Excellency Mr. J.R. Jayewardene, President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Conrad Suite, Waldorf Towers Hotel.

Private luncheon.

6:15 p.m.

President Jayewardene will meet with The Honorable Edward Koch, Mayor of the City of New York, Presidential Suite, Waldorf Towers Hotel.

Private dinner.

Saturday, June 23

8:50 a.m.

His Excellency Mr. J. R. Jayewardene, President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Mrs. Jayewardene and their party arrive John F. Kennedy International Airport, British Airways Terminal.

9:30 a.m.

Departure John F. Kennedy International Airport via British Airways Concorde Flight #192 enroute London, England.

PRESS DEPARTMENT OF STATE

As prepared for delivery



June 13, 1984
No. 154

STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUNE 13, 1984

For further information contact:

MR. CHAIRMAN.

MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE.

I WELCOME THIS OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS WITH YOU THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND THE CHALLENGES IT POSES TO OUR COUNTRY. THIS SUBJECT WAS DISCUSSED THOROUGHLY AT THE RECENT MEETING IN LONDON OF HEADS OF STATES AND GOVERNMENTS AND BY THEIR FOREIGN MINISTERS. A DECLARATION WAS ISSUED ON JUNE 9 WHICH MY STAFF HAS MADE AVAILABLE TO YOU. IN THAT DECLARATION, THE LEADERS "EXPRESSED THEIR RESOLVE TO COMBAT THIS THREAT BY EVERY POSSIBLE MEANS, STRENGTHENING EXISTING MEASURES AND DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE NEW ONES." ONE OF THE POINTS IN THAT DECLARATION CALLED ON EACH COUNTRY TO CLOSE GAPS IN ITS NATIONAL LEGISLATION, AND THAT IS ONE OF THE REASONS FOR MY APPEARANCE TODAY. FIRST, HOWEVER, I WANT TO DISCUSS WITH YOU THE PROBLEM IN GENERAL AND WHY IT IS OF SUCH GROWING CONCERN TO THE PRESIDENT AND ME.

TERRORISM HAS BEEN A GROWING PROBLEM SINCE 1968 WHEN OUR AMBASSADOR TO GUATEMALA WAS ASSASSINATED. TERRORIST INCIDENTS REACHED A PLATEAU IN NUMBER IN 1979. THE NUMBER OF RECORDED ATTACKS HAS NOT VARIED SIGNIFICANTLY SINCE THEN. IN 1983 THERE WERE MORE THAN 500 ATTACKS BY INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS OF WHICH MORE THAN 200 WERE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES. THIS WAS ONLY THE TIP OF THE ICEBERG BECAUSE THERE WERE AT LEAST AS MANY THREATS AND HOAXES.

THESE ARE A CHEAP WAY TO CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE OF FEAR AND THEY ALSO ABSORB A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF OUR RESOURCES AS WELL AS THOSE OF THE HOST GOVERNMENTS. BEYOND THIS ARE NATIONAL OR INDIGENOUS TERRORIST ACTIVITIES WHICH PROBABLY EXCEED BY A FACTOR OF ONE HUNDRED WHAT WE DEFINE AS INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.

THIS PROBLEM IS NOT CONFINED TO ANY GEOGRAPHIC AREA. FORTUNATELY, INSIDE THE UNITED STATES WE EXPERIENCE RELATIVELY FEW INCIDENTS; THE PROBLEM FOR THE UNITED STATES IS PRIMARILY IN OTHER AREAS OF THE WORLD. THE LARGEST NUMBER OF INCIDENTS OVERALL AND AGAINST THE UNITED STATES OCCUR IN EUROPE FOLLOWED BY LATIN AMERICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

WHY ARE WE SO CONCERNED? LET ME SUMMARIZE BRIEFLY:

--IN 1983 MORE AMERICANS WERE KILLED AND INJURED BY ACTS OF TERRORISM THAN IN THE FIFTEEN PRECEDING YEARS FOR WHICH WE HAVE RECORDS.

--THE ATTACKS IN 1983 WERE UNIQUE IN THE SHEER VIOLENCE OF THEM. FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW THE WORST TRAGEDIES WERE THE DESTRUCTION OF OUR EMBASSY AND THE MARINE BARRACKS IN BEIRUT AND OF OUR EMBASSY ANNEX IN KUWAIT. BUT WE WERE NOT THE

ONLY VICTIMS. THERE WAS THE BOMBING AT HARRODS IN LONDON, THE BOMBING AT ORLY AIRPORT IN PARIS, THE MURDER OF FOUR MEMBERS OF THE SOUTH KOREAN CABINET IN RANGOON, THE BOMBING DESTRUCTION OF A GULF AIR FLIGHT IN ONE OF THE EMIRATES AND OTHERS.

--CLOSELY TIED TO THE RISING VIOLENCE HAS BEEN THE INDISCRIMINATE TARGETING OF INNOCENTS -- PEOPLE WHO HAVE NO KNOWN ROLE IN EITHER CAUSING OR REDRESSING THE ALLEGED GRIEVANCES OF THE TERRORISTS.

--A SOURCE OF GROWING CONCERN IS THE EXTENSIVE TRAVEL OF TERRORISTS OUTSIDE THEIR OWN COUNTRIES AND REGIONS TO COMMIT ACTS OF TERROR ABROAD. AGAIN, INTELLIGENCE TELLS US THAT THIS OCCURS EXTENSIVELY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA BUT REPORTS ARE INCREASING OF SUCH TRAVEL TO THE US. AND WE ALSO KNOW THAT SOME AMERICANS ARE ENGAGED IN SUPPORTING THE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN STATES AND GROUPS THAT ENGAGE IN TERRORISM.

--THE MOST DISTURBING TREND OF ALL IS THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE AGENCIES OF FOREIGN STATES ARE ENGAGED IN TERRORIST ACTS. SEVENTY OR MORE INCIDENTS IN 1983 PROBABLY INVOLVED SIGNIFICANT STATE SUPPORT OR PARTICIPATION. NO LONGER THE

RANDOM ACTS OF ISOLATED GROUPS OF LOCAL FANATICS. TERRORISM IS NOW A METHOD OF WARFARE, NO LESS BECAUSE IT IS UNDECLARED AND EVEN (THOUGH NOT ALWAYS) DENIED.

--SOME FORTY PERCENT OF ALL THE INCIDENTS AND A LARGE PROPORTION OF ALL THE THREATS AND HOAXES ARE AIMED AT THE UNITED STATES--OUR DIPLOMATS, MEMBERS OF OUR ARMED FORCES, OUR BUSINESSMEN, OR OTHER AMERICANS.

WE ARE NOW FACED WITH A PROBLEM WHICH IS OF MAJOR AND GROWING SIGNIFICANCE. THE PROBLEM IS NOT ONLY REPRESENTED BY THE GRIM STATISTICS BUT BY THE THREAT THAT TERRORISM REPRESENTS TO CIVILIZED LIFE. THE MAIN TARGET OF TERRORISTS IS NOT JUST INDIVIDUALS BUT THE BASIC INTERESTS AND VALUES OF THE DEMOCRACIES. IT IS A FORM OF LOW-LEVEL WARFARE DIRECTED PRIMARILY AT WESTERN NATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR FRIENDS AND ALLIES. WE ARE THE TARGETS BECAUSE OUR BELIEF IN THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IS AN OBSTACLE TO THOSE WHO WISH TO IMPOSE THEIR WILL ON OTHERS. AND IT IS PRECISELY BECAUSE THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONS RESPECT THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND MAINTAIN THE MOST OPEN AND RESPONSIVE SOCIETIES THAT THEY ARE SO VULNERABLE TO TERRORISTS. THE GOAL OF THE TERRORIST IS TO CREATE ANARCHY AND DISORDER, FOR IT IS OUT OF DISORDER THAT HE HOPES TO INSTILL FEAR.

DISCREDIT GOVERNMENTS, DEMORALIZE SOCIETIES, OR ALTER NATIONAL POLICIES.

WHAT ARE WE DOING ABOUT IT?

--WE ARE WORKING WITH OUR CLOSEST ALLIES TO DEVELOP A CONSENSUS ON HOW WE DEAL WITH INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND THE SECURITY PROBLEMS IT PRESENTS FOR US. THE CONSENSUS EMBODIED IN THE DECLARATION IN LONDON ON JUNE 9 IS HEARTENING. IN EARLIER SUMMIT SEVEN MEETINGS WE HAD ADDRESSED SPECIFIC ISSUES SUCH AS AIRCRAFT HIJACKING AND PROTECTION OF OUR DIPLOMATS. WE HAVE MADE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS IN THESE AREAS. BUT ON THIS OCCASION WE DISCUSSED THE BASIC POLITICAL PROBLEM OF STATES ENGAGING IN TERRORISM AND WE ACKNOWLEDGED THE INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OF THE PROBLEM. WE NOTED THAT IN OUR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES WE HAVE GAPS IN LEGISLATION FOR COMBATTING TERRORISM.

THE LEGISLATION BEFORE THE CONGRESS TODAY WILL NOT FILL ALL THOSE GAPS FOR THE UNITED STATES, BUT IT WILL FILL SOME OF THEM. PART OF THE LEGISLATION WE HAVE PROPOSED IS TO IMPLEMENT TWO INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS THAT THE SENATE HAS PREVIOUSLY APPROVED. THESE ARE RELATIVELY NONCONTROVERSIAL, BUT IT IS TIME TO GET THE JOB DONE. THE TWO OTHER BILLS NOW BEFORE THIS COMMITTEE DEAL WITH AREAS OF LAW WHERE WE FEEL

THAT LEGISLATIVE IMPROVEMENTS CAN HELP IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM. WE WELCOME THIS OPPORTUNITY TO WORK WITH THE CONGRESS IN FINDING THE BEST LEGISLATIVE ANSWERS POSSIBLE TO THE COMPLEX QUESTIONS THAT TERRORISM POSES. THE DRAFT OF THE BILL ON TRAINING AND SUPPORT SERVICES HAS BEEN MODIFIED SIGNIFICANTLY TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF CONGRESSIONAL COMMENTS. MR. TROTT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS IN DETAIL.

WE ARE WORKING IN THIS ADMINISTRATION TO REVIEW AND APPLY THE WHOLE RANGE OF OPTIONS AVAILABLE. WE DO NOT HAVE ANY SINGLE ANSWER THAT WE THINK WILL WORK ALL THE TIME. WHAT WE MUST DO, THEREFORE, IS ATTACK THE PROBLEM ON MANY DIFFERENT FRONTS:

--WE HAVE ORGANIZED OURSELVES BETTER WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH TO DEAL WITH THESE PROBLEMS. WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR POLICY, PLANNING AND OPERATIONS ON THESE MATTERS HAS BEEN CONSOLIDATED IN THE OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT. THE POLICY AND PLANNING FOR THE DEPARTMENT AS WELL AS THE GOVERNMENT IN GENERAL IS THE TASK OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE FOR COUNTERTERRORISM AND EMERGENCY PLANNING WHILE THE OPERATIONS ARE IN THE OFFICE OF SECURITY.

--WE HAVE ADDED MORE RESOURCES TO INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND WE HAVE STRENGTHENED COOPERATION WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS. WE HAVE ALSO STREAMLINED OUR PROCEDURES FOR ADVISING OUR POSTS ABROAD OF THREATS AND ANALYSIS OF THEIR SECURITY PROBLEMS. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS PROCEDURE IS NOW WORKING MUCH BETTER. WE BELIEVE THAT WE NEED TO DO MORE.

--WE HAVE STEPPED UP OUR TRAINING AND ARE ALSO CONDUCTING EXERCISES FOR OUR PERSONNEL OVERSEAS ON THE TYPES OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS THEY MIGHT HAVE TO DEAL WITH. WE HAVE, FOR EXAMPLE, ADDED SEGMENTS IN EVERY APPROPRIATE COURSE AT THE FOREIGN SERVICE INSTITUTE ON HOW TO DEAL WITH SUCH PROBLEMS.

--THE CONGRESS APPROVED LAST YEAR A PROGRAM WHICH WILL PERMIT US TO TRAIN FOREIGN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS ON HOW TO DEAL WITH TERRORIST ACTS. WE ARE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN IMPLEMENTING THAT PROGRAM. ALTHOUGH THIS PROGRAM IS DESIGNED TO HELP OTHER GOVERNMENTS DEAL WITH THESE PROBLEMS AS IT AFFECTS THEM, IT SHOULD ALSO IMPROVE CONSIDERABLY THE RESPONSE FROM OTHER GOVERNMENTS WHEN WE NEED HELP AT ONE OF OUR POSTS.

--WE ARE CARRYING OUT SECURITY ENHANCEMENT PROGRAMS AT ALL OF OUR HIGH-THREAT POSTS. WE APPRECIATE GREATLY THE

CONSISTENT SUPPORT WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM THIS COMMITTEE IN THAT EFFORT.

--WE HAVE ALSO TAKEN STEPS TO IMPROVE OUR ABILITY TO RESPOND WHEN INCIDENTS OCCUR OVERSEAS. WE HAVE TEAMS AVAILABLE TO ASSIST ON CRISIS MANAGEMENT, SECURITY, COMMUNICATIONS AND OTHER MATTERS.

--THE COOPERATION OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS OFTEN DEPENDS ON HOW RESPONSIVE WE ARE ON THE SECURITY PROBLEMS THEIR DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS MAY HAVE IN THE UNITED STATES. THE CONGRESS HAS APPROVED LEGISLATION WHICH WILL ASSURE THAT WE HAVE A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM TO PROTECT FOREIGN OFFICIALS, NOT ONLY IN WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK CITY, BUT OTHER PLACES IN THE UNITED STATES. WE ARE SEEKING FUNDS FOR THAT PROGRAM IN THE CURRENT BUDGET.

--FINALLY, WE ARE ACTIVELY SEEKING TO IMPROVE OUR CAPABILITY TO PREVENT ATTACKS AGAINST OUR INTERESTS ABROAD. THE LONDON SUMMIT DECLARATION DISCUSSED, AMONG OTHER THINGS, "CLOSER COOPERATION AND COORDINATION BETWEEN POLICE AND SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS AND OTHER RELEVANT AUTHORITIES, ESPECIALLY IN THE EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION, INTELLIGENCE, AND TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE." AND WITHIN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WE ARE CONTINUING TO STUDY OTHER WAYS AND MEANS OF DETERRING OR

PREEMPTIVELY DEALING WITH A RANGE OF TERRORIST THREATS IN CONFORMITY WITH EXISTING LAW.

THE LEGISLATION BEFORE YOU REPRESENTS MODEST BUT NECESSARY STEPS. THEY ARE ESSENTIAL STEPS BECAUSE THE PROBLEM WILL NOT GO AWAY: THIS IS CERTAINLY NOT THE LAST YOU WILL HEAR ABOUT THE PROBLEM OF TERRORISM.

BUT WE NEED YOUR HELP. THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS OWE IT TO THIS COUNTRY TO DO WHATEVER IS NECESSARY TO PROTECT OUR PEOPLE, OUR INTERESTS, AND OUR MOST BASIC PRINCIPLES.

THANK YOU.

PRESS DEPARTMENT OF STATE

June 21, 1984
No. 155



PRESS BRIEFING
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
LONDON, ENGLAND
JUNE 9, 1984

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The first statement issued by this summit is a statement of democratic values. And I think it's fair to say that the subsequent statements and the discussion generally can be regarded as expressing what the heads of state felt is necessary at this point in time to give maximum support to those values.

Obviously, economic recovery, with inflation attended to, is a key. Obviously, the inter-relationships of the various economies represented at the summit and the developing world is a key. Clearly, as we look in the security dimension, the conduct of our arms control negotiations, and in general, the need, as expressed in the East-West statement, for the West, the free countries, to maintain their strength and their resolve and to be continually ready for reasonable dialogue with the Soviet Union and its allies got great emphasis and much discussion.

And, of course, and unfortunately, in this day and age, the problem of terrorism increasingly demands attention and received a great deal of discussion at this summit.

So I think, in a way, you can conceive of the way this summit proceeded as having started with values, and then looked kind of across the board at the key aspects of supporting those values in 1984.

Q Mr. Secretary, did any of the leaders have any new ideas of how to bring the Soviets back to the negotiating table?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The key, of course, is to be there, to keep expressing that point --

Q What's the question?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The question was, did anybody have any new ideas about how to bring the Soviets back to the bargaining table. And the answer is that the key is to maintain the resolve and firmness and also reasonableness.

For further information contact:

Now, let me point out that in the statement, it takes note of the fact that there are a lot of places in which discussion is taking place. So, of course, you're referring to the nuclear bargaining table, but there are a lot of bargaining tables where there's a considerable amount of activity, and, of course, many, in a sense, bilateral bargaining tables -- ourselves; President Mitterrand will be traveling to Moscow; three of the foreign ministers in the room either have been or shortly will be having direct discussions with their counterpart; and so on. So there's a lot of discussion going on.

Q Is there any intention for President Mitterrand to bring anything from this group of leaders when he goes to the Soviet Union? Any expression from the group?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, far be it from me to try to speak for President Mitterrand. He speaks for himself. But I have no doubt about the fact that what was discussed here and the expressions of resolve and firmness and the desire for dialogue, and so on, are very likely to be emphasized by him.

Q Did anyone encourage the President to try a new approach in getting -- to get the Soviets back to the arms table?

Q Question?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Did anyone encourage the President to try a new approach in getting the Soviets back to -- I think you must have meant -- the nuclear --

Q Yes, I did.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: -- bargaining table. And I keep emphasizing the fact that there are lots of contacts going on in various forums, some multilateral, some bilateral.

There was no discussion of any particular thing to do beyond saying that it is a mistake when somebody picks up and walks out of a bargaining setting to try to make some concession in order to get them back. The fact is that the positions taken by the United States in both the INF and START talks are reasonable positions. In the case of INF, especially, they've been worked out in extensive consultation with our allies. In both cases, it's in the nature of the positions that they lend themselves to give and take, and that is the spirit in which our representatives are ready to go to those bargaining tables, as it said in the statement, "anywhere, any time, and without preconditions".

Q Can you shed any light on why the statement stops -- falls short of urging the Soviets to return to the table, and just says we hope that the Soviet Union will act in a constructive and positive way?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, we're inviting a response from the Soviet Union about what they think, and so coming back to the bargaining table, of course, ultimately is the way you have to get somewhere. And so that's clearly what we want. The President has said that. And I think all of the leaders in one way or another have said that.

Q But it wouldn't be a more accurate reflection of the feelings to urge the Soviets to return?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, that's a formulation that's been used. And I think people felt, let's try a little different formulation. But it's basically the same idea.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you think the Latin American leaders will regard the call in this declaration for multi-year rescheduling as an adequate Western response to the severity of their debt repayment problems?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, they will have to speak for themselves. I do think that an excellent job has been done in working our way through the international debt problem. There is still plenty of work to be done. The idea of multi-year rescheduling, in effect, trying to move a great proportion of the debt out of the rollover and short-term area into longer obligations gives more stability. And I think it's fundamentally a proper idea. I would call your attention to the fact that there is a long list of things that have been proposed in this statement that show a broad action plan and awareness of this problem and a capacity and willingness to deal with it.

No doubt, the most important things to be done in dealing with the debt problem don't have to do explicitly with the debt at all. The most important thing is that the world economy is moving forward and the stronger that movement is, the better off people are going to be because it is the process of trade and the development of that in their external accounts that gives them the capacity to do something with their debt problems. And the same with some of the other suggestions that are made.

For example, the importance of getting equity as well as debt capital in as you're trying to attract finance from outside, and so on. So there's quite a menu of things that are suggested to deal with that problem.

Q Mr. Secretary, on the question of terrorism, we've been told all week that it's more important to get private agreements than public statements. Really a two-part question: What do you think that the public statement on terrorism accomplishes?

And, secondly, the language on concrete action is so weak, it only talks about proposals which found support. Did the nations agree, without getting into the specifics of it, did they agree to take any concrete joint action on terrorism?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Of course, private actions on something like this are the key. But there is a great deal of importance, I think, attached to identifying this problem publicly so people can see that the heads of these governments assembled felt that it was important enough to spend that much time on and to develop it in the detail that it has been developed in this statement. It's in greater detail than -- or at least on a broader scope -- than has been so in the past.

There will be follow-up in terms of various national pieces of legislation. And I would say the things that are listed are examples of steps that will be taken. But all of the ones that are listed, I think, can be helpful. To some degree they're taking place, but they can be firmed up and this subject will be developed further.

Q On that same subject, is this in fact an agreement? Does it go as far as being an agreement? And what is the United States willing to do out of this list? What specifics will the administration follow?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, the declaration says what people have agreed to. I don't think any of these things are agreements in some sort of formal or treaty sense at all. But the United States will proceed, I'm sure, as is laid out here. We are putting forward -- have put forward, for example, pieces of legislation designed to close the gaps, as it says here. We will be cooperating and do cooperate in the exchange of information and intelligence which can take place, I think, on a stronger scale.

No doubt, there will be benefits from identifying known terrorists more carefully. And when someone is excluded from Country A, it's interesting to know what the reasons are. And if they have to do with terrorism, if the same person applies to your country, you can think that over and ask yourself whether or not

you want that person in here and so on. So all of these things are by way of illustrative types of actions that are likely to be taken by all. It is always a point made in the Summit that of course while the seven countries get together, each one is a sovereign entity and nobody is trying to tell the United States what it must do or any of the other countries what it must do, but they represent undertakings of what we agreed is worthwhile carrying out and in our own sovereign way we will go about it. And each country, of course, has to develop these points in a slightly different manner.

Q Were preemptive strikes discussed as appropriate policy in either the heads meeting or at the ministerial level?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, in the ministerial meeting I can't say about all of the heads' discussion, but I was in a good bit of it, perhaps almost all of it on this subject. In the foreign ministers meeting, we discussed this subject very fully and I don't want to go into all the detail of it, but I think that there are great ramifications that go beyond purely defensive measures.

Q Does that mean that we are considering preemptive strikes?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I will simply refer you to the answer that I just gave very consciously on that subject.

Q Mr. Secretary, the United States made a number of appeals to the Soviets to return to Geneva. The other day you embraced a proposal that they had previously favored in Stockholm, yet there doesn't seem to be any affirmative response at all from the Soviets. Was there a sense in the discussion of the East-West declaration or in the other conversations of pessimism about relations with the Soviets, because nothing that anybody seems to do seems to get a positive response from them?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Quite to the contrary. I think the general spirit and sense here, as was true in the NATO foreign ministers' meeting just a week or so ago, is one of confidence, quiet confidence. But nevertheless, the notion that basically we're on the right track and that it is important for us to maintain our capacity and will to defend our interests and our readiness to engage in dialogue when they're ready. Now, in the views around the world, I think people very much prefer the stance of the United States and our allies to a stance of saying, as the Soviets seem to say for reasons that they know better than I, that their stance is that they seem not to want to engage in discussion of a great many of these issues. Now we hope that they'll come around because as the statement says, we believe that it's very much in their interests to discuss these matters.

Quite a number of people reported that when they or people working with them discuss these matters with the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union was very quick to assure their visitor that of course the U.S. elections had nothing to do with their attitude and it almost reminds you of that line, perhaps appropriately quoted in this country, "me thinks he dost protest too much". But at any rate, that's where the situation sits and I think we're in a very good posture.

Q Mr. Secretary, on terrorism, getting back to the point about having no real agreement on some of the principles that are mentioned under point number six, isn't it really more damaging to have issued a statement on which there is no agreement about intelligence sharing --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Oh, there is agreement. I don't know why you say this statement shows there's no agreement. What it shows is that there is a very calm and collected expression of the points in this phraseology -- I might note it as nice, British phraseology, which everyone accepted -- a kind of tendency for slight understatement. But nevertheless to say, and to say competently, that we've discussed this issue. There are things that we can do individually. There are things that we're going to collaborate on and we expect all of this to develop and these examples are just suggestive of the ways in which it would happen.

Q But would it be accurate to say then that even though it just -- it simply says proposals which found support. Would it be accurate to say that all of seven nations have agreed to share information intelligence and technical knowledge?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Found support is, as I said, a very nice term of art that the British contributed in the drafting, and I think it allows both for the fact that everyone agreed on this list, and that, in the process of carrying out these various undertakings, each country has to adapt it, somewhat, to its own circumstances which do vary considerably; and so, we would expect that to happen. But I think it's a very forthcoming -- and, personally, having thought about this issue a lot, and worried about it -- I'm simply delighted that in this meeting there was this much attention to the subject, and the statement was as extensive and forward-looking as the one that's been produced here. And it came, really, with no strain. Everyone is concerned and wants to see things advance, but yet we don't want to overstate or over-display our hand here.

Q Do you expect cooperation from France?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Certainly.

Q Mr. Secretary, the administration has taken a great deal of credit for convergence of economic policy by the Europeans' adopting the approach of the President toward the economy. On East-West relations, contrasting former talk of an "evil empire" with the current emphasis on dialogue, would you say the United States has moved toward the European position?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I would say that the United States, insofar as East-West relations are concerned, has been consistently on a path of saying that the first prerequisite is to be strong. And the second prerequisite is to be realistic about what is going on, and not to shy away from saying what the truth is. And the third prerequisite is to be willing to engage in dialogue with the Soviet Union and try to work out problems.

And if you go back to the statements made by the administration early on, you'll see the seeds of this policy all the way through. For example, in the very strong and wide-ranging agenda on an arms control, and a consistent application of the idea that what we want is reductions, not control, not freeze -- reductions. And that refrain has been played throughout.

Somebody over here --

Q Mr. Secretary, that -- the line about reducing the risk of surprise attack, and attack by accident -- on the East-West portion --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The last paragraph you're speaking of?

Q -- does this reflect concern among your colleagues over the tenor of Soviet alarms over the Pershing II?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, I think that that last paragraph is an effort to say to them, and to say to the world -- you know, there are some things that we ought to view as matters that we have in common. We must have in common the importance of peace. And as far as the particular thing that you mention, of course, confidence building measures, having to do with avoiding surprise attack and so-on -- that emerges out of the original Helsinki Accords. It was discussed in the CSCE talks in Madrid, and it's a centerpiece of the NATO position that we have taken in Stockholm and which we are seeking to engage with the Soviet Union and the other states there; and, in effect, as it says here, to put some real structure into the idea that the Soviets are fond of, and which, of course, people have agreed to before, namely the idea of the non-use of force.

Q Mr. Secretary, can you explain why there was a statement by Mrs. Thatcher on the Iran-Iraq conflict, and not a declaration, as with the other topics?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, it just sort of emerged that way. I don't know quite what the answer is to that, but I would describe, I guess, what happened more or less like this: Clearly, in the economic statement it's important to take note of the oil supply situation. It was reviewed, and, I think, concluded, as we have concluded in the United States, that basically the situation is in far better shape than it was in earlier periods. And that even if there is a disruption of some sort, it's manageable.

Now, I think in the discussion we felt that it wasn't sufficient to say that, because we are concerned about the broader aspects -- the human toll of that war, and other aspects of that war. And so, going on from the economic statement, it was felt that, while perhaps we didn't need to make a special declaration on it, the chairman ought to show that we do have these broader concerns. So that's how that emerged.

Q Mr. Secretary, in the Iran-Iraq conflict -- the statement says the principle of freedom of navigation must be respected -- in the Gulf -- Was there any --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, I would say everywhere -- it doesn't restrict it to the Gulf. But certainly the Gulf is the operative place right now.

Q Okay, sir. Was there any discussion of what action, individually or collectively, might have to be taken if that principle is not respected? We're talking about the Gulf now --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Yes, well of course we reviewed the positions of different countries and generally described and analyzed the situation. And, as I'm sure you're aware, there has been a lot of consultation, in one way or another, on this. And I'll just leave it at that.

Q Mr. Secretary, on terrorism -- was there an attempt to come up with a list of countries that are believed to be responsible for state-sponsored terrorism? And what was the discussion about the ties that some of the partners have with some countries that the United States believes are involved in state-sponsored terrorism?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There was not an effort to make out a list. But I think the -- the extra dimension noted on the problem of terrorism right now, and identified in the statement, is the dimension of state-sponsored terrorism. And we felt that it was important to do that, and probably sufficient, under the circumstances, to do that.

Q Mr. Secretary, to what extent -- we were told that the Sakharov issue was discussed -- to what extent do the cast of states see the Sakharov issue as significant to the overall East-West public agenda?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, of course, it's part of the concern that we all have for the rights and well-being of any human being, let alone such a distinguished person -- and Mrs. Bonner. So, obviously, that was discussed. I think, under all the circumstances, it is not necessarily productive to make some sort of public statement about it at this point in time.

Q Are you convinced they're alive?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think that Larry designated you as the last questioner. Is that correct, Larry?

MR. SPEAKES: That's right.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I didn't do that -- he did that.
(Laughter.)

Q Well, okay -- can you tell us what the President thought of the demonstrators? And, I have --

Q Speak up, Maureen --

Q -- a second question. Can you tell us if, during the sessions, there was a time when voices were raised?

Q Question?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The first question is, what did the President think of the demonstrators? Well, when the President came into the hall, we basically milled around briefly and went in and Mrs. Thatcher gave her statement; and then the heads, of course, left before the ministers and I had a chance to exchange a word with the President on that particular subject. So, I don't know the answer, in a direct sense, to that question.

Were there times where voices were raised? Well, people don't shout at each other at these, but I would say that the discussion was spirited discussion. These are all issues that

people care about. And even things where people agree on, they worry about how it's phrased, so that it gets the right nuance to it. So, these meetings -- at least I've observed the Williamsburg one and this one, and people have told me about some of the earlier ones -- beginning with the Williamsburg summit, the heads of state have taken over, and they're running this thing. And most of the discussion and all the operative discussion is really their discussion, and the various things that come out of it are worked through by them. Other people, of course, help with drafting and so-on, but it's very much their summit; and they are all people who are widely experienced, and they all care about these issues, and they're all forceful people, and they're all people who are accustomed to being listened to. And so, I think it's very important that that kind of discussion take place, and significant, as a result of that, that the results are as broad and as important as they are.

Q Summit booty (Laughter.)

PRESS DEPARTMENT OF STATE



June 26, 1984
No. 156

AS DELIVERED

TERRORISM:

THE CHALLENGE TO THE DEMOCRACIES

ADDRESS BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
TO THE JONATHAN INSTITUTE
SECOND CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
THE FOUR SEASONS HOTEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.
JUNE 24, 1984

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Thank you very much. I appreciate the warmth of your greeting. Let me say that I consider it an honor to be a part of this program, and especially here this evening, to share the platform and to learn and to be informed and be inspired and moved by the statements that have already been made, Mr. Chairman, by yourself, by Professor Netanyahu, by Professor Johnson, and by -- I keep thinking of "Ambassador Rabin." (Laughter)

For further information contact:

Five years have passed since the Jonathan Institute held its first conference on terrorism, and in that time the world has seen two major developments: one a cause for great distress; the other a reason for hope.

The distressing fact is that over these past five years terrorism has increased. More people were killed or injured by international terrorists last year than in any year since governments began keeping records. In 1983 there were more than 500 such attacks, of which more than 200 were against the United States. For Americans the worst tragedies were the destruction of our Embassy and then the Marine barracks in Beirut. But around the world, many of our close friends and allies were also victims. The bombing of Harrods in London, the bombing at Orly Airport in Paris, the destruction of a Gulf Air flight in the UAE, and the Rangoon bombing of South Korean officials are just a few examples -- not to mention the brutal attack on a West Jerusalem shopping mall this past April.

Even more alarming has been the rise of state-sponsored terrorism. In the past five years more states have joined the ranks of what we might call the "League of Terror," as full-fledged sponsors and supporters of indiscriminate -- and not so indiscriminate -- murder.

Terrorist attacks supported by what Qaddafi calls the "holy alliance" of Libya, Syria, and Iran, and attacks sponsored by North Korea, and others, have taken a heavy toll of innocent lives. Seventy or more such attacks in 1983 probably involved significant state support or participation.

As a result, more of the world's people must today live in fear of sudden and unprovoked violence at the hands of terrorists. After five years, the epidemic is spreading and the civilized world is still groping for remedies.

Nevertheless, these past five years have also given us cause for hope. Thanks in large measure to the efforts of concerned governments, citizens, and groups like the Jonathan Institute, the peoples of the free world have finally begun to grapple with the problem of terrorism, in intellectual and in practical terms. I say intellectual because the first step toward a solution to any problem is to understand that there is a problem, and then to understand its nature. In recent years we have learned a great deal about terrorism, though our education has been painful and costly. We know what kind of threat international terrorism poses to our free society. We have learned much about the terrorists themselves, their supporters, their targets, their diverse methods, their underlying motives, and their eventual goals.

Armed with this knowledge we can focus our energies on the practical means for reducing and eventually eliminating the threat. We can all share the hope that, when the next conference of this Institute is convened, we will look back and say that 1984 was the turning point in our struggle against terrorism, that having come to grips with the problem we were able to deal with it effectively and responsibly.

The Anatomy of Terrorism

Let me speak briefly about the anatomy of terrorism.

What we have learned about terrorism, first of all, is that it is not random, undirected, purposeless violence. It is not, like an earthquake or a hurricane, an act of nature before which we are helpless. Terrorists and those who support them have definite goals; terrorist violence is the means of attaining those goals. Our response must be twofold: We must deny them the means, but above all we must deny them their goals.

But what are the goals of terrorism? We know that the phenomenon of terrorism is actually a matrix that covers a diverse array of methods, resources, instruments, and immediate aims.

It appears in many shapes and sizes -- from the lone individual who plants a homemade explosive in a shopping center, to the small clandestine group that plans kidnappings and assassinations of public figures, to the well-equipped and well-financed organization that uses force to terrorize an entire population. Its stated objectives may range from separatist causes to revenge for ethnic grievances to social and political revolution. International drug smugglers use terrorism to blackmail and intimidate government officials. It is clear that our responses will have to fit the precise character and circumstances of the specific threats.

But we must understand that the overarching goal of all terrorists is the same: With rare exceptions, they are attempting to impose their will by force -- a special kind of force designed to create an atmosphere of fear. And their efforts are directed at destroying what all of us here are seeking to build. They're a threat to the democracies.

The Threat to the Democracies

The United States and its democratic allies are morally committed to certain ideals and to a humane vision of the future. In our foreign policies, we try to foster the kind of world that promotes peaceful settlement of disputes, one that welcomes change without violent conflict.

We seek a world in which human rights are respected by all governments, a world based on the rule of law. We know that in a world community where all nations share these blessings, our own democracy will flourish, our own nation will prosper, and our own people will continue to enjoy freedom.

Nor has ours been a fruitless search. In our lifetime, we have seen the world progress, though perhaps too slowly, toward this goal. Civilized norms of conduct have evolved, even governing relations between adversaries. Conflict persists, but with some notorious exceptions, even wars have been conducted with certain restraints: Indiscriminate slaughter of innocents is widely condemned; the use of certain kinds of weapons has been proscribed, and most but not all nations have heeded those proscriptions.

We all know that the world as it exists is still far from our ideal vision. But today, even the progress that mankind has already made is endangered by those who do not share that vision -- who, indeed, violently oppose it.

For we must understand, above all, that terrorism is a form of political violence. Wherever it takes place, it is directed in an important sense against us, the democracies -- against our most basic values and often our fundamental strategic interests.

The values upon which democracy is based -- individual rights, equality under the law, freedom of thought and expression, and freedom of religion -- all stand in the way of those who seek to impose their will, their ideologies or their religious beliefs by force. A terrorist has no patience and no respect for the orderly processes of democratic society and, therefore, he considers himself its enemy.

And it is an unfortunate irony that the very qualities that make democracies so hateful to the terrorists also make them so vulnerable. Precisely because we maintain the most open societies, terrorists have unparalleled opportunity to strike against us.

Terrorists and Freedom Fighters

The antagonism between democracy and terrorism seems so basic that it is hard to understand why so much intellectual confusion still exists on the subject. We have all heard the insidious claim that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." Let me read to you the powerful rebuttal that was stated before your 1979 conference by a great American, Senator Henry Jackson; who, Mr. Chairman, as you observed, is very much with us.

"The idea that one person's 'terrorist' is another's 'freedom fighter' cannot be sanctioned. Freedom fighters or revolutionaries don't blow up buses containing non-combatants; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don't set out to capture and slaughter school children; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don't assassinate innocent businessmen, or hijack and hold hostage innocent men, women, and children; terrorist murderers do. It is a disgrace that democracies would allow the treasured word 'freedom' to be associated with acts of terrorists." So Scoop told us in 1979.

Where democracy is struggling to take root, the terrorist is, again, its enemy. He seeks to spread chaos and disorder, to paralyze a society. In doing so he wins no converts to his cause; his deeds inspire hatred and fear, not allegiance. The terrorist seeks to undermine institutions, to destroy popular faith in moderate government, and to shake the people's belief in the very idea of democracy. In Lebanon, for example, state-sponsored terrorism has exploited existing tensions and attempted to prevent that nation from rebuilding its democratic institutions.

Where the terrorist cannot bring about anarchy, he may try to force the government to overreact, or impose tyrannical measures of control, and hence lose the allegiance of the people.

Turkey faced such a challenge, but succeeded in overcoming it. Martial law was imposed; the terrorist threat was drastically reduced, and today we see democracy returning to that country. In Argentina, the widely and properly deplored "disappearances" of the 1970s were in fact part of a response -- a deliberately provoked response -- to a massive campaign of terrorism. We are pleased that Argentina, too, has returned to the path of democracy. Other countries around the world face similar challenges, and they too must steer their course carefully between anarchy and tyranny. The lesson for civilized nations is that we must respond to the terrorist threat within the rule of law, lest we become unwitting accomplices in the terrorist's scheme to undermine civilized society.

Once we understand terrorism's goals and methods, it is not too hard to tell, as we look around the world, who are the terrorists and who are the freedom fighters. The resistance fighters in Afghanistan do not destroy villages or kill the helpless. The Contras in Nicaragua do not blow up school buses or hold mass executions of civilians.

How tragic it would be if democratic societies so lost confidence in their own moral legitimacy that they lost sight of the obvious: that violence directed against democracy or the hopes for democracy lacks fundamental justification. Democracy offers mechanisms for peaceful change, legitimate political competition, and redress of grievances.

But resort to arms in behalf of democracy against repressive regimes or movements is indeed be a fight for freedom, since there may be no other way that freedom can be achieved.

The free nations cannot afford to let the Orwellian corruption of language hamper our efforts to defend ourselves, our interests, or our friends. We know the difference between terrorists and freedom fighters and our policies reflect that distinction. Those who strive for freedom and democracy will always have the sympathy, and when possible, the support of the American people. We will oppose guerrilla wars where they threaten to spread totalitarian rule or deny the rights of national independence and self-determination. But we will oppose terrorists no matter what banner they may fly. For terrorism in any cause is the enemy of freedom.

The Supporters of Terrorism

If freedom and democracy are the targets of terrorism, it is clear that totalitarianism is its ally. The number of terrorist incidents in or against totalitarian states is negligible. States that support and sponsor terrorist actions have managed in recent years to co-opt and manipulate the phenomenon in pursuit of their own strategic goals.

It is not a coincidence that most acts of terrorism occur in areas of importance to the West. More than 80 percent of the world's terrorist attacks in 1983 occurred in Western Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East. The recent Posture Statement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff put it this way: "Terrorists may or may not be centrally controlled by their patrons. Regardless, the instability they create in the industrialized West and Third World nations undermines the security interests of the United States and its allies."

States that sponsor terrorism are using it as another weapon of warfare, to gain strategic advantage where they cannot use conventional means. When Iran and its allies sent terrorists to bomb Western personnel in Beirut, they hoped to weaken the West's commitment to defending its interests in the Middle East. When North Korea sponsored the murder of South Korean government officials, it hoped to weaken the non-Communist stronghold on the mainland of East Asia. The terrorists who assault Israel are also enemies of the United States. When Libya and the PLO provide arms and training to the Communists in Central America, they are aiding Soviet efforts to undermine our security in that vital region. When the Soviet Union and its clients provide financial, logistic, and training support for terrorists worldwide -- when the Red Brigades in Italy and the Red Army Faction in Germany assault free countries in the name of Communist ideology -- they hope to shake the West's self-confidence and sap its will to resist aggression and intimidation.

And we are now watching the Italian authorities unravel the answer to one of the great questions of our time: was there Soviet-bloc involvement in the attempt to assassinate the Pope?

We should understand the Soviet role in international terrorism without exaggeration or distortion: The Soviet Union officially denounces the use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy. Yet there is a wide gap between Soviet words and Soviet actions. One does not have to believe that the Soviets are puppeteers and the terrorists marionettes; violent or fanatic individuals and groups are indigenous to every society. But in many countries, terrorism would long since have passed away had it not been for significant support from outside. The international links among terrorist groups are now clearly understood, and the Soviet link, direct or indirect, is also clearly understood. The Soviets use terrorist groups for their own purposes, and their goal is always the same: to weaken liberal democracy and undermine world stability.

A Counterstrategy Against Terrorism

Having identified the challenge, we must now consider the best strategy to counter it.

We must keep in mind, as we devise our strategy, that our ultimate aim is to preserve what the terrorists seek to destroy: democracy, freedom, and the hope for a world at peace.

The battle against terrorism must begin at home. Terrorism has no place in our society, and we have taken vigorous steps to see that it is not imported from abroad. We are now working with the Congress on law-enforcement legislation that would help us obtain more information about terrorists through the payment of rewards to informants, and would permit prosecution of those who support states that use or sponsor terrorism. Our F.B.I. is improving our ability to detect and prevent terrorist acts within our own borders.

We must also ensure that our people and facilities in other countries are better protected against terrorist attacks. So we are strengthening security at our embassies around the world to prevent a recurrence of the Beirut and Kuwait Embassy bombings.

While we take these measures to protect our own citizens, we know that terrorism is an international problem that requires the concerted efforts of all free nations. Just as there is collaboration among those who engage in terrorism, so there must be cooperation among those who are its actual and potential targets.

An essential component of our strategy, therefore, has been greater cooperation among the democratic nations and all others who share our hopes for the future. The world community has achieved some successes. But too often, countries are inhibited by fear of losing commercial opportunities or fear of provoking the bully. The time has come for the nations that truly seek an end to terrorism to join together, in whatever forums, to take the necessary steps. The declaration on terrorism that was agreed upon at the London Economic Summit two weeks ago was a welcome sign that the industrial democracies share a common view of the terrorist threat. And let me say I trust and I hope that that statement and the specific things referred to in it will be the tip and the only visible part of the iceberg. We must build on that foundation.

Greater international cooperation offers many advantages. If we can collectively improve our gathering and sharing of intelligence, we can better detect the movements of terrorists, anticipate their actions, and bring them to justice. We can also help provide training and share knowledge of terrorist tactics. To that end, the Reagan Administration has acted promptly on the program that Congress approved last year to train foreign law enforcement officers in anti-terrorist techniques. And the President has sent Congress two bills to implement two international conventions to which the United States is a signatory: the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, and the Montreal Convention to protect against sabotage of civilian aircraft.

Text of missing
pp. 15-16 is
in Department
of State Bul-
letin, August
1984, p. 33.

"We must make it clear to any country that is tempted to use violence to undermine democratic governments, destabilize our friends, thwart efforts to promote democratic governments, or disrupt our lives, that it has nothing to gain, and much to lose."

Clearly there are complicated moral issues here. But there should be no doubt of the democracies' moral right, indeed duty, to defend themselves.

And there should be no doubt of the profound issue at stake. The democracies seek a world order that is based on justice. When innocents are victimized and the guilty go unpunished, the terrorists have succeeded in undermining the very foundation of civilized society, for they have created a world where there is no justice. This is a blow to our most fundamental moral values and a dark cloud over the future of humanity. We can do better than this.

No matter what strategy we pursue, the terrorist threat will not disappear overnight. This is not the last conference that will be held on this subject. We must understand this and be prepared to live with the fact that despite all our best efforts the world is still a dangerous place. Further sacrifices, as in the past, may be the price for preserving our freedom.

It is essential, therefore, that we not allow the actions of terrorists to affect our policies or deflect us from our goals. When terrorism succeeds in intimidating governments into altering their foreign policies, it only opens the door to more terrorism. It shows that terrorism works; it emboldens those who resort to it and it encourages others to join their ranks.

The Future

If we remain firm, we can look ahead to a time when terrorism will cease to be a major factor in world affairs. But we must face the challenge with realism, determination, and strength of will. Not so long ago we faced a rash of political kidnappings and embassy takeovers. These problems seemed insurmountable. Yet, through increased security, the willingness of governments to resist terrorist demands and to use force when appropriate, such incidents have become rare. In recent years, we have also seen a decline in the number of airline hijackings -- once a problem that seemed to fill our newspapers daily. Tougher security measures and closer international cooperation have clearly had their effect.

I have great faith that we do have the will, and the capability, to act decisively against this threat. It is really up to us, the nations of the free world. We must apply ourselves to the task of ensuring our future, and consigning terrorism to its own dismal past.

Thank you. (Standing applause)

PRESS DEPARTMENT OF STATE



July 5, 1984
No. 157

APPOINTMENT OF U.S. DELEGATION CHAIRMAN TO THE SPACE SERVICES WORLD ADMINISTRATIVE RADIO CONFERENCE

The Department of State today announced White House approval of the Department's appointment of the Honorable Dean Burch as Chairman of the United States Delegation to the first session of the World Administrative Radio Conference on the Use of the Geostationary-Satellite Orbit and the Planning of Space Services Utilizing It (Space WARC).

The first session of the Space WARC conference, known as Orb-85 will convene in Geneva, Switzerland from August 8, to September 14, 1985. It will consider the international agreements by which nations obtain recognition and protection of the communications satellites that operate from the geostationary-satellite orbit located some 22,300 miles above the earth. This potentially treaty-making conference is being held by the International Telecommunication Union, an autonomous United Nations Organization of 159 countries. The second session of the conference is scheduled for October 1988, and will implement the agreements approved by the first session.

Mr. Burch brings extraordinary skills and experience to this task. As former Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission (1969-1974) and through three decades of law practice, Mr. Burch has been actively involved in a broad range of telecommunications. After serving as Counsellor to the President in 1974, Mr. Burch joined the law firm of Pierson, Ball & Dowd, Washington, D.C., where he is currently a partner.

Mr. Burch will be located in the Office of the Coordinator for International Communication and Information Policy (T/CIP, 6317 NS - 632-5832) which coordinates the work of the U.S. Delegation to the Space WARC and overall U.S. negotiations in this policy area.

For further information contact:

Dean Olmstead 632-5832