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Department of State

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

Department of State
bulletin

Volume 84/Number 2089/August 1984

The DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, published by the Office of Public Communication in the Bureau of Public Affairs, is the official record of U.S. foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the public, the Congress, and government agencies with information on developments in U.S. foreign relations and the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN's contents include major addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State; statements made before congressional committees by the Secretary and other senior State Department officials; selected press releases issued by the White House, the Department, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations; and treaties and other agreements to which the United States is or may become a party. Special features, articles, and other supportive material (such as maps, charts, photographs, and graphs) are published frequently to provide additional information on current issues but should not necessarily be interpreted as official U.S. policy statements.

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(White House photo by Bill Fitz-Patrick)

London Economic Summit

President Reagan attended the 10th economic summit of the industrialized nations in London June 7–9, 1984, which was hosted by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. The other participants were Prime Minister Pierre-Elliott Trudeau (Canada), President Francois Mitterrand (France), Chancellor Helmut Kohl (West Germany), Prime Minister Bettino Craxi (Italy), Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone (Japan), and Gaston Thorn, President of the European Communities Commission. Following are texts of four declarations and a statement issued by the participants and President Reagan's radio address.[1]

Lancaster House, the site of the 10th economic summit of industrialized nations, is situated adjacent to St. James's Palace overlooking the Mall. It is a notable example of a great London mansion of the period spanning the end of the Georgian era and the beginning of that of Queen Victoria. Construction began in 1825, and the main design and most of the decoration were the work of Benjamin Dean Wyatt. Between 1838 and 1843, Sir Charles Barry (the architect of the Houses of Parliament) was employed to decorate the great staircase hall, which is the most splendid of its kind and date in England. Lancaster House housed the collection for the London Museum during 1914–46 and was the locale of a number of conferences marking important stages in the constitutional development of the Commonwealth countries.

Declaration on Democratic Values, June 8, 1984

We, the Heads of State or Government of seven major industrial democracies with the President of the Commission of the European Communities, assembled in London for the Tenth Economic Summit meeting, affirm our commitment to the values which sustain and bring together our societies.

2. We believe in a rule of law which respects and protects without fear or favour the rights and liberties of every citizen and provides the setting in which the human spirit can develop in freedom and diversity.

3. We believe in a system of democracy which ensures genuine choice in elections freely held, free expression of opinion and the capacity to respond and adapt to change in all its aspects.

4. We believe that, in the political and economic systems of our democracies, it is for Governments to set conditions in which there can be the greatest possible range and freedom of choice and personal initiative; in which the ideals of social justice, obligations and rights can be pursued; in which enterprise can flourish and employment opportunities can be available for all; in which all have equal opportunities of sharing in the benefits of growth and there is support for those who suffer or are in need; in which the lives of all can be enriched by the fruits of innovation, imagination and scientific discovery; and in which there can be confidence in the soundness of the currency. Our countries have the resources and will jointly to master the tasks of the new industrial revolution.

5. We believe in close partnership among our countries in the conviction that this will reinforce political stability and economic growth in the world as a whole. We look for co-operation with all countries on the basis of respect for their independence and territorial integrity, regardless of differences between political, economic and social systems. We respect genuine non-alignment. We are aware that economic strength places special moral responsibilities upon us. We reaffirm our

(White House photo by Jack Kightlinger)

Left to right are Prime Minister Craxi, President Thorn, President Reagan, Prime Minister Thatcher, President Mitterrand, Prime Minister Nakasone, Prime Minister Trudeau, and Chancellor Kohl.

determination to fight hunger and poverty throughout the world.

6. We believe in the need for peace with freedom and justice. Each of us rejects the use of force as a means of settling disputes. Each of us will maintain only the military strength necessary to deter aggression and to meet our responsibilities for effective defence. We believe that in today's world the independence of each of our countries is of concern to us all. We are convinced that international problems and conflicts can and must be resolved through reasoned dialogue and negotiation and we shall support all efforts to this end.

7. Strong in these beliefs, and endowed with great diversity and creative vigour, we look forward to the future with confidence.

Economic Declaration, June 9, 1984[2]

We, the Heads of State or Government of seven major industrialised countries and the President of the Commission of the European Communities, have gathered in London from 7 to 9 June 1984 at the invitation of the Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher FRS MP, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, for the tenth annual Economic Summit.

2. The primary purpose of these meetings is to enable Heads of State or Government to come together to discuss economic problems, prospects and opportunities for our countries and for the world. We have been able to achieve not only closer understanding of each other's positions and views but also a large measure of agreement on the basic objectives of our respective policies.

3. At our last meeting, in Williamsburg in 1983, we were already able to detect clear signs of recovery from world recession. That recovery can now be seen to be established in our countries. It is more soundly based than previous recoveries in that it results from the firm efforts made in the Summit countries and elsewhere over recent years to reduce inflation.

4. But its continuation requires unremitting efforts. We have to make the most of the opportunities with which we are now presented to reinforce the basis for enduring growth and the creation of new jobs. We need to spread the benefits of recovery widely, both within the industrialised countries and also to the developing countries, especially the poorer countries who stand to gain more than any from a sustainable growth of the world economy. High interest rates, and failure to reduce inflation further and damp down inflationary expectations, could put recovery at risk. Prudent monetary and budgetary policies of the kind that have brought us so far will have to be sustained and where necessary strengthened. We reaffirm the commitment of our Governments to those objectives and policies.

5. Not the least of our concerns is the growing strain of public expenditure in all our countries. Public expenditure has to be kept within the limits of what our national economies can afford. We welcome the increasing attention being given to these problems by national governments and in such international bodies as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

6. As unemployment in our countries remains high, we emphasise the need for sustained growth and creation of new jobs. We must make sure that the industrial economies adapt and develop in response to demand and to technological change. We must encourage active job training policies and removal of rigidities in the labour market, and bring about the conditions in which more new jobs will be created on a lasting basis, especially for the young. We need to foster and expand the international trading system and liberalise capital markets.

7. We are mindful of the concerns expressed by the developing countries, and of the political and economic difficulties which many of them face. In our discussion of each of the issues before us we have recognised the economic interdependence of the industrialised and developing countries. We reaffirm our willingness to conduct our relations with them in a spirit of goodwill and cooperation. To this end we have asked Ministers of Finance to consider the scope for intensified discussion of international financial issues of particular concern to developing countries in the IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development] Development Committee, an appropriate and broadly representative forum for this purpose.

8. In our strategy for dealing with the debt burdens of many developing countries, a key role has been played by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), whose resources have been strengthened for the purpose. Debtor countries have been increasingly ready to accept the need to adjust their economic policies, despite the painful and courageous efforts it requires. In a climate of world recovery and growing world trade, this strategy should continue to enable the international financial system to manage the problems that may still arise. But continuously high or even further growing levels of international interest rates could both exacerbate the problems of the debtor countries and make it more difficult to sustain the strategy. This underlines the importance of policies which will be conducive to lower interest rates and which take account of the impact of our policies upon other countries.

9. We have therefore agreed:

(1) to continue with and where necessary strengthen policies to reduce inflation and interest rates to control monetary growth and where necessary reduce budgetary deficits;

(2) to seek to reduce obstacles to the creation of new jobs:

- by encouraging the development of industries and services in response to demand and technological change including in innovative small and medium-sized businesses;
- by encouraging the efficient working of the labour market;
- by encouraging the improvement and extension of job training;
- by encouraging flexibility in the patterns of working time;
- and by discouraging measures to preserve obsolescent production and technology;

(3) to support and strengthen work in the appropriate international organisations, notably the OECD, on increasing understanding of the sources and patterns of economic change, and on improving economic efficiency and promoting growth, in particular by encouraging innovation and working for a more widespread acceptance of technological change, harmonising standards and facilitating the mobility of labour and capital;

(4) to maintain and wherever possible increase flows of resources, including official development assistance and assistance through the international financial and development institutions, to the developing countries and particularly to the poorest countries; to work with the developing countries to encourage more openness towards private investment flows; and to encourage practical measures in those countries to conserve resources and enhance indigenous food and energy production. Some of us also wish to activate the Common Fund for Commodities;

(5) in a spirit of co-operation with the countries concerned, to confirm the strategy on debt and continue to implement and develop it flexibly case by case; we have reviewed progress and attach particular importance to:

- helping debtor countries to make necessary economic and financial policy changes, taking due account of political and social difficulties;
- encouraging the IMF in its central role in this process, which it has been carrying out skillfully;
- encouraging closer co-operation between the IMF and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and strengthening the role of the IBRD in fostering development over the medium and long term;
- in cases where debtor countries are themselves making successful efforts to improve their position, encouraging more extended multi-year rescheduling of commercial debts and standing ready where appropriate to negotiate similarly in respect of debts to governments and government agencies;
- encouraging the flow of long-term direct investment; just as there is need for industrial countries to make their markets more open for the exports of developing countries, so these countries can help themselves by encouraging investment from the industrial countries;
- encouraging the substitution of more stable long-term finance, both direct and portfolio, for short-term bank lending;

(6) to invite Finance Ministers to carry forward, in an urgent and thorough manner, their current work on ways to improve the operation of the international monetary system, including exchange rates, surveillance, the creation, control and distribution of international liquidity and the role of the IMF; and to complete the present phase of their work in the first half of 1985 with a view to discussion at an early meeting of the IMF Interim Committee. The question of a further allocation of Special Drawing Rights is to be reconsidered by the IMF Interim Committee in September 1984;

(7) to carry forward the procedures agreed at Versailles and at Williamsburg for multilateral monitoring and surveillance of convergence of economic performance toward lower inflation and higher growth;

(8) to seek to improve the operation and stability of the international financial system, by means of prudent policies among the major countries, by providing an adequate flow of funding to the international financial institutions, and by improving international access to capital markets in industrialised countries;

(9) to urge all trading countries, industrialised and developing alike, to resist continuing protectionist pressures, to reduce barriers to trade and to make renewed efforts to liberalise and expand international trade in manufactures, commodities and services;

(10) to accelerate the completion of current trade liberalisation programmes, particularly the 1982 GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] work programme, in co-operation with other trading partners; to press forward with the work on trade in services in the international organisations; to reaffirm the agreement reached at the OECD Ministerial Meeting in May 1984 on the important contribution which a new round of multilateral trade negotiations would make to strengthening the open multilateral trading system for the mutual benefit of all economies, industrial and developing; and, building on the 1982 GATT work programme, to consult partners in the GATT with a view to decisions at an early date on the possible objectives, arrangements and timing for a new negotiating round.

10. We are greatly concerned about the acute problems of poverty and drought in parts of Africa. We attach major importance to the special action programme for Africa, which is being prepared by the World Bank and should provide renewed impetus to the joint efforts of the international community to help.

11. We have considered the possible implications of a further deterioration of the situation in the Gulf for the supply of oil. We are satisfied that, given the stocks of oil presently available in the world, the availability of other sources of energy, and the scope for conservation in the use of energy, adequate supplies could be maintained for a substantial period of time by international co-operation and mutually supportive action. We will continue to act together to that end.

12. We note with approval the continuing consensus on the security and other implications of economic relations with Eastern countries, and on the need to continue work on this subject in the appropriate organisations.

13. We welcome the further report of the Working Group on Technology, Growth and Employment created by the Versailles Economic Summit, and the progress made in the eighteen areas of co-operation, and invite the Group to pursue further work and to report to Personal Representatives in time for the next Economic Summit. We also welcome the invitation of the Italian Government to an international conference to be held in Italy in 1985 on the theme of technological innovation and the creation of new jobs.

14. We recognise the international dimension of environmental problems and the role of environmental factors in economic development. We have invited Ministers responsible for environmental policies to identify areas for continuing co-operation in this field. In addition we have decided to invite the Working Group on Technology, Growth and Employment to consider what has been done so far and to identify specific areas for research on the causes, effects and means of limiting environmental pollution of air, water and ground where existing knowledge is inadequate, and to identify possible projects for industrial co-operation to develop cost-effective techniques to reduce environmental damage. The Group is invited to report on these matters by 31 December 1984. In the meantime we welcome the invitation from the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to certain Summit countries to an international conference on the environment in Munich on 24–27 June 1984.

15. We thank the Prime Minister of Japan for his report on the Hakone Conference of Life Sciences and Mankind, organised by the Japan Foundation in March 1984, and welcome the intention of the French Government to sponsor a second Conference in 1985.

16. We believe that manned spaced stations are the kind of programme that provides a stimulus for technological development leading to strengthening economies and improved quality of life. Such stations are being studied in some of our countries with a view to their being launched in the framework of national or international programmes. In that context each of our countries will consider carefully the generous and thoughtful invitation received from the President of the United States to other Summit countries to participate in the development of such a station by the United States. We welcome the intention of the United States to report at the next Summit on international participation in their programme.

17. We have agreed to meet again next year and have accepted the Federal Chancellor's invitation to meet in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Declaration on East-West Relations and Arms Control, June 9, 1984

1. We had a substantial discussion of East-West relations. We stressed that the first need is for solidarity and resolve among us all.

2. At the same time, we are determined to pursue the search for extended political dialogue and long-term co-operation with the Soviet Union and her allies. Contacts exist and are being developed in a number of fields. Each of us will pursue all useful opportunities for dialogue.

3. Our aim is security and the lowest possible level of forces. We wish to see early and positive results in the various arms control negotiations and the speedy resumption of those now suspended. The United States has offered to re-start nuclear arms control talks anywhere, at any time, without preconditions. We hope that the Soviet Union will act in a constructive and positive way. We are convinced that this would be in the common interest of both East and West. We are in favour of agreements which would build confidence and give concrete expression, through precise commitments, to the principle of the non-use of force.

4. We believe that East and West have important common interests: in preserving peace; in enhancing confidence and security; in reducing the risks of surprise attack or war by accident; in improving crisis management techniques; and in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

Declaration on International Terrorism, June 9, 1984

1. The Heads of State and Government discussed the problem of international terrorism.

2. They noted that hijacking and kidnapping had declined since the Declarations of Bonn (1978), Venice (1980) and Ottawa (1981) as a result of improved security measures, but that terrorism had developed other techniques, sometimes in association with traffic in drugs.

3. They expressed their resolve to combat this threat by every possible means, strengthening existing measures and developing effective new ones.

4. They were disturbed to note the ease with which terrorists move across international boundaries, and gain access to weapons, explosives, training and finance.

5. They viewed with serious concern the increasing involvement of states and governments in acts of terrorism, including the abuse of diplomatic immunity. They acknowledge the inviolability of diplomatic missions and other requirements of international law; but they emphasised the obligations which that law also entails.

6. Proposals which found support in the discussion included the following:

- closer co-operation and co-ordination between police and security organisations and other relevant authorities, especially in the exchange of information, intelligence and technical knowledge;
- scrutiny by each country of gaps in its national legislation which might be exploited by terrorists;
- use of the powers of the receiving state under the Vienna Convention in such matters as the size of diplomatic missions, and the number of buildings enjoying diplomatic immunity;

- action by each country to review the sale of weapons to states supporting terrorism;
- consultation and as far as possible cooperation over the expulsion or exclusion from their countries of known terrorists, including persons of diplomatic status involved in terrorism.

7. The Heads of State and Government recognised that this is a problem which affects all civilised states. They resolved to promote action through competent international organisations and among the international community as a whole to prevent and punish terrorist acts.

Statement on the Iran-Iraq Conflict, June 9, 1984

1. We discussed the Iraq/Iran conflict in all its various aspects.

2. We expressed our deep concern at the mounting toll in human suffering, physical damage and bitterness that this conflict has brought; and at the breaches of international humanitarian law that have occurred.

3. The hope and desire of us all is that both sides will cease their attacks on each other and on the shipping of other states. The principle of freedom of navigation must be respected. We are concerned that the conflict should not spread further and we shall do what we can to encourage stability in the region.

4. We encourage the parties to seek a peaceful and honourable settlement. We shall support any efforts designed to bring this about, particularly those of the United Nations Secretary-General.

5. We also considered the implications for world oil supplies on the lines set out in the Economic Declaration. We noted that the world oil market has remained relatively stable. We believe that the international system has both the will and the capacity to cope with any foreseeable problems through the continuation of the prudent and realistic approach that is already being applied.

(White House photo by Bill Fitz-Patrick)

In January 1984, President Reagan committed the United States to develop a permanently manned space station by the early 1990s to satisfy U.S. civil and commercial requirements in space. At the same time, he invited America's friends and allies to participate in the program. The space station will benefit the scientific research of all participating nations and provide the capability to conduct space-based research in many fields including astrophysics, earth sciences and applications, life sciences, astronomy, materials processing, and communications. Viewing the model space station with President Reagan are EC Commission President Thorn, Chancellor Kohl, Prime Minister Thatcher, Italian Foreign Minister Andreotti, Canadian Finance Minister Lalonde, and Prime Minister Nakasone.

President's Radio Address, June 9, 1984[3]

Greetings from London. As you probably know, Nancy and I have been in Europe for 8 days, visiting Ireland, commemorating the 40th anniversary of D-Day at Normandy, and now meeting with the leaders of the major industrialized democracies at the economic summit to strengthen the basis for freedom, prosperity, and peace.

Change comes neither easily nor quickly in foreign affairs. Finding solutions to critical global problems requires lengthy and sustained efforts, the kind we've been making ever since my first economic summit in Ottawa in 1981. Those efforts are now paying off as we reap the benefits of sound policies. Think back 4 years—America was weak at home and abroad. Remember double-digit inflation, 20% interest rates, zero growth, and those never-ending excuses that such misery would be part of our lives for years to come. And remember how our foreign policy invited Soviet aggression and expansion in Afghanistan, Central America, and Africa. Entire countries were lost. Doubt spread about America's leadership in defense of freedom and peace. And so, freedom and peace became less secure.

A lot has changed. Today America stands taller in the world. At home we've made a fundamental change in direction—away from bigger and bigger government, toward more power and incentives for people; away from confusion and failure, toward progress through commitment to the enduring values of Western civilization; away from weakness and instability, toward peace through strength and a willingness to negotiate.

Together with our allies, we've tried to adopt a similar strategy for progress abroad—guided by realism, by common

values and interests, and by confidence that we will not remain prisoners of fear and a disappointing past. We can and will move forward to better days.

Last year the United States hosted the Williamsburg summit. It has been an active year for allied relations as we grappled with economic and security problems, but we didn't dwell on differences. We joined in a peace and security statement and a blueprint for world economic recovery. Williamsburg was an unprecedented endorsement of Western values. Our alliance emerged stronger and more united than ever. Peace and prosperity were made more secure.

Later in the year I traveled to Japan and Korea to emphasize the importance we attached to the dynamic Pacific region. Here too, we faced tough problems, particularly in trade with Japan. But Prime Minister Nakasone is a man of vision and strength, who has worked hard with me to iron out our differences, and we've made progress. Japan has opened up its trading and financial markets and moved to increase its defense expenditures, so vital to preserving peace and freedom in the Pacific Basin. This will mean more U.S. jobs and greater security for both our nations.

In April I returned to the Pacific region to visit China. Our relations have steadily improved and our visit capped important agreements that will stimulate U.S. exports to China as we cooperate with them to modernize their economy.

Now here in London at this year's economic summit, it's clear we've made impressive gains. In 1981 our economies had an average growth rate of only 1.8% and 8½% inflation. Today, our average growth rate has risen to 4%, while inflation has been cut in half. Stronger growth means more jobs with the U.S. economy leading the way. We've created more than 6 million jobs in the last 18 months, and we're venturing into new, promising areas. We've offered our summit partners the opportunity to participate with us in the development of our manned space station. An international space station will stimulate technology development, strengthen our economies, and improve the quality of life into the next century.

I've stressed in London that continued progress will require new determination to carry out our common strategy for prosperity and peace. We must summon courage. We must continue with action to curb inflation by reducing unnecessary spending, spur greater growth by reducing regulation, trade barriers, and personal income tax rates. And, yes, we must be prepared for peace by strengthening NATO's ability to deter war, while making clear we're prepared to reduce nuclear weapons dramatically as soon as the Soviets are ready to work with us on this all-important goal.

This has been a year of progress, a year when we and our friends in Europe and the Pacific set aside differences and united as great democracies should be with shared vision and values. That progress, stretching beyond America from the Pacific Basin to a strengthened Atlantic alliance, is a source of hope for a more prosperous and safer world.

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[1]Texts from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of June 18, 1984.

[2]Prime Minister Thatcher read the declaration to reporters assembled in the Great Hall of the Guildhall and in the presence of the other summit participants.

[3]Recorded in London for broadcast in the United States. ■

Visit to Ireland, the United Kingdom, and France

President Reagan departed the United States on June 1, 1984, to visit Ireland (June 1–4), the United Kingdom (June 4–10), where he attended the economic summit, and to participate in ceremonies commemorating the 40th anniversary of D-Day at Normandy (June 6). He returned to Washington on June 10. Following are remarks made on various occasions during the trip.[1]

IRELAND

Shannon, Arrival Remarks, June 1, 1984[2]

President and Mrs. Hillery, Prime Minister and Mrs. FitzGerald, distinguished guests, and I want to add with the greatest of pleasure—I'll try—*a chairde Gaeil* [Irish friends]. [Laughter] How did I do? [Applause] But on behalf of Nancy and myself, thank you very much for your warm and wonderful Irish welcome.

We're beginning a mission to strengthen ties of friendship and cooperation among the world's leading democracies. It's our deepest hope and our earnest conviction that we can make genuine progress together toward a safer world, a more prosperous world, a far better world.

To be able to begin our journey on this isle of wondrous beauty, with a countryside green as no other place seems to be, to be able to stand on the soil of my ancestors among all of you is, for me, a very special gift. I want you to know that for this great-grandson of Ireland, this is a moment of joy.

And I'm returning not only to my own roots, I'm returning to America's roots. So much of what America means and stands for we owe to you—to your indomitable spirit and generosity and to your impassioned love for liberty and independence.

There are few people on Earth whose hearts burn more with the flame of freedom than the Irish. George Washington said, "When our friendless standard was first unfurled for resistance, who were the strangers who first mustered around our staff? And when it reeled in fight, who more bravely sustained it than Erin's generous sons?" You did.

America has always been a haven of opportunity for those seeking a new life. They, in turn, have given to us, they have shaped us and enriched us. And from the beginning, when that first large party of your ancestors arrived at Newport News in 1621, your Irish blood has enriched America.

With courage and determination, you helped our struggling colony break free. And then day by day, by the sweat of your brow and with an ache in your

back, you helped turn our small, undeveloped country into a great and mighty nation. Your hearts and minds shaped our literacy and cultural history. Your smiles, mirth, and song lifted our spirits with laughter and music. And always, you reminded us by your deep faith that wisdom and truth, love and beauty, grace and glory begin in Him—our Father, our Creator, our loving God.

No wonder we've been blessed all these years by what some call "the luck of the Irish."

Today the sons and daughters of our first Irish settlers number 40 million strong. Speaking for them, and even for those not so fortunate, may I say: We're still part of you; we have and will remain true to your values; long live Irish-American friendship.

The challenges to peace and freedom that we face today are neither easy nor free from danger. But face them we must, and surmount them we can, providing that we remember the rights of individual liberty, and of government resting on the consent of the governed, are more than the sole position of a chosen few; they are universal rights, gifts from God to men and women everywhere. And those rights are a crucial anchor for stability in a troubled world, a world where peace is threatened by governments that oppress their citizens, renounce God, and prey on their neighbors. Edmund Burke's warning of nearly two centuries ago holds true today: "The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing."

Ireland today is undertaking important responsibilities in international councils, and through your peacekeeping forces, to help reduce the risks of war. The United States bears a heavy burden for strengthening economic development and preserving peace, and we're deeply grateful for Ireland's contributions.

Americans are people of peace. We've known and suffered the trauma of war, witnessed the fruits of reconciliation. And that is why we pray tolerance and reconciliation will one day unite the Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland in a spirit of communion and community. And that is why those who advocate violence or engage in terrorism in North Ireland will never be welcome in the United States.

Looking to the future, I believe there's reason for optimism and confidence. America's economic expansion can and should bring more jobs and opportunities to your people. And the more than 300 U.S. companies that are based here demonstrate our clear commitment to a future of peace and well-being for all the people of Ireland, North and South.

So, thank you, again, for making Nancy and me feel so welcome. And may I speak for so many of your families and friends in America when I say the words: "Ireland, oh, Ireland . . . Country of my fathers . . . Mother of my yearning, love of all my longings, home of my heart . . . "

Galway, University College, June 2, 1984[3]

A Chairde Gaeil—thank you.

I very much appreciate the honor that you've done me today. A degree, honorary though it may be, is a recognition of a certain understanding of culture and of the truths that are at the foundation of Western civilization. And a degree from an Irish university, in this respect, is of even greater significance.

I have to confess that on the 25th anniversary of my own graduation, my alma mater presented me with an honorary degree, and thereby culminated 25 years of guilt that I had nursed, because I had always thought the first one they gave me was honorary. [Laughter]

But I would like to take this moment to congratulate your distinguished president of University College, Galway, Dr. O'hEocha for all that he has done and is doing to overcome the spiral of violence which has plagued Northern Ireland. As chairman of the New Ireland Forum, you helped to open doors of opportunity for peace and reconciliation.

Progress will depend on other responsible leaders, in both parts of Ireland and in Great Britain, following your example. As far as the United States is concerned, we applaud all those who strove for constructive political cooperation and who renounce violence. We pray that men and women of good will in all parts of this land can, through mutual consent and consultation, find a way of bringing peace and harmony to this island that means so much to us.

It was here in Ireland that monks and scholars preserved the theological and classical achievements of the Western world during a time of darkness on the Continent of Europe. With the triumph of St. Patrick and Christianity, Ireland emerged as one of the most learned countries of Europe, attracting students from distant lands and known for centuries as the Island of Saints and Scholars.

This veneration of knowledge is part of our heritage I am most proud to share. While tyrants in many nations stamped their populations into conformity and submission, our ancestors enjoyed heated exchanges of ideas as far back as in the court of good King Brian Boru. It's part of our blood. That's what I keep telling myself every time I try to iron out my differences with the Speaker of our House of Representatives, a lad by the name of Tip O'Neill. [Laughter]

He's a great son of Ireland and America as well, and I can say that, knowing that we have heartfelt differences of opinion. Yet, in free societies, differences are expected, indeed, encouraged. It is this freedom to disagree, to question, to state one's case even when in opposition to those in authority that is the cornerstone of liberty and human progress.

When I arrived in Shannon yesterday, I mentioned that I was not only returning to my own roots but also to those of my country's freedom. Historically, of course, no one can doubt Ireland's enormous contributions to American liberty. Nine of the signers of our Declaration of Independence were of Irish ancestry; four were born in Ireland. Twenty generals in our Revolutionary Army were of Irish ancestry. Generals Montgomery, Sullivan, Wayne, and others were in the thick of the battle. On Washington's personal staff were Generals Moyland and Fitzgerald. And on the high seas, Commodore John Barry, considered by many the father of the United States Navy, was born in County Wexford.

As officers and as soldiers, sailors, and marines, Irish immigrants added fire to the American Revolution, a fire that ignited a flame of liberty as had never before been seen. This was not a result of uncontrollable historical forces but the accomplishment of heroic individuals whose commitment and courage shook the foundations of empires. William Butler Yeats put it well: "Whatever flames upon the night, man's own resinous heart has fed." And I imagine the British weren't surprised to see just who was fanning those flames. Sir Henry Clinton wrote home to London that, "the emigrants from Ireland are our most serious opponents."

By the time of the American Revolution, Ireland was already a nation steeped in culture and historical traditions, a fact evidenced by your own city of Galway—now my own city of Galway—which is celebrating its 500th anniversary. Permit me to congratulate all of your citizens on this august occasion.

This esteemed university is only one part of the traditional educational glory of Galway. I'm told that as far back as 1580, Galway Mayor Dominick Lynch founded a free school here which became a well-known center of Catholic culture and nationalist activity, attracting pupils from near and far. By 1627 so many were flocking here, many with no means of support, that the city ordered "foreign beggars and poor scholars" to be whipped out of town. Now, considering the degree you've just bestowed on me, I can hope that that rule is no longer in effect. [Laughter]

I'm afraid we have no communities quite so venerable as Galway in the United States. But what we lack in years we try to make up for and try hard in spirit. From the time of our independence until the present moment, the mainspring of our national identity has been a common dedication to the principles of human liberty. Further, we believe there's a vital link between our freedom and the dramatic progress—the increase in our material well-being that we've enjoyed during these last 200 years.

Freedom motivates people of courage and creativity to strive, to improve, and to push back the boundaries of knowledge. Here, too, the Irish character has contributed so much. Galway, a city Columbus, as has been said already, is supposed to have visited on his way to the New World, is on a coast which for so long was the western edge, the frontier of the known world.

This is the 1,500th anniversary of the birth of St. Brendan, who, legend tells us, sailed west into uncharted waters and discovered new lands. This man of God, a man of learning whose monasteries were part of Ireland's Golden Age, may, indeed, have been the first tie between Ireland and America. I understand much time and effort has gone into organizing what will be an annual transatlantic yacht race between Ireland and the United States commemorating Brendan's voyage. I commend those making this effort to establish what could prove to be an exciting new link between our two countries.

(White House photo by Jack Kightlinger)

President Reagan, accompanied by Michael Leahy (left), Mayor of Galway, and Colm D'hEocha, President of the University College, on his way to receive an honorary doctorate of law degree from the university.

Whether Brendan reached the American Continent or not, there is no doubt about the Irish role in taming the wilderness of the New World and turning America into an economic dynamo beyond imagination. The Irish came by the millions, seeking refuge from tyranny and deprivation—from hunger of the body and of the soul. Irish Americans worked in the factories. They built our railroads and, as with my family, settled and farmed the vast stretches of uncultivated prairie in the heartland of America.

The dream of a better life brought these people to our shores and millions of others from every corner of the world. They and their descendants maintain great pride in their ancestry—but also to say thank you to your nation and to your people for all you contributed to the spirit and well-being of the United States of America.

Certainly an important part of that spirit has and must remain close people-to-people contacts. The Prime Minister and I are, therefore, pleased to announce our agreement to increase academic exchange programs between the United States and Ireland.

We have instructed the appropriate agencies to put this into effect as soon as possible. We have a long tradition of academic cooperation; we'll strengthen it. And for our part, we intend to triple the number of students and scholars—triple them—in participating in the programs.

America in these last four decades has assumed a heavy burden of responsibility to help preserve peace and promote economic development and human dignity throughout the world. Sometimes, as is to be expected in all human endeavors, mistakes were made. Yet, overall, I believe that we have an admirable record.

There is something very important I want you to know, and then I will hasten on. The American people still hold dear those principles of liberty and justice for which our forefathers sacrificed so much. Visiting America you understand this—and I hope that each of you will one day be able to do that.

We're still a nation comprised of good and decent people whose fundamental values of tolerance, compassion, and fairplay guide and direct the decisions of our government.

Today, the free world faces an enormously powerful adversary. A visit to that country or to its colonies would reveal no public disagreement, no right of assembly, no independent unions. What we face is a strong and aggressive military machine that prohibits fundamental freedoms.

Our policy is aimed at deterring aggression and helping our allies and friends to protect themselves, while, at the same time, doing everything we can to reduce the risks of war.

We seek negotiations with the Soviet Union, but unfortunately we face an empty chair.

I'll be speaking more on this in my speech to Parliament, but right now I think that I should cut short whatever I was going to say, because I would like to bring up a proclamation in which we are congratulating Galway on its 500th anniversary.

This is our greeting on the quincentennial from our country to your city. Let us hope in our hearts that we will always stand together. Brothers and sisters of Ireland, *Dia libh go leir* [God be with you all].

Radio Address, June 2, 1984[4]

Top o' the mornin' to you. I'm speaking from a small town named Cong in western Ireland, first stop on a 10-day trip that will also take Nancy and me to France and England.

We're in an area of spectacular beauty overlooking a large lake filled with islands, bays, and coves. And those of you who, like me, can claim the good fortune of Irish roots, may appreciate the tug I felt in my heart yesterday when we saw the Emerald Isle from Air Force One. I thought of words from a poem about Ireland:

"A place as kind as it is green, the greenest place I've ever seen."

I told our welcoming hosts that to stand with them on the soil of my ancestors was, for this great-grandson of Ireland, a very special moment. It was a moment of joy.

Earlier today we were in Galway, a coastal city celebrating its 500th anniversary. Legend has it Columbus prayed at a church there on his way to the New World. For a thousand years, Ireland was considered the western edge of civilization and a place that continued to revere learning during a time of darkness on the Continent of Europe.

That reverence earned Ireland its reputation as the Island of Saints and Scholars. I was pleased to address representatives of University College in Galway, to speak to them of Ireland's many contributions to America, and to give thanks for those great, great forces of faith and love for liberty and justice that bind our people.

The president of that institution, Dr. O'hEocha, also chaired a group called the New Ireland Forum, which has sought to foster a spirit of tolerance and reconciliation in Northern Ireland, so the spiral of violence that has cost so many innocent lives there can be finally ended.

Ireland is a beautiful, proud, and independent land with a young and talented population. But they have an employment problem. By the strength of our economy, and by the presence of some 300 U.S. firms here, Americans can and will help our Irish cousins create jobs and greater opportunities. And, of course, what helps them will help us, too.

Tomorrow, Nancy and I will travel to Ballyporeen for a nostalgic visit to the original home of the Reagan clan. On Monday, we'll be in Dublin, where I'll have the honor of addressing a joint session of the Irish Parliament, as John Kennedy did here 21 years ago.

When we leave Ireland, we'll be participating in two events that mark America's determination to help build a safer, more prosperous world.

On June 6th, I'll join former U.S. Army Rangers at the historic battlefield of Pointe du Hoc and, later, President Mitterrand and other American veterans at Omaha Beach and Utah Beach on the Normandy coast of France. Together we'll commemorate the 40th anniversary of D-Day, the great Allied invasion that set Europe on the course toward liberty, democracy, and peace.

That great battle and the war it helped bring to an end mark the beginning of nearly 40 years of peace in Europe—a peace preserved not by good will alone, but by the strength and moral courage of the NATO alliance. On June 6th, I will reaffirm America's faithful commitment to NATO. If NATO remains strong and unified, Europe and America will remain free. If NATO can continue to deter war, Europe and America can continue to enjoy peace—40 more years of peace.

And let me make one thing very plain: A strong NATO is no threat to the Soviet Union. NATO is the world's greatest peace movement. It never threatens; it defends. And we will continue trying to promote a better dialogue with the Soviet Union. The Soviets could gain much by helping us make the world safer, particularly through arms reductions. That would

(White House photo by Michael Evans)

free them to devote more resources to their people and economy.

Growth and prosperity will occupy our attention when we return to London for the annual economic summit of the major industrialized countries. And we'll be marking another important anniversary: 50 years ago, America's leaders had the vision to enact legislation known as the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934. It helped bring an end to a terrible era of protectionism that nearly destroyed the world's economies.

We'll talk about how best to maintain the recent progress that has lifted hopes for a worldwide recovery for our common prosperity. You can be proud that the strength of the U.S. economy has led the way. I believe continued progress lies with freer trade and more open markets. Less protectionism will mean more progress, more growth, more jobs, a bigger slice of pie for everyone.

As we meet in Normandy and London, we'll have much to be thankful for, much to be optimistic about, but still much to do.

The President and Secretary Shultz confer at Ashford Castle (background), where President and Mrs. Reagan stayed during part of their visit in Ireland. Built over a period of 30 years by Lord Ardilaun in the 19th century, Ashford Castle incorporates in its castlellated facade the remains of a 13th century De Burgo Castle and the original Ashford House, built in the style of a French chateau. In more recent years, Ashford has been renovated and luxuriously appointed to create one of Europe's premier castle hotels. It has a fairy tale setting on the shores of beautiful Lough Corrib, the second largest lake in Ireland, with its hundreds of islands, bays, and coves.

Ballyporeen, Village Square, June 3, 1984

(White House photo by Bill Fitz-Patrick)

President Reagan addresses the citizens of Ballyporeen, his ancestral home. Located at the foot of the Knockmealdown-Kilworth Mountains in County Tipperary, Ballyporeen is a village in the heart of Ireland's dairyland.

In the business that I formerly was in, I would have to say this is a very difficult spot—to be introduced to you who have waited so patiently—following this wonderful talent that we've seen here. And I should have gone on first, and then you should have followed—[laughter]—to close the show. But thank you very much.

Nancy and I are most grateful to be with you here today, and I'll take a chance and say, *Muintir na Heireann* [People of Ireland]. Did I get it right? [Applause] All right. It's difficult to express my appreciation to all of you. I feel like I'm about to drown everyone in a bath of nostalgia. Of all the honors and gifts that have been afforded me as President, this visit is the one that I will cherish dearly. You see, I didn't know much about my family background—not because of lack of interest, but because my father was orphaned before he was 6 years old. And now thanks to you and the efforts of good people who have dug into the history of a poor immigrant family, I know at last whence I came. And this has given my soul a new contentment. And it is a joyous feeling. It is like coming home after a long journey.

You see, my father, having been orphaned so young, he knew nothing of his roots also. And, God rest his soul, I told the father, I think he's here too, today, and very pleased and happy to know that this is whence he came.

Robert Frost, a renowned American poet, once said, "Home is the place, where, when you have to go there, they have to take you in." [Laughter] It's been so long since my great-grandfather set out that you don't have to take me in. So, I'm certainly thankful for this wonderful homecoming today. I can't think of a place on the planet I would rather claim as my roots more than Ballyporeen, County Tipperary.

My great-grandfather left here in a time of stress, seeking to better himself and his family. From what I'm told, we were a poor family. But my ancestors took with them a treasure, an indomitable spirit that was cultivated in the rich soil of this country.

And today I come back to you as a descendant of people who are buried here in paupers' graves. Perhaps this is God's way of reminding us that we must always treat every individual, no matter what his or her station in life, with dignity and respect. And who knows? Someday that person's child or grandchild might grow up to become the Prime Minister of Ireland or President of the United States.

Looking around town today, I was struck by the similarity between Ballyporeen and the small town in Illionis where I was born, Tampico. Of course, there's one thing you have that we didn't in Tampico. We didn't have a Ronald Reagan Lounge in town. [Laughter] The spirit is the same, this spirit of warmth, friendliness, and openness in Tampico and Ballyporeen, and you make me feel very much at home.

What unites us is our shared heritage and the common values of our two peoples. So many Irish men and women from every walk of life played a role in creating the dream of America. One was Charles Thompson, Secretary of the Continental Congress, and who designed the first Great Seal of the United States. I'm certainly proud to be part of that great Irish-American tradition. From the time of our revolution when Irishmen filled the ranks of the Continental Army, to the building of the railroads, to the cultural contributions of individuals like the magnificent tenor John McCormack and the athletic achievements of the great heavyweight boxing champion John L. Sullivan—all of them are part of a great legacy.

Speaking of sports, I'd like to take this opportunity to congratulate an organization of which all Irish men and women can be proud, an organization that this year is celebrating its 100th anniversary: the Gaelic Athletic Association. I understand it was formed a hundred years ago in Tipperary to foster the culture and games of traditional Ireland. Some of you may be aware that I began my career as a sports broadcaster, so I had an early appreciation for sporting competition. Congratulations to all of you during this GAA centennial celebration.

I also understand that not too far from here is the home of the great Irish novelist Charles Joseph Kickham. The Irish identity flourished in the United States. Irish men and women proud of their heritage can be found in every walk of life. I even have some of them in my Cabinet. One of them traces his maternal roots to Mitchellstown, just down the road from Ballyporeen. And he and I have almost the same name. I'm talking about Secretary of the Treasury Don Regan.

He spells it R-e-g-a-n. We're all of the same clan, we're all cousins. I tried to tell the Secretary one day that his branch of the family spelled it that way because they just couldn't handle as many letters as ours could. [Laughter]

And then I received a paper from Ireland that told me that the clan to which we belong, that in it those who said "Regan" and spelled it that way were professional people and the educators, and only the common laborers call it "Reagan." [Laughter] So, meet a common laborer.

The first job I ever got—I was 14 years old, and they put a pick and a shovel in my hand and my father told me that that was fitting and becoming to one of our name.

The bond between our two countries runs deep and strong, and I'm proud to be here in recognition and celebration of our ties that bind. My roots in Ballyporeen, County Tipperary, are little different than millions of other Americans who find their roots in towns and countries all over the Isle of Erin. I just feel exceptionally lucky to have this chance to visit you.

Last year a member of my staff came through town and recorded some messages from you. It was quite a tape, and I was moved deeply by the sentiments that you expressed. One of your townsmen sang me a bit of a tune about Sean Tracy, and a few lines stuck in my mind. They went like this—not that I'll sing—"And I'll never more roam, from my own native home, in Tipperary so far away."

The Reagans roamed to America, but now we're back. And Nancy and I thank you from the bottom of our hearts for coming out to welcome us, for the warmth of your welcome. God bless you all.

Dublin, Dinner Toasts, June 3, 1984[5]

Prime Minister FitzGerald

In accordance with long-established custom and given that it's expected of us, let me start on an historical note. We are believed, outside this country, to always plunge back into the depths of history. I'm going to do so, because in the year 1029, King Reagan of Brega inflicted a crushing defeat on the Vikings of Dublin. [Laughter]

The victor demanded as ransom for the Viking King, Olaf Sitricson, the following: 1,200 cows, 6 score Welsh horses—I don't know why Welsh—60 ounces of gold, 60 ounces of pure silver, and all the "Irishmen of Leinster and of the North" who were being held prisoner in Dublin on this very site, then the fortress of the Viking city.

Fortunately for us FitzGeralds, we didn't arrive for another 140 years—[laughter]—when the Reagans, having in the meantime failed in a bid for the High Kinship of Ireland—you made it on a second try, playing on a different field—had become less powerful. And fortunately for us, because I doubt if my family could have bought themselves out of a Reagan jail at that price. [Laughter]

We, the FitzGeralds, do, however, owe the Reagans one important debt. For it was one, Malachy Reagan, then Latin secretary to a rather well-known king of Leinster—whom I don't need to and would prefer not to name—who wrote to us inviting us over here in 1169. [Laughter] The Irish people 800 years later are, I need hardly tell you, deeply grateful. [Laughter]

Your great grandfather and my grandfather left for London from two places divided 7 miles apart a century and a quarter ago. They both married Irish wives, in the very same church in that city, Southwark Cathedral. And thereafter their paths divided, bringing us by very different routes to the leadership of our respective governments.

Since they both left Ireland, much has happened in this small country. Much of it has been good. An independent Irish State has come into existence that is now respected by the nations of the world. Literature in the English language has since been transformed by towering Irish figures such as Shaw and Wilde, Yeats, and Joyce. And the grinding poverty in which our people lived three generations back has been replaced by a modest prosperity, as you will have seen traveling through Mayo and Galway and Tipperary and flying over other counties.

This modest prosperity has not marred the beauty and calm of our countryside, which continues to draw hundreds of thousands of your compatriots as welcome visitors to our shores.

Most significantly for the future, the last decade has seen the growth in Ireland of high technology industry—the vast bulk of it the fruit of U.S. investment here, now in total amounting to over $4 billion and employing one in six of our manufacturing labor force. Ireland's share of Europe's high technology activity is now totally disproportionate to our size and population. We are well on the way to becoming a silicon valley in Europe, as your investors match their inventiveness with the special skills and enthusiasm of our dynamic, well-educated laborforce—the youngest in Europe.

There is, of course, another side to this picture—one of heavy unemployment as the worldwide recession, now lifting in your country, continues to take its toll in Europe and, particularly, in this island. And we also have our own specific economic and financial problems. We'll have an opportunity to discuss some of these issues together tomorrow.

But worst of all, we have within this island a conflict that threatens the peace and stability of this corner of Europe, one that has brought tragedy to thousands of homes in Northern Ireland and to many here, also, and in Britain. This is a conflict of two traditions, two identities in this island, but first and foremost, within Northern Ireland.

You are aware of the work of the New Ireland Forum, launched in this great hall, and you have commented supportively on it. The New Ireland Forum made only one set of proposals in its report. It used the word "proposes" only once. It proposes, as necessary elements of a framework within which a new Ireland could emerge, a set of requirements, a list of "musts," centered on the need to accommodate each of the two Irish traditions equally satisfactorily in new structures. I'm deliberately availing of this important occasion to emphasize this point, because it has, perhaps, not been fully understood.

The forum goes on to express the belief—the belief, not the demand—of nationalists that unity offers the best solution and our further preference that the particular form of unity we would wish to see established is a unitary state, achieved by agreement and consent. That is our belief, our strong preference; it is not a demand. We set out our best arguments in favor of this preference, but we also set out the arguments in favor of two quite different alternatives that we considered: a federal-confederal state and joint authority. And most significantly of all, we committed ourselves to being open to discuss other views which may contribute to political development. Nothing, I believe, could be more open than that approach.

The report of the New Ireland Forum is, as I have said, an agenda, not a blueprint. We know that you and our European friends want, in an appropriate way, to help to end this tragedy. The people of Northern Ireland have suffered far too much. They deserve and they need our help and yours.

You will forgive me for having dwelt for some minutes on a problem that is so close to our hearts, so ever-present to our minds. It is, alas, only one of the many problems of violence and threats of violence in the world today—problems to which you and I will be turning our thoughts together tomorrow morning.

Dominating everything, of course, is the issue of East-West relations, the arms race, and, in particular, the nuclear menace that threatens life on this planet. Here, above all, as we have indeed been discussing together the last few minutes, there's an absolute need for dialogue between the superpowers, for the reopening of channels of communication that have become clogged, for the creation, if it can be achieved, of the kind of trust and confidence upon which alone world peace can be built. We look forward to hearing you speak on aspects of these problems to the joint session of the Houses of *Oireachtas* [Parliament] tomorrow.

Ireland is a small country with a nightmare past. More than most people, therefore, we are deeply concerned at the violent tyranny that tears apart small countries like Afghanistan, at the repression that seeks to still the powerful instinct for freedom in Eastern European countries like Poland, and at the deprivation of human rights in so many countries of Latin America. With many of these Latin American countries our people have close emotional ties through the work of our priests and nuns and lay helpers there who seek to relieve the poverty of the people and to give them back their dignity of which they've been deprived by oppressive regimes. Our people's deep concern is that these problems be resolved peacefully by the people of the region themselves—in Central America, along the lines proposed by the Contadora countries. In this connection, I might add that many people in Ireland have been most heartened by the news of Secretary Shultz' visit to Nicaragua on Friday last and hope that this may lead to the restoration of normal relations between that small state and your great country, thus enhancing the climate for peace and democracy in that troubled region.

In 4 weeks' time, Ireland takes over the responsibilities of the Presidency of the European Community. It will be our task to bring to a conclusion the negotiations to enlarge the community by admitting Spain and Portugal as members and to complete the negotiations for the new convention between the EEC and the African, Caribbean, Indian Ocean, and Pacific countries. We should also be seeking during this presidency to secure agreement to a more coherent organization of the economic policies of our member states so as to take fuller advantage of the recovery that has been taking place in the United States. Hopefully, this task may be made somewhat easier by the discussions that you will be having with other major economic powers in London this week.

There's another task we should also tackle. Just as in our first Presidency of the European Community in 1975, it fell to me as President of the Council of Ministers of the community to establish and get working the new system of political consultation between Europe and America that had been decided upon in the previous year, so in this new Irish presidency we shall endeavor to reconcile economic differences between Europe and America and to secure a greater convergence of views on foreign policy issues.

There are few tasks that the Irish Government could look forward to with as much enthusiasm or commitment. After all, our own relations with your great country are based first on human considerations, on people, rather than on the cold concerns of policy. It is on that human dimension, on such old, enduring, and unquenchable friendships that the hope of our world can best rely today.

Your visit to your homeland has reinforced and revitalized that precious bond. I ask all here to raise their glasses in a toast to the President of the United States and Mrs. Reagan.

President Reagan

Nancy and I are delighted to be here in the homeland of my ancestors and delighted to be with all of you this evening. The magnificent green of your hills and meadows, likewise, the warmth and kindredship of your people during our visit has touched us deeply. May I offer in return a heartfelt thank you from both Nancy and me.

Every American, even those not lucky enough to be of Irish background, has much to be grateful for in the Isle of Erin. I think I have some firsthand knowledge of this. You see, Nancy and I reside in a house that was designed by an Irishman. [Laughter]

We all know the Irish names and the lists of their achievements in our government, going all the way back to our Revolutionary history. Not only have Ireland's own had great impact on America but the opposite has also been true.

The cross-pollination of American and Irish liberty is truly an historic phenomenon. Benjamin Franklin, a preeminent influence on the course of American democracy, visited here during our Revolutionary period. As Prime Minister FitzGerald pointed out to me during his last visit to Washington, more than just a "couple" of American Presidents—and one which I will not mention—descend from this land.

On the other side of the coin, individuals significant to the development of Irish liberty were much affected by what was happening in America. Daniel O'Connell, a nationalist hero and a true humanitarian, was influenced by our great pamphleteer, Thomas Paine. And the great parliamentarian, Charles Stewart Parnell, journeyed to America as a youth, a journey which may well have colored his political views of the world. And, of course, Eamon de Valera, your third President, was actually born in the United States.

And yet, with our countries so close, there are some influences we're not so proud of. And I believe I speak for all Americans of Irish descent who now hold elected office when I join you in condemning any misguided American who supports terrorists in Northern Ireland. I want to offer my thanks to Prime Minister FitzGerald for his strong stand on this issue. When he last visited Washington, he articulated a message of conviction and courage and, by doing so, I'm sure has saved some innocent lives.

Oscar Wilde had a comment on war that is also applicable to terrorism. He said, "When it is looked upon as vulgar," Wilde said, "it will cease to be popular."

The American people overwhelmingly support peaceful efforts to reconcile the differences between the two traditions on this island. We pray there will be a new dawn, that it will come soon, when both Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland can live in the sunlight of a peaceful and just society.

We're following, with keen interest, the efforts that your government has been making, and we wish you success. We especially welcome the hard work and thought that went into the New Ireland Forum's report. We hope it will strengthen Anglo-Irish cooperation in resolving the Northern Ireland problem through a peaceful reconciliation.

Ireland, even with this problem at home, has been exerting an admirable influence internationally. As peace-

keepers, working within the structure of the United Nations, you've taken great risks for peace. Your bilateral development assistance to less fortunate countries is a tribute to your generosity and your humanitarianism, as is the personal dedication of Irish men and women engaged in voluntary service throughout the world.

Ireland has had an active and respected role in the European Community. We look forward to consulting closely with your government during Ireland's forthcoming presidency of the European Community Commission. Ireland has always promoted an open and meaningful dialogue between the United States and the member states of the community, and I know we can count on a continuation of that fine and very practical tradition.

We respect Ireland's independent course in international affairs. We respect Ireland's contributions, which were predicted by President Kennedy, as a maker and shaper of world peace. And we respect the democratic and humanitarian values embodied in your actions. *Taoiseach* [Prime Minister], our people have a common love of freedom and a sense of decency that transcends political consideration. In many respects, my journey here is a celebration of our ties and ideals, as well as of family. They are ties that secure our friendship and ensure our good will.

That Thomas Paine that I mentioned a moment ago said—and I think that all of us should take this to heart—said that the opportunity is ours, we have it in our power to start the world over again. And I think we share another ideal. What is our goal when we talk of ideologies and philosophies? It is one, very simple: the ultimate in individual freedom consistent with an orderly society. That is our goal.

Ladies and gentlemen, please join me in a toast to the Prime Minister of Ireland.

(White House photo by Jack Kightlinger)

At the dinner hosted by Prime Minister FitzGerald are (left to right) Secretary Shultz, Mrs. FitzGerald, President Reagan, the Prime Minister, and Mrs. Reagan.

Irish Parliament, June 4, 1984[6]

I am fully cognizant of the great honor that has been done me by your invitation for me to speak here. [Applause] Thank you.

And I can't help but say, I wonder if there is an awareness in some that there are countries in the world today where representatives would not have been able to speak as they have here.[7]

When I stepped off Air Force One at Shannon a few days ago and saw Ireland, beautiful and green and felt again the warmth of its people, something deep inside began to stir.

Who knows but that scientists will someday explain the complex genetic process by which generations seem to transfer across time and even oceans their fondest memories. Until they do, I will have to rely on President Lincoln's words about the "mystic chords of memory"—and say to you that during the past few days at every stop here in your country, those chords have been gently and movingly struck. So, I hope you won't think it too bold of me to say that my feelings here this morning can best be summarized by the words "home—home again."

I know some of us Irish Americans tend to get carried away with our ancestral past and want very much to impress our relatives here with how well we've done in the New World. Many of us aren't back in Ireland 5 minutes before, as the American song has it, we're looking to shake the hand of Uncle Mike and kiss the girl we used to swing down by the garden gate. [Laughter]

I do want you to know that for Nancy and me these last few days will remain in our hearts forever. From Shannon to Galway, to Ballyporeen to Dublin, you have truly made us feel as welcome as the flowers in May, and for this we'll always be grateful to you and to the Irish people.

Of course I didn't exactly expect a chilly reception. As I look around this chamber, I know I can't claim to be a better Irishman than anyone here, but I can perhaps claim to be an Irishman longer than most any of you here. [Laughter] There are those who just refuse to let me forget that. [Laughter] I also have some other credentials. I am the great-grandson of a Tipperary man; I'm the President of a country with the closest possible ties to Ireland; and I was a friend of Barry Fitzgerald. [Laughter] One Irishman told me he thought I would fit in. "Mr. President," he said, "you love a good story, you love horses, you love politics—the accent we can work on." [Laughter]

But I also came to the land of my forebears to acknowledge two debts: to express gratitude for a light heart and a strong constitution; and to acknowledge that well-spring of so much American political success: the Blarney Stone. I don't have to tell you how the Blarney Stone works. Many times, for example, I have congratulated Italians on Christopher Columbus' discovery of

America, but that's not going to stop me from congratulating all of you on Brendan the navigator. [Laughter]

I think you know, though, that Ireland has been much in our thoughts since the first days in office. I'm proud to say the first Embassy I visited as President was Ireland's, and I'm proud that our Administration is blessed by so many Cabinet members of Irish extraction. Indeed I had to fight them off Air Force One or there wouldn't be anyone tending the store while we're gone. And that's not to mention the number of Irish Americans who hold extremely important leadership posts today in the U.S. Congress.

I can assure you that Irish Americans speak with one voice about the importance of the friendship of our two nations and the bonds of affection between us. The American people know how profoundly Ireland has affected our national heritage and our growth into a world power. And I know that they want me to assure you today that your interests and concerns are ours and that, in the United States, you have true and fast friends.

Our visit is a joyous moment, and it will remain so. But this should not keep us from serious work or serious words. This afternoon, I want to speak directly on a few points.

I know many of you recall with sadness the tragic events of last Christmas: the five people killed and 92 injured after a terrorist bomb went off in Harrods of London. Just the day before, a Garda recruit, Gary Sheehan, and Private Patrick Kelly, a young Irish soldier with four children, were slain by terrorist bullets. These two events, occurring 350 miles apart—one in Ireland, one in Britain—demonstrated the pitiless, indiscriminate nature of terrorist violence, a violence evil to its core and contemptible in all its forms. And it showed that the problems of Northern Ireland are taking a toll on the people of both Britain and Ireland, north and south.

Yet the trouble in the north affects more than just these two great isles. When he was in America in March, your Prime Minister courageously denounced the support that a tiny number of misguided Americans give to these terrorist groups. I joined him in that denunciation, as did the vast majority of Irish Americans.

I repeat today, there is no place for the crude, cowardly violence of terrorism—not in Britain, not in Ireland, not in Northern Ireland. All sides should have one goal before them, and let us state it simply and directly: to end the violence, to end it completely, and to end it now.

The terrorism, the sense of crisis that has existed in Northern Ireland has been costly to all. But let us not overlook legitimate cause for hope in the events of the last few months. As you know, active dialogue between the governments—here in Dublin, and in London—is continuing. There's also the constructive work of the New Ireland Forum. The forum's recent report has been praised. It's also been criticized. But the important thing is that men of peace are being heard and their message of reconciliation discussed.

The position of the United States in all of this is clear: We must not and will not interfere in Irish matters nor prescribe to you solutions or formulas. But I want you to know that we pledge to you our good will and support, and we're with you as you work toward peace.

I'm not being overly optimistic when I say today that I believe you will work out a peaceful and democratic reconciliation of Ireland's two different traditions and communities. Besides being a land whose concern for freedom and self-determination is legendary, Ireland is also a land synonymous with hope. It is this sense of hope that saw you through famine and war, that sent so many Irish men and women abroad to seek new lives and to build new nations, that gave the world the saints and scholars who prescribed Western culture, the missionaries and soldiers who spoke of human dignity and freedom and put much of the spark to my own country's quest for independence and that of other nations.

You are still that land of hope. It's nowhere more obvious than in the economic changes being wrought here. I know Ireland faces a serious challenge to create jobs for your population, but you've made striking gains, attracting the most advanced technology and industries in the world and improving the standard of living of your people. And you've done all of this while maintaining your traditional values and religious heritage, renewing your culture and language, and continuing to play a key role in the world community.

Based on Ireland's traditional neutrality in international affairs, you can be proud of your contribution to the search for peace. Irish soldiers have been part of eight UN peacekeeping operations since you joined that organization.

In the economic sphere, we Americans, too, are proud that our businesses have been permitted to prosper in Ireland's new economic environment. As you know, there are more than 300 American businesses here providing between 35,000 and 40,000 jobs. We're continuing to encourage this investment. And I assure you today that we will encourage even greater investment for the future.

I think part of the explanation for the economic progress you are making here in Ireland can be found in your nation's historic regard for personal freedom. Too often the link between prosperity and freedom is overlooked. In fact, it's as tight as ever. And it provides a firm basis for increasing cooperation, not only between our two countries but among all countries of the globe that recognize it.

Men and women everywhere in our shrinking world are having the same experience. For most of mankind the oceans are no longer the fearful distances they were when my great-grandfather, Michael Reagan, took weeks to reach America. Some men and women still set out with their children in small boats fleeing tyranny and deprivation. For most of us, though, the oceans and airways are now peaceful avenues, thronged with ideas, people, and goods going in every direction. They draw us together. Slowly, but surely, more and more people share the values of peace, prosperity, and freedom which unite Ireland and America.

In the last year, I've made two visits to America's neighbors across the Pacific in Asia. This century has brought the Pacific nations many hardships, and many difficulties and differences remain. But what I found everywhere was energy, optimism, and excitement. Some nations in Asia have produced astounding economic growth rates by providing incentives that reward initiative by unleashing freedom. More and more, there is a sense of common destiny and possibility for all the peoples of this great region. The vast Pacific has become smaller, but the future of those who live around it is larger than ever before.

Coming to Ireland, I sensed the same stirring, the same optimism toward a better future.

I believe that great opportunities do lie ahead to overcome the age-old menaces of disease and hunger and want. But moments of great progress can also be moments of great testing. President Kennedy noted, when he was

here, that we live in a "most climactic period" but also, he said, "in the most difficult and dangerous struggle in the history of the world." He was talking about our century's struggle between the forces of freedom and totalitarianism—a struggle overshadowed, we all know too well, by weapons of awful destruction on both sides.

Believe me, to hold the office that I now hold is to understand, each waking moment of the day, the awesome responsibility of protecting peace and preserving human life. The responsibility cannot be met with halfway wishes; it can be met only by a determined effort to consolidate peace with all the strength America can bring to bear.

This is my deepest commitment; to achieve stable peace, not just by being prepared to deter aggression but also by assuring that economic strength helps to lead the way to greater stability through growth and human progress—being prepared with the strength of our commitment to pursue all possible avenues for arms reduction; and being prepared with the greatest strength of all, the spiritual strength and self-confidence that enables us to reach out to our adversaries. To them, and to all of you who have always been our dear and trusted friends, I tell you today from my heart, America is prepared for peace.

What we're doing now in American foreign policy is bringing an enduring steadiness, particularly in the search for arms reduction. Too often in the past, we sought to achieve grandiose objectives and sweeping agreements overnight. At other times, we set our sights so low that the agreements, when they were made, permitted the numbers and categories of weapons to soar. For example, our nation from the time of the signing of the SALT II agreement until the present added 3,950 warheads to its arsenal. That might be arms limitation; it certainly isn't arms reduction. The result wasn't even arms control. Through all of this, I'm afraid, differing proposals and shifting policies have sometimes left both friends and adversaries confused or disconcerted.

And that's why we've put forward, methodically, one of the most extensive arms control programs in history. We believe there can be only one policy, for all nations, if we are to preserve civilization in this modern age. A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.

In five areas, we have proposed substantive initiatives. In Vienna less than 2 months ago, the Western side put forward new proposals on reducing the levels of conventional military forces in Europe. In the same week in Geneva, Vice President Bush put forward a draft agreement for a worldwide ban on chemical weapons, the gases that have been used in Afghanistan and in Kampuchea. In Stockholm we're pursuing at the Conference on Disarmament in Europe a series of proposals that will help reduce the possibility of conflict. And in Geneva—as most of you are aware—we have been participating, until recently, in arms reductions talks on two fronts: the START talks on reducing intercontinental nuclear forces, and the INF talks, which deal with the issue of intermediate-range missiles worldwide. In addition, we're working to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to require comprehensive safeguards on all nuclear exports.

During the months the START and INF talks were underway, the United States proposed seven different initiatives. None of these was offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Indeed, we made a number of adjustments to respond to the stated concerns of the Soviet side. While Soviet flexibility did not match our own, the Soviets also made some steps of the kind required in any serious negotiations. But then, after the first deployment of intermediate-range missiles here in Europe, the Soviets quit the bargaining table.

This deployment was not something we welcomed. It had been my hope, and that of the European leaders, that negotiations would make the deployments unnecessary. Unfortunately, the Soviet stance in those talks left us no alternative. Since 1977, while we were not deploying, but urging the Soviets to negotiate, they were deploying some 370 SS–20 missiles, capable of reaching every city in every country in Europe. We and our allies could not ignore this threat forever.

But I believe today it is still possible to reach an agreement. Let me assure you that in both the START and INF talks, we want to hear Soviet proposals; we want them to hear our own; and we're prepared to negotiate tomorrow if the Soviets so choose. I'm prepared to halt, and even reverse, the deployment of our intermediate-range missiles from Europe as the outcome of a verifiable and equitable agreement. But for such an outcome to be possible, we need to have the Soviets return to the bargaining table. And before this body, and the people of Europe, I call on them to do so.

Indeed, I believe we must not be satisfied—we dare not rest, until the day we've banished these terrible weapons of war from the face of the Earth forever.

My deepest hope and dream has been that if once we can, together, start down the road of reduction, we will inevitably see the common sense of going all the way, so that our children and grandchildren will not have to live with that threat hanging over the world.

In addition to the arms control negotiations, I want to stress today that the United States seeks greater dialogue in two other critical areas of East-West relations. Just as we seek to reduce the burden of armaments, we want to find, also, ways to limit their use in troublesome or potentially difficult regional situations. We seek serious discussions with the Soviets to guard against miscalcuation or misunderstanding in troubled or strategically sensitive areas of the world. I want to stress again today the serious commitment of the United States to such a process.

In the Stockholm conference I mentioned a moment ago, the United States and 34 other nations are negotiating measures to lessen East-West tensions and reduce uncertainties arising from military activities in Europe, the area with the greatest concentration of armed forces in the world. The 16 nations of the Atlantic alliance have advanced concrete proposals which would make conflict in Europe less likely. The Soviet Union has not accepted these proposals, but has focused upon a declaration of the non-use of force.

Mere restatement of a principle all nations have agreed to in the UN Charter and elsewhere would be an inadequate conclusion to a conference whose mandate calls for much more. We must translate the idea into actions which build effective barriers against the use of force in Europe. If the Soviet Union will agree to such concrete actions, which other countries in the Stockholm conference already seem prepared to accept, this would be an important step forward in creating a more peaceful world.

If discussions on reaffirming the principle not to use force, a principle in which we believe so deeply, will bring the Soviet Union to negotiate agreements which will give concrete, new meaning to that principle, we will gladly enter into such discussion. I urge the Soviet Union now to join all other countries in the Stockholm conference to

move promptly to take these steps which will help ensure peace and stability in Europe.

We seek to build confidence and trust with the Soviets in areas of mutual interest by moving forward in our bilateral relations on a broad front. In the economic field, we're taking a number of steps to increase exchanges in nonstrategic goods. In other areas, we have for example, extended our very useful incidents-at-sea agreement for another term. And we've proposed discussions for specific steps to expand and multiply contacts of benefit to our people. I might add here that the democracies have a strong mutual obligation to work for progress in the area of human rights. And positive Soviet steps in this area would be considered by the United States a significant signal.

In summary then, we're seeking increased discussion and negotiation to reduce armaments, solve regional problems, and improve bilateral relations. Progress on these fronts would enhance peace and security for people everywhere.

I'm afraid the Soviet response has been disappointing. Rather than join us in our efforts to calm tensions and achieve agreements, the Soviets appear to have chosen to withdraw and to try to achieve their objective through propaganda rather than negotiations.

The Soviets seek to place the blame on the Americans for this self-imposed isolation. But they have not taken these steps by our choice. We remain ready for them to join with us and the rest of the world community to build a more peaceful world. In solidarity with our allies, confident of our strength, we threaten no nation. Peace and prosperity are in the Soviet interest as well as in ours. So let us move forward.

Steadiness in pursuing our arms reductions initiatives and bettering East-West relations will eventually bear fruit. But steadiness is also needed in sustaining the cause of human freedom.

When I was last in Europe, I spoke about a crusade for freedom, about the ways the democracies could inaugurate a program promoting the growth of democratic institutions throughout the world. And now it is underway. And this can have an impact in many ways in many places and be a force for good.

Some, of course, focusing on the nations that have lost their freedom in the postwar era, argue that a crusade for democratic values is impractical or unachievable. But we must take the long view. At the start of this century, there were but few democracies. Today, there are more than 50, comprising one-third of the world's population. And it is no coincidence—showing once again the link between political, economic freedom, and material progress—that these nations enjoy the highest standards of living.

History is the work of free men and women, not unalterable laws. It is never inevitable, but it does have directions and trends; and one trend is clear—democracies are not only increasing in number, they're growing in strength. Today they're strong enough to give the cause of freedom growing room and breathing space, and that's all that freedom ever really needs. "The mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs." Thomas Jefferson said that. Freedom is the flagship of the future and the flashfire of the future. Its spark ignites the deepest and noblest aspirations of the human soul.

Those who think the Western democracies are trying to roll back history are missing the point. History is moving in the direction of self-government and the human dignity that it institutionalizes, and the future belongs to the free.

On this point of democratic development, I think it is vital to appreciate what has been happening in the Western Hemisphere, particularly Latin America. Great strides have been made in recent years. In fact, 26 of 33 Latin American countries today are democracies, or are striving to become democracies. I think it is also vital to understand that the U.S. current program of assistance to several Central American countries is designed precisely to assist this spread of democratic self-rule.

I know that some see the United States, a large and powerful nation, involved in the affairs of smaller nations to the south, and conclude that our mission there must be self-seeking or interventionist. The Irish people, of all people, know Americans well. We strive to avoid violence or conflict. History is our witness on this point.

For a number of years at the end of the last war, the United States had a monopoly on nuclear weapons. We did not exploit this monopoly for territorial or imperial gain. We sought to do all in our power to encourage prosperity and peace and democracy in Europe. One can imagine if some other countries, possibly, had had these weapons instead of the United States, would the world have been as much at peace in the last 40 years as it has been.

In a few days in France, I will stand near the only land in Europe that is occupied by the United States—those mounds of earth marked with crosses and stars of David, the graves of Americans who never came home, who gave their lives that others might live in freedom and peace. It is freedom and peace that the people of Central America seek today.

Three times in little more than 2 years, the people of El Salvador have voted in free elections. Each time they had to brave the threats of the guerrillas supported by the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua and by Cuba and the Soviet Union. These guerrillas use violence to support their threats. Their slogan in each one of those elections has been, "Vote today and die tonight." Yet the people of El Salvador—1.4 million of them—have braved ambush and gunfire and trudged for miles to vote for freedom and then stood in line for hours waiting their turn to vote.

Some of our observers who went down there—many of them going down convinced that perhaps we were wrong in what we are trying to do there—came home converted. Some of them came home converted by one woman standing in the voting line—had been there for hours. She had been shot. She suffered from a rifle bullet. She refused to leave the line for medical treatment until she had had her opportunity to vote. They came home convinced that the people of El Salvador want democracy.

All the United States is attempting to do—with only 55 military advisers and $474 million in aid, three-fourths of which is ear-marked for economic and social development—is give the Salvadorans the chance they want for democratic self-determination, without outside interference. But this the Government of Nicaragua has been determined not to permit.

By their own admission, they've been supplying and training the Salvadoran guerrillas. In their own country they have never held elections. They have all but crushed freedom of the press and moved against labor unions, outlawed political freedoms, and even sponsored mob action against Nicaragua's independent human rights commission and imprisoned its director.

Despite this repression, a hundred thousand Nicaraguan Catholics attended a rally on Good Friday this year to support their church, which has been persecuted by the Sandinistas' communist dictatorship. And the bishop has

now written a pastoral letter citing this persecution of the church by that government. And yet, even in our own country we didn't read anything of that demonstration. Somehow word of it didn't get out through the news channels of the world.

In a homily to 4,000 Nicaraguans packed into Don Bosco Church several weeks ago, the head of the Nicaraguan Bishops Conference, Bishop Pablo Antonio Vega, said, "The tragedy of the Nicaraguan people is that we are living with a totalitarian ideology that no one wants in this country." You may not have heard about this—again, as I say, the words of Nicaraguan Archbishop Obando y Bravo. "To those who say that the only course for Central American countries is Marxism-Leninism, we Christians must show another way. That is to follow Christ, whose path is that of truth and liberty."

The vast majority of those now struggling for freedom in Nicaragua—contrary to what the Sandinistas would have the world believe—are good and worthy people who did not like the Somoza dictatorship and who do not want the communist dictatorship. The tragedy is they haven't been given the chance to choose.

The people of Nicaragua and El Salvador have a right to resist the nightmare outside forces want to impose on them, just as they have the right to resist extremist violence from within whether from the left or right. The United States must not turn its back on the democratic aspirations of the people of Central America.

Moreover, this is a worldwide struggle. The Irish orator James Philpot Curran once said, "The condition upon which God hath given liberty to man is eternal vigilance." And yes, military strength is indispensable to freedom. I have seen four wars in my lifetime; none of them came about because the forces of freedom were too strong.

In the moving words used by the Czechoslovak Charter 77 group just a week ago, in reply to supporters of nuclear disarmament in the West, they said, "Unlike you, we have personal experience of other, perhaps less conspicuous, but no less effective means of destroying civilization than those represented by thermonuclear war; some of us, at the very least, prefer the risk involved in maintaining a firm stance against aggression to the certainty of the catastrophic consequences of appeasement."

The struggle between freedom and totalitarianism today is not ultimately a test of arms or missiles but a test of faith and spirit. And in this spiritual struggle, the Western mind and will is the crucial battleground. We must not hesitate to express our dream of freedom; we must not be reluctant to enunciate the crucial distinctions between right and wrong—between political systems based on freedom and those based on a dreadful denial of the human spirit.

If our adversaries believe that we will diminish our own self-respect by keeping silent or acquiescing in the face of successive crimes against humanity, they're wrong. What we see throughout the world is an uprising of intellect and will. As Lech Walesa said: "Our souls contain exactly the contrary of what they wanted. They wanted us not to believe in God, and our churches are full. They wanted us to be materialistic and incapable of sacrifices; we are anti-materialistic, capable of sacrifice. They wanted us to be afraid of the tanks, of the guns, and instead we don't fear them at all." Lech Walesa.

Let us not take the counsel of our fears. Let us instead offer the world a politics of hope, a forward strategy for freedom. The words of William Faulkner, at a Nobel prize ceremony more than three decades ago, are an eloquent answer to those who predict nuclear doomsday or the eventual triumph of the superstate. "Man will not merely endure," Faulkner said, "he will prevail . . . because he will return to the old verities and truths of the heart. He is immortal because, alone among creatures, he has a soul, a spirit of compassion and sacrifice and endurance."

Those old verities, those truths of the heart—human freedom under God—are on the march everywhere in the world. All across the world today—in the shipyards of Gdansk, the hills of Nicaragua, the rice paddies of Kampuchea, the mountains of Afghanistan—the cry again is liberty. And the cause is the same as that spoken in the chamber more than two decades ago by a young American President, who said, "A future of peace and freedom."

It was toward the end of his visit here that John Fitzgerald Kennedy said, "I am going to come back and see old Shannon's face again." And on his last day in Ireland, he promised, "I certainly will come back in the springtime."

It was a promise left unkept, for a spring that never came. But surely in our hearts there is the memory of a young leader who spoke stirring words about a brighter age for mankind, about a new generation that would hold high the torch of liberty and truly light the world.

This is the task before us: to plead the case of humanity, to move the conscience of the world, to march together—as in olden times—in the cause of freedom.

Thank you again for this great honor, and God bless you all.

Luncheon Toasts, June 4, 1984[8]

President Reagan

Nancy and I are delighted to welcome you here this afternoon. We hope to return the kind hospitality that has been extended to us from the moment that we set foot on this Emerald Isle. By the way, I noted that this house has a Blue Room, a Coral Room, and a Gold Room—and that reminds me of the White House back in Washington. As you may have seen when you visited Washington, Mr. Prime Minister, the White House is a good home for an Irishman, because every March 17th, I can honor St. Patrick by spending all day in the Green Room. [Laughter]

For Americans, the very mention of Ireland holds a magical sense of allure. It brings to mind images of green pastures, rugged highlands, and wide lakes—like Lough Conn, Corrib, Killarney—images of a lovely village square in Galway or the graceful Georgian architecture here in Dublin. Perhaps what strikes Americans most when they visit Ireland is that yours is a land of many faces—a face of rich and unparalleled beauty, a face of a proud and glorious past, and a face of a young and bright and hopeful future.

More than eight centuries before Columbus discovered the New World, Irish monasteries were great centers of faith and learning. Scholars from all over Europe came here to study theology, philosophy, Greek, and Latin. Your ancestors created stunning illuminated manuscripts, including a book many consider the most beautiful ever made, the Book of Kells.

Today, you and your sons and daughters are making Ireland young again—young in your spirit of hope and faith in the future; young in your determination to create new opportunities

(White House photo by Michael Evans)

President and Mrs. Hillery accompany President and Mrs. Reagan to Air Force One for the latters' departure from Ireland.

and attract new technologies to help your economy along. And you're young in heart, ready to give and forgive, and ready to reach out in goodness and friendship and love.

Our own country, of course, remains a young nation simply because it is a young nation. Only a few centuries have passed since the first settlers landed on our eastern shores. And they and those who followed them came from virtually every nation on Earth. By 1900, nearly 4 million had come from Ireland alone. They cleared the land, built towns, established legislatures. They created a new and distinctly American way of life, and yet they continued to cherish memories of their homelands. Today Ireland and the United States share a living bond: the many Irish people who have cousins in America, and the 40 million Americans of Irish descent who always keep a special place for this island in our hearts.

Our two countries share a second bond—a bond of fundamental beliefs and enduring values. And as Ireland works to foster international understanding in this troubled world, you'll have the admiration, the respect, and the support of the United States. We pledge our unremitting effort for the cause of peace with freedom and human dignity.

As you may know, my own family left Ireland for the United States more than a hundred years ago. Some of the people in our country say I was with them. [Laugher] This homecoming to the land of my ancestors has moved me more deeply than I can say. And Nancy and I, as we draw our visit to a close, know that many Irish Americans who can't be here today will watch from home. They're with us in spirit and sharing a deep affection for Ireland and its people—an affection that's shared, as well, by your great poet, or I should say—he did share it when he wrote—William Butler Yeats, when he wrote: "Land of Heart's Desire, Where beauty has no ebb . . . But joy is wisdom, time an endless song."

Would you please join me in a toast to the President of Ireland, President Hillery.

President Hillery

Somebody remarked to me that your progress in Irish was so rapid that I should begin my speech in Irish and that you would understand it. [Laughter][9]

I would like to thank you for your kind words, for your invitation to Maeve and to me to be here, and to thank you and Mrs. Reagan for arranging this very happy occasion. I'm sure everybody here would wish to thank you both personally, if time allowed, because for us it is a really happy occasion.

We will, when you have left, wonder after your all too brief visit—we'll reflect on the personal and official reasons and aspects of your visit and what made it such a success. And I think I'd start off by saying that you brought to us a cheerful atmosphere, which Europe is badly in want of.

I suppose it's safe to say that if anybody in the free world has cause to look worried and overburdened, it's you. And still you come among us with courageous cheerfulness, showing us the way you're going and assuring and reassuring our people and the people of the world. And I thank you for doing that.

Your search for Irish roots has obviously been an important consideration for you and for us. It goes straight to the heart of the relationship between this country and the United States of America. We have our friends and relations in your country, and you have yours here.

You were here for the first time in 1948 as a private citizen, and you returned in 1972 as Governor of California. Now, 12 years later you have come again, this time as President of the United States. It is not necessary for me to say how much we welcome you.

We're not promoting the idea that every American who comes to Ireland three times will become President of the United States—[laughter]—but some among us are pointing to the wisdom of letting young people in America know that they cannot visit Ireland too early or too often. In fact, inherited wisdom has brought Ronald Reagan, Jr., here twice already. [Laughter]

Your visit has consolidated the special friendship which exists between Ireland and the United States. Your presence among us testifies to that special friendship—a friendship which has endured and grown and become more, not less, important with the passage of time, and moving away from the original links of history. It is based on blood and kinship and reinforced by the bedrock of shared beliefs and ideals.

Ireland shares with the United States of America a profound respect for the rights of the individual, for the abiding worth of democracy, and for the dignity of the human person. The tyranny of flying time compels me to omit reference to very many aspects of our friendship and ties at official and unofficial levels. Some, but not all have been referred to and recalled over the past 3 days. Suffice it to say that the bonds which bind us are many and strong and enduring.

The best guarantee of ensuring the permanence of such a happy relationship is in the best tradition of old friends—is to visit more often. With that in mind, I hope that you and Mrs. Reagan will soon return to our shores. And you will, let me assure you, receive *Céad Mille Fáilte* [one hundred thousand welcomes].

I now ask those of you who are not Mr. and Mrs. Reagan—[laughter]—to join with me in a toast to the President of the United States of America.

(White House photo by Bill Fitz-Patrick)

At the Normandy Cemetery, Mrs. Reagan places flowers at the graves of U.S. servicemen who died during the D-Day invasion. More than 9,000 Americans are buried here.

NORMANDY

Pointe du Hoc, June 6, 1984[10]

We're here to mark that day in history when the Allied armies joined in battle to reclaim this continent to liberty. For 4 long years, much of Europe had been under a terrible shadow. Free nations had fallen, Jews cried out in the camps, millions cried out for liberation. Europe was enslaved, and the world prayed for its rescue. Here in Normandy the rescue began. Here the Allies stood and fought against tyranny in a giant undertaking unparalleled in human history.

We stand on a lonely, windswept point on the northern shore of France. The air is soft, but 40 years ago at this moment, the air was dense with smoke and the cries of men, and the air was filled with the crack of rifle fire and the roar of cannon. At dawn, on the morning of the 6th of June, 1944, 225 Rangers jumped off the British landing craft and ran to the bottom of these cliffs. Their mission was one of the most difficult and daring of the invasion: to climb these sheer and desolate cliffs and take out the enemy guns. The Allies had been told that some of the mightiest of these guns were here and they would be trained on the beaches to stop the Allied advance.

The Rangers looked up and saw the enemy soldiers—the edge of the cliffs shooting down at them with machine guns and throwing grenades. And the American Rangers began to climb. They shot rope ladders over the surface of these cliffs and began to pull themselves up. When one Ranger fell, another would take his place. When one rope was cut, a Ranger would grab another and begin his climb again. They climbed, shot back, and held their footing. Soon, one by one, the Rangers pulled themselves over the top, and in seizing the firm land at the top of these cliffs, they began to seize back the Continent of Europe.

Two hundred and twenty-five came here. After 2 days of fighting, only 90 could still bear arms.

Behind me is a memorial that symbolizes the Ranger daggers that were thrust into the top of these cliffs. And before me are the men who put them there.

These are the boys of Pointe du Hoc. These are the men who took the cliffs. These are the champions who

helped free a continent. These are the heroes who helped end a war.

Gentlemen, I look at you, and I think of the words of Stephen Spender's poem. You are men who in your "lives fought for life . . . and left the vivid air signed with your honor."

I think I know what you may be thinking right now—thinking "we were just part of a bigger effort; everyone was brave that day." Everyone was. Do you remember the story of Bill Millin of the 51st Highlanders? Forty years ago today, British troops were pinned down near a bridge, waiting desperately for help. Suddenly, they heard the sound of bagpipes, and some thought they were dreaming. They weren't. They looked up and saw Bill Millin with his bagpipes, leading the reinforcements and ignoring the smack of the bullets into the ground around him.

Lord Lovat was with him—Lord Lovat of Scotland, who calmly announced when he got to the bridge, "Sorry I'm a few minutes late," as if he'd been delayed by a traffic jam, when in truth he'd just come from the bloody fighting on Sword Beach, which he and his men had just taken.

There was the impossible valor of the Poles who threw themselves between the enemy and the rest of Europe as the invasion took hold, and the unsurpassed courage of the Canadians who had already seen the horrors of war on this coast. They knew what awaited them there, but they would not be deterred. And once they hit Juno Beach they never looked back.

All of these men were part of a rollcall of honor with names that spoke of a pride as bright as the colors they bore: the Royal Winnipeg Rifles, Poland's 24th Lancers, the Royal Scots Fusiliers, the Screaming Eagles, the Yeoman of England's armored divisions, the forces of Free France, the Coast Guard's "Matchbox Fleet" and you, the American Rangers.

Forty summers have passed since the battle that you fought here. You were young the day you took these cliffs; some of you were hardly more than boys, with the deepest joys of life before you. Yet, you risked everything here. Why? Why did you do it? What impelled you to put aside the instinct for self-preservation and risk your lives to take these cliffs? What inspired all the men of the armies that met here? We look at you, and somehow we know the answer. It was faith and belief; it was loyalty and love.

(White House photo by Michael Evans)

President Mitterrand and President Reagan place wreaths at the Ranger Monument at Pointe du Hoc which is located on a cliff overlooking Omaha Beach. The monument was erected by the French to honor the U.S. 2nd Ranger Battalion and was officially turned over to the U.S. Government in 1979.

The men of Normandy had faith that what they were doing was right, faith that they fought for all humanity, faith that a just God would grant them mercy on this beachhead or on the next. It was the deep knowledge—and pray God we have not lost it—that there is a profound, moral difference between the use of force for liberation and the use of force for conquest. You were here to liberate, not to conquer, and so you and those others did not doubt your cause. And you were right not to doubt.

You all knew that some things are worth dying for. One's country is worth dying for, and democracy is worth dying for, because it's the most deeply honorable form of government ever devised by man. All of you loved liberty. All of you were willing to fight tyranny, and you knew the people of your countries were behind you.

The Americans who fought here that morning knew word of the invasion was spreading through the darkness back home. They felt in their hearts, though they couldn't know in fact, that in Georgia they were filling the churches at 4 a.m., in Kansas they were kneeling on their porches and praying, and in Philadelphia they were ringing the Liberty Bell.

Something else helped the men of D-Day: their rockhard belief that Providence would have a great hand in the events that would unfold here; that God was an ally in this great cause. And, so, the night before the invasion, when Colonel Wolverton asked his parachute troops to kneel with him in prayer he told them: "Do not bow your heads, but look up so you can see God and ask His blessing in what we're about to do." Also that night, General Matthew Ridgway on his cot, listening in the darkness for the promise of God made to Joshua: "I will not fail thee nor forsake thee."

These are the things that impelled them; these are the things that shaped the unity of the Allies.

When the war was over, there were lives to be rebuilt and governments to be returned to the people. There were nations to be reborn. Above all, there was a new peace to be assured. These were huge and daunting tasks. But the Allies summoned strength from the faith, belief, loyalty, and love of those who fell here. They rebuilt a new Europe together.

There was first a great reconciliation among those who had been enemies, all of whom had suffered so greatly. The United States did its part, creating the Marshall Plan to help rebuild our Allies

and our former enemies. The Marshall Plan led to the Atlantic alliance—a great alliance that serves to this day as our shield for freedom, for prosperity, and for peace.

In spite of our great efforts and successes, not all that followed the end of the war was happy or planned. Some liberated countries were lost. The great sadness of this loss echoes down to our own time in the streets of Warsaw, Prague, and East Berlin. Soviet troops that came to the center of this continent did not leave when peace came. They're still there, uninvited, unwanted, unyielding, almost 40 years after the war. Because of this, allied forces still stand on this continent. Today, as 40 years ago, our armies are here for only one purpose—to protect and defend democracy. The only territories we hold are memorials like this one and graveyards where our heroes rest.

We in America have learned bitter lessons from two World Wars: It is better to be here ready to protect the peace than to take blind shelter across the sea, rushing to respond only after freedom is lost. We've learned that isolationism never was and never will be an acceptable response to tyrannical governments with an expansionist intent.

But we try always to be prepared for peace, prepared to deter aggression; prepared to negotiate the reduction of arms; and, yes, prepared to reach out again in the spirit of reconciliation. In truth, there is no reconciliation we would welcome more than a reconciliation with the Soviet Union, so, together, we can lessen the risks of war, now and forever.

It's fitting to remember here the great losses also suffered by the Russian people during World War II: 20 million perished, a terrible price that testifies to all the world the necessity of ending war. I tell you from my heart that we in the United States do not want war. We want to wipe from the face of the Earth the terrible weapons that man now has in his hands. And I tell you, we are ready to seize that beachhead. We look for some sign from the Soviet Union that they are willing to move forward, that they share our desire and love for peace, and that they will give up the ways of conquest. There must be a changing there that will allow us to turn our hope into action.

We will pray forever that some day that changing will come. But for now, particularly today, it is good and fitting to renew our commitment to each other, to our freedom, and to the alliance that protects it.

We are bound today by what bound us 40 years ago, the same loyalties, traditions, and beliefs. We're bound by reality. The strength of America's allies is vital to the United States, and the American security guarantee is essential to the continued freedom of Europe's democracies. We were with you then; we are with you now. Your hopes are our hopes, and your destiny is our destiny.

Here, in this place where the West held together, let us make a vow to our dead. Let us show them by our actions that we understand what they died for. Let our actions say to them the words for which Matthew Ridgway listened: "I will not fail thee nor forsake thee."

Strengthened by their courage, heartened by their valor, and borne by their memory, let us continue to stand for the ideals for which they lived and died.

Omaha Beach, June 6, 1984[11]

We stand today at a place of battle, one that 40 years ago saw and felt the worst of war. Men bled and died here for a few inches of sand, as bullets and shellfire cut through their ranks. About them, General Omar Bradley later said, "Every man who set foot on Omaha Beach that day was a hero."

No speech can adequately portray their suffering, the sacrifice, their heroism. President Lincoln once reminded us that through their deeds, the dead of battle have spoken more eloquently for themselves than any of the living ever could. But we can only honor them by rededicating ourselves to the cause for which they gave a last full measure of devotion.

Today we do rededicate ourselves to that cause. And at this place of honor, we're humbled by the realization of how much so many gave to the cause of freedom and to their fellow man.

Some who survived the battle of June 6, 1944, are here today. Others who hoped to return never did.

"Someday, Lis, I'll go back," said Private First Class Peter Robert Zanatta, of the 37th Engineer Combat Battalion, and first assault wave to hit Omaha Beach. "I'll go back, and I'll see it all again. I'll see the beach, the barricades and the graves."

Those words of Private Zanatta come to us from his daughter, Lisa Zanatta Henn, in a heart-rending story about the event her father spoke of so often. "In his words, the Normandy invasion would change his life forever," she said. She tells some of his stories of World War II but says of her father, "the story to end all stories was D-Day."

"He made me feel the fear of being on that boat waiting to land. I can smell the ocean and feel the seasickness. I can see the looks on his fellow soldiers' faces—the fear, the anguish, the uncertainty of what lay ahead. And when they landed, I can feel the strength and courage of the men who took those first steps through the tide to what must have surely looked like instant death."

Private Zanatta's daughter wrote to me, "I don't know how or why I can feel this emptiness, this fear, or this determination, but I do. Maybe it's the bond I had with my father. All I know is that it brings tears to my eyes to think about my father as a 20-year-old boy having to face that beach."

The anniversary of D-Day was always special for her family. And like all the families of those who went to war, she describes how she came to realize her own father's survival was a miracle: "So many men died. I know that my father watched many of his friends be killed. I know that he must have died inside a little each time. But his explanation to me was, 'You did what you had to do, and you kept on going.'"

When men like Private Zanatta and all our Allied forces stormed the beaches of Normandy 40 years ago, they came not as conquerors but as liberators. When these troops swept across the French countryside and into the forests of Belgium and Luxembourg they came not to take but to return what had been wrongly seized. When our forces marched into Germany, they came not to prey on a brave and defeated people but to nurture the seeds of democracy among those who yearned to be free again.

We salute them today. But, Mr. President [Mitterrand], we also salute those who, like yourself, were already engaging the enemy inside your beloved country—the French Resistance. Your valiant struggle for France did so much to cripple the enemy and spur the advance of the armies of liberation. The French Forces of the Interior will forever personify courage and national spirit. They will be a timeless inspiration to all who are free and to all who would be free.

(White House photo by Mary Anne Fackelman)

Eight heads of state gather at Utah Beach for the closing ceremony commemorating the 40th anniversary of the D–Day landing at Normandy. Left to right are Prime Minister Trudeau (Canada), Queen Beatrix (Netherlands), King Olav V (Norway), King Baudouin (Belgium), President Mitterrand (France), Queen Elizabeth II (United Kingdom), Grand Duke Jean (Luxembourg), and President Reagan.

Today, in their memory, and for all who fought here, we celebrate the triumph of democracy. We reaffirm the unity of democratic peoples who fought a war and then joined with the vanquished in a firm resolve to keep the peace.

From a terrible war we learned that unity made us invincible; now, in peace, that same unity makes us secure. We sought to bring all freedom-loving nations together in a community dedicated to the defense and preservation of our sacred values. Our alliance, forged in the crucible of war, tempered and shaped by the realities of the post-war world, has succeeded. In Europe, the threat has been contained, the peace has been kept.

Today, the living here assembled—official, veterans, citizens—are a tribute to what was achieved here 40 years ago. This land is secure. We are free. These things are worth fighting and dying for.

Lisa Zanatta Henn began her story by quoting her father, who promised that he would return to Normandy. She ended with a promise to her father, who died 8 years ago of cancer: "I'm going there, Dad, and I'll see the beaches and the barricades and the monuments. I'll see the graves, and I'll put flowers there just like you wanted to do. I'll feel all the things you made me feel through your stories and your eyes. I'll never forget what you went through, Dad, nor will I let anyone else forget. And, Dad, I'll always be proud."

Through the words of his loving daughter, who is here with us today, a D–Day veteran has shown us the meaning of this day far better than any President can. It is enough for us to say about Private Zanatta and all the men of honor and courage who fought beside him four decades ago: We will always remember. We will always be proud. We will always be prepared, so we may always be free.

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[1]Texts from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of June 11, 1984.

[2]Made at the airport.

[3]Made in Quadrangle Square at the university. Prior to his address, the President received an honorary doctorate of law degree from the National University, of which the college at Galway is a part, and was presented with the Freedom of the City and a resolution scroll by Mayor Michael Leahy.

[4]Broadcast to the United States from Ashford Castle in Cong, County Mayo, where the President and Mrs. Reagan stayed during their visit in Galway.

[5]Hosted by the Prime Minister in honor of President Reagan in St. Patrick's Hall in Dublin Castle.

[6]Made before a joint session of the Parliament in the *Dail* [House of Representatives] at Leinster House.

[7]The President was referring to three members of the National Parliament who protested the President's presence and left the room after he was introduced by the Prime Minister.

[8]Hosted by President Reagan in honor of President Hillery at Deerfield, the residence of the U.S. Ambassador to Ireland.

[9]President Hillery opened his remarks in Irish.

[10]Made at the site of the U.S. Ranger Monument where veterans of the Normandy invasion had assembled for the anniversary.

[11]Made at the Omaha Beach Memorial. ■

Vice President Bush Visits East and South Asia and the Middle East

Vice President Bush departed Washington, D.C., May 8, 1984, to visit Japan (May 8–10), Indonesia (May 10–12), India (May 12–15), Pakistan (May 15–18), and Oman (May 18–20). He returned to Washington on May 20. Following are the Vice President's statements, toasts, and remarks he made on various occasions during the trip.[1]

JAPAN

Tokyo, Dinner Toast, May 9, 1984[2]

Six months ago, President Reagan and Prime Minister [Yasuhiro] Nakasone met here to renew a personal friendship and to strengthen a national friendship. Both men share a vision of U.S.-Japan bilateral and global cooperation unhampered by the barrier of lingering trade problems, and together they set a demanding agenda for progress to realize that vision.

In the succeeding 6 months, we have witnessed an unprecedented chapter in our relations: an almost unbroken period of intense communication and close cooperation marked by frequent personal consultations. I know, Mr. Foreign Minister [Shintaro Abe], the important role that you played in these negotiations, and we are grateful to you for your efforts.

We have made real and significant progress. Still, much remains to be done. Our work together is far from complete. We must continue to build on the gains we have already made to forge new progress for the future.

In a relationship of the size and scope of that between the United States and Japan, there will always be problems to command our attention. But I think we have demonstrated in this last half year of negotiations that we have the imagination and means to find solutions to those difficulties as they arise. In so many ways, our two countries are providing the world with the promise of a better future.

Finally, let me stress how highly my country values its relationship with Japan. Together we stand as engines of prosperity in the world economy and bulwarks in defense of freedom and democratic values in a world too often beset by tyranny. As President Reagan said in his address to the *Diet* last year, "Together, there is nothing Japan and America cannot do."

I would like to propose a toast to you, Mr. Foreign Minister, and to your gracious and hospitable country, our partner in prosperity and ally in democracy.

Statement, May 10, 1984[3]

We have had a wonderful stay in Japan, and it has been a great pleasure to meet with my Japanese colleagues who have, as always, proven to be the most thoughtful and gracious of hosts.

My discussions with the Prime Minister [Yasuhiro Nakasone], the Foreign Minister [Shintaro Abe], Mr. [Toshio] Komoto [Director General of Economic Planning Agency] and other distinguished leaders focused largely on the follow-up process stemming from the President's visit to Japan last November.

Our meetings were extremely friendly, and our discussions frank and to the point. There was a clear recognition on both sides of all that remains to be done.

We have accomplished much in the last 6 months, but our work together in resolving the difficult trade and economic issues is far from complete. I'm sure that if we approach the problems that remain in the same spirit of cooperation that has marked our negotiations so far, we will continue to make progress; and the strong and vital Japan-U.S. relationship will continue to prosper.

I leave Japan today more convinced than ever of the importance of that relationship to both of our great nations.

With Prime Minister Nakasone.

(White House photos by Dave Valdez)

INDONESIA

Jakarta, Statement, May 12, 1984[3]

On the personal level, I leave with some feeling of regret that I have had too little time to see more of Indonesia. My visit to Taman Mini yesterday brought home to me the tremendous variety and grandeur of this beautiful country.

But on an official level, during these 2 days of talks I have learned much and, I think, we have accomplished much. In excellent meetings with President Soeharto, with Vice President Umar, and with other senior officials of the Government of Indonesia, I took every opportunity to stress how much the United States values our broad and friendly ties with Indonesia.

I spent a good deal of time discussing with President Soeharto the subject of East-West relations. I wanted to convey to him President Reagan's deep and abiding commitment to arms control and listen to his views on these issues that affect the peace of all mankind. President Reagan has proposed negotiations in five vital areas with the Soviets. They include proposals to limit strategic arms, intermediate force missiles, mutual force reductions, chemical warfare, and confidence-building measures. I noted that despite the fact that the Soviets have rejected these efforts, President Reagan is determined to push forward in this important area.

I was also pleased to discuss with President Soeharto President Reagan's recent trip to China and stressed that President Reagan sees improved relations with the People's Republic of China as a progressive step designed to bring stability to the world. I think it's important to note that improved relations with the People's Republic of China will not come at the expense of our friendship with the member nations of ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations].

I am grateful for President Soeharto's views on these issues of importance for peace in both the region and the world. I will report what I have heard to President Reagan upon my return. President Soeharto will, I know, convey the details of our discussion to the other leaders of ASEAN when they meet in Jakarta this coming July.

With President Soeharto.

I came here to learn; and thanks to my very productive meetings, I did. I learned much about what Indonesia, under President Soeharto's leadership, has accomplished in nationbuilding; and I was extremely impressed with the strides Indonesia has made in promoting economic development.

As we leave today, I am confident that relations between the United States and Indonesia are stronger than at anytime. It is our intention to work jointly with the government of President Soeharto to strengthen our friendship even further in the months and years to come.

Finally, I want to express my sincere appreciation and that of my wife, Barbara, and our entire traveling party for the kindness that we have been afforded during the past few days. As I said at the very beginning, we have seen too little of this beautiful country, and I spent too little time here. We all look forward to returning one day.

INDIA

New Delhi, Dinner Toast, May 12, 1984[4]

In looking at the relationship between India and the United States, I am impressed by the many values our two countries share. First, of course, is our common heritage as two nations in the forefront of the anti-colonial struggle. We both know the pain and price of independence, and we both appreciate the necessity of carefully guarding our hard-won freedom.

It is significant, I believe, that in both our countries national elelctions will be held within the next few months. Our common democratic traditions hold our two nations in an enduring alliance of the spirit—the vibrant, unbreakable alliance of free men everywhere.

Closely related to our shared democratic ideals is the pluralistic nature of our two societies. The peoples of both countries—so varied in ethnic, linguistic, and cultural backgrounds—have chosen to bind themselves together through democratic institutions in order to protect their diversity and their individual liberties.

Third, both societies value openness of discussion and debate, whether in the political arena or in a free press. Both India and the United States know that freedom of expression is the ultimate guarantor of our survival as free and proud peoples. We have seen too many countries around the world stagnate and decay—both spiritually and economically—as freedom withered under press censorship and state control.

Given all this that our two societies have in common, some have asked why there is not greater accord between India and the United States in the way we look at the world. Let me say, first, that I count myself among those who believe there is no fundamental conflict between the foreign policy objectives of the United States and those of India. Each of us, in our own way, seeks a better life for our people in a world at peace with itself.

We do bring different perspectives to bear on the problems of our planet. Such differences are in the natural order of things; and as open, democratic societies which value the intellectual ferment stimulated by the debate of ideas, we should not confuse such debate with irreconcilable differences, nor give such debate a greater importance than it deserves.

Let us take, for example, my country's policy toward this region, South Asia. The United States supports a system of stable, peaceful, and prosperous South Asian states—states free to choose their own system of government and to exercise their rights as sovereign, independent nations.

The United States recognizes the important role of a strong India, whose well-established democratic institutions help it serve as an anchor of regional stability.

Good relations between a strong, free, and united India and its neighbors also contributes to regional stability and the peaceful, economically progressing South Asia we seek. We have welcomed efforts to increase regional cooperation, as well as India's efforts to improve bilateral relations with China and Pakistan. India and its neighbors, obviously, must determine the pace and path of the normalization process; but you should know that the United States stands ready to support it in whatever ways we reasonably can.

In our view, the most destabilizing factor to emerge in the region in recent years has been the brutal Soviet invasion and continuing war against Afghanistan. The presence of more than 100,000 Soviet troops in that country has fundamentally altered the strategic balance in the region and created the world's largest refugee problem.

I look forward to discussing these and other matters with Prime Minister [Indira] Gandhi and her officials. India and the United States have differences which we are sensitive to, but our common interests, which are grounded in a common commitment to democracy and human dignity, are larger and ultimately much more important.

Ladies and gentlemen, I ask you to join me in a toast to Vice President [Mohammed] Hidayatullah and to the Republic of India.

Statement, May 15, 1984[3]

My talks with Indian leaders have been friendly, frank and, I think, productive. Prime Minister [Indira] Gandhi was especially gracious. We met together privately for a full 2 hours and exchanged views on a far-ranging array of global and regional issues. One can hardly overestimate the importance of such intimate discussions. I feel that I came away from my meeting with Mrs. Gandhi with a renewed appreciation of the Indian perspective on the problems that confront our world.

The United States and India together possess the basis of a strong and enduring friendship. Mutually beneficial exchanges in the fields of education, culture, and science are going on between India and the United States largely on a case-to-case basis. The Indo-U.S. Joint Commission is actively involved in these activities. I understand that representatives of our Embassy and the Government of India have had useful discussions in recent months on how to provide a more systematic framework for such bilateral exchanges in the future. These discussions will be continued further and will, we trust, be successful.

In conclusion, I would like to reiterate the firm commitment of the United States to a strong and united India. We see India as a major, pivotal power and a key element in a peaceful and prosperous South Asia. We believe India and its neighbors have a vital, long-range interest in each other's stability, and a stable South Asia is important to the world. For our part, we will do what we can to help promote the stability and peaceful prosperity of the region.

I leave India extremely optimistic that our two great democracies will continue to build an even stronger relationship based on our common interests and the many traditions and values we share.

With Prime Minister Gandhi.

PAKISTAN

Islamabad, Arrival Statement, May 15, 1984

I am delighted to be here. I come on behalf of President Reagan and the American people to reaffirm our country's support for a strong, stable, and independent Pakistan at peace with its neighbors.

The United States shares with your country an enduring commitment to the security and stability of this region. And we hope to continue to cooperate with Pakistan's efforts to enhance its security and to further its economic and social development.

I have come here to listen and learn, and to share views with the leaders of your country on a variety of issues of common interest. I look forward to meeting with President Zia [General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq], Foreign Minister [Sahabzada] Yaqub Khan, and other senior officials, and to the opportunity to meet with your countrymen here in Islamabad, Lahore, and Peshawar.

In Peshawar I will have the opportunity to visit an Afghan refugee village and learn more about the Afghan struggle for freedom.

We believe that this visit will contribute to a broader understanding and reinforce the already strong ties that exist between our two nations.

Peshawar, Remarks (excerpts) at Afghan Refugee Camp, May 17, 1984

My dear Afghan brethren, I want to thank you for your invitation to visit this refugee village. To the officials of the Pakistani Government and to the representatives of the relief agencies, I also want to say thank you for making this visit possible.

I have today witnessed firsthand the tragic results of the invasion of your homeland. I have seen much suffering here, much hardship and pain; but I have also seen a courageous and proud people who remain hospitable and generous despite want—a strong and noble people whose commitment to freedom and faith in a loving God remains undampened by adversity.

With President Zia.

Across the border, a brutal war is being waged against the people of Afghanistan. Reports come out of that tragic country of indiscriminate bombing of civilian population centers, and scorched earth tactics. These tactics are laying waste to the land and creating millions of homeless and thousands of dead.

My dear Afghan brethren, you and your people have suffered greatly. You have shown courage and fortitude beyond the usual measure. You have my heartfelt admiration and that of my countrymen. You have earned the admiration of free men everywhere.

I have seen the indomitable spirit of freedom living on in this refugee camp. Your homeland, the proud nation of Afghanistan, has never been conquered. The bravery and independence of the Afghan people is legend. Those who try to deprive you of freedom and place you in bondage will, I am convinced, learn that the light of liberty that burns so brightly in your valiant nation can never be extinguished.

The Soviets must withdraw their military machine and stop interfering in the internal affairs of the sovereign nation of Afghanistan. We do not want the suffering to be prolonged—we want to see a negotiated settlement as soon as possible. But the critical issue remains Soviet withdrawal. I know your resistance will continue until the Soviets realize they cannot subjugate Afghanistan.

Before I leave, I would like to pay tribute to the officials and citizens of Pakistan who have welcomed over 3 million Afghan refugees into this country with such compassion and sacrifice. I would also like to salute the workers from all over the world who are here with the relief agencies caring for the refugees. The work you all do is obviously outstanding. I am also proud of the American Government's contribution to the relief program.

I am pleased to announce that as part of our continuing effort to help the Afghan refugees, I have brought with me a check for $14 million from the people of America to the people of Afghanistan. And yesterday, a cargo plane arrived bearing $1 million worth of medical supplies, a sample of which will be on display.

In this village, in the midst of despair, survives hope. Deprived by tyranny of all material things, the people of Afghanistan fight for that most precious possession of all—freedom. Your cause is right, your cause is just. I feel very privileged to be able to shake your hands. Meeting you, I feel confident that the proud people of Afghanistan will once again win back their homeland—that the cause of freedom will prevail.

Long live Afghanistan!

Lahore, Statement, May 18, 1984[3]

I would like to take this opportunity to publicly thank President Zia, who has extended to us his warm and generous hospitality for which we are most grateful.

The chance I have had in these last few days to travel to different parts of Pakistan with President Zia has given me an increased understanding of his unique qualities as a leader and a stronger admiration of this proud nation.

In the last few days, as well, we have had many valuable discussions with the President and other top government officials. The United States admires Pakistan's constructive role in the nonaligned movement and OIC [Organization of the Islamic Conference] and strongly supports its ongoing efforts to improve its relations with India. We also welcome President Zia's plans to bring about the return of more representative government in Pakistan. Our constructive talks about these and other issues have conributed to a clearer understanding of our respective positions that I'm sure will enhance our already strong bilateral relations.

As you know, yesterday I visited an Afghan refugee camp close by the border. It was an experience I shall never forget; and the suffering of those proud, courageous people, fighting alone against overwhelming odds—this is a reality to which the world must never close its eyes.

Great credit must be given the Pakistani people for the humanitarian assistance they are providing the refugees. The extraordinary generosity of the Pakistanis, who have opened up the doors of their nation to their homeless neighbors, deserves the praise of compassionate people the world over.

Both the United States and Pakistan want a just solution to the war in Afghanistan based on the withdrawal of Soviet forces, the restoration of Afghanistan's independence and sovereignty and the return with honor of Afghanistan's millions of refugees.

OMAN

Muscat, Statement, May 19, 1984[3]

With Sultan Qaboos.

My first visit to the Sultanate of Oman has renewed my admiration for the courage, energy, and determination of His Majesty Sultan Qaboos [bin Said] and the entire Omani people.

My consultations with His Majesty Sultan Qaboos and his ministers have underscored the determination of our two countries to continue our joint efforts on behalf of international peace and mutually valuable economic progress.

These talks have also underscored the respect and friendship which have for so long characterized the relations between the Sultanate of Oman and the United States. President Reagan and I are proud of our close relationship with His Majesty Sultan Qaboos. We consider him to be an inspiring leader, a statesman whose advice we seek and remember and, above all, a friend. As this visit has shown so well, His Majesty and his people are also warm and generous hosts to friends like ourselves who journey here from afar.

As regards the developments in the gulf, we are, of course, paying very close attention. The recent attacks against neutral shipping on the high seas are in violation of international law and should be a source of very great concern to all nations. We deplore the loss of life and property and would hope that the two belligerents reconsider this perilous road they are moving down. In fact, I think the whole world would welcome an end to the fighting which has gone on too long, wasted too many lives, and profits no one.

[1]Texts from the Vice President's Office of the Press Secretary.

[2]Made at dinner hosted by Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe.

[3]Made at a news conference.

[4]Made at dinner hosted by Vice President Mohammad Hidayatullah. ■

Terrorism: The Problem and the Challenge

Secretary Shultz's statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 13, 1984.[1]

I welcome this opportunity to discuss with you the problem of international terrorism and the challenges it poses to our country. This subject was discussed thoroughly at the recent meeting in London of heads of state and government and by their foreign ministers. A declaration was issued on June 9 which my staff has made available to you. In that declaration, the leaders "... expressed their resolve to combat this threat by every possible means, strengthening existing measures and developing effective new ones." One of the points in that declaration called on each country to close gaps in its national legislation, and that is one of the reasons for my appearance today. First, however, I want to discuss with you the problem in general and why it is of such growing concern to the President and me.

Terrorism has been a growing problem since 1968 when our Ambassador to Guatemala was assassinated. Terrorist incidents reached a plateau in number in 1979. The number of recorded attacks has not varied significantly since then. In 1983 there were more than 500 attacks by international terrorists of which more than 200 were against the United States. This was only the tip of the iceberg because there were at least as many threats and hoaxes. These are a cheap way to create an atmosphere of fear, and they also absorb a substantial amount of our resources as well as those of the host governments. Beyond this are national or indigenous terrorist activities which probably exceed by a factor of 100 what we define as international terrorism.

This problem is not confined to any geographic area. Fortunately, inside the United States we experience relatively few incidents. The problem for the United States is primarily in other areas of the world. The largest number of incidents overall and against the United States occurs in Europe followed by Latin America and the Middle East.

Why Are We So Concerned?

Let me summarize briefly.

- In 1983 more Americans were killed and injured by acts of terrorism than in the 15 preceding years for which we have records.
- The attacks in 1983 were unique in the sheer violence of them. From our point of view, the worst tragedies were the destruction of our Embassy and the Marine barracks in Beirut and of our Embassy annex in Kuwait. But we were not the only victims. There was the bombing at Harrods in London, the bombing at Orly airport in Paris, the murder of four members of the South Korean Cabinet in Rangoon, the bombing destruction of a Gulf Air flight in one of the emirates, and others.
- Closely tied to the rising violence has been the indiscriminate targeting of innocents—people who have no known role in either causing or redressing the alleged grievances of the terrorists.
- A source of growing concern is the extensive travel of terrorists outside their own countries and regions to commit acts of terror abroad. Again, intelligence tells us that this occurs extensively in the Middle East, Europe, and Latin America, but reports are increasing of such travel to the United States. And we also know that some Americans are engaged in supporting the terrorist activities of foreign states and groups that engage in terrorism.
- The most disturbing trend of all is the extent to which the agencies of foreign states are engaged in terrorist acts. Seventy or more incidents in 1983 probably involved significant state support or participation. No longer the random acts of isolated groups of local fanatics, terrorism is now a method of warfare, no less because it is undeclared and even (though not always) denied.
- Some 40% of all the incidents and a large proportion of all the threats and hoaxes are aimed at the United States—our diplomats, members of our Armed Forces, our businessmen, or other Americans.

We are now faced with a problem which is of major and growing significance. The problem is not only represented by the grim statistics but by the threat that terrorism represents to

civilized life. The main target of terrorists is not just individuals but the basic interests and values of the democracies. It is a form of low-level warfare directed primarily at Western nations and institutions and their friends and allies. We are the targets because our belief in the rights of the individual is an obstacle to those who wish to impose their will on others. And it is precisely because the democratic nations respect the rights of the individual and maintain the most open and responsive societies that they are so vulnerable to terrorists. The goal of the terrorist is to create anarchy and disorder, for it is out of disorder that he hopes to instill fear, discredit governments, demoralize societies, or alter national policies.

What Are We Doing About It?

We are working with our closest allies to develop a consensus on how we deal with international terrorism and the security problems it presents for us. The consensus embodied in the declaration in London on June 9 is heartening. In earlier summit meetings we had addressed specific issues such as aircraft hijacking and protection of our diplomats. We have made considerable progress in these areas. But on this occasion we discussed the basic political problem of states engaging in terrorism, and we ackowledged the international character of the problem. We noted that in our respective countries we have gaps in legislation for combating terrorism.

The legislation before the Congress today will not fill all those gaps for the United States, but it will fill some of them. Part of the legislation we have proposed is to implement two international conventions that the Senate has previously approved. These are relatively noncontroversial, but it is time to get the job done. The two other bills now before this committee deal with areas of law where we feel that legislative improvements can help in the fight against terrorism. We welcome this opportunity to work with the Congress in finding the best legislative answers possible to the complex questions that terrorism poses. The draft of the bill on training and support services has been modified significantly to take account of congressional comments.

We are working in this Administration to review and apply the whole range of options available. We do not have any single answer that we think will work all the time. What we must do, therefore, is attack the problem on many different fronts.

- We have organized ourselves better within the executive branch to deal with these problems. Within the Department of State the responsibility for policy, planning, and operations on these matters has been consolidated in the Office of the Under Secretary for Management. The policy and planning for the Department as well as the government in general is the task of the Director of the Office for Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning while the operations are in the Office of Security.
- We have added more resources to intelligence collection, and we have strengthened cooperation with other governments. We have also streamlined our procedures for advising our posts abroad of threats and analysis of their security problems. We believe that this procedure is now working much better. We believe that we need to do more.
- We have stepped up our training and are also conducting exercises for our personnel overseas on the types of terrorist incidents they might have to deal with. We have, for example, added segments in every appropriate course at the Foreign Service Institute on how to deal with such problems.
- The Congress approved last year a program which will permit us to train foreign law enforcement officers on how to deal with terrorist acts. We are actively engaged in implementing that program. Although this program is designed to help other governments deal with these problems as it affects them, it should also improve considerably the response from other governments when we need help at one of our posts.
- We are carrying out security enhancement programs at all of our high-threat posts. We appreciate greatly the consistent support we have received from this committee in that effort.
- We have also taken steps to improve our ability to respond when incidents occur overseas. We have teams available to assist on crisis management, security, communications, and other matters.
- The cooperation of other governments often depends on how responsive we are on the security problems their diplomatic missions may have in the United States. The Congress has approved legislation which will assure that we have a comprehensive program to protect foreign officials, not only in Washington and New York City but other places in the United States. We are seeking funds for that program in the current budget.
- Finally, we are actively seeking to improve our capability to prevent attacks against our interests abroad. The London summit declaration discussed, among other things, "closer cooperation and coordination between police and security organizations and other relevant authorities, especially in the exchanges of information, intelligence and technical knowledge." And within the U.S. Government we are continuing to study other ways and means of deterring or preemptively dealing with a range of terrorist threats in conformity with existing law.

The legislation before you represents modest but necessary steps. They are essential steps because the problem will not go away: this is certainly not the last you will hear about the problem of terrorism.

But we need your help. The President and the Congress owe it to this country to do whatever is necessary to protect our people, our interests, and our most basic principles.

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[1]Press release 154. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Terrorism: The Challenge to the Democracies

Secretary Shultz's address before the Jonathan Institute's second Conference on International Terrorism on June 24, 1984.[1]

Five years have passed since the Jonathan Institute held its first conference on terrorism, and in that time the world has seen two major developments: one a cause for great distress; the other a reason for hope.

The distressing fact is that over these past 5 years terrorism has increased. More people were killed or injured by international terrorists last year than in any year since governments began keeping records. In 1983 there were more than 500 such attacks, of which more than 200 were against the United States. For Americans the worst tragedies were the destruction of our Embassy and then the Marine barracks in Beirut. But around the world, many of our close friends and allies were also victims. The bombing of Harrods in London, the bombing at Orly Airport in Paris, the destruction of a Gulf Air flight in the United Arab Emirates, and the Rangoon bombing of South Korean officials are just a few examples—not to mention the brutal attack on a West Jerusalem shopping mall this past April.

Even more alarming has been the rise of state-sponsored terrorism. In the past 5 years more states have joined the ranks of what we might call the "League of Terror," as full-fledged sponsors and supporters of indiscriminate—and not so indiscriminate—murder. Terrorist attacks supported by what [Libyan leader] Qadhafi calls the "holy alliance" of Libya, Syria, and Iran, and attacks sponsored by North Korea and others, have taken a heavy toll of innocent lives. Seventy or more such attacks in 1983 probably involved significant state support or participation.

As a result, more of the world's people must today live in fear of sudden and unprovoked violence at the hands of terrorists. After 5 years, the epidemic is spreading and the civilized world is still groping for remedies.

Nevertheless, these past 5 years have also given us cause for hope. Thanks in large measure to the efforts of concerned governments, citizens, and groups like the Jonathan Institute, the peoples of the free world have finally begun to grapple with the problem of terrorism in intellectual and in practical terms. I say intellectual because the first step toward a solution to any problem is to understand that there is a problem and then to understand its nature. In recent years we have learned a great deal about terrorism, though our education has been painful and costly. We know what kind of threat international terrorism poses to our free society. We have learned much about the terrorists themselves, their supporters, their targets, their diverse methods, their underlying motives, and their eventual goals.

Armed with this knowledge we can focus our energies on the practical means for reducing and eventually eliminating the threat. We can all share the hope that, when the next conference of this institute is convened, we will look back and say that 1984 was the turning point in our struggle against terrorism, that having come to grips with the problem we were able to deal with it effectively and responsibly.

The Anatomy of Terrorism

Let me speak briefly about the anatomy of terrorism. What we have learned about terrorism, first of all, is that it is not random, undirected, purposeless violence. It is not, like an earthquake or a hurricane, an act of nature before which we are helpless. Terrorists and those who support them have definite goals; terrorist violence is the means of attaining those goals. Our response must be twofold: we must deny them the means but above all we must deny them their goals.

But what are the goals of terrorism? We know that the phenomenon of terrorism is actually a matrix that covers a diverse array of methods, resources, instruments, and immediate aims. It appears in many shapes and sizes—from the lone individual who plants a homemade explosive in a shopping center, to the small clandestine group that plans kidnapings and assassinations of public figures, to the well-equipped and well-financed organization that uses force to terrorize an entire population. Its stated objectives may range from separatist causes to revenge for ethnic grievances to social and political revolution. International drug smugglers use terrorism to blackmail and intimidate government officials. It is clear that our responses will have to fit the precise character and circumstances of the specific threats.

But we must understand that the overarching goal of all terrorists is the same: with rare exceptions, they are attempting to impose their will by force—a special kind of force designed to create an atmosphere of fear. And their efforts are directed at destroying what all of us here are seeking to build. They're a threat to the democracies.

The Threat to the Democracies

The United States and its democratic allies are morally committed to certain ideals and to a humane vision of the future. In our foreign policies, we try to foster the kind of world that promotes peaceful settlement of disputes, one that welcomes change without violent conflict. We seek a world in which human rights are respected by all governments, a world based on the rule of law. We know that in a world community where all nations share these blessings, our own democracy will flourish, our own nation will prosper, and our own people will continue to enjoy freedom.

Nor has ours been a fruitless search. In our lifetime, we have seen the world progress, though perhaps too slowly, toward this goal. Civilized norms of conduct have evolved, even governing relations between adversaries. Conflict persists; but, with some notorious exceptions, even wars have been conducted with certain restraints—indiscriminate slaughter of innocents is widely condemned; the use of certain kinds of weapons has been proscribed; and most, but not all, nations have heeded those proscriptions.

We all know that the world as it exists is still far from our ideal vision. But today, even the progress that mankind has already made is endangered by those who do not share that vision—who, indeed, violently oppose it.

For we must understand, above all, that terrorism is a form of political violence. Wherever it takes place, it is directed in an important sense against us, the democracies—against our most basic values and often our fundamental strategic interests. The values upon which democracy is based—individual rights, equality under the law, freedom of thought and expression, and freedom of religion—all stand in the way of those who seek to impose their will, their ideologies, or their religious beliefs by force. A terrorist has no patience and no respect for the orderly processes of

democratic society, and, therefore, he considers himself its enemy.

And it is an unfortunate irony that the very qualities that make democracies so hateful to the terrorists also make them so vulnerable. Precisely because we maintain the most open societies, terrorists have unparalleled opportunity to strike against us.

Terrorists and Freedom Fighters

The antagonism between democracy and terrorism seems so basic that it is hard to understand why so much intellectual confusion still exists on the subject. We have all heard the insidious claim that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." Let me read to you the powerful rebuttal that was stated before your 1979 conference by a great American, Senator Henry Jackson, who, Mr. Chairman, as you observed, is very much with us.

> The idea that one person's "terrorist" is another's "freedom fighter" cannot be sanctioned. Freedom fighters or revolutionaries don't blow up buses containing non-combatants; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don't set out to capture and slaughter school children; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don't assassinate innocent businessmen, or hijack and hold hostage innocent men, women, and children; terrorist murderers do. It is a disgrace that democracies would allow the treasured word "freedom" to be associated with acts of terrorists.

Where democracy is struggling to take root, the terrorist is, again, its enemy. He seeks to spread chaos and disorder, to paralyze a society. In doing so he wins no converts to his cause; his deeds inspire hatred and fear, not allegiance. The terrorist seeks to undermine institutions, to destroy popular faith in moderate government, and to shake the people's belief in the very idea of democracy. In Lebanon, for example, state-sponsored terrorism has exploited existing tensions and attempted to prevent that nation from rebuilding its democratic institutions.

Where the terrorist cannot bring about anarchy, he may try to force the government to overreact, or impose tyrannical measures of control, and hence lose the allegiance of the people. Turkey faced such a challenge but succeeded in overcoming it. Martial law was imposed; the terrorist threat was drastically reduced; and today we see democracy returning to that country. In Argentina, the widely and properly deplored "disappearances" of the 1970s were, in fact, part of a response—a deliberately provoked response—to a massive campaign of terrorism. We are pleased that Argentina, too, has returned to the path of democracy. Other countries around the world face similar challenges, and they, too, must steer their course carefully between anarchy and tyranny. The lesson for civilized nations is that we must respond to the terrorist threat within the rule of law, lest we become unwitting accomplices in the terrorist's scheme to undermine civilized society.

Once we understand terrorism's goals and methods, it is not too hard to tell, as we look around the world, who are the terrorists and who are the freedom fighters. The resistance fighters in Afghanistan do not destroy villages or kill the helpless. The *contras* in Nicaragua do not blow up school buses or hold mass executions of civilians.

How tragic it would be if democratic societies so lost confidence in their own moral legitimacy that they lost sight of the obvious: that violence directed against democracy or the hopes for democracy lacks fundamental justification. Democracy offers mechanisms for peaceful change, legitimate political competition, and redress of grievances. But resort to arms in behalf of democracy against repressive regimes or movements is, indeed, a fight for freedom, since there may be no other way that freedom can be achieved.

The free nations cannot afford to let the Orwellian corruption of language hamper our efforts to defend ourselves, our interests, or our friends. We know the difference between terrorists and freedom fighters, and our policies reflect that distinction. Those who strive for freedom and democracy will always have the sympathy and, when possible, the support of the American people. We will oppose guerrilla wars where they threaten to spread totalitarian rule or deny the rights of national independence and self-determination. But we will oppose terrorists no matter what banner they may fly. For terrorism in any cause is the enemy of freedom.

The Supporters of Terrorism

If freedom and democracy are the targets of terrorism, it is clear that totalitarianism is its ally. The number of terrorist incidents in or against totalitarian states is negligible. States that support and sponsor terrorist actions have managed in recent years to co-opt and manipulate the phenomenon in pursuit of their own strategic goals.

It is not a coincidence that most acts of terrorism occur in areas of importance to the West. More than 80% of the world's terrorist attacks in 1983 occurred in Western Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East. The recent posture statement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff put it this way:

> Terrorists may or may not be centrally controlled by their patrons. Regardless, the instability they create in the industrialized West and Third World nations undermines the security interests of the United States and its allies.

States that sponsor terrorism are using it as another weapon of warfare, to gain strategic advantage where they cannot use conventional means. When Iran and its allies sent terrorists to bomb Western personnel in Beirut, they hoped to weaken the West's commitment to defending its interests in the Middle East. When North Korea sponsored the murder of South Korean Government officials, it hoped to weaken the noncommunist stronghold on the mainland of East Asia. The terrorists who assault Israel are also enemies of the United States. When Libya and the Palestine Liberation Organization provide arms and training to the communists in Central America, they are aiding Soviet efforts to undermine our security in that vital region. When the Soviet Union and its clients provide financial, logistic, and training support for terrorists worldwide; when the Red Brigades in Italy and the Red Army faction in Germany assault free countries in the name of communist ideology—they hope to shake the West's self-confidence and sap its will to resist aggression and intimidation. And we are now watching the Italian authorities unravel the answer to one of the great questions of our time: was there Soviet-bloc involvement in the attempt to assassinate the Pope?

We should understand the Soviet role in international terrorism without exaggeration or distortion: the Soviet Union officially denounces the use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy. Yet there is a wide gap between Soviet words and Soviet actions. One does not have to believe that the Soviets are puppeteers and the terrorists marionettes; violent or fanatic individuals and groups are indigenous to every society. But in many countries, terrorism would long since have passed away had it not been for significant support from outside. The international links among terrorist groups are now clearly understood; and the Soviet link, direct or indirect, is also

clearly understood. The Soviets use terrorist groups for their own purposes, and their goal is always the same—to weaken liberal democracy and undermine world stability.

A Counterstrategy Against Terrorism

Having identified the challenge, we must now consider the best strategy to counter it. We must keep in mind, as we devise our strategy, that our ultimate aim is to preserve what the terrorists seek to destroy: democracy, freedom, and the hope for a world at peace.

The battle against terrorism must begin at home. Terrorism has no place in our society, and we have taken vigorous steps to see that it is not imported from abroad. We are now working with the Congress on law enforcement legislation that would help us obtain more information about terrorists through the payment of rewards to informants and would permit prosecution of those who support states that use or sponsor terrorism. Our FBI is improving our ability to detect and prevent terrorist acts within our own borders.

We must also ensure that our people and facilities in other countries are better protected against terrorist attacks. So we are strengthening security at our Embassies around the world to prevent a recurrence of the Beirut and Kuwait Embassy bombings.

While we take these measures to protect our own citizens, we know that terrorism is an international problem that requires the concerted efforts of all free nations. Just as there is collaboration among those who engage in terrorism, so there must be cooperation among those who are its actual and potential targets.

An essential component of our strategy, therefore, has been greater cooperation among the democratic nations and all others who share our hopes for the future. The world community has achieved some successes. But, too often, countries are inhibited by fear of losing commercial opportunities or fear of provoking the bully. The time has come for the nations that truly seek an end to terrorism to join together, in whatever forums, to take the necessary steps. The declaration on terrorism that was agreed upon at the London economic summit 2 weeks ago was a welcome sign that the industrial democracies share a common view of the terrorist threat. And let me say that I trust and I hope that that statement and the specific things referred to in it will be the tip and only the visible part of the iceberg. We must build on that foundation.

Greater international cooperation offers many advantages. If we can collectively improve our gathering and sharing of intelligence, we can better detect the movements of terrorists, anticipate their actions, and bring them to justice. We can also help provide training and share knowledge of terrorist tactics. To that end, the Reagan Administration has acted promptly on the program that Congress approved last year to train foreign law enforcement officers in antiterrorist techniques. And the President has sent Congress two bills to implement two international conventions to which the United States is a signatory: the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages and the Montreal convention to protect against sabotage of civilian aircraft.

We must also make a collective effort to address the special problem of state-sponsored terrorism. States that support terror offer safehavens, funds, training, and logistical support. We must do some hard thinking about how to pressure members of the "League of Terror" to cease their support. Such pressure will have to be international, for no one country can exert sufficient influence alone. Economic sanctions and other forms of pressure impose costs on the nations that apply them, but some sacrifices will be necessary if we are to solve the problem. In the long run, I believe, it will have been a small price to pay.

We must also discourage nations from paying blackmail to terrorist organizations. Although we recognize that some nations are particularly vulnerable to the terrorist threat, we must convince them that paying blackmail is counterproductive and inimical to the interests of all.

Finally, the nations of the free world must stand together against terrorism to demonstrate our enduring commitment to our shared vision. The terrorists may be looking for signs of weakness, for evidence of disunity. We must show them that we are unbending. Let the terrorists despair of ever achieving their goals.

Active Defense

All the measures I have described so far, domestic and international, are important elements in a comprehensive strategy. But are they enough? Is the purely passive defense that these measures entail sufficient to cope with the problem? Can we as a country—can the community of free nations—stand in a solely defensive posture and absorb the blows dealt by terrorists?

I think not. From a practical standpoint, a purely passive defense does not provide enough of a deterrent to terrorism and the states that sponsor it. It is time to think long, hard, and seriously about more active means of defense—about defense through appropriate preventive or preemptive actions against terrorist groups before they strike.

We will need to strengthen our capabilities in the area of intelligence and quick reaction. Human intelligence will be particularly important, since our societies demand that we know with reasonable clarity just what we are doing. Experience has taught us over the years that one of the best deterrents to terrorism is the certainty that swift and sure measures will be taken against those who engage in it. As President Reagan has stated:

> We must make it clear to any country that is tempted to use violence to undermine democratic governments, destabilize our friends, thwart efforts to promote democratic governments, or disrupt our lives, that it has nothing to gain, and much to lose.

Clearly there are complicated moral issues here. But there should be no doubt of the democracies' moral right, indeed duty, to defend themselves.

And there should be no doubt of the profound issue at stake. The democracies seek a world order that is based on justice. When innocents are victimized and the guilty go unpunished, the terrorists have succeeded in undermining the very foundation of civilized society, for they have created a world where there is no justice. This is a blow to our most fundamental moral values and a dark cloud over the future of humanity. We can do better than this.

No matter what strategy we pursue, the terrorist threat will not disappear overnight. This is not the last conference that will be held on this subject. We must understand this and be prepared to live with the fact that despite all our best efforts the world is still a dangerous place. Further sacrifices, as in the past, may be the price for preserving our freedom.

It is essential, therefore, that we not allow the actions of terrorists to affect our policies or deflect us from our goals. When terrorism succeeds in intimidating governments into altering their foreign policies, it only opens the door to more terrorism. It shows that terrorism

works; it emboldens those who resort to it; and it encourages others to join their ranks.

The Future

If we remain firm, we can look ahead to a time when terrorism will cease to be a major factor in world affairs. But we must face the challenge with realism, determination, and strength of will. Not so long ago we faced a rash of political kidnapings and embassy takeovers. These problems seemed insurmountable. Yet, through increased security and the willingness of governments to resist terrorist demands and to use force when appropriate, such incidents have become rare. In recent years, we have also seen a decline in the number of airline hijackings—once a problem that seemed to fill our newspapers daily. Tougher security measures and closer international cooperation have clearly had their effect.

I have great faith that we do have the will, and the capability, to act decisively against this threat. It is really up to us, the nations of the free world. We must apply ourselves to the task of ensuring our future and consigning terrorism to its own dismal past.

[1]Press release 156 of June 26, 1984. ■

Negotiating With the Soviets

by Paul H. Nitze

Address before the Foreign Policy Association in New York City on June 1, 1984. Ambassador Nitze is head of the U.S. delegation to the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) negotiations.

In 1954, just after the summit meeting between President Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and Bulganin in Geneva, Chip Bohlen, then our Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. invited Phyllis and me and our children to stay with them at the U.S. Ambassador's residence in Moscow. At that time the British Ambassador in Moscow was Sir William Hayter. There was a story about Hayter that, when asked what it was like to negotiate with the Russians, he said it was rather like dealing with a defective vending machine. You put a coin in and nothing comes out. There may be some sense in shaking it; you may get your coin back; but there is no point of talking to it.

Soviet Tactics

Hayter's statement, like most witty cracks, is a gross overstatement, but there is a kernel of truth in it. Negotiations with the Russians can be important and sometimes, in the past, have achieved useful results. But progress is generally possible only if there has been a prior Soviet Defense Council, or full Politburo, decision favoring a deal on the specific subject matter. If there has been such a prior high-level decision, then it is up to the Soviet negotiators to get the best possible deal for the U.S.S.R., but they will negotiate seriously with the objective of arriving at a deal. If there has been no such prior positive high-level decision, the United States will find itself negotiating with itself. It will offer one position which will be firmly rejected, modify it in the hope that the new position will be more acceptable to the Soviet side, modify it again and again until finally it either comes down to a position so onesidedly favorable to the Soviets that they can't fail to accept it or the United States has to draw back and wait until Soviet higher authority comes to the conclusion that other events in the world are evolving in such a way that it would, in fact, be advantageous for them to make a balanced deal on terms that take account of U.S. interests, not only their own.

As I look back on my experience in negotiating with representatives of the Soviet Union, a number of instances come to mind.

Lend-Lease. In 1943 President Roosevelt merged the organization of the Board of Economic Warfare, of which I was a part, with the Lend-Lease Administration in the Foreign Economic Administration. The lend-lease people had worked out a procedure under which the Soviet lend-lease mission in Washington would submit documentation indicating the specifications of the various items they needed and the ports to which they should be delivered by what dates. The Soviet mission had fallen behind in getting these documents to us. Arutinian, head of their mission in Washington, was called in to explain the delay. When the point was made to him that he was behind in giving us the necessary documentation, he flew into a rage. He cried out that he had come to the meeting to talk about "your behind," not "my behind." Nevertheless, the problems were sorted out, and we did manage to get to the Soviet Union the additional necessary war material in time to help them defeat Hitler's armies in Russia. In that instance both sides had a common interest in winning the war.

In the summer of 1946, I was appointed to head a U.S. team to negotiate with a Soviet team the implementation of Article XII of the Lend-Lease Agreement. That article called for the two sides to sit down promptly after the defeat of Germany to work out the optimum way of conducting trade between two states organized on differerent social principles. As it happened, Arutinian was again head of the Soviet team. It proved impossible to entice Arutinian into any discussion of the problem; he had received no green light to do so. I tried a number of different approaches but in response to each one Arutinian would say, "Mr. Nitze, what is your specific proposal?" I was not authorized to make a specific proposal. I wanted to enter into a discussion with Arutinian and his team with a view to developing a joint proposal for consideration by our governments. This he would not do. Undoubtedly he had received no guidance from Moscow that they wanted an agreement on that subject at that time.

Forces in Germany. When the Soviets lifted the 1949 blockade of Berlin, they laid down as a precondition that we agree to a prompt meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and France. They gave us little indication as to what it was they wished to discuss at that meeting. George Kennan and I thought they must have something highly important in mind; we thought they might well propose the removal of both U.S. and Soviet forces from Germany. We developed a plan called Plan A to respond to that contingency. Chip Bohlen told us we were quite wrong, that there was no possibility that the Soviet Union would wish to remove its forces from Germany. We developed another plan, Plan B, to respond to that alternate contingency. On the very first day of the conference, General Chuikov, the Soviet High Commissioner in Germany, asked Bohlen to have lunch with him. Early in the conversation Chuikov said that he understood there were those who thought both sides should remove their forces from Germany. He said, "They are mad. The Germans hate us. It would be madness to remove our forces." It soon became evident in the conference that no progress was possible on the unification of Germany or even of Berlin. It was possible to work out clearing arrangements with respect to trade between the two parts of Germany and Berlin and to make some headway on the Austrian State Treaty, but nothing more. They had insisted on the foreign minister meeting as a way of saving face when they had concluded it was wiser for them to lift the Berlin blockade than to continue with it.

Disarmament. Prior to 1961, almost all thought about arms control was in the context of an international, worldwide disarmament solution. The Baruch Plan would have created a world entity with authority restricted to one subject matter—full ownership and control over nuclear raw materials and the plants that processed or used those materials. The Soviets rejected that concept. They later came up with an unenforceable and impractical plan for what they called "total and complete disarmament."

During 1959, 1960, and 1961, there were a series of meetings on the subject in what were called the eight-nation disarmament negotiations. I was an adviser to the U.S. delegation during a portion of those talks. It soon became quite evident that the Soviet position was wholly directed toward supporting their propaganda effort depicting the Soviet Union as the great proponent of peace and that they had no intention of arriving at any concrete agreement as a result of the talks.

Early in the Kennedy Administration, it became clear that the pollution of the atmosphere caused by atmospheric tests of large weapons—particularly by the mammoth, multimegatonnage weapons tested by the Soviets—would, if continued, cause dangerous worldwide pollution of the atmosphere. Once we in Washington had worked out the kind of a limited test ban treaty we could live with, there was no great difficulty in working out an agreement with the Soviet Union. As I remember, it took Averell Harriman and Gladwyn Jebb no more than 13 days in Moscow to do so. In that instance there was a definite common interest in arriving at an agreement. This was also true of the Nonproliferation Treaty which followed thereafter.

The idea of U.S.-U.S.S.R. talks directed toward the limitation of the nuclear weapons of the two principal nuclear powers, rather than toward a worldwide international disarmament agreement, arose later during the Kennedy Administration, specifically in 1963. Secretary McNamara tried to persuade Kosygin of the merits of such an approach at Glassboro in 1967. It was not until 1968, however, that the Soviets came to the conclusion that such talks might be useful. The talks finally began in Helsinki in the fall of 1969. Semenov, the head of the Soviet delegation, said that it was not until the fall of 1970 that he received word indicating that the Politburo had decided in favor of reaching an agreement. The Politburo interest, however, was restricted to an agreement limiting antiballistic missile (ABM) systems, not to an agreement limiting the offensive forces of the two sides. After a further year of intense negotiations, it proved possible to arrive at the ABM Treaty. A comprehensive treaty of indefinite duration on offensive forces proved to be impossible to obtain. In the attempt to get a comprehensive treaty on offensive forces to parallel the ABM Treaty, we offered a series of major concessions, but in the end they brought us nothing. The result was the ineffective short-term accord, the Interim Agreement.

During the SALT II negotiations, there never was an indication that the Politburo had come to the decision that they wanted a mutually advantageous agreement. This again resulted in the United States making one not fully reciprocated concession after another in an attempt to move the negotiations forward. The final signed but unratified SALT II Treaty, in my view, was unsatisfactory. It was a one-sided agreement which, by its terms, would expire in 1985, before it would have any substantial effect on the programs of either side. More importantly, it did not constitute a good foundation for SALT III. The invasion of Afghanistan nailed down its nonratifiability.

> ***. . . progress [in negotiations with the Russians] is generally possible only if there has been a prior Soviet Defense Council, or full Politburo, decision favoring a deal on the specific subject matter.***

INF Negotiations

Over the last 2½ years, I have been involved in the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) negotiations. Those negotiations have focused on the Soviet SS-20 missile force and NATO's counter-deployments of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs). In November 1982, before the negotiations began, we stated the ongoing U.S. position. That was that the United States would entirely forego its planned deployment of 572 Pershing IIs and GLCMs if the Soviets would eliminate their SS-20s. I continue to believe that objectively this would have been the optimum solution for both sides. It would have eliminated the entire class of INF missiles worldwide. It would have been verifiable with high confidence.

The first rounds of the negotiations in Geneva were largely exploratory. The U.S. side set forth the considerations it thought important to arriving at a mutually acceptable agreement. In February 1982, we tabled a draft treaty

text setting forth in detail the provisions we thought desirable to implement that approach. Subsequently the Soviet side set forth their considerations and tabled a draft treaty text which embodied their approach. Toward the end of the first two rounds, each side quite fully understood the position of the other side. The question was how could one cut through the maze of disagreements and arrive at a mutually acceptable compromise.

At that point Ambassador Kvitsinskiy, the head of the Soviet delegation, told me that a basic review of Soviet policy toward the INF negotiations was scheduled to take place that summer in Moscow. He said he thought it important to make as much progress as we could prior to that review taking place. Once it had taken place the Soviet position would become set in concrete and it would be much harder thereafter to get it changed. It was with the prospect in mind that he and I decided we should attempt, with some urgency, to work out a package of mutual concessions which might cut through the panoply of issues dividing the sides. The result was the "walk in the woods" formula, in which the United States would have moved off of its proposal to eliminate all longer-range INF missiles and would have agreed to deploy only cruise missiles, and, for their part, the Soviets would have accepted some U.S. deployments in Europe, agreed to reduce their systems in Europe to an equal level, and to freeze their systems in Asia. This dropped their unjustified demand for compensation for British and French nuclear forces.

From the U.S. standpoint the "walk-in-the-woods" formula was not wholly satisfactory. The United States would have preferred freedom to choose within the agreed ceiling the number of Pershing IIs or cruise-missile launchers which it wished to deploy. It also would have preferred a lower ceiling on SS–20s in the Far East than a freeze at the then current number of 90. However, Washington approved the basic approach and the method by which Kvitsinskiy and I had arrived at the formula.

On the Soviet side all the basic elements of the package were rejected, as was the free, uninstructed mode of negotiation which led to it. I was subsequently told by Ambassador Kvitsinskiy that Moscow had pretty well completed its policy review by the time he returned to Moscow after our "walk in the woods." Our formula was quite contrary to the decisions they had reached. As best as I can reconstruct it, they had come to the following decisions.

During the SALT II negotiations, there never was an indication that the Politburo had come to the decision that they wanted a mutually advantageous agreement.

- From the standpoint of the sum of Soviet interests and objectives, it would be better for there to be no agreement and for U.S. deployments to go forward as scheduled rather than for them to agree to and thus sanction any U.S. INF missile deployments whatsoever. The reason for this was basically political. For the U.S.S.R. to enter into an agreement sanctioning even minimal U.S. deployments would undercut their growing group of supporters in NATO Europe, including the supporters of anti-Americanism and the antinuclear and peace movements. These were all groups into the support of which they had made a major investment.
- They judged it improbable that the United States and NATO would agree to forego deploying INF missiles if the U.S.S.R. would not eliminate their SS–20s and that the negotiations were, therefore, headed for a stalemate.
- It was decided to initiate immediately a propaganda campaign designed to throw the onus for the failure of the negotiations onto the United States.
- They decided to convey to the U.S. INF delegation a threat to pull out of the Geneva negotiations if and when the United States took practical steps to deploy INF weapons.
- They authorized the Soviet military to proceed with full preparations for counter-counterdeployments to begin when U.S. counterdeployments began.
- They decided that after the United States had begun their counterdeployment to the SS–20s and the Soviets had begun their counter-counterdeployments to the Pershing IIs and GLCMs, the U.S.S.R. would take the position that in any follow-on negotiation the proper trade would be their counter-counterdeployments against our counterdeployments. This would leave their existing SS–20 deployments substantially untouched.

After they walked out of the INF and START negotiations in November-December 1983, they announced they were undertaking another basic policy review of these issues. It appears that that review has resulted largely in a confirmation and hardening of their earlier 1982 decisions.

Soviet Decisionmaking Process

A good deal of study had been given to the question of how decisions are arrived at in the Soviet Union. I think it is pretty well agreed that nothing can be done by the Soviet Government or by any of the other organs of Soviet society subject to party control which is in conflict with decisions of the Politburo. Furthermore, it is generally agreed that the basic issues concerning defense, national security, and arms control are made in the Defense Council, which is customarily chaired by the General Secretary of the Party and on which a certain number of the other members of the Politburo also sit. Kvitsinskiy told me there is also a subordinate body, chaired by Foreign Minister Gromyko, which deals with the day-to-day operations concerned with arms control. On that committee are members of the military establishment; Zamyatin, who chairs the Central Committee subcommittee dealing with the media and propaganda; and Zagladin, who chairs the Central Committee subcommittee dealing with relations with other communist parties and with what they call "political action," as well as representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the KGB. Kvitsinskiy left me with the impression that it was this group that formulated his instructions and coordinated them with the political action, propaganda, and other campaigns which were related to the objectives which their arms control positions and statements were designed to support.

Future of INF Talks

What is the outlook for the immediate future? The U.S. position is clear. We do not think the INF talks, or START, should have been broken off. The Soviet spokesmen gave as the reason for their walking out, the votes in the British Parliament, the Italian Parliament, and

finally in the *Bundestag* reaffirming their 1979 decision that in the absence of an INF agreement, the United States should deploy INF missiles on their territory. The Soviets say they cannot negotiate while we are deploying; we must remove the missiles already deployed before they will return to the negotiating tables. This is a worthless argument. We sat at the table in Geneva and negotiated hard and constructively for 2 years while they were adding to their already large deployments of SS-20s an additional SS-20 system per week.

We are ready to return to the negotiating table on 24-hours' notice. Part of our INF delegation is in Geneva at the present time. The rest of us are prepared to return on a moment's notice. It is the Soviet Union, not the United States, which has blocked and continues to block progress in the negotiations. Soviet higher authority does not wish at this time to resume either the INF or the START negotiations. Instead, they are concentrating upon a political, psychological warfare campaign backed by a continuing comprehensive military build-up. They hope to expand and exploit fissures within the North Atlantic alliance and over time, if possible, to get the United States out of Europe. The main target of their campaign is the United States and, in particular, President Reagan.

Soviet Analysis of Policy

It is worth reviewing for a moment the way in which communists think that policy should be analyzed. They start with the proposition that there are certain fundamental theses which distinguish the communist approach to the world from that of others, particularly from that of the capitalist world. Among those theses is the primacy of the class struggle and the continuing fight against imperialism in the formerly colonial world. These theses they hold to be unchangeable.

They have a different view with respect to strategy. They think that strategy should, from time to time, be changed to reflect changes in the correlation of forces. In the correlation of forces they include not only military forces but economic, political, and psychological ones as well. When the correlation of forces is favorable to their side their doctrine calls on them to exploit that favorable correlation by moving forward. When it is negative, the doctrine calls upon them to hold or to retreat while they attempt to reverse the trends in the correlation of forces.

With respect to tactics, they believe there should be great flexibility. The guiding thoughts should be deception and surprise. They also hold that it is important at all times to decide upon what they call the "general line." By that they mean that it is necessary at all times to correctly identify that group which constitutes the major potential future threat to their ability to carry their program forward. During the early years after the October 1917 revolution, the "general line" called for concentrating their attack on the social democrats within the U.S.S.R., the group having the greatest potential appeal to workers, the class they claimed to represent but were less close to than the social democrats. Later, after their victory in the civil war, the "general line" called for concentrating their attack on the social democrats in other countries, particularly Germany. In 1946 Stalin made it clear that he saw the United States as being the principal potential opponent, even at a time when President Truman and his advisers were striving hard to preserve in peacetime the wartime collaboration between the United States and the U.S.S.R. Today the general line focuses directly on the United States, and particularly on President Reagan, as being at the heart of the only potentially effective opposition to their program.

A further Soviet communist precept is never to let emotion interfere with what they call "scientific realism." One should never let anger influence one's judgment, although it might be advisable from time to time to show anger. For some time before 1960 we were flying U-2s over the U.S.S.R., but they could not shoot them down. During that period they showed no anger. The moment they were able to shoot down a U-2, Khrushchev put on a tremendous show of anger and beat his shoe upon the podium at the UN meeting of that year. I doubt that there is merit in the common thesis that the Soviet leadership is angry at the United States or at President Reagan, I believe that propagandists are telling the Politburo that, at least for the time being, this is the astute impression to create.

A major point that emerges from what I have been saying is that there is, indeed, a contrast between the way the United States and other countries in the West approach foreign policy issues and the way in which they are approached by the Soviet Union. We approach foreign affairs from the standpoint of being a uniquely important member, but still a member having rights no greater than those of other members, in a relatively loose coalition of independent states. The government of each of the NATO states, for instance, is responsible to a parliament elected by the votes of a free populace informed by a free press. On the Soviet side the situation is quite different. Those who equate what they call the two superpowers and imply that they somehow are equally responsible for today's difficulties are far off the mark. The United States, like every democratic country, continuously makes mistakes, but the processes of a democratic government permit mistaken trends to be reversed and to some extent corrected. The totalitarian states, when they go wrong, can go very wrong indeed. ■

The Soviets say they cannot negotiate while we are deploying . . . [yet we] negotiated hard and constructively for 2 years while they were adding to their already large deployments. . . .

Nuclear Arms Control and the NATO Alliance

by Edward L. Rowny

Address before the Royal United Services Institute, in London on June 21, 1984. Ambassador Rowny is chief negotiator for the U.S. delegation to the strategic arms reductions talks (START).

More than 6 months have passed since the Soviets walked out of the INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] talks in Geneva and refused to set a resumption date for START, the strategic arms reduction talks. These Soviet actions are as regrettable as they are unnecessary. They do, however, give us the opportunity to reflect upon the events of the past several years. Accordingly, let me review developments to date in START, discuss the impact which recent events have had on the NATO alliance, and, finally, give you my thoughts on where we should go from here.

Let me begin with a preview of these issues. The major thought I would like to leave with you is that throughout START the United States has negotiated seriously and flexibly. The Reagan Administration remains committed to the notion that the best way to increase strategic stability is through substantial reductions in nuclear arms. Next, we made a number of modifications to the original U.S. position in an effort to take account of reasonable Soviet concerns. Despite these efforts, a wide gulf continues to separate the U.S. and Soviet positions in START. Nevertheless, more progress was achieved in the course of the talks than is generally recognized. When the Soviets return to the negotiating table, it should be possible to build on that progress. I am convinced that their own self-interest will eventually impel the Soviets to return to the table. When they do, the best way to build on the progress already made is through the concept of trade-offs between areas of U.S. and Soviet advantage, which President Reagan enunciated as his plan for achieving an agreement in the interest of both nations.

In walking out of the negotiations on intermediate-range forces, the Soviets are clearly testing Western resolve. The Western democracies have met that test. The best way to encourage the Soviets to return to the table is to continue current programs designed to ensure our common defense, while simultaneously reiterating our readiness to resume negotiations toward balanced and verifiable agreements. One-sided cuts in our defense programs or failure to uphold alliance commitments would only reward the Soviets for their intransigence and make a return to the negotiating table less likely.

Achieving a high degree of Western unity, however, has not been without its price. In recent months, voices have been heard on both sides of the Atlantic which challenge some of the fundamentals of NATO defense policy. Most Americans and Europeans recognize that the deployment of U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Europe and the modernization of U.S. strategic deterrent forces constitutes a necessary and measured response to the massive and continuing buildup of Soviet forces threatening Western Europe and the United States. At the same time, an understandable concern about the consequences of a strategy which relies for its ultimate sanction on the possible use of nuclear weapons has led many to ask if there is not some better alternative.

We cannot ignore these questions. It is patently obvious that we cannot "disinvent" nuclear weapons. For the foreseeable future, they will remain a crucial element of the deterrent forces necessary to preserve our liberties. We need, however, to look for ways to assure deterrence through reduced reliance on weapons of mass destruction. We must reduce the risk that nuclear war would occur for, as President Reagan has said, "A nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought." Strategic arms control agreements which are soundly conceived and firmly supported by our democratic societies can improve the stability of the nuclear balance between the superpowers. Stability can also be enhanced by upgrading NATO's conventional forces in Europe. Raising the nuclear threshold in Europe, in concert with increased strategic nuclear stability, reduces Soviet incentives to stimulate or exploit crises and, therefore, reduces the risk of nuclear war.

Developments in START

Let me briefly discuss the developments to date in START. On May 9, 1982, President Reagan outlined the basic elements of the U.S. START proposal in a speech at Eureka College. The President sought to break the mold of past negotiations which concentrated on limiting strategic offensive arms at high levels. He sought to improve strategic stability through substantial reductions in the more destabilizing strategic offensive arms. Specifically, he proposed to reduce the number of ballistic missile warheads on each side to 5,000, approximately a one-third reduction from existing U.S. and Soviet levels. He also proposed to reduce deployed ballistic missiles to no more than 850. This amounted to a 50% reduction from the prevailing U.S. level of such missiles, a level that was already considerably lower than the Soviet level.

To achieve the basic objective of increased stability, President Reagan sought to focus reductions on the most threatening strategic weapons—ballistic missiles and, particularly, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). These are the most dangerous systems because large numbers of powerful and highly accurate warheads can be deployed on them and because their fixed basing mode makes them vulnerable to attack. Our proposals also asked each nation to reduce its heavy bombers to lower equal levels.

The Soviets, for their part, proposed to limit the numbers of ballistic missiles and heavy bombers to a combined total of 1,800. It was encouraging that the Soviets joined us in departing from SALT II [strategic arms limitation talks] by proposing to limit not only launchers but their weapons. In most other respects, however, the Soviet proposal closely paralleled the SALT II Treaty.

Nevertheless, by the spring of 1983, it was clear that the U.S. and the Soviet positions were still far apart. After an exhaustive reevaluation, President Reagan decided to make a number of changes in the U.S. position. These modifications were undertaken to meet the major concerns the Soviets had expressed with our original proposal.

- We offered to raise the proposed limit of 850 deployed ballistic missiles.
- We offered to drop the constraints we had proposed on the number of heavy and medium-sized ICBMs. We also said we would no longer insist on strict equality in U.S. and Soviet throw-weight, provided the agreement substan-

tially reduced the current 3-to-1 Soviet advantage in this area.

- We offered to limit air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) from the outset of an agreement and proposed limitations on numbers of heavy bombers and ALCMs to levels well below those of SALT II.
- In making these modifications, we reaffirmed the importance of reductions to 5,000 ballistic missile warheads.

On July 7, 1983, the United States tabled a draft START treaty which reflected these changes. In response, the Soviets modified some of the more extreme elements of their initial position. They stated their willingness to limit ALCMs numerically instead of banning them and revised their one-sided proposals on U.S. sea-based systems, which would have banned the U.S. D-5 missiles and limited us to 4-6 Trident submarines.

As a result of these developments, when the fourth round of START ended last summer, we left Geneva with the expectation that we might be on the verge of a breakthrough. Both sides appeared to have begun the natural process of modifying their original ingoing positions in order to come closer to a mutually acceptable accord.

Prospects for progress in START were further enhanced in October 1983 when President Reagan decided to incorporate the mutual guaranteed build-down into the U.S. START approach. Build-down, which is important not only in its own right but because it also has wide bipartisan backing in the U.S. Congress, is intended to encourage the modernization of strategic forces in a manner which leads toward stability. President Reagan also took the highly significant step of proposing that the United States and the Soviet Union explore the concept of trade-offs between areas of U.S. and Soviet advantage.

Unfortunately, when round five of START resumed in October 1983, the Soviets reacted negatively to the new U.S. proposals. They dismissed build-down and refused seriously to consider trade-offs. It was evident from the beginning of the round that the Soviets were concentrating their efforts on preventing U.S. deployments of missiles in Europe. Reflecting their displeasure that NATO had proceeded with INF deployments, the Soviets walked out of the INF talks and refused to agree to our proposal to resume START negotiations in February 1984.

As I mentioned earlier, considerable progress was made during the first year of the START negotiations, even though it was obviously less than we would have liked. For their part, the Soviets proposed lower limits on the numbers of missiles and bombers than they were willing to consider in SALT and acknowledged that, in any future agreement, it is not sufficient to limit only ballistic missile launchers. Some modest progress was also made on verification; the Soviets indicated a willingness to consider cooperative measures to supplement national technical means of verification.

Nevertheless, a wide gulf still separates the United States and the Soviet Union in several fundamental areas. The first major area of disagreement concerns the level of reductions. The United States has proposed the most substantial reductions since the beginning of U.S.-Soviet strategic arms negotiations. Even though the Soviets have proposed 25% reductions in the number of delivery vehicles, under their proposal the Soviets could actually deploy about 45% more missile warheads than they now have. Their proposal thus gives the appearance, but not the reality, of reducing offensive arms.

The second major area of disagreement concerns the treatment of heavy bombers and the nuclear weapons they carry. The United States proposed that heavy bombers and ALCMs, while limited to new lower levels, be treated separately and not lumped together in a combined aggregate limit of all weapons. We made this proposal because heavy bombers and their weapons are less destabilizing than ballistic missiles. The Soviets, however, have proposed a combined ceiling on ballistic missile warheads and all bomber weapons, including ALCMs, shorter range air-launched missiles, and bombs. In effect, the Soviet proposal would equate the large, highly accurate, and fast-flying warheads carried on their SS-18 ICBM with the much smaller warheads on a slower flying cruise missile. This proposal is unacceptable because it fails to distinguish between ballistic missiles—whose large size, multiple warheads, great accuracy, and short time of flight give them the capability to be used in a first strike—and cruise missiles—whose slow speed of flight makes them clearly retaliatory weapons.

Moreover, the Soviet proposal completely ignores the fact that the retaliatory U.S. bomber force must be capable of penetrating massive Soviet air defenses which are unconstrained by any agreement. It is clear that the Soviets seek, through their proposal, a large superiority in the number of ballistic missile warheads.

We recognize that the kind of changes we seek in Soviet and U.S. strategic forces cannot be accomplished quickly. Nor do we seek mirror image force structures with the U.S.S.R. We do, however, insist that any agreement substantially reduce the number of ballistic missile warheads and redress a serious disparity in missile throw-weight.

Fundamentally, the disagreement over these issues revolves around the question of whether a future agreement will allow the Soviets to maintain their 3 to 1 advantage in ballistic missile capability of strategic weapons. The best measurement of such capability is throw-weight, which constitutes the total weight of warheads a missile is capable of delivering to a target together with its associated targeting devices. Past agreements allowed the Soviets a superiority in ballistic missile throw-weight on grounds that their technology lagged behind ours. Whatever the merits of that argument then, it has no validity now, since the Soviets have caught up and even surpassed us in many areas of missile technology. The Soviet advantage in throw-weight has allowed them to deploy over 6,000 large and highly accurate warheads on their ICBMs. This gives the Soviets a massive and highly

Raising the nuclear threshold in Europe, in concert with increased strategic nuclear stability, reduces Soviet incentives to stimulate or exploit crises and, therefore, reduces the risk of nuclear war.

destabilizing advantage in their ability to attack "hardened targets" quickly. Such hardened targets include missile silos, command posts and the like. This means that the Soviet Union has the only genuine first-strike force in the world today, a situation which will not change when we deploy the MX, since the number we plan to deploy would be objectively insufficient for a first strike on the Soviet Union. The United States, of course, has never had and never will have any intention of using its strategic nuclear weapons in a first strike. Consequently, we must effectively refuse Soviet claims that the MX will even give us the potential of doing so.

The INF Connection

Another major area of disagreement between the United States and the U.S.S.R. concerns the relationship between limits on strategic and intermediate-range systems. The Soviets attempted to link the START and INF negotiations by conditioning the reductions they proposed in START to no deployments of Pershing II intermediate-range ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs). The Soviets claimed that U.S. systems deployed in Europe—which they call "forward-based systems"—have strategic significance because they can strike the U.S.S.R. We pointed out that these U.S. systems did not meet the previously agreed criteria for intercontinental weapons. In SALT II, an ICBM, for example, was defined as a land-based ballistic missile of over 5,500 kilometer range. Moreover, the United States and the Soviet Union were negotiating on Pershing IIs and GLCMs—along with equivalent Soviet missiles—in the INF talks. Absent an INF agreement, however, NATO was determined to deploy U.S. missiles to counter the threat presented by the much larger numbers of Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles, a threat which continues to grow as the Soviets deploy even more SS-20s.

At the heart of this Soviet position is a concept they call "equality and equal security." At first glance, this seems to be an unexceptional, if vague, formula. However, as the Soviets envision it, "equality and equal security" appears to be nothing less than an insistence of a Soviet "right" to possess nuclear forces equal to those of all other nuclear powers combined. In other words, it is a prescription for Soviet global hegemony.

I do not want to get into a detailed discussion of the INF negotiations. Let me simply point out that in INF, as in START, the United States negotiated seriously and flexibly, making every effort to take account of legitimate Soviet concerns. Unfortunately, all our efforts foundered on the inflexible Soviet insistence on retaining a monopoly of longer range INF missiles. In essence, the Soviet position in INF was aimed at undermining NATO's ability to defend itself.

Faced with Soviet unwillingness to consider a balanced INF agreement, NATO had no choice but to proceed with deploying Pershing IIs and GLCMs. We stressed, however, our willingness to continue the negotiations even after deployments began and to remove these missiles if a balanced agreement could be achieved. We also pointed out that, since the initiation of the INF negotiations, the U.S.S.R. had deployed about 100 SS-20s—with some 300 warheads—in addition to the 270 SS-20s already in place when the talks began.

Impact on the NATO Alliance

The Soviets are clearly testing Western resolve. Their hope is that the absence of negotiations will impel the West to make one-sided concessions to draw the Soviets back to the negotiating table. So far, I am happy to state, this Soviet gambit has failed.

Let me stress my strong support for the NATO alliance. I have been involved in NATO affairs for almost 30 years. As special assistant in the mid-1950s to Gen. Lemnitzer, who was then the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, I witnessed the wrenching debate the alliance went through in its initial efforts to devise a common military strategy. The alliance emerged from that debate all the stronger. The nations of the alliance share a common political, economic, and cultural heritage which links our destinies closely together. The ability of free people in Western Europe and the United States to question the policies of their elected governments constitutes the bedrock of our common heritage and represents one of our greatest assets. The alliance could not have survived this long if it could not change in response to changing circumstances. The democratic process followed in NATO represents the best way to allow new ideas to be developed, debated, and, if found desirable, carried out in practice.

If this process is to work, however, it demands an honest examination of our current circumstances, including a willingness to face unpleasant facts. We cannot allow our satisfaction with 35 years of joint effort in successfully deterring aggression to blind us to the new political and military realities NATO faces.

First, the Soviet threat continues to grow. In recent years the Soviets have made major efforts to reduce the qualitative edge in weaponry on which NATO has traditionally relied to offset massive Soviet quantitative advantages. In addition, the growing global reach of Soviet military power has given Moscow the capability to threaten vital alliance interests in areas outside Western Europe, such as the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.

Second, NATO's military strategy is being questioned. For the past two decades, NATO policy for deterring attack on Western Europe has rested on its strategy of flexible response. This policy is now being challenged by some who believe that the costs of using nuclear weapons—if it would ever come to that—would be out of all proportion to any conceivable benefit.

The overwhelming majority of Europeans and Americans support a strong NATO. Some Europeans, however, assert that within the alliance framework, European interests would best be served by steering a middle course between the the two superpowers. At the same time, some Americans urge the United States to place less emphasis on its Atlantic ties and to direct more attention elsewhere. The former position hints of a return to pre-World War II appeasement; the latter of pre-World War II isolationism. Both are wrong.

The existence of differences between the United States and its European allies is neither new nor particularly surprising. NATO is an alliance of sovereign nations. It is not, after all, the Warsaw Pact. Moreover, in the broad sweep of historical perspective, the existence of an alliance of sovereign nations for over 35 years may well be unprecedented.

Within a number of European nations, the events surrounding deployment of NATO INF missiles stimulated a broader debate on questions of nuclear strategy. In reality, the debate among Europeans over the missiles highlights the importance of this issue to the defense of Europe. By enhancing the credibility of nuclear deterrent, the INF deployment is designed to protect the values of liberty, democracy, and humanity which all Europeans would agree mark the difference between Western Europe and its totalitarian

adversary to the East; values which Western Europe has done so much to create and to spread throughout the world.

The political challenge facing the alliance is compounded by changes in European perception of the United States, due in part to the fact that the leaders who were present at the creation of NATO are passing from the scene. They personally experienced the liberation of Europe at the end of the Second World War and helped plan U.S. assistance to Europe in the early postwar years. The place of the older generation in positions of influence in Western Europe is being taken by what is often called the "successor generation." This later generation entered into active political life during the 1960s; their initial perceptions of the United States were often formed during the difficult years of Vietnam and Watergate.

In the years ahead, we will need to devote more energies to ensuring that our common political heritage and mutual goals are better understood and more solidly supported. This will require more effort on both sides of the Atlantic to understanding the different perspectives which Europeans and Americans bring to the alliance. To take one example drawn from my experience as START negotiator, the alliance has developed a pattern of close and regular briefings and consultations, a process that has been very effective in ensuring that European concerns are factored into our bilateral negotiations.

As we chart the course of the alliance over the coming years, I believe we must keep in mind several basic propositions.

First, the democratic traditions and national independence of the Western community are worth defending. We can take comfort in the fact that there is little disagreement on this point.

Second, the defense of our liberties will require sacrifices. These sacrifices must be borne equally by all members of the community. As President Reagan said recently, the defense of Western Europe is vital to U.S. security, and the United States will continue to do its part in our common defense. At the same time, the United States cannot be expected to attach greater importance to the security of Europe than Europeans do themselves. The nations of Western Europe can, and should, do more to defend themselves.

Third, it is imperative for the alliance to devote more attention to improving its conventional defense capability. The desirability of reducing our reliance on nuclear weapons is one lesson we can learn from the antinuclear protestors who filled the streets of Europe last autumn. But if NATO is ever to reduce its dependence on nuclear weapons, it must have a better capability to deter a Soviet attack on Western Europe through conventional means.

If we fail to improve the serious imbalance between NATO's conventional defensive capability and the conventional capability of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union may be tempted to commit aggression with its conventional forces or to increase its efforts to intimidate the nations of Western Europe. Thus, upgrading NATO's conventional forces is not only urgent, but it is compatible with our arms control proposals.

Fortunately, we are now presented with a window of opportunity for enhancing the alliance's conventional capability by the introduction of new technology. These improvements could enhance the alliance's ability to deter Soviet conventional attack and, by raising the nuclear threshold, would reduce the possibility of a devastating nuclear war.

Without going into detail, let me refer you to the recent "European Security Study" report on strengthening conventional deterrence in Europe. This report highlighted five critical areas for improving defense and deterrence by NATO. These areas are:

- Countering an initial Warsaw Pact attack;
- Eroding Soviet air power;
- Attacking Warsaw Pact follow-on forces;
- Disrupting Warsaw Pact command and control; and
- Improving NATO command and control.

We should welcome, therefore, the decision at the last meeting of NATO defense ministers to consider ways in which emerging technology could be applied. I urge the alliance to proceed in these areas as rapidly as possible. At the same time, we must avoid becoming the captive of past ways of thinking. Thus, developing the ability to successfully attack communications and logistics facilities deep in the enemy's rear would not, as is sometimes charged, represent a change in the defensive orientation of NATO. Rather, it would constitute a recognition that successful defense would be enhanced by an ability to disrupt the second echelon of the enemy offensive before it reaches the battlefront. We should avoid adopting a Maginot Line philosophy; that philosophy did not work in the 1940s, and it could not work in the 1980s or 1990s either. In any case, emerging technologies can be applied to the entire range of military tasks to counter the Soviet threat.

The United States, of course, has never had and never will have any intention of using its strategic nuclear weapons in a first strike.

Increased use of advanced technology would allow the NATO alliance to exploit one of our greatest advantages over the Soviet bloc. In exploiting this advantage, however, we must be careful to avoid excessive reliance on "gadgets" and trap ourselves into the mistaken belief that these new weapons could allow us to defend with fewer soldiers. As an infantry officer with service in three wars, I am convinced that nothing will ever eliminate the need for sizable numbers of soldiers on the ground, with their unique capability to seize and hold terrain. However, if our soldiers are given proper recognition of their importance, their effectiveness can be improved with modern technology. They can be given more hope of successfully defending against an attack. In short, our soldiers in NATO are outnumbered and must be assured that they can make up for their smaller numbers with the better weapons which advanced technology of the West can provide.

In this connection, it is important that we give more than lip service to ensuring that all members of the alliance share in the arms procurement process for such advanced technology weapons. Too often our plans for technological improvements have foundered over our inability to resolve this thorny problem.

Our current opportunity for improving NATO's conventional capabilities and thereby reducing the risk of nuclear war should not be missed because of our inability to cope with the problem of procurement sharing.

In strengthening NATO's conventional capability we must recognize that as long as nuclear weapons exist, they will be a factor in the defense of the alliance. This means that the United States will, for the foreseeable future, have an important role to play in the defense of Western Europe.

Only the United States has the capability to maintain sufficient nuclear forces to deter the Soviets across the entire range of theater and strategic threats. The fact that U.S. strategic forces will remain NATO's ultimate deterrent means that an American officer should remain at the head of NATO's military command. No doubt, there are many ways in which NATO's political and military structure can be improved to increase European participation. However, appointing a European to the post of SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe] is not one of the ways in which NATO's structure should be changed. It would be a grave mistake to do so.

Lessons Learned From Negotiating With the Soviets

Turning from START and alliance issues, let me discuss some of the lessons I have learned from 10 years of negotiating strategic arms control with the Soviets. The first lesson is that the wide differences in the historical and cultural experiences of the United States and the Soviet Union have a direct impact on our respective approaches to negotiations. Americans tend to be idealistic, activist, and pragmatic in our approach to problemsolving. We are often impatient. If one approach does not work, we try another.

Conditioned by their Russian heritage, however, the Soviets take a longer view. Although they can be flexible on tactics, their long-term objectives seldom vary. Above all, they are remarkably patient.

The Russian language has no native root for the word "compromise"; the word has been derived from other languages. To Soviet negotiators, compromise carries a distinctly pejorative connotation, one more associated with "weakness" or "capitulation" than with the Western connotation of "sensible" or "reasonable."

These differences in Soviet and American negotiating style have both positive and negative features. On the positive side, the American orientation toward problemsolving means that most of the breakthroughs in arms control negotiations have come about as a result of U.S. initiatives. On the other hand, our impatience has, on repeated occasions, allowed the Soviets to outlast us. A common Soviet tactic is to react, not initiate. As long as the United States keeps coming up with new proposals, the Soviets sit back patiently until one appears that they like.

It is particularly important that we remember this Soviet tactic now. In both START and INF, the United States has made a good faith effort to take account of Soviet concerns. We are prepared to continue to negotiate on that basis. But we cannot make unilateral concessions designed solely to lure the Soviets back to the negotiating table.

The second lesson is that even though our two nations differ in ideology, in historical experience, in moral values, and in negotiating style, we share one important common objective: a mutual desire to avoid nuclear war. We must, therefore, continue to negotiate with one another toward this common objective.

As long as the Soviet Union remains determined to expand its power and influence at the expense of legitimate Western interests, the United States and the Soviet Union will be rivals. Arms control will not end that rivalry which stems from the very nature of the Soviet system. Arms control can, however, make the rivalry less dangerous. It can add a measure of predictability to the U.S.-Soviet relationship and place some bounds on the competition.

A corollary to this second lesson is that arms control is an important element of our foreign policy and thus cannot be divorced from the general climate of U.S.-Soviet relations. Arms control cannot by itself turn around a climate of relations which Soviet actions have soured. Nor, in the final analysis, would it be realistic to expect the United States and the Soviet Union to be able to conclude far-reaching arms control agreements at a time when relations are at a low point. At such times, our first priority must be to repair the basic fabric of the relationship, to set the stage for further arms control.

A third lesson is that we must be realistic about the military benefits of strategic arms control. Balanced arms control agreements can improve stability. But arms control agreements can never, by themselves, substitute for the determination of free people to maintain the ability to deter Soviet aggression. Indeed, such determination is a vital prerequisite for any effective arms control agreement with the U.S.S.R. This is a central paradox of arms control negotiations, a paradox not well understood by many Western critics. If we are to negotiate arms control agreements with the U.S.S.R., we must not appear to be overly eager for an arms control agreement. We must be able to convince the Soviets not only that they will be better off with an agreement, but that they will be worse off without one. Put another way, if we want to be in a position to negotiate arms reductions with the Soviets, we first have to convince them that we have the will to match them in the absence of an agreement.

At the same time, we have to recognize that arms control agreements must be based on existing military realities. One of these realities is the difference in the structure of U.S. and Soviet strategic forces. An arms control agreement can be useful in closing off dangerous areas of competition and in encouraging trends which lead toward greater stability of the U.S.-Soviet military relationship. However, we should not delude ourselves into thinking that an arms control agreement will free us from the responsibility of taking care of our own security. Moreover, arms control agreements by themselves will not necessarily result in major savings in defense spending. Both the United States and the Soviet Union maintain large, complex, and expensive strategic forces. They will undoubtedly continue to do so after any conceivable strategic arms control agreement.

An arms control agreement should improve the stability of the strategic balance in two important ways.

First, it should inhibit the deployment of large numbers of strategic offensive weapons capable of being used in a first strike.

Second, it should encourage the deployment of survivable and retaliatory systems.

Achieving an agreement which improves the stability of the strategic balance calls for the necessity of recognizing that not all reductions have an equally beneficial impact on strategic stability. The SALT II Treaty, painfully negotiated over a period of 7 years, would have required a reduction of

about 300 Soviet strategic missiles or bombers. One of its most important shortcomings, however, was that it permitted a massive increase in the numbers of ballistic missile warheads. The Soviets were able to use their throw-weight advantage to deploy such massive numbers of large, highly accurate nuclear warheads that they are in a position to threaten the destruction of a large part of the U.S. ICBM force with only a small portion of their own strategic forces.

It is evident, therefore, that only an agreement which limits in a verifiable manner both the number and the destructive power of ballistic missile warheads can genuinely improve the stability of the strategic balance.

Stability, survivability, and modernization are interrelated, particularly in view of the different way the United States and the U.S.S.R. have chosen to structure their strategic forces. Historically, the Soviet Union has deployed the bulk of its strategic forces in land-based ICBMs. Nevertheless, the Soviets recognize that their ICBMs will become more vulnerable as the United States begins to redress its current asymmetries by deploying modern, more capable systems. The Soviets, therefore, are already planning to deploy a portion of their ICBMs in a mobile basing mode. The United States, even though it has a smaller portion of its total forces in land-based systems, also recognizes the decreased vulnerability of moving to mobile land-based systems.

Mobile ICBMs demonstrate what may become an increasingly difficult problem for arms control in the coming years: their verifiability. Mobile ICBMs must be effectively verified. Otherwise they could be extremely destabilizing because the opposing side might have no real idea of the magnitude of the threat it faces.

Cruise missiles present a similar dilemma. Because of their long flight time, cruise missiles are inherently retaliatory weapons. Yet cruise missiles, because of their small size and because they can be deployed in a variety of basing modes, are difficult to verify.

The United States has a number of serious concerns about Soviet failure to comply with previous arms control agreements. We will continue to press these concerns with the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels and insist upon explanations, clarifications, and corrective actions. At the same time, the United States is continuing to carry out its own obligations and commitments under relevant agreements.

We should recognize, however, that ensuring compliance with arms control agreements remains a serious problem. Better verification and compliance provisions and better treaty drafting will help, and we are working toward this in ongoing negotiations. It is fundamentally important, however, that the Soviets take a constructive attitude toward compliance.

Future arms control agreements will, accordingly, require more effective verification measures than in past agreements. In particular, a START agreement will require cooperative verification measures, possibly including some form of onsite inspection, to supplement national technical means.

Conclusion

With the talks in limbo for over 6 months, the natural question is where do we go from here? Discussion of this question has to begin with a few basic facts.

First, it was the Soviet Union and not the United States which interrupted the negotiations. The United States is ready to resume the negotiations at any time without preconditions. We have repeatedly made this point to the Soviets, both in public and in private channels.

Second, the United States has good positions on the table in START and INF. We believe an agreement based on our proposals will serve the interest of both nations.

Third, any negotiation is a process of give-and-take. As I noted earlier, we have already modified our initial position to take account of several of the Soviets' major concerns. We have also told the Soviets that, in an effort to reach a mutually acceptable accord, we are ready to explore trade-offs between areas of U.S. and Soviet advantage. Specifically, the United States is prepared to limit its advantage in heavy bomber capabilities in return for equivalent Soviet limits on its advantage in ballistic missile capabilities. We have a number of concrete ideas in mind on how the concept of trade-offs might be applied in START, and we are ready to explore them with the Soviets in some detail once the Soviets decide to resume the negotiations.

But it takes two to negotiate, and, accordingly, the natural next question is what do the Soviets intend to do? As a longtime student of Soviet affairs, I recognize the pitfalls in attempting to predict Soviet actions.

One reason why the Soviets are not negotiating is the uncertain situation in the Soviet hierarchy. In the past year and a half, the Soviets have experienced two changes of leadership. In the not too distant future, they may face yet another leadership turnover.

Chernenko's accession to power represented a victory for the conservative old guard, the small group of men who have stood at the top of the Soviet Government since the Brezhnev era. They show little inclination to undertake the innovative or imaginative measures which would be required to resolve the serious internal problems facing the Soviet Union. In the economy, to take one example, Chernenko appears to be backpedaling from even the relatively modest innovations which Andropov sought to introduce. In the time-honored style of Soviet bureaucrats, Chernenko apparently seeks to resolve Soviet economic problems by tinkering with the administrative apparatus rather than by undertaking the far-reaching structural changes which most observers believe are required.

In foreign policy, likewise, the watchword of the Chernenko regime is continuity. It would be wrong, however, to conclude that this accent on continuity will prevent the Soviets from carrying out an effective foreign policy.

The Russian language has no native root for the word "compromise"; . . . To Soviet negotiators, compromise carries a distinctly pejorative connotation, one more associated with "weakness" or "capitulation" than with the Western connotation of "sensible" or "reasonable."

The Soviets recognize that they lost the first round of the INF contest. However, they are far from ready to admit that the game is over. Having failed to block initial deployments, the Soviets hope to force us to pay a high political price for proceeding with further scheduled deployments.

Through their adamant stand against any NATO INF deployments and by appearing to make the withdrawal of these missiles a precondition for the resumption of negotiations, the Soviets have, in effect, painted themselves into a corner. For the present, the Soviets seem disinclined to take any actions to get themselves out of this situation. It would be a mistake for us to make unilateral concessions simply to get the talks resumed. The West should, however, refrain from actions which could make it more difficult for the Soviets to extract themselves from their corner. But as the President has said: "The door is open and every once in a while we're standing in the doorway to see if anyone's coming up the steps."

The Soviets, for the time being, are continuing to use their deployments as well as ours as a basis for creating an atmosphere of crisis around East-West relations. They have blamed the United States for the breakdown of the negotiations and have claimed that NATO INF deployments make war more likely. In fact, the opposite is true. NATO INF deployments, by increasing its ability to deter Soviet attack, actually increase the prospects for lasting peace.

In calling for a rollback in NATO INF deployments, without any reduction in the threat that Soviet SS-20 missiles and other nuclear forces present to Europe, the Soviets are, in effect, denying any legitimacy to the security concerns of Western Europe. The Soviet objective is clear. They are attempting to decouple the United States from the defense of Europe and to pressure the Western alliance in an effort to extract one-sided concessions. At the same time, the Soviets are using the unwarranted argument that the NATO INF deployments are responsible for a change in the strategic situation between the United States and the U.S.S.R.

It is my belief that in these circumstances, NATO must do two things. First, it must continue to exhibit firmness in the face of Soviet pressure tactics. Second, it must seize the opportunity that new weapons technology makes possible to upgrade its conventional military capability in Europe.

We in the United States continue to modernize our strategic forces and will continue to hold out the prospects for negotiations.

I believe that eventually the Soviets will recognize that it is in their interest to return to the negotiating table. What is necessary is a political decision by the Soviets which recognizes that the time for posturing is over and the time for serious negotiations is long overdue. When the Soviets make that decision, they will find us ready. ■

Preserving Freedom and Security

by Kenneth W. Dam

Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 13, 1984. Mr. Dam is Deputy Secretary of State.[1]

No issue is of greater importance to the Administration or to the American people than war and peace. As President Reagan has said, "We must both defend freedom and preserve the peace. We must stand true to our principles and friends while preventing a holocaust." There is no escaping this dual responsibility. Indeed, the task of preserving our freedom and security has never been more important or more complex than it is today.

A sound national security policy rests on the conviction that, whatever our differences, the United States and the Soviet Union have a profound common interest in avoiding nuclear war and its unimaginable consequences. A responsible national security policy must include both a firm resolve to maintain deterrent forces and an active pursuit of arms control to restrain competition. That is our policy.

Arms control is not a panacea for our problems around the world. It is one facet of our relationship with the Soviet Union, albeit a very important one.

It is useful to keep in mind what nuclear arms control can and cannot do. Arms control cannot:

- Eliminate the threat of nuclear war. Nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented;
- Save vast amounts of money. Nuclear forces constitute about 15% of the budget of the Defense Department;
- Substantially reduce casualties or damage should a nuclear war occur. A small number of weapons can do catastrophic damage.

Arms control, however, can:

- Substantially reduce nuclear forces.
- If approached properly (that is, if the constraints encourage an evolution toward smaller, more survivable, and more stable forces on both sides), arms control can enhance stability and reduce the risk of war.

We must bear in mind that progress in arms control requires good faith bargaining on both sides and also depends on many factors beyond the substance of our proposals. For arms control to succeed, we must work to shape the conditions that make success possible: we must maintain the balance of power and ensure the strength of our alliances even as we recognize the legitimate security concerns of our adversaries.

Modernization of our military forces is an important—and essential—element of our approach to preserving the balance and creating an environment in which arms control can be successful. As you know, during the past decade or more, Soviet military expenditures have, in many vital categories, far outstripped our own. The President's modernization program is designed to restore the balance, enhance deterrence, and increase Soviet incentives to negotiate equitable, verifiable arms control agreements. Modernization is, thus, an integral part of our national security policy that includes both effective deterrence and effective arms control.

In all of the many arms control efforts this Administration has undertaken, we are guided by four objectives.

Reductions. We seek agreements that actually constrain the military capabilities of the parties through substantial reductions in weapons and forces, not merely freezing them at existing or higher levels.

Equality. The final result should be equal or equivalent levels of forces on both sides. An agreement that legitimizes unequal forces creates instability which could unravel the agreement and may, over time, increase the risk of conflict.

Stability. An agreement must improve the stability of deterrence in a crisis. If each side's forces are secure enough to survive an all-out attack, the incentive to preempt in a crisis or confrontation will be minimized. This is an important message of the bipartisan Scowcroft commission's report on the future of our strategic forces.

Verifiability. Finally, arms control agreements must be effectively verifiable. In the past, agreements for which compliance cannot be verified have generated mistrust and suspicion rather than reinforced the prospects with greater stability. The President's January report to Congress finding Soviet violations or probable violations of several arms control agreements underscores the need for effective verification.

Building on these four principles, this Administration has undertaken an unprecedented range of arms control negotiations across the whole spectrum of East-West security issues. As part of our effort to create an environment conducive to successful negotiations, the Administration has adopted a policy of not taking actions that would undercut existing strategic arms agreements, provided the Soviet Union exercises equal restraint. This continues to be our policy.

Let me turn now to several of the more significant subjects.

Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

The major goal of our approach to strategic arms control is to enhance stability and reduce the risk of war through significant reductions in U.S. and Soviet ballistic missile forces, particularly ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles]. As you are well aware, these systems can present special problems. Reduced reliance on ICBMs—especially large MIRVed [multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle] ICBMs—would directly diminish the incentive for one side to use its nuclear weapons first in a crisis against elements of the other side's strategic deterrent.

Thus, the heart of our position in START [strategic arms reduction talks] is a substantial reduction in the number of ballistic missile warheads. After close consultation with Congress, we have proposed to accomplish these reductions by means of a "build-down," where each side reduces more weapons than it deploys until the agreed limit is reached.

In addition, we have been sensitive to Soviet concerns that our position requires extensive restructuring of their strategic force. Consequently, over the past year we made several modifications to our original proposal. We tabled a draft treaty that collapsed the two phases envisioned in our original proposal into a single agreement, making clear that all systems would be limited from the outset. We also demonstrated flexibility and solicited Soviet ideas on how to reduce the current large disparity in ballistic missile throw-weight. Finally, the President has communicated our willingness to negotiate trade-offs between areas of comparative U.S. and Soviet advantage.

Soviet responsiveness to our concerns over the course of five rounds of negotiation has been less than we would have liked, but they have taken some positive steps. While our positions remain far apart, the Soviets have indicated their willingness to discuss reductions in their nuclear delivery vehicles and have offered some changes in their own position. For the most part, however, the Soviet proposals are designed to allow them to retain their advantage in ballistic missile destructive power and even to increase the number of their ballistic missile warheads.

We believe our proposal for trade-offs could pave the way for future progress. But, unfortunately, the Soviets tied progress in START to preventing INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] deployments in Europe. Last December, they refused to agree to a resumption date for START, apparently due to frustration over their failure to prevent the deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs [ground-launched cruise missiles]. What is needed now is for the Soviets to return to the negotiating table. It is in their interest as well as ours.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

Our proposals in negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces further underscore our commitment to the goal of reductions in nuclear weapons. The President's objective in these negotiations, familiar to all, was even more far reaching than in START—to eliminate an entire category of missiles on a global basis. When the Soviet Union found this approach too far reaching, we proposed an interim solution whereby we would significantly reduce our planned deployments if the Soviet Union would reduce its SS-4s, 5s, and 20s to an equal number of warheads. However, the Soviets rejected this interim approach as well, since any outcome which would allow the deployment of a single U.S. intermediate-range missile is inconsistent with their policy of maintaining a monopoly of such missiles in Europe and Asia. We again modified our position several times during 1983 to take account of express Soviet concerns regarding Pershing II, aircraft limitations, and global constraints.

Nevertheless, the Soviets remained intransigent on preserving their monopoly of these missiles. Every Soviet proposal permits none for the United States. Their final idea, proffered immediately prior to breaking off negotiations, would have had each side reduce actual or planned deployments by 572 warheads—thus leaving them 700 warheads and the United States zero.

The Soviet Union attributed its walkout to the initiation of the U.S. deployment of INF missiles in Europe. There is no justification for the Soviet walkout. We negotiated in good faith despite the fact that during the 2 years of negotiation the Soviet Union deployed over 100 new SS-20 missiles with more than 300 warheads. Moreover, many U.S. nuclear weapons have been and are in the process of being withdrawn from Europe under decisions taken by NATO ministers in 1979 and 1983. By the time our INF deployments are complete, more than five warheads will have been withdrawn for every new one deployed.

We are ready to resume negotiations—in both START and INF—at any time and place, without preconditions. Our proposals are fair and workable. All the elements for an agreement are on the table. We hope the Soviet Union will come to recognize that its policy of non-negotiation and countermeasures is not intimidating Western publics.

Nuclear Testing

On nuclear testing limitations, the Administration determined that the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and its companion, the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, are not effectively verifiable in their present form. On a number of occasions last year, we approached the Soviets and invited them to discuss with us verification improvements to these accords. Each time, the U.S.S.R. rebuffed our request for talks. We remain determined to make progress in this area, but our efforts have been made much more difficult by the Soviet attitude. Possible next steps on this issue are under active review.

Space Arms Control

The United States has long been committed to the exploration and use of space for peaceful purposes. We played a leading role in formulating the considerable body of international law regarding space. The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, and the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched Into Outer Space of 1968 are notable examples. The Charter of the United Nations also includes provisions germane to outer space.

The United States does not seek an arms race in space, nor do we underestimate the current and potential future threat of Soviet antisatellite weapons. The Administration has been seriously studying the question of whether constraints on space weapons or activities could be found that would be equitable, verifiable, and compatible with U.S. security. The President's report on U.S. policy on controlling antisatellite weapons, sent to Congress in April, provides the initial findings of this study. We are continuing on an urgent basis our studies to see whether acceptable measures banning or limiting specific weapons systems can be identified.

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR)

In addition to our efforts to reduce nuclear weapons, we and our allies have continued discussions with the Warsaw Pact nations on the mutual and balanced reduction of conventional forces in central Europe. The United States is playing a constructive role, broadening the scope of the East-West arms control agenda and pursuing reductions in conventional forces to lower, equal levels. The major stumbling block for some time has been the discrepancy between the manpower figures provided by the Warsaw Pact and our estimates of those forces. We, with our NATO allies, recently proposed a new initiative designed to resolve this problem, which we hope will lead to serious negotiations on verifiable reductions to parity. The initial Soviet response, however, is not encouraging.

Chemical Weapons

Our major challenge in the area of chemical weapons is to reestablish the longstanding code of restraint against the use of chemical weapons. The United States seeks the total elimination of chemical weapons. In April, Vice President Bush presented to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva a draft treaty for a comprehensive ban on their development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use. The draft treaty also contains innovative verification provisions that we hope the Soviet Union will be willing to address. We firmly believe that the chemical weapons problem demands a radical solution, and we are prepared to go forth with one.

Confidence-Building Measures

Complementing our proposals to reduce nuclear and conventional forces, we are proposing confidence-building measures designed to reduce the risk of war as the result of surprise attack, accident, or miscalculation. Over the last year, we and the Soviets have held a series of constructive meetings on upgrading the "hotline," the direct communications link between Washington and Moscow.

In START and in INF, we have made a number of proposals, such as for prior notification of ballistic missile launches and major military exercises and expanded exchanges of military force data.

In the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe, the United States, with its allies, is pursuing additional measures on notification and inspection of military exercises. The Soviet Union has not accepted these proposals, focusing instead on a declaration of the non-use of force. As the President said in Dublin:

> If discussions on reaffirming the principle not to use force, a principle in which we believe so deeply, will bring the Soviet Union to negotiate agreements which will give concrete, new meaning to that principle, we will gladly enter into such discussions.

Lastly, both East and West are already routinely exchanging notification of exercises that might be otherwise misinterpreted. We believe these practices should be broadened and made mandatory.

Conclusion

Ultimate success in these arms control efforts will depend on a number of factors: credible deterrent forces, a strong alliance, and a willingness to work together to conclude balanced and effective agreements which safeguard each nation's interests. But these conditions will, in turn, depend on the qualities that we as a nation bring to the negotiating table: patience, perseverance, and unity. Just as cohesion among allies is crucial to the West's position in such negotiations as INF and MBFR, unity in this country is critical to progress in all these negotiations. If we appear divided, the Soviets will conclude that they can accomplish at least some of their objectives without negotiations, without compromise, and without constraints on their forces. On the other hand, constructive bipartisan support of our arms control proposals and strategic modernization programs will advance the prospects for arms control.

President Reagan has often spoken of his desire to build a constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. His approach is based on credible deterrence, peaceful competition, and constructive cooperation. Unfortunately, the Soviets have not yet taken up this challenge. The shrill tenor of recent Soviet statements directed toward the United States is disappointing. While we have shown flexibility in both our INF and START proposals and have made clear we will meet the Soviets half way should they return to Geneva, they still refuse to reestablish the nuclear arms control dialogue. Success in arms control will require substantial changes in the Soviet approach.

We continue to express our willingness to resume these negotiations any time, without preconditions. We have no intention of sacrificing our basic objectives of reductions, equality, stability, and verification. Yet we realize there may be more than one way to achieve these objectives, and the President has made clear that there is flexibility in our approach. We stand ready; we have taken the first step. Now it is up to the Soviets to respond.

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[1]The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Steel: Domestic Industry in a Global Market

by W. Allen Wallis

Address before the Convention of the Iron and Steel Society of the American Institute of Metallurgical Engineers in Chicago on April 2, 1984. Mr. Wallis is Under Secretary for Economic Affairs.

I may say more about steel than about foreign policy, but this group should not object if I do that. My comments will be based on some principles of a free-enterprise, market economy. These principles are accepted widely on faith but often violated in practice. My remarks will fall into three categories: history, economics, and international politics.

First, I will review briefly some recent history of government-industry relations, especially government interventions in the affairs of the steel industries here and abroad. Then I will explore some major economic problems that have arisen in the steel industry as a result of government intervention. Finally, I will look at some of the major international political problems facing our domestic steel industry, and the Reagan Administration's responses.

The Dismal History of Government-Steel Industry Relations

The recent history of the relations between our government and the steel industry is instructive; but, like lots of instruction, it is painful.

In 1952 the Federal Wage Stabilization Board made recommendations for a new contract between the major steel companies and the United Steelworkers. The companies refused to accept the wage board's proposals, and the union called a strike. President Truman issued an executive order seizing the steel plants, and the Secretary of Commerce was made responsible for operating them. Fortunately, the Supreme Court reversed the President's action a month later. Labor and management eventually worked out an agreement.

In 1962, after a wage settlement dominated by the government, Roger Blough, the president of U.S. Steel, announced a price increase. The announcement moved President Kennedy to excoriate Blough publicly, to initiate antitrust investigations against the steel companies, to launch examinations of the personal tax returns of steel executives, to have the FBI rouse newspaper reporters out of bed in the middle of the night for questioning, and generally to loose all of the vast powers of the government for a purpose which, as I said in a speech in Pittsburgh shortly after the event, was "... entirely outside the law. Since the powers he used ...," I said, "are perfectly legal, redress through the courts [such as was obtained after President Truman's action] is probably impossible and certainly improbable." Needless to say, the industry yielded to this authoritarian intimidation and coercion.

Thus began a pattern which has led to wages and benefits for steel workers far higher than in most other industries. In addition to government pressures on wages, or perhaps because of the results of those pressures, there have been significant restrictions on imports of steel during 9 of the last 16 years. We have had so-called "voluntary" export restraints by our major steel suppliers; we have had trigger-price mechanisms I and II; we have had a surge-monitoring mechanism; we have had a special arrangement with the European Community. These devices, conceived as temporary, did not solve the industry's problems, well intentioned though they were.

At this moment, we face two new major initiatives for protection against steel imports. In one, Bethlehem Steel and the United Steelworkers have filed a petition for protection under Title II, Section 203 of the Trade Act of 1974. This is a legitimate step under our laws, and I want to emphasize that I am in no way criticizing it. The U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) will decide in early June whether steel imports have been a significant cause of serious injury to our steel industry and, if so, will recommend action to the President in early July. It would be inappropriate for me to comment on the merits of this case until the ITC has submitted its report and the President has made his decision.

But the other proposal is much more serious, and I have no hesitation in speaking out against it. In fact, I feel obliged to do so because the "Fair Trade in Steel Act" is dangerous to the health of the industry. The "Fair Trade in Steel Act" would limit steel imports to 15% of consumption. Whatever you think of that, listen to this: the act would require the industry to submit to the Secretary of Commerce an acceptable plan to invest "substantially all of the cash flow from the steel sector for reinvestment in, and the modernization of, the steel sector." The bill further provides for oversight of these plans by the Secretary of Commerce and requires him to make annual determinations as to whether the implementation of the investment plan is satisfactory.

If such a bill had been on the books a couple of years ago, the diversification which most major steel companies have embarked upon could not have taken place. If the bill is enacted, the industry will cede to the government effective control over investment decisions—precisely the situation in state-owned steel industries. This is bad enough on its face, but it is even worse that the statute would direct the industry's funds exclusively to steelmaking instead of allowing the individual firms to find the most remunerative uses of their funds. This kind of managed investment would not enable our firms to reduce costs to the level of those in countries like Korea. I urge any of you who have been sympathetic to the "Fair Trade in Steel Act" to take another look at it. It represents a threat of government industrial planning and direction that would kill forever any hope of vitality and strength in the steel industry.

Problems of Government Intervention

Whether it's the seizure of steel mills, the pillorying of steel company executives, or building trade barriers, government involvement in the affairs of the steel industry will not strengthen the steel industry but will only hurt the industry and the whole economy. Among the many reasons why this is true, I will single out three.

First, one of the laws of physics applies also to trade policy: every action generates an equal and opposite reaction. In the trade area I can't guarantee that the reaction will be equal, but I can guarantee that it will be opposite. And in trade matters, there are two opposite reactions, one domestic and one foreign. As Bethlehem Steel and the United Steelworkers make their case for import controls, the auto industry, the machine tool industry, the home appliance industry, the construction industry, and other users of steel will be making the case for unfettered trade in steel. Some of them will make the point that limits on imports of steel will increase their own production costs and make them less competitive with imports in their own sectors. Some spokesmen for the steel-consuming industries may take another tack and argue that the steel industry certainly needs

protection from import competition, but, of course, their industry will also need to be protected. And they will have a good point. The 19th-century humorist Ambrose Bierce in his *Devil's Dictionary* defined a tariff as a "tax on imports designed to protect the domestic producer against the greed of his consumer." This definition applies equally to quotas.

As to foreign reactions, we can be sure that any restrictions on our imports will be answered with restrictions on our exports. We, ourselves, retaliate for foreign restrictions on our exports, as we have a right to do under the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—the GATT. Other countries act the same way. When the cycle of action-reaction is completed, a competitive American exporter will find its profitability cut in order to pay for the protection given another domestic industry. For example, last year the United States imposed tariffs and quotas on imports of specialty steel. In reply, the European Community raised barriers to our exports of sporting equipment, fire and burglar alarms, and certain chemicals. What our import controls did was transfer benefits to the makers of specialty steel from the makers of chemicals, sporting goods, and alarms.

The second reason why government intervention will hurt the industry and the economy, not help them, is that government intervention will make the industry less competitive than it would be if left alone. There is a very dramatic difference between the average cost of labor in the American steel industry, reported by the American Iron and Steel Institute to be around $21 an hour, and the average cost of labor in other American manufacturing industries, reportedly from $10 to $12 an hour. (It is perhaps worth noting that the cost of labor in the steel sector in Japan is about $12 an hour, and in Korea it is about $4 an hour. To make matters worse, *The New York Times* recently reported that our steel mills require 13 man-hours to produce a ton of steel, whereas the comparable figure in Japan is 8.) I realize that the unions and companies in your industry have slashed labor costs by 19% in just 1 year; that was a truly remarkable achievement and merits strong commendation. But that $21 figure is also remarkable and not so commendable. When our steel firms return to profitability, as is generally expected later this year, there will be renewed pressures for wage increases.

It is my hope that whatever needs to be done with regard to labor costs in the U.S. steel industry will be done by the parties concerned without government intervention and certainly without the presumption that the U.S. Government will try to validate labor contracts by insulating steel producers from foreign competition. Note that I am not saying what, if anything at all, must be done; that is a judgment for the industry and the unions. But if steel firms decide that they cannot compete with wage costs as they are, they must be prepared to do what is necessary to change those costs in the give-and-take of collective bargaining with the unions. They should not ask government to pressure the unions or to penalize consumers or other industries.

My third reason why government intervention will hurt, not help, involves the relationship between import protection and industrial adjustment. It is popular to argue that if the government is going to restrict competition for the benefit of domestic producers (and the detriment of domestic consumers), then the government must ensure that domestic producers apply the "temporary" benefits to modernize and rationalize their particular industry. I have already described this phenomenon when I talked about the "Fair Trade in Steel Act." Normally, industries seeking protection are quick to give the government pledges of desire and intent to restructure. They say that they merely lack the profitability to do so without protection from imports. The restructuring plans never suggest the development of different lines of business, the steady phasedown of capacity in the protected industry, or the elimination of inefficient companies. In many instances, obviously, these are precisely the actions that would make the most sense. It is universally assumed (probably correctly) that an industry must persuade the government that it will do the same things better, rather than do new things, if it is to obtain protection from import competition. This means that protection not only extracts a price from consumers but also acts as a drag on the economy by lessening pressure for technological innovation, directing resources away from more productive sectors, and encouraging management to look to government, rather than the market, for guidance.

I want to be clear: I am aware of the fact that adjustment probably means a loss of jobs in some industries, but in a healthy economy that loss will be more than compensated in other sectors. I am conscious of the importance of the steel industry to our national defense, but adjustment is not terminal. What we need for a strong defense is a strong economy which can support the defense expenditures; we can't afford to debate guns or butter, nor do we need to. A healthy growing economy will provide guns and butter. For steel, in particular, our national defense requires an industry that is lean and mean, rational, efficient, and competitive in a truly global steel industry.

The World Steel Industry

Without doubt, steel is the quintessential example of global industry. The steel industry was a leading force in the rapid economic expansion that followed the Second World War. At the end of the war, about half of the world's steelmaking capacity was in the United States, but new steel plants soon were established in Europe and Japan and then in the developing countries, particularly in Asia and Latin America. By 1982, only about 13% of steelmaking capacity was in the United States, 16% was in Japan, and 19% was in the European Community; so about half of total world capacity was in the free world. The communist countries have only about 28% of world capacity. Among the developing countries, Latin America has about 15%, and the developing countries of Asia about 9%.

Not only is steel a global industry, but the steel market is a world market. As is true of other manufacturing industries, world steel production is gradually increasing in a number of developing countries, while production in Europe, the United States, and Japan is shrinking. This phenomenon has happened in other industries in the past, and it will happen in the future. Indeed, it is through this evolutionary process that the major industrial countries, including the United States, developed from exporters of raw materials only to major exporters of manufactured goods.

It is doubtless true that some developing countries have made uneconomic investments in steel and have unwisely channeled resources away from more productive sectors so that they could join the ranks of the steelmaking nations. It is, nevertheless, also true that a number of the developing countries have significant natural advantages, for example, rich deposits of iron ore and coal, cheap energy, and relatively inexpensive labor, which attract investments in steel. Steel capacity in the developing countries has doubled in the short period of 8 years. It has been estimated that during the next 2 years capacity in Latin America alone will increase another 15%.

The response of the developed countries to the rise in the production of steel by less developed countries has been gradually to reduce capacity and employ-

ment. The European Community employed 895,000 steelworkers in 1970 but by 1982 had reduced that figure by 409%. During the same period, the number of Japanese employed in the steel industry dropped by 19%. Peak employment in steel in the United States was 550,000 in 1977. By 1982 the number was barely half that, at 289,000. Most notable has been the adjustment undertaken in the United Kingdom, where the number of workers now employed in the steel industry is only 25% of what it was in 1970.

In the European Community the reduction of capacity in the steel sector has been directed by public authorities and subsidized with billions of dollars. Restructuring in the United States, however, is being carried out by the steel firms themselves without government interference and at no direct cost to the taxpayer. It is the decisions of your companies and your unions relating to investment, rationalization, modernization, diversification, labor relations, executive compensation, and the closure of inefficient facilities that have pointed the industry as a whole in the direction of renewed profitability.

The improving health of our steel industry is the best answer to those who say that the governments of the steel-producing countries should organize and manage world trade in steel. Trade in steel should continue to benefit from the impulse of the market and should not be exempted from the sound rules embodied in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Those industries that have not been subject to the healthy discipline of the GATT continue to experience overproduction brought about by subsidization and protection against competition from imports. The same fate awaits any industry that tries to establish a cartel or otherwise manage and control trade in its products. The economic health of the country can only suffer.

The Reagan Administration and the Steel Industry

The Reagan Administration will resist the cartelization of steel trade. It will also enforce the laws which neutralize any artificial competitive advantages of foreign firms, whether from government subsidies or from selling at prices below costs of production. If we could count on a perpetual flow of such foreign assistance, perhaps we could just relax and accept the "generosity" of foreign taxpayers. But we can be certain that subsidies and dumping would not continue if our industry were crippled, so we cannot allow that to happen. The neutralization of the artificial advantages is not protectionist; quite the contrary. Such measures enhance the efficiency of the market by "correcting" price distortions.

The United States participates actively in consultations on steel in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and in the work of the OECD Steel Committee.

In both the Steel Committee and the Committee on Export Credit, we will continue to press for an end to government subsidies in export financing and more specifically in the export of steel manufacturing facilities. If the buyers and sellers of steelmaking plants and equipment cannot raise the necessary funds for new investment on the international financial markets, the markets are telling them something. It is foolish and wasteful for developed countries to compete with each other to supply subsidized credit to build new steelmaking facilities which will not make profits adequate to cover the cost of capital on international markets.

I have been stressing the importance of keeping the government out of decisions which properly belong to the steel industry, but I do not want to convey the impression that the Reagan Administration is indifferent to the fate of the industry. When the Administration took office, spokesmen for the steel industry stressed that they faced four major problems: unfairly traded imports, high expenses for pollution control, disruptive taxation, and crippling constraints to sensible mergers. After 3 years of effort by the Administration, the situation is quite different—though not yet as different as we hope to make it.

First, on trade policy, we have scrupulously enforced our trade statutes and now have in effect a wide range of antidumping and countervailing duties on steel from many countries, including developing nations. It is sometimes charged that our laws against unfair trade are not enforced. I reject that charge; but I suggest that trade laws, no matter how meticulously enforced, cannot solve the basic problems facing your industry (or any other industry).

Second, our regulations for controlling pollution have been rationalized with a consequent reduction in costs to your companies. This is part of President Reagan's broader commitment to reform regulatory codes so that they are less burdensome to business and the economy.

Third, the Reagan Administration and the Congress have made giant strides in easing the tax burden on business. Depreciation schedules for the steel industry have been significantly shortened, with savings of millions of dollars for the industry. Many more millions of dollars have been saved through the safe-harbor leasing provisions of the Administration's 1981 Tax Equity Act.

Fourth, The Administration recognizes that steel is a global industry in a global marketplace, and we are sympathetic to industrial mergers which promise increased efficiency without seriously diminishing competition. This is evidenced by the approval recently given to the revised merger proposal of the LTV Corporation and Republic Steel.

Conclusion

By far the most important thing for the steel industry is the general economic recovery. The dramatic decline of inflation, the rapid advance in employment, and the broad increase in demand all point to better days ahead for the steel industry and for the economy generally. This Administration will continue its fight to see that the responsibility for the future of the steel industry remains in the hands of the steel industry, so that the tremendous strength of the free-enterprise, free-market system can advance the well-being of your companies, their employees, and their shareholders, along with the prosperity of the nation as a whole. ■

The Near West: America and the Pacific

by W. Allen Wallis

Address before the World Affairs Council in Pittsburgh on May 9, 1984. Mr. Wallis is Under Secretary for Economic Affairs.

Since I am an economist, it will not surprise you that from the three foci of your meeting—economics, politics, and security—I have selected economics. And since this meeting is about Asia, it will not surprise you if I discuss our evolving economic relationship with Asia, how it differs from our relationship with Europe, and what we and our Asian partners can do to maximize the mutual benefits from our relationship.

First, I will consider what has been described as a shift in the focus of U.S. foreign policy from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Second, I will touch on the reasons why Asia has captured our attention and become so attractive to our traders and investors. Finally, I will comment on the direction of economic policy, both in the U.S. and in Asia, that will promote solid and enduring ties.

U.S. Focus on the Pacific

Last month the French newspaper, *Le Monde,* quoted a famous American as saying that "Western history began with a Mediterranean era, passed through an Atlantic era, and is now moving into a Pacific era." Indeed, our geography and the quest for economic growth inevitably have pushed our center of gravity westward. America has had a Pacific coast since 1819, and the population center of America moves steadily toward it with each succeeding census.

Recent events spotlight this trend. President Reagan has crossed the world's largest ocean four times in the past 6 months. Vice President Bush even now is visiting in the Orient. I have traveled to Asia three times in the past 6 months—heading the U.S. delegations to the U.S.-ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] economic dialogue, to our economic consultations with Korea and with Japan, and accompanying Secretary [of the Treasury] Regan to the meetings of the U.S.-China Joint Economic Commission. A list of high-level official travelers to the region would illustrate the emphasis the Reagan Administration places on our Pacific relationships.

This emphasis is explained by today's economic realities. For two decades, Japan has been our largest overseas trading partner; it is the largest foreign purchaser of American goods, after Canada. The United States and Japan combined account for over one-third of the world's total gross national product. They are the two most significant developers and producers of high technology. In the 21st century, we are likely to be both the world's major economic competitors and the world's major economic partners. Since the late 1970s, trade with our East Asian and Pacific partners has exceeded our trade with Western Europe. In 1983 this transpacific trade was $26 billion larger than our trade with Europe. Of our 20 largest overseas customers, seven are in the East Asian and Pacific region. Our European friends wonder where this leaves them.

Ironically, I received the invitation to speak to you the day before I left for a trip to Europe. (I have traveled to Europe six times in the past 6 months.) In Europe I noticed that the press was filled with speculation about an American tilt toward Asia and away from Europe. I want emphatically to dispel that notion. The Reagan Administration certainly will not swap Europe for Asia in our foreign policy portfolio. A strong Atlantic alliance is, and will remain, vital to our economic, political, and security interests. We cannot, however, ignore the Soviet buildup in the Pacific. We have interests in Asia as well as in Europe.

Our ties with Europe go far beyond economics and security. Probably more than 90% of this audience traces its ancestry to Europe. We share with Europe a common culture, literature, music, art, science, legal system, and economic system. We inherited our political ideals from Europe. We are probably closer to Europe and Europeans now than at any time in our history, and it would be a sad thing, indeed, if the ties should weaken.

Traditionally, we have thought of Asia as the "Far East." We looked far, and we looked east, across Europe to Asia. Now we look west, across the Pacific, to Asia. East Asia and the Pacific region have become the "Near West."

While our cultural ties are not so strong with Asia as with Europe, they are neither new nor insignificant. Asian immigrants contributed significantly to the unification of our country by rail and to the development of Pacific coast agriculture. An important and growing number of Americans boast of Asian ancestry. They have become leaders in business, government, education, science, and the arts, and they participate in forging new and stronger links between America and Asia. In declaring this week "Asian Pacific American Heritage Week," President Reagan said "Americans who have come from Asian and Pacific countries have added a special quality to the United States. . . . This Nation owes a debt of gratitude to the Asian and Pacific immigrants. Their desire for liberty strengthens and underscores our own."

More times than we care to remember, Americans have joined Asians fighting for freedom in Asia and the Pacific. Our commitments to the security of the region are designed to prevent having to fight there again. Fortunately, most countries in the region share our interest in a secure and stable environment for growth and development.

For many reasons the Asian and Pacific region is vital to the United States.

- The Soviet threat hangs over the entire region. As the President has noted, this is a growing concern to all freedom-loving states in the region.
- Vietnamese aggression in Kampuchea is perceived by all of Southeast Asia as a threat, particularly to Thailand.
- North Korea remains hostile toward the South three decades after the official "cessation" of hostilities on the peninsula.
- The Republic of Korea in the south is not only a key ally but also provides a striking contrast between its market economy and the totalitarian society to the north.
- The six countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations form a political and economic grouping which has taken a united stand in opposing Soviet-backed Vietnamese aggression in Indochina. We are strengthening our economic cooperation with ASEAN as a group and individually.
- Thailand provides refuge for hundreds of thousands fleeing aggression, while struggling to overcome formidable challenges. Our continued support of this front-line state is critical.
- Malaysia provides us with important strategic materials and has great potential for vigorous economic development.
- Singapore is a stable and growing city-state which provides a striking example of the effectiveness of a free market system.

• Indonesia is the fifth most populous nation in the world and a major supplier of our imported petroleum.

• The Philippines hosts two important American military bases, as well as a significant amount of American private investment.

• Newly independent Brunei boasts the highest per capita income in the region, derived from its petroleum.

• Taiwan continues to be a major trading partner, despite the absence of official governmental ties.

• Hong Kong is a true miracle of the market, converting barren mountains into one of the world's leading trade and financial centers.

• Improving relations with the People's Republic of China is a major element of our regional policy. China's shift toward a more open and decentralized economy is important for Western trade and investment.

• Australia and New Zealand are longstanding allies with key economic linkages to Japan and to the region as a whole.

• Finally, the Pacific includes territories administered by the United States that are important to us strategically.

Trade and Investment

So much for my brief survey of the region. Many of you have visited some of those places, possibly first as members of our military. Fortunately, the weight of American involvement has shifted significantly to trade and investment, bringing new challenges for both cooperation and competition.

Those of you involved in foreign trade understand well the importance of our growing economic ties to Asia, but most of the rest of us are prone to forget the growing impact of the international economy on our lives. Exports now represent 20% of U.S. industrial output, about twice the proportion of 12 years ago. One out of three agricultural jobs and one out of eight manufacturing jobs is export related. It is estimated that our $52 billion in sales last year to the East Asian and Pacific region provided 1.3 million American jobs. Many companies in the Pittsburgh area depend on exports for their survival.

What factors account for the economic dynamism of this vast region?

By almost every measure we can devise, Asia is a region of diversity. When we cite broad statistics, we obscure this diversity. When we use terms like "East Asia and the Pacific," we sometimes forget that we are not dealing with a homogeneous entity. Not only are the countries I mentioned spread over a large portion of our globe, they vary widely in area. Several are roughly the size of the United States, but some are smaller than Pittsburgh. In population they range from China, with over a billion people to the tiny ministates of the Pacific Islands. In language and culture, Australia and New Zealand share our roots, and the rest of the region is a rich tapestry of ethnic, cultural, and linguistic variety. Their economic systems range from the nearly pure *laissez-faire* capitalism of Hong Kong to the rigid Marxist control of North Korea.

Levels of development vary widely as well. Economic size and influence range from Japan with a per capita GNP of over $9,000 to Burma with a per capita GNP of less than $200. The three OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] members of this region (Australia, Japan, and New Zealand) have standards of living similar to ours. A group of rapidly industrializing economies in Asia have that goal clearly in sight. A few countries in the region still have serious developmental problems, and their people have yet to enjoy the benefits of the modern world.

This very diversity attracts us to the region and gives it the force and energy—the "dynamism"—that we are addressing today.

Beyond the diversity, we find some common characteristics, especially in the economic sphere. The most successful economies of the region have obviously studied the growth and development of the West. There is a growing application in Asian and Pacific nations of those economic principles which have served America so well. Where these have been adopted, economies are growing rapidly and becoming more attractive to our traders and investors.

Let me comment on a few of the principles that have promoted better-than-average economic performance.

The first is willingness to rely on the market. The most successful economies in the region have free-market orientations with major roles for private enterprise. Among the developing economies of the region, this is particularly evident in the ASEAN countries and also in Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. We see this trend even in countries without free-market orientations. The President noted just last week, for example, that China too is moving toward market incentives to spur production.

The second factor that has created economic growth in Asia is effective utilization of Asia's most abundant resource—people. It is well known that Asia has a large population. It is less well known that the human resources in many of these countries have been carefully nurtured. Literacy rates vary greatly among the nations in the region but average about 70% in developing Asia, well ahead of South America and Africa. Population growth rates are lower than the average for low- and middle-income countries as a group. The people are healthy; average life expectancy, at just over 62 years, is higher than in other developing regions of the world.

Third, sound financial management has helped protect Asian countries from crises like those that have plagued other areas of the world, especially Latin America. The ratio of debt service to exports is the lowest of any region—under 16% in 1982. The ratio of outstanding debt to exports, near 80%, is also the best in the world.

Finally, a solid technological base has resulted from the high priority placed on scientific and technical education. On the upper end of the scale, Australia and New Zealand are modern industrial democracies with a scientific tradition similar to our own. Science and technology in Japan have evolved to their present impressive stages from a base established well before the Meiji restoration of 1868. The Asian less developed countries have used bilateral and multilateral assistance effectively to acquire the technology they needed to achieve rapid growth in agricultural and industrial productivity. Trade and investment have replaced foreign assistance as primary forces for growth. Both have become effective vehicles for introducing modern technology.

These principles, applied effectively by skilled leaders, have created vibrant, growing economies that serve their citizens well and contribute to the well-being of the world in general. As a group, the economies in the East Asia and Pacific region outpaced the rest of the world in the 1970s. Equally as important is their resilience in bad times. During the recent recession, economic growth continued in much of this region, though more slowly.

There is no question that the economies of this region are tough competitors. You in Pittsburgh already know that well. We do well to remember, however, that our suppliers, as well as our customers, are important to our economy. Pacific Basin suppliers provide a vast array of basic materials, intermediate goods, and finished products. Ninety percent of our natural rubber comes from the region, which also supplies large

amounts of wool, tin, bauxite, and oil. We import from this region significant quantities of meat and dairy products, sugar, and plywood, as well as a wide variety of manufactured goods which we American consumers find attractive. While Asian and Pacific producers are competition for some American producers, they meet critical supply needs, help keep our prices down, and enable the United States to sell more to them.

Trade and investment have largely supplanted the need for foreign assistance in many East Asian countries. This is what economic development is all about. By whatever method we use to measure American investment in the region, it is clear that American businesses are forging ever stronger links with our Pacific Basin trading partners. Estimates are that American private investment in East Asia and the Pacific jumped some $4 billion in 1981, to a total estimated at nearly $30 billion.

Investment climates in the region generally are favorable to foreign investment. Where problems still exist, virtually all the market economies are making improvements. The Reagan Administration has taken positive steps to ensure that American investors are treated fairly throughout the world. An energetic program, led by Ambassador William Brock [U.S. Trade Representative], to negotiate and conclude bilateral investment treaties, is the hallmark of this effort. The ASEAN countries (Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Brunei, and the Philippines) together have absorbed over $10 billion in American private investment. China continues to attract American companies. Agreements reached during the President's visit will open even more opportunities in that vast market.

We naturally welcome the fact that trade and investment are supplying the capital and technology once provided only by foreign assistance. We can be proud, nonetheless, of the results of the assistance we have given to countries in the region. To put this in proper perspective, however, I note that the total of all economic assistance ever given by the United States to Korea is approximately equal to American exports to Korea in just 1 year. For Taiwan our total past development assistance amounts to only half a year's exports to Taiwan. Both of these graduates of American economic assistance now have impressive aid programs of their own.

These few examples of the success stories of a remarkable part of the world clearly demonstrate that the Asian and Pacific region will be important to the well-being of Americans. For a long time to come, we must be vigilant to manage constructively the frictions that inevitably accompany broad and complex ties among nations.

Direction of Economic Policy

Rising protectionist sentiment at home and abroad is the greatest threat to continued growth in East Asia and the Pacific. Much of my time at the State Department is devoted to encouraging our trading partners to open their markets to foreign competition. While the world is still far from a free trade utopia, we are making progress. Japan captures most of the headlines. While we are still engaged in complex negotiations with the Japanese, we have seen progress since the President's visit there 6 months ago. Korea has unilaterally lowered trade barriers. American firms, including banks, are already benefiting, but we will continue to press for more liberalization. In December, at the U.S.-ASEAN economic dialogue, I discussed with ASEAN leaders the mutual benefits of trade liberalization. Ambassador Brock is actively exploring with his ASEAN colleagues innovative ideas for reducing trade barriers between ASEAN and the United States. Worldwide, we are seeking a new round of multilateral trade negotiations in the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]. We will press for further tariff reductions and elimination of nontariff barriers. Countries in Asia, led by Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone, are supportive of new negotiations in the GATT.

During his trip to Asia last November, President Reagan stated succinctly the case for free trade:

> . . . protectionism is defensive and dangerous. Erecting barriers always invites retaliation, and retaliation is a threat to the one out of every eight American jobs dependent on our exports. At the end of this vicious cycle are higher costs for consumers and lost American jobs, the exact opposite of what we all want.
>
> Let's recognize Japanese and Korean efficiency for what it is. If their products are better made and less expensive, then Americans who buy them benefit by receiving quality and value. And that's what the magic of the marketplace is all about.

This Administration is committed to free markets. Experience shows that this is the most beneficial policy not only for the United States but also for the Asian and Pacific nations.

Where we see Americans disadvantaged by protectionism in Asian markets, we will press for changes. Where trade barriers exist in less developed countries, we will argue that trade must be expanded through tariff reductions among those countries themselves. We will also press for the continuation of generalized preference schemes in developed nations. Our own generalized system of preferences legislation is currently before the Congress. The Reagan Administration strongly supports renewal.

New and innovative international business relationships will be required to meet the challenges of the future. I mention in passing the increasingly complex legal problems which may affect our ability to cooperate and may damage our ability to compete. How we manage such issues as "unitary tax," antitrust, bank secrecy, and trade sanctions will be crucial to our success in developing a mature economic relationship with Asia.

At home, the President has pledged to the American people that he will strive to keep our markets open to competition, both domestically and internationally. From an economic standpoint, that is the prudent course regardless of what the rest of the world may be doing. Nonetheless, we are dedicated to seeking progress in creating new opportunities for American exporters through further liberalization of the world's trading system. Asia's dynamism is traceable to the willingness of many countries in the region to adopt market-based economic policies like those which have served us so well. As these countries become serious competitors, we must treat them as new export opportunities. Above all, we must not abandon our own adherence to the principles of competition and open markets.

Conclusion

I said I would concentrate on economics and I have. I am an economist, after all; but a few words on political and security matters.

Political stability and security in the Pacific region are obviously vital to our own security. It is also true that the political situation in the region has made possible its spectacular economic growth. At the end of the Second World War, the United States controlled the Pacific Ocean region militarily. We converted our military supremacy into formal security arrangements with Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and others. Today there are new challenges to our Pacific relationships. The Reagan Administration has taken steps to buttress the old ties and to reach new levels of understanding with friendly nonaligned nations, for example China.

I began my remarks by quoting a famous American who said that Western history began with a Mediterranean era, passed through an Atlantic era, and is now moving into a Pacific era. That American was not one of our contemporaries. It was Theodore Roosevelt in a speech he gave after he had, as he put it, "just chipped the Philippines away from Spain." If we were moving into a Pacific era then, now we have arrived in the Pacific era, led by our burgeoning economic relationship. ■

Cyprus: Reports of Turkish Cypriot Settlement in Varosha

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, JUNE 4, 1984[1]

We now have evidence that the Turkish Cypriots are permitting settlement by some of their people in a formerly closed sector of the city of Varosha, or Famagusta.

The area involved is in a portion of the city which has remained uninhabited since the Turkish military intervention of 1974. The settlement by Turkish Cypriots in the area establishes a precedent which we believe will prove unhelpful to the search for a fair and final settlement in the Cyprus problem.

We have urged the Turkish Cypriot communities' leaders not to proceed with this action and urged all parties to the Cyprus question to avoid any act which might complicate the situation as the UN Security Council prepares to consider renewal of the UN peacekeeping mandate for Cyprus, which expires June 15.

We are hoping that mandate can be renewed with minimal debate and that the Secretary General can then proceed with his good office's role in the search for diplomatic progress.

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[1]Read to news correspondents by acting Department spokesman Alan Romberg. ■

Soviet Active Measures

by William E. Knepper

Address before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations on May 30, 1984. Mr. Knepper is Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

I'm delighted to be here and appreciate this opportunity to help shed some light on one of the aspects of Soviet clandestine activities which attempt to influence world public opinion. One of the activities that falls within the purview of my new responsibilities has been an interagency working group on Soviet active measures. To us "active measures" means unorthodox and covert Soviet and Soviet-bloc efforts to affect political attitudes and influence public opinion in the noncommunist world. State chairs the group which includes representatives from several agencies including the Defense Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and U.S. Information Agency. Among its several responsibilities, the group is charged with identifying forged documents prepared by Soviet KGB [Committee for State Security] operatives or the closely coordinated East European or Cuban intelligence services.

Our Embassies abroad have as a priority requirement reporting likely forgeries that may appear in the press or be circulated privately among influential foreign leaders and opinionmakers. Our active measures working group meets every other week to review the "surfacing" of possible forgeries any place in the world. Confirmed forgeries are officially denied and publicly exposed in discussions such as this one.

Larry Eagleburger, who retired May 7 as the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs—the highest ranking position then held by a career officer in the State Department—wrote in a recent article:

> Soviet Active Measures need to be countered by public exposure. They are infections that thrive only in darkness, and sunlight is the best antiseptic. Governments should make available to their publics as much as possible of our growing knowledge of Soviet practices.

Overview

Before we see some examples of forgeries, let's look behind the cloak of secrecy with which the Soviets seek to shroud their intelligence operations.

The term "active measures" itself is a literal translation from the Russian *aktivnye meropriyatiya*. That's the name of the organization in the KGB's First Chief Directorate responsible for worldwide direction of these activities. As the Soviets use the concept, active measures encompass a wide range of practices, including disinformation, manipulating the media in foreign countries, the use of communist parties and communist front groups, and other operations to expand Soviet political influence. Unlike overt Soviet diplomatic and informational efforts, active measures usually involve an element of deception and frequently employ clandestine means to mask Moscow's involvement.

Intelligence operations and propaganda can be grouped in three categories; white, black, and gray. White refers to openly acknowledged government positions, policies, and statements. Black operations are supposedly never officially acknowledged or attributed. Gray affairs fall somewhere in between.

Looking at the whole spectrum of Soviet foreign policy, diplomatic, trade, and informational programs may be considered white or overt activities. The use of procommunist fronts, local communist parties, or traditional media information outlets fall into a gray category. Spreading rumors, planting false stories, surfacing forgeries, and use of agents of influence—collaborators, voluntary or paid—are black or clandestine operations. Active measures thus involve either gray or black operations, depending on the specific circumstances. Characteristic of Soviet active measures is their wide scope, geographic spread, and persistence over time, as well as the frequent use of fabricated documents to underpin disinformation operations.

As a policy tool, active measures trace back to the 1920s when the Soviets sought to discredit emigre groups in Western Europe, particularly in France, by spreading disinformation. They also lured emigre activists back to Russia through various subterfuges.

Some of you may have watched last fall on PBS the 10-part series, "Reilly, Ace of Spies." A character in the series was lured back to his death in Russia by a supposed exile organization, "The Trust," which was in reality a KGB black operation. Even before the 1917 revolution, the tsarist secret police employed similar deception techniques. They used agents abroad not only to collect intelligence but also to sow dissent among emigre groups of that era. They also gave covert subsidies to selected journals to stimulate a better press for imperial Russia.

After World War II, the Soviets institutionalized these activities. They established a disinformation unit—Department D—within the First Chief Directorate of the KGB, the Soviet overseas intelligence arm. In the 1960s, the term "active measures" first appeared when the Soviets changed the name of Department D to the Active Measures Department. The switch conveyed that the scope of the department's activities was far broader than mere dissemination of false stories in the press or floating forged documents.

Some of our best information on Soviet and Soviet-bloc intelligence operations is provided by defectors. In 1968 the one-time chief of the disinformation section of Czechoslovak intelligence, Ladislav Bittman, defected and has provided unusual insights into active measures operations. Bittman recounts that one of the main aims of Czech activities was to brand West German officials as Nazis. But he was also involved in anti-U.S. operations taking place as far afield as Indonesia and central Africa.

Bittman's experience underscores the close cooperation between the Soviets and satellite intelligence services. Indeed, it is often difficult to know whether the Soviets or one of their surrogates are implementing an operation. Since their overall purpose is the same, the difficulty in differentiating a Russian from an East German or Cuban effort is an interesting challenge but not really significant.

In the mid-1970s, the KGB active measures department was upgraded to a "service," a further indication of the importance the Soviet leadership attached to active measures. This change meant that the chief of the service would have KGB general officer rank. The timing of the shift in the mid-1970s suggests a connection with Soviet disappointment with the fruits of detente—during which time forgeries had fallen off sharply. It indicated renewed willingness to employ deception techniques on a larger scale in support of Soviet aims. Reflective of this, the Carter Administration was targeted with an upsurge of active measures, frequently involving fake U.S. documents. These were particularly directed against the U.S.-Egyptian relationship and the Camp David process.

Organizationally, the KGB Active Measures Service has the primary role of backstopping foreign active measures operations, which are directed in general terms at the Politburo level—the summit of the Soviet hierarchy. The service is organized along functional and geographic lines with roughly half a dozen departments. It is believed to employ directly about 300 people. They monitor ongoing active measures around the world; process proposals for new operations; maintain liaison on active measures with KGB regional and country desks and with overseas operations; and provide technical support for operations through preparation of forgeries and fabrications, translation of documents, and printing and publication of materials.

Our best view under the Soviet cloak of secrecy has been provided by Stanislav Levchenko, a former KGB major and active measures specialist who defected to the United States in 1979 while working as a "journalist" in Japan. At the time of this defection, Levchenko was acting chief of the active measures section of the KGB "residency" in the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo. He supervised five case officers or KGB operatives. They, in turn, ran a string of 25 agents of Japanese or third-country nationalities. Levchenko was sentenced to death by a Soviet military tribunal meeting in secret in August 1981. He has declared open opposition to what he views as ". . . the corrupt Soviet system." The Soviets are preventing his wife and teenage son from joining him in the United States.

According to Levchenko, KGB "residencies" or foreign stations operating under diplomatic cover in Soviet Embassies or missions consider active measures part of their core operational work, along with espionage. Residencies submit proposals for new active measures and assessments of old activities in the annual plan sent to Moscow every December. Residencies can take the initiative in proposing new operations to take advantage of perceived opportunities at any time during the year. Final approval, however, rests with KGB headquarters as approved by

Baltic Freedom Day

PROCLAMATION 5209, JUNE 14, 1984[1]

It has been over 40 years since invading Soviet armies, in collusion with the Nazi regime, overran the three independent Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and forceably incorporated them into Moscow's expanding empire. The new regime then ordered the illegal deportation, murder, and imprisonment of tens of thousands of Baltic peoples whose only "crime" was to resist foreign tyranny and to defend their liberties and freedoms.

Oppression and persecution continue to this day, but despite this long dark night of injustice, the brave men and women of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have never abandoned the battle for their national independence and God-given rights. Although the full measure of their struggle and sacrifice is screened by the oppression and censorship under which they live, the friends and families of the Baltic peoples all over the world are aware of their heroic endeavors and aspirations.

Their peaceful demands for their rights command the admiration of everyone who loves and honors freedom. All the people of the United States of America share the just aspirations of the Baltic nations for national independence, and we uphold their right to determine their own national destiny free of foreign domination. The United States has never recognized the forceable incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union, and it will not do so in the future. The Congress of the United States, by Senate Joint Resolution 296, has authorized and requested the President to issue a proclamation for the observance of June 14, 1984, as "Baltic Freedom Day."

Now, Therefore, I, Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim June 14, 1984, as Baltic Freedom Day. I call upon the people of the United States to observe this day with appropriate remembrance and ceremonies and to reaffirm their commitment to the principles of liberty and freedom for all oppressed people.

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this fourteenth day of June, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty-four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and eighth.

Ronald Reagan

[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of June 18, 1984. ■

the Politburo. Moscow can, of course, instruct residencies to undertake active measures at any time.

Most official or quasi-official Soviet representatives abroad are likely to be involved from time to time in active measures. Even Soviet scholars, journalists, and representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church, who are often accepted abroad as legitimate counterparts by their non-Soviet colleagues, also often engage in these types of active measures. Unlike their free-world counterparts, they often must play a dual role. Their legitimate academic or other pursuits sometimes play a subsidiary role to their political activities on behalf of the Kremlin. They are required to obey instructions from the bodies which plan and control Soviet active measures.

While the specifics of active measures vary widely, Levchenko stresses that all are specifically designed to reinforce Soviet policy objectives in a particular country or region. The United States and NATO are the Soviet Union's principal worldwide targets. However, as Major Levchenko's activities in Japan show, other countries are also on the receiving end of active measures.

When Levchenko defected, he was ostensibly working as a correspondent for the Soviet news magazine, *New Times*. He found cover as a journalist to be especially useful for active measures operations, since it provided broader access than more traditional diplomatic cover.

Ideally, the KGB seeks publication of disinformation in reputable noncommunist media. The Soviet press then replays the story, citing credible sources. It may also be replayed elsewhere, for example by wire services or others unaware that they are repeating disinformation. Sometimes the KGB runs disinformation in pro-Soviet news outlets. This is in the hope that the phony story will gain acceptance through frequent repetition, even though the initial surfacing vehicle lacks credibility.

Spreading rumors is perhaps the crudest form of active measures. This was done on a considerable scale by both the Axis and the Allied nations in World War II. In recent years, there are indications that the Soviets may have resumed the practice. In 1979 after the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by religious fanatics, U.S. Embassies picked up numerous reports that the Soviets were falsely spreading the word to Arab contacts that the United States was implicated. Levchenko told the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence that he personally participated in several operations to spread rumors in Japan directed against the People's Republic of China. One such effort was to suggest secret collusion on nuclear matters between the Chinese and the Italians.

Forgeries

Many disinformation operations gain acceptance by showing tangible "proof." Fabricated documents and forgeries are provided as "evidence." In some cases a Soviet role in manufacturing these documents may be uncovered by content and forensic analyses of the document, the method of surfacing, the relative level of sophistication of the forgery, or its nearly instananeous replay by the Soviet media. While it is not entirely clear why the Soviets have made forgeries such a specialty, the fake U.S. Government document has become a postwar hallmark of Soviet disinformation operations. In 1961 then CIA Assistant Director Richard Helms told the Senate Judiciary Committee that some 32 forgeries of U.S. Government documents had been uncovered during the preceding 4 years. These ranged from fake high-level plans on Middle East policy, involving Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and then New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller, to false Pentagon documents alleging that most U.S. strategic bomber pilots were medical wrecks.

Nineteen years later in February 1980, John McMahon, a successor to Helms as chief of the CIA's clandestine service, told the House Intelligence Committee a similar tale of fabricated U.S. Government documents. He provided background on the renewed Soviet surfacing of forgeries following the establishment of the Active Measures Service in the mid-1970s. McMahon elaborated on some two dozen forgeries, such as a series intended to create frictions in U.S.-Egyptian relations.

Since 1980, the KGB forgery curve has continued to rise. According to CIA testimony before the House Intelligence Committee in 1982, and our own State

Berlin's Status in European Parliament Elections

The following is a joint response by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States to the Soviet Union's protest on Berlin's participation in the election to the European Parliament. The allied response was read by Department of State spokesman John Hughes on June 15, 1984.

On instructions of my government, I would like to state the following with regard to the statement of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of June 11, 1984:

The three powers, in accordance with the established procedures and insofar as is compatible with allied rights and responsibilities, in 1957 approved the extension to the western sectors of Berlin of the treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC). On the same basis they subsequently approved the extension to the western sectors of Berlin of other constitutive treaties of the European Community. Consequently, the western sectors of Berlin have since 1957 been included in the area of application of these treaties. The three powers have throughout that period ensured that allied rights and responsibilities, including those relating to matters of security and status, were not affected by developments in the European Community. The Quadripartite Agreement in no way affected the application in the western sectors of Berlin of the European Community treaties.

Direct elections to the European Assembly, in the work of which representatives from the western sectors of Berlin have participated since its inception, were provided for in the EEC treaty of 1957. As in the past, representatives from the western sectors of Berlin will continue to be included within the quota of the Federal Republic of Germany at the assembly. They are not directly elected but are selected by the Berlin House of Representatives. In these circumstances it is clear that continued participation of Berlin representatives in the European Assembly does not affect the status of Berlin. Such participation can therefore not constitute a violation of the Quadripartite Agreement.

In conclusion, my government recalls the importance which the three powers attach to avoiding complications in and around Berlin. ■

Department reports on Soviet active measures, 4 forgeries surfaced in 1980, 7 in 1981, 9 in 1982, and 12 in 1983—or over 30 since 1980. In addition, several earlier forgeries have been purposely resurfaced a number of times.

The technical quality of recent forgeries has improved over earlier KGB products. The formatting is on the whole good, certainly sufficient to deceive those unfamiliar with U.S. Government documents. There are, however, almost always some discrepancies and mistakes. It is difficult for an outsider to duplicate U.S. Government documents with total accuracy, given the frequent changes in form and procedures. (It's even difficult for us insiders to do it "by the book"—skilled secretaries and word processors are highly prized.) While the American English in most forged documents is colloquial, there are occasional linguistic flaws, use of stilted language or of British rather than American phrases or spelling. In some instances, literal translations expose the likely Soviet authorship. In a fake U.S. document that was surfaced in Nigeria, the term "wet affair" was used to describe a proposed assassination. "Wet affair" is the euphemism in the Soviet intelligence lexicon for "assassination." In a letter from the New Orleans-based aviation personnel agency to the South African Air Force chief, the term "competent bodies" is used. "Competent bodies" is the way the Soviets describe their security services.

In contrast to the 1950s when the Soviets were often satisfied with surfacing forgeries in the communist press, in recent years the KGB has sought publication in noncommunist media. When successful, this enhances the credibility of the disinformation operation and provides more believable sourcing for replay by communist media. A number of respected noncommunist journals have been victimized by fabrications during the past 2 years.

The Soviets sometimes surface forgeries through blind mailings sent to newsmen with no return address or other indication of the sender's identity. This is a random affair since most serious media outlets will either reject an anonymously sent document or, at the least, check before printing. The Soviets also use journalists working as KGB agents of influence to surface disinformation. They also try to plant fakes with newsmen either gullible or unprofessional enough to accept the authenticity of a document without checking.

Some fabrications are circulated privately and do not seem intended for publication in the media. This method prevents the alleged author from finding out about the forgery and thus is unable to publicly deny the document's authenticity.

Many fabrications never attain uncritical publication or surface only in communist or procommunist journals; still, forgeries are one of the most popular tools of disinformation. One reason forgeries are so frequently used is the difficulty in rebutting them effectively. The United States or other offended parties can forcefully deny fabrications. However, once published, a story frequently assumes a life of its own. Either the denial does not catch up with the original false report or a few people are willing to believe the story simply because it is in print.

Now let's review several examples of forgeries that dovetail with Soviet propaganda themes.

- Probably the most enduring set of forgeries are the so-called Holocaust papers, designed to create tension between the United States and our European allies. This is a collection of altered and authentic U.S. war plans that date from the early 1960s. The papers allege that the United States would sacrifice Western Europe by nuclear bombing strikes during a prospective world war III to save the continental United States. The papers surfaced initially in a Norwegian magazine in 1967. More recently, they were the subject of questions in the town council of Graz, Austria, in December 1982. At least 20 separate surfacings have been identified.

The Soviets received at least some of the authentic documents from an espionage agent, a U.S. Army sergeant. The sergeant was stationed in Paris as a military courier in the early 1960s. In 1965 he was tried and convicted of espionage and given 25 years in prison. He passed a wide variety of U.S. documents to the Soviets, some of which still occasionally appear in altered form.

- In November 1981 an attempt was made in Madrid to surface a forged letter from President Reagan to the King of Spain. The forgery was technically well done with the correct White House stationery and typescript. In terms intended to offend Spanish sensitivities, the letter urged the King both to join NATO and to crack down on groups such as the "Opus Dei pacifists" and the "left-wing opposition."

After an initial blind mailing to Spanish journalists failed to obtain publication, the forgery was circulated on November 11 to all delegations (except the U.S. and Spanish) to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) then meeting in Madrid. This time several Madrid newspapers ran stories that exposed the letter as a fabrication, probably of Soviet origin.

- This forgery of an alleged June 1979 letter from then NATO Commander Alexander Haig to NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns surfaced in April 1982. The letter discusses a possible nuclear first strike and calls for ". . . action of a sensitive nature to jolt the faint hearted." The letter is intended to stimulate the nuclear disarmament campaign by suggesting a Haig-Luns collusion against opponents of the modernization of nuclear forces in Europe. Technically, the quality is good but does include mistakes, such as inappropriate stationery and also the "Dear Joseph" greeting instead of the "Dear Joe" habitually used by General Haig. The forgery was surfaced in a leftist Belgian weekly and reported to Belgian television and radio. Its appearance coincided with numerous antinuclear demonstrations in the spring of 1982.

- In January 1982, a forged letter and an accompanying research analysis dated September 23, 1981, from Judge William Clark, then Deputy Secretary of State, to the U.S. Ambassador to Greece, Monteagle Stearns, was surfaced in Athens. This forgery indicated U.S. support for the conservatives in the October Greek elections. It alluded to a possible military coup if socialist leader Andreas Papandreou won at the polls (as he did). On the basis of Embassy assurances that the letter was a fake, it was not initially published. Several weeks later, after copies had been circulated at the CSCE in Madrid, a small Athens daily published it. However, the daily described the letter as of doubtful authenticity and probably attributable to a "third-country" intelligence service.

- Two faked 1982 telegrams were allegedly from the U.S. Embassy in Rome. They depict the Italian investigation of a possible Bulgarian connection in the assassination attempt against Pope John Paul II as a campaign orchestrated by the United States. The forgery appeared in a leftist Rome newsweekly in late July 1983. The cables are cleverly done and read much like State Department cables. An exception is the use of the term "spynest Sofia" and various technical formatting errors. The fabrication apparently was designed to provide "credible evidence" for Soviet media allegations that the United States had

orchestrated the arrest of the Bulgarian intelligence officer, Antonov, as part of an effort to blame the Soviets and Bulgarians for the papal assassination attempt.

- Another active measure alleging military cooperation with South Africa is a forged letter from the U.S. Defense Mapping Agency, addressed to a Lt. Gen. Dutton, South African Defense Force. This purports to be a positive reply to a South African request for satellite-produced maps and charts of Angola, Zambia, and Mozambique. Let me point out that Lt. Gen. Dutton has not held a command in the South African forces for years. There are many other features about this letter which indicate that the Defense Mapping Agency would never have written it, such as curious and ungrammatical punctuations—even for U.S. Government bureaucratese. The word "concretize" is used, which is similar to a Russian word in general usage.
- *Jeune Afrique,* an influential French-language newsweekly published in Paris and widely read in Francophone Africa, reported on November 17, 1982, that despite the U.S. embargo on arms sales to South Africa, Northrop Aviation was offering to sell South Africa its new Tigershark fighter. To "prove" the point, *Jeune Afrique* published a picture of a letter ostensibly sent by Northrop's vice president for marketing to the commander of the South African Air Force. When Northrop called the letter a fake, *Jeune Afrique* ran a new story on January 19, 1983, suggesting that the denial was untrue and the original letter was authentic.

In this case, the perpetrator of the active measure apparently obtained a copy of a genuine letter that Northrop had routinely sent to many countries, but not to South Africa, and simply typed in the South African addressee. The purpose of this active measure was to suggest that the U.S. embargo on military sales to South Africa was a sham. The envelope also had a 20¢ stamp—not enough to reach South Africa.

- In Lima, Peru, last year a report surfaced that the United States was planning to sell nuclear-tipped cruise missiles to Chile. Nothing, of course, could be further from the truth. The obvious intent was to stir up trouble between Peru and Chile and make the Peruvians suspicious of and antagonistic toward the United States. The report was based on a fake airgram appearing there. The Peruvians quickly realized that an attempt was being made to dupe them, and nearly every newspaper in Lima denounced the report as a forgery, most likely of Soviet inspiration.

Impact of Active Measures

The box score for disinformation and other media influence efforts is mixed. Despite extensive KGB active measures operations, it is hard to perceive any major impact on well-established, noncommunist, Western media outlets. Most fabrications or disinformation efforts are able to achieve publication only in obscure journals or in those known for their predilection for the Soviet line. Probably more damaging are repeaters. Even though exposed, through repeated surfacing and occasional uncritical publication, the impression can be created that "where there is smoke, there is fire."

Unfortunately for the United States, the Soviets have had much more success with active measures in the Third World. In Africa and South Asia, in particular, they have probably significantly added to U.S. image problems. Over the years, the KGB and its allies have developed well-established outlets to float disinformation. They also have had considerable success in arranging for press plants of distorted news stories in Africa.

In gauging the overall impact of active measures, it is important to view it through Soviet, not just American, eyes. The Soviets, as Levchenko points out, take a long-term view. They are not seeking immediate, short-term gains or necessarily a big impact from any one operation. Rather, they regard active measures like pawns in a chess game, able to damage the opponent at the margin. If Dr. Goebbels espoused the technique of the "big lie," the Soviets in active measures operations have more modest aspirations. They take the long-term view and by all accounts appear satisfied that the cumulative impact makes their considerable investment worthwhile. ■

Doctrine of Moral Equivalence

by Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

Address before the Royal Institute for International Studies in London on April 9, 1984. Ambassador Kirkpatrick is U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations.

I am honored by the invitation of the Royal Institute for International Affairs to appear here today. I thought a good deal about what I might speak about and was greatly tempted to offer a lecture on American presidential nominating politics, about which not too long ago I wrote a large book. I decided, however, it was not quite appropriate. The famous cracks within the alliance that are so much discussed in public presented themselves. It is clear there exists on both sides of the Atlantic a growing sense that we have come again to one of those periodic times of decision: Will we continue as we are, working in and through the existing framework, or is it time for new departures?

Not all issues that are discussed in public places make their way onto a legislative calendar. Some simply die. But widespread public interest in an important subject, if not a harbinger of official changes to come, at least gives notice of that possibility. Articles on the "crisis" of the alliance have become a staple of the editorial pages in the United States and Europe. In the European press, these articles usually deal with U.S. faults and raise questions whether our policies and our rhetoric do not make the world more dangerous—for Europeans. The U.S. articles deal with European shortcomings and question whether it makes any sense at all for the United States to go on investing people and money in the NATO enterprise.

I should like to emphasize that there is no discussion in the U.S. Government of withdrawing American troops from Europe or changing American strategic doctrine. Nonetheless, op-ed pieces about the alliance multiply and influential persons join the dialogue. Only last week, after I had begun to think about this statement, *The Wall Street Journal* featured a column on anti-Americanism by a Swiss diplomat which paraphrased Lord Acton: "Dependency corrupts, and absolute dependency corrupts absolutely." Recently also, James Schlesinger and Helmut Schmidt had a widely reported public dialogue in Brussels. Henry Kissinger has suggested the time may have arrived for Europe to assume the responsibility for its own defense against conventional attack, time

to draw down or withdraw entirely the 300,000 U.S. troops in Germany. The persistence of the unofficial discussions made it almost inevitable that officials would join the discussion. That has happened. Under Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger has recently addressed the issues in two public fora. I propose today to enter this discussion at a somewhat different point.

Naturally, being an American and an official of the U.S. Government, I shall speak from an American perspective, but my subject is not only the United States. I shall try to speak to the same subject addressed here in Britain by my colleague, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, concerning whether there is or is not a moral difference between the so-called "superpowers"—the United States and the U.S.S.R. But this subject is, I think, only a subtopic (albeit a terribly important one) of a more general question: whether there is a significant moral difference between the democratic countries of the West and the communist countries of the Eastern bloc. Many, perhaps most, of the most influential treatments of East-West differences during the last decade or so propose tacitly, and sometimes explicitly, that the differences are not that great after all.

Europe

First, there was the vogue enjoyed by theories of converging development not long ago, which argued that the dynamics of modernity would force increasing openess and liberalization of the Soviet Union and, at the same time, force progressively autocratic centralization in the industrial democracies in such a way that, before long, both would become modified bureaucratic autocracies presided over by technocrats with a feel for popular desires. When "things" seemed not to develop as predicted, the convergence theory was shelved without comment to be replaced by a more aggressive argument that required less cooperation from history: now it was argued that in fundamental moral respects the democracies and communist states were already much alike, a position that simultaneously denies the virtues of the democracies and the vices of the totalitarian systems of the East. This position, too, threatens, as Raymond Aron emphasized in his important book *In Defense of Decadent Europe*, to undermine the virtue of the Western nations, the ". . . capacity for collective action and historic vitality that now, as always, remains the ultimate cause of the fortunes of nations and of their rise and fall."

Recently, another Frenchman, Jean-Francois Revel, has sounded a more urgent alarm. In his book, *Comment les Democraties Finissent*, Revel wonders aloud if democracy may not be a mere parenthesis in the long march of autocracy, ". . . the first system in history which, confronted by a power that wants to destroy it, accuses itself. . . ." Revel further wrote:

> The distinctive mark of our century is the humility with which democratic civilization agrees to disappear and works to legitimize the victory of its mortal enemy.
>
> That communism shall have been more clever and effective in its offensive would only be one additional example of one power being a better strategist than the other. . . . It is less natural and newer that the targeted civilization should not only judge that its defeat is justified, but provide its partisans as well as its adversaries ample reason to regard all forms of self-defense as immoral, or at best superfluous and useless, if not downright dangerous.

Revel's subject is the delegitimization of the West, which he believes is in danger of becoming a willing victim. My subject is the delegitimization of the United States by and within the West. I am concerned not with the charges of our adversaries, who accuse us of the most terrible crimes, but rather with the growing tendency inside the political class of our allies in Great Britain and continental Europe to feel that, after all, in many important respects, there may not be significant differences between the Soviet Union and the United States.

It is difficult for an American to raise such questions without sounding defensive, but the subject is too important to be pushed under the rug.

To illustrate my meaning, to dispel any suggestion that my impression of the situation is illusory or exaggerated, I shall take as my text three recent comments: one from the *Guardian*, a second from the *Observer*, the third from a leading politician.

First, the *Guardian*, which printed on October 28:

> There are plenty around who are already prepared to see the U.S. as no better than the Soviet Union in the standards of its international behaviour. There are many more, however, who still expect superior standards of the U.S., who are shocked and bewildered at the spectacle of Americans engaging in an act of aggression quite as blatant as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which was deplored in such fine-sounding words.

Next, the *Observer*, in its leader of October 30:

> . . . Reagan should be told that when the U.S. borrows Soviet methods . . . European distrust of American behaviour, which lies at the root of the peace movement, is vastly reinforced.

And finally, these comments from a political leader who provided unwelcome confirmation that extreme distrust of the United States displayed by the peace movement, in some of its forms, was shared in high political circles. Concerning threats to the peace, he was reputed to have said: "There is an almost miserable equity of threat;" or, in another formulation, an "equity of menace."

The suggestion that the United States and the Soviet Union are morally equivalent, that with regard to methods and policies there is a rough moral symmetry, is now common enough among our closest allies that its expression no longer causes shock in Europe. Obviously, this is a serious matter. We are democratic countries in which broad consensus is required to sustain foreign policy. If the opinion that the United States is a lawless, reckless gunslinger spreads widely enough, the alliance will simply collapse by mutual consent based on distrust on the European side and disgust on the American side.

As I understand it, the charge that there exists a moral symmetry between the United States and the U.S.S.R. has taken form only in the past year or so, with Grenada, Central America, and missile deployment serving as landmarks in its evolution. Less harsh but still serious charges had been around for some time. Chief among them was the conviction that the United States—especially under Ronald Reagan—is obsessed with East-West relations and that viewing the world through the lenses of East-West conflict causes us to see political conflicts where there may be none and obscures more important indigenous, basic social and economic factors and predisposes us to emphasize bilateral approaches over broader international cooperation and military solutions where economic and social remedies would be more appropriate. Now, on behalf of the U.S. Government, and very formally, I should like to enter a plea of "not guilty" even to this charge, which, though serious, is less than those associated with the doctrine of moral symmetry.

Assistance Programs

And, though we could spend the rest of the day on this subject alone, let me note briefly that our economic assistance programs alone belie the charge that U.S.

foreign policy is driven by a preoccupation with East-West conflict. The United States is a major supporter of multilateral assistance programs. We remain the largest contributors to UN independent agencies and special programs, such as the UN Development Program, UN International Children's Emergency Fund, World Food Program, Food and Agriculture Organization, World Health Organization, and to the international development banks and multilateral fiscal institutions. The contrast between U.S. and U.S.S.R. support for multilateral programs is important. But that is not all.

Today, as in the past, the United States has a powerful proclivity for trying to serve universal goals through its foreign policy. Reluctant to become deeply involved in foreign affairs in the first place, we have always tended to feel that our participation is justified only if it is devoted to abstract universal ends like "making the world safe for democracy" and "abolishing war, hunger, chaos." We are still at it, as demonstrated by Secretary Shultz's statement to the Congress this year on the foreign assistance package. In that statement the Secretary of State emphasized to U.S. lawmakers that the proposed U.S. assistance program for some $15.9 billion in economic and military assistance in fiscal year 1985 serves four U.S. interests:

- Our interest in a growing world economy which enhances the well-being of citizens in both the developing and the industrialized world;
- Our interest in security, protecting our vital interests abroad, strengthening our friends, contributing to regional stability, and backstopping our diplomatic efforts for peaceful solutions to regional problems;
- Our interests in building democracy and promoting adherence to human rights and the rule of law; and
- Our humanitarian interest in alleviating suffering and easing the immediate consequences of catastrophe on the very poor.

My point is that, when we speak to one another, we justify our assistance in terms of trying to build a "world of stability and progress." Contrast, I suggest, our practices not only with the Soviets, who limit their aid to military assistance to countries who are members of the Soviet bloc or ripe for incorporation in it; compare our assistance programs even with those of major allies who, to an extent greater than we, use aid to reinforce special relationships, for example, with former colonies.

I seek no kudos when I say that the U.S. assistance programs provide substantially more economic than military assistance and only rarely are allocated on the basis of U.S. national security in what are called "superpower rivalries." I am not even certain this is a wise allocation of scarce resources. But it is a fact.

What is true for our assistance programs is true also for many other aspects of our foreign policy. In Africa, for example, the United States has worked hard throughout this Administration and previous ones to achieve, through peaceful negotiation, an independent, democratic, stable Namibia. Why? Not because Namibia is a matter of vital U.S. interest. It is not. It is on the other side of the world. We have no significant cultural or historical ties with it. The fact is, we believe Namibia's right to independence should be achieved in a negotiated settlement rather than through the imposition of solutions by force—by whomever.

Another recent example of U.S. efforts to achieve relatively disinterested goals through foreign policy may be seen in Lebanon. A myth has already arisen that the United States sought to impose a military solution wholly inappropriate to the problem, which, according to some mythology, is based on historic, indigenous Lebanese rivalries. Nothing could be more mistaken. In 1958 the United States, seeing Lebanon's independence threatened by radical Arab nationalism, sent 15,000 Marines to protect Lebanon's independence. In 1983 the United States sent 1,500 Marines to a joint peacekeeping effort with France, the United Kingdom, and Italy, first, to ensure the safe evacuation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)—hardly a goal sought by us because we were trying to fit the conflict into an East-West framework. The multinational force (MNF) departed as soon as that task was completed. But after the Sabra and Shatila massacres, the MNF returned in a classical peacekeeping role, interposing itself between factions all of whom, it was believed, basically desired peace.

The effort was sabotaged by someone else's determination to impose a military solution but not that of the United States, the other MNF parties, or Israel. Syria, sending more than 100 tons of ordnance daily into the Shouf, has very nearly succeeded in imposing a military solution. It is symptomatic of the different approaches that President Assad, in his search for a settlement, undertook no shuttles in the manner of Ambassadors Habib, Rumsfeld, or Secretary Shultz. He sent armed emmissaries and waited for peacekeepers to come to him. Various criticisms may be made of our Lebanon policy, but not, I think, that reflected a preoccupation with East-West affairs nor a predilection for military solutions.

Central America

But even if our whole policy is not governed by obsession with East-West rivalry, and even if we do not have an uncontrollable desire to impose military solutions everywhere, surely in Central America the United States reflects, in purest form, all the worst tendencies of U.S. foreign policy: seeing communist influence where there are only indigenous social and economic factors; attempting military solutions where only reforms are appropriate.

Once again, I respectfully dissent. The government headed by Ronald Reagan has not the slightest tendency to imagine that the political turmoil in Central America has no roots in social and economic problems. We know the people of El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica have been ill fed, ill housed, ill clothed, and illiterate for centuries. We know they have generally been governed by bad governments, one-party systems as under Somoza or military dictatorships as in El Salvador before 1979. We know that there existed in both countries neglect, unmet needs, unfulfilled hopes, and that these gave rise to movements for reform and revolution. We understand, broadly speaking, how it happened.

In both Nicaragua and El Salvador, three political currents existed:

First, the traditional oligarchs who had most of what there was to get;

Second, a large group of middle class, farmers, trade unionists, businessmen, who wanted to get rid of the dictator and establish a democratic government; and

Third, a small group of Marxist-Leninists tied to Havana and Moscow, trained, as they themselves have told us, in Havana, in the Middle East with the PLO, or elsewhere in the Soviet bloc; armed and advised by their Soviet sponsors.

In Nicaragua, these two groups, the democrats and Leninists, joined in a broad-based popular front to overthrow Somoza. Their program was democracy, but once in power, the Leninists forced out the democrats and betrayed the promises of democracy made to the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Nicaraguan people. Most of the democrats are now in exile; many are with the Contras, still fighting for a

democratic Nicaragua. The Leninists, meanwhile, have consolidated one-party control.

In El Salvador, where the same three-sided contest existed, no popular fronts was formed. Instead, after a coup overthrew General Romero in October 1979, the democratic forces came to power in the administration of Napoleon Duarte, who immediately undertook to democratize the government, nationalize credit, and instigate sweeping land reforms; the guerrillas and the traditional armed right took up armed struggle against the government—one operating out of Managua; the other, it is said, out of Guatemala.

The stakes are high. The Soviet Union understood the strategic importance of the region, through which most sealanes pass with most of the oil and other strategic materials the United States would supply to Europe in case of an emergency. By 1967 the Soviets were writing in theoretical journals about opportunities for tying down the United States in the Western Hemisphere and rendering us less able to act in such remote places as Europe and Asia. The United States, finally, has also understood the stakes and the challenge and believes that challenge must be met.

Here, concerning U.S. policy in Central America, the charge of obsessive concern with East-West relations melds imperceptibly into an argument that there is no significant moral difference between Soviet policy in Eastern Europe and U.S. policy in Central America. This position was put with clarity during the Oxford Union debate by a questioner who asked:

> Is it not true that your country controls in, for example, the whole of Latin America, many corrupt and puppet governments—and surely the question we are asking you to address yourself tonight is what is the difference, if any—and I suspect there is no difference—as do many, many people in this country—what is the difference between your puppet regimes and the puppet regimes of the Soviet Union?

In a followup exchange the questioner charged Central American governments, supported by the United States, with "terrorizing, torturing, killing."

The first striking fact about views such as those of the questioner is that the level of outrage far exceeds the level of information. The charges do not square with the facts. The United States does not, repeat not, support dictatorships in Central America. Let me be specific. It it not generally understood in Europe that the United States tried hard to encourage and help develop a democracy in Nicaragua:

- By supporting the efforts to replace Somoza and helping to negotiate his departure—supporting the OAS resolution that called for his ouster;
- By providing $25 million in emergency food and medical aid in the first week the Sandinistas came to power and $115 million in generous, prompt economic aid; and
- By offering assistance of diverse kinds relevant to the development of democratic institutions, even though the Sandinista junta gave early signs of claiming a monopoly of power and imposing censorship. We also supported, inside the international fiscal institutions such as the Inter-American Development Bank, Nicaraguan loan applications enabling it to secure from these institutions more assistance than the Somoza regime had received from international fiscal institutions in the previous 20 years.

The United States remains hopeful that Nicaragua's government will decide to cease destabilization of its neighbors, relax repression, and expand freedom in Nicaragua.

In El Salvador, it is well known that the United States supported the coup that brought down General Romero in October 1979, installed Napoleon Duarte and his Christian Democrats in office, and sponsored the land reforms which were designed by AFL-CIO specialists. From that time forward, the United States has encouraged and assisted a process of democratic development in El Salvador, which has been warmly supported by the Salvadoran people—who walk for miles, stand for hours, braving bullets and threats to cast their votes in favor of democracy in El Salvador. In a hundred ways, the people of El Salvador continue to demonstrate their lack of support for the guerrillas whose violence has not won the hearts or minds of the Salvadorans. Violent minorities—relying on revolution and not persuasion—can devastate the economy, terrorize families and villages. But in more than 4 years of trying, they have not prevented the great majority of Salvadorans from showing their opposition to politics of violence and extending their support for democratic politics.

It is true that the United States has strategic goals in Central America. We believe it would be bad for the people of the region and bad for the United States for there to be installed one-party, Marxist-Leninist states integrated into the Soviet bloc and willing to have their territory serve as bases for the projection of Soviet military power in the hemisphere. That is the strategic basis of our policy. We also have serious political and moral grounds for this position.

- We do not think it is moral to leave small countries and helpless people defenseless against conquest by violent minorities which are armed and trained by remote dictatorships. The amount of Soviet-bloc arms funneled into El Salvador is staggering. So is the sophistication of the guerrilla command and control system, including a special communication system that guides the insurgency from outside Managua.
- We believe our political goal, a more democratic and stable hemisphere, requires building democracies, not the multiplication of dictatorships.

The U.S. Government warmly supports the democratic governments of Costa Rica and Honduras and works to further democratic development in Central America. To that end, the recommendations of the Kissinger commission have been translated into a legislative package which has been submitted to Congress. The package calls for a mix of social, economic, political, and security assistance, not unlike the support package that helped to rebuild Europe after World War II.

The U.S. Government agrees with the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America that:

> Central America is both vital and vulnerable and that whatever other cases may arise to claim the nation's attention, the U.S. cannot afford to turn away from that threatened region. Central America's crisis is our crisis.

We do see East-West dimensions to that crisis. We do see external support as well as indigenous social and economic factors. We want to respond to all levels of the problem. We do seek a negotiated diplomatic solution. We support and have supported a wide variety of diplomatic efforts, the most important current one, the Contadora process, to resolve the regional problems within the region. We will continue to do so.

The time has come in this discussion to confront the issue of using force. I am aware that the United States is charged today with displaying a proclivity for the use of force to solve problems, a penchant for military solutions. The proofs cited, as I understand it, are our landing in Grenada, which both we and the Grenadans call a liberation, not an invasion; our military assistance to the Government of El Salvador; our presence, through military maneuvers, in Honduras; and our putative support for Nicaragua's insurgents. Sometimes participation in the multinational force in Lebanon is also adduced to support the view that the U.S. Government is heade

by gunslingers who would, in the words of a famous American cigarette advertisement, "rather fight than switch."

I desire to deal forthrightly with these questions, beginning with Central America. Let me turn, then, to Grenada and the arms race.

The facts are not really difficult to establish. El Salvador has been the object of unceasing armed attacks by insurgents whose identity, training, supplies, and goals are clear. The leadership of El Salvador's FMLN [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front] has been open about their commitment to armed struggle and prolonged war. An article by Shafik Handal in the *World Marxist Review* of fall 1980 straightforwardly explains that the FMLN has no interest in a negotiated settlement, being persuaded that full victory is within reach. Since then, certain proposals for what they call "power sharing" have been made—all involve "restructuring" the government; "purging" the armed forces, national guard, and police; and otherwise assuming power over the state. They have continued to this moment to reject utterly "power sharing" based on free elections held in the presence of international observers. The reasons, doubtless, are that they know they do not enjoy popular support; and they do not, in any case, recognize popular sovereignty expressed through free elections as the legitimate basis of a legitimate government.

Confronted with the need to combat the guerrillas and also control violence from other sources, the Government of El Salvador requires arms, training, and communications equipment. Otherwise, it will simply be vanquished by superior force, after which a new dictatorship will be imposed on an unwilling people. There is only one group seeking to impose a military solution in El Salvador; they are the guerrillas. It is all very well to argue that persons of good will ought to be able to find a peaceful solution peaceably. But if one side makes surrender a precondition of peace, then the alternatives are only to surrender or resist. We can, of course, continue to try to persuade the other party to reconsider. And that is precisely what the United States has done and is doing in El Salvador. Meanwhile, however, we believe it necessary and acceptable to supply military assistance needed to permit the government to continue to resist guerrilla attacks. Morality does not, indeed cannot, require that we stand by passively while a small nation—underequipped and unsophisticated—succumbs to well-armed and trained guerrilla forces.

More than El Salvador is at stake. Subversion and violence have already disrupted ordinary life in Costa Rica and Honduras. Do we leave them essentially defenseless against externally supported violence? What of Chad? What of the Sudan? Has the transvaluation of values so far progressed that now, in the West, it is not permissible to help countries help protect themselves against armed subversion and armed aggression?

From our side of the Atlantic, it sometimes seems that in Europe there is more sympathy for the Nicaraguans who threaten the peace, independence, and freedom of all their neighbors than for the neighbors themselves. Sometimes it seems there is more "understanding" of the thousands of Cuban and Soviet-bloc military advisers in Nicaragua—one of whose tasks it is to direct the struggle against El Salvador—than for the 37 or so U.S. military advisers in El Salvador who help that country fend off its would-be conquerers. Sometimes it seems that there is more enthusiasm for Nicaragua's preparations for what gives every evidence of being staged, rigged elections than for El Salvador's earnest efforts to have genuinely free elections under difficult circumstances. Sometimes it sounds as though our friends are as inclined to exaggerate America's minimal use of force for limited, defensive purposes as they are to minimize the Soviet bloc's regular reliance on force to subvert and overwhelm hapless, too often helpless, Third World nations.

Grenada and Afghanistan

With the landing on Grenada, attacks on the United States reached a crescendo. Americans, it was asserted, were no better than the Soviets. Invading Grenada is no different than Argentina invading the Falklands. One Member of Parliament asserted there was an "uncanny resemblance." Another charged:

> If the governments arrogate to themselves the right to change the governments of other sovereign states, there can be no peace in this world in perhaps the most dangerous age which the human race has ever known. It is quite improper for Hon. Members to condemn, as we have, the violation of international law by the Soviet Union in its attack on Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan if we do not apply the same standards to the United States' attack on Grenada two days ago.

Obviously, we don't agree. Moreover, we found it truly unbelievable that countries which were themselves so recently liberated by force from the occupying troops and quisling governments of Nazi tyrants, or who participated in that liberation, should have been unable to distinguish between force used to conquer and victimize and force used to liberate. We believe we acted on solid legal grounds to protect 1,000 American nationals—some of whom we had good reason to believe were in real danger—and at the request of the Governor General and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), which, in turn, acted in accordance with its treaty. We have discussed our view of the legal grounds of our actions at length in other arenas. I am concerned today with the Grenada-Afghanistan analogy, which is perhaps the clearest example of the argument that there is no moral difference between the superpowers.

To argue that the use of force by the United States in Grenada was equivalent to the Soviet's use of force in Afghanistan, it is necessary to overlook the circumstances under which the two "invasions" were undertaken, the policies followed after the so-called "invasions" took place, and the views of the populace involved.

First, the circumstances—it is true that the Soviet Union cited as justification of its invasion of Afghanistan a supposed request for assistance made by the Afghan Government under the 1978 Soviet-Afghan treaty of friendship. But, whereas United States and OECS forces went to great lengths to protect and rescue Sir Paul Scoon, who was in hiding for his life and who is now alive and free to verify his participation in invoking the action—as well as to lay the groundwork for free elections and the establishment of constitutional government in Grenada—the very first action of Soviet forces in Afghanistan was the murder, by a special Soviet assault team, of then-President Hafizullah Amin, in whose name they claimed to be acting.

Second, less than 1 week after the military action in Grenada began, Governor General Scoon was beginning to lay the groundwork for future free elections and a return to constitutional government. U.S. forces were reduced from 3,000 to fewer than 300 in a matter of weeks. Four years after the Soviet invasions of Afghanistan, there has never been the slightest suggestion by Soviet authorities or by the regime they installed in Kabul that free elections will ever be held in Afghanistan. Moscow has repeatedly declared that the "Socialist revolution" in Afghanistan, i.e., the coup of April 27, 1978, is "irreversible," has refused to suggest any timetable for withdrawal of its forces, has annexed portions of Afghan territory, has built

massive permanent military installations, and has thousands of Soviet personnel making the actual decisions in nominally Afghan Government offices.

Third, the people of Grenada have welcomed U.S. and OECS forces as liberators and are assuredly not fighting against them; indeed, many, if not most, members of the Grenadan Army and militia laid down their arms and returned to civilian life. It was outside occupation forces—i.e., Cubans—who dug in and fought, leading to ongoing suffering.

In Afghanistan, on the other hand, Soviet forces numbering close to 125,000 are supported by a mere handful of communist party functionaries dependent on Soviet protection and are opposed by the general population, who form the resistance which has been fighting the Soviet occupation for 4 years. Not even the Soviet Union reported grateful Afghans lining the streets of Kabul to shout "God Bless Brezhnev."

The proof of the pudding is in the eating. Not only did the students and the people of Grenada welcome the American, Jamaican, Barbadian, and OECS forces as liberators but a recent poll in Grenada—conducted by an American academic organization not famous for its support of the Administration—shows approximately 84% of the population both believed they were in danger and were glad that U.S. troops came to Grenada. The American students feel the same way and still have not forgiven the U.S. reporters whom they accuse of failing to understand the danger.

Conclusion

In conclusion, let me say that the most important problem about the doctrine of moral equivalence is that it eliminates all the most important distinctions and confuses almost all the important issues of international affairs today. Take the arms race: the very notion that there is an arms race in the first place and not a belated response to Soviet military buildup is a problem. The very widespread assumption that they respond to our provocations is equally false; in fact, we permitted them, as a matter of deliberate policy, to gain parity. And, having gained parity, the Soviets proceeded to accelerate further their arms buildup, not to slow it down.

In thinking about the doctrine of moral symmetry, I was reminded of the doctrine of "*tous azimuts*," which the French Communist Party has advocated from time to time in regard to the *force de frappe*. It seemed to me that a doctrine of "*tous azimuts*" in regard to moral quality is perhaps even more dangerous than one with regard to nuclear weapons. If it is no longer possible to distinguish between freedom and despotism—the United States is a free society; between consent and violence, we are a society based on consent; between open and closed societies, we are an open society—then the erosion of the foundation of a distinctively Western, democratic civilization is already far advanced and the situation is serious indeed. ■

U.S. Position on Jerusalem

by Michael H. Armacost

Statement before the Subcommittees for Europe and the Middle East and International Operations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 21, 1984. Ambassador Armacost is Under Secretary for Political Affairs.[1]

I appreciate the opportunity to meet with the members of these subcommittees to discuss the Administration's position on H.R. 4877, which provides for the U.S. Embassy and Ambassador's residence in Israel to be moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

The issues involved in this bill are important and sensitive; they have far-reaching implications for the U.S. role in the Middle East. Before I outline the reasons for our opposition to this bill, let me describe the context from which we approach this issue.

The United States has long been Israel's closest friend and supporter. In 1948, the State of Israel proclaimed its independence, and the United States was the first country to extend it recognition. We established diplomatic relations and opened an embassy in Tel Aviv, then Israel's seat of government. Since then, the United States and Israel have shared a special friendship whose depth and uniqueness are recognized throughout the world. No one can doubt the commitment of the United States to the security and well-being of Israel. No one can deny that the Reagan Administration regards a strong Israel not only as a guarantor of security for its people but as a close friend and valued strategic partner to America and the West. No one can discount or diminish the many tangible steps taken by this Administration to broaden and deepen the scope of day-to-day friendship and cooperation between Israel and the United States.

I regret that the location of our Embassy in Israel has been made the subject of legislative proposals. We recognize the sincerity of the motivations of those sponsoring or supporting the bill before the committee. We also appreciate the special importance of Jerusalem to Israel and to Jews the world over. I am not here to take issue with these facts. I do, however, want to review with you the serious, sober, and substantial reasons for our position on the issue of our Embassy's location.

As you know, the United States has consistently sought to encourage peace in the Middle East through negotiations, and we have consistently opposed efforts to resolve Arab-Israeli differences through force or unilateral actions. This principled commitment of the United States has helped preserve our ability to serve as the only effective mediator between the parties.

Jerusalem is a city with deep religious significance for Jews, Muslims, and Christians throughout the world. Its status is also one of the fundamental issues Arabs and Israelis will have to resolve if there is to be peace between them. Precisely because of the key mediating role we have played in the past—and the interest we have in being able to play such a role in the future—our position on this sensitive issue is of critical importance to the parties. A change in the U.S. position on the status of Jerusalem, we are convinced, would seriously impair our ability to play a constructive role when the parties resume the search for peace. Indeed, it would complicate the resumption of that process. Moving our embassy to Jerusalem would be interpreted by many as prejudging the outcome of negotiations, thereby seriously eroding our credibility as an honest broker.

Our Embassy has remained in Tel Aviv for over three decades. This decision has not been capricious. The rationale has been found persuasive by eight Administrations—Democratic and Republican. Each has had to deal with the Jerusalem question in one way or another. Each has considered it a mistake for the United States to endorse or acquiesce in the effort of any state to determine the status of the city unilaterally.

As early as 1949, when Israel began to relocate government ministeries to Jerusalem, we explained that we could not accept its unilateral claim to the city and could not move our Embassy there. Again, in 1960, we informed Jordan of our opposition to its making the eastern part of the city Jordan's second capital. We sought to preclude any unilateral actions that would prejudice a negotiated resolution of the status of the city or its reunification. The Israeli actions of 1967 to extend Israeli law and administration to the eastern part of the city did not affect the U.S. commitment to a negotiated settlement of the status of Jerusalem.

Surely, a key question for us all is whether a move of the embassy would improve, or harm, prospects of achieving the peace we all seek. We would not have achieved the Camp David accords—which led to Israel's first peace treaty with an Arab state—if the United States had adopted the position of either Israel or Egypt on the subject of Jerusalem. President Carter's separate letter attached to the Camp David accords reiterated the U.S. position that the status of Jerusalem must be resolved through negotiations. That position was restated by President Reagan in his September 1, 1982, Middle East initiative: "Jerusalem must remain undivided but its final status should be determined through negotiations." We remain dedicated to encouraging the process of such negotiations.

The bill before the committee also raises serious constitutional problems. In our view, it would be a direct interference in the President's constitutional authority to conduct foreign affairs. The President has historically been responsible for conducting diplomatic relations on behalf of the United States. This has included the determination of where and through what means to conduct such relations and deciding questions of recognition. Legislation directing him to relocate an embassy would be in direct conflict with this basic principle.

I am fully aware of the frustrations many feel because of our position on this issue. Much as all of us in the Administration understand this and regret it, we must look at the long term. I am convinced that in the long term it is peace for Israel that will bring with it a solution to the problem of the status of Jerusalem. Throughout the history of the State of Israel, the United States has been committed to helping secure for that nation a just and lasting peace. We must continue to be able to play what has become an indispensable role.

[1]The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

U.S. Policy in the Pacific Island Region

President Reagan's responses to questions submitted by Pacific Magazine, *May 4, 1984.*[1]

Q. Is it possible to state in a few concise words what the basic principles and goals are of U.S. policy in the Pacific island region?

A. First of all, we are part of the Pacific island region. Hawaii, American Samoa, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands, which soon should formally acquire commonwealth status, make the United States of America a permanent part of the area. In addition, we continue to have a special relationship with the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau.

Our relationship with the Pacific island region is a partnership. We share a strong belief in freedom and democracy, respect for human rights, and faith in the power of the free market. We want to build on these values to establish even better relationships with the new nations of the Pacific. And we want to help the islanders keep the region free from tensions and rivalries as it has been since World War II.

Q. Is there any likelihood that in the future there will be more U.S. aid to the Pacific island nations, possibly on a direct bilateral basis?

A. We intend to maintain a helpful development assistance role, supplementing the larger programs of Australia and New Zealand. We anticipate that future U.S. aid to the region will be at modestly increasing levels.

Our assistance is available indirectly through the Asian Development Bank, the United Nations, and various regional institutions. There are grants to local and U.S. private voluntary organizations for programs in the individual countries, and of course, we have the U.S. Peace Corps. The system seems to work quite well. This approach provides a broad range of U.S. assistance on a regional and individual country basis.

I should also add that private business can and will play a larger role in the economic development of the Pacific island region than aid from any government. This theme was stressed in my message to the South Pacific conference held in American Samoa 1½ years ago. The free enterprise system is the best way to promote growth and development. As far as Micronesia is concerned, we are the primary donor, and if Congress approves, we will continue to support the economic development of the Micronesian states under the Compact of Free Association.

Q. Vanuatu has recently established full diplomatic relations with Cuba. The Solomon Islands has adopted a policy of looking to Southeast Asia for partners in its economic development. Western Samoa has full diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China and a significant cultural exchange program. Kiribati is receiving some material aid from the People's Republic of China. Do you regard these events as a trend that may cause the United States to reassess its Pacific islands policies?

A. As independent countries, Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, Western Samoa, and Kiribati have the right to choose their friends. We share a community of values and interests with the islanders. We try to understand their activities in light of our common interests. We hope they take the same approach with us.

Q. Some heads of state from South Pacific nations have complained that not enough attention is paid to them in Washington. Is there still a residual attitude in Washington that writes off the islands because of their comparatively small populations?

A. Direct U.S. involvement in the South Pacific was very limited until the middle 1970s, since almost all of the islands were colonial dependencies of other states. Nevertheless, the United States began responding to the changing situation in the South Pacific more than a decade ago. We initiated Peace Corps programs, educational and cultural exchanges, and established consulates. As more states became independent, we upgraded the consulates to embassies and accredited ambassadors. This process is continuing. We are now considering additional diplomatic representation in the area. These posts symbolize our recognition of the importance of the Pacific island nations. Also, recently, we began a regional development assistance program and stepped up our contributions to the work of the South Pacific Commission.

I can assure you that the U.S. Government is very conscious of the island states and sensitive to their needs and aspirations.

Q. Now that the Compact of Free Association between the United States and the Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, and Palau is close to completion, do you foresee anything that could block approval of the compact in the U.S. Congress or the United Nations?

A. Because the compact reflects the will of the people, I hope that both the U.S. Congress and the international community will recognize that self-government for the peoples of the Trust Territory should not be delayed. I have sent the compact to Congress with a message urging its approval. We expect close examination of the compact by the Congress. The democratic process and public review of the compact and implementing the mandate of the Palauan people. The primary issue has to do with nuclear materials.

Free association is a partnership. Under the compact, the United States has responsibility for regional peace and stability, while Palau would have self-government, substantial economic assistance, and autonomy in foreign affairs. This partnership requires the United States to perform a security role. Therefore, I have asked the U.S. Congress to approve the compact with the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia at this time. I will request congressional approval of the compact with Palau only after that government has confirmed that its internal constitutional approval process is complete. We will cooperate with the Palauan Government, but ultimately it is an issue for the Palauans to decide.

Partnership requires resolution of this issue. Last October the President of Palau joined the Presidents of the Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands in signing the Saipan accords, which call for prompt approval of the compact by the U.S. Congress and early termination of the trusteeship.

Q. Leaders in these islands—the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau—generally give the United States high marks for promoting democracy. However, they have often criticized its effort in promoting economic development. Is your Administration addressing this issue?

A. We are meeting that challenge head-on. The United States supports the operations and economic development of these governments under UN trusteeship. A long-range capital improvement program devoted to basic requirements such as power, water, and sewage systems, docks, roads, and airports, is near completion. Looking to the future, the Compact of Free Association provides substantial grants for government operations, social services, capital improvements, economic development programs, health, education, telecommunications, energy self-sufficiency, and other needs.

This assistance will enable the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau to work toward the economic goals they have established for themselves. I would like to highlight the point that the elected leaders of the Micronesians will establish the economic policies under the compact. This will put decisionmaking authority and economic resources in the hands of Micronesians and their leaders.

Q. How does your Administration evaluate the prospects for economic independence of these island nations after the expiration of the U.S. compact-related funding?

A. During the initial term of free association, the Micronesians will have the tools and resources to make significant progress toward economic self-sufficiency. Much will depend on the priorities they establish and their ability to exercise fiscal restraint. The compact provides an opportunity for them to move toward their goals and objectives.

Again, however, I want to stress the important role of private business. A free enterprise system offers opportunity and rewards initiative, imagination, hard work, perseverance, and productivity. The governments of the Micronesian States will find that the private sector is the key to a promising future.

Q. Is it likely that the United States will require more naval, air, and ground force bases in the Pacific islands in the future than it now has?

A. The short answer is no. However, it is always wise to preserve our options. The United States already has important air and naval bases on Guam. They will continue to be the principal U.S. facilities in the central Pacific. In addition, we exercised our option for a long-term lease of land in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, which will ensure added flexibility to meet any change in our base and logistics requirements. Although current plans are to use the area only for training, we will also have the option, under the compact, for limited harbor, airfield, and training sites in Palau. The only other defense installation in Micronesia is our testing facility at Kwajalein. Use of this facility is set by the compact for 15 years, with an option for an additional 15 years. We do not anticipate the need for any major changes.

Q. A tremendous amount of attention has been given to the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau during the years of negotiating the Compact of Free Association with them. In the meantime, many people in the U.S. Pacific territories of American Samoa, Guam, and the Northern Marianas are complaining that they are being overlooked—not enough U.S. private capital, not enough technical assistance. Do you think these complaints are justified?

A. I can understand why the American territories view the negotiations in Micronesia with great interest. Guam has been a loyal part of the American political family since 1898; American Samoa since 1900. The people of the Northern Marianas chose to become Americans in 1975. The Compact of Free Association has been negotiated over the past 14 years. It is an agreement that recognizes the sovereignty of the people of Micronesia.

Although Americans in the territories have watched these negotiations with interest, I hope they share my

pride in their own permanent role in America's future.

American Samoa, Guam, and the Northern Marianas are part of the American family. We have done much to guarantee that their specific problems receive special assistance. And we will do more. We are working with the three territories to diversify and expand their economies, particularly with the help of the private sector.

The territories do need more technical assistance and a major effort is underway to establish long-range technical assistance objectives for major programs in each territory. Once the objectives are established, needed resources will be better defined. During the last 2 years, the U.S. Congress has been supportive of increased technical assistance programs, and I hope this welcome trend continues.

But there still is not enough U.S. private capital available to the territories. We are exploring ways to make financial capital more available and accessible. We are working closely with the territories to identify and make changes in Federal regulations and legislation. That will promote economic development.

The most important thing to remember is that the people there are our fellow U.S. citizens and nationals. They enjoy great benefits and carry the responsibilities of citizenship. They have, and should have, the full resources of the Federal Government available to them. The challenge—and one I'm sure we can assist—is to tailor those benefits to their unique circumstances.

Q. The United States has not yet signed the Law of the Sea Convention. Why not? Is it possible that the United States would sign it if it were in any way amended?

A. When we announced that the United States would not sign the convention, I stated that the deep seabed mining section did not meet U.S. objectives. Our problems with the deep seabed mining regime include:

- Provisions that would actually deter future development of deep seabed resources, when such development should serve the interest of all countries;
- A decisionmaking process that would not give the United States or others a role that fairly reflects and protects their interests;
- Provisions that would allow amendments without U.S. approval. This is incompatible with our approach to treaties;
- Stipulations relating to mandatory transfer of private technology and the possibility of national liberation movements sharing in benefits; and
- The absence of assured access for future qualified deep seabed miners to promote the development of these resources.

In spite of our well-known objections and renewed negotiating efforts in early 1982, the Law of the Sea Conference adopted the convention on April 30, 1982, although, after nearly 2 years, it has not yet come into force. I would also point out that many major industrialized nations share our concerns. As to amending the convention, at this point it would be most difficult, and we are not aware of any move to do so.

Nevertheless, the convention contains many positive and significant accomplishments. We are prepared to accept and act in accordance with international law as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention that relates to traditional uses of the ocean. We are willing to respect the maritime claims of others, including economic zones, that are consistent with international law as reflected in the convention, so long as the international rights and freedoms of the United States and others in such areas are respected.

Q. The nuclear issue is a big one in the Pacific. Could you clarify the U.S. position on the testing of nuclear weapons and on the dumping of nuclear waste in the South Pacific?

A. The United States is sensitive to the nuclear concerns of the island people. We share the desire to protect the ocean from pollution. The United States is a party to the London dumping convention and other international agreements aimed at protecting the health of the oceans. Our domestic laws regulating ocean dumping are even more stringent and are vigorously enforced. The United States is also a member of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which bans nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water.

Q. The passage of U.S. Navy ships that are nuclear powered and that are capable of carrying nuclear weapons is also of concern to the people of the South Pacific. Can you clarify the U.S. position in this regard?

A. U.S. nuclear-powered warships have an unparalleled record of safe operation since the first nuclear-powered ship became operational in 1955. U.S. nuclear-powered ships have accumulated over 2,700 reactor years of operation without a single nuclear mishap. This record reflects the very strict control exercised over the design, construction, operation, maintenance, and repair of our nuclear-powered ships and the careful selection, training, and qualification of the personnel manning the ships.

Over 40% of our navy's major ships are nuclear powered, and they are among our most effective ships. Access to all areas of the oceans by U.S. nuclear-powered warships is essential to maintain the peace.

The ability of the United States to deter aggression and to help maintain peace throughout the world depends on the ability of its ships and aircraft to travel the ocean spaces, including the South Pacific. The presence of the U.S. Navy ships does not pose a danger to the interests of the people of the South Pacific; rather, it helps guarantee their continued peace and freedom.

Q. You are a man from California—the Pacific State. What would you like the Pacific people to remember you and your Administration for having accomplished in the Pacific?

A. As a Californian, I am particularly aware of our Pacific interests. I would like to have our Administration remembered as one which fully recognized the importance of Asia and the Pacific. Focus is shifting increasingly to the Pacific, which is now—as I said earlier—the fastest growing economic region of the world. We want to build on the good relations we already have and make them stronger. We want to do our part to encourage regional cooperation. And we want to continue our security role, a role that permits the islands to develop politically and economically according to the wishes of the islanders themselves.

Recently, meeting at the White House with a group of Americans of Asian and Pacific heritage, I had a chance to reflect on the contributions to American society that derive from the people of this region. It's part of what you might call "the spirit of America." Back in the fall of 1980, I attended a rally held in the shadow of the Statue of Liberty. And there were many nationalities and ethnic groups there, all reminding us that we're all descendants from immigrants who came here looking for freedom and opportunity. And, while our country had its flaws and we still have them, the American dream was real.

Asian and Pacific Americans have helped preserve that dream by living up to the bedrock values that make us a good and a worthy people. I'm talking about principles that begin with the sacred worth of human life, religious faith, community spirit, and the responsibility of parents and schools to be teachers of tolerance, hard work, fiscal responsibility, cooperation, and love. After all, it is values, not programs and policies, that serve as our nation's compass. They hold us on course. They point the way to a promising future.

America needs its Asian and Pacific American citizens. They've enriched our national cultural and our heritage. They've held the beliefs that account for so much of our economic and social progress. They've never stopped striving for excellence, despite times in the past when they experienced terrible discrimination. We will continue to fight against discrimination, wherever there are any vestiges of it remaining, until we've removed such bigotry from our entire land.

And when we look toward that great and grand Pacific Basin, there's a promising future. Americans may not hear much about our Pacific and Asian foreign policy, but then there's a lot of good news that they don't seem to hear about.

Our relations with our Pacific and Asian friends and allies have never been better. First of all, as I indicated in answering your first question, it's not all foreign policy. The United States of America is part of the Pacific. There's Hawaii, American Samoa, Guam, and the soon-to-be commonwealth status of the Northern Mariana Islands and our special relationship with the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republics of the Marshall Islands and Palau. It is my hope that our Administration will be remembered as helping the people of the Pacific Basin achieve their hopes and aspirations, and that together, we will bring a pacific, tranquil future to the region.

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[1]Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of May 14, 1984. ■

Refugees: Overseas Aid and Domestic Admissions

by James N. Purcell, Jr.

Address before the seventh annual National Legal Conference on Immigration and Refugee Policy convened by the Center for Migration Studies in Washington, D.C., on March 30, 1984. Mr. Purcell is Director of the Bureau for Refugee Programs.

The refugee crises of the second half of the 1970s posed an immense challenge to the international community and to the United States in particular. The takeover of the Indochinese countries by communist regimes, the expulsion of thousands of Cubans by the Castro regime, the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, the Ogaden war in the Horn of Africa, and the upheaval in Iran all created large numbers of refugees. The refugee crises we had to deal with as a result of these events have been largely overcome, and we are now faced with situations where regional solutions to refugee problems can be more aggressively explored.

Today I would like to talk about refugee assistance versus admissions because these are the basic alternatives facing the international community and the U.S. refugee program during the next few years. The changing composition of the refugee population in the world today and U.S. policy decisions have brought about a reduction in refugee admissions to the United States. At the same time, we are continuing to provide strong support for the assistance needs of refugees through contributions to international organizations and private voluntary agencies.

We have also been actively encouraging other traditional refugee-receiving states to contribute more generously to refugee assistance programs and to take their fair share of the refugees who must be resettled. A graphic illustration of the shift in U.S. refugee programs from admissions to assistance can be seen in the change in the last few years in the level of funding of these two functions. Four years ago, two-thirds of the funding in our appropriation was used for admissions to the United States and only one-third for assistance to refugees abroad. Since then, the funding levels have been basically reversed. Our FY 1985 budget request calls for $196.3 million for assistance and $117.3 million for admissions programs.

Proposed Spending for Refugee Assistance

Let's examine for a minute the breakdown of our proposed spending for refugee assistance in the current fiscal year. The largest single item under this heading is $67 million for assistance to Palestinian refugees through the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). The approximately 2 million Palestinian refugees in the Middle East registered with UNRWA constitute the longest continuous refugee problem we have had to deal with. Our assistance to this refugee population supports U.S. efforts for peace in the Middle East while answering a real humanitarian need. Only a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute appears likely to finally resolve this refugee situation.

We are requesting $54.5 million for assistance to refugees in Africa. The African nations have historically provided asylum to neighboring populations fleeing civil strife and natural disasters. Here again the primary requirement is for care and maintenance assistance, not resettlement in the United States. Together with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the African nations themselves, the United States is working toward finding permanent solutions for the refugee problems created by the political and social conditions in Ethiopia, Uganda, South Africa, and some of the other countries of Africa. The upcoming International Conference for Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA II), in which the United States will participate, will provide an opportunity to spotlight the urgent assistance needs of the approximately 2 million refugees on that continent.

Next on the list of assistance programs in terms of funding is the request for $26 million to assist Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Some 2.9 million Afghans have registered with the Government of Pakistan as refugees. U.S. assistance funds are channeled through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and a number of private voluntary agencies. In addition, the United States will provide food aid to Afghan refugees through the World Food Program of the United Nations. The generosity of the Pakistani Government in providing asylum to the Afghan refugees has greatly eased the burden on the world community of this enormous

refugee population. Most of these refugees are tribal agriculturalists who are determined to return to Afghanistan some day and, therefore, resettlement outside the area is not generally desired. Pending a settlement of the internal political strife in Afghanistan and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from that country, we must continue to provide a relatively high level of assistance to the Afghan population living in the Pakistani borderlands.

Finally, we have requested $15 million for assistance to refugees in Latin America. Although the number of refugees is small—approximately 150,000 according to UNHCR estimates—the proximity of the area to the United States and our deep interest in developments in Central America warrant a relatively high level of assistance. In almost all cases, refugees have been granted asylum by neighboring states pending a resolution of the conflicts in their home countries, and resettlement outside the area has not been necessary.

Refugee Admissions

The regions which we have looked at so far—the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, and Latin America—contain the vast bulk of the world's refugees, approximately 7.3 million out of a total refugee population of 7.7 million in the world today. As I have noted, in these regions, and for all but a few of these refugees, assistance through international organizations and private voluntary agencies is the proper role for the United States to play. Where then does admissions fit into the picture of U.S. refugee policy?

For FY 1985, the Department of State will request a worldwide ceiling of 72,000 for the resettlement of refugees in the United States. This is the same ceiling we requested in FY 1984. And as in FY 1984, 50,000 of these numbers are intended for refugees from East Asia, with 22,000 for refugees from the other geographic areas. We are continuing to work closely with the governments of the first-asylum countries in Southeast Asia in the international effort to resettle those refugees who require resettlement. Combined with the admissions opportunities provided by other major resettlement countries such as France, Australia, and Canada, this level of U.S. admissions should greatly reduce the first-asylum burden on the countries of Southeast Asia, which have acted as hosts to thousands of refugees from Indochina. In addition, I believe that the 22,000 remaining numbers will provide adequately for those refugees from other regions who require resettlement in the United States. The proposed ceilings for those regions are: Near East and South Asia—6,000; Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union—12,000; Africa—3,000; and Latin America and the Caribbean—1,000.

My purpose in throwing these statistics at you has been to demonstrate that the magnitude of the refugee resettlement problem is not as great as you might think. Indeed, only some 5% of those migrating to the United States every year are legal refugees; the remainder are immigrants and illegal migrants. While the number of refugees needing assistance remains great, those requiring resettlement in countries far from their native lands has been steadily reduced. I want to stress that this situation is "normal" in that it reflects the overcoming of a series of emergencies which hit the United States and other resettlement countries in the 1970s. We are not "closing the doors" to refugees. We are reacting for the most part to the changing nature of the refugee problem in the world and, in particular, to the diminished flow of refugees from Indochina. In this current period, the appropriate response is more often assistance than admissions.

Problem Areas

While the world refugee situation has stabilized, two problem areas remain which I would like to address:

First, the need to afford better protection to those refugees who have not yet found safety and security; and

Second, the need to bring under greater control the crisis which has existed in Southeast Asia since 1975.

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees issued a report in August 1983 calling the international community's attention to the urgent need to provide better protection to persons fleeing from oppression. The High Commissioner's "Note on International Protection" pointed out that not only were countries taking a more restrictive position on legal protection, but in some instances the physical protection situation of refugees had also worsened.

The provision of legal protection to refugees has been complicated by the debate over whether many asylum seekers are, in fact, "economic migrants" who have no fears of persecution in their countries of origin. Indicative of the hardening attitude toward granting asylum is the new Swiss law on asylum due to take effect on April 1. This law, a revision of the liberal 1981 asylum statute, will deny work permits to asylum applicants and will allow only a single appeal in cases where asylum is refused. Previously, asylum applicants were granted permission to work while their cases were pending and could file two appeals. Asylum applications which the authorities consider groundless can be denied without granting the applicant a personal interview.

It is ironic that in Switzerland, the headquarters country of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the government should be taking measures to reduce the number of persons granted asylum. I mention the Swiss case only as an illustration of a wider phenomenon among the economically hard-pressed developed countries. We can hardly be smug about this issue. Here in the United States we, too, are faced with increasingly difficult decisions about who should be granted asylum. There is no easy answer to this dilemma.

While the legal protection question is troublesome, the physical protection problem is truly alarming. The savage pirate attacks on boat people in the waters south of Vietnam and the armed attacks on refugee camps on the Thai-Kampuchean border and in Lebanon are the most dramatic examples of the physical protection problem. Together with the UNHCR and the other donor nations, we are working with Thailand to find ways in which the antipiracy campaign in the Gulf of Thailand can be made more effective. During 1983 the UNHCR estimates that 40% of the boats carrying escapees from Vietnam were attacked by pirates. The figures of the number of people killed, raped, and left to die at sea are truly horrifying. It is imperative that a vigorous antipiracy program stop this mayhem as soon as possible.

A related area in which greater efforts at physical protection are needed is the rescue at sea of boat people. UNHCR figures show that, in 1980, 20% of all Vietnamese refugees arriving in Southeast Asian refugee camps had been picked up by ships traversing the South China Sea. In 1983 this figure had dropped to 12%. Various reasons have been advanced to account for this decline, but it is clear that to a great extent boat people are being passed up because ship captains fear they will not be able to disembark the refugees at the next port of call and will be forced to incur considerable expense for their upkeep until some country agrees to accept them. Here again, together with UNHCR, the United States is actively engaged in educating shipping organizations and ships' masters about the procedure for handling persons embarked at sea. For this procedure to

work, however, there must be ready resettlement offers for such people. Unfortunately, the number of such resettlement offers has decreased.

The other area of concern which I mentioned is how to gain greater control over the international resettlement effort for Indochinese refugees. Here, also, we are faced with some difficult protection issues. Countries of first asylum in Southeast Asia have reacted to many of the more recent arrivals from Indochina by instituting, in some instances, a policy of "humane deterrence." The use of closed camps—in which persons are not permitted to have contact with the UNHCR and in which "austere" living conditions are imposed in order to discourage additional migrants—poses questions which concern us all.

We in the U.S. refugee program are faced with the question of how to deal with the so-called "Priority Six" refugees from Indochina—those who have no identifiable ties to the United States but who satisfy the definition of a refugee under U.S. law. Do we agree to accept such people for resettlement in the United States? If so, can we be assured that other countries will take their fair share of the refugees remaining in countries of first asylum? I believe that through a policy of discouraging additional clandestine flight from Vietnam by expanding the UNHCR's Orderly Departure Program and through continued international cooperation in resettling the remaining refugees in first asylum, the Indochinese refugee problem can be largely contained in the next few years.

U.S. Dedication to Safeguarding Refugee Interests

Despite these troublesome issues of protection and resettlement, I think we can look with some satisfaction on the current state of the U.S. refugee program. We have responded generously to appeals for assistance to refugees in Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and Latin America. We are working with the UNHCR and other resettlement countries to expand the Orderly Departure Program from Vietnam, which hopefully will provide a safe means of exit from that country and thereby end the phenomenon of the boat people, with all its attendant problems, particularly the scourge of pirate attacks. I am certain that as we move into the 1980s the United States will continue to provide leadership to the international community in safeguarding the interests of refugees. Although the mix between admissions and assistance may change, this will in no way signal a slackening of our dedication to this vitally important task. ■

East-West Relations and Technology Transfer

by William Schneider, Jr.

Address delivered by Michael B. Marks, Senior Policy Adviser for Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology Schneider before the Federal Bar Association in Newton, Mass., on March 29, 1984.

My remarks will be directed primarily at the nature and setting of U.S. policy, as well as a brief description of our activities at the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Security Controls (COCOM). Many of you will recall, as I do, the euphoric days of the early 1970s—the heyday of detente in East-West relations. The Soviet Union and the United States had just signed a strategic arms limitation agreement, perceived at the time as an important milestone in limiting arms expenditures and as the prime indicator of relaxation of Soviet-American tensions. President Nixon and Premier Brezhnev exchanged visits and signed numerous agreements. Our allies joined in to create a widespread spirit of East-West detente.

Economic relations, naturally, played a major part in the new atmosphere. The West liberalized its credit terms, and the Soviets took advantage of this liberalization to increase their purchases of strategic technology and equipment that they either could not make or could make only with radical shifts in existing patterns of resource allocation, such as truck assembly lines, entire chemical plants, and innumerable pieces of capital equipment.

The theory underlying detente was that a web of economic, scientific, cultural, and political relationships would so interlink Soviet and Western societies that their views on security and other core issues would tend to converge. It was believed that the tangible benefits flowing from economic and other interchanges would encourage Soviet restraint in foreign policy. In a word, it was believed that our two societies would become "interdependent," thereby diminishing the possibility of any serious conflict.

These hopeful views of East-West relations regrettably were not fulfilled. The Soviets, in the late 1970s and after, failed to live up to the hopes of a decade earlier. Their sponsorship of Cuban adventures in Africa, their continuing activities in Indochina, their invasion of Afghanistan, their crackdown in Poland, and their involvement in Central America were visible indications that their fundamental values and policies had not been changed by a more lenient, friendly, and cooperative attitude on the part of the West. Most recently, we have seen another brutal reaffirmation of Soviet values—the Korean Air Lines tragedy—which has cost 169 innocent lives.

Underlying these aggressive acts, of course, is the massive and unrelenting Soviet military buildup that went far beyond any reasonable notion of what would be needed to defend the U.S.S.R. In retrospect, it is clear the Soviet Union used detente as a tactical device to slow the modernization of U.S. forces and lull the West into a false sense of security while they carried on the largest, costliest, and most threatening military buildup in history.

Soviet Efforts to Acquire Advanced Western Technology

As we slowly disabused ourselves of the belief that we and the Soviets shared a common objective, we became increasingly critical of the ease with which the Soviets could obtain advanced Western technology. We increased and focused our information gathering and analysis to try to determine what technology the Soviets were getting and what the military impact might be. The results were dismaying. Evidence grew that Western technology was the target of a massive, well-coordinated Soviet acquisition effort, orchestrated through legal and illegal methods and aimed at those technologies which promised the highest military payoff.

Make no mistake—U.S. companies and equipment are a prime target of the largest intelligence organization on earth. They are determined, well financed, and increasing their efforts. There is no end in sight for the struggle which this forces upon us. This struggle is complicated by the fact that industry is overwhelmingly in the civil, rather than the military, domain. As a consequence, the ability of the Federal Government to directly control the dissemination of this technology to the Soviet Union is a vastly more difficult task than controlling the critical technology of a generation ago—nuclear weapons—which was entirely in the military domain.

The Soviet acquisition effort is planned and approved at the highest governmental and party levels. Much of the Soviet acquisition of Western equipment, know-how, and training applicable to the military has been through entirely legal and open means, such as commercial sales, business and research seminars and symposiums, commercial visits, and academic exchange programs. This effort is complemented by the extensive and growing use of Soviet and East European intelligence services through a variety of clandestine and illegal means.

Continued problems in Soviet domestic technological capabilities—due in part to the Soviet system itself, which tends to discourage innovation—strongly suggest they are not likely to decrease their dependency on Western equipment, technology, and know-how.

Soviet acquisition efforts have become more systematic and effective over the past 15 years and a number of trends have become clear.

- Weapon-related acquisitions increasingly are more selective, focusing on critical components and materials necessary to achieve greater performance.
- Greater emphasis is being placed on acquiring Western production technology and equipment, as opposed to end products. This reflects the Soviet need to become self-sufficient and to increase the efficiency of large-volume production. Much of this technology and equipment is subject to export controls, and its acquisition often is accomplished through intelligence-directed trade diversions.
- Increasing priority is being given to dual-use commercial technologies and emerging high technologies, perhaps indicating the military value placed on them by the Soviet Union, as well as their greater vulnerability to intelligence acquisition methods.
- Acquisitions of U.S. technology are being stepped up beyond U.S. borders.
- The role of East European intelligence services has increased steadily since Western sanctions against the Soviet Union were initiated following Afghanistan and Poland.

We believe these acquisitions have benefited the Soviet Union by increasing the pace of Soviet weapons systems development; reducing military research-and-development costs and risks; expediting the development of effective countermeasures against Western military systems; and modernizing and expanding critical sectors of the Warsaw Pact defense industry and support base. These payoffs are very critical to the Soviets, who continue to forge ahead with their military buildup, despite a deteriorating economic growth rate.

The qualitative advances made by the Soviet military by means of acquiring Western technology increase the burden that we and our NATO allies must share in maintaining qualitative superiority over the Warsaw Pact.

The Reagan Administration has given top priority to fighting this massive Soviet effort at increasing its military power with the fruits of Western technology. However, a great deal of damage has already been done that has saved the Soviet Union millions of dollars in research-and-development costs and has cost the West billions of dollars in forcing an accelerated pace of arms modernization.

The U.S. Response

The U.S. Government has had to ask itself a number of important questions in facing this problem. How shall we meet this challenge? What priority should it receive, among the many threats to our interests? What should we expect of our allies, who are increasingly capable of producing the technologies of concern? What should our private sector do?

This Administration has sharply increased the priority and the resources assigned to this problem. We intend to sustain and increase our efforts to minimize the acquisition of militarily useful technology by our potential adversaries. As the problem is a long-term one, rooted in Soviet ambition and weakness, it is essential that our response be sustained.

One way, I believe, has been through the creation of an interagency organization that has assumed great importance in the Administration's efforts to stem the flow of strategic technology to our adversaries—the Senior Interagency Group on the Transfer of Strategic Technology. Since its advent in the summer of 1982, several exciting developments have taken place. It was created to bring all U.S. Government agencies with strategic technology programs or interests together at a policymaking level for the purpose of coordinating the many facets of the government's technology transfer activities. Eighteen agencies or offices are members.

Prior to the formation of the group, there was already a healthy amount of activity within the executive branch on the issue. The problem was that there was no day-to-day focal point for organizational coherence and the setting of priorities. It was this very lack of a coordinating center that stultified the last year of the Carter Administration when policies, principally after Afghanistan, began to turn in the direction advocated then and pursued now by this Administration.

The Senior Interagency Group had, and still has, several key objectives. They are:

- To raise the level of attention to these issues within all relevant U.S. Government agencies;
- To take an overall view of the issue and to seek priorities accordingly;
- To initiate new projects where necessary and to see that implementation and followup occur in all U.S. initiatives;
- To make policy decisions whenever necessary; and
- To coordinate the activities of all relevant U.S. Government agencies as previously described.

Let me review with you now some of the substantive work of the group over the last year.

Under presidential tasking, the group is committed to execute U.S. policy in strengthening COCOM, to negotiate multilaterally to seek strategic trade controls on oil and gas technologies, and to draft a comprehensive U.S. technology transfer policy for presidential decision—now in its formal stages of completion.

The Senior Interagency Group has set in motion numerous projects on its own initiative. We have opened major bilateral dialogues with our key high-technology allies, seeking enhanced government awareness of the technology transfer issue and a strengthening of their national control systems. We are more than satisfied with the results of our initial steps. You can be assured that our efforts will continue unabated.

Yet another project of the group has been the raising of intelligence priorities within allied intelligence agencies. We have had consultations with at least 12 countries so far. They began looking at what they had largely ignored before and did not like what they saw. Of the approximately 80 expulsions or arrests of Soviet intelligence officers in 1983 in the industrial democracies, we believe more than half were involved in strategic technology collection.

In taking the overview of the strategic transfer issue, we discovered early on that there were some problems in our own system of protection and control. One response was to strengthen the visa mechanism. It was clear that there is a group of people entering the United States every year with the intent of acquiring controlled U.S. technology illegally, and yet it was unclear what the gov-

ernment could do. We put the issue under intensive study in 1982–83. In April we reached the conclusion of this process, adopting a new policy of denying and restricting visas when we have evidence that this is justified.

Another of our efforts has been to enhance U.S. public awareness of the transfer problem. This is what today's appearance by myself and my colleagues is all about. We have been actively pursuing this goal through opportunities presented by public speaking invitations, media appearances, and dissemination of unclassified government reports. A more specific aspect of this program is to brief industrial, commercial, and research-and-development institutions that we believe may be high on the Soviet priority list. I am happy to report we have had a generally positive response to our presentation of the problem to defense contractors, civilian firms, trade associations, and even the universities. A great deal has been accomplished in this area and efforts are even now being intensified. One of our next steps will be to press friendly governments to follow our example with awareness programs of their own.

Coordination of Export Controls Through COCOM

As you know, the role of our allies is also vital to our success. The organization through which we work to coordinate U.S. and allied export controls is COCOM. COCOM has been in existence since the late 1940s when the United States realized it was essential to achieve a fundamental agreement among the major Western industrial powers concerning their trade in militarily relevant technology to the Soviet bloc. The importance of this organization has increased over the years since the United States has had less and less of a monopoly in the advanced sensitive technologies of military importance. We need the active cooperation of our allies if our own national security controls are to be effective. Before going on to our efforts to strengthen COCOM, let me first provide a quick thumbnail sketch of this organization.

COCOM's present membership comprises all of the NATO members except Iceland and Spain, plus Japan. It was created by informal agreement of its members and has no formal treaty or executive agreement basis. The members, therefore, have no legal obligation to participate in COCOM or to abide by the commitments made there. However, there have been relatively few instances when a member nation has exercised its sovereign right to deviate from decisions reached in COCOM. This may be in part because all important COCOM decisions are made on the basis of unanimity.

Traditionally, COCOM has had three major functions:

The first is the establishment and updating of the three lists of embargoed products and technologies—the munitions list, the atomic energy list, and the international list which covers dual-use items with both civil and military applications. Although the COCOM lists are not published, they become the basis for the national control lists administered by member governments. The lists are revised—i.e., strengthened, liberalized, or clarified—when proposals submitted by member governments obtain unanimous support. Most revisions are made in the context of the list reviews, exercises involving more than a year of technical negotiations held every 3 or 4 years.

Second, COCOM acts as the clearinghouse for requests submitted by member governments to ship specific embargoed items to specified end users in the proscribed countries. (The COCOM-proscribed countries are the Soviet Union, the other Warsaw Pact countries, Albania, and the communist countries in South Asia.)

Third, COCOM serves as a means of coordinating the administration and enforcement activities of the member governments, largely through its Export Control Subcommittee, which in recent years has met on an annual or semiannual basis.

In brief, COCOM has been reasonably effective over the years in coordinating national export control policies and restrictions. Without COCOM, competition among Western exporters would have escalated so that even more high-technology sales to the Soviet Union and other communist countries would have taken place.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact have obtained equipment and technology of military significance from the United States and the other COCOM countries either through violations of controls or because such items have not been controlled. It was apparent that we needed to gain increased support from our COCOM allies for expanding the embargo lists to cover sensitive technologies not under control and for significantly upgrading their export licensing and enforcement activities.

President Reagan's initiative on sensitive technology transfer at the Ottawa summit underscored our commitment to improving and strengthening COCOM. It resulted in a high-level COCOM meeting in January 1982, the first ministerial-level meeting of the organization since the late 1950s. Since that time, we have been working with our allies to implement the decisions of that meeting. Our efforts were given a healthy "shot in the arm" last fall when we reached a consensus agreement with our major allies to undertake a broad review of East-West economic relations with an eye to assuring that such relations are in line with the security interests of the West. COCOM has been an important part of this review.

Last spring I led a senior-level interagency delegation to the second high-level meeting which was held in Paris in late April. I am glad to report that our COCOM allies are more committed to working with us on strengthening the multilateral system of export controls in some very concrete ways.

In October 1982 the United States submitted more than 100 technical proposals for consideration in the 1982–83 list review. Most of these were aimed at expanding and strengthening the existing COCOM embargo lists. Some were directed at releasing from the list those obsolescent technologies which were really no longer of concern. These negotiations will hopefully wind up this spring. We have already obtained COCOM agreement on a number of high-priority U.S. proposals for new or expanded controls.

COCOM has no enforcement powers of its own and must depend on the national enforcement activities of the 15 member governments. At the U.S. initiative, the first high-level meeting endorsed the need to strengthen the national enforcement activities and also called for a harmonization of national licensing practices. A subsequent meeting of the COCOM Export Control Subcommittee in May 1983 adopted a large number of recommendations drawn from U.S. initiatives which, if implemented, could result in broad improvement in both of these areas. One of the most important of these recommendations deals with the need to devote adequate resources to export control monitoring and enforcement activities.

Before leaving COCOM, I would like to mention one other U.S. COCOM initiative which grew out of the La Sapiniere consensus agreement with our allies on East-West economic relations. The allies agreed that COCOM not only would undertake efforts to strengthen its existing activities but also would undertake a study of "other high technology, including oil and gas" whch might have security implications for the West.

At the risk of telling you more than you really wanted to know about COCOM, I hope this overview has given you a better idea of how we deal with COCOM and the problem of foreign availability of technology.

Cooperation With the Private Sector

A final way to sustain our response to the Soviet threat is through our continuing cooperation with our own technical and business communities, for the private sector is at once the source of creativity and the engine of our society. With your good will and support, we will be able to manage our own technology losses and bring increasing pressure on our allies to conform their export policies to ours. Without your participation, we will enter a world where all compete to increase their own insecurity. We will, to paraphrase Lenin's chilling prophecy, sell the rope to hang ourselves.

Conclusion

In closing, a society such as ours, which values individual freedom and private initiative, is bound to suffer some disadvantage when confronted with an attempt to utilize our openness, our lack of secrecy, and the military utility of our commercial technologies against us. But we also have certain strengths, which, in my view, more than outweigh these disadvantages—our technical creativity, the speed and breadth of our technical advances, and, most of all, the spirit of responsibility with which our private citizens have always responded to challenges. I have no doubt that we shall meet this challenge as we have met all others, for the future belongs to the free. ■

The Role of Science and Technology in Foreign Affairs

by James L. Malone

Address before the Council of Scientific Society Presidents on April 25, 1984. Ambassador Malone is Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs.

I am honored to have this opportunity to speak to this distinguished gathering today and to discuss with you the evergrowing role of science and technology in our country's foreign affairs. As you will have gathered from my title, the bureau I head within the State Department is concerned with a wide range of scientific and science-related activities. Actually, there is more than the bureau's name implies. In addition to oceans and international environmental and scientific affairs, we are also concerned with health, natural resources, nuclear energy and energy technology, polar and fisheries affairs, and population matters.

Now, when Thomas Jefferson was Secretary of State, he didn't need a lot of assistance on matters such as these. He knew about as much as anyone did about them, and they didn't impinge very much on his work or that of his few assistants. Since then, however, and particularly since the end of World War II, things have grown much more complex, and what started as a small office a few decades ago has evolved into what, in State Department terms, is a relatively large bureau. I can assure you it is not too large, however. With responsibilities ranging from cooperation in space to the effluent from Tijuana's sewers, and from the division of the fish catch off our coasts to efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation, we are never underemployed.

International scientific cooperation, an area in which I know many of you are involved, is a particularly important responsibility. It was not, of course, invented by the Department of State. American scientists, even before the creation of the Republic, were engaged in fruitful collaboration with their colleagues in other countries. Benjamin Franklin, who was one of our first diplomats, was also one of our first internationally recognized scientists. Mutually beneficial cooperation goes on today in thousands of areas of scientific endeavor both on an academic and a commercial level, with little reference to the U.S. Government.

I do not mean to suggest, however, that the government is inactive in this vitally important sphere of activity. Nothing could be further from the truth. We play a major role as a catalyst and, quite often, material supporter of both bilateral and multilateral international scientific cooperation. In doing all this, the Federal Government has a particularly important responsibility in seeing to it that international scientific and technological cooperation serves the overall strategic and foreign policy interests of the United States.

The magnitude and diversity of America's research and development activities make cooperation with the United States in science and technology at the individual, institutional, and governmental levels extremely attractive, and often imperative, to scientists of other nations. Conversely, American scientists and engineers reap substantial benefits from such cooperation. Often they gain access to new or superior scientific instrumentation or to unique geographical settings and phenomena. In addition, their human and financial resources are augmented through international cooperation. American scientists are able to benefit from the unpublished data developed by their colleagues in other countries and to use facilities which would cost a great deal of money to reproduce in the United States. Naturally, foreign scientists realize similar benefits from their cooperation with the United States. It would be impossible to draw up a balance sheet of these benefits. Obviously, all of mankind gains, and we know that the United States would be poorer and our rate of scientific and technological advance much slower were such mutually beneficial collaboration not taking place.

Bilateral Cooperation

President Reagan has given considerable attention to our programs of bilateral scientific cooperation, with particular emphasis on selected countries. Among the most important are Brazil, China, India, Israel, and Japan. He has taken these initiatives both because the scientific capabilities of these countries are sufficiently advanced in some areas so as to permit fruitful cooperation and because such cooperation promotes more general American foreign policy objectives.

Brazil. Science and technology played an important role in the President's December 1982 trip to Brazil and, as a result, a working group on science and technology was established by the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Department of State. The initial objective of this body was to renew the intergovernmental science and technology agreement between the two countries. To advance these efforts, the National Science Foundation organized a conference on American-Brazilian private sector cooperation in science and technology last spring to explore ways

in which a new intergovernmental agreement could be used to advance industrial productivity in the two nations. A new cooperative science and technology agreement, which I was privileged to negotiate, was concluded in February of this year and signed by Secretary of State Shultz. Brazil is a nation of virtually unlimited potential that is, even with its current financial problems, evolving rapidly both economically and politically. We wish, of course, to assist it in this evolution, and, in doing so, scientific cooperation is playing a significant role.

China. Scientific cooperation with China is conducted under an umbrella agreement which was signed in 1979. Since that time, Sino-American scientific cooperation has grown to become our largest bilateral program and we have concluded technical protocols on cooperation in 21 fields. A joint commission directs and coordinates the overall program. The Chinese attach great importance to this area of cooperation with the United States as, indeed, do we to our cooperation with them. And it will be one of the subjects discussed during the President's visit to China which starts tomorrow. I do not need to emphasize to this group the importance of our relations with China, the world's most populous nation and one occupying a pivotal strategic position. In any case, the President's trip makes the point more eloquently than could any words of mine. I am pleased to underline, however, the very significant role that scientific cooperation is playing in strengthening our relationship.

India. Scientific cooperation with India was given special emphasis during Prime Minister Gandhi's July 1982 visit to Washington. At the close of her stay, Mrs. Gandhi and President Reagan announced the formation of a senior scientific panel to formulate plans for intensified joint research efforts. This panel has been carrying out its mandate, and I believe its activities will bring about an improvement in our scientific cooperation. We have also just begun negotiations with the Indians to use a portion of our dwindling supply of special foreign currency rupees to establish an endowment fund to be able to continue to finance scientific cooperation after such funds would otherwise have been exhausted. As I am sure you are aware, Indo-American relations over the years have not been without their difficulties. At the same time, however, our continuing scientific cooperation has contributed to a reservoir of good will toward the United States, which is of great assistance to Prime Minister Gandhi and President Reagan in their efforts to improve these relations.

Soviet Union. Scientific and technological exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union are, of course, an area of particular concern to all of us. The history of these exchanges essentially falls into three distinct periods. The first, from 1954 to 1972, saw a steady increase in the volume of exchanges and in expansion of research topics. The second period, from 1972 to 1979, was characterized by the establishment of 11 bilateral agreements. They provided more direction and purpose to the exchanges. During the third period— which began in 1980 and continues to the present—because of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and events in Poland, exchanges were sharply curtailed. At present, they are operating at very limited levels. It is, of course, our hope that over time this situation will change and the Soviet Union's conduct will be such that we will be able to return to a higher level of cooperation. There are many areas of science, outside those having military applications, where cooperation between us can produce significant benefits.

International Cooperation

One area of important international cooperation, multilateral as well as bilateral, has been space science. Important civil space projects include the solar maximum mission, the international solar polar mission, the space telescope, the infrared astronomical satellite, and the Galileo Jupiter orbiter and probe. Many friendly foreign countries have played a significant role in the space shuttle program, and we look forward to their participation in the permanent manned space station announced by the President in his State of the Union address in January.

One indication of the increasing importance of science and technology in international affairs is the fact that cooperation in these areas was a major subject of discussion at both the Versailles and Williamsburg economic summits. The governments participating in the summit meetings are continuing their examinations of possibilities of improving their cooperation in many fields, and we can expect science and technology to continue to be a subject of discussion whenever the leaders of the world's major industrial nations gather together.

State Department's Role

I would like to comment briefly about the Department of State's role in international scientific and technological cooperation. We have a coordinating role assigned to us by Congress in Title V of the 1978 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, and, in conformity with the President's directions, we attempt to see to it that such cooperation serves the United States' overall interests. The Department's role is necessarily limited, however, and we normally do not become involved directly in the management of scientific programs. The direction, amount, and nature of cooperation must, in the first instance, be decided upon by the American scientific agencies or institutions directly involved. The project must make sense to them in terms of their interests, priorities, and funding constraints. Our role is to ensure that such cooperation serves our vital national interests. Where it does, we encourage such cooperation.

One of the tasks that I take most seriously among the duties assigned to me in my present position in the Department of State is seeing to it that scientific and technological considerations become an integral part of our foreign affairs decisionmaking. In part, this effort involves keeping my senior colleagues and the Secretary aware of these considerations. More importantly, perhaps, it also involves building a greater awareness of science and technology throughout the Foreign Service and the Department.

In carrying out this effort, we are addressing ourselves to two groups within the Foreign Service. The first is that relatively small body of officers who specialize in scientific and technological affairs. They, for the most part, serve in the 25 or so science counselor and attache positions we have in our Embassies abroad. Many are trained scientists but others are Foreign Service officers with a more traditional foreign affairs background who have decided to specialize in the scientific area. Given their varied backgrounds, the training we give them must also vary. Basically, we try to turn the scientists into better diplomats by giving them appropriate language and area training, and the diplomats into scientifically aware officers by exposure to scientific institutions, seminars, and on-the-job experience. I am striving, too, to make the scientific specialty a more attractive career path within the Foreign Service. Unfortunately, this is not the present

perception. Most officers, both non-career and career, still regard science and technology as ancillary to the conduct of foreign affairs and not as an essential part of our bilateral and multilateral relations.

This is why, in my view, the greater and more important task for me may be that concerned with the second group of Foreign Service officers, that is, all those who are not science specialists. They are involved in political, consular, economic, and administrative work, though some also have science-related duties in the great majority of overseas posts which do not have full-time science officers. It is no easy task addressing these officers. They are spread all over the world, as well as in Washington, and involved in time-consuming jobs. One tool we have developed is a series of seminars on specific topics at our Foreign Service Institute. Another, which gives promise of long-term results, is an elective scientific affairs period in the 6-month training course which is now being required of all mid-level officers. We are also organizing regional conferences of full-time science officers and others with part-time responsibilities so as to make both groups—but particularly the latter—more aware of current issues and events in the area of international science and technology. In all this we are not trying to create scientists—or even what I would call scientific bureaucrats—but Foreign Service officers who are aware of the importance of science and technology in relations between nations.

One example of this increased importance is the related areas of technology transfer, intellectual property rights, and patents. These questions are among the most vexing and complex facing our diplomats in many countries today. They arise all the time, for instance, in our relations with China. You simply can't talk about them and understand the issues involved without a significant level of scientific literacy. The same is true of environmental issues, such as the acid rain controversy with Canada and the area of civil nuclear affairs. These are difficult and demanding issues today, and we can expect that they, and others like them, will become even more complex in the future. It is my determination in facing up to them now to leave the United States a foreign affairs instrument better able to comprehend them in the future.

If Franklin and Jefferson could see the amazing diversity of activities encompassed by the modern diplomatic establishment, they would be incredulous. I hope, however, that they would approve of our efforts to make science and technology serve this nation's broad interests in the world today. ■

Iran-Iraq War

Following is a statement made by Jose S. Sorzano, U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, in the Security Council on May 30, 1984, and text of the resolution adopted by the Council.

AMBASSADOR SORZANO[1]

This Council has long been seized with the tragic war between Iran and Iraq. This war has dragged on for much too long—almost 4 years. It has already inflicted perhaps as many as half a million casualties among combatants, innocent civilians, and children and brought about untold property damage. Emotions have understandably run very high on both sides.

This Council has met repeatedly in an effort to stop or suspend or ameliorate this conflict. Since September 28, 1980, the Council has approved four resolutions calling for a cease-fire. It has sought the good offices of the Secretary General and his representatives in working toward conciliation of the parties, endorsed the efforts of the Prime Minister of Sweden, and issued five Security Council presidential statements, including, most recently, condemnation of the illegal and unacceptable use of chemical weapons in this tragic war. The United States wholeheartedly supported and continues to support all these efforts.

Despite all these efforts, the war continues adding to its already terrible costs. And, as so often happens when things do not get better, they do not stay the same either—rather, they get worse.

The war not only continues but it expands, posing an increasing threat to the stability of the region and even to the global economic system. The acceleration of attacks against shipping in the gulf, particularly attacks against shipping going into or out of the ports of nonbelligerent states, threatens not only those states but indirectly poses a potential threat to world price levels and inflation just at the moment when world economic recovery and a healthy economic expansion is beginning to get under way.

The Council's specific concern today is the request of the six members of the Gulf Cooperative Council to consider attacks against nonbelligerent merchant vessels in international waters of the gulf and in the territorial waters of nonbelligerent states. It is completely appropriate that we should directly address this problem.

It is well known that rights of free passage of innocent shipping in international waters has long been enshrined in international law as a fundamental right, representing common interests of all states. Roman lawyers characterized the sea as *res communis*—by which they meant it is beyond appropriation. Their characterization has influenced the concept of freedom of the seas as we know it today. It is too important a right, too important a concept to an increasingly interdependent world, to permit it to be trampled upon.

We recognize that many of the issues which have been raised concerning this ongoing war are complicated. We wish they all could be resolved. We earnestly desire an overall settlement. We welcomed the fact that one of the parties to the war accepted in principle the cease-fire called for in Security Council Resolution 540, and we hope that, in time, the time will come when both parties can agree to a cease-fire and mediation leading to a resolution of their differences.

However, we believe this is no reason not to straightforwardly address the issue of attacks on shipping as requested by the representatives of six states which asked for this meeting, just as this Council separately addressed the frightful issue of chemical weapons use.

We, therefore, agree with the members of the Gulf Cooperative Council that this Council should take a clear and unambiguous stand against the extremely dangerous expansion of the war by attacks on innocent vessels in international waters or in the territorial waters of noncombatants. We firmly support the views expressed by the Gulf Cooperative Council states and the League of Arab States on this issue.

The Gulf Cooperative Council's reaffirmation of the principle of collective security and its expressed determination to respond to threats to the security of member states reflects deep concern about recent developments. The United

States shares that concern. As President Reagan said recently, the gulf states are concerned about not enlarging the war—as we all should be. We must prevent a widening of the war in the Persian Gulf which might disrupt the vital flow of oil and, for that reason, we urge that the Council take meaningful action in addressing this critically important matter.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 552[2]

The Security Council,

Having considered the letter dated 21 May 1984 from the representatives of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (S/16574) complaining against Iranian attacks on commercial ships en route to and from the ports of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia,

Noting that Member States pledged to live together in peace with one another as good neighbors in accordance with the United Nations Charter,

Reaffirming the obligations of Member States to the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter,

Reaffirming also that all Member States are obliged to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State,

Taking into consideration the importance of the Gulf region to international peace and security and its vital role to the stability of world economy,

Deeply concerned over the recent attacks on commercial ships en route to and from the ports of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia,

Convinced that these attacks constitute a threat to the safety and stability of the area and have serious implications for international peace and security,

1. *Calls upon* all States to respect, in accordance with international law, the right of free navigation;
2. *Reaffirms* the right of free navigation in international waters and sea lanes for shipping en route to and from all ports and installations of the littoral States that are not parties to the hostilities;
3. *Calls upon* all States to respect the territorial integrity of the States that are not parties to the hostilities and to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any act which may lead to a further escalation and widening of the conflict;
4. *Condemns* these recent attacks on commercial ships en route to and from the ports of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia;
5. *Demands* that such attacks should cease forthwith and that there should be no interference with ships en route to and from States that are not parties to the hostilities;
6. *Decides*, in the event of non-compliance with the present resolution, to meet again to consider effective measures that are commensurate with the gravity of the situation in order to ensure the freedom of nagivation in the area;
7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report on the progress of the implementation of the present resolution;
8. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

[1]USUN press release 49.
[2]Adopted by a vote of 13–0, with two abstentions (Venezuela and Zimbabwe) on June 1, 1984. ■

Future Opportunities for U.S.-Latin American Trade: The U.S. Perspective

by Langhorne A. Motley

Address before the National Center for Export-Import Studies, Georgetown University, on June 15, 1984. Ambassador Motley is Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.

It is a special pleasure for me to participate in this conference on U.S.-Latin American trade relations. Trade is important to all of us. It affects not only our economic relationship but also the whole range of political, social, and cultural ties. It is encouraging that this issue is being addressed in depth by a group such as this.

One of the most striking trends of the past 20 years has been the tremendous growth of U.S. international trade as a share of GNP. Over the past 14 years it has doubled—from $35 billion in 1960 (6.9% of GNP) to $469 billion in 1983 (13.2% of GNP). Moreover, the developing countries—and particularly Latin America—are playing an increasingly important role in U.S. trade. The Latin share of our total imports, for example, has grown from 13% ($23 billion) in 1978 to 16% in 1983 ($41.7 billion)—notwithstanding recessions, debt crises, and the widely held perception that Latin exporters are being pushed out of the U.S. market by other competitors.

But I won't dwell on statistics. What I would like to offer you, instead, is my view of our trade future, especially the overall U.S.-Latin American relationship. I also have a few simple points to make—points which are easy to say but which need much hard work and thought to implement.

The Costs of Protectionism

My first point is that trade is a two-way street. It is also a good thing. Though I need not convince this audience, it is something which is not always understood or accepted widely either here in the United States or in Latin America. And trade appears to be under increasing attack. A recent poll, for example, showed that 77% of the American public favored more restrictions on imported products, and an absolute majority favored high tariffs. Concern about loss of American jobs was found to be the main influence on public attitudes—outweighing the prospect of lower prices, wider choice for consumers, or new jobs in the export market. Similar attitudes are prevalent in Latin America, particularly under the twin pressures of recent economic difficulties and the desire to develop domestic industries.

I might add that, although we refer to ourselves as a "developed" nation, that does not imply that our economy is stagnant. We are still "developing" ourselves. And just as restricted trade introduces rigidities into less developed economies, it also distorts our own production pattern.

We, therefore, have a major challenge—and responsibility—to gain broader public understanding and acceptance of the benefits of trade. That will not be easy, because change arising from trade is often disruptive and therefore hard to accept. But change is also the foundation of all innovation and economic progress. We need to make clearer to our respective publics the enormous costs of protectionism and of trying to maintain the status quo.

That brings me to my second point. Protectionist pressures—in the United States and abroad—are strong, but I believe the United States has been remarkably successful in resisting them. Indeed, when one looks objectively at the structure of protection of major trading countries, the United States is notable for its openness. Let's look at tariffs.

First, much of our trade—almost a third of it—is completely free of duty. The percentage of Latin American products which enter the United States duty-free (30% in 1983) has consistently been above that of the developing world as a whole (28%), and above that of Latin America's most formidable competitors in Southeast Asia (27%).

Second, on that portion of our trade which is not free, the average duty is low (5.4% in 1983) and is steadily declining as we implement the tariff reductions negotiated in the last round of multilateral trade negotiations. Latin American products enter with lower duties than the global average. The average duty paid by Latin American products has been cut in half in the last 5 years—from 6.4% in 1979 to 3.1% in 1983.

Third, we have very few high tariffs, the kind which are major impediments to trade. Three-quarters of our tariffs are below 5%, and less than 1% of trade is subject to tariffs of more than 20%. We do have some problems, of course. Tariff escalation, the upward stairstepping of duties as the degree of processing increases, is still prevalent in the developed countries, including the United States. As you know, U.S. raw material imports are frequently duty-free, but many processed products are dutiable. On semifinished manufactures, for example, our duties—after full implementation of the multilateral negotiated reductions—will average 6.1%, and for finished manufactures, 7%. Hence, the effective rate of protection for the processing operation can be relatively high.

On the whole, however, we in the United States can take pride in the openness of our market compared to other developed countries. Canada's average duty on imports from developing nations is 11% and one-fifth of all its imports enter at tarriff rates above 20%. In Japan, half of the duties on goods from the developing world are 5% or more, while about one-twelfth of duties exceed 20%.

As you know the problem these days lies much more in nontariff barriers. Here again, our record is good. True, we have quotas on a few products and sectors, some of them—such as textiles and sugar—particularly important to Latin America. On several more agricultural items there are quotas to protect domestic support programs; e.g., cotton, peanuts, though they generally have not limited trade. There are a few important items where quotas or voluntary export restraints are in effect because of adjustment problems in U.S. domestic industries—steel, autos, textiles. But when you look at the total structure of our trade, this list of items under restraint is remarkably small.

Let us also look at the way in which we have used the "safeguards" provision of our trade legislation (the so-called Section 201 injury findings). Since January 1975, the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) has heard 50 petitions from U.S. industries and workers claiming injury from rapidly growing imports and seeking some sort of import relief—quotas and/or increased tariffs. Of those 50 cases, the ITC actually found injury in about half. And of those, the President decided to actually impose relief in only 12.

The Future of U.S.-Latin American Trade

The outlook for U.S.-Latin American trade reveals some strong positive signs, as well as a few questions. The strongest plus is also the most obvious one. After the economic difficulties of the past 2 years, the world economy is experiencing a real turn-around.

The U.S. economy in 1984 is expected to grow about 5.9%; while the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] should grow a strong 4.0%. In 1985, U.S. growth is projected at 4.1%, while the OECD should experience an expansion of about 3.5%. The strong U.S. and world recovery will be a driving impetus to inter-American trade. U.S. imports from Latin America in 1983 were up by 11% over 1982. Preliminary data for 1984—first quarter figures—show an increase of 31% over the first quarter of 1983. Projecting unadjusted quarterly figures is risky, of course. If this trend continues, however, imports from the region could increase by nearly $13 billion by year-end.

Another positive development is the U.S. Government's strong commitment to special opportunities for developing countries in general and for the Caribbean Basin, in particular. The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) represents a milestone in our relationship with the area. It eliminates duties on virtually all products imported from the region. The CBI not only opens up dramatic new opportunities for investment, employment, and broadbased growth in the region, but it also represents a long-term U.S. political commitment. The program offers a real inducement for investors over a period of 12 years. The CBI was passed by a broad bipartisan coalition in the Congress and continues to enjoy support from both sides.

The scope and duration of the CBI program also means that it offers incentive beyond its immediate trade objectives. Those countries which have the right policy framework to promote investment and innovation will best be able to seize those trade opportunities. The CBI increases very significantly the payoff for appropriate economic policies.

Like the CBI, the generalized system of preference (GSP) offers specific benefits—preferential duty-free trade—as well as powerful indirect incentives for economic policy reforms. But unlike the CBI, we are still in the process of renewal of the GSP legislation. The Administration's proposal to extend the GSP for another 10 years was introduced in the Congress last August, and we hope that the legislation will be renewed before its January 1984 expiration. We have passed one crucial hurdle: last month the Senate Finance Committee approved the Administration's proposal with only minor amendments.

There has been some concern about the shape of the new legislation, including criticism of the concentration of benefits among a few relatively advanced developing countries, such as Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong, Mexico, and Brazil which utilized about two-thirds of the benefits in 1983. There is also congressional and private sector concern about the lack of market access for U.S. products in some of the leading beneficiary countries.

The Administration's proposal builds on the existing legislation but contains additional provisions addressing the issues of graduation and further liberalization. Under the proposal, all beneficiaries will be given an opportunity to increase their GSP benefits on a product-specific basis. For least developed beneficiaries, the increases will be automatic. Increased GSP benefits will be made possible through a new provision granting the President the authority to waive competitive need limits with respect to individual products. In making such determinations, the President will give great weight to the extent to which a country is willing to provide equitable and reasonable access to its market commensurate with its level of development.

Our proposal will also grant the President discretionary authority to reduce competitive need limits on some highly competitive GSP products. This authority, which would replace our current discretionary graduation policy,

would thereby enhance the program's predictability. It may also help to assuage the concerns of some members of Congress who would prefer to see some beneficiaries—e.g., the top three or five—removed entirely from the program.

The final positive sign which I see in our future trade relationship—one which is often overlooked in the current atmosphere—is the fundamental strength of Latin American economies. This region has a well-educated and trained population. It is endowed with a wealth of natural resources, has good infrastructure, an extensive industrial base, and well-developed governmental and other institutions. To a large extent, the current debt problems which so many Latin American countries face now reflect past successes and bankability. There are, of course, some uncertainties.

Debt. The first challenge, of course, is debt. The past few years have seen a downward economic spiral caused by world economic problems, compounded by internal policy and institutional rigidities in many Latin American countries. We are moving out of that recessionary phase. Led by the United States, the world economy is growing. There has also been a growing commitment by the region's leaders over the past 5 years to redirect government policies to encourage production, innovation, and exports. With such changes, social progress will be more durable because it will be built on the solid foundation of efficiency and international competitiveness rather than artificial protection of small markets.

At this point let me say a few words about our evolving approach to managing external debt problems. Our response to the debt crisis in Latin America and the Caribbean is a broad-based five-part strategy combining:

- Economic recovery and open markets in the industrialized countries;
- Economic adjustment by the debtor countries;
- Support for a strengthened International Monetary Fund and other international financial institutions;
- Special financing when debt emergencies occur; and
- Continued commercial bank financing on a prudent basis.

Without being complacent, I believe that our strategy is working in broad terms. It is flexible enough to deal successfully with future strains.

President Reagan and his colleagues at the recently concluded economic summit in London confirmed that the current approach is working and pledged to take various actions that will strengthen the strategy further. Among the improvements recommended are closer cooperation between the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and the World Bank, with a strengthening of the bank's ability to foster development over the medium- and long-term, a willingness to negotiate the official and officially guaranteed debt on an extended multiyear basis, and a study of ways to improve the operation of the international monetary system.

Adjustment by debtor countries is a key element in our approach. These policy and institutional changes are constructive and necessary. They will ultimately pay off with higher growth and more jobs for the people of the region. But they often involve significant short-term costs. Opening protected markets, streamlining bureaucracies, making enterprises pay for themselves rather than depend on subsidies, can all be highly disruptive in the short-term. Many countries are experiencing the pain right now—lost jobs, higher prices, less services—costs which, tragically, are most acutely felt by the poor, who can afford it least.

But these adjustments must be pursued with courage and determination. Political courage is required to adopt correct, if temporarily unpopular, policies which are indispensable to creating a solid foundation for future broadbased economic benefit. It will take courage and patience on the part of the people of the region to cope with massive economic problems and, in some cases, with violence and political turmoil.

Multilateral Liberalization. The second challenge is to regain momentum toward a concerted multilateral liberalization of trade. Our past successes in the international arena are impressive, but they are in the past. The tasks before us are broader and more difficult. They go well beyond lowering high duties remaining on some products and dismantling the bewildering array of nontarriff barriers—many ostensibly designed for purposes other than trade restrictions.

The whole definition of "trade" is changing. It is no longer just a bag of wheat or a piece of machinery going from port A to port B. It's data—in the shape of an electronic impulse—flowing from computer A to computer B. It's engineering advice going from one brain to another. Future trade will necessarily reflect an extraordinary shift in human activities, which we are experiencing but still do not fully understand—the shift from producing goods to producing information and services. We all know about U.S. deficits in merchandise trade, but remember that last year we had a surplus of $30 billion in the service account. This has been a growing success story for years. Service trade now accounts for over one-third of total U.S. international commerce with a dollar value in excess of $239 billion in the past year alone.

The future offers a long trade agenda which needs to be addressed now. Two years ago, economic and trade ministers from almost 100 countries met in Geneva to deal with the trade problems of the 1980s. That meeting was a start in defining the issues. There's a lot of work ahead before we can speak of real progress—better international rules and substantial new trade opportunities. We must pursue that agenda vigorously.

For the United States, it is essential that new or partially protected areas of international trade be brought under full protection under the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]. Despite their importance, agricultural products to date have not been treated as any other commodity. Agriculture should be brought under full GATT discipline. Additionally, given the diversity of trade in new services—banking, insurance and other financial services, engineering, communications, data processing, and telecommunications—it will be necessary to develop principles to govern this trade and encourage its expansion. It must be done, because experience shows that restrictions in national markets will fragment trade in services, stifle competition, and raise prices. Services need to be an important part of any trade negotiation that aims to contribute to global prosperity.

There is of course, another side to this bargain. Developing countries, if they are to lower import barriers, will want concessions from the United States on items like textiles, shoes, and steel. The political problems at home will be considerable. Thus, the next round of negotiations should prove to be the most difficult of any to date. But, at the same time, it is more than ever indispensable to get nations to negotiate.

Latin American countries have a vital stake in multilateral trade liberalization. The import substitution approach to development is now largely discredited among serious students of such matters. Many developing countries have recognized the drawbacks of im-

port substitution and have moved toward freer trade of their own volition. Many have been encouraged to do so by the IMF and the World Bank in the context of needed stabilization and structural adjustment programs, but the pace has been slow.

Unless Latin American countries expand their exports enough to both service their debt and restore more normal import levels, they are likely to face political unrest on top of their economic woes. But they must pursue the adjustment programs which they have begun and restore their international competitiveness through structural and exchange rate reforms instead of using import barriers and subsidies to balance their trade. Otherwise, both their imports and exports are likely to be inadequate.

Conclusion

The crucial importance of attracting the Latin American and other major developing countries to the bargaining table lies in the linkages among our respective economies. If the economic health of the developing countries is not restored, our economy will suffer as well.

In short, the stakes are high. Trade negotiations offer Latin American and other developing countries the opportunity to gain greater market access in industrial countries while they reduce tariff and nontariff barriers in their own interest.

Returning to my earlier theme of development and trade as constructive change, adaptation to change is almost always painful but is both necessary and beneficial in the long run. That is as true in Latin America as in the United States. If we consider the inter-American market as a single entity, the opportunities for productive interchange and cooperation are staggering. This potential must be turned into tangible and real opportunities through determined and consistent pursuit of market-oriented and trade-promoting policies by the region's governments. ■

U.S. Central American Policy at a Crossroads

by Langhorne A. Motley

Statement prepared for the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 2, 1984. Ambassador Motley is Asssistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.[1]

In 1979, one of my predecessors testified before this subcommittee that Central America was at a crossroads, with one path leading to violent and radical change, the other to democratic reform. Yet many believed that a foreign policy for Central America based on democratic reform was unrealistic because, except in Costa Rica, democracy couldn't survive in Central America.

Today Central Americans have made their choices. Except for Nicaragua, our neighbors have chosen the path to democracy. Over the last 5 years, Honduras has elected a civilian president, El Salvador has had two free elections, and Guatemala has begun to move toward constitutional government.

Today it is the United States that is at a crossroads. Will we support the efforts of Central Americans to build democracy and peace? Are we prepared to pursue a policy that will persuade the Sandinistas to abandon their violent and radical course? Or will we return to the alternating neglect and interventionism that marked our relations with Central America in the past and that have contributed so much to the problems we face today?

This is not the moment for the United States to falter. Without our help, our neighbors would face an unequal struggle. As Secretary Shultz said on March 20:

> If regimes responsive to Moscow and Havana and hostile to the United States are installed in Central America, we will pay a high price for a long, long time.

Support for democratic reform and peace in Central America requires confidence in ourselves and in our neighbors. It requires providing democratic forces with the resources they need to get the job done in the face of grave threats. And it requires acting with steadfastness and political determination throughout the region.

That is why I believe the approach developed by the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America is in the best interests of the United States and should be supported by the Congress.

I will not repeat here the many arguments presented by the Administration and the independent bipartisan commission before this and other interested committees. Those testimonies, and the almost 1,000 pages of the bipartisan commission's *Report* and *Appendix*,[1] analyze the crisis in Central America and how the United States should respond to it in exhaustive detail.

Rather, I will focus on two points:

- Why Central America's dynamic confronts us with a choice we can defer only at our peril; and
- An update with particular regard to Nicaragua, El Salvador, and prospects for a comprehensive regional settlement.

THE LAST 5 YEARS

At this time 5 years ago, Central America's traditional order was in serious trouble.

- Nicaragua's National Guard faced popular uprisings in Leon, Esteli, and Masaya, while Nicaraguan patriots like Eden Pastora were in Costa Rica and Honduras preparing what proved to be their final campaign against General Somoza.
- In El Salvador, General Romero's government was paralyzed by its own ineptitude and repression and by the terrorism of young radicals who were amassing substantial popular support.
- In Guatemala, the government of General Lucas had been implicated in assassinations of moderate politicians and was in increasingly open conflict with the Catholic Church; the countryside was prey to armed bands from left and right.
- Honduras was more peaceful, but it, too, had a military president, a suspended constitution, and a simmering conflict with El Salvador.
- Only democratic Costa Rica was free of violence.

Today, the traditional dictators are gone. But now the pendulum threatens to swing all the way from rightwing dictatorship to communist totalitarianism.

- General Somoza is gone. But his self-appointed successors have so repressed their people that many, including Pastora, have again taken up arms, this time against the communization of their country.

• General Romero is gone. El Salvador is in the midst of its second successful national election in 2 years, but the relentless guerrilla assault supplied and managed from Cuba and Nicaragua continues.

• General Lucas is gone. Although his successors have also been generals, Guatemala is preparing for Constituent Assembly elections in July and national elections in 1985.

• Honduras has a restored constitutional order and a strong civilian president. But, although it has made peace with El Salvador, it now faces constant threats from Nicaragua.

• Costa Rica remains vibrantly democratic. But it, too, is threatened by Nicaragua.

Politically, these events reflect two opposing trends:

The first is the gradual democratization of Central American life. This very real trend suggests that those who argue that Central Americans are not ready for democracy are out of touch with what has been happening there in recent years.

The second trend is the Cuban-Soviet militarization of Nicaragua and of the conflict in El Salvador for antidemocratic purposes. Cuba and the Soviet Union have provided the military and technical infrastructure to redirect the Nicaraguan revolution and inflame the entire isthmus.

These changes have come about so rapidly that many observers have been caught off guard.

• To this day many Americans still look at El Salvador as if it were the semifeudal state of the pre-1979 era. It is not.

• Many still view Nicaragua as it was in mid-1979: newly liberated from the Somoza dictatorship; pledged to the world and its neighbors to be democratic, nonaligned, and nonaggressive. That view is, at best, naive.

• Many still ignore the escalating Cuban and Soviet military intervention underway in Central America. Yet it has global as well as local implications.

• And, most ironically, some assume that the United States itself has not changed, that we, government and critics alike, are still incapable of viewing Central America in anything more than the simplest of stereotypes.

Yet today, were it not for the United States, the struggle between the advocates of democracy and their armed communist enemies would be desperately unequal—not because of numbers, for an overwhelming majority of Central Americans have always supported democracy when given a chance, but because of Cuban- and Soviet-supplied guns wielded to prevent a free choice.

Nicaragua's buildup gives the Sandinistas military power unimagined in the annals of Central American militarism. Somoza had 12,000 men under arms; the Sandinistas boast of having 100,000 or more. Somoza had 3 tanks and 25 armored vehicles. The Sandinistas have more than 50 medium tanks and at least 80 armored vehicles, plus amphibious light tanks, tank ferries, and multiple rocket launchers. With Soviet and Cuban encouragement and resources, the Sandinistas have turned Nicaragua into a general headquarters for thousands of guerrillas throughout the isthmus. Ironically, this buildup began the day the Sandinistas moved into Somoza's bunker, even as the rest of the world was prematurely celebrating the end of Nicaraguan militarism.

Nicaragua's neighbors would be unable to preserve a balance if they could not count on the United States. Costa Rica has no army. Honduras, even now, has but 16 light tanks and a dozen armored vehicles. And across the Gulf of Fonseca from Nicaragua, guerrillas are using the military technology and supplies they receive through Nicaragua to fight democratic reforms supported by an overwhelming majority of Salvadorans.

This is why we now face a critical choice. We have had 5 years to determine what is happening. It is obvious that the overwhelming majority of Central Americans want democracy. They are clearly capable of working and even fighting for it. Equally, Cuba and the Soviet Union are attempting to turn Central America's travails to the disadvantage of both Central America and the United States. And a distinguished and independent bipartisan commission has reviewed the evidence and provided a blueprint for a long-range solution. The Administration has accepted that blueprint.

We have, in short, a coherent policy that addresses the need to help strengthen democratic institutions and to lay the basis for equitable economic growth in a more secure environment. But, though no alternative has been put forward, we are still not providing the resources our neighbors need. It is as if we had decided to wring our hands at the absence of quick and easy solutions. It is not a pretty picture.

The words of the 1984 Easter pastoral of Nicaragua's Roman Catholic bishops, "it is useless to blame everything on the evils of the past without recognizing the deficiencies of the present," apply to us as well.

What will we say 5 years from now if, on top of our past failures in Central America, we now turn our backs on our neighbors when they face armed communism as well as continued resistance to democratic change from extremists of the right?

SOME SPECIFICS

Let me be more specific, by country.

El Salvador

Few predicted in 1979 that the Salvadoran Government would prove capable of launching and carrying through major reforms. Yet the government that ultimately emerged from the 1979 coup against General Romero, composed of the armed forces and the Christian Democratic Party, succeeded in breaking the power monopoly of the old ruling order and installing a new alternative and a new perspective. This new perspective has been evident in the current election campaign: not even the candidates of the right suggest reversal of the reforms.

On March 28, 1982, more than 1.5 million Salvadorans turned out to vote in that nation's first free and fair elections ever. They believed that their vote was important, and they were not disappointed. Power passed peacefully to a Government of National Unity headed by independent Alvaro Magana. The elections did not end the war, but they produced a Constituent Assembly which passed an amnesty law, authorized a Peace Commission to try to bring the guerrillas into the democratic process, and adopted the new liberal constitution under which El Salvador now lives. The reforms continued: the assembly extended the land-to-the-tiller program three times. Under this program, President Magana's administration has redistributed more land than the previous government.

Now El Salvador is in the midst of the next phase of its transition to democratic government. Whoever is elected president of El Salvador on Sunday will have a mandate that represents a majority of the voters.

Some commentators have predicted a military coup if one or the other candidate wins, but I can tell you we have seen no evidence of this. The armed forces have maintained a professional distance from politics and worked to protect the physical security and institutional integri-

ty of the process. The words of the OAS [Organization of American States] observers to the first round of voting, on March 25, are worth noting:

> The Armed Forces deserve praise for the correct manner in which they provided security to the voters and for their cooperation with the citizenry in defending their right to express their political preference without undue influence.

Though there is still a long way to go, El Salvador has also made great strides in human rights. Political violence is down sharply from 3 and 4 years ago. Salvadoran political and military leaders, backed by the United States, have ensured that death squad activity can no longer be cloaked in the guise of "patriotic anticommunism." Death squad killings are murder and are being condemned as such by Salvadoran public opinion. The death squads have as their goal the destruction of democratic rule and social reform—they represent a virulent but declining opposition to the government and its reforms.

Progress also has been made, again not without difficulty, in all cases of murdered American citizens. In the only two cases in which suspects have not been identified, the deaths of John Sullivan and Lt. Cmdr. Albert Schaufelburger, investigations proceed. The Salvadoran Government's pursuit of these cases and the enthusiasm we have seen during our project to help upgrade their judicial and investigative capabilities demonstrate their desire for genuine improvement across the board, not just in politically sensitive cases.

Most importantly, and this is admittedly difficult to measure, there is a new attitude in El Salvador. Every Salvadoran—whether government official, member of the armed forces, businessman, politician, or private citizen—is aware of the fundamental importance of human rights. In the long run, that is the most important consideration, because it is they, not us, who must prevent further abuses in their own society.

El Salvador has now begun to counter economic destabilization, which is the key to the guerrillas' "prolonged war" strategy. From 1979 through 1982, the Salvadoran economy declined sharply due to guerrilla violence and adverse developments in the world economy. Per capita income fell by about one-third in real terms, to levels El Salvador had achieved in the early 1960s. But in 1983, with the help of U.S. assistance, the economy finally stabilized. The cost of guerrilla violence to the economy is still greater than the value of all U.S. economic assistance during the same period, but with our continued assistance, the Salvadoran economy could begin to grow again in 1984-85.

In short, in the last 5 years, El Salvador has survived an externally supported guerrilla war to achieve:

- The beginnings of reform, stability, and increased democracy in the political field;
- Sharp reductions in human rights abuse with the clear prospect of further progress; and
- Economic stabilization, albeit still at a low level.

In only one major area of concern can I report little definitive progress over the last 5 years—the military sphere. There is little immediate danger of a guerrilla victory in El Salvador. The armed forces can force the guerrillas to abandon positions. And there have been improvements in command structure, force levels, and tactics. But the nation remains vulnerable to high-impact guerrilla raids; critical security tasks such as protecting the elections are still being provisioned on a hand-to-mouth basis. The Salvadoran Armed Forces do not have the capacity at this time to force the guerrillas to abandon their pursuit of a military victory or to induce them to accept participation in an open, democratic process.

I regret to say it, but U.S. support for creating a better society in El Salvador has not kept up with Cuba's and Nicaragua's admittedly easier objective of destroying it through support for terrorism, sabotage, and guerrilla war.

In the same period in which we have seen such progress in the political, human rights, and economic arenas, the Administration's requests for military assistance have been regularly underfunded. This past year, for example, while the second Continuing Resolution for FY 1984 was being considered, the National Bipartisan Commission was working to develop a long-range strategy for Central America. Military assistance for El Salvador was appropriated at a low level while we awaited the commission's findings.

The bipartisan commission unanimously recommended that the United States provide to El Salvador "*significantly increased levels of military aid as quickly as possible, so that the Salvadoran authorities can act on the assurance that needed aid will be forthcoming*" [emphasis in the report]. It added that there is "no logical argument for giving some aid but not enough. The worst possible policy for El Salvador is to provide just enough aid to keep the war going but too little to wage it successfully."

Although underfunding is helping to prolong the conflict, the Administration's request for $178 million in supplementary assistance has not been acted upon in this House, even after intense consultations and after the Administration's willingness—and the Senate's bipartisan action—to approve an initial $62 million for the most urgent needs.

That, in a nutshell, is the explanation for the President's use of the emergency provision of Section 21(d) of the Arms Export Control Act to assist El Salvador by allowing it to defer payments on essential defense articles. We had run out of time. Were the Salvadorans unable to protect the election from guerrilla disruption, who would give the Salvadoran Government the benefit of the doubt? How many would have said that the Salvadorans "cannot win" and that we should push them to accept an undemocratic power-sharing deal with the guerrillas? With our own lack of firmness so fully displayed, any such deal would lead directly to the kind of power play in El Salvador we saw the Sandinistas achieve in Nicaragua in 1979-80.

The Salvadorans need and deserve our support. Not just token support but support adequate to a difficult task. They have proven themselves capable when they have the means. We should be ready to provide them.

Nicaragua

In July 1979, Nicaragua's new leaders pledged to the entire hemisphere that they would hold free elections, be nonaligned, and respect the self-determination of peoples.

In September 1983, the Government of Nicaragua made an even broader commitment. It agreed with its Central American neighbors and the Contadora states—Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela—to negotiations to implement 21 specific objectives. These objectives include the establishment of democratic government, an end to support for subversion, and various military cutbacks—both cuts in arms and military personnel and reductions in foreign military and security advisers with a view to their eventual elimination.

On January 8, 1984, Nicaragua further agreed with the Central American governments on specific procedures to guide the negotiation of a treaty embodying the 21 points and the verification and control measures necessary to ensure that they are actually carried out.

Were the Sandinistas to meet these commitments to their own people and their neighbors, the basic objectives of the United States with respect to Nicaragua would be achieved. We ask of the Sandinistas only that they do what they have publicly committed themselves to do—and what their increasingly fearful neighbors are asking of them.

The problem, of course, is that the Sandinistas have been moving in the opposite direction ever since 1979. They have based their power not on elections but on internal controls and militarization and on Cuban and Soviet support. They have systematically destroyed the broad national coalition that overthrew Somoza. They have harassed political critics, the media, business and labor, ethnic minorities, even the Catholic Church. They have built a military establishment many times the size of Somoza's National Guard. They have brought in at least 2,500 Cubans and over 100 Soviet-bloc military and secret police advisers to develop a pervasive internal security apparatus and to organize support for guerrilla warfare against El Salvador and their other neighbors.

Experience has taught that we must seek actions, not words, from Nicaragua—action to sever military and security ties to Cuba and the Soviet bloc; action to end all support for guerrilla violence and terrorism in Central America; action to reduce Nicaragua's military buildup to levels in balance with its neighbors; action to establish a genuinely democratic political system.

What we have seen so far is mainly rhetoric. And I firmly believe that without critical pressures from the military and diplomatic aspects of our policy, we would not have heard even this more accommodating rhetoric, only the kind of destructive defiance the Sandinistas have used with everyone from Arturo Cruz to the Pope.

In October 1980, the Sandinistas betrayed President Carter and the U.S. Congress- the more than $100 million in aid we had given them and the political risks we took to do it. At that time we asked them to halt their efforts to export communism in Central America or face U.S. opposition. They persisted, and in January President Carter suspended aid to Nicaragua and authorized military support for El Salvador.

Again in August 1981 and April 1982, both times under President Reagan, the United States asked Nicaragua to end its support for the guerrilla insurgents in El Salvador, offering to resume constructive relations and economic cooperation. Again the Sandinistas were unresponsive.

In October 1982 in San Jose, Costa Rica, we joined seven other democratically elected governments in making fair and balanced proposals for regional peace. (Those who question the depth of U.S. support for the more recent Contadora objectives might do well to compare them to the principles in the San Jose Final Act.) Nicaragua refused even to receive the Costa Rican foreign minister as emissary of this group.

Last year, the difficulties they were encountering began to give the Sandinistas second thoughts. Their domestic critics made clear they would not be intimidated. International support from democratic movements stopped being automatic. The United States undertook military maneuvers to help maintain the regional military balance. The Contadora nations insisted that Nicaragua begin to address the complaints of its neighbors.

Nicaragua's response so far falls far short of meeting the basic concerns I have outlined. The six-point "peace proposal" Junta Coordinator Daniel Ortega announced last July, for example, would have cut off all outside assistance to the Government of El Salvador without affecting Cuban and Soviet assistance to the Government of Nicaragua.

The four "draft treaties" that Nicaragua presented in October ignored the Contadora objective to establish democratic institutions, did not deal with the issue of foreign military advisers, and made no meaningful proposals for verification. In tabling and immediately publicizing these treaties before the ink was dry on the 21 objectives, Nicaragua was trying to undercut the Contadora process procedurally and attempting to narrow it substantively. Since then, the Sandinista leadership has sought repeatedly to shift the venue of dialogue away from Contadora—as in last fall's failed attempt at the UN General Assembly, at the Security Council last month, and again now at The Hague.

In November, following the collective action in Grenada, Nicaragua spread word that it was reducing the Cuban presence and telling the Salvadoran FMLN/FDR [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front/Revolutionary Democratic Front] to leave Managua. But, in fact, as Nicaraguan Interior Minister Borge admitted, Cuban departures were normal year-end rotations of teachers and did not affect military or security advisers. The Salvadoran guerrilla headquarters are still operating from Nicaragua.

Now Nicaragua has announced elections for November 4. We would welcome genuinely open elections in which all representative political elements can participate. Such an event would be a particular relief for Nicaragua's democratic neighbor Costa Rica. Nonetheless, the state of emergency, with its arbitrary prior censorship of the media and controls on freedom of assembly, continues. And we have not yet seen movement toward a framework which would ensure free and fair elections: an end to the state of emergency, reversal of the decision to bar opposition leaders, full media access, and limits on Sandinista use of state resources and institutions for partisan purposes. The Sandinistas' arrest of a prominent journalist on April 29 and their denunciation of the call to dialogue issued on Easter Sunday by the Catholic bishops are not hopeful signs.

Like other democracies, though skeptical, we have, nonetheless, publicly welcomed the Sandinistas' positive statements. We have also made clear that we are looking for genuine change, not rhetoric—for real rather than cosmetic actions on our four objectives. Our most recent exchange was on April 4, when special envoy Harry Shlaudeman and I talked with Nicaraguan leaders in Managua. Unfortunately, the Sandinistas remain intransigent, insisting simultaneously that they are not now, nor ever have been, supplying the Salvadoran insurgents and also that their support has diminished. They add that no action is required on their part to restore peace to the region. But they know what must be done. And the time has come for them to begin.

Honduras

Honduras is the poorest Central American nation, but the internal conditions that facilitated the Sandinista takeover in Nicaragua and nurtured the development of the guerrilla movement in El Salvador do not exist in Honduras.

- Honduras does not have a landed oligarchy. Land reform is a success.
- An independent and free press is open to everyone—including the political opposition.
- Trade unions are an effective force and have been so for more than 30 years.
- Although still the strongest single institution, the military has never been a praetorian guard for the privileged, nor is it repressive.

But Honduras does face serious problems in building democratic institutions in the face of extreme economic hardship and with potential instability on every border.

The Suazo government inherited an economy that was nearly bankrupt. Depressed global markets for the tropical and subtropical agricultural products that are Honduras' major exports, continued regional instability, and burgeoning population growth are all reasons why we have increased U.S. economic assistance ($84.4 million in the FY 1984 Continuing Resolution; $84.5 million in the FY 1984 supplemental request; $139 million requested for FY 1985).

The inflow of over 44,000 refugees fleeing internal crises in neighboring countries has placed major additional demands on Honduras' fragile economy. About 18,000 refugees are Salvadoran, 700 are from Guatemala, and the rest—more than 20,000—are Nicaraguan, the majority Miskito and Sumo Indians.

Beginning in 1981-82, despite the government's popularity, Honduras was struck by a wave of terrorist and subversive attacks. The timing, targets, and accompanying propaganda made it obvious that they were orchestrated by Nicaragua to intimidate the Honduran Government and to retaliate for depriving the Salvadoran guerrillas of unchallenged transit and sanctuary in Honduran territory.

The government's reaction to the terrorist violence has been firm but measured. Fears of 2 years ago that a rising level of terrorism would provoke police repression have not been borne out. But the Sandinistas have not relented. Their strategy is to increase the political and psychological pressures created by their military buildup and heightened destabilization efforts. Last July, Nicaragua infiltrated 100 Cuban-trained guerrillas into Honduras. Most of these guerrillas, including their leader, were quickly captured; but the intention was clear: to spread rural warfare to Honduras as well as to El Salvador.

Honduran Army units are undertrained; the country's total military force is one-fourth that of Nicaragua; and its inventory of transportation, communications, and air defense materiel is skimpy and aged. In addition, Soviet and Cuban activities in Nicaragua, including the training of military pilots in Bulgaria, call into question the deterrent capacity of the Honduran Air Force, the nation's traditional defensive mainstay.

Honduras wants to avoid war with Nicaragua and has become a major advocate of restoring a military equilibrium through force reductions. In the meantime, it has not attempted to match Nicaragua's buildup of ground forces but has embarked upon a selective military modernization program to establish a minimal deterrent for self-defense.

U.S. military assistance concentrates on training and basic equipment. No sophisticated weapons or systems have been transferred to Honduras. Our military aid ($41 million in the FY 1984 Continuing Resolution; $37.5 million in the FY 1984 supplemental request; $62.5 million for FY 1985) would provide training, helicopters, fixed-wing transport and communications aircraft, naval equipment and patrol boats, vehicles, medical equipment, radar, communications equipment, ammunition, and spare parts.

To enhance Honduran and U.S. capabilities and to demonstrate resolve, we have also conducted a series of major joint military exercises with Honduras. Some temporary facilities were also improved to support the exercises. In June 1983, the Hondurans established a Regional Military Training Center to offer training, with U.S. help, to friendly countries in the region.

Military Aid and Democratization. A frequent criticism of U.S. policy toward Honduras is the assertion that all this military activity weakens democracy.

A careful look at what has happened politically—and militarily—in Honduras over the past few years suggests the contrary conclusion: that the direction of events has been from military control toward a civilian, democratic polity.

Honduras returned to civilian and constitutional rule in January 1982 after nearly 18 years of military governments. President Suazo's inauguration saw a clear transfer of power from military to civilian hands. This process had already begun during the transition period of the Constituent Assembly, when the key Communications Ministry shifted from military to civilian direction, as did the Ministry of Justice and the Agrarian Reform Institute. The Foreign Ministry and the Forestry Agency were returned to civilian control, leaving the Defense Ministry and the telephone and telegraph agency as the only major government bodies still headed by military men.

The Liberal Party government has since exercised unquestioned authority and established a solid reputation for honesty and technical competence. In economic and political matters, including appointments, President Suazo makes the decisions. This has been confirmed by the recent changes in military leadership. In military and diplomatic affairs, moreover, Honduras has consistently been at the forefront in supporting a comprehensive regional settlement.

The U.S. role is just as clear. At each stage in the return to democratic rule the U.S. Government encouraged the restoration and specifically discouraged those elements, which sought to maintain *de facto* military rule. In addition, while not determining politically, U.S. military assistance has permitted the Honduran Government to husband scarce resources for health, education, and public works without diverting them to military requirements.

In September 1983, a Costa Rican affiliate of the Gallup organization asked 700 Honduran adults with at least 1 year of secondary school what country, if any, was either a threat or a help to Honduras. The interviewers volunteered no names of countries. Eighty percent named Nicaragua as a military threat to Honduras. One percent so identified the United States. (This contrast was further emphasized when 93% identified the United States as helping Honduras to solve its problems.)

In part because of U.S. support, Honduras today is clearly more progressive and more democratic than it was before the 1980s.

Costa Rica

Five years ago Costa Rica was reeling from the economic one-two punch of increased oil prices and sharply falling coffee and other primary export prices. Deteriorating trade was exacerbated by onerous debt-service burdens (reaching as high as 58% of export receipts by 1983), partly a result of overzealous foreign borrowing by autonomous agencies in the late 1970s.

In 1983, the Costa Rican Government was able to obtain and comply with the terms of an IMF [International Monetary Fund] standby program for $100 million. Austerity measures greatly slashed the public sector deficit. Inflation was lowered significantly. Real gross domestic product grew slightly.

U.S. economic assistance was a significant factor in Costa Rica's ability to stabilize its economy. But despite the encouraging signs of 1983, it would be premature to speak of economic recovery during 1984.

Five years ago, staunchly democratic Costa Rica was serving as a base for numerous dissident groups fighting the Somoza dictatorship in neighboring Nicaragua. Tensions between Costa Rica and Nicaragua are thus not new. What is new, and what deeply concerns Costa Ricans, is the conjunction of economic recession and the radicalism and expansionism of the Sandinista regime on its northern border. Compared to the heavily armed Nicaraguan Army and massive

militia reserves totaling more than 100,000, Costa Rica has no army, and its police forces total less than 7,000.

The deepest concern of the Costa Rican leadership, however, is not the specter of armed invasion but the longer range threat posed by the ideological aggressiveness of a Marxist-Leninist Nicaragua bent on propagating its creed. This concern is heightened by Nicaragua's ties to Cuba, the Soviet Union, and the Soviet bloc generally, which exposes Costa Rica to externally supported subversion backed by a huge military and intelligence apparatus next door.

The influx of about 20,000 Salvadorans and 200,000 Nicaraguans has deeply affected Costa Rica. The several thousand men operating in southern Nicaragua under the command of former Sandinista hero Eden Pastora have elicited a good deal of sympathy for his cause among Costa Ricans. In mid-1983 members of the Basque terrorist group ETA were apprehended by Costa Rican security forces while apparently preparing to assassinate anti-Sandinista leaders in Costa Rica.

Faced with an armed-to-the-teeth Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, unarmed Costa Rica continues to rely upon the inter-American system for its security. While it remains militarily neutral, as President Monge has explained, Costa Rica continues to be a strong political advocate of democracy and a leading proponent of a negotiated regional peace.

Guatemala

Five years ago the people of Guatemala were being squeezed between an increasingly repressive government and a violent opposition that had come under the influence of Castro's Cuba. Leading political figures—like Colom Argueta and Fuentes Mohr, who offered an alternative between the two extremes—were killed, as were church leaders, labor union organizers, and members of the judiciary. The government of General Lucas Garcia rejected a plan for intense development projects to improve life for the rural peasant majority in the highlands and relied instead on the indiscriminate use of violence to force their allegiance. Guerrilla groups recruited successfully for the first time among the Indian population. Economically, the country was being driven to ruin, as the government spent millions on large capital development projects, many of which had little chance of success. Corruption was widespread.

The widespread human rights violations under the Lucas regime led to substantial international isolation. Efforts by both this Administration and the previous one to engage Guatemala in a dialogue about human rights concerns were unsuccessful.

This pattern began to change in 1982. On March 23 a group of young officers overthrew Lucas and installed a junta headed by retired General Rios Montt. Rios had been the Christian Democratic candidate for president in 1974 and by many accounts won the elections but lost the count to official fraud and was never allowed to take office.

Under Rios, the government and the army undertook a series of efforts to regain the support of the rural population and to seize the initiative from the guerrillas. Called the beans-and-rifle program, the army reasserted itself militarily in the highlands and began a well-conceived program of civic action projects that provided the Indian population with food, shelter, and medicine. At the same time the Rios Montt government organized rural villages into local civil defense forces, a key factor in the government's counterinsurgency efforts. As a result, the insurgents were increasingly put on the defensive throughout 1982–83.

At the same time, Guatemala was hit by the same forces of worldwide recession suffered by the other countries of Central America and was particularly affected by the collapse of the Central American Common Market. After several years of substantial real growth, the Guatemalan economy was nearly stagnant in 1981, then declined by an estimated 3.5% in 1982 and 2.0% in 1983. Austerity resulted in sharply lower levels of consumption, investment, and imports. A sustained drop in private investment over the past 5 years and the reduction of its Central American export markets further lowered production. Fiscal and monetary restraint (supported now by an IMF-sponsored program begun in July 1983) will continue for the foreseeable future.

Despite his relative successes, Rios was replaced in August 1983 by his Defense Minister, Gen. Oscar Mejia, in a nearly bloodless coup. The Mejia government immediately suspended the state of alarm, abolished the controversial special courts, and granted an amnesty. Moreover, the new government declared itself transitional and committed itself to returning the country to civilian, democratic rule. Mejia himself refused to take the title of president (he remains merely head of state). He confirmed Constituent Assembly elections for July 1984 and announced that an elected president would take office in 1985.

The Mejia government has followed through on these positive steps by taking the necessary measures to assure July elections by moving ahead with the legalization of political parties, registering voters, and decreeing an electoral law; 2.3 million voters have registered. Thirty-seven political groups across the political spectrum are taking steps to legalize themselves, and some 15 or 20 are expected to participate in the July 1 elections. The United Nations, OAS, and foreign governments have been invited to send observers to these elections.

Serious problems remain, especially human rights abuses. But it is important to recognize that significant political changes have taken place since 1982. Political abductions and murders continue, but the general level of violence has decreased markedly. Compared to the Lucas period, the record of the Rios and Mejia governments has been such that the Special Rapporteur appointed by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to study the human rights situation reported favorably on the improved human rights picture in Guatemala.

We have to decide now how to encourage further progress. Economic assistance is vital if the Guatemalan Government is to be able to meet the basic needs of the people and especially the rural Indian population which has suffered the bulk of the violence. Similarly we need to resume—in a limited and conditioned fashion—a relationship with the Guatemalan military. The Guatemalan military still faces a serious insurgent threat. U.S. support for those Guatemalans who are attempting to restore democracy, improve human rights, meet human needs, and defeat externally supported Marxist guerrillas is important to help create a sounder basis for the civilian government that will take over next year.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Our objectives in Central America today remain as they were set forth by the President to the Joint Session of Congress a year ago. We support democracy, development, dialogue, and security.

But recent events have highlighted for all of us the need to focus on the vital links between power and diplomacy. As Secretary Shultz has emphasized, power and diplomacy are not mutually antagonistic. Peace is not achieved merely by wishing for it—the hard reality is that diplomacy not backed by power is doomed.

In El Salvador, we are heartened by the prospect that the election 4 days from now will produce a president with a clear

popular mandate. We have a major stake in El Salvador's continued progress toward democracy, the promotion of human rights, and security. Our relations are and will be governed by how the new government affects these interests. As noted above, our ability to support El Salvador's progress to date has been less than our national interest so clearly requires. The President's use of emergency authorities under section 21(d) in no way diminishes the need for prompt congressional action on our pending *military and economic* assistance requests. Our ability to press for continued economic, social, and political progress, and to help provide the security necessary to attain it, depend on congressional action.

With Nicaragua, also, our relations are at a critical stage. Again, a combination of pressure and inducements is essential. The need for pressures arises from one fundamental reality: the need to convince the Sandinistas of the unworkability of their starting assumption that their Cuban/Soviet ties would enable them to assault their people and their neighbors with impunity.

For pressure to work, short of a direct military confrontation we all want to avoid, it must have defined political goals—a reasonable alternative that satisfies common concerns. That is the essence of diplomacy in the real world. And clearly delineated goals do exist: they are contained in the 21 points agreed to by all nine countries engaged in the Contadora process last fall.

The Document of Objectives agreed to on September 9, 1983, by the five Central American states, including Nicaragua, is a specific set of standards written in terms fully understandable to all the participants. And it is a formula that would achieve our objectives in Nicaragua—if actually implemented on a verifiable and enforceable basis.

Compare our own four basic objectives toward Nicaragua with the substance of the Contadora Document of Objectives:

- We seek an end to Nicaraguan support for guerrilla groups; the Document of Objectives calls for an end to support for subversion.
- We want Nicaragua to sever its military and security ties to Cuba and the Soviet bloc; the Document of Objectives calls for the proscription of foreign military bases and the reduction and eventual elimination of foreign military advisers and troops.
- We seek reduction of Nicaragua's military strength to levels that would restore military equilibrium in the area; the Document of Objectives calls for the reduction of current inventories of arms and military personnel.
- We seek fulfillment of the original Sandinista promises to support democratic pluralism; the Document of Objectives calls for establishment of democratic systems of government based on genuinely open elections.
- Finally, we seek a diplomatic solution that is verifiable and enforceable; the Document of Objectives calls for adequate means of verification and control.

Our joint exercises with Honduras, the fleet maneuvers, the fears of Nicaragua's neighbors, the resistance of the Nicaraguan people, the warnings to the Sandinistas from Europe and from around this hemisphere—all contribute to this carefully developed framework of pressure-with-purpose. What the Sandinistas are being asked to do is clear to them, to their neighbors, and to us. The path to a political "solution" to regional democracy and disarmament is encompassed in the 21 objectives.

To keep their commitments to their people and the OAS, the Sandinistas could act unilaterally or they could act as a result of negotiations, as in the ongoing Contadora process. How they do what they have promised is up to them. What matters is action—and the sooner the better.

The basic fact is this: if the Sandinistas adhere to those principles in a way in which others can have confidence—whether on the basis of a formal treaty or not—its neighbors will do the same, and so will we. The pressure will have worked, our concerns will have been alleviated, and a political solution will have been achieved in Central America.

The months ahead are critical. They will determine whether the progress to date proves ephemeral or represents a real move toward regional stability.

The willingness of the Central American democracies to implement the Document of Objectives was reiterated by the foreign ministers of Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras on April 25. On that date they issued a communique reemphasizing their commitment to the verifiable and enforceable implementation of all 21 points. Moreover, to help advance the negotiation of the concrete measures required to achieve those objectives, they declared their willingness to take the following additional steps:

- Immediately deliver an inventory of their countries' active and reserve combat units and principal weapons systems to a special commission of the Inter-American Defense Board and invite the board to send a suitable inspection team to verify the statements made in the inventories;
- Publish all military treaties and agreements with third countries;
- Inform the Inter-American Defense Board of arms and munitions deliveries from external sources and enable it to verify data concerning such deliveries; and
- Publish the number and location of all foreign military personnel in their countries and permit the Inter-American Defense Board to verify such number and location.

This is a positive and serious contribution to the negotiating process. It is recognition that the road to peace involves a series of steps each of which, incrementally, brings closer the goal of a verifiable, balanced, comprehensive, and lasting settlement. History provides all too many examples of treaties admirable in intention but unconnected to reality. The challenge to the Contadora participants is to avoid the pitfall of signing meaningless documents that proclaim peace but do nothing concrete to change the reality of continued conflict. This joint statement conforms to a realistic appreciation of the kinds of first steps required to advance the negotiating process.

The seriousness of this offer contrasts with the vacuousness of the statement issued 2 days later by Nicaragua. Ignoring the joint statement of Honduras, Costa Rica, and El Salvador, the Nicaraguan communique of April 27 advocated the immediate signing of peace treaties. There is no mention—not even rhetorically—in the Nicaraguan statement of verification and control. Why? I suspect the answer is that the Nicaraguans know that the democracies would be bound—by their very nature as open societies with democratic institutions of press, political opposition, and institutional restrictions on the unbridled exercise of power—to adhere to any treaties that they sign. They know, equally, that in the absence of workable verification procedures, that they themselves could with impunity continue their present behavior. They would in that circumstance have achieved their political objectives of protecting themselves against the consequences of their actions while ensuring themselves the ability to continue destabilizing their neighbors.

The difference between the two positions is the difference—to quote Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Shirley Christian—between "real policy and applause lines." That is why ending our assistance would force Central Americans to choose

between dictatorship and communism. Our assistance is creating a practical choice between those polar extremes.

- It is helping El Salvador build a democracy;
- It is helping Costa Rica and Honduras to resist Nicaraguan pressures; and
- It is keeping alive the possibility that Central America's problems can ultimately be solved through negotiations.

We know what the standards are. There are benchmarks along the way. And we must all keep careful track, in effect, "conditioning" our attitudes and actions on what is actually happening in Central America. We are looking for tangible evidence—that El Salvador and Honduras are continuing to develop more democratic polities; that Nicaragua and Guatemala are taking credible steps toward fair elections; and that democratic governments are able to protect themselves against the antidemocratic terror of the far left and the far right.

We can, with some precision, envision a better future for the people of Central America. We cannot and should not expect these countries to "Americanize" themselves in our image. To be effective, our policies must build on directions that those countries find in their own national interests. That is happening in Costa Rica, Honduras, and, increasingly, El Salvador, where events are demonstrating that a democratic vision is attainable. It must also be attained in Nicaragua and Guatemala. It would be wrong both morally and strategically not to use our resources now to help them move toward that future.

[1]The U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO) offers for sale the *Report of the National Bipartisan Commission for Central America* (132 pp.) and the *Report of the National Bipartisan Commission for Central America—Appendix* (832 pp.). Please contact GPO for availability and prices:

Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

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Visit of Dominican Republic President

President Salvador Jorge Blanco of the Dominican Republic made a state visit to the United States April 9–14, 1984. While in Washington, D.C., April 9–12, he met with President Reagan and other government officials.

Following are remarks made by the two Presidents at the arrival ceremony and a White House statement.

(White House photo by Dave Valdez)

ARRIVAL CEREMONY, APR. 10, 1984[1]

President Reagan

President and Mrs. Jorge Blanco, it's indeed an honor for me to welcome you, the first President of your country to make a state visit to the United States. This is a special visit. The people of our countries are both friends and neighbors, and we're pleased to have this opportunity to express our good will to neighbors who reflect the same love of liberty in which we take such pride.

The Dominican Republic today shines as a beacon of freedom-loving people everywhere. Your people have shown the spirit, courage, and perseverance necessary to build, in your words, "a true functional democracy in the Caribbean." Democracy, as all free people have found, is not the easiest path, but it is the best one. It is the way most consistent with the spirit of the New World, with the values of which all Americans, from one end of the hemisphere to the other, can claim as their birthright.

As such, it is fitting that the Dominican Republic, with its stability and political liberty, now shows others the way. Your nation, after all, was the beachhead of Western civilization in the New World. Christopher Columbus, the great discoverer, landed on your shores during his first voyage of exploration. In your country still stands the first cathedral of America, built in 1540. The hopes and dreams of all the Americans once focused on those hardy souls who left the Old World and entered the New through the doorway of Santo Domingo.

Today, as you strive to increase the opportunity of all your citizens, you follow in the spirit of those who came before you. You face many challenges in invigorating your economy and improving the standard of living of your people. Yet even in the days of Columbus, the magnificent beauty and vast potential of your land were evident. In early 1493 Columbus wrote, "In that island . . . we named Española, there are mountains of very great size and beauty, vast plains, groves, and very fruitful fields. . . . The convenience and excellence of the harbors in this island and the abundance of the rivers . . . surpass anything that would be believed by one who had not seen it." That beauty and that potential still remain. Coupled now with freedom, your people have every reason to expect that great things can be accomplished.

President Jorge Blanco, it is propitious that your visit coincides with Pan American Week, a time when we have for the last 53 years celebrated the ties between the peoples of the Western Hemisphere. The people of the United States place great value on the special ties that we have with friends close to home. And while the progress of any country depends most heavily on the freedom, the hard work, and the ingenuity of its own people and government, the United States is committed to healthy cooperation with our Caribbean Basin neighbors for the betterment of all our peoples.

Combined with your own domestic reforms, which we heartily applaud, the trade and commerce unleashed by the Caribbean Basin Initiative should bring vast new opportunities to Dominicans and to other Caribbean people. Your country and some two dozen others will now have for most of your products virtually unrestricted duty-free entry until 1996 into the world's largest market. Never before has the United States or any other nation offered one-way free trade to any regional group of countries. It's a revolutionary step based on the conviction that enterprise, investment, and job creation will elevate the quality

of life while preserving the freedom and independence so cherished by both our peoples.

There is a Caribbean country on a much different path. Instead of economic freedom, it imposes heavy-handed controls, denying for people, for example, the right of private ownership and the right to organize independent unions. Instead of seeking mutual respect and friendly commerce with its neighbors, it exports violence and hatred. Instead of enjoying democratic liberties as are guaranteed in the Dominican Republic and most other Caribbean countries, its people are denied freedom of the press, speech, and religion. This tyranny has brought little hope for economic progress, providing its people only shortages and foodlines. Cuba is now dependent on a faraway totalitarian power without whose subsidy its dictatorial government could not export aggression or, indeed, survive.

Such serfdom and bowing to the interests of faraway masters is not consistent with the legacy of the people of this hemisphere. Our history is that of breaking away from such tutelage, and in this all Americans have a common vision. Your proud independence and the continuing strength of democracy in the Dominican Republic is a tremendous inspiration here and to other people in the hemisphere who are now battling to establish their own democracies.

President Jorge Blanco, we in the United States are fully aware that the success of democratic institutions in your country is due to the good will and strenuous efforts of individuals like yourself. You and your fellow countrymen have our respect. As we work to build a more prosperous and happy future, let us continue to open the doors of commerce and social interaction between our peoples.

In less than a decade we will be celebrating the 500th anniversary of a history-shattering event—Columbus' first great voyage of discovery. We look forward to commemorating this, one of mankind's greatest leaps, with the free people of the Dominican Republic.

Pedro Henriquez Ureña, a renowned literary figure as well as a great Dominican patriot, once wrote, "Words are like empty sacks. One must fill them with true human feeling." Well, I hope today that you can sense the feeling, the warmth, and admiration behind these words of welcome. President and Mrs. Jorge Blanco, we're proud to have you visiting with us.

President Jorge Blanco[2]

I am very pleased with this state visit, made at your invitation and which begins at the doorstep of the majestic White House, which represents and symbolizes the prestigious image of the United States all over the world.

Since the Pilgrims arrived on the shores of Massachusetts in search of a safe haven in order to freely exercise their religious and political ideas; through the heroic struggles which culminated in independence and the establishment of the first democracy in the Americas; and then on the emancipation of the slaves proclaimed by the eminent Abraham Lincoln, your people have been and are a model for men who join together in support of the eternal ideals of human freedom and dignity. These common efforts have created the great melting pot of races and cultures which is the United States of America.

As President and as jurist, I must recall with admiration the important documents which sustain the institutional history of the great American people, and which have established landmarks in the upward climb of humanity—the Mayflower Compact, the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights, Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, the Proclamation of the Four Freedoms by Roosevelt, among many others, have been and shall always be the most outstanding example of this nation's contribution to equality, democracy, and social progress.

We represent a Dominican democracy which is nourished, among other sources, by the old teachings which came precisely from this great nation when it proclaimed its independence on the Fourth of July of 1776. Since that time, freedom has had its most immediate origin on these American lands.

In the Dominican Republic, we have always fought for freedom, and our recent history increasingly has enhanced this struggle, which is the mainstay of our democracy, playing a vital role within the inter-American system, whose principles have been incorporated into the functional charter of our Organization of American States.

I am particularly grateful, for the reference you made to my political role of responsibility for the destinies of my country, and of the difficult task that I face in strengthening our democracy, while at the same time facing the dire effects of an international economic crisis which has dealt harsh blows to the weak economies and fragile political institutions of developing countries. And I want to express my appreciation for the Caribbean Basin Initiative, which has opened new possibilities for the development of our countries in the Caribbean.

We are pleased with the certainty that our efforts will always receive the encouragement and cooperation of friendly peoples, particularly the people of this great nation which never falters in its resolve to provide necessary and important solidarity.

I accept your words of praise toward me as a recognition of the values of the Dominican people, firmly resolved to enrich its political democracy with economic and social development and to strengthen peace throughout the hemisphere. I hope that our visit will serve to strengthen even more the firm bonds of friendship and of mutual cooperation between our governments and between our peoples.

And now I would hope that our visit will be able to provide us, a visit which we are making at your kind invitation, with a way to increase even more the very strong bonds of friendship that exist between your people and mine.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, APR. 15, 1984[3]

President Salvador Jorge Blanco of the Dominican Republic this week concluded a highly successful state visit to the United States.

In his discussion with President Reagan and senior American officials, President Jorge and his delegation showed once again that the Dominican Republic is an outstanding example of a people and leadership committed to democracy and to seeking solutions to social and economic problems through democratic means. President Reagan praised President Jorge for his skillful and courageous leadership in a time of serious economic difficulties and for his role in promoting solidarity among the Caribbean Basin nations.

President Reagan expressed his strong confidence in the economic potential of the Dominican Republic. Among the first countries to be designated for participation in the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), the Dominican Republic's proximity to the United States, its installed industrial capacity, and agricultural potential make it one of the countries most likely to benefit from the CBI's trade and investment incentives.

President Jorge's announcement during the course of his visit, of the conclusion of an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on

measures to resolve the Dominican Republic's economic problems further bolsters confidence in his government's economic program and prospects for the island nation's economic recovery. The agreement is the second President Jorge has negotiated with the IMF since taking office in 1982.

Reflecting the U.S. Government's confidence in its democratic neighbor, President Reagan informed President Jorge that U.S. assistance to the Dominican Republic will be increased during this fiscal year which ends September 30, 1984. Furthermore, as a result of the meetings between the two Presidents, the U.S. Government and the Dominican Government have already begun discussions regarding additional cooperation during the current period of economic recovery.

President Reagan told his guest that the United States is proud to have the Dominican Republic as a close friend. Wishing the departing President every good fortune, President Reagan stressed his confidence in the future of the Dominican Republic and its enlightened and capable leadership.

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[1]Made on the South Lawn of the White House where President Jorge Blanco was accorded a formal welcome with full military honors (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Apr. 16, 1984).

[2]President Jorge Blanco spoke in Spanish, and his remarks were translated by an interpreter.

[3]Made by the principal deputy press secretary to the President (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Apr. 23, 1984). ■

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation
Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft. Done at The Hague Dec. 16, 1970. Entered into force Oct. 14, 1971. TIAS 7192.

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered into force Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.
Accessions deposited: Monaco, June 3, 1983; Bahrain, Feb. 20, 1984.[1]

Protocol relating to an amendment (Art. 3 *bis*) to the convention on international civil aviation (TIAS 1591). Done at Montreal May 10, 1984. Enters into force on the date on which the 102d instrument of ratification is deposited.

Commodities—Common Fund
Agreement establishing the Common Fund for Commodities, with schedules. Done at Geneva June 27, 1980.[2]
Ratification deposited: Chad, June 6, 1984.

Conservation
Convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices. Done at Washington Mar. 3, 1983. Entered into force July 1, 1975. TIAS 8249.
Ratification deposited: Netherlands, Apr. 19, 1984.

Amendment to the convention of Mar. 3, 1973 on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora (TIAS 8249). Adopted at Bonn June 22, 1979.[2]
Acceptance deposited: Austria, Mar. 16, 1984.

Cultural Relations—UNESCO
Agreement on the importation of educational, scientific, and cultural materials; and protocol. Done at Lake Success Nov. 22, 1950. Entered into force May 21, 1952; for the U.S. Nov. 2, 1966 (TIAS 6129).

Protocol to the agreement on the importation of educational, scientific, and cultural materials of Nov. 22, 1950 (TIAS 6129). Adopted at Nairobi Nov. 26, 1976. Entered into force Jan. 2, 1982.[3]
Accession deposited: Portugal, June 11, 1984.

Customs
Customs convention on containers, 1972, with annexes and protocol. Done at Geneva Dec. 2, 1972. Entered into force Dec. 6, 1975.[3]
Accession deposited: Cuba, June 8, 1984.

Genocide
Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. Done at Paris Dec. 9, 1948. Entered into force Jan. 12, 1951.[3]
Accession deposited: Togo, May 24, 1984.

Human Rights
International convenant on civil and political rights. Done at New York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.[3]

International convenant on economic, social, and cultural rights. Done at New York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3, 1976.[3]
Accession deposited: Togo, May 24, 1984.

Law
Statute of The Hague conference on private international law. Done at The Hague Oct. 9–31, 1951. Entered into force July 15, 1955; for the U.S. Oct. 15, 1964. TIAS 5710.
Acceptance deposited: Poland, May 29, 1984.

Load Lines
International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at London Apr. 5, 1966. Entered into force July 21, 1968. TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720.
Accession deposited: United Arab Emirates, Dec. 15, 1983.

Amendments to the international convention on load lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720). Adopted at London Nov. 15, 1979.[2]
Acceptances deposited: Bulgaria Nov. 2, 1983; Canada, June 2, 1983.

Amendments to the international convention on load lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720). Adopted at London Nov. 17, 1983. Enters into force 12 months after the date on which amendments are accepted by two-thirds of the Contracting Governments, except for those which, before amendments come into force, make a declaration that they do not accept the amendments.

Marine Pollution
Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington Dec. 29, 1972. Entered into force Aug. 30, 1975. TIAS 8165.
Notification of succession: Solomon Islands, Mar. 20, 1984.

Maritime Matters
International convention on maritime search and rescue, 1979, with annex. Done at Hamburg Apr. 27, 1979.[2]
Accessions deposited: Australia, Nov. 7, 1983[4]; Barbados, July 25, 1983.

Narcotic Drugs
Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961 (TIAS 6298). Done at Geneva Mar. 25, 1972. Entered into force Aug. 8, 1975. TIAS 8118.
Ratification deposited: Belgium, June 13, 1984.

Patents
Patents cooperation treaty, with regulations. Done at Washington June 19, 1970. Entered into force Jan. 24, 1978, with the exception of Chapter II for the U.S. TIAS 8733.
Accession deposited: Korea, Republic of, May 10, 1984.

Patents—Microorganisms
Amendment to the Budapest treaty of Dec. 31, 1977, on the international recognition of the deposit of microorganisms for the purposes of patent procedure (TIAS 9768). Adopted by the Assembly of the Budapest Union Sept. 26, 1980.
Entered into force: May 24, 1984.

Red Cross
Geneva convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field. Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 1949. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for the U.S. Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3362.

Geneva convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea.

Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 1949. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for the U.S. Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3363.

Geneva convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war. Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 1949. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for the U.S. Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3364.

Geneva convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war. Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 1949. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for the U.S. Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3365.
Accession deposited: Cape Verde, May 11, 1984.

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and relating to the protecting of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), with annexes. Done at Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.[3]

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of noninternational armed conflicts (Protocol II). Done at Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.[3]
Accessions deposited: Cameroon Mar. 16, 1984; Oman, Mar. 29, 1984.

Rubber
International natural rubber agreement, 1979. Done at Geneva Oct. 6, 1979. Entered into force Apr. 15, 1982. TIAS 10379.
Accession deposited: Greece, June 5, 1984.

Trade
Agreement on implementation of article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT], and protocol (customs valuation). Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979 and Nov. 1, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1981. TIAS 10402.
Ratification deposited: Czechoslovakia, May 28, 1984.

Arrangement regarding bovine meat. Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9701.
Acceptance deposited: Colombia, June 4, 1984.

UNIDO
Constitution of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, with annexes. Adopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.[2]
Ratification deposited: Portugal, May 21, 1984.

Wheat
1983 Protocol for the further extension of the wheat trade convention 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Apr. 4, 1983. Entered into force July 1, 1983.
Ratification deposited: Luxembourg, June 26, 1984.
Accession deposited: Tunisia, June 28, 1984.

1983 protocol for the further extension of the food aid convention, 1980 (TIAS 10015). Done at Washington Apr. 4, 1983. Entered into force July 1, 1983.
Ratification deposited: Luxembourg, June 26, 1984.

Women
Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. Adopted at New York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 3, 1981.[3]
Accession deposited: Yemen (Aden), May 30, 1984.

World Health Organization
Constitution of the World Health Organization. Done at New York July 22, 1946. Entered into force Apr. 7, 1948. TIAS 1808.
Acceptance deposited: Cook Islands, May 9, 1984.

BILATERAL

Barbados
Agreement for the furnishing of commodities and services in connection with the peacekeeping force for Grenada. Effected by exchange of notes at Bridgetown Nov. 25, 1983 and Jan. 12, 1984. Entered into force Jan. 12, 1984.

Belgium
Agreement on social security, with final protocol. Signed at Washington Feb. 19, 1982.

Additional protocol to the agreement on social security. Signed at Brussels Nov. 23, 1982.

Administrative agreement for the implementation of the agreement on social security. Signed at Brussels Nov. 23, 1982.
Entered into force: July 1, 1984.

Belize
Arrangement relating to radio communications between amateur stations on behalf of third parties. Effected by exchange of notes at Belmopan and Belize May 3 and 23, 1984. Entered into force June 22, 1984.

Brazil
Memorandum of understanding concerning the Landsat system. Signed at Brasilia May 8, 1984. Entered into force May 8, 1984.

Canada
Agreement with respect to social security. Signed at Ottawa Mar. 11, 1981.

Administrative arrangement for the implementation of the agreement on social security. Signed at Washington May 22, 1981.

Supplementary agreement amending the agreement of Mar. 11, 1981 and the administrative arrangement of May 22, 1981 with respect to social security. Signed at Ottawa May 10, 1983.

Understanding with the Government of Quebec on social security, with administrative arrangement. Signed at Quebec Mar. 30, 1983.
Entered into force: Aug. 1, 1984.

Agreement for the establishment, operation, and maintenance of two Loran–C chains for the Canadian east coast and the Labrador Sea, with annex. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa Mar. 30, and May 3, 1984. Entered into force May 3, 1984.
Supersedes agreement of Sept. 16, 1964 (TIAS 5657).

Agreement on interpretation of Art. III(1)(a) of the air transport agreement of Jan. 17, 1966, as amended (TIAS 5972, 7824, 10258). Effected by exchange of letters at Washington May 4, 1984. Entered into force May 4, 1984.

Agreement amending the agreement of Jan. 17, 1966 on air transport, as amended (TIAS 5972, 7824, 10258), with related letter. Effected by exchange of letters at Ottawa May 24, 1984. Entered into force May 24, 1984.

Costa Rica
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed or ensured by the U.S. Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Washington May 18, 1984. Entered into force June 22, 1984.

Denmark
Agreement concerning Faroese fishing in fisheries off the coasts of the U.S., with annex and agreed minute. Signed at Washington June 11, 1984. Enters into force upon date agreed upon by exchange of notes following completion of internal procedures of both parties.

Dominica
Agreement for the furnishing of commodities and services in connection with the peacekeeping force for Grenada. Effected by exchange of notes at Bridgetown and Roseau Nov. 25, 1983 and Jan. 13, 1984. Entered into force Jan. 13, 1984.

Dominican Republic
Agreement amending the agreement of Jan. 13, 1984, for the sale of agricultural commodities. Signed at Santo Domingo May 21, 1984. Entered into force May 21, 1984.

Egypt
Agreement amending the agreement of Jan. 23, 1984, for the sale of agricultural commodities. Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo Apr. 19 and May 3, 1984. Entered into force May 3, 1984.

Second agreement to the program grant agreement of Aug. 29, 1982, as amended (TIAS 10472; 10728), for decentralization sector support. Signed at Cairo May 14, 1984. Entered into force May 14, 1984.

Second amendment to the project grant agreement of Aug. 29, 1979, as amended (TIAS 9632; 10247), for Shoubra El-Kheima thermal power plant. Signed at Cairo May 14, 1984. Entered into force May 14, 1984.

Grenada
Agreement concerning the provision of training related to defense articles under the U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program. Effected by exchange of notes at St. George's May 18 and 24, 1984. Entered into force May 24, 1984.

Haiti
Agreement amending the agreement of Feb. 17 and May 4, 1984, relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Port-au-Prince May 21, 1984. Entered into force May 21, 1984.

Agreement for sale of agricultural commodities, relating to agreement of June 8, 1979, with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Port-au-Prince June 12, 1984. Entered into force June 12, 1984.

International Labor Organization
Agreement relating to a procedure for U.S. income tax reimbursement, with annex. Signed at Washington May 18, 1984. Entered into force May 18, 1984; effective Jan. 1, 1984.

Israel
Agreement on cooperation in energy research and development, with annex. Signed at Jerusalem June 3, 1984. Entered into force June 3, 1984.

Japan
Memorandum of understanding with respect to U.S. action on porcelain-on-steel cookware pursuant to GATT Art. XIX, with exchange of letters. Signed at Geneva Sept. 6, 1983. Entered into force Sept. 6, 1983; effective Jan. 1, 1984.

Memorandum of understanding on the participation of Japan in the ocean drilling program. Signed at Washington and Tokyo May 8 and 16, 1984. Entered into force May 16, 1984.

Agreement amending the arrangement of Aug. 17, 1979 concerning trade in cotton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles, as extended and amended with record of discussion (TIAS 9564, 10484). Signed at Washington May 25, 1984. Entered into force May 25, 1984.

Memorandum of understanding relating to the protocol of Apr. 25, 1978, (TIAS 9242) amending the international convention for the high seas fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, as amended (TIAS 2786, 5385). Signed at Washington June 5, 1984. Entered into force June 5, 1984.

Malawi
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed or ensured by the U.S. Government and its agencies with annexes and implementing agreement regarding repayments due under AID loans, with annexes. Signed at Lilongwe Apr. 30, 1984. Entered into force June 11, 1984.

Mexico
Agreements amending the agreement of Nov. 9, 1972, as amended (TIAS 7697, 9436, 9647, 10159, 10234, 10466, 10688, 109792), concerning frequency modulation broadcasting in the 88 to 108 MHz bands. Effected by exchanges of notes of June 24, 1983; Jan. 10, Feb. 6, Feb. 27, Apr. 11, and June 12, 1984. Entered into force June 12, 1984.

NATO
Interim agreement relating to a procedure for U.S. income tax reimbursement. Signed at Brussels Feb. 29, 1984. Entered into force Feb. 29, 1984.

St. Lucia
Agreement for the furnishing of commodities and services in connection with the peacekeeping force for Grenada. Effected by exchange of notes at Bridgetown and Casteries Nov. 23, 1983, and Jan. 13, 1984. Entered into force Jan. 13, 1984.

St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Agreement for the furnishing of commodities and services in connection with the peacekeeping force for Grenada. Effected by exchange of notes at Bridgetown and St. Vincent Nov. 25, 1983, and Jan. 13, 1984. Entered into force Jan. 13, 1984.

Spain
Memorandum of understanding with respect to U.S. action on porcelain-on-steel cookware pursuant to GATT Art. XIX, with exchange of letters. Signed at Geneva July 29, 1983. Entered into force July 29, 1983; effective Jan. 1, 1984.

United Kingdom
Agreement amending Annex 2 of the air services agreement of July 23, 1977, as amended (TIAS 8641, 8965, 9722, 10059). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 25, and 31, 1984. Entered into force May 31, 1984.

Agreement amending the agreement of July 3, 1958, as amended (TIAS 4078, 4267, 6659, 6861, 8014, 9688), for cooperation on the uses of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes. Signed at Washington June 5, 1984. Enters into force on the date on which each government shall have received from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements.

Yugoslavia
Agreement amending agreement on Nov. 9, 1964 (TIAS 5689) for financing certain educational exchange programs, with implementing letters. Effected by exchange of letters at Belgrade Jan. 20, 1984. Entered into force Mar. 22, 1984.

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[1]With reservation(s).
[2]Not in force.
[3]Not in force for the U.S.
[4]With statement. ■

June 1984

Note: The editors solicit readers' comments on the value of the *Bulletin's* monthly chronologies. Unless a positive response is received, the chronologies will be discontinued.

June 1–10
President Reagan visits Ireland (June 1–4), the U.K. (June 4–10), and joins other leaders of the World War II Allies (June 6) in ceremonies at Normandy commemorating the 40th anniversary of D-Day. June 7–9 he attends the 10th annual economic summit of industrialized nations in London.

June 1
Secretary Shultz heads the U.S. delegation to the inauguration of Jose Napoleon Duarte as President of El Salvador. He then goes to Managua, Nicaragua, to meet with Sandinista government leader Ortega.

U.S. announces that it agrees to act as the protecting power for the Israel Interests Section in Sri Lanka.

UN Security Council adopts a resolution by a vote of 13–0, with two abstentions (Nicaragua and Zimbabwe) condemning Iran's recent attacks on commercial ships in the Persian Gulf and calls on all states to respect the right of free navigation.

Dutch Cabinet votes to defer final decision on deployment of U.S. cruise missiles until November 1985, and states that deployments will occur if Soviets increase their SS–20 deployments or an arms control agreement is reached in the meantime. State Department acting spokesman Romberg expresses the U.S. disappointment at this decision and adds that the other basing countries share the U.S. view that the 1979 NATO decision for deployment should be implemented on schedule.

June 2
North Korea withdraws from participation in the Summer Olympics.

Iran formally rejects the UN Security Council resolution of June 1, saying the resolution has guaranteed the total insecurity of the gulf and has, in effect, condoned future Iraqi attacks on Iranian shipping.

June 3
Iraqi jets hit a Turkish oil tanker near Kharg Island.

Bolivia withdraws from participation in the Summer Olympics, citing financial difficulties.

June 4
State Department acting spokesman Romberg describes as "unhelpful to the search for a fair and final settlement to the Cyprus problem" Turkish Cypriot settlement in an uninhabited area of Famgusta.

Tass reports that Andrei Sakharov and his wife "were in good health and not starving." It describes reports abroad that Dr. Sakharov had died as "nothing more than invention."

Iran warns it will take firm reprisals in response to the Iraqi attack on a Turkish oil tanker in the Persian Gulf and criticizes several gulf states for aiding Iraq and not remaining neutral.

State Department releases its 16th semiannual report on the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act covering the period Jan.-Mar. 1984.

June 5
Saudi Arabia's Defense Ministry announces that their F-15 aircraft shot down an unidentified aircraft which intruded into Saudi airspace.

June 6–27
ILO holds its annual conference in Geneva. At the opening session Anna-Greta Leijon (Sweden) is elected President.

June 6
Prime Ministers of Greece, Sweden, and Finland call on the U.S. and the Soviet Union to hold a summit in order to break the impasse over arms control negotiations.

South African Prime Minister Botha states that his government will withdraw from Namibia if one of the five members of the Western contact group will take over responsibilities there. SWAPO and Canada reject the idea. U.S. says any plan should be based only on UN resolutions. State Department acting spokesman Romberg says UN Resolution 435 "is the internationally accepted basis for a settement of the Namibia issue."

June 7–9
The 10th annual summit of the industrialized nations is held in London. Leaders attending are Prime Minister Trudeau (Canada), President Mitterrand (France), Chancellor Kohl (West Germany), Prime Minister Craxi (Italy), Prime Minister Nakasone (Japan), Prime Minister Thatcher (U.K.), President Reagan (U.S.), and Gaston Thorn, President of the EC.

Summit participants issue a Declaration on Democratic Values (June 8) affirming their commitment to democracy, freedom, and the "close partnership" of the seven nations and the European Communities. The declaration also states the leaders' position against the use of force to settle disputes.

On June 9, the leaders issue a final communique emphasizing their pledge to ease the burden of Third World countries to repay debts and to continue their policies against rising inflation and interest rates. Participants agree to consult other GATT members on the possibility of launching a new round of multilateral trade negotiations. The leaders also issue three political statements regarding East-West relations, terrorism, and the Iran-Iraq conflict. President Reagan invites countries represented at the economic summit to participate in building a permanently manned space station as a symbol of cooperation in the peaceful uses of space.

June 7
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights issues a report saying that hundreds of Miskito Indians were imprisoned by Nicaragua's Sandinista government and some were tortured.

Warsaw Pact negotiators at the MBFR talks in Vienna have strongly criticized proposals offered by NATO in Apr. to cut conventional forces in central Europe.

During an official visit to Warsaw, Romanian President Ceausescu says he is concerned by deployment of missiles by the East and West and calls for a renewal of the arms talks. Polish leader Gen. Jaruzelski defends the Soviet deployment in East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

June 8
In an interview from London on the "Today Show," Secretary Shultz says the Iran-Iraq war is one conflict that hasn't become an East-West issue. He adds that the U.S. and Soviet Union want international waters in the Persian Gulf area to remain open.

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Iranian Director General of the Foreign Ministry Sayyed Mohammed Sadr meet to discuss preventing the Iran-Iraq war from reaching the point where military assistance from the U.S. or other nations may be requested by Arab oil-producing countries.

Senate votes to cut $4.4 million from funds for construction of two military bases in Honduras.

The Granadero I military exercise in Honduras, involving U.S., Honduran, and Salvadoran troops, ends.

State Department acting spokesman Romberg urges the Soviet Union to allow independent observers to have direct contact with the Sakharovs.

The National Academy of Sciences, concerned about the situation of Andrei Sakharov, announces it is postponing talks over a scientific cooperation agreement with its Soviet counterparts.

June 9–27
Chinese Defense Minister Zhang Aiping makes a working visit to the United States. While in Washington, D.C. (June 11, 12), he meets with President Reagan and Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger.

June 9
Lebanese President Gemayel and Prime Minister Karami meet with UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar.

June 10
A Kuwaiti supertanker, *Kazimah*, is hit by a rocket fired from an unidentified plane in the southern Persian Gulf. The *Kazimah*, the third Kuwaiti tanker to be hit in the gulf conflict, is outside the proclaimed war zone.

Iran and Iraq agree to UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar's request to cease attacks on civilian population centers.

While on a European tour, South African Prime Minister Botha meets with Assistant Secretary Crocker in Rome to discuss South-West Africa issues.

Underground Solidarity's second leading official, Bogdan Lis, is arrested by the "Gdansk security service." Lis had been in the underground since Dec. 1981 when martial law was imposed in Poland.

June 11
Iraq accuses Iran of shelling three Iraqi cities hours before the ban on air strikes against civilian areas becomes effective. Iraqi forces stop their attacks on Iranian towns before the deadline. Iraq reemphasizes that the agreed ban will not halt Iraqi blockage of Kharg Island.

Soviet President Chernenko calls on the U.S. to begin immediate negotiations on banning ASAT and other space weapons. Chernenko says the Soviets are convinced that a freeze on ASAT weapons tests can be verified. State Department acting spokesman Romberg says the U.S. is ready to informally discuss the issue, but sees important verification difficulties.

Some 90 people are killed and over 300 are wounded in renewed fighting between Lebanese factions in Beirut.

The Soviet Union denies that U.S. Consul Ronald A. Harms was beaten up outside a Leningrad restaurant on Apr. 17. TASS reports the alleged attack is a U.S. Government fabrication to divert attention from the Soviet's accusation of poor security at the Summer Olympics.

Shortly after meeting with South African Prime Minister Botha and Foreign Minister Botha in Rome, Pope John Paul II issues a statement condemning South Africa's apartheid policy.

June 12–14
Ambassador Fields, U.S. representative to the Conference on Disarmanent, attends the Munster chemical weapons destruction and verification workshop held in West Germany.

June 12
Senators Baker and Percy urge President Reagan to meet with Soviet President Chernenko to discuss existing problems between the U.S. and Soviet Union despite the suspension of arms control talks. In response, White House spokesman Speakes says Presi-

dent Reagan would be willing to meet with Chernenko "without any precondition as to venue or schedule" but careful preparation would be needed to produce results.

Senate votes 61 to 28 to allow testing of ASAT weapons with the provision that President Reagan affirms to Congress that he is willing to negotiate arms control limitations on such weapons with the Soviet Union.

Japanese Foreign Minister Abe proposes that the U.S. and Soviet Union move toward negotiating a nuclear test ban.

Foreign Ministers of the U.K., the Netherlands, France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg meet in Paris to discuss ways of strengthening their political role in NATO.

The Lebanese National Assembly voices confidence in the Cabinet by a vote of 53 to 15 with three abstentions. The National Assembly also supports a motion to allow the Lebanese Cabinet to repeal or amend previous government decrees for the next 9 months and votes to extend its own term of office for 2 years.

The U.S. Government lifts a 7-year ban on direct economic assistance to Mozambique. The ban was imposed in 1977 in protest of human rights violations.

June 13

In a statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Secretary Shultz proposes broadening the laws which prosecute Americans who illegally provide goods, such as weapons, to terrorist supporters to include prosecution of those who provide services as well.

Pravda reports that Soviet President Chernenko rejected a proposal by the leaders of the industrialized democracies for renewed talks on arms control and other issues.

The House votes 304 to 120 to support a proposal to penalize employers for hiring illegal aliens. The immigration bill calls for employers to be fined up to $2,000 for each alien illegally hired.

UNITA rebels in Angola capture 11 foreigners, including Portuguese, Colombians, and perhaps some Americans, during fighting with government troops.

June 14–17

Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, U.K., and Greece hold elections for the European Parliament, the 434-seat directly elected assembly of the European Communities.

June 14

State Department spokesman Hughes says the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador confirmed that the Salvadoran intelligence section of the treasury police has been disbanded as "part of President Duarte's move to improve the human rights situation in El Salvador."

The Dutch Parliament votes 79 to 71 in favor of a Cabinet decision on cruise missile deployment.

State Department spokesman Hughes announces that a move to expel Israel from the UPU, if successful, would cause the U.S. to withdraw its delegation from the UPU Congress, suspend its participation in UPU activities, and withhold payments.

In a televised news conference, President Reagan, appearing to relax conditions for discussing issues of mutual interest, says he would meet with Soviet President Chernenko "any time."

The U.S. delegation refused to participate in a debate on an arms race in space in the UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. U.S. representative Eskin says the U.S. considers the Conference on Disarmament as the proper forum for discussions of this issue.

The U.S. International Trade Commission unanimously rules that the U.S. copper industry has been seriously injured by imports. USITC Commissioner Rohr says 1983 imports exceeded the 1979 level by about 122%. The major U.S. sources of copper imports are Canada, Chile, Peru, Zaire, and Zambia.

The House votes 228 to 172 to allow temporary foreign workers into the U.S. to harvest perishable crops. The proposal will allow aliens to move among different employers for up to 11 months of seasonal employment.

U.S. and Philippines military officials conclude a new defense plan at the annual defense board meeting.

The UN Trusteeship Council, reporting to the Security Council on the administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific, says that recent votes for self-government by the Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands were the "free and fair expression" of the people.

Israeli military command reports a 2-hour battle between Israeli soldiers and attackers from behind Syrian lines. No casualties are reported.

UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar says two teams of UN observers, established to monitor the Iraq-Iran agreement of June 10, will be available by June 15 upon request of either government.

June 15

Secretary Shultz and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin meet at the Department of State.

UN Security Council votes to keep the UN peacekeeping forces in Cyprus for an additional 6 months.

Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau steps down as Liberal Party leader.

Treasury Department announces that the U.S. will not extend a commitment to lend $300 million to Argentina beyond the June 15 deadline. Argentina was unable to reach an agreement of an adjustment program with the IMF.

Iran proposes a halt to oil tanker attacks in the Persian Gulf if Iraq agrees to stop its raids, and says it would welcome a UN effort to ban attacks on commercial shipping.

June 16–23

President J.R. Jayewardene of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka makes a state visit to the United States.

June 16

In a communique read over state television, Iraq accuses Iran of violating their agreement to halt attacks on civilian areas, claiming Iran shelled an Iraqi border town injuring one civilian and damaging two houses.

John Turner succeeds Prime Minister Trudeau as Canada's Liberal Party leader.

June 17

Poland holds nationwide elections.

June 18

Nicaragua says it will send an Olympic team to Los Angeles despite reports of economic problems.

The following newly appointed ambassadors present their credentials to President Reagan: Claudio Antonio Volio Guardia of Costa Rica; Richard Hendrik Fein of the Netherlands; Klaus Jacobi of Switzerland; Valentin Hernandez Acosta of Venezuela; Hernan Felipe Errazuriz Correa of Chile; and Luis Ernesto Marchand Stens of Peru.

June 19–22

Ambassador Shlaudeman continues consultations in support of the Contadora process in visits to Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Panama.

June 19

State Department spokesman Hughes reports the U.S. "does not contemplate a sale" of Stinger antiaircraft missiles to Kuwait "at this time."

Senate votes 58 to 38 against a proposal to phase out aid to Nicaraguan rebels.

A Salvadoran judge sentences five former national guardsmen to 30-year prison terms each for the murders of four American churchwomen in 1980.

Polish Government announces that a voter turnout of less than 50% in the June 17 elections will require new elections to be held in 85 voting areas.

Defense Department announces the sale of 12 C–130 military transport planes to Taiwan.

June 20

State Department spokesman Hughes reports that China has protested the U.S. sale of 12 C–130 military transport planes to Taiwan. Hughes says the sale is "within the terms of the August 17, 1982, communique" with China on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

State Department spokesman Hughes confirms reports that Saudi Arabia, with U.S. approval, has been passing to Kuwait, "on an intermittent basis, relevant AWACS-derived information."

Joao C. Baena Soares (Brazil) is sworn in as the sixth Secretary General of the Organization of American States.

State Department spokesman Hughes describes as "nonsense" the *Defense Attache* article which alleges the KAL #007 flight, shot down by the Soviets in 1983, was part of a U.S. intelligence gathering operation.

U.S. and Israeli forces participate in joint medical evacuation exercises.

House approves an immigration bill to enforce sanctions on employers hiring illegal aliens, and legalize the status of aliens who entered the U.S. illegally before 1982. The vote is 216 to 211. This most important immigration legislation in over three decades now goes to the House-Senate conference.

June 21
Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee approves President Reagan's request for $117 million in emergency military aid to El Salvador in FY 1984 and an additional $132 million for FY 1985.

NATO Secretary General Luns says the method used for estimating NATO-Warsaw Pact forces has been changed to reflect a "more realistic picture." The revised definition of forces focuses on those forces which would be readily available in the event of conflict.

Senate rejects a proposal to withdraw U.S. troops from Western Europe between 1987–90. The vote is 55 to 41.

June 22
Agreeing to set up a process of foreign debt consultation, 11 Latin American nations, meeting in Colombia, propose to establish a group to form a new world structure to refinance Third World debts.

The Department of State announces Laos has accepted a U.S. donation of 5,000 metric tons of glutinous rice as emergency assistance in response to a food shortage resulting from monsoon rains.

June 23
Lebanese Cabinet approves a security plan for the Beirut area. Prime Minister Karami says the plan includes eliminating the "green line" that divides the city and opening Beirut's international airport and harbor.

Vietnam withdraws 3,000 troops from Kampuchea. Kampuchean rebels, the U.S., China, and ASEAN have dismissed earlier similar actions as a rotation of troops.

June 24
Secretary Shultz, in a speech before a conference sponsored by the Jonathan Institute, urges governments opposed to terrorism to "think long, hard, and seriously about . . . appropriate preventive or preemptive actions against terrorist groups before they strike."

A Greek tanker carrying Iranian oil is attacked by Iraqi planes south of Kharg Island. The tanker is slightly damaged; none of the crew is injured.

June 24–27
EPA Administrator Ruckelshaus attends the Multilateral Conference on the Environment in Munich, West Germany, where he confirms U.S. commitment to reducing transboundary air pollution.

June 25–26
Ambassador Shlaudeman meets with Nicaraguan Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Tinoco in Manzanillo, Mexico.

June 25
Speaking before a conference sponsored by the Jonathan Institute, Ambassador Kirkpatrick says the Soviet Union is the "principal supporter" of using terrorism as a form of political action.

Senate votes 88 to 1 to discontinue aid from an emergency spending bill for Nicaraguan rebels.

Lord Carrington (U.K.) is sworn in as the sixth Secretary General of NATO.

June 26
Eleven Soviet journalists arrive in Washington, D.C., as part of a U.S.-Soviet journalist exchange.

In a statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Assistant Secretary Abrams reaffirms U.S. opposition to governments' use of torture.

Angola withdraws from participation in the Summer Olympics.

June 27
In remarks to U.S.-Soviet relations specialists, President Reagan says he is working to improve economic, cultural, scientific, and consular ties with the Soviet Union. Proposals include opening a Consulate in Kiev and a cooperative space mission with the Soviets.

After meeting with Cuban President Castro, Rev. Jesse Jackson, a Democrat presidential candidate and civil rights leader, announces the release from prison of 22 U.S. citizens. State Department spokesman Hughes says the U.S. is pleased this humanitarian effort succeeded.

A Swiss-owned, Liberian-registered supertanker, carrying Iranian oil, is hit by an Exocet missile fired by Iraqi warplanes. Eight crewmen die, and three are injured.

An ILO commission of inquiry concludes the Polish Government violated a treaty to guarantee trade union freedom. The commission urges Poland to release jailed union members and allow independent unions.

State Department spokesman Hughes terms the Soviet journalists' cancellation to interview Secretary Shultz as a "rebuff" to U.S. efforts for a dialogue with the Soviet Union.

Nicaraguan rebel leader Adolfo Calero Portocarrero says despite lack of U.S. aid, the rebels will continue fighting and will obtain aid from other sources.

Sierra Leone deports eight West Germans and Americans for arms smuggling.

June 28
Rev. Jesse Jackson returns to the U.S. with 26 Cuban and 22 U.S. prisoners released by Cuban President Castro. Six of the Americans, charged with offenses in the U.S., are arrested upon arrival.

Secretary Shultz describes the Cuban President's decision to release 26 Cuban political prisoners in addition to the 22 Americans as a "propaganda victory." He adds that despite this gesture, the Cuban Government still supports armed subversion, and the Administration is not softening its policy toward Cuba.

TASS reports President Reagan's call for improved U.S.-Soviet relations in economic, science, cultural, and consular affairs as a campaign maneuver.

U.S. and Soviet Union extend for 10 years an agreement on economic, industrial, and technical cooperation.

Mexican Government expresses concern that proposed U.S. immigration changes could "injure the human and labor rights of Mexican workers" and pledges to "protect its nationals" and demand respect for their rights.

Israel and Syria exchange prisoners of war. Israel returns approximately 290 soldiers and 20 civilians; Syria returns 3 soldiers and 3 diplomatic security guards. The bodies of 72 Syrians and 5 Israelis were also exchanged.

State Department acting spokesman Romberg reports that ARENA leader d'Aubuisson, meeting with Assistant Secretary Motley on June 27, indicated his support for El Salvador President Duarte's democratic government.

Supreme Court upholds the U.S. Government's authority to restrict travel by Americans to Cuba.

In testimony before a joint session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Senate Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Government Processes of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, ACDA Director Adelman says that the U.S. strives to focus world attention on the dangers of chemical weapons proliferation and seeks a "complete and effective ban." He adds that maintaining a deterrent capability is necessary to safeguard Western interests until a comprehensive treaty is concluded.

June 29
Soviet Union offers to begin talks with the U.S. in September on banning space weapons. It also calls for a moratorium on the testing and deployment of space weapons to be effective at the opening of such talks. National Security Adviser McFarlane says the U.S. will agree to discuss a verifiable and effective limitation of ASAT weapons as well as to discuss how to resume negotiations on offensive nuclear forces.

The House of Representatives passes a resolution (399 to 0) urging President Reagan to strongly protest the Soviet's refusal to provide information on the Sakharovs. The resolution also calls on the other 34 signatory nations of the Helsinki Final Act to join the protest.

Rev. Jesse Jackson briefs Under Secretary Armacost on his visit to Cuba and other Central American countries. He expresses appreciation for the Administration's quick processing of the Cuban political prisoners and approving landing rights for the Cubana airliner.

Israeli Navy reports sinking a "terrorist" boat off a Lebanese island used as a guerrilla training base.

Argentina agrees to pay $225 million from its reserves to help pay off $350 million in interest due June 30. Eleven American, European, and Japanese banks give Argentina a 45-day loan for the balance of $125 million. The banks also agree to a 90-day extension to repay $750 million due on June 15.

The Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee announces that a record 141 countries will participate in the Summer Games.

UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, in messages to Iran and Iraq, declares that the June 10 agreement should not be used as a cover for troop concentrations in civilian areas, and he seeks assurances that chemical weapons will not be used in the war.

June 30
John N. Turner is sworn in as Canada's 17th Prime Minister.

Yuri Aleshin, a dancer with the Moscow Philharmonic Classical Ballet, defects while in Tokyo and asks the U.S. for asylum. ■

Department of State

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
145	6/4	Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea; released June 7.
146	6/7	Shultz: news conference in Managua, Nicaragua, June 1.
*147	6/5	Shultz: interview on "Good Morning, America," London.
*148	6/8	Shultz: interview on "Today Show," London.
*149	6/12	International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT) meeting, study groups A and B, July 9.
*150	6/12	Integrated Services Digital Network and CCITT joint meeting, July 9.
*151	6/12	CCITT meeting, July 10.
*152	6/13	Shultz: remarks and question-and-answer session before the Overseas Writers Club, June 12.
*153	6/13	Program for the state visit of President J.R. Jayewardene of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, June 16–23.
154	6/13	Shultz: statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
*155	6/21	Shultz: news conference in London, June 9.
156	6/26	Shultz: address before the Jonathan Institute Second Conference on International Terrorism, June 24.

*Not printed in the BULLETIN. ■

Department of State

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Free **multiple** copies may be obtained by writing to the Office of Opinion Analysis and Plans, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Secretary Shultz
Terrorism: The Challenge to the Democracies, Jonathan Institute's Second Conference on International Terrorism, June 24, 1984 (Current Policy #589).
Terrorism: The Problem and the Challenges, House Foreign Affairs Committee, June 13, 1984 (Current Policy #586).

Arms Control
Arresting the Nuclear Genie, Kenneth L. Adelman, ACDA Director, Mid-America Committee, Chicago, May 2, 1984 (Current Policy #582).

East Asia
U.S.-Japanese Trade (GIST, June 1984).
U.S.-China Educational and Cultural Exchanges (GIST, June 1984).

Economics
The Logic and Politics of the Next Trade Round, Deputy Assistant Secretary Lamb, World Trade Conference, Chicago, April 25, 1984 (Current Policy #585).
The American Trade Deficit in Perspective, U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany Arthur F. Burns, Industrie-Club, Dusseldorf, April 5, 1984 (Current Policy #583).

Europe
The Atlantic Alliance and the American National Interest, Ambassador Kirkpatrick, National Committee on American Foreign Policy, New York, April 30, 1984 (Current Policy #581).
The Effect of European Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy, Assistant Secretary Bennett, Education Committee, North Atlantic Assembly, Luxembourg, May 24, 1984 (Current Policy #588).
Negotiating With the Soviets, Ambassador Paul H. Nitze, head of the U.S. Delegation to the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) negotiations, Foreign Policy Association, New York, June 1, 1984 (Current Policy #587).

General
Doctrine of Moral Equivalence, Ambassador Kirkpatrick, Royal Institute for International Affairs, London, April 9, 1984 (Current Policy #580).

Pacific
The ANZUS Relationship: Alliance Management, Assistant Secretary Wolfowitz, Conference on the American Effect on Australian Defense, Australian Studies Center, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania, June 24, 1984 (Current Policy #592).

Science and Technology
The Role of Science and Technology in Foreign Affairs, Assistant Secretary Malone, Council of Scientific Society Presidents, April 25, 1984 (Current Policy #584). ■

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President Eisenhower came to office committed to end the war. His Administration considered very tentatively the use of tactical atomic weapons if it could not achieve peace at the negotiating table. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles passed the hint of such a strategy to the People's Republic of China. The new American determination, as well as other considerations, moved the communists closer to *de facto* acceptance of the American position on the POW question. But President Rhee believed the impending armistice would mean the end of his dream of a unified Korea and resisted it. The U.S. Government successfully embarked on a diplomatic campaign to obtain from Rhee a promise not to obstruct the armistice.

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