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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: TRIP FILE

Withdrawer

DLB 7/6/2006

File Folder [FOREIGN POLICY BACKGROUND FOR PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO EUROPE - NOTEBOOK] (1 OF 2)

FOIA

F01-051

Box Number ~~91429~~

CHARTRAND

13

| ID | Doc Type | Document Description | No of Pages | Doc Date | Restrictions |
|-------|----------|---|-------------|-----------|--------------|
| 26644 | MEMO | RICHARD BEAL, WILLIAM MARTIN, ROGER ROBINSON TO ROBERT MCFARLANE, RE: FOREIGN POLICY BACKGROUND FOR THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO EUROPE <i>R 1/7/2011 F2001-051/1</i> | 2 | 5/18/1984 | B1 |
| 26645 | MEMO | COPY OF #26644 WITHOUT ANNOTATION <i>R 1/7/2011 F2001-051/1</i> | 2 | 5/18/1984 | B1 |
| 26646 | PAPER | U.S. FOREIGN POLICY : A LOOK AHEAD <i>R 7/3/2007 NLRRF01-051</i> | 13 | 5/18/1984 | B1 |
| 26648 | PAPER | RE: "ENVIRONMENTS, 1985-1989", MARKED "3" <i>R 7/3/2007 NLRRF01-051</i> | 1 | ND | B1 |
| 26649 | PAPER | RE: GLOBAL OBJECTIVES, MARKED "4" <i>R 7/3/2007 NLRRF01-051</i> | 1 | ND | B1 |
| 26651 | PAPER | RE: SOVIET UNION, MARKED "5" <i>R 7/3/2007 NLRRF01-051</i> | 1 | ND | B1 |
| 26653 | PAPER | RE: WESTERN EUROPE, MARKED "6" <i>R 7/3/2007 NLRRF01-051</i> | 1 | ND | B1 |
| 26654 | PAPER | RE: PACIFIC BASIN, MARKED "7" <i>R 7/3/2007 NLRRF01-051</i> | 1 | ND | B1 |

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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| ID | Doc Type | Document Description | No of Pages | Doc Date | Restrictions |
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| 26655 | PAPER | RE: MIDDLE EAST, MARKED "8" R 7/3/2007 NLRRF01-051 | 1 | ND | B1 |

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

TO MCFARLANE

FROM BEAL

db 7/6/05

DOCDATE 18 MAY 84

MARTIN

18 MAY 84

ROBINSON

18 MAY 84

KEYWORDS: LONDON SUMMIT

EUROPE WEST

SUBJECT FORN POLICY BACKGROUND FOR PRES TRIP TO EUROPE

ACTION. SEE 8404300 FOR FINAL ACTION DUE: STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

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COMMENTS

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4046

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 18, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: RICHARD S. BEAL ^{RSB}
WILLIAM F. MARTIN ^{WFM}
ROGER W. ROBINSON ^{RWR}

Subject: Foreign Policy Background for the President's trip to Europe

The preparations for the European trip have primarily been focussed on the Economic Summit and Bilateral issues. In our view, however, the central questions European leaders will be asking the President are: 1) what have you accomplished during the first four years and 2) based on the likelihood that you will be reelected, what will be your foreign policy during the next four years.

For these reasons, we have:

- identified key national security accomplishments of the First Term,
- prepared forecasts of the global and regional issues over the next four years,
- compiled our policy objectives and,
- made observations concerning our global and regional objectives and policy priorities for the second term.

DECLASSIFIED
NLRN FOI-051 #26644
BY RW NARA DATE 1/7/11

It is important to note that we have generally drawn upon the great wealth of material in existing NSDD's, the President's speeches, as well as tried to reflect your own views. In addition, we have exercised substantial creativity in defining some new policies and objectives based on our assessment of world events and trends in the years ahead.

This is a first step in a more broad reaching effort to develop a foreign policy game plan for the second term now incorporated within the context of the "Poindexter Group". However, it occurred to us that the President, himself, would enjoy reading a broad perspective of where we have been and where we are going prior to his trip to Europe. We could find no such document, so we generated one. *never off the ground*

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To facilitate an easy, organized review we have divided our work into three sections:

- An overview paper, "Foreign Policy: A Look Ahead"
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This paper and notebook benefitted invaluablely from extensive research and suggestions from the Crisis Management Center.

Recommendation

That you review the paper and agree to the process identified above.

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

Attachment
Foreign Policy Notebook

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
GOALS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

DATE PREPARED: 18 MAY 1984

NATIONAL SECURITY
1. Foreign Policy
2. Defense Policy
3. Intelligence Support

CONTENTS

I. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY " A LOOK AHEAD "

II. BRIEFING POINTS

1. FIRST TERM FOREIGN POLICY ACCOMPLISHMENTS
2. GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
3. GLOBAL OBJECTIVES
4. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES
 - A. Soviet Union
 - B. Western Europe
 - C. Pacific Basin
 - D. Middle East
 - E. Latin America
 - F. Africa
 - G. China
 - H. South Asia
 - I. North America
5. DESIRABLE RESULTS (HEADLINES)

III.

DOCUMENTATION

1. THE THIRD WORLD
2. INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
3. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
4. TERRORISM
5. SOVIET UNION/EAST EUROPE
6. WESTERN EUROPE
7. MIDDLE EAST
8. AFRICA
9. LATIN AMERICA
10. ASIA
11. STRATEGIC DEFENSE
12. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

National Security Council
The White House

System # I

Package # 4046

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26645

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4046

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

NOTED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 18, 1984

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NLRR #01-051 #26645
BY RW NARA DATE 11/7/11

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Foreign Policy Notebook

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
GOALS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

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10. ASIA
11. STRATEGIC DEFENSE
12. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
"A LOOK AHEAD"

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NLRR FOI-051 # 26646

BY CW NARA DATE 7/3/07

18 May 1984

U.S. Foreign Policy: A Look Ahead

I. Introduction

When the President entered office three years ago, America's future was uncertain. Friends and foes alike questioned U.S. resolve. A vacillating foreign policy opened avenues for Soviet expansion which was being rapidly exploited worldwide. A sense of malaise clouded the minds of the American people who openly wondered whether the United States had entered a period of permanent decline.

The President's strong leadership and clarity of purpose in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy replaced this doubtful prognosis for the nation's future with an enduring optimism and will to succeed. Restoring the principle of bipartisanship in formulating foreign policy has also strengthened the President's role in carrying vital foreign policy initiatives.

America's military strength has been greatly enhanced as has the confidence of our Allies that we will do what is necessary to protect the rights of free men and women everywhere. At the same time, we have made it clear to the Soviet Union that we desire better relations and effective arms reduction any time it is willing to negotiate an equitable and verifiable agreement.

The President's economic policies at home and his leadership of the Economic Summit process culminating in the Williamsburg Declaration have led the world out of the worst recession since World War II. Our economy is robust, our industries are competitive internationally and our technology is unsurpassed. Confidence and faith are being restored in Western economies, at a time when the centrally-controlled communist systems are faltering globally. The United States has consistently encouraged open markets and friendly competition, thus stimulating the free exchange of goods and ideas and bolstering economic recovery throughout the Free World.

United States has supported and nurtured the growth and development of democratic institutions worldwide. We have helped resurrect freedom in Grenada, extended humanitarian assistance to drought-stricken African nations, provided economic support to emerging nations and beleaguered debtor countries, moved toward peace and stability in Southern Africa by encouraging the withdrawal of foreign troops from the region, helped curb Libyan aggression in Chad and the Sudan, bolstered opportunities for national reconciliation in Lebanon, advanced the cause of peace throughout the Middle East by maintaining a strong presence and commitment of resources to the area, and countered Soviet and Cuban-sponsored aggression and subversion in El Salvador and other peaceful nations in Central America.

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Perhaps most importantly, the President has restored the belief of the American people in themselves upon which all other accomplishments for the future are made possible and re-asserted the pre-emminence of the United States in world affairs.

II. Global Environment -- The Next Four Years

Although the next four years will witness an unprecedented number of regional low-level conflicts, the world will be a safer place because of U.S. efforts to correct the dangerous strategic imbalances of the past. We are also pursuing policies which advance economic growth that, in turn, will gradually lead other peaceful nations to new levels of economic prosperity and political stability.

The Soviet Union will remain the greatest threat to world peace due to its unrelenting arms buildup and determination to impose the Communist system of government on free nations throughout the world. The deployment of newer and more sophisticated Soviet weapons systems (both strategic and conventional) will continue. Likewise, we can expect continued rigidity in the Soviet negotiating posture because of the systemic pressures for maintenance of the status quo and the influence of the Soviet military on decision-making. Nevertheless, the gradual deterioration of the Soviet economy, in part, caused by rising military expenditures on weapons will put increasing pressure on the Politburo to institute structural economic reform, including the alleviation of systemic bottlenecks presently impeding production, and slowly shift high quality resources from defense-related industries to the civilian sector (with particular emphasis on consumer industries). These domestic economic pressures could form the basis of a more flexible Soviet approach to arms control.

Moscow will continue to stimulate and exploit Western European faltering or disagreements over INF deployments and differing perceptions within NATO concerning the Soviet threat in Europe and the proper Alliance response to it. The beginning of these deployments represented a major threshold crossed in the restoration of political will on the part of our European allies. It has had an uplifting effect on European morale and has stemmed the drift toward political retrenchment. So-called "Europessimism" could continue if Europe resists the urgent need to replace outmoded and subsidized industries with new service-oriented and high technology industries which will provide the jobs of tomorrow.

In contrast to Western Europe, the Pacific Basin nations will continue sustained economic growth as well as remain on the cutting edge of technological innovation. Our volume of trade with these nations will exceed trade with Europe and accelerate

the shift in the world's economic center of gravity from the Atlantic to the Pacific. As our economic ties expand and prosper, we can expect greater cohesion among this community of nations and an increasingly shared perception of our common security needs.

The Middle East will remain highly vulnerable to conflict given the provocative and unpredictable actions of radical regimes such as Libya, Iran, and Syria and the continuing inability of nations in the region to settle their long-standing territorial and political disputes. Incidents in this "tinker-box" environment could quickly engage other states in the region and potentially lead to U.S. and/or Soviet Union intervention. In addition, Moslem Fundamentalism will continue its current resurgence and become a source of serious instability to many of the nations in the Middle East.

The Soviet Union and Cuba will press on with the export of revolution via Nicaragua to peaceful neighbors in Central America in an effort to replace fragile democracies with Soviet-style totalitarianism. Although the spread of democracy in Latin America is encouraging, rapid population growth, the need for continued economic austerity, and the weight of the debt burden will continue to fray the social and political fabric of several important countries in the Hemisphere.

Eastern Europe is falling increasingly behind in its ability to compete in world markets due to the retarding effects of trying to balance Communist ideology against the urgent need for a shift in the direction of a form of market socialism (similar to Yugoslavia).

Developing nations in Africa will continue to face bleak economic prospects due to rapid population growth and limited economic resources. Political instability, poverty, hunger, and disease will represent the primary challenges for the leaders of these beleaguered countries as well as for U.S. policy toward most of the Continent. These problems will be exacerbated by the efforts of such countries as Cuba and Libya to export their revolution to African nations.

Common to all these areas are the following problems:

- o The increasing availability of cheap weapons enhance the levels of violence and the danger of armed conflict, destabilizing weaker nations and adversely affecting Western interests. More nations will edge closer to acquiring nuclear weapons or the means to produce them, adding to the threat of war.

- o Acts of international terrorism, whether sponsored by extremist groups or radical nations, will become more numerous, more devastating in their effects, more technically sophisticated, and harder to counter.

- o The continuing technological revolution will sharpen industrial competitiveness and economic rivalries among nations and probably increase protectionist pressures.
- o Declining global energy, mineral, and food reserves coupled with rising demand--fueled by a rapidly expanding world population--will tax the ingenuity and strength of all nations to face this challenge.
- o International financial relations will be significantly transformed by the international debt crisis and foster among other developments, greater interdependence between creditor and debtor nations, more restricted availability of financing, more conservative international lending practices among banks and increased delicacy in balancing economic austerity and political/social stability in debtor countries.

III. Key Issues and Policy Objectives

This forecast presents both formidable challenges and exciting opportunities for American leadership during the next four years. The United States will meet these challenges and pursue the opportunities with confidence, vigor, and constancy of purpose. In the conduct of American foreign policy, we will be guided by these broad objectives:

- o Reduce the threat of nuclear war and reduce the world-wide arms race
- o Promote world prosperity, democratic institutions, and advance individual freedoms
- o Blunt the expansion of communist aggression and counter international terrorism
- o Strengthen our ties with traditional allies and encourage and expand the role of multi-national organizations in the resolution of international problems
- o Move forward with a comprehensive Pacific Basin Initiative.

To carry out these objectives, the United States will need to seek more effective means of persuading the non-communist nations of the world that it is the US, and not the USSR, that is the greatest friend of peace, progress, prosperity, and freedom in the world.

Soviet Union

Objectives: Seek a stable U.S.-Soviet bilateral relationship based on principles of mutual respect, understanding, and the peaceful competition of ideas; encourage equitable and verifiable Soviet-Western agreements on START, INF, MBFR, resulting in real reductions by both sides in nuclear weapons stockpiles; influence the readjustment of Soviet policy priorities from emphasis on rapid arms buildup and global adventurism to internal economic reform and interest in seeking areas of mutual advantage through a consistent U.S. policy based on political, military and economic strength; seek lasting solutions to regional problems and conflicts.

Discussion: The new Soviet leadership took a relatively moderate tone in its initial approach to U.S.-USSR relations, particularly in Chernenko's public statements following Andropov's death and in his meeting with the Vice President. Since then, however, the Soviets have increasingly been taking a harsh line in public statements and private comments. Moscow has been especially rigid on START and INF, with the Soviets insisting on withdrawal of U.S. INF deployments as a precondition to resumption of these two negotiations.

This rigid stance is understandable given that both the strategic and economic imbalances of a misguided detente era have been reversed during the President's first term in office. Moreover, West has demonstrated greater resolve in curtailing Soviet exploitation of strategic Western economic resources, particularly militarily relevant technology. The Soviet Union now understands that the U.S. will remain firm in its determination to meet Soviet efforts to undermine vital U.S. interests in the world head on.

The Soviets are having greater difficulty in fulfilling their economic commitments to Third World clients as they are forced to increasingly turn their attention to internal economic problems. As the Soviets calculate the potentially drastic economic consequences of keeping abreast of the United States without fundamental structured reforms, the prospects for reducing the expansion of Soviet influence should improve. Nevertheless, this recognition by of Soviet leadership has not yet matured and they will therefore continue to look for every opportunity to undermine Western influence and advance Soviet interests in vulnerable regions of the world.

Policies: In moving the Soviet Union away from policies of confrontation toward those of conciliation, we should: continue to vigorously build a credible U.S. defense while maintaining the high ground on arms control proposals; further restrict access to militarily useful technology; strengthen the allied consensus on the security dimensions of East-West economic relations (COCOM, subsidized credits, energy dependence, enhanced Economic Committee of NATO); engage in selected economic competition with the USSR in the Third World through more focused and forward-leaning security, technological, and economic assistance; implement more aggressive policies to meet the challenges emerging from state-sponsored terrorism and the of unstable radical leaders of Soviet client-states, and compete more effectively as the standard bearers for world peace, freedom, and prosperity.

Western Europe

Objectives: Offset the drift toward political and economic retrenchment in Western Europe and restore sufficient political will to keep abreast of the velocity of world events; encourage militarily secure West European states that will contribute proportionally to defense costs and shoulder their share of the burden of helping less-fortunate states; encourage a politically strong, healthy Western Alliance which resolves differences in recognition of overriding common goals.

Discussion: Europe today is in the throes of perhaps its most fundamental adjustment in the post-war period as it struggles to maintain political, security and economic resolve against the trends underlying "Europessimism." There exists the danger of economic retrenchment in the form of protectionism, a greater insecurity in its dealing with the Soviet Union and potentially greater difficulty in forging intra-European positions, much less positions dovetailing with those of the United States. On the brighter side, as the Williamsburg Summit demonstrated, the Atlantic Alliance retains substantial resilience in the face of a massive Soviet propaganda effort to derail INF deployment. At Williamsburg, we successfully forged a common approach to the world's most pressing economic and security issues and positioned the Alliance for an upbeat second term.

Policies: The U.S. should pursue policies which: restore European political will to increasingly shoulder the burden of our common defense and support to Third World countries; urge Europeans to make necessary structural economic adjustments; and enhance the stature of those present and future leaders who have a realistic view of Soviet policies and intentions and are prepared to pursue policies which reinforce key U.S. objectives.

Pacific Basin

Objectives: Continue strengthening our relations with Japan; capitalize on the substantial new opportunities for cooperation with China; lessen tensions on the Korean Peninsula; and stimulate greater economic, political, and military cohesion among ASEAN nations and the rest of the Pacific Basin community.

Discussion: In sharp contrast to Europe, the nations of the Pacific Basin are roaring ahead economically. Successful growth-oriented policies have illuminated the region with hope for the future and are gradually leading to greater cohesion among this community of nations. The elevated priority of U.S.-Japan relations and the great successes of the President's visits to Japan, Korea, and China have dispelled many doubts about future U.S.-Pacific relations. Although the initial phases of our Pacific Basin strategy highlight the economic, trade, financial and energy areas, we should use these policy areas as the building blocks for our future strategic objectives in the region.

Policies: Our policies should stimulate the creation of new international institutional mechanisms in the areas of trade, finance, energy, security assistance, technology transfer and defense. Examples of such institutions might include a new Pacific Energy Agency (achieved through the collapsing of our present bilateral energy working groups in Japan and Korea into a broader Pacific framework which would include China), a Pacific Basin Economic Council (a Pacific equivalent of the OECD), a Pacific Technology Center (soliciting participation of all Pacific nations to possibly be domiciled in Hawaii), a Pacific COCOM (to meet the challenge of illegal transfers of technology to the Warsaw Pact through Pacific conduits), and increasing formalization of intelligence sharing and security arrangements (a Pacific Basin Treaty Organization).

China

Objectives: Further expand economic and security ties; seek a secure, non-aligned China, comfortable with key U.S. objectives; continue to fulfill U.S. obligations to Taiwan while avoiding entanglement in the China-Taiwan dispute.

Discussion: The new realism that dominates the perceptions of Chinese leadership concerning the future of the world's most populace nation has resulted in a remarkable ideological shift toward a kind of market socialism. This development has necessitated significant ideological compromises that, in turn, open up several new avenues of cooperation with the United States both commercially and strategically. The unprecedented steps taken by Chinese leadership to facilitate personal contacts during the President's trip have substantially advanced the U.S. agenda in all major categories of our bilateral relations and deepened mutual understanding on key global developments.

The heightened level of hostility on the Vietnamese-Chinese border could become an increasingly significant component of U.S. policy in the region. China's role as a champion of Thailand territorial integrity could accelerate a more unified perception among ASEAN nations of the threat to the region posed by Vietnam--a Soviet surrogate. This development could in turn, offer fertile ground for a new US initiative advancing the critical security component of our Pacific Basin strategy.

Policies: Pursue policies which fully exploit our new economic and security opportunities with China, specifically, finalize a bilateral investment treaty; enhance bilateral energy cooperation; liberalize defensive arms sales; accommodate non-military technology transfer; seek to identify commercially viable opportunities to forge triangular transactions between the U.S., China and Japan, as a demonstration of the future strategic possibilities (i.e. sale of U.S. nuclear reactors, U.S. direct broadcast satellite system); and continue to cooperate in seeking solutions to Korea, Kampuchea, Vietnam, Afghanistan and other regional problems where we share common objectives.

South Asia

Objective: Maintenance of peace on the Sub-continent; promotion of prosperity, regional cooperation, and democratic institutions; and reduction of Soviet influence.

Discussion: As titular head of the Third World, India is a centerpiece of both a South Asian policy as well as U.S. policy toward developing countries as a whole (i.e. North-South dialogue). India is attempting to navigate a course between the U.S. and USSR that has often become disturbingly imbalanced in favor of the USSR. As the world's largest democracy, India's first concern is its relations with Pakistan, particularly because of the latter's nuclear ambitions. India itself could

become a potential non-proliferation concern given its efforts to obscure the facts surrounding its own nuclear program.

Policies: The U.S. should continue to wean India away from Soviet influence and to persuade India that U.S. efforts to increase the cohesion among Pacific Basin nations could also potentially serve its interests. The U.S. should also continue to take the lead in attacking hunger and disease, demonstrating US sensitivity to the plight of Third World nations. An initiative to strengthen economic and diplomatic ties with Sri Lanka should be pursued with a view toward reversing its drift toward radicalism.

Middle East

Objectives: Continue to promote our peace initiatives in the Middle East; contain regional conflicts, such as the current Iran-Iraq war, from significantly affecting US and allied interests in the region; encourage greater regional stability through improved economic conditions and development of indigenous defense capabilities; continue to seek an independent Lebanon free of foreign forces; continue close relations with a strong Israel; and assist the major powers in the region to identify a successful formula for the creation of an autonomous Palestine state.

Discussion: The Middle East will continue to be a major source of conflict, adversely affecting the security interests not only of the nations in the region, but of most of the rest of the world. Ancient antagonisms, territorial disputes, and cultural and religious differences make resolution of these conflicts and improvements in political stability and economic well-being difficult to achieve. The provocative and unpredictable actions of radical regimes such as Libya, Iran, and Syria, the resurgence of Moslem fundamentalism, and political extremist groups exacerbate this situation. Incidents in the "tinker-box" environment could quickly expand to engage other states in the region and potentially the U.S. and Soviet Union. The strategic position and the significant of oil supplies to the world economy will continue to keep the problems of the region at the forefront of world attention.

Policies: Advance internal reconciliation and the restoration of Lebanese independence; counter Soviet efforts to extend its influence in the region; support moderate Arab states and persuade them to come to terms with Israel; maintain a determined policy on the necessity of acceptance of Israel's right to exist and support for UN Resolution 242 as the basis for peace in the Middle East; and continue to seek solutions to the Iran-Iraq war and the protection Western economic and security interests in the Gulf.

Africa

Objectives: Promote the strengthening of independent nations with viable economic prospects; reverse Soviet/Cuban influence on the continent including Libya's radical policies; and continue to seek Namibian independence.

Discussion: The development strategies of the African nations have faltered due to lack of infrastructure, proper management, incentives and the inability to overcome economic bottlenecks. In several cases the problems of these developing nations can be attributed to adherence to out-moded Marxist-Leninist principles. The reversal of Libya's expansionist policy is becoming increasingly key to the stability of the continent. On the brighter side, some key Soviet client states are becoming increasingly disenchanted with the USSR's inability to meaningfully contribute to their economic development (i.e., Mozambique) and are increasingly looking to the West for financial aid and management techniques. South Africa is making progress in its relations with Angola and other neighbors although it will take more fundamental changes internally before South Africa is viewed as a legitimate partner in its relations on the Continent. We hope that progress will be made on the Western Sahara situation in order to facilitate progress in other sphere between the countries of North Africa.

Policies: We should continue to assist drought stricken nations with improved infrastructure and food aid; urge South Africa to seek peaceful solutions to Southern Africa and problems and move towards the integration of its own population into sharing power; continue efforts to diminish Cuban involvement in Angola; further isolate and reverse Libyan influence on the Continent,; and support the establishment of an independent Namibia.

Latin America

Objective: Promote the development of democratic institutions; encourage the economic adjustment programs of LDC debtors and provide sufficient private and public sector financing to facilitate the return to economic growth; provide friendly governments with sufficient economic and security assistance to roll back Soviet Bloc/Cuban/Nicaraguan subversion; and encourage dialogue between the U.S. and the countries of the region in addressing hemispheric problems.

Discussion: Soviet and Cuban-sponsored aggression in Central America, via Nicaragua poses a direct threat to the security of the United States and must be met head on. Isolating and reversing this dangerous development should remain priority one for the Hemisphere. The fragile structure of Central American political and economic systems have provided fertile ground for the Soviet Union and its surrogates to foment instability in the region. U.S. policies designed to provide adequate military assistance, stimulate and reinforce economic adjustment, create new investment opportunities, secure sufficient financial flows and natural resource exploitation can greatly enhance the development of democracy in Central America. Identifying the increasingly delicate balance between economic austerity/adjustment and political/social stability among debtor countries represents the single largest challenge to U.S. policy in the bulk of the Hemisphere. Creative short and long term measures are required to complement our present five-part debtor strategy if this balance is to be achieved while maintaining a positive North/South political dialogue. Fledgling democracies are emerging with increasing frequency but will remain vulnerable during this wrenching adjustment period. The most productive shift in emphasis would be the transition by the IMF from programs emphasizing economic austerity (largely through import contraction) to a more growth oriented program with an emphasis on export industries.

Policies: The U.S. should continue to promote the development of democratic institutions; encourage policies designed to rebuild economic and financial infrastructure; and support a multinational approach to counter Soviet and Cuban-sponsored aggression; encourage an increase in foreign direct investment and access to funding through international organizations (i.e. IMF and World Bank); implement regulatory and other changes required to keep commercial banks fully engaged in the Hemisphere; and maintain open markets to assist the critical export earning capabilities of the debtor countries of the Hemisphere.

North America

Objectives: Encourage an economically healthy, stable Mexico which is more responsive to key U.S. objectives in the Hemisphere; promote expanded and stronger ties with Canada; reinforce trilateral policies between U.S., Canada, and Mexico which support our common economic and security interests.

Discussion: Although we continue to confront a largely intransigent Mexican position on Central America, relations between the President and President de la Madrid continues to offer substantial potential for movement on that issue and other important bilateral issues (border problems, debt management, U.S. investment, energy cooperation and common security assessments). In addition, Mexico could be cast as the model of debtor country recovery, based on its substantial resource base and realistic growth policies.

Canada is laboring under severe economic constraints imposed by several years of mismanagement. Ottawa's policies have generally caused increased estrangement between the eastern and western sections of Canada. Western Canada could be potentially receptive to expanded cooperation with the U.S. particularly in relations with our northwestern states. Every effort should be made to consolidate the underlying concepts embodied in the President's original "North America Accord". This is a fertile policy area for the second term, particularly when linked to our Pacific Basin initiative.

Policies: In Mexican relations, the President should build on his positive relationship with de la Madrid. This involves developing a partnership between the two countries which taps the vast potential for increased economic and political cooperation concerning the Hemisphere as well as the bilateral relationship. Hopefully, Canadian elections will result in a conservative government where a broader relationship can be achieved with our northern neighbor. The quiet pursuit of a "special relationship" with Canada's western provinces could offer enormously important benefits to both parties and could be initiated by measured steps such as the establishment of a free trade zone; tax and investment incentives offered to U.S. firms; increased cooperation in energy and strategic mineral exploitation; more frequent Cabinet level and state governor visits; greater sharing of radio programming and network television; and a joint public affairs campaign to increase tourist, cultural, scientific and technological exchanges.

IV. The Challenges Ahead

Six basic themes emerge when looking at the past and projecting into the future:

American's strength has been revitalized. As leader of the free world, the United States continues to move ahead rapidly in the economic, technical and defense areas. In the next four years, the United States will be dealing from a position of strength. This momentum can generate a multiplier effect for the rest of the world if we can effectively increase the projection of US economic, diplomatic and strategic power.

The Soviet Union is in decline, but highly dangerous. Economic prospects in the Soviet Union are bleak due to rigid systemic constraints, but every effort will be made to give priority to the military and to Soviet adventurism around the world. The Soviet model has not worked. Time now is on the side of democracy, but entrenched ideologues in the Kremlin are unlikely to compromise with the West, unless the free world strengthens its ability to deter Soviet aggression and to assist democratic institutions worldwide.

America's future lies in the Pacific Basin. We must make every effort to pursue closer ties with Japan, Korea, ASEAN countries, the People's Republic of China and other nations in this dynamic

and growing region of the world. We should pursue a "phased" strategy which begins with a network of economic financial and trade ties and moves to more formal security arrangements in the out years.

Maintaining and strengthening the Atlantic Alliance is key to world prosperity and peace. Our European friends face difficulties in the years ahead as they are forced to compete in a sophisticated world market and as they are continually exposed to Soviet policies designed to weaken their political will. We must seek to expand economic and security relations with these longstanding Allies to ensure a democratic and secure Europe.

Stay the course in finding peaceful solutions in the Middle East and Central America. US credibility is on the line in these volatile regions. Blocking Soviet/Cuban expansionism and restoring economic prosperity in Latin and Central America must remain a high priority. Likewise, finding a peaceful settlement to the Israeli/Arab conflict and containing subversive and radical regimes in the Middle East is essential to world stability in the years ahead.

Adoption of democratic institutions in the Third World is key to their successful development plans. The United States must regain the ideological high ground in pursuing the advancement of freedom and prosperity. The "magic of the marketplace" is the foundation of economic growth. We should pursue policies in our assistance programs which help to expand private initiative and investment, while also keeping our moral commitments to assist in poverty stricken areas of the world. More advanced developing nations are likely to face continued problems of debt. Our approach to the international debt problem is likely to be a critical factor in the future of the majority of the world's population.

No one sums up the first term in office better than the President himself: "Gone are the days when the United States was perceived as a rudderless superpower, a helpless hostage to world events. American leadership is back."

Although much has been accomplished by the President's leadership over the past four years, the next four years could be even more challenging given the increase in low level conflicts which continuously threaten to explode into superpower struggles. Nevertheless, the opportunities are there to also craft a peaceful and prosperous world. To meet the challenge of this crossroad in mankind's destiny, the President must take personal command of the foreign policy agenda for the 1980s. The President's resolve and strength have become America's strength: his principles are reflective of the collective spirit of the American people; confidence, optimism, strength, realism and vision can and will bring peace.

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BRIEFING POINTS

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BRIEFING POINTS ON THE PRESIDENT'S
FOREIGN POLICY
GOALS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

- I. First Term Foreign Policy Accomplishments
- II. The Global Environment (1985-1990)
- III. Global Objectives
- IV. U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives
 - A. Soviet Union
 - B. Western Europe
 - C. Pacific Basin
 - D. Middle East
 - E. Latin/Central America
 - F. Africa
 - G. China
 - H. South Asia
 - I. North America
- V. Desirable Results (Headlines)

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By dlb NARA, Date 7/6/06

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I. First Term Foreign Policy Accomplishments

- o Established strong leadership and clarity of purpose.
- o ✓ Restored the principle of bipartisan formulation of foreign policy.
- o Improved U.S. military strength.
- o Developed Allied consensus on East-West trade in areas of credit, energy and transfer of technology.
- o Improved Allies' confidence.
- o Led the world out of the worst recession since World War II.
- o Supported the growth and development of democratic institutions throughout the world.
- o Helped establish freedom in Grenada.
- o ✓ Furthered economic and security relations with Pacific Basin nations.
- o Extended humanitarian assistance to drought stricken African nations.
- o Opened up new avenue of economic cooperation with China while continuing our comittment to the people of Taiwan.
- o Encouraged the withdrawal of foreign troops in southern Africa and, with our Allies, helped to curb Libyan aggression in Chad and the Sudan.
- o Countered Soviet and Cuban sponsored aggression and subversion in El Salvador.
- o Advanced the cause of peace by maintaining a commitment of resources in the Middle East.
- o Demonstrated U.S. leadership at its finest through personal visit of President Reagan throughout the Americas, the Pacific Basin, and Europe.

*we are deterring
peace making
Southern Africa.
w/ APLO
in let*

II. Global Environment (1985-1990)

Regional Challenges:

- o Despite economic difficulties and worldwide setbacks during the last four years, the Soviet Union will remain the greatest threat to world peace.
- o Europessimism could continue if Western Europe continues to resist the urgent need to replace or upgrade outmoded and subsidized industries. Despite continued Soviet threats, the Atlantic Alliance should remain in tact.
- o The world's economic gravity will continue to shift from the Atlantic to the Pacific, as key Pacific Basin nations continue their sustained economic growth and remain on the cutting edge of modern technology.

The Middle East will remain highly volatile because of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Palestinian issues and the actions of radical regimes such as Libya, Syria, Iran, and Iraq. Moslem fundamentalism will continue to spread.

- o Poverty, hunger and disease will continue to plague many developing nations in South Asia and Africa.
- o The Soviet Union and Cuba will continue to export revolution to Central American nations. Economic problems will mount and fray the political and social fabric of struggling democracies throughout Latin America.

Common Challenges:

- o International terrorism will become more sophisticated and harder to prevent. Increasing availability of cheap weapons--including some of considerable sophistication--will increase the level of armed clashes.
- o More nations will edge closer to gaining the capacity to produce or acquire nuclear weapons.
- o International financial relations will become more complex and tense as developing nations seek to manage their debt problems. International economic and trade issues will gain in significance.
- o International narcotics problems will worsen despite all efforts to reduce them.

tech debt development

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*more in
Call
reference*

VII. Global Objectives

Reduce the threat of nuclear war and reduce the world-wide arms race.

- o Promote world prosperity, democratic institutions, and advance individual freedoms.
- o Blunt the expansion of communist aggression and counter international terrorism. *sep pt*
- o Strengthen our ties with traditional allies and encourage and expand the role of multi-national organizations in the resolution of international problems.

articulate?

- o Move forward with a comprehensive Pacific Basin Initiative. *trade? defense? Tech. sharing?*
- o Seek more effective means of persuading the non-communist nations of the world that it is the U.S., and not the USSR, that is the greatest friend of peace, progress, prosperity, and freedom in the world.

*Develop
dent financial system*

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SOVIET UNION

IV. U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives by Region

Soviet Union

Setting:

- o Despite economic difficulties and worldwide setbacks during the last four years the Soviet Union will remain the greatest threat to world peace.
- o The Soviets will continue to foment wars and instability in Asia, Africa, Central America, and the Middle East.
- o The Soviets will continue to deploy newer and more sophisticated weapons.
- o We can expect continued Soviet aloofness from meaningful negotiations.

Foreign Policy Objectives:

- o Seek a stable bilateral relationship.
- o Obtain an equitable and verifiable agreement on START, INF, and MBFR. (O! COE? ☞
- o Influence the readjustment of Soviet policy from an emphasis on rapid arms buildup to economic reform.
- o Seek lasting solutions to regional problems and conflicts (e.g., Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Middle East, and Central America).
- o Further restrict access to militarily-useful technology.
- o Thwart Soviet efforts to increase energy exports to Europe and Pacific Basin nations.

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WESTERN EUROPE

Western Europe

Setting:

- o The Soviets will continue to exploit differences within NATO concerning the threat and the proper Allied response to it.
- o "Europessimism" could continue if Western Europe continues to resist the urgent need to replace or upgrade outmoded and subsidized industries.
- o The Atlantic Alliance should retain substantial resilience in the face of a massive Soviet propaganda effort to derail INF deployment.

Foreign Policy Objectives:

- o Offset the drift toward political and economic retrenchment.
- o Restore sufficient political will to resist Soviet coercions.
- o Encourage militarily secure West European states that will contribute proportionally to western defense.
- o Encourage a politically strong alliance that can resolve differences without rancor.

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PACIFIC BASIN

Pacific Basin

Setting:

Em?

- o The world's economic gravity will continue to shift from the Atlantic to the Pacific, as key Pacific Basin nations prosper and remain on the cutting edge of modern technology.
- o Emerging industrial states, S. Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan will face increasingly stiff competition for raw materials.
- o Vietnam and China will most likely be unable to resolve their differences.
- o Philippines and Indonesia will not adjust to political, economic, and social changes easily.

Foreign Policy Objectives:

- o Continue strengthening relations with Japan.
- o Lessen tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
- o Stimulate greater economic, political and military cohesion among ASEAN nations and the rest of the Pacific Basin.
- o Contain Vietnamese aggression in Southeast Asia.

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MIDDLE EAST

Middle East

Setting:

- o The region will remain highly volatile because of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Palestinian issue, and the actions of radical regimes such as Libya, Syria, Iran, and Iraq.
- o Moslem fundamentalism will continue its resurgence, leading to serious regional instability.

Foreign Policy Objectives:

- o Continue to promote our peace initiatives.
- o Contain and end regional conflicts.
- o Encourage greater regional stability through improved economic conditions and development of indigenous defense capabilities.
- o Seek an independent Lebanon free of foreign forces.
- o Continue close relations with a strong Israel.
- o Seek a solution to the Palestinian issue.
- o Continue to seek solutions to the Iran-Iraq war and the protection of Western economic and security interests in the Gulf.

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