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CENTRAL AMERICA - OVERVIEW OF US POLICY

Our goals: Promote democratic institutions; assist in improving living conditions and economic development; provide friendly governments security assistance to meet the threat posed by expanded Soviet bloc/Cuban/Nicaraguan subversion; and encourage dialogue for national reconciliation within and negotiations among countries to resolve regional problems.

The Bipartisan Commission reported in mid-January that Central America is a vital national security interest and concluded: further communist guerrilla warfare success there will mean that we would have to either substantially increase our defense capabilities along our southern border or sharply reduce our commitments to Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.

Regional Issues: The U.S. commitment to negotiating has not diminished; we are strongly committed to Contadora, which deserves the understanding and support of our allies. Ambassador Shlaudeman has visited every country involved with Contadora to encourage the process. Democratic elections in El Salvador, and coming elections in Guatemala will leave Nicaragua the only non-democratic country in Central America. We hope our allies hold Nicaragua to the same standards they apply to the rest of Central America.

Nicaragua: Relations with Nicaragua are seriously strained as a result of Sandinista support for subversion of its neighbors and the GRN's close alignment and security ties with Cuba and the USSR. We do not seek to overthrow or destabilize the GRN; we do believe the Sandinistas only respond positively to pressure.

Our policy has four purposes: (1) implementation of Nicaragua's democratic commitments to the OAS; (2) termination of its export of subversion; (3) reduction of its military apparatus to a point of equilibrium with the rest of the region; (4) termination of its military and security ties to the Soviet Union and Cuba. We maintain a dialogue with the GRN, and are prepared to respond to meaningful efforts in the areas we have identified to the GRN as critical to us.

Nicaraguan elections scheduled for November 4 are a potential opportunity for national reconciliation, but Sandinista efforts to block fair elections, e.g., denying access to the media, continuing the state of emergency, and excluding armed opposition leaders from the elections, will make this difficult.

El Salvador: The massive turnout of voters in El Salvador in two elections shows strong desire of Salvadorans for democracy. We are prepared to work closely with the new government headed by Christian Democrat Duarte. The communist guerrillas tried and failed to disrupt the elections. We will continue to support El Salvador in its efforts to combat

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communist terrorism.

Costa Rica: We look to Costa Rica as a model of social and political development for the region. It is an important regional force for peace and democracy. Our policy objectives are to preserve its independence and sovereignty in the face of Nicaraguan aggression and subversion. Recent Nicaraguan attacks have alarmed the GOOCR; it has requested additional security assistance. We have agreed on a formula for providing this, and assured Costa Rica we will be responsive if the situation deteriorates further.

Honduras: Honduras is the bulwark of our Central American security policy. It is essential to our regional interests that Honduras continue to strengthen its democratic institutions. Our programs of economic and military assistance are designed to support it in this vital effort. Honduras is the site of the regional military training center - and consequently an important force in our security assistance to El Salvador - and of bilateral military exercises. Honduran support for the FDN is fundamental to our policy of bringing pressure on Nicaragua.

Guatemala: A stable democratic Guatemala fully involved in solving regional problems remains a key but elusive goal. With Central America's largest population, potentially strongest economy and proximity to Mexico, Guatemala has been a prized target for Marxist insurgents since the early 1960's. Reduction of political violence against noncombatants (from 300 deaths/month to 40/month) and commitment to constituent assembly elections July 1 show officials recognize change must come. We will encourage them through discussion, a significant infusion of economic assistance, and modest military assistance.

Panama: 75 percent of traffic through the Canal is to or from the U.S.; our private investment in Panama is third in Latin America behind Mexico and Brazil. The Canal will remain important to us indefinitely, and we will defend our interests there. We want to continue use of our military bases there. Panama has played a moderately helpful role in regional efforts to promote peace and national reconciliation. We strongly supported its return to full democratic government, and have successfully avoided appearance of favoritism. We will continue to provide adequate economic and military assistance.

Belize: We support a peaceful resolution satisfactory to both parties of democratic Belize's border dispute with Guatemala. FOR UK ONLY: Withdrawal of the British garrison in Belize in the absence of a resolution of the territorial dispute would dangerously increase instability in an area of central concern to the U.S. There is no adequate alternative to the British presence.

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US-European Conventional Defense Issues

Before deployments began in late 1983, the US and its European allies focused on the modernization of Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) to the virtual exclusion of all other security issues. While INF remains an issue -- primarily with regard to the question of Dutch deployment -- other security issues have surfaced this year.

Defense Spending and Burdensharing: Since 1977 the allies have had as a public commitment the goal of a 3% real increase in defense spending per year. In 1981 the allies increased their real defense spending by 2.8%, declining to 2.3% in 1982, and -- once all the figures are in -- we predict about 1.9% in 1983. Faced with continuing economic stagnation and cuts in almost all other government expenditures, the allies have done reasonably well to maintain any real increase in defense spending, but we believe that they can and should do more.

NATO Strategy and Conventional Defense: Traditionally, the U.S. has been dissatisfied with NATO's conventional deterrent, a concern which has grown as the Soviet nuclear potential has increased. Two legs of NATO's triad of forces (strategic nuclear, theater nuclear and conventional) are being modernized; the US strategic deterrent, and INF. Thus, in 1984 we have emphasized the need to ensure that the conventional leg of the triad is strengthened to raise the nuclear threshold and underpin NATO's strategy of flexible response. There is a renewed interest in many quarters in Europe in strengthening conventional defense, partly as a reaction to the nuclear fears of recent years. At the same time, there are both doctrinal and financial obstacles which must be overcome if we are to achieve a significant improvement in Allied conventional defense efforts. Many in Europe have always feared that a substantial increase in conventional forces would downgrade nuclear deterrence and risk making Europe "safe for conventional war". Others have raised objections to some military tactics which might be employed by strengthened NATO conventional forces. In particular, the concept of deep interdiction of second echelon Soviet forces which both the US and NATO are considering has been criticized for introducing an allegedly offensive character to NATO plans. More mundanely, others simply reject the increased cost of a viable conventional defense.

Armaments Cooperation, the WEU and Emerging Technology: The Europeans have been traditionally dissatisfied with their share of the NATO armaments market. The current upwelling of European criticism was sparked in 1982 by such US protectionist

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legislation as that requiring only US origin specialty metals in equipment purchased by DOD. Since then, the "inequity" of the trans-Atlantic arms trade with our European allies -- running at an average of 6 to 1 in our favor -- has received extensive European publicity and political attention. Many Europeans have contended that US efforts to improve NATO defenses through introduction of high technology are really a device to continue US domination of the defense market within the Alliance.

Partly as a reaction to this feeling, and partly for broader political purposes, the French and the Germans are in the forefront of an initiative to revitalize the seven-nation West European Union (WEU), established 30 years ago. Earlier efforts to improve intra-European arms cooperation, including the Independent European Program Group (IEPG), have not produced significant results. In addition to improving the viability of European defense industries, the Germans hope that the initiative will help to keep alive the process of European unification while the French see it as a means to curb perceived trends toward neutralism in Germany. The Italians have been strongly supportive. The UK, the most skeptical major ally in the WEU, does not expect any significant results from the meeting of WEU Foreign Ministers scheduled for June 12.

For our part, we agree that any effort to increase European defense spending will be greatly influenced by the level of European participation in the production of new weapons. We have invited our allies to join with us in exploring emerging technologies to increase the effectiveness of NATO's conventional forces. Working to improve trans-Atlantic industry-to-industry arms cooperation, we have reinstated the exemption for our allies of the specialty metals amendment, and we are supporting legislation (the Stratton Amendment) that will allow us to waive certain provisions of law if this is required to enter into multi-national armaments projects.

Security Outside the NATO Treaty Area: A major focus of US policy in NATO has been to increase European cooperation in countering threats to Western security outside of Europe, particularly in Southwest Asia. The European allies have reacted cautiously. Given their current difficulties in increasing defense spending, the allies see few possibilities for compensating with additional forces -- within the treaty area -- for those US forces that might be diverted from European defense. Politically, some allies fear that formalized understandings on cooperation outside of NATO would be seen as an open-ended endorsement of US policies.

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Militarily, the allies worry about US contingency planning for Southwest Asia which they suspect represents a de facto readjustment of Alliance defense responsibilities, and implies a weakening of the US commitment to European defense. Despite these cautions, however, we have made progress with a number of allies in developing arrangements to facilitate US access to Southwest Asia. There is significant ad hoc cooperation with certain allies, notably the UK and France, in the defense of access to oil supplies, and the Alliance as a whole has accepted the need to include the impact of Southwest Asian contingencies in its overall force planning.

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East-West Relations

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Your speech of January 16 underscored the US desire for a more constructive relationship with the USSR based on realism, strength and dialogue. Vice President Bush conveyed this message to Soviet General Secretary Chernenko in February. In his January meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko, Secretary Shultz stressed his desire to move ahead on the full range of the East-West agenda: 1) arms control; 2) bilateral affairs; 3) human rights; and 4) regional issues. Our allies appreciate the moderate tone of our policy, but remain anxious about East-West tensions.

The new Soviet leadership took a relatively moderate tone in its initial approach to US-USSR relations, particularly in Chernenko's public statements following Andropov's death and in his meeting with the Vice President. Since then, however, the Soviets have increasingly been taking a harsh line in public statements and private comments. Moscow has been especially rigid on START and INF, with the Soviets insisting on withdrawal of US INF deployments as a precondition to resumption of these two negotiations.

On lower-profile issues, the Soviets have been careful not to exclude possibilities for progress, and have shown willingness to discuss a range of bilateral and non-nuclear arms control issues. In part to deflect attention from its rigid stance on nuclear arms reductions, the USSR has emphasized Soviet initiatives on outer space arms control and "nuclear norms" (declarations of no-first-use and non-use of force). In April, the USSR returned to the MBFR talks, and is also participating in the CDE process.

The Soviets recently underscored their tough rhetoric with two harsh actions: withdrawal from the summer Olympics and sharply increased pressure on the Sakharovs. In the latter case, the Soviets have refused to allow Dr. Sakharov's wife to go abroad for medical treatment, and have as well threatened her with imprisonment. Dr. Sakharov, in response, has begun a life-threatening hunger strike. This hard Soviet line reflects Moscow's hope that intransigence in US-Soviet relations will damage the Administration's reelection efforts and help sow divisions between the US and its European allies. There is also continuing Soviet resentment over the failure to block INF deployments -- a defeat that compounded the acute embarrassment of KAL 007 -- as well as residual tensions within the Soviet leadership as Chernenko tries to consolidate his position and others maneuver for the next transition of power.

There has been no real flexibility in Soviet positions on regional issues, including Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Central America, Southern Africa, or the Middle East. We have, however,

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restated our willingness to engage in constructive dialogue with the Soviets on these topics, as well as on a variety of other issues. On the bilateral front, we have put forward a number of initiatives, including talks on New York and Kiev consulates, a new cultural agreement, and revitalization of scientific and technical exchanges. Late April saw the latest round of US-Soviet hotline improvement talks, as well as the Moscow visit of Ambassador Goodby for discussions on CDE.

We have been especially mindful of the need for high-level dialogue: Ambassador Hartman has met with Gromyko on several occasions for talks on a wide range of issues, while Dobrynin has had a number of exchanges with Secretary Shultz. And of course your letters to Chernenko are our most explicit statements of commitment to a real improvement in relations. The US has made it clear that we do not seek to threaten Soviet security and that we are prepared to engage in serious discussions on START and INF, as well as on the full range of issues which engage our countries.

One persistent problem in East-West relations is the unsatisfactory human rights situation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In particular, emigration from the USSR remains at exceptionally low levels, and the crackdown on dissent in the USSR shows no sign of abating. Following last September's conclusion of the Madrid CSCE review meeting -- which advanced human rights standards beyond the Helsinki Final Act -- the US has worked to maintain allied pressure for an improvement in Communist human rights performance.

Since the NATO Ministerial last December, NATO allies have been engaged in a major review of East-West relations. Our goal has been to strengthen alliance consensus on this central issue and point the way to a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. Shortly before the start of your trip, NATO foreign ministers will have approved the classified study and issued a public statement at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Washington May 29-31.

United States East-West economic policy is largely determined by our overall relationship with the Soviet Union, and heavily influenced by the Afghanistan and Poland sanctions and by our policy of "differentiation" toward the countries of Eastern Europe. We have been working closely with our allies to strike a consensus for a comprehensive and prudent economic relationship with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. Key elements of this approach include: 1) no subsidization of the Soviet economy through preferential trade or financing; 2) curbs on militarily-significant exports to the Warsaw Pact; and 3) avoidance of dependence on the USSR as an energy supplier.

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STATUS OF ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

START

The Soviets have refused to return to the START negotiations since Round V ended on schedule in December 1983 without agreement to a resumption date. At that time, the Soviets stated that the U.S. LRINF deployments had so changed the strategic situation as to require a full review of their START position.

During the last round their approach, with few exceptions, remained one of wholesale condemnation of the U.S. position. The only positive development was the establishment of a working group on confidence building measures. With respect to a merger of INF and START, we continue to believe that a merger would complicate the negotiations and impede progress; however, we are ready to consider any serious Soviet proposal for resuming the nuclear arms control dialogue.

INF

On November 24, 1983, Andropov announced a unilateral suspension of the INF talks. Chernenko maintains the Soviet formula that their walkout is irreversible unless NATO demonstrates readiness to reverse deployments. The Soviet walkout is regrettable and unjustified, since their SS-20 deployments continued without pause for two years while the U.S. pursued a negotiated solution with the Soviets. The U.S. believes that all the elements for an agreement are on the table; the U.S. is willing to resume the INF talks at any time and place, however, without preconditions. In the absence of a concrete agreement, deployments of U.S. LRINF missiles are moving ahead on schedule.

MBFR

The negotiations resumed on March 16 an after unusually long break (three months) brought about by Soviet refusal last December to continue the talks. With our NATO Allies, we created and tabled a new proposal aimed at breaking the deadlock. We are hopeful that the East will respond constructively in the next round which begins May 24.

CDE

The West has proposed Confidence and Security Building Measures which would make military activities in Europe more open, and therefore harder to use for surprise attack or intimidation. Our measures would also reduce the danger of war from accident or miscalculation.

The Soviets have offered declaratory measures -- non-use of force, etc. Their measures sound more ambitious than NATO's, but they only reiterate existing pledges in the U.N. Charter and Helsinki Final Act, which often have been violated. Our challenge is to achieve agreement on NATO's more modest but concrete measures which would do more for European confidence and security than agreement on Soviet proposals would do.

CW Arms Control

On April 18, Vice President Bush tabled a draft CW treaty in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The draft treaty proposes a comprehensive and global ban on CW development, production and stockpiling, under effective international verification (including challenge inspections). The U.S. recognizes that verification of such a ban is a difficult task, therefore, conclusion of an effective CW agreement will take some time to achieve.

Arms Control Compliance

The U.S. has determined that the USSR is violating or probably violating several arms control agreements. Soviet non-compliance calls into question important security benefits from arms control, and could create new security risks. The U.S. will continue to press its compliance concerns with the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels, and insist on explanations, clarifications, and corrective actions. At the same time, the U.S. will continue to carry out its own obligations and commitments under relevant agreements, and will ensure that future arms control agreements contain effective verification and compliance provisions.

Outer Space Arms Control/SDI

A comprehensive ban on ASAT's appears impossible to verify, but the U.S. is continuing to review other approaches that could be effectively verified and that would enhance NATO security interests. With respect to the strategic defense initiative, the research program is completely consistent with all U.S. treaty obligations.

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Extraterritoriality

With the increasing integration of the world economy, strong regulatory and enforcement interests necessitate application of U.S. law (e.g., antitrust laws, re-export controls, compelled disclosure of offshore documents) to persons or conduct outside U.S. territory. While the U.S. is not alone in applying its laws in this manner (West Germany, Sweden and the European Commission also do so to a lesser extent), we are in a decided minority. The U.K., Canada and most others oppose this "extraterritorial" application of law to persons or conduct in their territories, which they view as intruding upon their sovereignty. They are most disturbed when they think the U.S. is attempting to control activities in their territory in accordance with U.S. interests and without regard to their own distinct interests. The U.K., Australia and others have adopted domestic legal measures to block such actions.

This has led to confrontations over specific cases and to heavy pressure on the U.S. to address this issue bilaterally and multilaterally. We have discussed it separately with the Canadians and British and multilaterally with the OECD. In these meetings, some allies argue that the interests of the territorial sovereign predominate over the interests of all others. The U.S. has countered that more than one state may have jurisdiction concurrently, and that the real need for measures reaching outside a state's own borders precludes any simple solution, such as a commitment to "territorial primacy," in deciding which of these states can properly exercise jurisdiction in a specific case. Rather, we have urged use of a balancing of interests approach through which other states would recognize the authority of the state with the greatest interest in conduct to exercise jurisdiction in that case.

The U.S. has also urged focusing on managing and mitigating the problem by accommodating the interests of all involved governments when possible. This would be achieved by (1) establishing an internal USG mechanism through which foreign interests in proposed conduct can be identified and taken into account (a mechanism for notice to State is presently under study by the SIG/IEP), and (2) creating procedures, such as those now in place for antitrust enforcement, through which other governments would be notified and consulted, in advance when feasible, about proposed actions which might affect their interests. This approach would also promote intergovernmental cooperation in lieu of unilateral action.

While our allies continue to express their opposition to U.S. assertion of extraterritorial authority as a matter of principle, they have indicated willingness to explore our conflict management approach, as indicated by recent negotiation of an OECD recommendation supporting this approach, adoption of antitrust consultation arrangements with Australia and Canada, pending negotiation of law enforcement assistance agreements with Canada and West Germany, and recent U.K. interest in exploring this approach generally.

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Normandy Events

The greatest amphibious landing in the history of war took place on the morning of June 6, 1944, when elements of nine Allied divisions (five American, four British-Canadian) landed on the coast of Normandy. For reasons of communications security, the time and place of the landing were not communicated to General de Gaulle in London, and he never forgave the Allies for this. As a consequence the Normandy landings have traditionally been commemorated only by the Allies and by local French committees.

President Mitterrand decided to correct this historical anomaly and give to the Normandy commemoration this year the importance and national recognition it deserves in view of its historic importance for France. This is all the more important because the generations that actually remember D-day in Normandy will soon be passing on. Mitterrand wanted to establish a new tradition of French national celebration of the D-day anniversary. The coincidence with the London Economic Summit this year enables the extraordinary presence on June 6 of the heads of state or government of all the participants in the Normandy landings.

While the French landed only a commando battalion on D-day, the French Forces of the Interior played an important role in disrupting enemy lines of communication and harassing the movement of Wehrmacht reinforcements to the battle zone.


Commemoration of the American role in the Normandy landings will focus on three main events:

(1) Pointe du Hoc. This is a jut of land west of Omaha beach, a high cliff scaled by the Second Ranger Battalion. Its mission was to put out of action a heavy enemy gun battery which was a dangerous threat to troops landing on both Omaha and Utah beaches. The memorial site has been maintained by local residents and was only recently ceded to the United States Government. The commemorative plaque is being installed for dedication on June 6.

(2) Omaha beach. Combat teams of the 1st and 29th Infantry Divisions, comprising the Fifth Corps commanded by General Gerow, landed along this three-mile stretch of beach in the most costly of the D-day battles. British and Canadian forces landed at three beaches to the east of Omaha. President Mitterrand, after first participating in ceremonies for French and British war dead at Bayeux, is to proceed to the American Military Cemetery at Omaha beach for the French-American ceremony,

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(3) Utah beach. Regimental combat teams of the 4th Infantry Division, under the Seventh Corps commanded by General Collins (who will be present on June 6) landed along this stretch of sand dunes to the west of the Carentan marshes. They linked up with the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions which had been dropped inland just after midnight. President Mitterrand will speak at this site, in the presence of all the Allied leaders. He is later to attend additional ceremonies at Canadian and French cemeteries east of Omaha beach.



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PUBLIC STATEMENTS

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6. Irish Parliament Address - June 4
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PRESERVING PEACE AND PROSPERITY:
The President's Trip to Europe, June 1984

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY THEMES

I. Central Perceptions

A. Scene

- The President's trip to Ireland, France and the London Economic Summit should be publicly viewed as a practical expression of the foreign policy principles articulated in the April 6th CSIS speech: Realism, Strength, Economic Growth, Shared Responsibility With Allies, Non-Agression, and Dialogue With Adversaries.
- Explicitly or implicitly every part of the June itinerary should provide mutual reinforcement for one or more of these principles.
- The importance of the President's June travel will transcend not only the London Summit itself but in a real sense the entire European itinerary: our objective, by the time the trip is completed, will be to reassert U.S. interest in a stronger and viable Europe within a larger policy context embracing both the Atlantic and Pacific communities, while stressing shared democratic values.

B. Primary Perception

- A Strong President and the American Renewal: assertive U.S. leadership is essential to world peace and prosperity.

C. Supporting Perceptions

- The Dynamics of Interdependence: genuine peace is a product of Western strength, constancy, and cohesion.
- Keeping Our Powder (And Our Provender) Dry: viable Western security depends on both economic and defense cooperation.
- Reality Is Catching Up With Reagan's Vision: convergence of the Atlantic and Pacific communities as a positive trend in the late 20th Century.
- Continuity and Consistency: from Williamsburg to London, a full year of successful high-level meetings with foreign leaders (forging solidarity at Williamsburg Summit; expanding Pacific ties with Korea and Japan; further normalization with China; re-emphasis on the Atlantic relationship).

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PRESERVING PEACE AND PROSPERITY:
The President's Trip to Europe, June 1984

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D. Individual Locations and Matching Themes

1. Ireland

- General Theme: "Return to American Roots"
- Specific Emphases
- Ireland as an island link between two continents
- Importance of European integration Ireland assumes EC presidency in July
- Reaffirmation of cultural and historic ties
- Partnership of shared values
- Peaceful settlement of conflict (rejection of violence)
- Importance of East-West dialogue

2. France/Normandy

General Theme: "Reconciliation and the Primacy of Peace"

Specific Emphases

- The legacy of D-Day: 40 years of peace and prosperity in Europe
- The meaning of American leadership: an enduring commitment to eliminate the world's most destructive weapons
- Creativity of today's coalition: prepared to counter new forms of aggression (terrorism)
- From Normandy to the farther shore: America's unflagging efforts to eliminate the world's most destructive weapons

3. Bilaterals in London

General Theme: "The sacred trinity of tested ties - tradition, trust, and vitality"

Specific Emphases

- Recommitment to the consultative process
- Necessity of united stand on East-West issues

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PRESERVING PEACE AND PROSPERITY:
The President's Trip to Europe, June 1984

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- Sincerity of American efforts to deal constructively with the Soviets
- More direct Japanese role in defense of its own regional area

4. London Economic Summit

General Theme: "The Spirit of Williamsburg Continues"

Specific Emphases

- U.S. economic expansion as major stimulus for world recovery (due primarily to the policies President Reagan has pursued since 1981 Ottawa Summit)
- Continued pursuit of non-inflationary growth (sustains and spreads recovery, creates jobs, increases prosperity)
- Trade liberalization (despite problems, post-Williamsburg actions work to create more open markets and greater competition)
- New partnerships and the vitality of the Summit process (at and after the Summit, Western leaders are pioneering creative approaches to joint cooperative ventures e.g., space research, counter-terrorism)-- (tentative depending on evolution of pre-Summit preparations)
- London Summit and the political dimension
 - (President Reagan, while maintaining America's deterrent strength, is taking a realistic, positive approach vis-a-vis the USSR and the issue of arms reductions)
 - Need for Western unity on major security issues (global political outlook, increasing Asia-Europe-U.S. consultations)

Prepared by:

James M. Rentschler

(Elliott)
May 30, 1984
2:00 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: DEPARTURE FOR EUROPE
SOUTH LAWN
FRIDAY, JUNE 1, 1984

My fellow Americans, in a few moments, Nancy and I will board Marine One to begin our journey to Europe. During the next 10 days, we will be your ambassadors on a mission to preserve peace, to strengthen prosperity, and to enhance solidarity among America's oldest friends and allies.

We will visit three countries, and I will meet with the leaders of the major industrialized nations. I intend to reaffirm the United States' commitment to work as a faithful and determined partner for a brighter future -- a future in which our world is safer and the liberties our peoples cherish can be enjoyed by people everywhere.

Our first stop is Ireland, a very special homecoming to a land of hardy people and heavenly beauty -- one from which I, like some 40 million Americans, am proud to trace my roots. We hope our visit will honor and strengthen U.S.-Irish friendship, forged by our great and enduring traditions of shared values and family ties. We hope, as well, to convey the deep desire of Americans for a peaceful solution to the tragic conflict in Northern Ireland, which has wasted so many innocent lives.

Our return to the United Kingdom provides an opportunity to renew our consultations with a close and trusted friend. We will review the broad range of issues in which we are both vitally interested, striving always to ensure that British-American

cooperation remains as close and effective as it has been in the past.

On June 6th, the 40th anniversary of D-Day, I will join other leaders on the beaches of Normandy to commemorate one of the momentous events of the 20th century. Together, we will mark that historic day when armies of the free nations of the West began the battle to liberate Europe. We will, in a very real sense, be celebrating the beginning of 40 years of peace in Europe; and we will be renewing our determination to keep that peace and our allied partnership intact.

Returning to London, I will join six other western leaders and the President of the European Commission for the tenth Economic Summit of the major industrialized nations. Since we met last year at Williamsburg, the world economy has turned decisively toward recovery, led, in large part, by our own dynamic expansion. I am confident that our discussions will reveal broad areas of agreement -- both to continue those successful policies that can produce lasting, non-inflationary growth, and to maintain a firm, positive, and unified stance toward the Soviet Union.

We are determined to maintain our collective security. I will make clear that the United States is ready, at any time, to resume negotiations with the Soviets for mutual and verifiable arms reductions. I believe the solidarity of the NATO Allies and our Japanese friends has never been greater on these issues.

So, with a spirit of confidence that America and our friends will go forward in our resolve to protect the peace and

strengthen our prosperity, Nancy and I bid you farewell, and we'll see you again in 10 days.

God bless you all.

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(Elliott/RR)
May 30, 1984
2:00 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: SHANNON ARRIVAL STATEMENT
FRIDAY, JUNE 1, 1984

President and Mrs. Hillery, Prime Minister and Mrs. FitzGerald, distinguished guests, and I want to add with the greatest of pleasure: A chairde gaeil (Ah-car-jah gale -- My Irish friends):

On behalf of Nancy and myself, thank you very much for your warm and wonderful Irish welcome. We are beginning a mission to strengthen historic ties of friendship and cooperation among the world's leading democracies. It is our deepest hope, and our earnest conviction, that we can make genuine progress together toward a safer world, a more prosperous world, a far better world.

To be able to begin our journey on this isle of wondrous beauty, with a countryside green as no other place seems to be, to be able to stand on the soil of my ancestors among all of you, is, for me, a very special gift. I want you to know that, for this great-grandson of Ireland, this is a moment of joy.

And I am returning not only to my own roots, I am returning to America's roots. So much of what America means and stands for we owe to you -- to your indomitable spirit and generosity, and to your impassioned love for liberty and independence.

There are few people on Earth whose hearts burn more with the flame of freedom than the Irish. George Washington said, "When our friendless standard was first unfurled for resistance, who were the strangers who first mustered around our staff? And

when it reeled in fight, who more bravely sustained it than Erin's generous sons?"

You did. America has always been a haven of opportunity for those seeking a new life. They, in turn, have given to us, shaped us, enriched us. And, from the beginning, when that first large party of your ancestors arrived at Newport News in 1621, your Irish blood has enriched America.

With courage and determination, you helped our struggling colony break free. Then, day-by-day, by the sweat of your brow and with an ache in your back you helped turn our small, undeveloped country into a great and mighty Nation; your hearts and minds shaped our literary and cultural history; your smiles, mirth, and song lifted our spirits with laughter and music; and always, you reminded us by your deep faith that wisdom and truth, love and beauty, grace and glory begin in Him -- our Father, our Creator, our loving God.

No wonder we have been blessed all these years by what some call "the luck of the Irish."

Today, the sons and daughters of our first Irish settlers number 40 million strong. Speaking for them, and even for those not so fortunate, may I say: We are still part of you; we have and will remain true to your values; long live Irish-American friendship.

The challenges to peace and freedom that we face today are neither easy nor free from danger. But face them we must, and surmount them we can, providing that we remember the rights of individual liberty, and of government resting on the consent of

the governed, are more than the sole possession of a chosen few; they are universal rights, gifts from God to men and women everywhere. And those rights are a crucial anchor for stability in a troubled world -- a world where peace is threatened by governments that oppress their citizens, renounce God, and prey on their neighbors. Edmund Burke's warning of nearly two centuries ago holds true today, "The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing."

Ireland today is undertaking important responsibilities in international councils, and through your peacekeeping forces, to help reduce the risks of war. The United States bears a heavy burden for strengthening economic development and preserving peace, and we are deeply grateful for Ireland's contributions.

Americans are people of peace. We have known and suffered the trauma of war, and witnessed the fruits of reconciliation. That is why we pray tolerance and reconciliation will one day unite Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland in a spirit of communion and community; and that is why those who advocate violence or engage in terrorism in Northern Ireland will never be welcome in the United States.

Looking to the future, I believe there is reason for optimism and confidence. America's economic expansion can and should bring more jobs and opportunities to your people. And the more than 300 U.S. companies based here demonstrate our clear commitment to a future of peace and well-being for all the people of Ireland, North and South.

Thank you, again, for making Nancy and me feel so welcome.

And may I speak for so many of your families and friends in America when I say the words:

"Ireland, oh Ireland . . . Country of my fathers . . .
Mother of my yearning, love of all my longings,
home of my heart . . ."

God bless you all.