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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records
 Head of State File
File Folder: FRANCE: President Mitterrand (8491035-8791344)
 Box 11

Archivist: mjd
FOIA ID: F99-077/1, Zuber
Date: 8/17/2000

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. cable (8591013)	020340Z OCT 85, 3p R 5/9/03 F99-077/1 #199	10/2/85	P1/F1 →
2. memo	Lehman/Linhard/Kracmer to McFarlane re: letter to Mitterrand, 1p R - #200	10/1/85	P1/F1 →
3. draft letter	Reagan to Mitterrand, 3p R - #201	nd	P1/F1
4. draft letter	Reagan to allies, 3p R - #202	nd	P1/F1 →
5. letter (8690535)	Reagan to Mitterrand, 2p R - #203	nd	P1/F1 →
6. letter	Reagan to Mitterrand, 2p R - #204	7/19/86	P1/F1 →
7. draft letter	Reagan to Mitterrand (annotated), 2p R - #205	nd	P1/F1 →
8. memo	North et al to Poindexter re: message to Mitterrand, 1p D - #206	7/18/86	P1/F1
9. memo	Poindexter to Reagan re: message to Mitterrand, 1p D - #207	nd	P1/F1
10. cable	181754Z JUL 86, 6p D 3/19/01 F99-077/1 #208	7/18/86	P1/F1
11. cable (8790443)	081639Z MAY 87, 1p PART 5/9/03 - #209	5/8/87	P1/F1
42. cable	061837Z MAY 87, 1p R - #210	5/6/87	P1/F1 →

RESTRICTIONS

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(5) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records
 Head of State File
File Folder: FRANCE: President Mitterrand (8491035-8791344)
 Box 11

Archivist: mjd
FOIA ID: F99-0771, Zuber
Date: 8/17/2000

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
13. letter	Reagan to Mitterrand, 2p <i>R 5/9/03 F99-0771, #211</i>	nd	P1/F1 →
14. memo	Frank Carlucci to Reagan re: message to Mitterrand, 1p <i>R - - #212</i>	5/4/87	P1/F1 →
15. letter	Mitterrand to Reagan, 2p	nd	P1/F1
16. cable	241655Z MAR 87, 4p	5/24/87	P1/F1
17. memo	Fritz Ermarth to Carlucci re: message to Mitterrand, 1p <i>R 5/9/03 F99-0771, #215</i>	5/1/87	P1/F1 →
18. memo (8791344)	Colin Powell to Reagan re: response to Mitterrand, 1p <i>R - - #216</i>	12/7/87	P1/F1 →
19. cable	071945Z DEC 87, 2p <i>L - - #217</i>	12/7/87	P1/F1 →
20. letter	Reagan to Mitterrand, 1p <i>R - - #218</i>	nd	P1/F1 →
21. cable	012145Z DEC 87, 2p	12/1/87	P1/F1
22. cable	012145Z DEC 87 (french), 3p	12/1/87	P1/F1

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 02 OCT 84 11

TO

KIMMITT

FROM MCKINLEY, B

DOC DATE 02 OCT 84

filed
To: United Kingdom
Germany (Kohl)
Japan (Nakasone)

Canada (Mulroney)
Italy (Craxi)

Australia (Hawke)
France (Mitterand)

KEYWORDS: USSR

HS

GROMYKO, ANDREI A

SUBJECT: DRAFT PRES LTR ON GROMYKO VISIT

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 03 OCT 84 STATUS S FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

SIGUR

COBB

COMMENTS ** URGENT ACTION REQUIRED

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(B / *JS*)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

McFarlane X *10/2* *For Decision*

OCT 03 1984

McFarlane approved

OCT 03 1984

Pres msg sent

PS, JM, SV, LX

DISPATCHED *SIT Room* *OCT 03 1984*

W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

F99-0771 #199

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II

91013

OUTGOING

BY CU

NARA, DATE

5/9/03

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03 THE WHITE HOUSE 4771
SIT692

DTG: 020340Z OCT 85 PSN: 014132
TOR: 275/0255Z

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OP IMMED
DE WTE #4771 2750255
O 020340Z OCT 85
FM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO THE ELYSEE PALACE

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS WH04771

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND
FROM PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN.

DEAR FRANCOIS:

NOW THAT WE HAVE SEEN THE BASIC PRESENTATION OF THE SOVIET
COUNTERPROPOSAL IN THE NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS IN GENEVA, I
WISH TO SHARE WITH YOU OUR LATEST INFORMATION AND SOME
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.

ON MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, THE SOVIET UNION PRESENTED TO THE US
DELEGATION IN JOINT PLENARY THE FOLLOWING SOVIET PROPOSALS:

- (1) A BAN ON DEVELOPMENT "INCLUDING SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH,"
TESTING, AND DEPLOYMENT OF "SPACE STRIKE ARMS" ADDING THAT
"WITHOUT MUTUAL REGULATION OF THE QUESTION OF BANNING THE
ARMS RACE IN SPACE, THE REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS
WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE;"
- (2) A 50 PERCENT REDUCTION IN EACH SIDE'S NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES
CAPABLE OF STRIKING THE TERRITORY OF THE US AND USSR, THAT IS
ICBMS, SLBMS, HEAVY BOMBERS, AND ON THE US SIDE MEDIUM RANGE
AIRCRAFT AND MISSILES, AND CARRIER-BASED AIRCRAFT, RESULTING
IN SNDV LIMITS FOR THE USSR OF 1250 AND FOR THE US OF 1680;
- (3) A MAXIMUM AGGREGATE OF 6000 "NUCLEAR CHARGES," ON THE
PERMITTED DELIVERY VEHICLES;
- (4) NO MORE THAN 60 PERCENT OF THE PERMITTED CHARGES ON ANY ONE
COMPONENT, ICBMS, SLBMS, OR "DELIVERY AIRCRAFT;"
- (5) A BAN ON ALL CRUISE MISSILES INCLUDING ALCMS;
- (6) A BAN OR SEVERE LIMITATION ON NEW TYPES OF DELIVERY
SYSTEMS;
- (7) THE DEEPEST POSSIBLE REDUCTIONS IN MEDIUM RANGE SYSTEMS
"IN ACCORD WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL
SECURITY".

ON TUESDAY, OCTOBER 1, THE SOVIET DELEGATION PRESENTED SOME
PROPOSALS FOR IMMEDIATE STEPS TO BE TAKEN BY THE TWO SIDES:

- (1) SUSPEND ALL WORK ON SPACE STRIKE ARMS AND FREEZE AND
LIMIT THE NUMBERS OF EXISTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
- (2) STOP DEPLOYMENT OF MEDIUM-RANGE SYSTEMS,
- (3) REMOVE FROM COMBAT ALERT AND DISMANTLE A PERCENTAGE OF
THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR SYSTEMS EXISTING ON A SPECIFIC DATE,
WHICH COULD INCLUDE 200 OR 300 ICBMS,
- (4) ASSUME AN OBLIGATION NOT TO PLACE NUCLEAR ARMS IN

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OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 THE WHITE HOUSE 4771 DTG: 020340Z OCT 85 PSN: 014132

NATIONS WHERE THEY ARE NOT NOW LOCATED AND TO STOP THE ADDITION OR REPLACEMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO NATIONS WHICH DO HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND

(5) ESTABLISH A MUTUAL MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR TESTING UNTIL OTHER STATES ACTIONS ARE CLARIFIED.

IN SHORT, THE BASIC PRESENTATION BY THE USSR APPARENTLY REMAINS THE SAME AS THAT PRESENTED TO YOU LAST SATURDAY BY BUD EXCEPT THAT THEY HAVE:

(A) GIVEN SOME NUMBERS FOR START: NAMELY ASYMMETRICAL SNDV LIMITS (1680 AND 1250), NUCLEAR CHARGES (6000), AND THE SINGLE FORCE ELEMENT PERCENTAGE LIMIT (60 PERCENT);

(B) ADDED TO THEIR MORATORIUM OPTION SOME ELEMENTS OF THEIR EARLIER FREEZE PROPOSAL SUCH AS A NUCLEAR TESTING MORATORIUM AND A FREEZE ON SHORT RANGE AND TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS;

(C) INTRODUCED ADDITIONAL IMMEDIATE STEPS SUCH AS INTERIM DISMANTLEMENTS OF SOME PERCENTAGE OF NUCLEAR SYSTEMS SUCH AS ICBMS AND A HALT TO DEPLOYMENT OR REPLACEMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OVERSEAS; AND

(D) RE-EMPHASIZED THEIR ORIGINAL POSITION THAT AMERICAN NUCLEAR SYSTEMS IN RANGE OF THE SOVIET UNION WILL COUNT IN START BUT THAT SOVIET SYSTEMS WHICH CAN STRIKE OUR ALLIES IN EUROPE AND ASIA ARE EXCLUDED FROM SUCH LIMITS.

SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS MAY ALSO BE OF HELP. WE BELIEVE THAT OUR STRATEGY OF BEING FIRM BUT FAIR AND EXPRESSING ALLIANCE UNITY HAS FORCED THE SOVIET UNION TO TABLE A COUNTERPROPOSAL WHICH CALLS FOR DEEP REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR ARMS. IN ALL CANDOR, HOWEVER, I MUST SAY THAT WE ARE DISAPPOINTED IN WHAT THEY HAVE PRESENTED SO FAR AND HOPE THAT THEY HAVE NOT CHOSEN TO REJECT AN OPPORTUNITY FOR REAL PROGRESS PRIOR TO MY MEETING WITH GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV. WE WILL CONTINUE TO PROBE FOR FLEXIBILITY AND REPORT TO YOU ON ANY NEW DEVELOPMENTS.

AS YOU CAN SEE, THE SOVIET PROPOSAL CUTS AT THE HEART OF EUROPEAN SECURITY. THE SOVIETS MAINTAIN THAT, AS OF 1 SEPTEMBER 1985, THEY HAVE 2504 ACCOUNTABLE SYSTEMS AND THAT WE HAVE "APPROXIMATELY 3360" WHICH THEY HAVE ITEMIZED AS 2215 ICBMS, SLBMS, AND HEAVY BOMBERS, 209 MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES, 380 MEDIUM-RANGE AIRCRAFT IN EUROPE AND ASIA, AND 560 CARRIER BASED AIRCRAFT, FOR A TOTAL OF 3364. THEY WOULD HAVE US SACRIFICE A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF OUR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES AND WEAPONS IN ORDER TO DEPLOY OVERSEAS OUR DUAL CAPABLE AIRCRAFT. HOWEVER, THEY WOULD NOT LIMIT THEIR OWN MORE NUMEROUS, COMPARABLE SYSTEMS WHICH POSE A THREAT TO OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES OVERSEAS. ALTHOUGH THEIR FORMAL COUNTERPROPOSAL HAS NOT EXPLICITLY NAMED THE INDEPENDENT FORCES OF FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN. WE BELIEVE THAT THE CONTINUED REFERENCE TO THE SOVIET PRINCIPLE OF "EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY" MEANS THAT THEY EXPECT ADDITIONAL SOVIET NUCLEAR FORCES TO MATCH YOUR FORCES AND THOSE OF GREAT BRITAIN. VERY QUICKLY, WHAT IS ANNOUNCED AS AN EQUAL PROPOSAL BECOMES A VERY UNEQUAL PROPOSAL AIMED AT DESTROYING THE MUTUAL SECURITY OF THE ALLIANCE.

FURTHERMORE, THE PROPOSAL DOES NOT APPEAR TO DISTINGUISH IN ANY EFFECTIVE WAY BETWEEN DESTABILIZING SYSTEMS SUCH AS FAST-FLYING BALLISTIC MISSILES AND STABILIZING SYSTEMS SUCH AS SLOW-FLYING BOMBERS. IN ADDITION, THE PROPOSAL ATTEMPTS

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TO STOP OR LIMIT MODERNIZATION OF NUCLEAR SYSTEMS IN A MANNER WHICH FAVORS THE SOVIET UNION, THAT IS, IT WOULD PERMIT THE SOVIET MOBILE SS-24 AND 25 MISSILES BUT WOULD PREVENT DEPLOYMENT OF THE U.S. TRIDENT D-5, MIDGETMAN, AND "STEALTH BOMBER". THE OVERALL IMPACT OF THEIR PROPOSAL WOULD BE DANGEROUSLY DESTABILIZING. WE ARE ALSO DISAPPOINTED AT THE INTRODUCTION OF A NUMBER OF ESSENTIALLY PROPAGANDISTIC ELEMENTS. CLEARLY, WE HAVE A TOUGH NEGOTIATION AHEAD. AT THE SAME TIME, WE WILL CONTINUE TO DO OUR VERY BEST TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS.

YOUR SUPPORT IS ESSENTIAL IN THAT REGARD, AND THERE ARE A NUMBER OF OTHER ISSUES HERE THAT ARE OF SPECIAL INTEREST TO YOU. FOR EXAMPLE, THEY HAVE SAID THAT THEIR NUCLEAR TESTING MORATORIUM WOULD BE DEPENDENT UPON "CLARIFICATION" OF ACTIONS OF OTHER STATES, AN APPARENT REFERENCE TO TESTING SUCH AS IS CONDUCTED BY YOUR COUNTRY. ALSO, ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET PRESENTATION ON INF HAS BEEN VAGUE THUS FAR, THE HEAD OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION MADE A PUBLIC STATEMENT ON MONDAY REFERENCING YOUR FORCES AND THOSE OF THE BRITISH. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV MAY PRESENT TO YOU SOME STATEMENTS OR INITIATIVES IN THESE AREAS. I RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF ESPECIALLY CLOSE CONSULTATIONS, SO I HOPE THIS INFORMATION WILL BE TIMELY AND OF USE TO YOU.

SINCERELY,

RONALD REAGAN

PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND
ELYSEE, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
PARIS, FRANCE
1174

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

System II
91013

1 October 1985

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: RON LEHMAN/BOB *RL* LINHARD/SVEN KRAEMER *SK*

SUBJECT: Letter to Mitterrand

Attached for you to send this evening is the letter to President Mitterrand tasked at today's SACG. The letter details the Soviet arms control and then provides some general comments leading him to some conclusions, but not forcing them. It is now a letter from the President.

Recommendation

That you approve the attached letter on the President's behalf and have it sent as a cable this evening.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Jack Matlock, Ty Cobb concur.

Attachments:

Tab A Presidents letter to Mitterrand

NOTE: Also attached (Tab B) is the cable to diplomatic posts. One other cable is in work -- near release -- that addresses the public affairs themes.

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Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED
NLS 799-0771, #20
BY CW NARA, DATE 5/9/13

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VIA PRIVACY CHANNEL

Dear Francois:

Now that we have seen the basic presentation of the Soviet counterproposal in the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva, I wish to share with you our latest information and some preliminary observations.

On Monday, September 30, the Soviet Union presented to the US Delegation in Joint Plenary the following Soviet proposals:

(1) a ban on development "including scientific research," testing, and deployment of "space strike arms" adding that "without mutual regulation of the question of banning the arms race in space, the reduction of strategic nuclear arms would be impossible;"

(2) a 50% reduction in each side's nuclear delivery vehicles capable of striking the territory of the US and USSR, that is ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers, and on the US side medium range aircraft and missiles, and carrier-based aircraft, resulting in SNDV limits for the USSR of 1250 and for the US of 1680;

(3) a maximum aggregate of 6000 "nuclear charges," on the permitted delivery vehicles;

(4) no more than 60% of the permitted charges on any one component, ICBMs, SLBMs, or "delivery aircraft;"

(5) a ban on all cruise missiles including ALCMs;

(6) a ban or severe limitation on new types of delivery systems;

(7) the deepest possible reductions in medium range systems "in accord with the principle of equality and equal security".

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Declassify on: OADR

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BY

caj

NARA, DATE

5/9/03

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NLS 799-077/1 #001

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On Tuesday, October 1, the Soviet delegation presented some proposals for immediate steps to be taken by the two sides:

- (1) suspend all work on space strike arms and freeze and limit the numbers of existing nuclear weapons,
- (2) stop deployment of medium-range systems,
- (3) remove from combat alert and dismantle a percentage of the number of nuclear systems existing on a specific date, which could include 200 or 300 ICBMs,
- (4) assume an obligation not to place nuclear arms in nations where they are not now located and to stop the addition or replacement of nuclear weapons into nations which do have nuclear weapons, and
- (5) establish a mutual moratorium on nuclear testing until other states actions are clarified.

In short, the basic presentation by the USSR apparently remains the same except that they have:

(a) given some numbers for START; namely asymmetrical SNDV limits (1680 and 1250), nuclear charges (6000), and the single force element percentage limit (60%);

(b) added to their moratorium option some elements of their earlier freeze proposal such as a nuclear testing moratorium and a freeze on short range and tactical nuclear weapons;

(c) introduced additional immediate steps such as interim dismantlements of some percentage of nuclear systems such as ICBMs and a halt to deployment or replacement of nuclear weapons overseas; and

(d) re-emphasized their original position that American nuclear systems in range of the Soviet Union will count in START but that Soviet systems which can strike our Allies in Europe and Asia are excluded from such limits.

Some preliminary observations may also be of help. We believe that our strategy of being firm but fair and expressing Alliance unity has forced the Soviet Union to table a counterproposal which calls for deep reductions in nuclear arms. In all candor, however, I must say that we are disappointed in what they have presented so far and hope that they have not chosen to reject an opportunity for real progress prior to my meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev. We will continue to probe for flexibility and report to you on any new developments.

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As you can see, the Soviet proposal cuts at the heart of European security. The Soviets maintain that, as of 1 September 1985, they have 2504 accountable systems and that we have "approximately 3360" which they have itemized as 2215 ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, 209 medium-range missiles, 380 medium-range aircraft in Europe and Asia, and 560 carrier based aircraft, for a total of 3364. They would have us sacrifice a substantial number of our strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and weapons in order to deploy overseas our dual capable aircraft. However, they would not limit their own more numerous, comparable systems which pose a threat to our friends and Allies overseas. Although their formal counterproposal has not explicitly named the independent forces of France and Great Britain, we believe that the continued reference to the Soviet principle of "equality and equal security" means that they expect additional Soviet nuclear forces to match your forces and those of Great Britain. Very quickly, what is announced as an equal proposal becomes a very unequal proposal aimed at destroying the mutual security of the Alliance.

Furthermore, the proposal does not appear to distinguish in any effective way between destabilizing systems such as fast-flying ballistic missiles and stabilizing systems such as slow-flying bombers. In addition, the proposal attempts to stop or limit modernization of nuclear systems in a manner which favors the Soviet Union. The overall impact of their proposal would be dangerously destabilizing. We are also disappointed at the introduction of a number of essentially propagandistic elements. Clearly, we have a tough negotiation ahead. At the same time, we will continue to do our very best to achieve progress.

Your support is essential in that regard, and there are a number of other issues here that are of special interest to you. For example, they have said that their nuclear testing moratorium would be dependent upon "clarification" of actions of other states, an apparent reference to testing such as is conducted by your country. Also, although the Soviet presentation on INF has been vague thus far, the Head of the Soviet delegation made a public statement on Monday referencing your forces and those of the British. It is possible that General Secretary Gorbachev may present to you some statements or initiatives in these areas. I recognize the importance of especially close consultations, so I hope this information will be timely and of use to you.

Sincerely,

President Francois Mitterrand
Elysee, Office of the President
Paris, France

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IMMEDIATE ANATO, TOKYO IMMEDIATE, CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
IMMEDIATE MOSCOW, NST GENEVA IMMEDIATE

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: US, UR, PARM

SUBJECT: INFORMING THE ALLIES OF SOVIET COUNTERPROPOSAL IN
GENEVA NST NEGOTIATIONS

REF: NST GENEVA 9029, NST GENEVA 9053

1. ~~SECRET~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY OF THE SOVIET COUNTERPROPOSAL UNVEILED TO DATE. The Soviet Union formally tabled their counterproposal in the Nuclear and Space Talks on September 30 and October 1. Posts have been provided the reporting cables referenced above SEPTTEL for internal background information only. In order to permit diplomatic briefing on a close-hold basis, the following summarization of the counterproposal is provided:

-- Ban development "including scientific research," testing, and deployment of space strike arms. Suspend all work on space strike arms and freeze and limit the numbers of existing nuclear weapons.

-- Implement a 50% reduction in each side's nuclear delivery vehicles capable of striking the territory of the US and USSR, that is ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers, and on the US side medium range aircraft and missiles, and carrier-based aircraft, resulting by their definition and estimation in SNDV limits for the USSR of 1250 and for the US of 1680. In this connection the Soviets maintain that, as of 1 September 1985, they have 2504 accountable systems and that we have "approximately 3360" which they itemize as 2215 ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, 209 medium-range missiles, 380 medium-range aircraft in Europe and Asia, and 560 carrier based aircraft, for a total of 3364.

-- Remove from combat alert and dismantle a percentage of the number of nuclear systems existing on a specific date, which could include 200 or 300 ICBMs.

-- Permit a maximum aggregate of 6000 "nuclear charges," on the permitted delivery vehicles.

-- Permit no more than 60% of the permitted charges on any one component, ICBMs, SLBMs, or "delivery aircraft."

-- Ban all cruise missiles, including ALCMs.

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NLS 799-0771 #202
BY CS NARA, DATE 5/9/03

- Ban or severely limit new types of delivery systems.
- Stop deployment of medium-range systems, followed by the deepest possible reductions in medium range systems.
- Refrain from deploying any nuclear arms on the territories of states where none now exist. Refrain from building up the stockpiles, or replacing with new weapons, nuclear arms in countries where such weapons are already deployed.
- Establish a mutual moratorium on nuclear testing until other states actions are clarified.

3. POSTS SHOULD PASS INFORMATION OUTLINING NEW SOVIET COUNTERPROPOSAL SUMMARIZED IN PARA 2 TO APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICIALS AND SCG REPRESENTATIVES OF HOST GOVERNMENTS AND NATO SYG CARRINGTON'S OFFICE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IN DOING SO, POSTS SHOULD ALSO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- WE FELT THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO PROVIDE FOR YOU A SENSE OF WHAT THE SOVIET UNION IS CURRENTLY PRESENTING AT THE BARGAINING TABLE IN GENEVA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

-- WE THINK THAT EVEN WITHOUT PROVIDING ANY DETAILED ANALYSIS OF WHAT HAS BEEN PUT ON THE TABLE THUS FAR, YOU CAN SEE THAT WHAT HAS BEEN PROVIDED CONTAINS MANIFOLD PROBLEMS.

-- AT THE SAME TIME, WE MUST VIEW THIS AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF FIVE YEARS OF SOVIET INTRASIGENCE. VIEWED IN THIS LIGHT, OUR (FOR NATO: NATO) STRATEGY HAS WORKED. WHILE THE COUNTERPROPOSAL IS CLEARLY INEQUITABLE, THE SOVIETS ARE AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE WITH PROPOSALS.

-- WE WILL ATTEMPT TO TURN THIS DISAPPOINTING SOVIET PROPOSAL INTO AN OPPORTUNITY TO DRAW THE SOVIETS INTO SERIOUS NEGOTIATION.

-- THEREFORE, WHILE WE WILL CERTAINLY BE PREPARED TO REBUT SOVIET ASSERTIONS MADE PUBLICLY, WE WILL TRY TO MAKE THE PRIMARY FORA FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE SOVIETS THE CONFIDENTIAL NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA.

-- AS A RESULT, IT WILL BECOME EVEN MORE IMPORTANT FOR ALLIES TO BE PREPARED TO EXPLAIN OUR POSITION TO THEIR PUBLICS, AND WE INVITE ALLIED PUBLIC COMMENTS ON THE FLAWS OF THE APPROACH THE SOVIETS HAVE CHOSEN TO TAKE, TO WHIT:

-- INCLUSION IN PROPOSED LIMITS SYSTEMS WHICH, WHILE CAPABLE OF REACHING THE SOVIET UNION, ARE CLEARLY DESIGNED TO DEFEND (FOR NATO: NATO) (FOR OTHERS: ALLIES), WHILE EXCLUDING FROM PROPOSED LIMITS SOVIET SYSTEMS THAT ARE PRIMARILY DESIGNED TO THREATEN (FOR NATO: NATO) (FOR OTHERS, ALLIES).

-- ALLOWS SOVIETS TO RETAIN NEWLY MODERNIZED FORCES WHILE ATTEMPTING TO BLOCK U.S. STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION (FOR NATO: AND THE MODERNIZATION ANTICIPATED IN THE MONTEBELLO DECISION WHICH PERMITS SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN THE OVERALL NATO NUCLEAR STOCKPILE)

-- THE ABOVE ARE SIMPLY PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.

-- THE SEPTEMBER 30TH AND OCTOBER 1ST PLENARY SESSIONS AT WHICH THIS SOVIET POSITION WAS PRESENTED DID NOT PROVIDE FOR FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS BY THE U.S. DELEGATION AND WE EXPECT TO LEARN MORE ABOUT THE SOVIET COUNTERPROPOSAL THROUGH POST-PLENARY DISCUSSION OVER THE COMING DAYS.

-- THIS IS A ROUGH SUMMARIZATION OF OUR CURRENT UNDERSTANDING OF THE SOVIET COUNTERPROPOSAL. A MORE DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WILL BE PROVIDED SHORTLY.

4. IN ADDITION, WHEN MAKING THEIR PRESENTATIONS TO HOST GOVERNMENTS, POSTS SHOULD:

-- STRESS THE SPECIAL SENSITIVITY OF THIS INFORMATION AND NECESSITY FOR ITS CONTINUED TREATMENT ON A CLOSE HOLD BASIS.

-- REAFFIRM THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE ALLIES AS FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS ARISE IN THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS.

DM

National Security Council
The White House

86 JUL 18 9:13

System # _____
Package # 90535
DOCLOS DM AIO _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
Rodney McDaniel	<u>2</u>	<u>M</u> ⁷⁻¹⁹	
Don Fortier			
Paul Thompson	<u>3</u>	<u>T</u>	
Florence Gantt			
John Poindexter	<u>4</u>		<u>A</u>
Rodney McDaniel			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
<u>WSCIS</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>PA</u>	<u>N</u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other WRP

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Cable has been dispatched

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 18 JUL 86 21

TO POINDEXTER

FROM NORTH

msg 8/17/00

DOCDATE 18 JUL 86

EARL

18 JUL 86

COY

18 JUL 86

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

TERRORISM

MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

ABDALLAH, GEORGES I

HS

SUBJECT: PRIVACY CHANNEL MSG TO PRES MITTERRAND RE RAY CASE

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR DECISION

DUE: 21 JUL 86 STATUS X

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(J / *27*)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

- 7/19 POINDEXTER APPROVED

C 7/19 CABLE SENT VIA SIT ROOM

*OLN' WFP-
CHRON*

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

(C)

~~SECRET~~

*Released
Carmichael*

FM: WHITE HOUSE
TO: AMEMB PARIS

~~SECRET~~ //SEND VIA PRIVACY CHANNEL EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR
FOR DELIVERY TO FRANCOIS BUJON DE ESTANG

SUBJECT: LTC RAY CASE ~~(S)~~

1. ~~SECRET~~--ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS:

AS YOU WILL RECALL, GEORGES IBRAHIM ABDALLAH, LEADER OF THE
TERRORIST ORGANIZATION LEBANESE ARMED REVOLUTIONARY FACTION
(LARF), HAS BEEN CHARGED IN PARIS AS AN ACCOMPLICE IN THE JANUARY
1982 MURDER OF LTC CHARLES RAY, ASSISTANT ARMY ATTACHE AT THE
U.S. EMBASSY. THE PRESIDENT WOULD LIKE FOR PRESIDENT MITTERRAND
AND PM CHIRAC TO UNDERSTAND THAT WE ARE CONFIDENT, DESPITE RUMORS
TO THE CONTRARY, THAT THE ASSURANCES GIVEN GEORGE SHULTZ ON THIS
MATTER ARE FIRM AND THAT ABDALLAH, WHO WAS RECENTLY CONVICTED OF
OTHER CRIMINAL CHARGES AND SENTENCED TO FOUR YEARS IMPRISONMENT
IN LYON, WILL NOT BE RELEASED FROM FRENCH CUSTODY BEFORE
COMPETENT LEGAL AUTHORITIES FROM BOTH OUR COUNTRIES HAVE ADEQUATE
OPPORTUNITY TO ASSESS ALL EVIDENCE THAT CAN BE OBTAINED REGARDING
CHARGES AGAINST HIM IN PARIS.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

F99-0771 #203

BY

CIS

NARA, DATE 5/9/03

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS JOINED THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S CASE AGAINST ABDALLAH AS A CIVIL PARTY IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO COOPERATE MORE FULLY IN LEGAL MEASURES AVAILABLE IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES TO TO COMBAT TERRORISM. THE PRESIDENT BELIEVES THIS CASE, INVOLVING SUCH A HEINOUS ACT AND SUCH A DANGEROUS ORGANIZATION AS THE LARF, IS AN IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY TO DEMONSTRATE THAT DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES HAVE THE CAPABILITY AND THE WILL TO SEE THAT JUSTICE IS CARRIED OUT FAIRLY AND FULLY AGAINST THOSE CHARGED WITH COMMITTING TERRORIST ACTS.

WARM REGARDS, RON.

END TEXT.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FM: WHITE HOUSE
TO: THE ELYSEE

*Released
19 Jul 82*

~~SECRET~~ //SEND VIA BLUE CHANNEL EYES ONLY FOR JEAN LOUIS
BIANCO FROM ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS JOHN POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: LTC RAY CASE (~~S~~)

1. SECRET--ENTIRE TEXT.
2. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR JEAN LOUIS:

AS YOU WILL RECALL, GEORGES IBRAHIM ABDALLAH, LEADER OF THE
TERRORIST ORGANIZATION LEBANESE ARMED REVOLUTIONARY FACTION
(LARF), HAS BEEN CHARGED IN PARIS AS AN ACCOMPLICE IN THE JANUARY
1982 MURDER OF LTC CHARLES RAY, ASSISTANT ARMY ATTACHE AT THE
U.S. EMBASSY. THE PRESIDENT WOULD LIKE FOR PRESIDENT MITTERRAND
AND PM CHIRAC TO UNDERSTAND THAT WE ARE CONFIDENT, DESPITE RUMORS
TO THE CONTRARY, THAT THE ASSURANCES GIVEN GEORGE SHULTZ ON THIS
MATTER ARE FIRM AND THAT ABDALLAH, WHO WAS RECENTLY CONVICTED OF
OTHER CRIMINAL CHARGES AND SENTENCED TO FOUR YEARS IMPRISONMENT
IN LYON, WILL NOT BE RELEASED FROM FRENCH CUSTODY BEFORE
COMPETENT LEGAL AUTHORITIES FROM BOTH OUR COUNTRIES HAVE ADEQUATE
OPPORTUNITY TO ASSESS ALL EVIDENCE THAT CAN BE OBTAINED REGARDING
CHARGES AGAINST HIM IN PARIS.

DECLASSIFIED
NLS #99-07711-#204
BY CR NARA, DATE 5/9/03

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS JOINED THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S CASE AGAINST ABDALLAH AS A CIVIL PARTY IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO COOPERATE MORE FULLY IN LEGAL MEASURES AVAILABLE IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES TO TO COMBAT TERRORISM. THE PRESIDENT BELIEVES THIS CASE, INVOLVING SUCH A HEINOUS ACT AND SUCH A DANGEROUS ORGANIZATION AS THE LARF, IS AN IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY TO DEMONSTRATE THAT DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES HAVE THE CAPABILITY AND THE WILL TO SEE THAT JUSTICE IS CARRIED OUT FAIRLY AND FULLY AGAINST THOSE CHARGED WITH COMMITTING TERRORIST ACTS.

WARM REGARDS, JOHN.

END TEXT.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F99-077/1 #205
BY CIS, NARA, DATE 5/9/03

FM: WHITE HOUSE

TO: THE ELYSEE

for Jean Louis Bianco

to Amb for delivery to Boston (check full name)

SEND VIA BLUE CHANNEL

PRIVACY CHANNEL

~~SECRET~~ // EYES ONLY FOR *JEAN LOUIS BIANCO* ~~PRESIDENT MITTERRAND FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN~~

SUBJECT: LIEUTENANT COLONEL RAY CASE ~~(TS)~~

1. ~~SECRET~~--ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

JEAN LOUIS
DEAR FRANCOIS:

AS YOU MAY RECALL, GEORGES IBRAHIM ABDALLAH, LEADER OF THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION LEBANESE ARMED REVOLUTIONARY FACTION (LARF), HAS BEEN CHARGED IN PARIS AS AN ACCOMPLICE IN THE JANUARY 1982 MURDER OF LTCOL CHARLES RAY, ASSISTANT ARMY ATTACHE AT THE U.S. EMBASSY. *The President would like for President Mitterrand and Mr. Chirac to understand that we are* I AM CONFIDENT, DESPITE RUMORS TO THE CONTRARY, THAT THE ASSURANCES GIVEN GEORGE SHULTZ ON THIS MATTER ARE FIRM AND THAT ABDALLAH, WHO WAS RECENTLY CONVICTED OF OTHER CRIMINAL CHARGES AND SENTENCED TO FOUR YEARS IMPRISONMENT IN LYON, WILL NOT BE RELEASED FROM FRENCH CUSTODY BEFORE COMPETENT LEGAL AUTHORITIES FROM BOTH OUR COUNTRIES HAVE ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY TO ASSESS ALL EVIDENCE THAT CAN BE OBTAINED REGARDING CHARGES AGAINST HIM IN PARIS.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS JOINED THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S
CASE AGAINST ABDALLAH AS A CIVIL PARTY IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO
COOPERATE MORE FULLY IN LEGAL MEASURES AVAILABLE IN DEMOCRATIC
SOCIETIES TO COMBAT TERRORISM. *The Secret & believes*
I BELIEVE THIS CASE, INVOLVING
SUCH A HEINOUS ACT AND SUCH A DANGEROUS ORGANIZATION AS THE LARF,
IS AN IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY TO DEMONSTRATE THAT DEMOCRATIC
SOCIETIES HAVE THE CAPABILITY AND THE WILL TO SEE THAT JUSTICE IS
CARRIED OUT FAIRLY AND FULLY AGAINST THOSE CHARGED WITH
COMMITTING TERRORIST ACTS.

WARM REGARDS, ~~RON.~~ *John*

END TEXT.

~~SECRET~~

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 8 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

TAB
I

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 9 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

TAB

II

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 10 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 01 MAY 87 18

TO CARLUCCI

FROM COBB

msg 8/17/82

DOCDATE 01 MAY 87

ERMARTH

01 MAY 87

CARLUCCI

04 MAY 87

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

USSR

MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

ARMS CONTROL

HS

SUBJECT: PRIVACY CHANNEL MSG TO MITTERRAND RE ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR DECISION

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CARLUCCI

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(J / H)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

Pres

?

5/4

For Decision

—

5/5

Pres approved Recon

C

5/7

MSG Sent via WH812

TC, Chron

—

5/8

MSG Sent to Amb Rodgers

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

(C)

**National Security Council
The White House**

System # _____
 Package # 90443
 DOCLOG M AIO _____

87 MAY 5 7:16

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	1	P	review
Marybel Batjer	_____	_____	_____
Grant Green	_____	_____	_____
Colin Powell	_____	_____	_____
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Frank Carlucci	_____	_____	_____
Grant Green	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	2	20W.5/7	N
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	2A	✓	D
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
-----------------	------------	------------	--------------	-----------------------

cc: VP Baker Other _____

COMMENTS _____
 Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

date 5/5/87

Please close -
msg sent by
WHSR,

Paul Hetras

5/8

Please send copy of msg to
M. Henand to Amb. Roges via
private channel.

Bob

THE WHITE HOUSE Receiver 03

WASHINGTON MAY 4 1987 10:00

May 4, 1987

Processed by room 05/05/87

RR

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: *for* FRANK C. CARLUCCI *CH*

SUBJECT: Privacy Channel Message to President Mitterrand

Issue

How to reply to President Mitterrand's letter that he sent on the eve of Secretary Shultz' departure to Moscow.

Fact

President Mitterrand sent you a privacy channel message laying out his views on how we might respond to the probable Soviet arms control proposals Gorbachev is likely to present to Secretary Shultz. You reviewed that message and drew on it in providing instructions to George.

Discussion

Although you acknowledged receiving this message in the letter you sent in early April to Mitterrand and other Heads of State/ Government I would recommend that you follow that up with a privacy channel response. As you know Mitterrand is extremely sensitive to receiving replies from you, and given the thoughtful and lengthy message he sent we have drafted a personal reply from you. Mitterrand's incoming is at Tab B and a draft response for your approval is at Tab A.

Recommendation

<u>OK</u>	<u>No</u>	That you approve release of the privacy channel message at Tab A to Mitterrand.
<i>RR</i>	_____	

Prepared by:
Tyrus W. Cobb

Attachment

- Tab A Privacy Channel Message to Mitterrand cc Vice President
- Tab B Incoming Message

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 799-0771 #212
BY CS NARA, DATE 5/9/83

TOP SECRET

SYSTEM II
90443

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

PRT: COMM
SIT: WHSR_OUT WHSR_SPECIAL

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~TOP SECRET~~ <DTG> 081639Z MAY 87

FM WHITE HOUSE

~~TOP SECRET~~ PARIS

~~TOP SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE PASS TO AMBASSADOR RODGERS FROM FRANK CARLUCCI. THE FOLLOWING LETTER WAS SENT TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN ON MAY 5, 1987.

BEGIN TEXT

DEAR FRANCOIS,

I KNOW YOU HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED MY LETTER WRITTEN ON THE EVE OF SECRETARY SHULTZ' TRIP TO MOSCOW. IN THAT LETTER I WANTED TO SHARE MY THOUGHTS ON THE MAJOR ISSUES IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

I ALSO WANTED TO WRITE YOU PRIVATELY TO UNDERSCORE HOW MUCH I APPRECIATED RECEIVING THE INCISIVE THOUGHTS REFLECTED IN YOUR MARCH 24 MESSAGE. AS WE PREPARED FOR THE SECRETARY'S TRIP, IT WAS VERY HELPFUL TO HAVE YOUR VIEWS AND WISE COUNSEL, WHICH AS ALWAYS WERE SO CLEARLY EXPRESSED.

I WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN YOUR PERCEPTION THAT THERE IS A CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS ON STRATEGIC ISSUES AMONG OTHER EUROPEAN LEADERS. LIKE YOU, I REMAIN CONVINCED THAT IF WE ARE FIRM IN OUR DETERMINATION TO SET A REALISTIC COURSE FOR OUR POLICIES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION, WE CAN MAKE A PROMISING STEP TOWARD PEACE AND STABILITY. I TOO AM CONVINCED THAT WE HAVE SET THE RIGHT COURSE AND ARE INDEED MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.

GEORGE SHULTZ DID A MARVELOUS JOB IN MOSCOW AND I AM HOPEFUL THAT WE HAVE INDEED REACHED A TURNING POINT IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. I TRULY BELIEVE, FRANCOIS, THAT WITHOUT YOUR LEADERSHIP WE WOULD NOT BE IN THIS POSITION. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN MANY YEARS, THERE APPEARS TO BE REAL MOVEMENT ON THE SOVIET SIDE. TO BE SURE, WE STILL HAVE A LONG WAY TO GO BUT I AM HOPEFUL THAT GENUINE PROGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL AND OTHER ISSUES CAN NOW BE MADE.

AS YOU ARE AWARE, NATO CONSULTATIONS ARE WELL UNDERWAY, AND WE ARE ALL ASSESSING THE WAY FORWARD. GEORGE SHULTZ AND FRANK CARLUCCI TOLD ME THAT FOREIGN MINISTER RAIMOND'S VISIT WAS VERY USEFUL IN SETTING FORTH FRENCH VIEWS. ONCE WE HAVE COMPLETED A MORE DETAILED REVIEW, I WILL BE WRITING YOU AGAIN TO SHARE OUR PERCEPTIONS WITH YOU. FOR NOW, I WANT TO THANK YOU AS AN ALLY AND A FRIEND AND TO LET YOU KNOW HOW MUCH I APPRECIATE YOUR ADVICE AND COUNSEL.

RON

END TEXT

#0067

FOIA(b) (1)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS EQ9-077/1 #209

By CU NARA, Date 5/9/03

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

SYSTEM II
90443

PAGE 01

PRT: COMM COPY

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~TOP SECRET~~ <DTG> 061837Z MAY 87

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO ELYSEE PARIS FRANCE

~~TOP SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO
PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND.

MAY 5, 1987

DEAR FRANCOIS,

I KNOW YOU HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED MY LETTER WRITTEN ON THE EVE OF
SECRETARY SHULTZ' TRIP TO MOSCOW. IN THAT LETTER I WANTED TO
SHARE MY THOUGHTS ON THE MAJOR ISSUES IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH
THE SOVIET UNION.

I ALSO WANTED TO WRITE YOU PRIVATELY TO UNDERSCORE HOW MUCH I
APPRECIATED RECEIVING THE INCISIVE THOUGHTS REFLECTED IN YOUR
MARCH 24 MESSAGE. AS WE PREPARED FOR THE SECRETARY'S TRIP, IT
WAS VERY HELPFUL TO HAVE YOUR VIEWS AND WISE COUNSEL, WHICH AS
ALWAYS WERE SO CLEARLY EXPRESSED.

I WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN YOUR PERCEPTION THAT THERE IS A
CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS ON STRATEGIC ISSUES AMONG OTHER EUROPEAN
LEADERS. LIKE YOU, I REMAIN CONVINCED THAT IF WE ARE FIRM IN OUR
DETERMINATION TO SET A REALISTIC COURSE FOR OUR POLICIES TOWARD
THE SOVIET UNION, WE CAN MAKE A PROMISING STEP TOWARD PEACE AND
STABILITY. I TOO AM CONVINCED THAT WE HAVE SET THE RIGHT COURSE
AND ARE INDEED MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.

GEORGE SHULTZ DID A MARVELOUS JOB IN MOSCOW AND I AM HOPEFUL THAT
WE HAVE INDEED REACHED A TURNING POINT IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. I
TRULY BELIEVE, FRANCOIS, THAT WITHOUT YOUR LEADERSHIP WE WOULD
NOT BE IN THIS POSITION. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN MANY YEARS,
THERE APPEARS TO BE REAL MOVEMENT ON THE SOVIET SIDE. TO BE
SURE, WE STILL HAVE A LONG WAY TO GO BUT I AM HOPEFUL THAT
GENUINE PROGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL AND OTHER ISSUES CAN NOW BE
MADE.

AS YOU ARE AWARE, NATO CONSULTATIONS ARE WELL UNDERWAY AND WE ARE
ALL ASSESSING THE WAY FORWARD. GEORGE SHULTZ AND FRANK CARLUCCI
TOLD ME THAT FOREIGN MINISTER RAIMOND'S VISIT WAS VERY USEFUL IN
SETTING FORTH FRENCH VIEWS. ONCE WE HAVE COMPLETED A MORE
DETAILED REVIEW, I WILL BE WRITING YOU AGAIN TO SHARE OUR
PERCEPTIONS WITH YOU. FOR NOW, I WANT TO THANK YOU AS AN ALLY
AND A FRIEND AND TO LET YOU KNOW HOW MUCH I APPRECIATE YOUR
ADVICE AND COUNSEL.

RON

#0063

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 799-0771 #210
BY CIS, NARA, DATE 5/9/03

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

FROM: PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN
WHITE HOUSE

TO: PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND
ELYSEE, PARIS, FRANCE

~~T O P S E C R E T~~ SEND VIA BLUE CHANNELS

Dear Francois,

I know you have already received my letter written on the eve of Secretary Shultz' trip to Moscow. In that letter I wanted to share my thoughts on the major issues in our relationship with the Soviet Union.

I also wanted to write you privately to underscore how much I appreciated receiving the incisive thoughts reflected in your March 24 message. As we prepared for the Secretary's trip, it was very helpful to have your views and wise counsel, which as always were so clearly expressed.

I was particularly interested in your perception that there is a convergence of views on strategic issues among other European leaders. Like you, I remain convinced that if we are firm in our determination to set a realistic course for our policies toward the Soviet Union, we can make a promising step toward peace and stability. I too am convinced that we have set the right course and are indeed moving in the right direction.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F99-077/0#211
BY OLS NARA, DATE 5/9/03

Historical File

George Shultz did a marvelous job in Moscow and I am hopeful that we have indeed reached a turning point in our relationship. I truly believe, Francois, that without your leadership we would not be in this position. For the first time in many years, there appears to be real movement on the Soviet side. To be sure, we still have a long way to go but I am hopeful that genuine progress on arms control and other issues can now be made.

As you are aware, NATO consultations are well underway and we are all assessing the way forward. George Shultz and Frank Carlucci told me that Foreign Minister Raimond's visit was very useful in setting forth French views. Once we have completed a more detailed review, I will be writing you again to share our perceptions with you. For now, I want to thank you as an ally and a friend and to let you know how much I appreciate your advice and counsel.

Ronald

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 15-16 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

National Security Council
The White House

DM

System # _____

Package # 90443

DOCLOG DM A/O _____

87 MAY 1 P 6: 23

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>
Marybel Batjer			
Grant Green	<u>2</u>	<u>BT</u>	
Colin Powell	<u>3</u>	<u>BT</u>	
Paul Thompson	<u>4</u>	<u>BT</u>	
Frank Carlucci	<u>5</u>	<u>BT</u>	<u>A</u>
Grant Green			
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>	<u>DM5/4</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I = Information **A = Action** R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Baker Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

SIGNED

May 1, 1987

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK C. CARLUCCI

FROM: FRITZ W. ERMARTH *FE*

SUBJECT: Privacy Channel Message to Mitterrand

Mitterrand sent the President a very thoughtful letter, via the privacy channel, just prior to Secretary Shultz' departure for Moscow. In his letter, Mitterrand was generally supportive of the President's position and emphasized Alliance solidarity in dealing with the Soviet Union.

As you will recall, the President sent all the Allied leaders a message prior to Shultz' departure. While the Secretary also briefed the Allies in Brussels, we believe that a personal reply from the President to Mitterrand would be helpful in our management of U.S.-French relations. As you know Mitterrand is very sensitive to receiving replies to his correspondence with the President.

Bob Linhard *BL*, Nelson Ledsky *NL*, Peter Sommer *PS* and State ^{the gov} concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Tab I memorandum, forwarding a suggested reply for the President's approval.

Approve *✓*

Disapprove _____

Prepared by: *TCW*
Tyrus W. Cobb

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Presidential Reply to Mitterrand
- Tab ~~B~~ Incoming from Mitterrand

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 799-077/1 #215
BY CS NARA DATE 5/9/03

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 14 MAY 87 21

TO CARLUCCI

FROM ERMARTH

W-DM 8/17/0

DOCDATE 14 MAY 87

LEDSKY

14 MAY 87

CARLUCCI

15 MAY 87

KEYWORDS: BERLIN

GREAT BRITAIN

THATCHER, MARGARET

FRANCE

USSR

MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

HS

W. Thatcher

SUBJECT: PRIVACY CHANNEL MSGS TO MITTERRAND & THATCHER TO OBTAIN VIEWS RE BERLIN AIR CORRIDOR ACCESS

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR DECISION

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CARLUCCI

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(J / T)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	C 5/19	Obtain Sgd Memo (2)		NCL Chan
	- 5/19	NFAR per Pearson (1)		

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 07 DEC 07 00

TO POWELL

FROM ERMARTH

*WJH
8/14/00*

DOCDATE 04 DEC 87

COBB

04 DEC 87

POWELL

07 DEC 87

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

HS

MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

USSR SUMMIT

INF

ARMS CONTROL

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO PRES MITTERRAND RE SUMMIT

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR SIG

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

POWELL

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(A / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Pres</i>	<i>P 12/07</i>	<i>Signature</i>		<i>VP, ITB</i>
	<i>C 12/07</i>	<i>Pres sgd msg</i>		
	<i>C 12/07</i>	<i>msg sent by Sgt Rom</i>		<i>FWE, TC</i>

DISPATCH *gd*

W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

**National Security Council
The White House**

ED

87 DEC 7 P2:12

System # _____
 Package # 91344
 DOCLOG SP AIO _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Courtney	<u>1</u>	<u>WTR</u>	<u>A-review</u>
Marybel Batjer	_____	_____	_____
Paul Stevens	_____	_____	_____
John Negroponte	_____	_____	_____
Colin Powell	_____	_____	_____
Paul Stevens	_____	_____	_____
Lou Michael	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	<u>↑</u>	WTR	<u>↑</u>
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	<u>SPR</u>	<u>R</u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Baker Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____

Pls provide me w/ a comeback copy. WTR (Date/Time)

National Security Council
The White House

BR

87 05 P12:27

System # #
Package # 91344
DOCLOG BR NO

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Courtney	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
Marybel Batjer			
Paul Stevens	<u>2</u>	<u>PM</u>	<u>A</u>
John Negroponte	<u>3</u>		
Colin Powell	<u>4</u>	<u>CP</u>	<u>A</u>
Lou Michael			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>12/7Ac</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Baker Other KD

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

— 12.5.87

Colin,

This is drafted as pre-Summit
reply to Mitterand cable. It
will have to go to the President
on Monday.

— Paul.

~~SECRET~~

The President has seen 12/7

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II
91344

December 7, 1987 1987 DEC -7 AM 8:13

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: COLIN L. POWELL *CP*

SUBJECT: Response to President Mitterrand on the Summit

RR

Issue

To approve the text of your response to President Mitterrand.

Background

President Mitterrand wrote you (Tab B) in reply to your letter to the Allies informing them of your strategy for the Summit with Gorbachev and asking for their advice. Mitterrand provides little new in his letter, but does reiterate his strong endorsement of the INF Treaty and express the hope that you will be able to achieve progress on other arms control issues. He specifically endorses your proposal for a total elimination of chemical weapons, a conventional balance at lower and more stable levels and reductions of strategic offensive forces. Mitterrand also makes a positive reference to his March, 1984 meeting with you where you engaged him in a broad discussion of your perspectives on Soviet-American relations.

Facts

Your reply thanks Mitterrand for his letter and for his efforts to maintain Alliance cohesion on East-West relations in the face of Soviet attempts to split the Allies. You make reference to his 1984 visit and express appreciation for the insights he provided at that time on developments in the USSR.

Recommendation

OK No That you approve the text of your reply to Mitterrand at Tab A.

RR

Attachments

Tab A Suggested Reply to Mitterrand
Tab B Mitterrand Incoming

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff (2)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F99077/1 #216

BY CS NARA, DATE 5/9/03

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II
91344

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: COURTNEY
SIT: WHSR_SPECIAL

<PREC? IMMEDIATE <CLAS? SECRET <DTG? 071945Z DEC 87

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO ELYSEE FRANCE

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS
QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN
EYES ONLY TO FRANCOIS MITTERRAND, PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH
REPUBLIC, PARIS

DEAR FRANCOIS:

I APPRECIATE YOUR THOUGHTFUL REPLY TO MY LETTER OF NOVEMBER 18,
OUTLINING MY APPROACH TO MY UPCOMING MEETINGS WITH SOVIET GENERAL
SECRETARY GORBACHEV. -LIKE YOU I AM PLEASED THAT WE WILL BE
SIGNING THE INF ACCORD, AN AGREEMENT THAT WAS MADE POSSIBLE BY
THE STEADFAST UNITY THE ALLIANCE DEMONSTRATED. I ALSO HOPE THIS
SUMMIT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO A GENUINE IMPROVEMENT IN ALL FACETS OF
EAST-WEST RELATIONS, NOT JUST ARMS CONTROL, BUT IN THE AREAS OF
REGIONAL DISPUTES AND HUMAN RIGHTS, AS WELL.

LIKE YOU I RECALL THE MARCH, 1984 MEETINGS WE HAD HERE WITH
PLEASURE, PARTICULARLY THE WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSIONS WE HAD ON THE
DIRECTION THE SOVIET UNION WAS LIKELY TO TAKE IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
YOUR OBSERVATIONS ON THE PERMANENCY OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF SOVIET
DEVELOPMENT HAVE CERTAINLY PROVEN CORRECT.

FRANCOIS, THANKS AGAIN FOR YOUR SUPPORT, AND I WILL WRITE YOU
SOON AFTER THE SUMMIT WITH A PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF MY DISCUSSIONS
WITH GORBACHEV.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F99-077/i #217

BY CIS NARA, DATE 5/9/03

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

-
-
-
SINCERELY,

RON

#0124

~~SECRET~~

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO ELYSEE FRANCE

~~SECRET/EYES ONLY~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

FM RONALD REAGAN, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

TO FRANCOIS MITTERRAND, PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, PARIS

DEAR FRANCOIS:

I APPRECIATE YOUR THOUGHTFUL REPLY TO MY LETTER OF NOVEMBER 18, OUTLINING MY APPROACH TO MY UPCOMING MEETINGS WITH SOVIET GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV. LIKE YOU I AM PLEASED THAT WE WILL BE SIGNING THE INF ACCORD, AN AGREEMENT THAT WAS MADE POSSIBLE BY THE STEADFAST UNITY THE ALLIANCE DEMONSTRATED. I ALSO HOPE THIS SUMMIT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO A GENUINE IMPROVEMENT IN ALL FACETS OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, NOT JUST ARMS CONTROL, BUT IN THE AREAS OF REGIONAL DISPUTES AND HUMAN RIGHTS, AS WELL.

LIKE YOU I RECALL THE MARCH, 1984 MEETINGS WE HAD HERE WITH PLEASURE, PARTICULARLY THE WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSIONS WE HAD ON THE DIRECTION THE SOVIET UNION WAS LIKELY TO TAKE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. YOUR OBSERVATIONS ON THE PERMANENCY OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF SOVIET DEVELOPMENT HAVE CERTAINLY PROVEN CORRECT.

FRANCOIS, THANKS AGAIN FOR YOUR SUPPORT, AND I WILL WRITE YOU SOON AFTER THE SUMMIT WITH A PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF MY DISCUSSIONS WITH GORBACHEV.

SINCERELY,



RON

~~SECRET/EYES ONLY~~

Historical File

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BY CAI NARA DATE 5/9/03

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 21-22 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SYSTEM II
91344

December 4, 1987

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL

FROM: FRITZ W. ERMARTH *F*

SUBJECT: Response to President Mitterrand

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President forwarding President Mitterrand's reply to President Reagan's pre-Summit letter to the Allies. Your memorandum also provides a draft response for the President to send to Mitterrand.

NL Nelson Ledsky, ^{*the Gov*} John Herbst and Steve Steiner concur. *Steve*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and forward the memo to the President at Tab I.

Approve *[Signature]* Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Powell Memo to the President
- Tab A Suggested Reply to Mitterrand
- Tab B Mitterrand Incoming

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 29, 1997
By *M 92* NARA, DRC *8/17/02*

Prepared by: *[Signature]*
Tyrus W. Cobb

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR