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Last Updated: 11/13/2023

Ronald Reagan Library

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179187 MEMO		MIKE LEDEEN TO IRAN	MR. MCFARLANE RE	1	ND	B1
179188 LETTER		C. WEINBERGER T EXPORTS TO IRAN		1	9/27/1984	B1
179189 REPORT		AND COVER MEM			10/12/1984	B1
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179190 CABLE		021812Z OCT 84		1	10/2/1984	B1
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179191 REPORT		RE IRAN		11	10/18/1984	B1
179192 MEMO		H. TEICHER TÓ J. INDIAN OCEAN	POINDEXTER RE	1	8/9/1984	B1
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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DECLASSIFIED

August 14, 1984

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP

SUBJECT: S-W-M Breakfast, August 15, 1984

The following subject is on the agenda for tomorrow's S-W-M Breakfast:

U.S. Policy in Iran - Preparations for the Post-Khomeini Period

Talking points are attached.

Attachment

As Stated

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- -- By all accounts, there is a power struggle under way in Iran, not only over the conduct of the war, but over the potential succession crisis in the event that Khomeini finally dies. We need to think through carefully what initiatives, if any, we should take in the event there is a change of leadership.
- As I understand it, our contacts suggest that initially the struggle will be within the clerical hierarchy and that it's unclear at this stage who is likely to emerge as the winner
 and if so, what his policies towards us will be.
- It's unlikely that a pro-Western, let alone pro-American, leadership will emerge at first. We have two objectives: (1) to keep very close to the ground - particularly to head off any precipitous Soviet move in the event of a power vacuum; (2) but also we must not precipitate a crisis by overactivity on our own part. It seems to me that it would be helpful if the agency could work with State in bringing together a scenario and gameplan for how we should handle the succession crisis and what use we should make, if any, of our friends and allies who have better relations with Tehran. It's obvious that countries such as India, Pakistan, China, Japan and Algeria have better links than we do, as do the British. It may be that we should quietly engage in some low-key discussions with our allies and friends to sound out what, if anything, we can do in the post-Khomeini era.

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MEMORANDUM



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 27, 1984

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DECLASSIFIED NLRR748-37-1-2-4 MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE NARA DATE 4/8/3 BY KOR DONALD R. FORTIER

884.

9.28.84

FROM:

SUBJECT: S-W-M Breakfast Item: U.S. Export Policy Toward Iran

Under existing anti-terrorist export controls, U.S. exports to Iran of airplanes, helicopters, and goods and technologies, controlled for national security purposes for military end use or end users, that fall below certain weight or dollar thresholds are permitted. Because aircraft and helicopters, the export of which is now permissible, have potential for terrorist use by the Government of Iran, we recommended that the President direct that the threshold be set at zero and that a new presumption of denial should obtain for any such license. We also recommended the establishment of a similar presumption against licenses for the export to Iran of outboard motors with 45 horsepower or greater because of counter-terrorist requirements.

We saw no point in going beyond this decision at this moment, thereby creating an incentive or pretext for Iranian provocations . at a moment when the fighting had abated and new political forces appeared to be at work in Iran. Recognizing, however, the continuing importance of the problem, we directed the Department of State to review the advisability of eventually placing U.S. exports to Iran in the same category as U.S. exports to Libya, that is, to require licenses for all U.S. exports, except food and medicine, to Iran and to identify categories of items that should receive special scrutiny with a prejudice against their export. This would better enable us to control more effectively the flow of goods from the U.S. to Iran. The Department of State was also asked to consult with our allies during the course of the review concerning allied export policy toward Iran and ways e linet that we could gain better intelligence from the trade that will, continue. north

You signed the directive out on August 17, reason to reopen the issue.

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SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO PRES 17 AUG DECISION RE US EXPORT POLICY TOWARD IRAN

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Washington, D.C.



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NARA DATE 4/8

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Response to the President's August 17 Decision on U.S. Export Policy Toward Iran

We are responding to advise you of our progress in implementing the President's August 17 decision on U.S. export policy toward Iran.

On August 22, Secretary Shultz sent to Secretary Baldrige draft regulations tightening the anti-terrorism controls on Iran. The regulations will establish a general policy of denial for Iran for all items already controlled by the anti-terrorism regulations, and for all aircraft, helicopters, and related parts and components, regardless of value, weight or enduser; all national security controlled items destined to military endusers/enduses, regardless of value; and all outboard motorboat engines of 45 horsepower or greater.

In recognition of the sensitivity on the Hill and among the allies on the questions of contract sanctity and the extraterritorial reach of unilateral U.S. foreign policy controls, the regulations maintain the exceptions already contained in the anti-terrorism regulations for preexisting contracts, items outside the U.S. at the time the new controls are imposed, and for foreign products containing 20 percent or less U.S. content by value. Exceptions directed towards extraterritoriality and contract sanctity concerns have been included in all major foreign policy export controls imposed since early 1982, except the pipeline sanctions.

We will continue to work with Commerce on the expeditious implementation of these regulations.

We have also begun our review of the advisability of placing U.S. exports to Iran in the same category as exports to Libya. As directed by the President, we will consult with Defense, Commerce, and the allies as soon as possible on this question, and report our conclusions to you.

Charles Hill Executive Secretary



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MIKE LEDEEN TO MR. MCFARLANE RE IRAN

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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
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	Attachment	John N. McMahon		• . • • • •	
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Impact of Ciosing the Iranian Port of Bandar-e Abbas

DECLASSIFIED IN PART NLRR-148-37-1-6-0 BY COR NARA DATE 1/27/12

12 October 1984

Economic Impact. The closure of Bandar-e Abbas, Iran's most important port, would severely disrupt civilian and military imports.

- -- The port last year handled an estimated 7.4 million tons of incoming goods, one-third of total Iranian imports and one-half of seaborne imports.
- -- Bandar-e Abbas is handling 150 percent more tonnage than before the conflict with Iraq because of war damage to other port facilities and the threat of Iraqi attacks on ships and ports further north in the Persian Gulf.
- -- Between 60 and 80 ships normally are waiting to unload at the port and are double-berthed to speed up offloading.
- -- Most of the commercial shipping is handled along one quay. where 6 of the port's 10 berths are located. The other four berths are located, one each, at an offshore wharf, an ore pier, a POL pier, and at an offshore wharf at the naval base.


The Iranians would not be able to make up for the loss of facilities at Bandar-e Abbas.

- -- The current high level of Bandar-e Abbas operations reflects the lack of good alternatives.
- -- Overland transportation routes--from Turkey, Pakistan, and the USSR--are clogged. We estimate 7 million tons of imports arrived overland in 1983 compared with a pre-war peak of 2 million tons. Congestion of overland transportation arteries already is causing spoilage and precludes a significant expansion of their use.
- -- Assuming, however, that other Iranian ports remain open after whatever action is taken, Iran still would be able to import substantially more than the 8 to 10 million tons per year it was importing following the revolution and during the hostage crisis.

Economic problems are beginning to cause discontent among a war-weary Iranian populace and the loss of Bandar-e Abbas would make matters worse.

-- Prices for basic services--water, electricity, and telephone--have shot up since the war started and these services are interrupted with increasing frequency.

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- -- Shortages of many goods--especially consumer durables, spare parts, and non-essential foods--already are widespread and would get worse if Bandar-e Abbas were closed.
- -- A rationing program intended to brake prices has fostered a burgeoning black market. The difference between official and black market prices would widen if imports are reduced.

We would expect Tehran to prioritize imports of essential commodities should Bandar-e Abbas be closed.


- -- Food imports--which account for 20 percent of domestic consumption--and war materials would be given top priority.
- -- Tehran would probably attempt to increase imports of essential goods on overland routes, although this would prove difficult.
- -- Imports of non-essential foods, consumer goods, and nonessential raw materials would be sharply curtailed. Perishable foods, in particular, would be cutback.

Reduced imports would cause the current economic slowdown to worsen as many businesses would not have adequate supplies of imported inputs and spare parts. Merchants, with a smaller stock of imported goods to sell, would be hurt as well.

Iranian Reaction. Closing down Bandar-e Abbas would provoke Tehran to mount an intense campaign of terrorism against Western interests -- particularly those of the United States, Khomeini's "Great Satan".

- -- Attacks against US Embassies and official representatives in Gulf states and probably beyond would be likely. Iranian-trained terrorists are already in place in the Gulf states and Lebanon, and others could be sent easily to other states in the region -- or elsewhere.
- -- Depending on the degree of their involvement in any closure, US allies also would be vulnerable to Iranian terrorism. The French, in particular, are seen as a major supporter of Iraq, and Iran has not shied away from sponsoring terrorist acts in France.
- -- Iran might also use its agents against Persian Gulf allies of the US. The oil infrastructure of Gulf countries also remain vulnerable to sabotage.

The Iranians are likely to attempt to curtail other nations? oil shipments from the Gulf in retaliation for its closing.



-- 'Tehran could increase its air attacks on ships and attempt to mine ports in the Gulf. It might launch raids against oil and desalinization facilities of the Arab Gulf states.

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-- In the event of a blockage, Iran would use its limited military capabilities against the forces imposing the blockade.

We believe, however, that tough action could ultimately cause Iran to change its policies. An Iraqi warning to Iranian-supported terrorists in 1983 that it would execute their relatives if there were further terrorist attacks contributed to the cessation of major attacks for the last 18 months. Similarly, Iranian fear of tough action by a new US Administration was an important factor in Iran releasing the US hostages.

Soviet Response. Moscow would seek to translate a Western closure of Bandar-e Abbas into increased Soviet influence in Tehran!

-- The Soviets probably would offer to supply arms and perhaps even to improve Iranian air defenses.

- -- Soviet transportation links--overland and across the Caspian Sea--would become more important and Soviet leaders might offer to facilitate the shipment of goods to and from Iran. Increased use of Soviet facilities is likely to have only a limited short-term effect.
- -- They might issue a declaration insisting upon a cessation of all Western attacks on Iran.
- -- Moscow would attempt to minimize the adverse impact on Soviet-Iraqi ties by emphasizing that any aid was a response to a US threat to the region.

In any case, the Soviets would intensify their propaganda about a US and Western threat to the entire Persian Gulf region and its oil wealth.

- -- They might pursue a UN condemnation of the Western action and argue that the danger of escalation requires an international conference on Gulf security.
- -- Moscow almost certainly would renew its proposals for ensuring the security of the Persian Gulf.

The initial Soviet military response to any western closing of Bandar-e Abbas would be limited by the range of Soviet fighter aircraft and the lack of a significant naval presence in the area.



- As long as the Soviet leaders believed the US would not occupy Iranian ports and airfield, they would limit their immediate response to increased intelligence gathering and an augmentation of Soviet naval forces in the region.
- Moscow's inability to match Western naval strength there would make it difficult to challenge a naval quarantine of Bandar-e Abbas.

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