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Last Updated: 11/13/2023

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 8/4/2016

File Folder IRAN (8/1/84-10/18/84)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 37

SKINNER

734

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
179187	MEMO	MIKE LEDEEN TO MR. MCFARLANE RE IRAN	1	ND	B1
179188	LETTER	C. WEINBERGER TO G. SHULTZ RE EXPORTS TO IRAN	1	9/27/1984	B1
179189	REPORT	RE IRAN (INCL. WASHFAX RECEIPT AND COVER MEMO)	6	10/12/1984	B1
		PAR 1/27/2012 CREST NLR-748-37-1-6-0			
179190	CABLE	021812Z OCT 84	1	10/2/1984	B1
		D 9/12/2013 CREST NLR-748-37-1-7-9			
179191	REPORT	RE IRAN	11	10/18/1984	B1
179192	MEMO	H. TEICHER TO J. POINDEXTER RE INDIAN OCEAN	1	8/9/1984	B1
179193	MEMO	N. HENDERSHOT TO D. DUNFORD RE INDIAN OCEAN	1	8/8/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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NSC/S PROFILE

SECRET

ID 8406157

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

8/4/86 (108)

RECEIVED 14 AUG 84 17

DOC DATE 14 AUG 84

TO MCFARLANE

FROM KEMP

KEYWORDS IRAN

SUBJECT ADENDA ITEM SWM MTG 15 AUG - US POLICY IN POST-KHOMEINI IRAN

ACTION.	FOR INFORMATION	DUE:	STATUS C	FILES PA
	FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE		FOR INFO
	MCFARLANE			

COMMENTS

REF#	LOG	NSC IF ID	(CT CB)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	C	8/16 Noted by McFarlane		6K

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

PA

(B)

National Security Council
The White House

cc 8

System # I

RECEIVED Package # 6157

84 AUG 14 P 3: 34

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>5</u>	
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>		
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>		
Situation Room			

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

ON 11/17 10:41:59

—

NO HAS SEEN

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

6157

DECLASSIFIED

August 14, 1984

NLRR 74237-1-1-5

~~SECRET~~

BY KOB NARA DATE 4/8/13

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP *GK*

SUBJECT: S-W-M Breakfast, August 15, 1984

The following subject is on the agenda for tomorrow's S-W-M Breakfast:

U.S. Policy in Iran - Preparations for the Post-Khomeini Period

Talking points are attached.

Attachment

As Stated

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

TALKING POINTS

- By all accounts, there is a power struggle under way in Iran, not only over the conduct of the war, but over the potential succession crisis in the event that Khomeini finally dies. We need to think through carefully what initiatives, if any, we should take in the event there is a change of leadership.

- As I understand it, our contacts suggest that initially the struggle will be within the clerical hierarchy and that it's unclear at this stage who is likely to emerge as the winner - and if so, what his policies towards us will be.

- It's unlikely that a pro-Western, let alone pro-American, leadership will emerge at first. We have two objectives: (1) to keep very close to the ground - particularly to head off any precipitous Soviet move in the event of a power vacuum; (2) but also we must not precipitate a crisis by overactivity on our own part. It seems to me that it would be helpful if the agency could work with State in bringing together a scenario and gameplan for how we should handle the succession crisis and what use we should make, if any, of our friends and allies who have better relations with Tehran. It's obvious that countries such as India, Pakistan, China, Japan and Algeria have better links than we do, as do the British. It may be that we should quietly engage in some low-key discussions with our allies and friends to sound out what, if anything, we can do in the post-Khomeini era.

NSC/S PROFILE

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ID 8406456

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 28 AUG 84 18

TO MCFARLANE

FROM FORTIER

8/4/86 LCB

DOCDATE 27 AUG 84

KEYWORDS: IRAN

EXPORT CONTROLS

SHULTZ, G

INTL TRADE

WEINBERGER, C

SUBJECT: SWM BREAKFAST ITEM RE US EXPORT POLICY TOWARD IRAN

ACTION: NOTED BY MCFARLANE W/ COMMENT DUE: STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

FORTIER

COMMENTS


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6456



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 27, 1984

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-37-12-4

BY 1008 NARA DATE 4/8/13

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: DONALD R. FORTIER *DF*

SUBJECT: S-W-M Breakfast Item: U.S. Export Policy Toward Iran

Under existing anti-terrorist export controls, U.S. exports to Iran of airplanes, helicopters, and goods and technologies, controlled for national security purposes for military end use or end users, that fall below certain weight or dollar thresholds are permitted. Because aircraft and helicopters, the export of which is now permissible, have potential for terrorist use by the Government of Iran, we recommended that the President direct that the threshold be set at zero and that a new presumption of denial should obtain for any such license. We also recommended the establishment of a similar presumption against licenses for the export to Iran of outboard motors with 45 horsepower or greater because of counter-terrorist requirements.

We saw no point in going beyond this decision at this moment, thereby creating an incentive or pretext for Iranian provocations at a moment when the fighting had abated and new political forces appeared to be at work in Iran. Recognizing, however, the continuing importance of the problem, we directed the Department of State to review the advisability of eventually placing U.S. exports to Iran in the same category as U.S. exports to Libya, that is, to require licenses for all U.S. exports, except food and medicine, to Iran and to identify categories of items that should receive special scrutiny with a prejudice against their export. This would better enable us to control more effectively the flow of goods from the U.S. to Iran. The Department of State was also asked to consult with our allies during the course of the review concerning allied export policy toward Iran and ways that we could gain better intelligence from the trade that will continue.

You signed the directive out on August 17, 1984. We see no reason to reopen the issue.

*agree proposal
copy sent
but no action required
8-28-84*

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Declassify: OADR

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
8/29/84 1008

RECEIVED 29 AUG 84 08

DOC DATE 28 AUG 84

TO MCFARLANE FROM HILL, C

~~SUSPENSE~~

KEYWORDS: EXPORT ADMIN ACT IRAN

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO PRES 17 AUG DECISION RE US EXPORT POLICY TOWARD IRAN

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 31 AUG 84 STATUS S FILES PA

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
ROBINSON	FORTIER	MCMINN
	KEMP	DUR

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REF# 8423778 LOG 8406456 NSCIFID (CL

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S/S 8423778 6491
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

AUG 28 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Response to the President's August 17 Decision on U.S.
Export Policy Toward Iran

We are responding to advise you of our progress in implementing the President's August 17 decision on U.S. export policy toward Iran.

On August 22, Secretary Shultz sent to Secretary Baldrige draft regulations tightening the anti-terrorism controls on Iran. The regulations will establish a general policy of denial for Iran for all items already controlled by the anti-terrorism regulations, and for all aircraft, helicopters, and related parts and components, regardless of value, weight or enduser; all national security controlled items destined to military endusers/enduses, regardless of value; and all outboard motorboat engines of 45 horsepower or greater.

In recognition of the sensitivity on the Hill and among the allies on the questions of contract sanctity and the extraterritorial reach of unilateral U.S. foreign policy controls, the regulations maintain the exceptions already contained in the anti-terrorism regulations for preexisting contracts, items outside the U.S. at the time the new controls are imposed, and for foreign products containing 20 percent or less U.S. content by value. Exceptions directed towards extraterritoriality and contract sanctity concerns have been included in all major foreign policy export controls imposed since early 1982, except the pipeline sanctions.

We will continue to work with Commerce on the expeditious implementation of these regulations.

We have also begun our review of the advisability of placing U.S. exports to Iran in the same category as exports to Libya. As directed by the President, we will consult with Defense, Commerce, and the allies as soon as possible on this question, and report our conclusions to you.

Covey

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

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NLRR 798-374-3-3

BY 6103 NARA DATE 4/8/04

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IRAN (8/1/84-10/18/84)

FOIA

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Box Number

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179187	MEMO MIKE LEDEEN TO MR. MCFARLANE RE IRAN	1	ND	B1

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

10
ID 8407332

RECEIVED 28 SEP 84 14

8/11/84

TO MCFARLANE

FROM WEINBERGER, C

DOCDATE 27 SEP 84

KEYWORDS: IRAN
TERRORISM

EXPORT CONTROLS

SHULTZ, G

SUBJECT: WEINBERGER MEMO TO SHULTZ RE HAMILTON STANDARD EXPORT OF PROPELLER
ASSEMBLIES TO IRAN

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KEMP

TAHIR KHELI

DUR

FORTIER

ROBINSON

North
DeGraffenreid
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179188	LETTER C. WEINBERGER TO G. SHULTZ RE EXPORTS TO IRAN	1	9/27/1984	B1

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12

WHSR
ROUTE SLIP

Time Stamp

EYES ONLY

STAFF	C/O
McFarlane	C
Poindexter	C
Kimmitt	
Shull	
Thompson	
Merchant	
NSC S/S	

BUD —

~~Hold [Signature]~~

LDX
Approval: _____

C : Copy

O : Original

RCM HAS SEEN

IRAN

17

DATE/TIME TRANSMITTED

WASHFAX MESSAGE NUMBER

DATE/TIME RECEIVED

OCT 16 11 16 AM '84

179689

04 OCT 16 11:30

C I A
OPERATIONS CENTER
SITE A

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

WASHFAX MESSAGE RECEIPT

DECLASSIFIED

612

NLRR748-371-6-D

BY GOB NARA DATE 1/27/12

FROM

DDCI

SUBJECT

President's Call

CLASSIFICATION

Secret

PAGES

5

SENT TO:

DELIVER TO:

EXTENSION

ROOM

Bud McFarlane
White House Situation Room

REMARKS:

DECLASSIFIED 14

NLRR 748-37-1-6-0

BY COB NARA DATE 1/21/02

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

16 October 1984

**NOTE FOR: Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs**

Bud:

You asked for our views on the
economic impact in closing Bandar-e
Abbas as well as Iranian/Soviet response.

John N. McMahon

Attachment

25X1

~~SECRET~~Impact of Closing the Iranian
Port of Bandar-e Abbas

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLR 748-37-1-6-0

BY CDR NARA DATE 1/27/02

12 October 1984

Economic Impact. The closure of Bandar-e Abbas, Iran's most important port, would severely disrupt civilian and military imports.

- The port last year handled an estimated 7.4 million tons of incoming goods, one-third of total Iranian imports and one-half of seaborne imports.
- Bandar-e Abbas is handling 150 percent more tonnage than before the conflict with Iraq because of war damage to other port facilities and the threat of Iraqi attacks on ships and ports further north in the Persian Gulf.
- Between 60 and 80 ships normally are waiting to unload at the port and are double-berthed to speed up offloading.
- Most of the commercial shipping is handled along one quay, where 6 of the port's 10 berths are located. The other four berths are located, one each, at an offshore wharf, an ore pier, a POL pier, and at an offshore wharf at the naval base.

The Iranians would not be able to make up for the loss of facilities at Bandar-e Abbas.

- The current high level of Bandar-e Abbas operations reflects the lack of good alternatives.
- Overland transportation routes--from Turkey, Pakistan, and the USSR--are clogged. We estimate 7 million tons of imports arrived overland in 1983 compared with a pre-war peak of 2 million tons. Congestion of overland transportation arteries already is causing spoilage and precludes a significant expansion of their use.
- Assuming, however, that other Iranian ports remain open after whatever action is taken, Iran still would be able to import substantially more than the 8 to 10 million tons per year it was importing following the revolution and during the hostage crisis.

Economic problems are beginning to cause discontent among a war-weary Iranian populace and the loss of Bandar-e Abbas would make matters worse.

- Prices for basic services--water, electricity, and telephone--have shot up since the war started and these services are interrupted with increasing frequency.

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- Shortages of many goods--especially consumer durables, spare parts, and non-essential foods--already are widespread and would get worse if Bandar-e Abbas were closed.
- A rationing program intended to brake prices has fostered a burgeoning black market. The difference between official and black market prices would widen if imports are reduced.

We would expect Tehran to prioritize imports of essential commodities should Bandar-e Abbas be closed.

- Food imports--which account for 20 percent of domestic consumption--and war materials would be given top priority.
- Tehran would probably attempt to increase imports of essential goods on overland routes, although this would prove difficult.
- Imports of non-essential foods, consumer goods, and non-essential raw materials would be sharply curtailed. Perishable foods, in particular, would be cutback.

Reduced imports would cause the current economic slowdown to worsen as many businesses would not have adequate supplies of imported inputs and spare parts. Merchants, with a smaller stock of imported goods to sell, would be hurt as well.

Iranian Reaction. Closing down Bandar-e Abbas would provoke Tehran to mount an intense campaign of terrorism against Western interests -- particularly those of the United States, Khomeini's "Great Satan".

- Attacks against US Embassies and official representatives in Gulf states and probably beyond would be likely. Iranian-trained terrorists are already in place in the Gulf states and Lebanon, and others could be sent easily to other states in the region -- or elsewhere.
- Depending on the degree of their involvement in any closure, US allies also would be vulnerable to Iranian terrorism. The French, in particular, are seen as a major supporter of Iraq, and Iran has not shied away from sponsoring terrorist acts in France.
- Iran might also use its agents against Persian Gulf allies of the US. The oil infrastructure of Gulf countries also remain vulnerable to sabotage.

The Iranians are likely to attempt to curtail other nations' oil shipments from the Gulf in retaliation for its closing.

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- Tehran could increase its air attacks on ships and attempt to mine ports in the Gulf. It might launch raids against oil and desalination facilities of the Arab Gulf states.
- In the event of a blockage, Iran would use its limited military capabilities against the forces imposing the blockade.

We believe, however, that tough action could ultimately cause Iran to change its policies. An Iraqi warning to Iranian-supported terrorists in 1983 that it would execute their relatives if there were further terrorist attacks contributed to the cessation of major attacks for the last 18 months. Similarly, Iranian fear of tough action by a new US Administration was an important factor in Iran releasing the US hostages.

Soviet Response. Moscow would seek to translate a Western closure of Bandar-e Abbas into increased Soviet influence in Tehran.

- The Soviets probably would offer to supply arms and perhaps even to improve Iranian air defenses.
- Soviet transportation links--overland and across the Caspian Sea--would become more important and Soviet leaders might offer to facilitate the shipment of goods to and from Iran. Increased use of Soviet facilities is likely to have only a limited short-term effect.
- They might issue a declaration insisting upon a cessation of all Western attacks on Iran.
- Moscow would attempt to minimize the adverse impact on Soviet-Iraqi ties by emphasizing that any aid was a response to a US threat to the region.

In any case, the Soviets would intensify their propaganda about a US and Western threat to the entire Persian Gulf region and its oil wealth.

- They might pursue a UN condemnation of the Western action and argue that the danger of escalation requires an international conference on Gulf security.
- Moscow almost certainly would renew its proposals for ensuring the security of the Persian Gulf.

The initial Soviet military response to any western closing of Bandar-e Abbas would be limited by the range of Soviet fighter aircraft and the lack of a significant naval presence in the area.

~~SECRET~~

- As long as the Soviet leaders believed the US would not occupy Iranian ports and airfield, they would limit their immediate response to increased intelligence gathering and an augmentation of Soviet naval forces in the region.
- Moscow's inability to match Western naval strength there would make it difficult to challenge a naval quarantine of Bandar-e Abbas.

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179190	CABLE 021812Z OCT 84	1	10/2/1984	B1

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179191	REPORT RE IRAN	11	10/18/1984	B1

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ID 8406060

RECEIVED 10 AUG 84 09

8/4/84 (203)

TO POINDEXTER

FROM TEICHER

DOCDATE 09 AUG 84

KEYWORDS MIDDLE EAST

IRAN

LIBYA

SUBJECT VIGILANCE IN INDIAN OCEAN

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

RLF# LOG NSCIFID (CL)

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179193	MEMO N. HENDERSHOT TO D. DUNFORD RE INDIAN OCEAN	1	8/8/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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