Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection:

Executive Secretariat, National Security Council: Country File

Folder Title:

INDIA (08/17 /1984-10/29/1984)

Box: Box 36

To see more digitized collections visit: https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Inventories, visit: https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-support/citation-guide

National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/

Last Updated: 02/05/2024

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

9/27/2006

CAS

File Folder

INDIA (08/17/1984-10/29/1984)

FOIA

1996-127/3

Box Number

36

BATTLE

32

No of Pages		Restrictions
· agoo		
3	8/17/1984	B1
4	ND	B1
1	ND	B1
1	ND	B1
1	8/17/1984	B1
2	8/17/1984	B1
2	ND	B1
	2	2 ND

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FolA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial Information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information complled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FDIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(\$) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

CAS

9/27/2006

File Folder

INDIA (08/17/1984-10/29/1984)

FOIA

1996-127/3

Box Number

36

BATTLE

			32	
ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
27842 DRAFT MEMO	TO GEORGE SHULTZ, DONALD REGAMAND DAVID STOCKMAN RE ADB/INDI (SAME TEXT AS #27841) R 7/3/2012 F1996-127/	A	ND	B1
27843 MEMO	OLIVER NORTH TO MCFARLANE RE HIJACKING	1	8/31/1984	B1
27844 PROFILE SHEET	RE PROBLEM	1	10/29/1984	B1
27845 MEMO	JOHN POINDEXTER TO HUGH MONTGOMERY RE PROBLEM	3	10/29/1984	B1
27846 MEMO	ORIGINAL OF #27845	3	ND	B1
27847 PROFILE SHEET	RE PROBLEM	1	11/23/1984	B1
27848 MEMO	HUGH MONTGOMERY TO POINDEXTE PROBLEM	R RE 5	11/23/1984	B1
27849 MEMO	TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE RE STATE D 11/29/2011 F1996-127/		11/9/1984	B1 B3

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

₩a ₩		NSC/S	PROFILE	- SEC	D EVAL		ID 840	6261
		1100715	THOI THE	UNCLASSIFIE OF CLASSIFIED		MO' , RECEIVED		
шо	MODADIAND		ED OM		Cys	9 DO POCDATE		
TO	MCFARLANE		FROM			DOCDATE		
				ROBINSON			17 AUG	84
*								
KE YWORDS:	INDIA			ECONOMICS				
SUBJECT.	ADB / INDI	A						
		*						
ACTION:	FOR SIGNAT	URE		DUE:	20 AU	G 84 STATUS X	FILES P	'A
						*** *** to all *** as if in one or or or or or or or		
	FOR ACTION			FOR CONC	URREN	CE	FOR INFO)
	MCFARLANE							
COMMENTS								
REF#			LOG			NSCIFID NSMO	DV 20	7)
	~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~							
ACTION OF	FICER (S)	ASSIG UG 2 0 1	ned 984 <i>olg</i>	ACTION REQ	1 1	DUE	COPIES	
			- ODE	fler por	efor	Con-	GIC, RO	2
					/			
	which will william provide.						AND THE RESIDENCE AND THE PERSON AND	<u>.</u>
	3							*
at the specimen of the specime	A photos and property	gin with a resignation and the global and the substrate of		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		-		-#
DISPATCH						W/ATTCH F	ILE	(C)

Bob Kimmitt	1	National Security The White Ho	Council	
SEQUENCE TO HAS SEEN DISPOSITION Paul Thompson Bob Kimmitt John Poindexter Tom Shull Wilma Hall Bud McFarlane Bob Kimmitt NSC Secretariat Situation Room R=Retain D=Dispatch N=No further Action cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other COMMENTS Should be seen by: (Date/Time) My Should have a paper from My Should have a paper from	•		System #	
SEQUENCE TO HAS SEEN DISPOSITION Paul Thompson Bob Kimmitt John Poindexter Tom Shull Wilma Hall Bud McFarlane Bob Kimmitt NSC Secretariat Situation Room R=Retain D=Dispatch N=No further Action cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other COMMENTS Should be seen by: (Date/Time) My Should have a paper from My Should have a paper from			Package #	
SEQUENCE TO HAS SEEN DISPOSITION Paul Thompson Bob Kimmitt John Poindexter Tom Shull Wilma Hall Bud McFarlane Bob Kimmitt NSC Secretariat Situation Room A = Action CC: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other COMMENTS Should be seen by: (Date/Time) The should have a page from The should have a page fro		to to	0.01.10	
Paul Thompson Bob Kimmitt John Poindexter Tom Shull Wilma Hall Blud McFarlane Bob Kimmitt NSC Secretariat Situation Room Cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other COMMENTS Should be seen by: (Date/Time) The game plan will be to get a		VIII CO	A 8: 40	
Bob Kimmitt John Poindexter Tom Shull Wilma Hall Bud McFarlane Bob Kimmitt NSC Secretariat Situation Room A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other COMMENTS Should be seen by: (Date/Time) We should have a paper from the paper from t		SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
John Poindexter Tom Shull Wilma Hall Bud McFarlane Bob Kimmitt NSC Secretariat Situation Room CC: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other COMMENTS Should be seen by: (Date/Time) We should have a page from the should he to get a state of the same plan will be to get a state of the same p	Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall Bud McFarlane Bob Kimmitt NSC Secretariat Situation Room A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action CC: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other COMMENTS Should be seen by: (Date/Time) The should hape a page from this the same plan will be to set a	Bob Kimmitt		K/	
Bud McFarlane Bob Kimmitt NSC Secretariat Situation Room A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other COMMENTS Should be seen by: (Date/Time) The should have a page from this the same plan will be to set a	John Poindexter	2	X_	
Bud McFarlane Bob Kimmitt NSC Secretariat Situation Room A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other COMMENTS Should be seen by: (Date/Time) The should have a page from this the same plan will be to set a	Tom Shull			
Bud McFarlane Bob Kimmitt NSC Secretariat Situation Room A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action CC: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other COMMENTS Should be seen by: (Date/Time) The should have a page how Other and the same plane will be to set a		3		V
Bob Kimmitt NSC Secretariat Situation Room A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action CC: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other COMMENTS Should be seen by: (Date/Time) The should have a page from this the search of		4	$\overline{\mathcal{M}}$	Adamone
Situation Room Situation Room Situation Reserved Situation Reserved Situation Reserved Situation Reserved Situation Situati				N. R
Situation Room Situation Room Situation Relation Delispatch New No further Action				
CC: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other COMMENTS Should be seen by: (Date/Time) The should have a page from this the game plan will be to get a				
COMMENTS Should be seen by: (Date/Time) We should have a paper from Roger and Stepp tomorrow on this The game plan will be to get a	Situation Room ·		-	-
COMMENTS Should be seen by: (Date/Time) We should have a paper from Roger and Stepp tomorrow on this The game plan will be to get a			-/	
COMMENTS Should be seen by: (Date/Time) We should have a paper how Rozer and stepp tomorrow on this The game plan will be to get a	= Information A = A	Action R = Retain	D = Dispatch N	= No further Action
Me should have a paper from Rozer and Teff tomorrow on this The game plan will be to get a	cc: VP Meese	Baker Deaver Oth	ner	
Me should have a paper from Rozer and Teff tomorrow on this The game plan will be to get a	COMMENTS	Should be so	aan hu	
Rozer and Teff tomorrow on this The game plan will be to get a	COMMILITY			
Rozer and Teff tomorrow on this The game plan will be to get a	Dr. 0 0	026	perser h	
The same plan will be to get a	Il should	or agency		71.
The same plan will be to get a	Reserve	Jeff ton	orrow	on the
lelas in the 24 day, meeting.	Til		00 be to	get a
Illas in the 24 day, meeting.	The game	glan we	4	- 0
	delay in	the 24 dug.	meelin	7. 8

	curity Council ite House	1304
	System #	4
	Package #	6261
84 AUG 18 AID	: 27	3
SEQUEN	CE TO HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson		
Bob Kimmitt	K	
John Poindexter	3	
Tom Shull	V	
Wilma Hall	<u> </u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Bob Kimmitt		
NSC Secretariat		N
Situation Room		,
Jour 2	- done	Corrections
I = Information	tain D = Dispatch N	= No further Action
cc: VP Meese Baker Deav	er Other	
COMMENTS Show	ld be seen by:	
A.A. 	10.	(Pate/Time)
Add OHB as cc	(Stockman)	TobI
Siven the le	vel gow	activity
over the next	- few day	p, we
have another		
	·	X

Nat	ional Security The White Ho	use	
		System #	1-
		Package #	I- 6261
			4
	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson			
Bob Kimmitt		- KA	
John Poindexter	2	-#-	
Tom Shull		U	***************************************
Wilma Hall			F 197. 45. 10. 15.11.
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt	3	K	-
NSC Secretariat	4		. N
Situation Room			/
l = Information A = Action	R = Retain	D=Dispatch N:	= No further Action
cc: VP Meese Bal	cer Deaver Otl	her	
COMMENTS	Should be s	een by:	
		•	(Date/Time)
Do Nemo to	ot Seno	Rohinso	~
Memo to	Kemp		

Paul Thompson Bob Kimmitt John Poindexter Tom Shull Wilma Hall Bud McFarlane Bob Kimmitt NSC Secretariat Situation Room	ity Council House	onal Security (The White Ho	Nati
Paul Thompson Bob Kimmitt John Poindexter Tom Shull Wilma Hall Bud McFarlane Bob Kimmitt NSC Secretariat Situation Room Linformation A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action CC: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other COMMENTS Should be seen by: (Date/Time) When Should have a page from the standard on the stand	Package #	Allo 20	
Bob Kimmitt John Poindexter Tom Shull Wilma Hall Bud McFarlane Bob Kimmitt NSC Secretariat Situation Room Telnformation A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action CC: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other COMMENTS Should be seen by: (Date/Time) When Should be seen by:	O HAS SEEN DISPOSITION	EQUENCE TO	
John Poindexter Tom Shull Wilma Hall Bud McFarlane Bob Kimmitt NSC Secretariat Situation Room A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action CC: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other COMMENTS Should be seen by: (Date/Time) When Should have a page from the standard of the seen by: (Date/Time)			Paul Thompson
Wilma Hall Bud McFarlane Bob Kimmitt NSC Secretariat Situation Room A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action CC: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other COMMENTS Should be seen by: (Date/Time) When Should have a page from the standard of the seen by: (Date/Time)			Bob Kimmitt
Bud McFarlane Bob Kimmitt NSC Secretariat Situation Room A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action CC: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other COMMENTS Should be seen by: (Date/Time) Machael Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = Retain D = Dispatch D = Dispatch D = Disp		2	John Poindexter
Bud McFarlane Bob Kimmitt NSC Secretariat Situation Room A=Action R=Retain D=Dispatch N=No further Action CC: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other COMMENTS Should be seen by: (Date/Time) The should have a page from The			Tom Shull
Bob Kimmitt NSC Secretariat Situation Room R=Retain D=Dispatch N=No further Action		3	Wilma Hall
NSC Secretariat Situation Room A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action CC: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other COMMENTS Should be seen by: (Date/Time) The should have a paper from the standard of the standar	- M Advance	4	Bud McFarlane
Situation Room Part Description Descr			Bob Kimmitt
CC: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other COMMENTS Should be seen by: (Date/Time)	- () N	5	NSC Secretariat
CC: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other COMMENTS Should be seen by:			Situation Room
COMMENTS Should be seen by: (Date/Time) Whe should have a paper from New York tomorrow on t		/	
We should have a paper from	pe seen by:		
The step tomorrow on t	paper from	lafe a	We should
I M le tet a	morrow on the	of tom	My 1/0
The game plan will in	will be to get a	la wi	The same &
delay in the 24 day, meeting. &	a meeting.	24 aug.	Sel: to

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 17, 1984

SECKET

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

GEOFFREY KEMP

ROGER W. ROBINSON

SUBJECT:

ADB/India

The level of support for ADB loans to India, which is presently scheduled to be discussed in Manilla on August 24, has emerged as the most contentious meetings on NSSD 3-84. Treasury and OMB oppose any increase in levels to India beyond \$200 million in addition to the \$40 million already agreed. State argues that this figure is far below the amount suggested by other Bank members and that the U.S. position will be defeated.

After receiving the positions of both Treasury and State, we find that there remain important gaps in the information needed to make a Presidential decision on this important issue.

A significant part of our bilateral problems with India in the context of ADB is the fact that the U.S. has consistently taken a strong and visible lead in opposing India's expanded access to the Bank. India has, naturally, seized on this perception to concentrate its focus on the U.S. and argue that the U.S. position on this matter represents an important factor in their decision-making on other crucial foreign policy concerns. Therefore, the "form" exercised by the U.S. within the ADB may be as important as the "substance" of the amount of India's borrowing ceiling.

DECLASSIFIED

Declassify on: OADR

SECRET

NLRR F96-127/3#27835 BY RIV NARA DATE 7/13/12 It is therefore important to place the U.S. position toward India within the ADB in as detailed a perspective as possible vis a vis the positions of the other country shareholders of ADB, especially key players such as Japan. A more complete understanding of other country positions would not only help identify the overall level of support for India, but also would provide a better readout on the feasibility of alternative U.S. positions prevailing in a vote of ADB members. For example, the Treasury paper argues that Congressional opposition to the next capital increase for the ADB scheduled for mid 1986 (affecting the period 1988-1992) is almost certain to preclude any significant increase for ADB if India is granted significantly expanded access at this time (i.e. above \$240 million). assumption is based on our experience with the Hill on the IMF quota increase and IDA VII, and a preliminary assessment of Hill opposition to a capital increase for the Asia Development Fund coming up next year (soft loan arm of ADB), could well impact on the amounts for India being proposed by other ADB members. However, given the overall strategic importance of the sub-continent, a concerted effort by the Administration in 1985 could conceivably alter some of these rigid positions. These and other facts should be laid out in greater detail so that we receive more complete data on which to base a Presidential decision. Other facts which Treasury and State should seek to obtain include:

- o Japan's precise position on various levels of support for India's access to the ADB.
- o Ascertaining the willingness of the Philippines (which could be adversely affected as a beneficiary of ADB funds at a crucial time), Malaysia, Thailand, Korea, Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, etc. to support figures lower than those they have currently proposed and enable the U.S. to position itself as part of a broader consensus rather than alone and out front.

The action forcing event behind moving this package to the President is the ADB Executive Board meeting of Friday, August 24. Treasury is prepared to approach Japan today to seek their willingness to request a postponement of this meeting or to do so in concert with the U.S. Even if Japan is not on board, Treasury believes they have a 90% chance of postponing the meeting a week or two on a U.S. request alone. We would obviously forge an appropriately diffuse reason to justify such a request (i.e. the Republican National Convention, etc.), although we must try to avoid giving the impression that these issues are to be decided at the Presidential level.

SECRET

8

This hiatus period could be used constructively in an effort by Treasury and State to compile the data necessary for the President to make a more informed decision. Treasury would, however, need a mandate to lay out the issues to these countries in greater detail in order for other ADB members to better understand the possible consequences of standing firm on their initial recommendations. Should Treasury come up short in garnering sufficient support among other ADB members, it could potentially help defuse their strong opposition to the State position, given the sensitivity of our present relationship toward India and the serious problem we face on the sub-continent. In short, everybody could win with this approach including the President.

Attached at (Tab I) is a memo from you to Secretaries Shultz and Regan outlining this proposed approach, the centerpiece of which is Treasury taking immediate action to postpone the August 24 Executive Board meeting.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memo to Secretaries Shultz and Regan at Tab I as a substitute for going forward with a package to the President at this time.

Approve	Disapprove	

Attachment

Tab I Memo to Shultz and Regan

SECRET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name Withdrawer

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE CAS 9/27/2006

File Folder FOIA

INDIA (08/17/1984-10/29/1984) 1996-127/3

BATTLE

Box Number

36

IDDocument TypeNo of Doc DateRestrictionDocument Descriptionpagestions

27836 MEMO 4 ND B1

DONALD REGAN TO WILLIAM MCFARLANE RE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK LENDING TO INDIA

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

CAS 9/27/2006

Withdrawer

File Folder

INDIA (08/17/1984-10/29/1984)

FOIA

1996-127/3

BATTLE

Box Number

36

32

ID	Document Type	
	Document Description	

No of Doc Date Restricpages tions

27837 TALKING POINTS

1 ND

B1

FOR USE WITH MCFARLANE (ATTACHMENT TO #27836)

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name Withdrawer EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE CAS 9/27/2006 File Folder **FOIA** INDIA (08/17/1984-10/29/1984) 1996-127/3 **BATTLE** Box Number 36 32 Document Type No of Doc Date Restric-IDtions pages **Document Description**

27838 CHART 1 ND B1

RE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (ATTACHMENT TO #27836)

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TRANSHITTED	e transmitte	4	HUHBEI	3	A AUG 177 WHITE K SITUATIO	A 8: GUSE N ROO	M	D
EURIZET OF H ADB./ CLASSIFICATION	INDIA		TA			50	363 BAGE	
2 / 2 3	DELIVER ROGER Eats Jaikensotu -Kimmiri -NSC/S		Eon PH	i pos	395- 36a	2	Rm 365	

Upon reciept.

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name Withdrawer

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE CAS 9/27/2006

File Folder FOIA

INDIA (08/17/1984-10/29/1984) 1996-127/3

BATTLE

Box Number

36

IDDocument TypeNo of Doc DateRestrictionsDocument Descriptionpagestions

27839 NOTE 1 8/17/1984 B1

ROGER ROBINSON TO JOHN POINDEXTER RE ATTACHED MEMO

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose Information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

6261

.MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DRAFT

August 17, 1984

SECKET

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

GEOFFREY KEMP

ROGER W. ROBINSON

SUBJECT:

ADB/India

After receiving the positions of both Treasury and State, we find that there remain important gaps in the information needed to make a Presidential decision on the issue of a U.S. position regarding the level of India's access to the ADB.

A significant part of our bilateral problems with India in the context of ADB is the fact that the U.S. has reportedly taken a visible lead in opposing India's expanded access to the Bank. India has, naturally, seized on this perception to concentrate its focus on the U.S. and argue that the U.S. position on this matter represents an important factor in their decision-making on other crucial foreign policy concerns. Therefore, the "form" exercised by the U.S. within the ADB may be as important as the "substance" of the amount of India's borrowing ceiling.

It is therefore important to place the U.S. position toward India within the ADB in as detailed a perspective as possible vis a vis the positions of the other country shareholders of ADB. A more complete understanding of other country positions would not only help identify the level of support for a lower U.S. figure for India, but also would provide a better readout on the feasibility of the U.S. position prevailing in a vote of ADB members. For example, the Treasury paper argues that Congressional opposition to the next capital increase for the ADB scheduled for mid 1986 (affecting the period 1988-1992) is almost certain to preclude any significant increase for ADB if India is granted significantly expanded access at this time (i.e. above \$240 million). This is a plausible assumption based on our experience with the Hill on the IMF quota increase and IDA VII, and could well impact on the amounts for India being proposed by other ADB members. These and other facts should be laid out in greater detail by Treasury so that we

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRF96-127/3#2784D BY LW NARA DATE 7/3/12

SECRET

receive more complete data on which to base a Presidential decision. Other facts Treasury should seek to obtain include:

- o Japan's precise position and potential willingness to step forward in opposing a higher figure for India's access to the ADB.
- o Ascertaining the willingness of the Philippines (which could be adversely affected as a beneficiary of ADB funds at a crucial time), Malaysia, Thailand, Korea, Indonesia, Austria, New Zealand, Hong Kong, etc. to support a lower U.S. figure and enable the U.S. to position itself as part of a broader consensus rather than alone and out front.

The action forcing event behind moving this package to the President is the ADB Executive Board meeting of Friday, August 24. Treasury is prepared to seek their willingness to request a postponement of this meeting or to do so in concert with the U.S. Even if Japan is not on board, Treasury believes they have a 90% chance of postponing the meeting a week or two on a U.S. request alone. We would obviously forge an appropriately diffuse reason to justify such a request (i.e. the Republican National Convention, etc.).

This hiatus period could be used constructively in an effort by Treasury to compile the data necessary for the President to make a more informed decision. Treasury would, however, need a mandate to lay out the issues to these countries in greater detail in order for other ADB members to better understand the possible consequences of standing firm on their initial recommendations. Should Treasury come up short in garnering sufficient support among other ADB members, it could potentially help defuse their strong opposition to the State position, given the sensitivity of our present relationship toward India. In short, everybody could win with this approach including the President.

Attached at (Tab I) is a memo from you to Secretaries Shultz and Regan outlining this proposed approach, the centerpiece of which is Treasury taking immediate action to postpone the August 24 Executive Board meeting.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memo to Secretaries Shultz and Regan at Tab I as a substitute for going forward with a package to the President at this time.

Approve			Disap	prov	<i>т</i> е]	
Attachment Tab I	Memo	to	Shultz	and	Re	gan



.

COPY

6261

DRAFT

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F96-127/3#27841

BY RW NARADATE 7/3/12

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ

The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE DONALD T. REGAN The Secretary of the Treasury

SUBJECT:

ADB/India (U)

We have received your position papers on the issue of Asian Development Bank lending to India. | In reviewing the information contained in these papers, we have determined that there remain important gaps in our data on this issue which we should attempt to reconcile prior to sending forward a package for a decision by the President. In addition, the delicate stage of our relations with India makes the posture assumed on a U.S. position toward India in the ADB potentially as important as the amount involved. determining as accurately as possible the positions of our other partners in the ADB would be very helpful in ascertaining the potential level of support for a relatively low U.S. figure on India's proposed access to the ADB, the potential willingness of other countries to step forward in support of the U.S. position in the interest of forging a consensus and the feasibility of the U.S. position prevailing in the voting apparatus of the ADB. There are a number of factors that if discussed with other ADB members in greater detail, could potentially affect their willingness to stand firm on their initial recommendations.

To accomplish this task, Treasury is prepared to seek the support of Japan and potentially other members to postpone the August 24 meeting of the Executive Board of the ADB for a sufficient period to complete more detailed discussions with members and a new polling of positions. An appropriate explanation for the U.S. request for a postponment would be provided that avoids reference to India. (S)

We believe this approach would provide us with a better grasp of the U.S. position relative to other shareholders and give the President the benefit of important additional information on which to make a decision. Treasury will

SECRET



report back to State and NSC as soon as possible with their findings and any new date for the ADB Executive Board meeting. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

NLRR F96-127/3#27842 BY AW NARADAG 7/3/12

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE DONALD T. REGAN The Secretary of the Treasury

THE HONORABLE DAVID A. STOCKMAN Pirector, Office of Management and Budget

SUBJECT:

ADR/India (U)

We have received your position papers on the issue of Asian Development Bank lending to India. In reviewing the information contained in these papers, we have determined that there remain important gaps in our data on this issue which we should attempt to recorcile prior to sending forward a package for a decision by the President. In addition, the delicate stage of our relations with India makes the posture assumed on a U.S. position toward India in the ADB potentially as important as the amount involved. Therefore, determining as accurately as possible the positions of our other partners in the ADB would be very helpful in ascertaining the potential level of support for a relatively low U.S. figure on India's proposed access to the ADB, the potential willingness of other countries to step forward in support of the U.S. position in the interest of forging a consensus and the resibility of the U.S. position prevailing in the voting apparatus of the ADB. There are a number of factors that if discussed with other ADB members in greater detail, could potentially affect their willingness to stand firm on their initial recommendations. (S)

To accomplish this task, Treasury should seek the support of Japan and potentially other members to postpone the August 24 meeting of the Executive Board of the ADB for a sufficient period to complete more detailed discussions with members and a new polling of positions. An appropriate explanation for the U.S. request for a postponement would be provided that avoids reference to India. (S)

We believe this approach would provide us with a better grasp of the U.S. position relative to other shareholders and give the President the benefit of important additional information on which to make a decision. Treasury will

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

22

report back to State and NSC no later than August 31 with their findings and any new date for the ADB Executive Board meeting. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

RECEIVED 31 AUG 84 10

TO

MCFARLANE

FROM NORTH

DOCDATE 31 AUG 84

UNI OF CLASS

ENCLUSURE(S)
(4) 9/27/06

KEYWORDS: INDIA

SAYRE, R

RASHID, S

SUBJECT: SIKH HIJACKING SITUATION

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE:

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

DISPATCH

LOG

NSCIFID

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	, ,	, , ,	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	. , , , , ,	
ACTION OFFICE			ACTION REQUIRED		COPIES TO
	C	AUG 3 1 1984	mo Farlane gon song	recon	ON
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3			Committee commit		
والموافق والمتاب والمتال	هایهایهای	مدان _م دان بادان اسال به که این بدان دان دان به دان بادان دان بادان دان بادان دان بادان دان بادان دان بادان دان	سريده في محدر وهنار وهنار وهنار وهنار وهنار وهنار وهنار أهناك وهناك وهنا		And the last transfer to the last transfer transfer to the last transfer
أرياضها والمتال والتقويم والتناب والتقويم والتناب والتناب والتناب والتناف والتناف والتناف والتناف والتناف		<u> </u>	Callengaline, China, Ch		Lating Street Livery Africa, Livery Livery Const. (See J. Const.) (See J. Const.)
Charles and the state of the st	حبيب				
Company of the Control of the Contro				- 15m, the state that 17m - 4,05m, the State the State the	

	National Security The White Ho	System #	II # 90927
	31 A 9 1	9	1380 24
	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson			
Bob Kimmitt		<u> </u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	3		
Bud McFarlane	٧	M	A
B ob Kimmitt	5	IC\	
NSC Secretariat	6	3	N
Situation Room			
I = Information A =	Action R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
cc: VP Meese	Baker Deaver Oth	er	
COMMENTS	Should be se	en by: <u>93</u>	0936
Bob Rta to	com did he this 0930 didn't	*	(Date/Time)

84 AUG 31 A 9: 19

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name Withdrawer

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE CAS 9/27/2006

File Folder FOIA

INDIA (08/17/1984-10/29/1984) 1996-127/3

BATTLE

Box Number

36

IDDocument TypeNo of Doc Date Restric-
pagesRestric-
tions

27843 MEMO 1 8/31/1984 B1

OLIVER NORTH TO MCFARLANE RE HIJACKING

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name Withdrawer

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE CAS 9/27/2006

File Folder FOIA

INDIA (08/17/1984-10/29/1984) 1996-127/3

BATTLE

Box Number

36

IDDocument TypeNo of Doc Date Restric-Document Descriptionpages tions

27844 PROFILE SHEET

1 10/29/1984 B1

RE PROBLEM

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 25, 1984

FOR MR. MCFARLANE SIGNED

27

For your meeting today with Secretary Shultz.

Stephen P. Rosen

Nati	ional Securi ty The White Ho	Council ouse	1	
•		System # 2	1000	
** T		Package #	1618	
8400,25 / 9:		1413 28		
S	EQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION	
Paul Thompson				
Bob Kimmitt		5	A	
John Poindexter		X		
Tom Shull	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	V	·	
Wilma Hall	3	_ m		
Bud McFarlane	4 (to	s seen a be	+) A	
Bob Kimmitt		-11		
NSC Secretariat	5		1 Day	
Situation Room	-)	1/00/	The second	
	=	6/ ()	JOHN SK	
I = Information	R = Retain	D = Dispetch N=	No further Action	
cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other				
COMMENTS	Should be see	en by: 1150	10/25	
Rom has easy			(Date/Time)	
Bud, Syron d		It to se	al the	
I could sen	Ito du	newst x	or Duga	
montzoneny				

84 OCT 25 A 9: 52

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

Withdrawer

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

CAS 9/27/2006

File Folder

FOIA

INDIA (08/17/1984-10/29/1984)

1996-127/3

BATTLE

Box Number

36

32

ID	Document Type
	Document Description

No of Doc Date pages

Restrictions

27845 MEMO

3 10/29/1984 B1

JOHN POINDEXTER TO HUGH MONTGOMERY RE PROBLEM

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 25, 1984

FOR MR. MCFARLANE SIGNED

For your meeting today with Secretary Shultz.

Stephen P. Rosen

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

CAS 9/27/2006

File Folder FOIA

INDIA (08/17/1984-10/29/1984) 1996-127/3

BATTLE

Box Number

36

IDDocument TypeNo of Doc Date Postric-
pagesRestric-
tions

27846 MEMO 3 ND B1

ORIGINAL OF #27845

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name Withdrawer

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE CAS 9/27/2006

File Folder FOIA

INDIA (08/17/1984-10/29/1984) 1996-127/3

BATTLE

Box Number

36

IDDocument TypeNo of Doc DateRestric-Document Descriptionpagestions

27847 PROFILE SHEET

1 11/23/1984 B1

RE PROBLEM

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name Withdrawer

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

CAS 9/27/2006

FOIA File Folder

1996-127/3 INDIA (08/17/1984-10/29/1984)

BATTLE

Box Number

36 32

No of Doc Date Restric-Document Type IDtions pages **Document Description**

11/23/1984 27848 MEMO 5 B1

HUGH MONTGOMERY TO POINDEXTER RE **PROBLEM**

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name Withdrawer

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE CAS 9/27/2006

File Folder FOIA

INDIA (08/17/1984-10/29/1984) 1996-127/3

BATTLE

Box Number

36

IDDocument TypeNo of Doc Date Postric-
pagesRestric-
tions

27849 MEMO 3 11/9/1984 B1

TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE RE STATUS

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]