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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 CAIRO 9357 DTG: 051120Z AUG 82 PSN: 033415  
SIT179 DATE 08/16/82 TOR: 217/1227Z

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EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: -----CHECKLIST-----

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHEG #9357 2171121

O 051120Z AUG 82 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0388

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 1291

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 9233

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 4191

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 9781

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0077

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 8552

BT

~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 19357

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, US, EG, IS, LE, XF, PLO

SUBJECT: WEST BEIRUT SITUATION -- DEMARCHE TO

- EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT

REF: (A) STATE 216968; (B) STATE 217365; (C) STATE 217471

1. ~~IS~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. I TELEPHONED MINSTATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS BOUTROS GHALI EARLY AUGUST 5 TO SAY I HAD A MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT MUBARAK FROM THE SECRETARY AND TO ASK HOW IT SHOULD BE DELIVERED. BOUTROS INFORMED ME THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS IN ALEXANDRIA, BUT SAID HE WOULD TRANSMIT TO MUBARAK THE STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT REAGAN (REF. A) AND THE MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY SHULTZ (REF. C). ACCORDINGLY, I CALLED ON HIM AT 1030 AUGUST 5.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. BOUTROS READ BOTH TEXTS CAREFULLY. I DREW HIS ATTENTION TO THE LAST TWO SENTENCES OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STATEMENT, EMPHASIZING THAT WE HAD FIRMLY AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY COMMUNICATED OUR CONCERNS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL AND THAT WE AGAIN WERE URGING THE GOE TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO FACILITATE PROSPECTS FOR THE PLO'S PROMPT EVACUATION FROM BEIRUT (REF. B). BOUTROS TOOK NOTE OF THESE POINTS, BUT SAID HE WANTED TO MAKE ONE OBSERVATION: PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STATEMENT CONTAINED NOTHING ON PROMPT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. HE THEN SAID HE WOULD LIKE ANSWERS TO THREE QUESTIONS:

- (A) WHAT DOES THE USG INTEND TO DO ABOUT ISRAEL'S REFUSAL TO PERMIT UN OBSERVERS TO TAKE UP POSITIONS AROUND WEST BEIRUT?
- (B) WHAT DOES THE USG INTEND TO DO IF ISRAEL WILL NOT WITHDRAW TO THE AUGUST 1 LINES OF OPPOSING FORCES?

(C) WHAT DOES THE USG INTEND TO DO IF ISRAEL GOES AHEAD WITH A FINAL ASSAULT ON WEST BEIRUT?

BOUTROS MADE CLEAR HE WAS NOT POSING THESE QUESTIONS ANTAGONISTICALLY. RATHER, HE SAID, HAVING ANSWERS TO THEM WOULD AID THE GOE IN TRYING TO BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE TO OUR EFFORTS TO FIND A WAY OUT OF THE CRISIS. I SAID I WAS SURE THESE CONTINGENCY QUESTIONS WERE UNDER REVIEW IN WASHINGTON AND SAID I WOULD REPORT HIS CONCERNS.

4. DRAWING ON THE MOST RECENT REPORTING FROM THE DEPARTMENT AND EMBASSY BEIRUT, I DESCRIBED CONDITIONS ON THE GROUND AND THE CURRENT STATE OF PHIL HABIB'S EFFORTS. AT THE CONCLUSION OF OUR MEETING, I ASKED IF THE GOE CONTINUED TO BE IN TOUCH WITH THE PLO. BOUTROS SAID YES, THOUGH HE HAD NOT BEEN INVOLVED IN THE MOST RECENT DISCUSSIONS AND THUS HAD NOTHING TO TELL ME. I ASKED IF THE GOE WERE COMMUNICATING DIRECTLY WITH THE ISRAELIS. BOUTROS SAID NO. THE GOE PREFERRED TO SPEAK TO US, AND IN THIS VEIN, BOUTROS NOTED THAT AMBASSADOR GHORBAL HAD RECENTLY HAD A VERY SATISFACTORY MEETING WITH SECRETARY SHULTZ. I SAID I WOULD KEEP IN TOUCH AS THE SITUATION EVOLVES.

5. COMMENT: IT WAS CLEAR BOUTROS HAD NO RECENT INSTRUCTIONS FROM MUBARAK. BEYOND BEING PLEASED THAT WE DID NOT VETO YESTERDAY'S UNSC RESOLUTION ON LEBANON, HE HAD NOTHING NEW TO OFFER IN TERMS OF CURRENT GOE THINKING. END COMMENT PRECHT

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

~~SECRET~~

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 CAIRO 9447 DTG: 061516Z AUG 82 PSN: 035556  
SIT714 DATE 08/10/82 TOR: 218/2017Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

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EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHEG #9447/01 2181536  
O 061516Z AUG 82  
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0428

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 19447  
NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: 8/6/02  
TAGS: PEPR, US, EG, IS, LE, XF, PLO  
SUBJECT: LEBANON CRISIS: EGYPTIAN ATTITUDES IN WAKE  
- OF KAMAL HASSAN ALI'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON  
REF: (A) CAIRO 19265; (B) CAIRO 19357

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: POL COUNSELOR HAD OCCASION ON AUGUST 5 TO ELICIT REACTIONS TO DEPRIMIN AND FORMIN KAMAL HASSAN ALI'S JULY 29-31 VISIT TO WASHINGTON FROM MFA INFORMATION DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR SALAH BASSIOUNI, WHO HAD ACCOMPANIED ALI'S DELEGATION TO THE U.S. AND WHO APPEARS TO BE CLOSE TO OSAMA EL-BAZ. WHILE REMARKING THAT THE EXCHANGE OF LETTERS THAT HAD OCCURRED BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN, SECRETARY SHULTZ AND PRESIDENT MUBARAK DURING ALI'S VISIT HAD PRODUCED THE "UNFORTUNATE" EFFECT OF HIGHLIGHTING THE "DIFFERENCE OF OPINION" THAT EXISTS BETWEEN THE GOE AND USG ON THE PLO EVACUATION ISSUE, BASSIOUNI PREFERRED TO DWELL ON POSSIBLE STEPS HE HOPED THE U.S. MIGHT TAKE TO MEET EGYPT'S CONCERNS HALFWAY. CHIEF AMONG THESE WAS HIS SUGGESTION THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN COMMUNICATE WITH MUBARAK AGAIN, THIS TIME ELABORATING -- IN SOME FASHION SHORT OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION OR A U.S. DECISION TO

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ENTER A DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO -- MORE SPECIFICALLY ON HOW WE INTEND TO "ADDRESS THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINE PEOPLE" IN THE CONTEXT OF RENEWED MIDEAST PEACE EFFORTS. BASSIOUNI ALSO STRESSED THAT FUTURE U.S. APPROACHES TO THE GOE ON THE PLO EVACUATION ISSUE SHOULD BE PRECEDED BY HEIGHTENED INTER-ARAB CONSULTATION/COORDINATION AND ACCOMPANIED BY DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE MECHANICS OF SUCH AN EVACUATION AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH EGYPT MIGHT ANTICIPATE FINANCIAL BACKING (E.G., FROM SAUDI ARABIA) FOR ITS POSSIBLE PARTICIPATION IN THE TRANSFER AND UPKEEP OF THE EVACUEES. END SUMMARY.

3. POL COUNSELOR MET AUGUST 5 WITH MFA INFORMATION DEPARTMENT (MFA'S INR) DIRECTOR SALAH BASSIOUNI TO ELICIT HIS IMPRESSIONS OF FORMIN KAMAL HASSAN ALI'S JULY 29-31 VISIT TO WASHINGTON FOR TALKS WITH PRESI-

DENT REAGAN, SECRETARY SHULTZ AND OTHER SENIOR USG OFFICIALS. BASSIOUNI NOTED WRYLTY THAT, WHILE THE WASHINGTON DISCUSSIONS HAD FAILED TO RESOLVE THE "DIFFERENCE OF OPINION" BETWEEN THE GOE AND USG REGARD THE "POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES" THAT SHOULD ATTEND THE PLO'S EVACUATION FROM BEIRUT, THEY HAD AT LEAST SERVED TO CLARIFY THE ATTITUDES OF EACH SIDE ON THAT ISSUE. IT HAD BEEN MOST UNFORTUNATE IN THIS CONNECTION, BASSIOUNI ADDED, THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S JULY 31 LETTER TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK (STATE 213727) HAD PARAPHRASED THE EGYPTIAN POSITION IN SUCH A WAY AS TO GIVE MUBARAK THE IMPRESSION EITHER THAT ALI HAD NOT MADE EGYPT'S POSITION SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR OR (WORSE) THAT THE USG WAS TRYING TO "HUSTLE" THE EGYPTIANS INTO ACCEPTING THE AMERICAN POSITION. THIS HAD DRAWN A "FURIOUS" REACTION FROM MUBARAK THAT HAD MORTIFIED ALI AND RESULTED IN INSTRUCTIONS TO HIM TO SEND A FOLLOW-UP LETTER TO THE SECRETARY (STATE 213901) WHICH SERVED TO DIG IN EGYPT'S POSITION EVEN DEEPER. THIS, IN TURN, HAD SPARKED CONSIDERABLE IRRITATION ON THE PART OF THE USG. INDICATING THAT HE WAS AWARE OF THE GENERAL THRUST AND TONE OF THE COMMENTS SUBSEQUENTLY MADE BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY VELIOTES AND UNDERSECRETARY EAGLEBURGER (STATE 213901 AND 216937) TO ASHRAF GHORBAL, BASSIOUNI CAUTIONED POL COUNSELOR THAT THIS IS NOT THE WAY TO DEAL WITH MUBARAK. OUR READING THE RIOT ACT TO THE EGYPTIANS ON THIS ISSUE, HE SAID, WOULD ONLY FORTIFY AN IMPRESSION THAT THE USG REGARDS THE GOE AS THE SUBSIDIARY PARTY IN A MASTER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP AND THEREBY CAUSE MUBARAK TO DIG IN HIS HEELS FURTHER.

CAIRO 9447 DTG: 061516Z AUG 82 PSN: 035556  
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS, IN BASSIOUNI'S VIEW, OUGHT NOT TO BE ALLOWED TO PERSIST. EGYPT AND THE U.S., HE OBSERVED, HAD COME TOO FAR TOGETHER AND DONE TOO MUCH FOR EACH OTHER IN TERMS OF THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONS AND IN THE CAUSE OF MIDEAST PEACE TO PERMIT THEMSELVES TO HAVE A FALLING OUT AT THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE ON THE PLO EVACUATION QUESTION. THAT ISSUE, HE SAID, CAN AND SHOULD BE RESOLVED AMICABLY AND QUICKLY IN A WAY THAT WILL MEET THE BASIC REQUIREMENTS OF BOTH SIDES, AVOID GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT THE USG TAKES IT COOPERATION FOR GRANTED, AND THEREBY ENHANCE, RATHER THAN DETRACT FROM, OUR FUTURE JOINT EFFORTS TO RESCUE THE PEACE PROCESS.

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 O 061516Z AUG 82 ZDK ZUI RUEHCE 0727F 2181710  
 FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0429  
 BT  
 SECRET SECTION 02 OF 03 CAIRO 19447  
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5. THINKING ALOUD ABOUT HOW WE MIGHT "FIND A WAY OUT" OF THE CURRENT TANGLE, BASSIDUNI WONDERED IF IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE USG TO SAY OR DO SOMETHING THAT WOULD LEND ADDITIONAL WEIGHT TO OUR PROFESSED DETERMINATION "TO ADDRESS THE LEGITIMATE NEEDS AND PROBLEMS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE URGENTLY AND IN ALL THEIR DIMENSIONS." HE SAID EGYPTIAN POLICY-MAKERS IN PRIVATE ARE FULLY AWARE OF THE REASONS WHY THE USG CANNOT NOW ACT FORMALLY OR OPENLY TO ESPOUSE THE CONCEPT OF PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION OR EVEN TO ENTER INTO A DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO LEADERSHIP. MUBARAK AND HIS ADVISORS, ACCORDING TO BASSIDUNI, MIGHT WELL BE SATISFIED WITH SOMETHING LESS -- SAY, A REITERATION OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR A "HOMELAND" OR "NATIONAL HOME" FOR THE PALESTINIANS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, OR U.S. PUBLIC RECOGNITION OF THE FACT THAT, REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME OF THE LEBANON CRISIS, PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM IS A FORCE THAT WILL CONTINUE TO COMMAND MORAL LEGITIMACY AND INTERNATIONAL RESPECT IN CONNECTION WITH FUTURE PEACE EFFORTS. IN RESPONSE TO POL COUNSELOR'S OBSERVATION THAT CHARGE PRECHT HAD THAT VERY MORNING DELIVERED A MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK (STATE 217471) THAT REITERATED OUR DETERMINATION TO WORK FOR A COMPREHENSIVE MIDEAST PEACE IN WHICH THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS MUST BE ADDRESSED, BASSIDUNI URGED US TO ELABORATE IMAGINATIVELY ON WHAT WE HAVE IN MIND IN THIS REGARD AND TO CONVEY OUR THINKING TO MUBARAK AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE HOPED PRESIDENT REAGAN WOULD FIND IT POSSIBLE TO COMMUNICATE WITH MUBARAK AGAIN SOON.

6. IN ANY CASE, BASSIDUNI CONTINUED, THE USG SHOULD ENSURE THAT WHEN IT AGAIN APPROACHES MUBARAK ON THE SUBJECT OF THE PLO'S EVACUATION, WE ARE IN A POSITION TO PROVIDE DETAILED INFORMATION AND IDEAS NOT ONLY ON THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE WE HOPE EGYPT WILL AGREE TO ACCEPT,

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 9112 DTG: 060104Z AUG 82 PSN: 034525  
SIT158 DATE 08/16/82 TOR: 218/B314Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

IN THE CONTEXT OF HABIB'S EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE AN AGREED PACKAGE. SINCE HABIB IS MAKING PROGRESS IN PUTTING TOGETHER SUCH A PACKAGE, WE ARE COMPLETELY FOCUSED ON BRINGING HIS NEGOTIATIONS TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR VP KEMP SIT EOB  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #9112 2180308  
O 060104Z AUG 82  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 8741

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 8592  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 1709  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 8289  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1080  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 2305  
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 219112

~~EXDIS~~

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PEPR, US, EG, IS PLO,  
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO EGYPTIAN DEMARCHE ON WEST BEIRUT

REF: CAIRO 19357

1. ~~S~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE UNDERSTAND SPIRIT IN WHICH BOUTROS GHALI POSED QUESTIONS REFEEL, ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVE LAST TWO QUESTIONS HAD DECIDEDLY RHETORICAL RING TO THEM. REGARDING HIS FIRST QUESTION ON UN OBSERVERS, YOU MAY PASS TO BOUTROS THE FOLLOWING:

-- U.S. AGREES FULLY ON UTILITY OF UN OBSERVERS, AS IS EVIDENCED BY OUR VOTE ON THE UN ON THE ISSUE, AND WE ARE FIRMLY ON RECORD WITH THE ISRAELIS IN THIS REGARD.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

-- HABIB HAS INCLUDED UN OBSERVERS AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF HIS EVACUATION PLAN.

-- HABIB'S NEGOTIATIONS ON THE EVACUATION PLAN HAVE MADE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS. PLO IS CLEARLY ENGAGED IN A SERIOUS EFFORT TO PUT TOGETHER A REALISTIC PLAN.

-- WHILE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE, SENSITIVE ISSUES REMAIN TO BE RESOLVED, WHICH WILL INVOLVE ENGAGING THE ISRAELIS ON ISSUES THEY FEEL STRONGLY ABOUT.

-- WE MUST PRESENT THE EVACUATION PLAN AS A PACKAGE AND,

THEREFORE, DO NOT WISH TO PRESS ISRAELIS FURTHER NOW ON ONE PART OF THE PACKAGE (UN OBSERVERS) BEFORE THE COMPLETE PACKAGE HAS BEEN WORKED OUT.

3. REGARDING SECOND QUESTION, YOU SHOULD NOTE THAT AS A PRACTICAL MATTER WITHDRAWAL OR DISENGAGEMENT WILL COME

4. REGARDING THIRD QUESTION, YOU MAY TELL BOUTROS WE ANTICIPATE IN CONTEXT OF HABIB SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDING HIS NEGOTIATIONS, THIS CONTINGENCY WILL NOT ARISE. YOU SHOULD NOTE, IF HE PRESSES, OUR REACTION TO TUESDAY'S AND WEDNESDAY'S DEVELOPMENTS IN BEIRUT CLEARLY INDICATE DEPTH OF OUR CONCERN ABOUT ACTIONS WHICH DETRACT FROM OUR EFFORTS TO RESOLVE BEIRUT PEACEFULLY. YOU MAY TELL BOUTROS THAT OUR CONCERN IN THIS REGARD WAS FORCEFULLY CONVEYED TO THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT.

5. YOU SHOULD USE OCCASION OF THIS FOLLOW UP CONVERSATION WITH BOUTROS TO NOTE OUR INTEREST IN WHAT PLO IS SAYING TO GOE CONCERNING BEIRUT EVACUATION, EGYPT AS A DESTINATION, ETC. YOU SHOULD ALSO USE THE OPENING THIS DISCUSSION PRESENTS TO REMIND BOUTROS THAT WE NEED ARAB COOPERATION TO SUCCESSFULLY EVACUATE BEIRUT AND PRESS HIM AGAIN FOR EARLY GOE AGREEMENT TO TAKE SHARE OF PLO FIGHTERS IN CONTEXT OF THE EXISTING BROADER ARAB AGREEMENT TO ENSURE THAT NEITHER OF US HAS TO FACE THE PROBLEMS THAT WOULD STEM FROM THE SCENARIO HE POSES IN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

HIS THIRD QUESTION. SHULTZ

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NLRR 748362-7-3

BY K717 NARA DATE 05/13

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 CAIRO 9451 DTG: 062005Z AUG 82 PSN: 035581  
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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHEG #9451 2182006  
O 062005Z AUG 82  
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0436

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 1300  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 9234  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 4199  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 9792  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0079  
BT

~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 19451  
EXDIS  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PEPR, US, EG, IS, PLO  
SUBJECT: REPSONSE TO EGYPTIAN DEMARCHE ON WEST BEIRUT  
REF: STATE 219112

1. ~~entire~~ ENTIRE TEXT)

2. WHEN I WAS FINALLY ABLE TO SEE MINSTATE BOUTROS GHALI EVENING AUGUST 6, I CONVEYED TO HIM REFTEL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS HE HAD POSED YESTERDAY. WITH GOOD-NATURED CYNICISM, BOUTROS SAID OUR ANSWERS WERE IN EFFECT NON-RESPONSIVE. I EMPHASIZED THAT THEY ALL BOILED DOWN TO ONE CENTRAL FACT. THAT WAS, AGAINST ALL ODDS, AMBASSADOR HABIB WAS ON THE VERGE OF REGISTERING AN AMAZING SUCCESS IN PERSUADING THE PLO TO AGREE MORE OR LESS TO HIS TERMS TO DEPART BEIRUT. BOUTROS CONFIRMED THAT THE FOE NOW HAD THE SAME INFORMATION VIA NEW YORK AND HE PROCEEDED TO OUTLINE SOME OF THE DETAILS OF THE PLO PLAN.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

I CORRECTED HIM IN A FRESH RESPECTS AND EMPHASIZED THAT THE ONE REMAINING UNANSWERED QUESTION WAS THE DESTINATION FOR A LARGE NUMBER OF THE FIGHTERS.

3. BOUTROS SAID HE UNDERSTOOD VIRTUALLY ALL OF THE FIGHTERS WOULD GO TO SYRIA, AT LEAST AS AN INTERMEDIATE STOP. I SAID THAT WAS NOT ACCURATE. SYRIA HAD AGREED TO TAKE IN A GROUP NUMBERING POSSIBLY ABOUT 2,000; JORDAN AND IRAQ HAD ALSO AGREED TO TAKE A CERTAIN NUMBER, BUT THERE WOULD BE 3-4,000 MEN FOR WHOM WE STILL NEEDED TO FIND A DESTINATION. PHIL HABIB CONTINUES TO EMPHASIZE TO THE LEBANESE AND IN HIS REPORTING THAT EGYPT WAS ABSOLUTELY CRUCIAL IN THIS REGARD.

4. HAD EGYPT RECEIVED ANY KIND OF HINT OF PLO READINESS TO COME HERE? BOUTROS REPLIED "NONE WHATSOEVER."

I SAID WE WERE AWARE THAT THE PLO WAS DEFINITELY THINKING OF EGYPT AS ONE OF ITS DESTINATIONS. THERE COULD WELL BE A REQUEST THAT A GROUP OF 3-4,000 BE ADMITTED TO EGYPT. I DID NOT KNOW WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN WASHINGTON, BUT THERE MIGHT BE A FURTHER APPEAL FROM THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF OUR GOVERNMENT TO THAT EFFECT. HOW DID HE THINK PRESIDENT MUBARAK MIGHT RESPOND? BOUTROS MADE SEVERAL POSITIVE-SOUNDING COMMENTS ABOUT TAKING IN THE FIGHTERS, BUT SAID HE SIMPLY COULD NOT PREDICT MUBARAK'S REACTION. MUBARAK WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE DAMAGE THAT COULD BE DONE TO THE EGYPTIAN-U.S. RELATIONSHIP IN THE PERCEPTION OF THE EGYPTIAN PUBLIC IF THERE WERE NO U.S. FACE-SAVING GESTURE MADE TOWARDS THE PALESTINIANS.

5. I ASKED IF EGYPT HAD BEGUN TO DO ANY PLANNING FOR ARRANGEMENTS TO HANDLE PLO FIGHTERS SHOULD THINGS FALL INTO PLACE. WHO, FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD PAY FOR THEIR UPKEEP? BOUTROS SAID HE ASSUMED THE SAUDIS WOULD FOOT THE BILL. HE SAID THERE WAS ANOTHER PROBLEM THAT WAS TROUBLING THE EGYPTIANS. THAT HAD TO DO WITH THE 10,000 PLO FIGHTERS CURRENTLY BEING HELD IN "CONCENTRATION CAMPS" BY THE ISRAELIS. THE EGYPTIANS HAD PRIVATE INFORMATION THAT ISRAEL INTENDED TO PUSH THOSE MEN SOMEHOW INTO EGYPT. I SAID WE HAD NO INFORMATION TO THAT EFFECT AND THAT PARTICULAR PROBLEM WOULD HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH FAR DOWN THE LINE.

6. BOUTROS WONDERED IF EGYPT AGREED TO ACCEPT THE FIGHTERS

CAIRO 9451 DTG: 062005Z AUG 82 PSN: 035581  
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WHETHER LATER THE U.S. WOULD AGREE TO SUPPORT THE EGYPTIAN-FRENCH RESOLUTION. I SAID I COULD GIVE NO ASSURANCES IN THAT REGARD.

7. BOUTROS SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD FROM THE PLO THAT THE MAIN OBSTACLE TO A SUCCESSFUL EVACUATION OF THE FIGHTERS WAS ISRAEL'S REFUSAL TO COOPERATE WITH HABIB. I SAID SEVERAL POINTS REMAIN TO BE ironed OUT WITH THE ISRAELIS AND IT COULD WELL BE THAT THE ENTIRE ENTERPRISE PRIZE WOULD COLLAPSE BECAUSE OF ISRAEL'S OPPOSITION OR A RENEWAL OF FIGHTING.

I STRESSED, AS I HAD IN PREVIOUS MEETINGS, THAT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR EGYPT NOT TO BE CAUGHT OUT AND ASSIGNED THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FAILURE OF THIS INITIATIVE SHOULD THE WORST COME TO PASS.

8. BOUTROS SAID HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH MUBARAK AND REPORT OUR CONVERSATION.

9. BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PRECHT

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CAIRO 9451 DTG: 062005Z AUG 82 PSN: 035581

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 CAIRO 9461 DTG: 071840Z AUG 82 PSN: 036868  
SIT092 DATE 08/16/82 TOR: 219/1949Z

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EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: REDTAG

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MESSAGE:

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O 071840Z AUG 82 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0441

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0080  
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 1301  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 9235  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 4200  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 9794  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 8561  
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SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 19461

EXD1S

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PEPR, EG, LE IS, PLO, US  
SUBJECT: POL TO EGYPT  
REF: (A) STATE 220816; (B) STATE 220901; (C) STATE 220896

- 1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)
- 2. I MET AT 7:00 P.M. AUGUST 7 WITH MINSTATE BOUTROS GHALI TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS AND RECIEVE THE FOLLOWING RESPONSES:
  - AN ARAFAT EMISSARY IN WASHINGTON HAD MADE PLAIN TO A VARIETY OF AMERICAN CONTACTS AS WELL AS TO EGYPTIAN EMBASSY OFFICERS THAT THE PLO WAS WILLING TO LEAVE BEIRUT WITHOUT A "POLITICAL BONUS"
  - (REF. A) HAD THIS BEEN REPORTED TO CAIRO?
  - ANSWER: NO. DID THIS CHANGE IN THE PLO POSITION NOT AFFECT THE EGYPTIAN POSITION? DID IT NOT MAKE THE EGYPTIAN POSITION "MORE HOLY THAN THE POPE?"

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

- BOUTROS REPLIED IN TWO PARTS: FIRST, THE PLO WAS SAYING DIFFERENT THINGS IN DIFFERENT PLACES. THE MOST RECENT WORD THE EGYPTIANS HAD FROM THE PLO WAS THAT THE ORGANIZATION SUPPOETED THE EGYPTIAN POSITION "100 PERCENT." IF THE PLO WANTED TO CHANGE THAT POSITION, IT SHOULD COMMUNICATE FORMALLY AND DIRECTLY WITH THE GOE. I NOTED THAT THE EGYPTIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON HAD APPARENTLY BEEN SO INFORMED.
- SECONDLY, BOUTROS SAID, THE EGYPTIAN POSITION WAS A PRINCIPLED ONE THAT RESPONDED TO EGYPTIAN INTERESTS.
- FOR FIVE YEARS THE PLO HAD OBJECTED THAT EGYPT SHOULD NOT SPEAK FOR THE PALESTINIANS. AND YET EGYPT HAD DONE SO BECAUSE IT BELIEVED ITS POSITION ON PEACE WAS CORRECT. SIMILARLY, IT NOW BELEIVED THAT ITS VIEW OF HOW TO HANDLE THE LEBANESE CRISIS AND THE MOVEMENT OF THE PALESTINIANS WAS CORRECT. IT WAS POSSIBLE, HE

- SAID, THAT THE PLO COULD PERSUADE PRESIDENT MUBARAK TO CHANGE THE ESTABLISHED EGYPTIAN POSITION, BUT BOUTROS APPEARED DOUBTFUL.

- 85 2- ,92 -?9) 753) 6 : ) 3-4, IS SAID, THAT THE PLO WAS READY TO LEAVE BEIRUT AND THAT DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS WERE NEARING COMPLETION. TO BACK THIS UP, I GAVE BOUTROS A COPY OF THE LETTER FROM ARAFAT CONTAINED REF. B, WITHOUT REVEALING HOW IT CAME INTO OUR HANDS. BOUTROS DID NOT CONTEST THAT THISD WAS NOW THE PLO POSITION.

- DRAWING ON REF. C, I SAID THE FRENCH NOW APPEARED TO GIVE PRIORITY TO SAVING BEIRUT AND WERE PREPARED TO DEFER INITIATIVES FOR A GENERAL POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE FRENCH MILITARY LIAISON OFFICER HAD ARRIVED IN BEIRUT AND THE ITALIAN LIAISON OFFICER WAS DUE THERE SOON, I UNDERSTOOD, BOUTROS INDICATED HE WAS AWARE OF THIS MODIFICATION IN THE FRENCH POSITION.

- I SAID I HAD HEARD THAT FURTHER APPEAL TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK WAS BEING CONSIDERED IN WASHINGTON. WAS THERE ANY INDICATION OF A CHANGE IN THE EGYPTIAN ATTITUDE? BOUTROS SAID THERE HAD BEEN A THREE-HOUR MEETING WITH MUBARAK IN WHICH LEBANON HAD BEEN THOROUGHLY DISCUSSED. ALTHOUGH HE COULD NBOT SAY HOW MUBARAK MIGHT REACT TO A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OR AN APPEAL FROM THE PLO OR OTHER GOVERNMENTS, AS OF NOW, THE EGYPTIAN POSITION REMAINED UNCHANGED. THERE MUST BE DEFINITE POLITICAL MOVEMENT IF EGYPT WAS TO ACCEPT PLO FIGHTERS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

- WE CONTINUES TO HEAR, IS SAID, THAT OTHER GOVERNMENTS AND THE PLO WANTED EGYPT TO ACCEPT THE PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS. BOUTROS SAID THE WEGYPTIANS ALSO HEARD THE SAME THINS INDIRECTLY. AT HIS LEVEL, HOWEVER, HE WAS UNAWARE OF ANY SUCH APPRAL FROM THE PLO, THE GOL, SAUDI ARABIA OR THE FRENCH. IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT THEIR LEADERS WE3RE DEALING DIRECTLY WITH MUBARAK, BUT, IF SO, MUBARAK WAS NOT TELLING HIS ADVISORS.

- 3. COMMENT: ON THE BASIS OF WHAT BOUTROS TELLS US OF THE EGYPTIAN POSITION AFTER TODAY'S POLICY REVIEW WITH MUBARAK, I BELIEVE IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE EGYPTIAN WILL MOVE TO GREATER FLEXIBILITY ON ACCEPTING PLO FIGHTERS UNLESS:

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

9

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 CAIRO 9461  
SIT091 DATE 08/16/82

DTG: 071840Z AUG 82 PSN: 036870  
TOR: 219/1949Z

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SIT KEMP  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHEG #9461/02 2191850  
O 071840Z AUG 82 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0440

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0080  
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 1301  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 9235  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 4200  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 9794  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 8561  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 CAIRO 19461  
EXDIS

- THEY GET A DEFINITE REQUEST FROM THE PALESTINIANS  
- TO BE ACCEPTED IN EGYPT AND THE PLO MAKES IT KNOWN  
- THE THE GOE THAT THE "POLITICAL BONUS" CAN BE DEFERRED.  
- WE ARE ABLE TO PRESENT TO THE GOE A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE  
- IN OUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE PLO THAT MUBARAK WILL BE  
- ABLE TO USE WITH HIS PUBLIC TO JUSTIFY A CHANGE IN THE  
- ESTABLISHED GOE POSITION.

AS WE KNOW FROM EXPERIENCE WITH MUBARAK ON THE QUESTION  
OF THE AUTONOMY TALKS VENUE, HE CAN BE VERY TOUGH IN SUS-  
TAINING A POSITION THAT HE BELIEVES IS VITAL TO THE STA-  
BILITY OF HIS GOVERNMENT. THIS IS THAT KIND OF ISSUE FOR  
HIM AND, GIVEN THE EMOTIONS AROUSED BY LEBANON, ACCEPTING  
THE PLO FIGHTERS IS PROBABLY MORE SENSITIVE FOR THE GOE  
THAN JERUSALEM. THEREFORE, FOR AN APPEAL TO SUCCEED WITH  
MUBARAK, IT WILL HAVE TO HAVE, I BELIEVE, A NEW ELEMENT  
ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION. IT MUST APPEAR TO THE EGYP-  
TIAN PUBLIC THAT HE IS ACTING IN THE INTEREST OF EGYPT AND

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE ARABV CAUSE -- NOT SIMPLY DOING US A FAVOR. END  
COMMENT.

4. BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PRECHT

CAIRO 9461

DTG: 071840Z AUG 82 PSN: 036870

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 CAIRO 9531  
SIT057 DATE 08/16/82

DTG: 091222Z AUG 82 PSN: 038452  
TOR: 221/1240Z

SENT.

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SIT: RDTG KEMP EOB  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: RED TAG

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHEG #9531 2211223  
O 091222Z AUG 82 ZFF-4 RUEHC/RUQMHT  
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0488  
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT NIACT IMMEDIATE 0532  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE 0083  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE 9805  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM NIACT IMMEDIATE 8570

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 1310  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 9238  
USINT BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 3370  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 4209  
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
BT

~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 19531  
EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PINT, PEPR, MILI, LE, IS, XF, PLO, SY, EG, US  
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MESSAGE FROM THE PLO  
REF: BEIRUT 5230

1. (~~S~~ ENTIRE TEXT)

2. I HAD APPOINTMENT WITH BOUTROS GHALI AT 1330 AUGUST 9 TO BRING HIM-UP-TO-DATE ON LATEST DEVELOPMENTS. AS I WAS LEAVING EH EMBASY I WAS HANDED REFTEL REGARDING REPORTED LETTER FROM OSAMA EL-BAZ TO THE PLO AGREEING TO RECEIVE ANY NUMBER OF FIGHTERS WITHOUT CONDITIONS.

3. I TOLD BOUTROS THAT HABIB CONTINUED TO MAKE REAL PRO-  
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

GRESS AND DESCRIBED THE STATE OF PLAY. D-DAY WAS NOW TENTATIVELY SET FOR AUGUST 14 AND THE PLO HAD INFORMED US THAT THEY EXPECTD 2,000 MEN TO GO TO EGYPT. MEANWHILE, THE ISRAELIS WERE TELLING US THAT EGYPT WOULD REFUSE THE PLO AND CONSEQUENTLY HABIB'S AGREEMENT WAS WORTHLESS. I EMPHASIZED THE CRITICAL NATURE OF EGYPT'S ROLE AT THIS POINT IN THE SCENARIO.

4. I THEN SUMMARIZED FOR BOUTROS REFTEL INFORMATION FROM THE PLO REGARDING EGYPT'S WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THE FIGHTERS SHOULD CHAIRMAN ARAFAT REQUEST. BOUTROS SAID HE HAS NO INFORMATION WHATSOEVER IN THAT REGARD. HE WAS UNAWARE OF ANY SUCH LETTER FROM OSAMA TO THE PLO. ADDITIONALLY, AS MUBARAK, OSAMA AND KAMAL HASSAN ALI WERE ALL IN OMAN FOR POSSIBLY ANOTHER 48 HOURS, IT WOULD BE EXCEEDINGLY DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO CONFIRM THAT A LETTER HAD BEEN

5. I SAID I THOUGHT WE WOULD WANT OUR EMBASSY IN MUSCAT TO CHECK WITH THE EGYPTIAN DELEGATION DIRECTLY. BOUTROS SAID HE SAW NO PROBLEM IN THAT. I ASKED HIM TO CHECK WITH PLO REP DJANI TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER HE HAD RECEIVED SUCH A LETTER FROM SAMA. BOUTROS SAID HE WOULD TRY TO DO SO.

6. AS WE WERE SPEAKING, BOUTROS WAS HANDED A NOTE WHICH SAID THAT THE PLO HAD MADE AN OFFICIAL REQUEST THAT EGYPT ACCEPT ITS FIGHTERS. HE COULD NOT ELABORATE ON THIS INFORMATION, BUT PROMISED FURTHER DETAILS LATER.

7. WE ARE REPEATING BEIRUT 5230 TO MUSCAT AND REQUEST THAT AMBASSADOR COUNTRYMAN OR CHARGE BUCK URGENTLY GET IN TOUCH WITH OSAMA EL-BAZ OR KAMAL HASSAN ALI TO CONFIRM THE SUBSTANCE OF THE LETTER MENTIONED THEREIN. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO KNOW WHETHER, IN FACT, EGYPT IS WILLING TO ACCEPT THE PLO FIGHTERS "WITHOUT CONDITIONS." THIS WOULD MEAN A CHANGE IN EGYPT'S ESTABLISHED POSITION THAT LINKS A POLITICAL BONUS FOR THE PLO (I.E., U.S. WILLINGNESS TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THE PLO AND RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION) TO EGYPT'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE FIGHTERS.

8. BEIRUT AND OAMSCUS MINIME CONSIDERED. PRECHT

CAIRO 9531

DTG: 091222Z AUG 82 PSN: 038452

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**NLRR 748-36-2-6-0**  
**BY KAB NARA DATE 6/5/13**

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

11

PAGE 01 CAIRO 9621  
SIT981 DATE 08/16/82

DTG: 101658Z AUG 82 PSN: 040497  
TOR: 222/2029Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHIS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHEG #9621 2221659  
O 101658Z AUG 82 (SERVICED BY WHITE HOUSE COMCENTER)  
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0534

~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 19621

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: MARR, EG, US  
SUBJECT: POLITICAL BASIS OF EGYPTIAN CONTINGENCY SUPPORT  
REF: CAIRO 19556; (B) CAIRO 18989;  
- (C) OMC CAIRO 081353 JUL 82; (D) STATE 205849

1. ~~is~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: WHILE LEBANON SITUATION HAS ADVERSELY AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT OF U.S.-EGYPTIAN MILITARY COOPERATION, MOD REPORTS MAJOR CONCERN IS SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF U.S. PRESENCE. FMS LEVELS MAY ALSO BE OR BECOME FACTOR. EMBASSY PROPOSES TO SEEK CLARIFICATION FROM FOREIGN MINISTER. END SUMMARY.

3. CHAGE PLANS TO SEEK APPOINTMENT WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ALI AUGUST 12 OR 14 IN ORDER TO EXPLORE, IN

12# BEFORE CONTINUING  
TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS ON RAS BANAS AND RELATED PROGRAM (REF A). INTENTION WOULD BE TO PROBE FOR FACTORS INVOLVED IN GOE POSITION AND DEGREE OF COMMITMENT TO THAT POSITION. SHOULD WASHINGTON AGENCIES WISH US TO MAKE ANY SPECIFIC POINTS IN THAT DISCUSSION, PLEASE PROVIDE GUIDANCE.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. COMING ON HEELS OF DEFMIN'S STATEMENT LINKING FACILITIES TO PALESTINIAN PROBLEM (REF B), WE HAVE ASSUMED THAT A FACTOR IN GOE'S CURRENT POSTURE IS THE LEBANON SITUATION. IN SEVERAL INSTANCES, THE GOE HAS SOUGHT TO PUT SOME DAYLIGHT BETWEEN ITSELF AND THE U.S. IN REACTION TO U.S. POLICY IN LEBANON WHICH IS SEEN AS CLOSELY IDENTIFIED WITH ISRAELI OBJECTIVES.  
ANOTHER FACTOR SEEMS TO BE GOE UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF THE FACILITIES WE WILL REQUIRE. MG RAHMAN, EAF DEPUTY CHIEF FOR OPERATIONS, AUGUST 10 TOLD OMC ACTING CHIEF THAT THE NEW PDSITION PRIMARILY RESULTED FROM UNEASE IN SENIOR GOE CIRCLES ON THESE COUNTS. RAHMANS AID THAT, WITHOUT MORE DETAILS, THE GOE COULD NOT DETERMINE WHETHER FACILITIES COULD ADEQUATELY HANDLE BOTH U.S. AND EGYPTIAN REQUIREMENTS. PREVIOUS BRIEFINGS BY U.S. OFFICIALS, E.G., MG RAHMAN'S

SESSION AT MCDILL, WERE PARTICULARLY DEFICIENT ON OPERATIONAL PURPOSES FOR WHICH U.S. SOUGHT FACILITIES.

6. AS DEPT IS AWARE, GOE HAS FORMALLY REQUESTED THIS TYPE OF INFORMATION IN LETTER FROM BG TOURKI (REF C). LYING BEHIND THIS ISSUE IS EGYPTIAN SENSITIVITY ON QUESTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN TROOPS -- E.G., THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN A "BASE" AND A "FACILITY," BETWEEN PERMANENT PRESENCE AND CONTINGENCY USE, BETWEEN U.S. OR EGYPTIAN MANAGEMENT. HERETOFORE, EMBASSY HAS PREFERRED TO TREAT THESE ISSUES SOFTLY, ELIDING THEM WHERE POSSIBLE WITH ORAL BRIEFINGS, E.G., BY BRANCH MISSION, RATHER THAN FORMAL WRITTEN RESPONSE, AT LEAST UNTIL LEBANON SITUATION EASED. WE MAY NOW BE IN A NEW BALL GAME, AND FORMAL RESPONSE MAY BE PART OF THE PRICE WE PAY FOR RE-ESTABLISHING A POLITICAL BASIS FOR COOPERATION. WE WOULD ENCOURAGE STATE AND DOD TO ACCELERATE WORK ON RESPONSE TO TOURKI LETTER WHICH WE UNDERSTAND FROM REF D IS ONGOING, IN THE EVENT THAT A RESPONSE BECOMES A PREREQUISITE, OR CAN BE HELPFUL, IN OUR EFFORT.

7. GOE IS ALSO NO DOUBT AWARE OF JEOPARDY FY-83 AND 84 FMS PROGRAM LEVELS MAY FACE BEFORE CONGRESS. CODEL RAHALL, FOR EXAMPLE, GAVE DEFENSE MINISTER GLOOMY ASSESSMENT DURING RECENT VISIT. IT IS HARD TO OVERSTATE THE CHILLING IMPACT WHICH WILL RESULT FROM SIGNIFICANT CUTBACKS IN ANTICIPATED FY-83 LEVELS. WE WANT NEITHER TO ALARM THE GOE UNNECESSARILY, NOR TO CREATE FALSE EXPECTATIONS. AT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE SAME TIME, WE SHOULD BE CONSIDERING HOW WE MIGHT RESPOND THE GOE INQUIRIES ON THE POINT.

8. DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS SECDEF, JCS, CSA, CNO, CSAF, USCINCEUR, CINCUSAREUR, HQ USAF, COMRDTF. PRECHT

CAIRO 9621

DTG: 101658Z AUG 82 PSN: 040497

~~SECRET~~

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12

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 CAIRO 9676  
SIT505 RECALLED

DTG: 111456Z AUG 82 PSN: 041589  
TOR: 223/1559Z

DISTRIBUTION: RCAL /001  
WHSR COMMENT: -----CHECKLIST-----

OP IMMED  
UTS2144  
DE RUEHEG #9676/01 2231500  
O 111456Z AUG 82  
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

**DECLASSIFIED**

**NLRR 748-36-2-8-8**

**BY COB NARA DATE 6/4/13**

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0558

INFO AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA 2297  
AMEMBASSY AMMAN 1323  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 4221  
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 6910  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 9819  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 8584  
DIA WASHINGTON DC//4

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 19676

E. O. 12356: DECL: 8/10/02  
TAGS: PINT, SOPN, PEPR, EG, IS, US, XF, PINS  
SUBJECT: (C) LEBANON CRISIS: EFFECTS ON EGYPTIAN  
ATTITUDES TOWARD THE U. S.  
REFS: (A) CAIRO 14037, (B) CAIRO 14055, (C) CAIRO 14155,  
(D) CAIRO 14310, (E) CAIRO 15013, (F) CAIRO 15866,  
(G) CAIRO 17801

1. ~~2~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. A RESURGENCE IN "REAL TERRORISM" IN THE MIDEAST AS A WHOLE, SORSENING SECTARIAN RELATIONS IN EGYPT AND GENUINE ANGER TOWARD THE U. S. AMONG INCREASING NUMBERS OF EGYPTIANS ARE WHAT LEFTIST OPPOSITION FIGURES HERE PREDICT CAN BE EXPECTED TO RESULT FROM ISRAEL'S SIEGE OF WEST BEIRUT AND LOCAL PERCEPTIONS OF THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE U. S. IN THE LEBANON CRISIS. WHILE PUBLIC OPINION HERE APPEARS TO HAVE LOST MUCH OF THE SPONTANEITY AND FIRE THAT CHARACTERIZED LOCAL REACTIONS TO OUR ROLE IN THE EARLY WEEKS OF THE CRISIS, EDITORIAL COMMENT INT THE CAIRO MEDIA REMAINS HIGHLY AND VOCALLY CRITICAL. WE ARE FORCED TO CONCLUDE THAT PUBLIC SUPPORT AND SYMPATHY FOR THE U. S. POSITION HAS ERODED CONSIDERABLY OVER THE PAST TWO MONTHS, AND THAT IT MAY BE A WHILE BEFORE WE CAN HOPE TO RECOUP EGYPTIAN CONFIDENCE IN OUR INTENTIONS AND GOOD FAITH. END SUMMARY.

3. DR RIFAAT AL-SAID, ASSISTANT SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE LEFTIST NATIONAL PROGRESSIVE UNIONIST GROUPING (NPUG), TOLD POLOFF ON AUGUST 5 THAT THE U. S. SHOULD EXPECT TO ENCOUNTER A "SHARP PUBLIC REACTION" IN ITS FUTURE RELATIONS WITH MUCH OF THE ARAB WORLD AS A RESULT OF WHAT HE BELIEVES ARE WIDESPREAD POPULAR PERCEPTIONS THAT THE USG HAS ACTED IN SUPPORT OF, IF NOT IN COLLUSION WITH, ISRAEL INB THE LATTER'S INVASION OF LEBANON AND ITS LENGTHY SIEGE OF WEST BEIRUT. HE PREDICTED THAT, WHATEVER THE OUTCOME OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN BEIRUT, ONE SURE RESULT OF THE EVENTS OF THE PAST TWO MONTHS IN LEBANON WILL BE A RESURGENCE OF WHAT HE CALLED "REAL TERRORISM" IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND ELSEWHERE. AL-SAID PREDICTED THAT U. S. INTERESTS WILL BE PRIMARY TARGETS FOR SUCH TERRORIST ACTIVITIES WHICH, IN THE MAIN, WILL BE MOTIVATED BY A DESIRE FOR "REVENGE". SAUDI AND GULF INTERESTS WILL ALSO BE

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B

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 CAIRO 9676

DTG: 111456Z AUG 82 PSN: 041589

TARGETS, HE SAID, AS NONE OF THESE COUNTRIES IS VIEWED AS HAVING ASSISTED THE PALESTINIANS SUFFICIENTLY IN THEIR HOUR OF DIREST NEED.

4. FOCUSING SPECIFICALLY ON POPULAR REACTION IN EGYPT, AL-SAID NOTED THAT EVEN IN BY-GONE DAYS WHEN NASSER'S RHETORIC AGAINST THE U. S. WAS AT ITS HEIGHT, MOST EGYPTIANS MAINTAINED A GRUDGING ADMIRATION AND WARM FEELINGS FOR THE U. S. LATER, DURING THE SADAT YEARS, MANY OF THESE SAME PEOPLE WERE BUOYED BY HOPES THAT THE AMERICAN CONNECTION WOULD BRING PEACE AND PROSPERITY TO EGYPT. THE SITUATION HERE IS DIFFERENT TODAY, HE SAID. A GREATER NUMBER OF EGYPTIANS FEEL GENUINELY ANGRY AT THE U. S. THAN AT ANY TIME IN RECENT MEMORY, AND THEIR FEELINGS OF BITTERNESS AND RESENTMENT ARE NOT LIKELY TO RECEDE OR BE DISSIPATED QUICKLY OR EASILY.

5. A PRINCIPAL ELEMENT IN THESE POPULAR ATTITUDES, ACCORDING TO AL-SAID, IS A DEEP SENSE OF BETRAYAL. EVEN THOSE MANY EGYPTIANS (NOT INCLUDING HIMSELF) WHO HAD SUPPORTED THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS, THE PEACE TREATY WITH ISRAEL AND EGYPT'S COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U. S. NOW SEE THEIR COUNTRY AS HAVING BEEN LURED

INTO A SITUATION WHERE -- HAVING FORECLOSED THE

POSSIBILITY OF HOSTILITIES WITH ISRAEL AND ACCEPTED

THE DEMILITARIZATION OF MOST OF THE SINAI -- IT CAN NO LONGER EXERT EFFECTIVE RESTRAINT ON ISRAEL'S ABILITY TO PURSUE ADVENTURIST MILITARY AND POLITICAL POLICIES VIS-A-VIS THE REST OF THE ARAB WORLD.

ECHOING A COMMENT MADE BY MINSTATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS BOUTROS GHALI TO THE AMBASSADOR LAST JUNE (CAIRO 15733), AL-SAID EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT ISRAEL WOULD HAVE ACTED AS IT HAS IN LEBANON IF IT HAD NOT BEEN RECEIVED BY THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE TREATY OF THE NEED TO MAINTAIN FORCES ALONG THE SOUTHERN FRONTIER TO COUNTER A POSSIBLE EGYPTIAN MILITARY RESPONSE. HE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH FEW EGYPTIANS ACTUALLY WANT TO SEE THEIR COUNTRY EMBROILED IN WAR WITH ISRAEL (OR ANYONE ELSE, FOR THAT MATTER), MANY BELIEVE THAT PRIOR TO 1978-79, THE POTENTIAL THREAT  
BT

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14

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 CAIRO 9676 DTG:111456Z AUG 82 PSN: 041670  
SIT982 DATE 08/16/82 TOR: 223/1704Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS KEMP

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHEG #9676/02 0000043

O 000042Z

FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0561

INFO AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA 2298

AMEMBASSY AMMAN 1324

AMEMBASSY JIDDA 4222

AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 6911

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 9820

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 8585

DIA WASHINGTON DC//4

BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 CAIRO 19676  
OF RENEWED HOSTILITIES WITH EGYPT OFTEN MADE THE  
ISRAELIS THINK TWICE BEFORE ATTACKING OTHER ARAB  
COUNTRIES.

6. AL-SAID ALSO CONFIDED THAT HE WAS FRANKLY WORRIED  
OVER THE IMPACT WHICH THE LEBANON CRISIS CAN HAVE  
ON FUTURE SECTARIAN RELATIONS IN EGYPT. ALREADY,  
HE SAID, TWO STRONG CURRENTS ARE DEVELOPING, BOTH  
OF WHICH ARE DEPLORABLE, FIRST, THE FACT THAT  
ISRAEL'S ACTIONS IN LEBANON, BY VIRTUE OF THEIR  
BEING TARGETED AGAINST AREAS INHABITED LARGELY BY  
MUSLIMS (LEBANESE AND PALESTINIAN ALIKE) AND BEING  
SO DESTRUCTIVE IN TERMS OF THE DEATHS OF INNOCENT  
PEOPLE, HAS PRODUCED AN UGLY UPSURGE OF ANTI-JEWISH  
FEELING HERE -- A TREND THAT CANNOT FAIL TO ERODE  
POPULAR SUPPORT FOR (OR  
ACQUIESCENCE IN) ANY FUTURE EFFORTS BY THE MUBARAK

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

REGIME TO RENEW THE PROCESS OF NORMALIZING RELATIONS  
WITH ISRAEL, AT LEAST IN THE SHORT-TERM. (THIS  
LATTER SPIN-OFF, OF COURSE, WAS NOT SEEN BY AL-SAID  
AS PARTICULARLY DEPLORABLE.) SECOND, THE PERCEPTION  
THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE ACTING IN CAHOOTS WITH BOTH  
THE AMERICANS AND LEBANESE CHRISTIANS IS PROVIDING  
ADDITIONAL IMPETUS TO THE ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST  
MOVEMENT IN EGYPT AND WILL, IN AL-SAID'S OPINION,  
CREATE BEW TEBSUIBS BETWEEN MUSLIMS AND COPTS.

7. COMMENT. ALTHOUGH AL-SAID OFTEN TENDS TO  
EXAGGERATE THE EXTENTY OF POPULAR SUPPORT FOR HIS  
PARTY'S VIEWS, NOT TO MENTION THE NPUG'S ABILITY  
TO GAUGE GRASS-ROOTS OPINION AMONG THE EGYPTIAN  
"MASSES", WE THINK HE IS FAIRLY CLOSE TO THE MARK  
ON THIS ISSUE. WHILE SOME OF OUR OTHER LOCAL

CONTACTS CONTINUE TO DOWNPLAY THE SIGNIFICANCE OF  
EVENTS IN LEBANON ON U.S.-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS, WE  
CONTINUE TO NOTICE A HIGH INCIDENCE IN THE NUMBER OF  
THOUGHTFUL, ORDINARILY PRO-AMERICAN EGYPTIANS WHO  
EXPRESS EMBARRASSMENT, DISAPPOINTMENT, ANGER AND  
DISGUST OVER THE U.S. RESPONSE THUS FAR TO ISRAEL'S  
ACTIONS IN LEBANON. (A RECENT DAO REPORT IN THIS  
REGARD IS A CASE IN POINT -- SEE IR 60899-03453-02.)  
IT IS TRUE THAT WE NO LONGER RECEIVE QUITE AS MANY  
SPONTANEOUS AND FIERY EXPRESSIONS OF OUTRAGED  
EGYPTIAN SENTIMENT AS WE DID IN THE INITIAL WEEKS  
OF THE LEBANON CRISIS. (THE PASSAGE OF TIME AND  
THE REPEATED ASSAULTS OF HORRORS TELEVISED FROM  
BEIRUT APPEAR TO HAVE DULLED -- AT LEAST FOR THE TIME  
BEING -- EGYPTIAN SENSIBILITIES IN THIS REGARD.)  
IT IS ALSO TRUE, BY ALL ACCOUNTS, THAT FOREIGN  
MINISTRY OFFICIALS CONTINUE STEADFASTLY TO REFRAIN  
FROM UTTERING CRITICISMS ON THE U.S. IN CONVERSATIONS  
WITH OUR FRIENDLY DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES. THEY, AND  
OTHER GOE OFFICIALS (MILITARY INCLUDED) ARE NOT  
NEARLY SO RESTRAINED, HOWEVER, IN THEIR DISCOURSE  
WITH US, AND OUR PRIVATE, UNOFFICIAL CONTACTS ARE  
EVEN LESS SO. IN SUM, WHAT EMERGES IN PLACE OF  
THE HEATED VIEWS EXPRESSED TO US A MONTH OR SO AGO  
IS A LOW-KEY, BUT CONSTANT AND SMOULDERING RESENTMENT  
-- SELDON VOICED IN CONFRONTATIONAL TONES, BUT CAPABLE  
OF FLARING AGAIN INTO HEIGHTENED VEHEMENCE SHOULD  
EVENTS IN DEIRUT DEVELOP FOR THE WORSE.

CAIRO 9676

DTG:111456Z AUG 82 PSN: 041670

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

8. PRESIDENT REAGAN'S AUGUST 4 STATEMENT AND THE  
ENSUING PUBLIC TENSION IN U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONS  
HAVE HELPED TO ARREST SOME OF THESE FEELINGS. BUT  
AS AL-SAID NOTES AND AS IS REFLECTED DAILY IN  
NEWSPAPER EDITORIALS, SUPPORT AND SYMPATHY FOR THE  
U.S. POSITION IS THE MIND OF THE EGYPTIAN PUBLIC  
HAS STEADILY ERODED OVER THE PAST TWO MONTHS. WE  
THINK IT WILL TAKE TIME AND A FORTUITOUS COMBINATION  
OF FUTURE EVENTS IN LEBANON TO ENABLE US TO RECOUP  
OUR LOSSES IN TERMS OF EGYPTIAN CONFIDENCE IN AMERICAN  
INTENTIONS AND GOOD FAITH.

9. FOR DIA: THIS RESPONDS TO YOU ICR-K-3CX-0037,  
U-UED-42150 AND DIRM Z-013-EG001.  
10/ DEPARTMENT PLEASE REPEAT TO OTHER INFO ADDRESSES AS  
DESIRED. PRECHT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

15

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 5860  
SIT938 DATE 08/16/82

DTG: 121951Z AUG 82 PSN: 043573  
TOR: 224/2234Z

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WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

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**NLRR 748-36-2-9-7**

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

**BY (CIS) NARA DATE 6/5/13**

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #5860 2242047  
O 121951Z AUG 82  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 9027

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 2448  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 1843  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 4158  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1270  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 8427  
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 225860  
~~EXDIS~~  
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PEPR, EG, LE, SY, US  
SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN POSITION UNCHANGED ON TAKING PLO

1. ~~(S)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AMBASSADOR GHORBAL CALLED NEA (CLUVERIUS) MID-DAY AUGUST 12 TO INFORM THAT HE PERSONALLY HAD GONE BEYOND THE CALL OF DUTY IN TRYING TO CONVINCE CAIRO THAT THEY SHOULD TAKE SOME OF THE PALESTINIANS FROM BEIRUT. HOWEVER, HE HAD JUST BEEN INFORMED BY BOUTROS GHALI THAT THE SITUATION HAD BEEN THOROUGHLY REVIEWED AND PRESIDENT MUBARAK HAS DECIDED THAT THERE WILL BE NO CHANGE IN THE EGYPTIAN POSITION AS IT IS NOW KNOWN TO U. S. GHORBAL ASSURED CLUVERIUS THAT CAIRO IS FULLY INFORMED OF OUR POSITION THAT WE ARE NOT PRESSING AND THAT THE SITUATION

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

IS ONE IN WHICH WE HAVE AGREED TO DISAGREE. SHULTZ

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 CAIRO 9718 DTG: 131145Z AUG 82 PSN: 044267  
SIT910 DATE 08/16/82 TOR: 225/1231Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

5. BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PRECHT

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EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: REDTAG

CAIRO 9718

DTG: 131145Z AUG 82 PSN: 044267

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

**DECLASSIFIED**

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

**NLRR 748-362-10-5**

MESSAGE:

**BY 1023 NARA DATE 6/5/13**

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHEG #9718 2251146  
O 131145Z AUG 82  
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0600

INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 9836  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0086  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 4234  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 9240  
AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 4073  
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 1337  
BT

~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 19718

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PEPR, LE, US, EG  
SUBJECT: LEBANON  
REF: STATE 225252

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. I HAD A BRIEF WORD WITH MINSTATE BOUTROS GHALI AUGUST 12. I GAVE HIM A VERY SHORT SUMMARY OF WHERE WE STOOD IN BEIRUT NEGOTIATIONS, NOTING THAT CERTAIN ISSUES REMAINED TO BE STRAIGHTENED OUT WITH THE ISRAELIS AND OUR ENCOURAGEMENT BY THE WILLINGNESS OF ADDITIONAL ARAB STATES TO ACCEPT PALESTINIANS. I ASKED IF THERE WAS ANYTHING NEW FROM THE EGYPTIAN SIDE.

3. BOUTROS REPLIED THAT THE GOE THOUGHT THE BALL WAS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

IN OUR COURT. THE EGYPTIANS WERE WAITING FOR US TO FASHION SOME STATEMENT THAT WOULD ALLOW THEM TO ADOPT A MORE FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE. HE WAS AWARE OF THE VELIOTES-GHORBAL MEETING AND SAID THAT HE BELIEVED MENTION OF A "HOMELAND" COULD BE VERY HELPFUL. HE SAID HE WAS STAYING IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH GHORBAL ON LEBANESE ISSUES.

4. COMMENT: WHILE GHORBAL AND BOUTROS MAY BE OF LIKE MINDS IN ATTEMPTING TO MOVE THE GOE TOWARDS A MORE FLEXIBLE POSITION ON ACCEPTING THE PALESTINIANS, WE HAVE NO INDICATION THAT MUBARAK'S OTHER ADVISORS, ESPECIALLY OSAMA EL-BAZ, ARE SO PERSUADED. I WILL TRY AGAIN TO SEE OSAMA WHEN HE RETURNS TO CAIRO FROM ALEXANDRIA IN A FEW DAYS. I HAVE AN APPOINTMENT WITH KAMAL HASSAN ALI AT NOON ON SUNDAY.

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 CAIRO 9720  
SIT863 DATE 08/16/82

DTG: 141032Z AUG 82 PSN: 045959  
TOR: 226/1301Z

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHEG #9720 2261032  
O 141032Z AUG 82  
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0602

INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 9837  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 8600  
BT

~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 19720  
EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL 8/11/88  
TAGS: PEPR, EG, IS, US  
SUBJECT: AUTONOMY NEGATIATIONS: A TASTE OF CURRENT  
EGYPTIAN THINKING  
REF: CAIRO 17997

1. ~~S~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN THE COURSE OF MY AUGUST 9 MEETING WITH MFA UNDER-SECRETARY SHAFEL ABDEL HAMID, IN WHICH WE COVERED MFO AND TABA TOPICS REPORTED SEPTELS, IS TOOK OCCASION TO INQUIRE ABOUT THE CURRENT STATE OF GOE THINKING WITH REGARD TO A POSSIBLE FUTURE RESUMPTION OF PALESTINIAN AUTONOMY TALKS. (AS DEPARTEMENT AND OTHER ADDRESSES ARE AWARE, ABDEL HAMID HEADS THE EGPTIAN WORKING-LEVEL TEAM IN THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS.) ABDEL HAMID RESPONDED WITH A LONG LECTURE, ACCOMPANIED BY A BIT OF HISTRIONICS AND PROCEEDING ALONG FAMILAR EGYPTIAN LINES, ABOUT THE NEED FOR THE USG TO PROVIDE SOME GREATER 'VISUALIZATION' OF A SOLUTION FOR THE BROADER PALESTINIAN QUESTION AS PART OF OUR CURRENT EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE SITUATION IN BEIRUT. HE WENT BEYOND EGYPT'S

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CUSTOMARY APPEALS FOR U.S. SUPPORT FOR PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND FOR A U.S.-PLO DIALOGUE AS DESIDERATA FOR GOE COOPERATION WITH OUR EFFORTS TO ARRANGE THE PLO'S EVACUATION FRDM WEST BEIRUT. HE STRESSED THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH STEPS ON OUR PART, IT WOULD BE "INCONCEIVABLE" FOR EGYPT TO RETURN TO THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS. EVAN A U.S. DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF A "HOME-LAND" FOR THE PALESTINIAN, SAID ABDEL HAMID, WOULD NOT SUFFICE FOR THIS PURPOSE, SINCE IT COULD NOT BE "SOLD" THE EGYPTIAN AND ARAB PUBLIC OPINION AS A CREDIBLE EXCUSE FOR RESUMING AUTONOMY TALKS IN THE AFTERMATH OF WHAT IS HAPPENING IN LEBANON.

3. WAXING ON THE SUBJECT, ABDEL HAMID ALSO THREW COLD WATER ON THE CONTINUED VALIDITY OF THE CAMP DAVID CONCEPT OF AN INTERIM. TRANSITIONAL PERIOD FOR THE EXERCISE OF

AUNTOHOMY ON THE WEST BANK AND IN GAZA. HE CLAIMED THAT THIS CONCEPT HAD ALSO BEEN NEGATED BY ISRAEL'S ACTIONS IN LEBANON AND BY THE GOI'S PROFESSED EXPECTATION THAT THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PLO AS A MILITARY AND POLITICAL FORCE WILL PAVE THE WAY FOR AN AUTONOMOUS PALESTINIAN REGIME SUBSERVIENT TO ISRAELI INTERESTS AND CONTROL. THE ONLY WAY IN WHICH THE CONCEPT OF INTERIM PALESTINAIN AUTONOMY COULD RETAIN ANY CREDIBILITY IN EGYPTIAN AND ARAB EYES, ABDEL HAMID MAINTAINED, WOULD BE FOR THE USG TO DECLARE ITS SUPPORT FOR PALESTINAIN SELF-DETERMINATION AS THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF THE TRANSITIONAL PROCESS. IN RESPONSE TO MY OBSERVATION THAT QUESTIONS SUCH AS THIS OUGHT TO BE LEFT FOR US TO ADDRESS AT SOME LATER STAGE IN THE PEACE PROCESS, HE NOTED THAT HE HAD RECENTLY REVIEWED THE ENTIRE RECORD OF THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS TO DATE AND BEEN STRUCK BY THE REALIZATION THAT THE U.S. DELEGATION HAD NEVER ONCE EXPRESSED OR ADOPTED AN INDEPENDENT POSITION OF ITS OWN ON ANY ISSUE. WE COULD NOT EXPECT, IN THE EVENT THAT AUTONOMY TALKS EVENTUALLY RESUME, TO CONTINUE ACTING LIKE THIS IN THE FUTURE, SAID ABDEL HAMID. OTHERWISE, HE SAID THE EGYPTIANS HAD LISTENED TO SUCH TALK FROM THE USG FOR 30 YEARS AND WERE NO LONGER PREPARED TO PUT MUCH CREDCENCE IN OUR WORDS ON THIS SCORE.

4. COMMENT: KNOWING ABDEL HAMID'S TANDENCY TO ALLOW EMOTIONAL RHETORIC TO AFFECT HIS BEHAVIOR AND CLOUD HIS BETTER SENSE, I AM NOT PREPARED TO REGARD HIS REMARKS AS INDICATIVE OF THE FORMAL, CONSIDERED JUDGMENT OF MORE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SENIOR POLICYMAKERS IN THE GOE. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY DOUBTLESS REFLECT SOMETHING OF THE SOUL-SEARCHING THAT EVENTS IN LEBANON HAVE INSPIRED IN MFA CIRCLES ABOUT EGYPT'S FUTURE ATTITUDE TOWARD, AND PARTICIPATION IN, THE MIDEAST PEACE PROCESS ASSUMING WE MANAGE TO SALVAGE, OR EVEN ENHANCE, THAT PROCESS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE LEBANON CRISIS). PRECHT

CAIRO 9720

DTG: 141032Z AUG 82 PSN: 045959

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**NLRR 748.76-2-11-4**  
**BY CCDB NARA DATE 6/5/13**

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 5872 DTG: 211931Z AUG 82 PSN: 055750  
SIT840 DATE 08/31/82 TOR: 233/1939Z

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #5872/01 2331936  
O 211931Z AUG 82 ZFF6  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 9510  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 2723  
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 8976  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 8655  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1580  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 2155

INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0676  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0873  
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 7998  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 235872  
NODIS  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PEPR, EG, IS, PLO, US, LW  
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR  
GHORBAL, AUGUST 20

1. ~~(SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT).~~

2. SUMMARY: IN A MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR GHORBAL AUGUST 20 THE SECRETARY REITERATED US DETERMINATION TO MOVE AHEAD PROMPTLY ON EFFORTS TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF THE PALESTINIANS. HE SAID US ACTIONS WILL BE TAKEN IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH EGYPT. THE SECRETARY EXPLAINED THAT AT THE PRESIDENT'S

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

INSTRUCTION HE HAD CONSULTED CLOSELY WITH LEADERS FROM THE MIDDLE EAST, AND WITH THE CONGRESS, TO GATHER IDEAS AND TO FORMULATE A PLAN. GHORBAL SAID THAT WHEN THE US IS ACTIVE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THERE IS PROGRESS. WHEN THE US FAILS TO EXERCISE A LEADERSHIP ROLE, THE RESULTING VACUUM IS FILLED BY ISRAEL. HE SAID THAT WHEN THE US PRESIDENT SPEAKS, ISRAEL LISTENS. IN RESPONSE TO GHORBAL'S STATEMENT THAT EGYPT WOULD BE CONSULTING WITH FRANCE ON NEXT STEPS IN THE UNSC, THE SECRETARY CALLED FOR A "CEASE-FIRE" IN THE UN. END SUMMARY

3. SECRETARY SHULTZ MET WITH AMBASSADOR GHORBAL FOR 45

MINUTES AUGUST 20 (MEETING SCHEDULED JUST PRIOR TO GHORBAL'S DEPARTURE ON LEAVE AUGUST 21). AFTER TOUCHING

ON LEBANON ELECTION ISSUES, GHORBAL CONGRATULATED THE SECRETARY ON HIS PRESS CONFERENCE EARLIER IN THE AFTERNOON AND ON THE RESULTS OF U.S. EFFORTS IN THE LEBANON CRISIS, SAYING HABIB'S SUCCESS WAS POSSIBLE BECAUSE OF THE BACKING OF THE SECRETARY, THE PRESIDENT AND THE COUNTRY. THE SECRETARY REITERATED WHAT HE HAD SAID EARLIER TO GHORBAL, AND ALSO IN HIS MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK, ABOUT GETTING TO WORK PROMPTLY ON THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. HE SAID THE U.S. WILL CONSULT CLOSELY WITH EGYPT, AND THAT AMBASSADOR ATHERTON HAD IN FACT ALREADY SOUGHT AN APPOINTMENT WITH MUBARAK IMMEDIATELY AFTER HIS RETURN.

**DECLASSIFIED**

NLRR/48-36-2-12-3

BY ICDR NARA DATE 6/4/13

4. IN RESPONSE TO GHORBAL'S REQUEST, THE SECRETARY EXPLAINED THE STATUS OF CURRENT U.S. THINKING: THE PRESIDENT INSTRUCTED THE SECRETARY FROM THE OUTSET TO WORK ON THE BEIRUT CRISIS WITH HABIB, BUT NOT TO BE DISTRACTED BY BEIRUT FROM THE NEED TO DEAL WITH FINDING A SOLUTION TO THE UNDERLYING ISSUES IN THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD CONSULTED MANY PEOPLE, INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA, SYRIA, JORDAN AND ISRAEL. THE ISSUE HAD BEEN DISCUSSED EXTENSIVELY WITH THE PRESIDENT, INCLUDING AT THE CAMP DAVID SESSION LAST WEEKEND. THOUGHTFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED AT MEETINGS WITH GROUPS FROM THE CONGRESS. THE SECRETARY SAID HE IS GATHERING IDEAS WITH THE PURPOSE OF FORMULATING A PLAN, AND THAT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AMBASSADOR ATHERTON WOULD BE DISCUSSING THE CURRENT STATE OF OUR THINKING WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK. THE SECRETARY SAID HE RESPECTED THE ROLE OF AMBASSADORS BUT UNDERSTOOD THE NEED TO DISCUSS THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES WITH THE CHIEF OF STATE.

5. GHORBAL ASKED THAT THE SECRETARY TAKE HIM INTO HIS CONFIDENCE AND USE HIM AS A SOUNDING BOARD. GHORBAL SAID THIS WOULD BE APPROPRIATE IN DEALINGS BETWEEN FULL PARTNERS, AND THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO DISCUSS ISSUES BEFORE FINAL DECISIONS ARE MADE. NOTING THAT EGYPT HAD BEEN WILLING TO TALK ABOUT HARD TRUTHS IN THE AREA WHEN NO ONE ELSE WOULD, GHORBAL SAID IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE U.S. TO TEST THE EGYPTIAN REACTION THROUGH HIM BEFORE APPROACHING SENIOR EGYPTIAN LEADERS. FOR EXAMPLE, GHORBAL SAID, WHILE THE SAUDIS AND SYRIANS HAD TALKED ABOUT LEGITIMATE PALESTINIAN RIGHTS, EGYPT IS TAKING A STRONGER POSITION FOR EFFECTIVE ACTION ON THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE NOW: THIS IS THE TRUE TEMPERATURE OF THE ARAB WORLD. GHORBAL URGED THAT THE SECRETARY PLAN AN EARLY

VISIT TO EGYPT. HE ASKED THE DIRECTION OF AMERICAN THINKING AND HOW EGYPT COULD HELP.

6. THE SECRETARY PREFACED HIS RESPONSE BY SAYING THAT NO PRESIDENTIAL DECISION HAS AS YET BEEN MADE. HE NOTED THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS IN DEALING WITH THESE ISSUES. HE SAID A QUESTION FACING THE U.S. IS WHETHER THE OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES WOULD JOIN EGYPT, AND ALSO HOW TO FIND ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION OF THE PALESTINIANS. OTHER ISSUES INCLUDE ASSURANCE THAT ISRAEL

~~SECRET~~

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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SIT836 DATE 08/31/82

DTG: 211931Z AUG 82 PSN: 055752  
TOR: 233/1941Z

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHC #5872/02 2331936  
O 211931Z AUG 82 ZFF6  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 9511  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 2724  
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 8977  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 8656  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1581  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 2156

INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0677  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0874  
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 7999  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 STATE 235872  
NODTS

WILL NOT SEE THE PALESTINIANS AS A THREAT, THE ROLE OF

~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 5872

DTG: 211931Z AUG 82 PSN: 055752

JORDAN, AND THE ROLE OF SYRIA. THE SECRETARY SAID ALL OF THESE ISSUES ARE BEFORE THE U. S., AND WE ARE CONSIDERING WHICH INITIATIVES WOULD PRODUCE PROGRESS. HE SAID A MAJOR MOTIVATION IS NOT AFFECTED BY CARROTS AND STICKS, BUT RATHER BY THE PROSPECT OF PEACE. RECALLING THAT HE WAS IN JERUSALEM AT THE TIME OF PRESIDENT SADAT'S JERUSALEM VISIT, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THE ONE GENUINE BREAKTHROUGH IN THE AREA IN RECENT YEARS WAS EGYPT'S INITIATIVE. HE ASKED FOR REACTIONS AND THE CONCERNS OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES.

7. GHORBAL SAID EGYPT BELIEVES THAT WHEN THE U. S. IS ACTIVE ("IN THE DRIVERS SEAT"), THEN SOLUTIONS CAN BE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FOUND. WHEN THE U. S. TAKES A BACK SEAT A VACUUM IS CREATED, WHICH ISRAEL FILLS. THE RESULTS CAN BE THAT ISRAEL MOVES IN, AND PRESENTS FAITS ACCOMPLIS. GHORBAL SAID THAT FOR THE PAST TWO YEARS THE U. S. HAS NOT BEEN CONTROLLING EVENTS, BUT HAS BEEN CATCHING UP. REFERRING TO THE SECRETARY'S MENTION OF CARROTS AND STICKS, GHORBAL SAID THAT SOME CARROTS HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN, ONLY TO BE GIVEN BACK.

8. CONTINUING, GHORBAL STRESSED THE NEED FOR VIGOROUS U. S. LEADERSHIP. WHEN THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT SAYS "ENOUGH", ISRAEL STOPS. IN 1956 THIS WAS DONE BY A STRONG PRESIDENT. IT WAS DONE ALSO TWO WEEKS AGO BY AN EQUALLY STRONG PRESIDENT. GHORBAL STRESSED HIS THEME OF A VACUUM IN THE AREA, AND SAID THAT WHEN THE U. S. FILLS THAT VACUUM, THINGS START TO GO RIGHT. GHORBAL SAID THAT PUBLIC OPINION AT FIRST WAS ON ISRAEL'S SIDE, BUT TODAY PUBLIC OPINION IS AGAINST ISRAEL AND MANY JEWS ARE DEEPLY

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 211931Z AUG 82 PSN: 055752

UPSET. THEREFORE, THIS IS THE TIME FOR THE U.S. TO ACT.

9. CONCLUDING, GHORBAL URGED THAT THE U.S. ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF SELF-DETERMINATION, ASSURING THAT THE PEOPLE OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA HAVE A ROLE IN THEIR FUTURE. HE SAID THE U.S. SHOULD NOT BE DETERRED BY ISRAEL'S SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. THE U.S. AND ITS

PRESIDENT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO LEAD WHICH MUST NOT BE MISSED.

10. RESPONDING TO GHORBAL'S RENEWED INVITATION TO VISIT EGYPT, THE SECRETARY SAID HE WOULD COME AS SOON AS IT APPEARS LIKELY A VISIT WOULD BE HELPFUL.

11. GHORBAL SAID THAT BOUTROS GHALI WOULD BE IN PARIS SUNDAY TO DISCUSS THE UNSC RESOLUTION WITH FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON. THE SECRETARY SAID HE HOPED THERE CAN BE A "CEASE-FIRE" ON FURTHER ACTIONS AT THE UN. GHORBAL RESPONDED THAT HE HAD PASSED THIS VIEW TO CAIRO, AND THERE WOULD BE NO ACTION FOR AT LEAST A WEEK. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE EGYPTIAN-FRENCH INITIATIVE IS NOT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CONFRONTATIONAL, AND IN FACT THE U.S. HAD FOUND THE EARLIER RESOLUTION INNOCUOUS.

12. BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SHULTZ

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 211931Z AUG 82 PSN: 055752

SECSTATE WASHDC 5872

DTG: 211931Z AUG 82 PSN: 055752

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

23

PAGE 01 CAIRO 0826 DTG: 211143Z AUG 82 PSN: 055311  
SIT847 DATE 08/31/82 TOR: 233/1229Z

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O 211143Z AUG 82  
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1022

INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS 7689  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 9886  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 8638  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 4278  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0098  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 20826

~~EXDIS~~

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PEPR, EG, US, IS, LE, PLO  
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH MINISTER OF STATE BOUTROS GHALI  
- SATURDAY, AUGUST 21  
REF: A. STATE 234266; B. STATE 234464

1. ~~SECRET~~-ENTIRE TEXT.
2. I DELIVERED TEXTS OF PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT AND TALKING POINTS CONTAINED REFTELS TO MINSTATE BOUTROS GHALI AUGUST
21. BOUTROS' ONLY COMMENT WAS THAT REFERENCE TO PALESTINIANS DID NOT GO BEYOND CAMP DAVID RHETORIC. BOUTROS THEN BEGAN TO RUMINATE ABOUT THE OPTIONS OPEN TO GOE.
3. HE SAID THIS WEEK'S CABINET MEETING HAD HAD A LENGTHY DISCUSSION OF PUBLIC UNHAPPINESS WITH THE GOE OVER LEBANON. RESENTMENT WAS WIDESPREAD AMONG "THINKING" EGYPTIANS AND

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WAS BEING MANIPULATED BY THE RECOGNIZED OPPOSITION PARTIES FOR THEIR POLITICAL PURPOSES. AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE GOVERNMENT'S OWN PARTY WAS FORCED TO ADOPT A CRITICAL LINE OVER LEBANON. EVERYONE IN THE CABINET, BOUTROS SAID, FELT DEEP FRUSTRATION OVER EGYPT'S ISOLATION AND INABILITY TO INFLUENCE EVENTS. THUS, EGYPT WAS ONLY ABLE, FOR EXAMPLE, TO SEND MEDICAL DOCTORS TO BEIRUT OR TO SEND HIM TO PARIS FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE FRENCH. NO ONE EXPECTED ANY OF THIS ACTIVITY TO BE PRODUCTIVE IN A REAL SENSE, AND EGYPTIAN FRUSTRATION WAS FURTHER AGGRAVATED BY THE SUSPICION THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT ONLY NEGLECTING EGYPT BUT WAS WORKING QUIETLY WITH THE SAUDIS AND OTHERS.

4. I TOLD BOUTROS THAT THE AMBASSADOR WAS BEING CALLED TO WASHINGTON THIS WEEK FOR VERY SENSITIVE CONSULTATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR REVIEW OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLICY.

I SAID THAT I HAD BEEN ASKED TO ARRANGE A PRIVATE MEETING FOR THE AMBASSADOR WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK AS SOON AS THE AMBASSADOR RETURNS. I SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE WELL IF BOUTROS AND THE FRENCH DEFERRED ANY DEFINITE PLANS FOR REACTIVATING THEIR UN RESOLUTION UNTIL WE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY FOR FULL CONSULTATIONS WITH THE GOE. BOUTROS SAID HE WOULD MERELY BE ASSESSING THE SITUATION WITH THE FRENCH, AND THERE WERE NO CURRENT PLANS FOR RENEWED ACTIVITY IN NEW YORK. HE WOULD BE MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR GHORBAL IN PARIS BEFORE MEETING FRENCH OFFICIALS. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT TIME WAS SLIPPING AWAY AND SOON WE WOULD BE ARGUING THAT THE EGYPTIAN-FRENCH INITIATIVE MUST BE DEFERRED WHILE WE DEALT WITH THE PROBLEM OF THE BIQA VALLEY.

5. RETURNING TO HIS THEME OF INTERNAL DISSATISFACTION, I ASKED BOUTROS WHY THERE WERE SO FEW SIGNS OF DISCONTENT. HE SAID, FIRST, THE HAND OF THE POLICE WAS VERY HEAVY AND, SECOND, ISLAMIC EXTREMISTS WERE IN THE MAIN STAYING UNDERGROUND AND BIDDING THEIR TIME. THE GOVERNMENT WAS VERY CONCERNED, HOWEVER, WITH THE WORK OF THE OPPOSITION IN FORMING GROUPS WITHIN THE UNIVERSITIES FOCUSED ON THE LEBANESE CRISIS. HIS SENSE AS A POLITICAL SCIENTIST WAS THAT EVENTUALLY THERE WOULD BE SOME FORM OF OUTBURST OF PUBLIC HOSTILITY OVER LEBANON AND THE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE VERY EMBARRASSED.

6. CHANGING THE SUBJECT SLIGHTLY, BOUTROS SAID HE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

UNDERSTOOD THE FEZ SUMMIT WOULD PUSH A MODIFIED VERSION OF THE FAHD PLAN. EGYPT WOULD BE LEFT OUT, BUT, HE SHRUGGED, THE NEW PLAN WOULD BE QUICKLY REJECTED BY ISRAEL AND THE U.S. EGYPT WAS DOING ITS BEST TO END ITS ISOLATION FROM THE ARAB WORLD BUT MEETING VERY LITTLE SUCCESS. ALL OF THE ARABS WANTED TO USE EGYPT BUT NONE WANTED TO WELCOME IT BACK TO THE FOLD. A RECENT SENIOR IRAQI VISITOR MADE A PLEA FOR EGYPTIAN HELP IN THE NAM. BOUCETTA HAD MET SECRETLY WITH BOUTROS IN PARIS TO URGE THAT HE MAKE HIS AFRICAN TRIP TO BLOCK QADAFI IN THE OAU. ALL, AND ESPECIALLY THE SAUDIS, WERE VERY RELUCTANT TO MAKE A GESTURE TOWARD EGYPT. BOUTROS SAID THERE WAS A SUSPICION THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT USING ITS INFLUENCE WITH SAUDI ARABIA TO PUSH RECONCILIATION WITH EGYPT. SAUDI ARABIA WAS ABSOLUTELY RESPONSIVE TO U.S. DESIRES AND, WHILE WE WERE NOT OPPOSING RECONCILIATION, WE WERE NOT GIVING THE RIGHT SIGNALS TO THE SAUDIS. WE COULD ATTEMPT TO FASHION A MIDDLE EAST POLICY WITHOUT AN ACTIVE EGYPTIAN ROLE, BOUTROS SAID, BUT THE EFFORT WOULD FAIL. WHILE EGYPT COULD NOT GUARANTEE THE SUCCESS OF A COOPERATIVE POLICY IN THIS REGION, IT COULD CERTAINLY

CAIRO 0826

DTG: 211143Z AUG 82 PSN: 055311

~~SECRET~~

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24

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01  
SIT846

CAIRO 0826  
DATE 08/31/82

DTG: 211143Z AUG 82 PSN: 055313  
TOR: 233/1229Z

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

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EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHEG #0826/02 2331148  
O 211143Z AUG 82  
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1023

INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS 7690  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 9887  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 8639  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 4279  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0099  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 CAIRO 20826  
BLOCK ANY MOVE THAT IT DISLIKED. HE WAS NOT SPEAKING  
OF THE MUBARAK GOVERNMENT, HE SAID, BUT OF SOME  
RADICAL SUCCESSOR REGIME.

7. COMMENT: BOUTROS WAS SPEAKING, HE SAID, AS A  
SCHOLAR, NOT AS A GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN, AND WE  
SHOULD NOT FEEL OBLIGED TO RESPOND TO HIS REMARKS.  
BUT WE SHOULD BEAR CAREFULLY IN MIND HIS OBSERVATIONS  
ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT'S PROBLEM WITH INTERNAL DISSENT  
AND ITS FRUSTRATIONS IN SEEKING TO PLAY A ROLE AS  
A FULL PARTNER OF THE U. S. IN THE LEBANESE CRISIS.

8. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PRECHT

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

25

PAGE 01 CAIRO 1234  
SIT720 DATE 08/31/82

DTG: 250814Z AUG 82 PSN: 003865  
TOR: 237/0947Z

FINALLY, THERE HAD BEEN SHOOTING INCIDENTS IN OR NEAR WEST BEIRUT WHICH WERE CAUSE FOR CONCERN.

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EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: RED TAG

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHEG #1234 2370816  
O 250814Z AUG 82 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

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NLRR748-36-2-141

BY KOB NARA DATE 6/5/13

CAIRO 1234

DTG: 250814Z AUG 82 PSN: 003865

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1184  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE 9908  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM NIACT IMMEDIATE 8655  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE 0106

INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 4296  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 9253  
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 1389  
BT

~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 21234  
EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PEPR, PLO, LE, IS, EG  
SUBJECT: PLO CONCERN FOR SAFETY OF LEADERSHIP

1. ~~IS~~ ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. MFA FIRST UNDERSECRETARY OSAMA EL-BAZ SUMMONED ME ON SHORT NOTICE AUGUST 25 AND SAID GOE HAD RECEIVED AN URGENT AND SERIOUS ORAL APPEAL FROM YASSAR ARAFAT REQUESTING EGYPT TO INTERVENE WITH THE U.S. TO ASSURE THE SAFETY OF ARAFAT AND THE PLO LEADERSHIP WHEN THEY DEPART BEIRUT. ARAFAT WAS DEEPLY CONCERNED BY CERTAIN RECENT ISRAELI ACTIONS THAT ISRAEL MIGHT ATTACK THE SHIP ON WHICH THEY WERE TRAVELLING OR ASSAULT THE LEADERSHIP AS IT WAS PREPARING TO DEPART BEIRUT. APPARENTLY, THIS CONCERN HAD BEEN CONVEYED THROUGH EGYPTIAN CHARGE IN BEIRUT TO AMBASSADOR HABIB AND THE RESPONSE,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WHICH WAS DEEMED "NEGATIVE," WAS A CAUSE FOR FURTHER CONCERN.

3. OSAMA PRESSED FOR U.S. GUARANTEES THAT ISRAELI FORCES WOULD BE RESTRAINED OR BLOCKED. PERHAPS ADDITIONAL SPECIAL PROTECTION BY THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE COULD BE PROVIDED FOR THE LAND MOVEMENT OF THE PLO LEADERSHIP TO THEIR SHIP, HE SUGGESTED.  
SECRET

4. I ASKED WHAT LED ARAFAT TO BELIEVE THE ISRAELIS WOULD INTERFERE WITH THEIR DEPARTURE. OSAMA SAID THERE HAD APPARENTLY BEEN SOME HARASSMENT BY THE ISRAELI NAVY OF VESSELS CARRYING PLO COMBATANTS. HE ALSO CONSIDERED THE INITIAL REFUSAL OF ISRAEL TO ALLOW AN EGYPTIAN VESSEL CARRYING MEDICINE TO ENTER BEIRUT AS A BAD SIGN.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 8610  
SIT093 DATE 10/12/82

DTG: 250214Z AUG 82 PSN: 003539  
TOR: 237/0222Z

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EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT:

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**NLRR 748-36-215-0**

**BY LC08 NARA DATE 6/5/13**

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #8610 2370223  
O 250214Z AUG 82 ZFF6  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 9635

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 8007  
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 238610

NODIS

FOR CHARGE FROM VELIOTES

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, EG, US

SUBJECT: FRENCH-EGYPTIAN UN INITIATIVE

L. ~~SECRET~~-ENTIRE TEXT.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 8610

DTG: 250214Z AUG 82 PSN: 003539

2. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN SEPTEL REPORT OF MY MEETING WITH EGYPTIAN CHARGE RE BOUTROS GHALI'S MEETINGS WITH FRENCH IN PARIS ON FRENCH-EGYPTIAN UNSC INITIATIVE. I UNDERSTAND YOU ARE BEING CALLED TO FOREIGN MINISTRY AUGUST 25, PROBABLY ON THIS SUBJECT. YOU SHOULD TAKE OCCASION TO EXPRESS OUR APPRECIATION FOR QUICK BRIEFING ON BOUTROS' MEETING WITH CHEYSSON AND WEIGH IN HEAVILY AGAINST REVIVAL OF FRENCH-EGYPTIAN RESOLUTION. YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO EGYPTIANS THAT WE EXPECT TO ENGAGE IN EARLY HIGH-LEVEL BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON FUTURE OF PEACE PROCESS WHEN ATHERTON RETURNS. WE WOULD HOPE OUR EGYPTIAN FRIENDS WILL NOT COMPLICATE MATTERS FURTHER BY REVIVAL OF UNHELPFUL MULTILATERAL INITIATIVE IN THE UNSC. SHULTZ

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 CAIRO 1238  
SIT362 DATE 09/17/82

DTG: 250956Z AUG 82 PSN: 003893  
TOR: 237/1010Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF VP SIT EOB  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHEG #1238 2370956  
O 250956Z AUG 82 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1186

INFO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
BT

~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 21238

~~NOBIS~~

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY VELIOTES FROM CHARGE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, EG, US

SUBJECT: FRENCH-EGYPTIAN UN INITIATIVE

REF: STATE 288610

1. ~~SECRET~~-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. UNFORTUNATELY YOUR MESSAGE ARRIVED AFTER I HAD MY MEETING WITH OSAMA EL-BAZ. SINCE THEN, HE HAS BEEN UNAVAILABLE. I WILL PERSIST IN TRYING TO REACH HIM AND WILL SEEK A MEETING WITH BOUTROS GHALI WHEN HE ARRIVES TO THE OFFICE TOMORROW MORNING.

3. IN MY CONVERSATION WITH OSAMA, I UNDERScoreD THAT A VERY SERIOUS REVIEW WAS UNDERWAY IN WASHINGTON AND THAT THE AMBASSADOR WOULD WANT TO HAVE THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE CHANCE TO DISCUSS WASHINGTON THINKING WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK. THE REPLY WAS TYPICAL OSAMA: "I HOPE IT'S NOT ONLY COSMETIC CHANGES YOU WILL MAKE." THERE WAS NO REFERENCE TO THE FRENCH-EGYPTIAN INITIATIVE IN NEW YORK, AND I SUSPECT, AS USUAL,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BOUTROS GHALI IS HANDLING THIS ON HIS OWN. PRECHT

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**NLRR 748-36-2-16-9**  
**BY KOO NARA DATE 6/5/13**

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

9

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 CAIRO 1331  
SIT361 DATE 09/17/82

DTG: 251609Z AUG 82 PSN: 004253  
TOR: 237/1613Z

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SIT: MCF JP VP SIT EOB  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHEG #1331 2371609  
O 251609Z AUG 82 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1239

INFO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
BT

~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 21331  
NOBIS  
FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY VELIOTES  
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PEPR, EG, US, IS  
SUBJECT: FRENCH-EGYPTIAN UN INITIATIVE  
REF: CAIRO 21230

1. ~~SECRET~~-ENTIRE TEXT.
2. I REACHED OSAMA EL-BAZ IN THE AFTERNOON AUGUST 25 TO URGE THAT EGYPT NOT PUSH THE EGYPTIAN-FRENCH DRAFT RESOLUTION IN THE UNSC. I STRESSED THAT WE WERE WORKING ON NEW IDEAS IN WASHINGTON AND THAT AMBASSADOR ATHERTON WOULD WANT TO INITIATE ACTIVE BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WITH THE GOE ON HIS RETURN. I CAUTIONED THAT UN ACTIVITY AT THIS TIME COULD SET BACK OUR PROGRAM TO DEVELOP A NEW APPROACH.
3. OSAMA TOOK THESE POINTS QUITE SERIOUSLY AND IMPLIED THAT THE GOE WAS NOT IN FACT PUSHING THE DRAFT IN NEW YORK. EGYPT DID, HOWEVER, HAVE TO REACT TO HEAVY FRENCH PRESSURE FOR MORE ACTIVE EFFORTS IN THE UNSC. I SAID WE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE PRESSURES WITH WHICH EGYPT HAD TO CONTEND BUT HOPED THAT EGYPTIAN LEADERSHIP COULD CONTINUE TO

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CONTAIN THOSE PRESSURES FOR THE PERIOD AHEAD. OSAMA DID NOT INDICATE THAT THERE WAS ANY FEELING OF URGENCY ON THE EGYPTIAN SIDE IN PURSUING THE INITIATIVE.  
PRECHT

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**NLRR 748-36-2-178**  
**BY (COP) NARA DATE 6/5/03**

CAIRO 1331

DTG: 251609Z AUG 82 PSN: 004253

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 CAIRO 1370  
SIT677 DATE 08/31/82

DTG: 261123Z AUG 82 PSN: 005467  
TOR: 238/1133Z

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS EOB  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHEG #1370 2381124  
O 261123Z AUG 82 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1249

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 8133  
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 7703  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 9921  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 8661  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0109  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 4302  
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 1397  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 9255  
BT

~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 21370

~~PARIS~~

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PEPR, EG, LE, PLO, IS, FR  
SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN-FRENCH DRAFT RESOLUTION

1. ~~IS~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. I MET WITH MINSTATE BOUTROS GHALI AUGUST 26 FOLLOWING HIS THREE-DAY VISIT TO PARIS. HE SAID HE AND FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON AND OTHER FRENCH OFFICIALS HAD CONSULTED CLOSELY ON A PLAN FOR ADVANCING THEIR DRAFT RESOLUTION. THERE HAD BEEN MUCH DISCUSSION OF TACTICS IN NEW YORK, CONTACTS TO BE MADE IN THE CAPITALS, AND SO FORTH. NO DEFINITE DECISION, HOWEVER, HAD BEEN MADE FOR MOVING FORWARD WITH THE RESOLUTION. ABOVE ALL, BOTH THE FRENCH AND THE EGYPTIANS WISHED TO AVOID A

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

U.S. VETO. THERE WAS AGREEMENT ON TWO POINTS: POSTPONEMENT OF ANY MOVE UNTIL PLO DEPARTURE HAD BEEN COMPLETED AND A WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER REASONABLE AMENDMENTS TO THE DRAFT. FRENCH AND EGYPTIANS WANTED THE RESOLUTION TO BE HELPFUL TO PEACE PROCESS AND HAD NO DESIRE TO CREATE DIFFICULTIES, COMPETITION OR BAD FEELINGS WITH THE U.S.

3. I REPEATED THE ARGUMENTS I HAD USED YESTERDAY AND EARLIER IN THE MORNING WITH OTHER MFA OFFICIALS TO URGE A DELAY ON DISCUSSION OF THE RESOLUTION IN NEW YORK. I STRESSED IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO HEAR WHAT AMBASSADOR ATHERTON HAD TO SAY WHEN HE RETURNS NEXT WEEK FOLLOWING HIS CONSULTATIONS. I SAID WE WOULD NOT WISH TO HAVE A UN INITIATIVE WHICH COULD SEVERELY COMPLICATE ANY NEW STEPS THE U.S. MIGHT TAKE LATER IN DEALING WITH THE

PROBLEM. BOUTROS SAID HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD OUR POINT OF VIEW AND INDICATED THAT EGYPT WOULD NOT PUSH THE RESOLUTION TO DISCUSSION STAGE UNTIL THERE HAD BEEN A FULL OPPORTUNITY FOR TALKS WITH AMBASSADOR ATHERTON. HE MADE CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT WHILE EGYPT MIGHT WAIT A LITTLE WHILE LONGER, IT HAD ALREADY BEEN WAITING FOR THE U.S. TO FIND THE RIGHT MOMENT SINCE JUNE AND WOULD FEEL COMPELLED TO PUSH AHEAD IF THERE WERE NOT STRONG REASONS FOR FURTHER DELAY. HE STRESSED THAT UNLESS EGYPT AND FRANCE TOOK AN INITIATIVE, OTHER COUNTRIES, NOTABLY THE SOVIET UNION, MIGHT DO SO. EGYPT WOULD THEN FIND ITSELF IN THE EMBARRASSING POSITION OF HAVING TO SUPPORT A SOVIET RESOLUTION WHICH THE U.S. WOULD CERTAINLY VETO.

4. BEITUT AND DAMASCUS MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PRECHT

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR 748-36-2-18-7  
BY 16703 NADA DATE 6/5/17