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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
letter case (223732)			
1. memo	from Robert Kimmitt to Fred Ryan, re Presidential appearance at meeting of Caribbean leaders	6/8/84	A
2. memo	from Raymond Burghardt to Robert McFarlane, re request for President to attend Caribbean leaders summit, July 8-10	5/30/84	A
3. routing slip	fax	6/84	A
4. profile	NSC/S	4/30/84	A
COLLECTION:			
WHORM: Subject File			smf
FILE LOCATION:			
PR 007 Engagements-Appointments-Interviews (223300-223999)			5/7/93

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af

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

TO: Central Files

FROM: **PAM BAILEY**  
*Office of Communications Planning*

To MAX  
Date 4/6 Time 9:45

**WHILE YOU WERE OUT**

M. Donna Alexander  
of Mr. Regnery's Asst.  
Phone 724-7751

Area Code	Number	Extension
TELEPHONED	PLEASE CALL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
CALLED TO SEE YOU	WILL CALL AGAIN	<input type="checkbox"/>
WANTS TO SEE YOU	URGENT	<input type="checkbox"/>

RETURNED YOUR CALL

Message  
Proposed language  
for a plaque  
commemorating  
the dedication  
of the Natl  
Operator [Signature]

School Safety  
Center referred  
# Don Clary

223315

1140

DR 007

MA



U.S. Department of Justice  
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

ED

Office of the Administrator

April 3, 1984

ED

MA

424-4751

FG-17

TO: Maxine Walker  
Office of Planning  
FROM: Donna K. Alexander  
Confidential Assistant  
to the Administrator, OJJDP

OKA

Attached please find a copy of the proposed language for a plaque commemorating the dedication of the National School Safety Center by the President. Also enclosed is a copy of the original memo sent to Pamela Bailey for assistance in this matter.

Thank you for your assistance. Please do not hesitate to call if you have any questions.

attachments

4/9- Refund to Don Clary for attn.

National School Safety Center Plaque

February 16, 1984

Pamela Bailey  
Director, Office of Planning

Alfred S. Regnery  
Administrator, OJJDP

I attach proposed language for a plaque commemorating the dedication of the National School Safety Center by the President. The plaque is to be donated by the landlord.

Please advise whether the White House may be able to approve the language. If the language is not appropriate, please so advise, or have it changed there so it can be approved.

Thank you for your help.

attachment

Presidential Seal

NATIONAL SCHOOL SAFETY CENTER

DEDICATION BY THE

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

THE MOTTO OF THE UNITED STATES IS "E PLURIBUS UNUM," OUT OF THE MANY, ONE. MORE THAN ANY OTHER INSTITUTION, OUR SCHOOLS HAVE BUILT THE ONE FROM THE MANY. TODAY OUR CHILDREN NEED GOOD SCHOOLS MORE THAN EVER. BECAUSE GOOD SCHOOLS REQUIRE SAFE CAMPUSES, I DIRECTED THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION TO COOPERATE WITH PEPPERDINE UNIVERSITY TO FORM THIS, THE NATIONAL SCHOOL SAFETY CENTER. THIS VITAL CENTER WILL USE EVERY POSSIBLE PUBLIC, PRIVATE AND ACADEMIC RESOURCE, INCLUDING THE LATEST COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES, TO ASSIST ALL AMERICANS TO WORK TOGETHER AS ONE TO RESTORE OUR SCHOOLS AS SAFE, SECURE AND TRANQUIL TEMPLES OF LEARNING.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, RONALD REAGAN, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, HEREBY DEDICATE THIS SPECIAL PLACE AS THE NATIONAL SCHOOL SAFETY CENTER. I URGE ALL FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCALS OFFICIALS, INDEED, ALL AMERICANS, TO VIGOROUSLY ASSIST THE NATIONAL SCHOOL SAFETY CENTER AND TO DEVOTE SPECIAL AND SUSTAINED ATTENTION TO THE NEEDS OF OUR NATION'S SCHOOLS AND, IN PARTICULAR, CAMPUS SAFETY, DISCIPLINE, TRUANCY REDUCTION, EFFECTIVENESS AND EXCELLENCE.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE HEREUNTO SET MY HAND THIS TWENTYSIXTH DAY OF MARCH, IN THE YEAR OF OUR LORD NINETEEN HUNDRED AND EIGHTY FOUR, AND OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA THE TWO-HUNDRED AND EIGHTH.

RONALD REAGAN



223327

1110

PR007

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Date

2/27/84

FJR

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

February 13, 1984

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR., DIRECTOR  
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

FROM: [REDACTED] JAW

REQUEST: To meet with the Damascus High School Band prior to their departure to "D-Day" event in France.

PURPOSE: To encourage and demonstrate support for the only U.S. high school band invited to the "D-Day" ceremonies.

BACKGROUND: This 20 member high school band was selected to be the U.S. representative in the "friendly invasion" portion of the "D-Day" ceremonies in France.

As you know, President Reagan will be participating in those activities as well.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: None

DATE AND TIME: Anytime prior to June 6th. DURATION: 10 mins.

LOCATION: Perhaps enroute to Camp David or the group could come to the White House.

OUTLINE OF EVENT: President delivers short remarks, departs

MEDIA PLAN: Full press

REQUIRED REMARKS: Short remarks

PROJECT OFFICER: Judi Buckalew

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 25, 1984

223328

1110

PR007

50005

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK RYAN, DIRECTOR, PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

FROM: ~~FAITH [redacted]~~ JW

REQUEST: For the President to host a White House concert of the Soviet Emigre Orchestra in honor of Andrei Sakharov.

PURPOSE: To express support for Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov, the Soviet human and national rights movements and to recognize Americans working on behalf of human rights in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

BACKGROUND: May 21 is the birthday of Andrei Sakharov, the Nobel Peace Prize winner and recognized leader of the human rights movement in the Soviet Union. In recent years, American supporters of Dr. Sakharov have organized public events in honor of him and other defenders of human rights to draw public attention to their oft forgotten struggle.

The Soviet Emigre Orchestra, an 18-piece all-string ensemble of world renown, is planning a U.S. and European concert tour as part of this effort. Their first concert will be at the Kennedy Center on May 16, 1984. The short concert at the White House would serve as a highly-publicized kick-off for this important tour, providing the White House an opportunity to honor Dr. Sakharov and the human rights movement in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: Sakharov Day Proclamation Signing Ceremony, May 1983 in the Rose Garden.

DATE: May 5-15, 1984

LOCATION: ~~the East Room~~

DURATION: 1 1/2 hours (The President could limit his participation ~~to 15 minutes~~).

PARTICIPANTS: 150 leaders of East European-American communities, prominent Soviet and East European dissidents residing in the United

States, and presidents of human rights organizations.

OUTLINE OF EVENT: The President makes opening remarks. The orchestra would play several pieces (not longer than 30 minutes total). Guests would then go to the East Room for light refreshments (coffee and pastries).

REMARKS REQUIRED: Brief remarks

MEDIA COVERAGE: Full press

RECOMMENDED BY: Faith Whittlesey, NSC

PROJECT OFFICER: Linas Kojelis, x2741

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

223328  
PROOF

March 6, 1984

TO: FRED RYAN

FROM: LINAS KOJELIS LK ←

SUBJECT: White House Concert by Soviet  
Emigre Orchestra

Fred, I recently received the regret announcement for the proposed Presidential event as described in the attached memo. I am somewhat surprised in that Jack Courtemanche had told me that the idea had not been rejected, but that it had been decided to postpone consideration of it until a date closer to the event.

I would appreciate your comments as to your understanding of the status of this proposal. Thanks.

cc: Steve Steiner, NSC  
Paula Dobriansky, NSC  
John Lenczowski, NSC

*Linas,*  
*Any luck in getting this reconsidered?*  
*We support it!*  
*Steve*

SECRET

2/22/84

FJR THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 25, 1984

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK RYAN, DIRECTOR, PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

FROM: FAITH WHITTLESEY *FHW*

REQUEST: For the President to host a White House concert of the Soviet Emigre Orchestra in honor of Andrei Sakharov.

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REMARKS REQUIRED: Brief remarks

MEDIA COVERAGE: Full press

RECOMMENDED BY: Faith Whittlesey, NSC

PROJECT OFFICER: Linas Kojelis, x2741

223330  
1110

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON



*John*  
February 8, 1984

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR., DIRECTOR  
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

FROM: FAITH R. WHITTLESEY *FRW*

REQUEST: President to drop-by and deliver brief remarks to Public Affairs Delegates of the Association of Junior Leagues (AJL).

PURPOSE: To recognize the spirit of volunteerism and leadership demonstrated by the officers and members of the 244 Junior Leagues in the United States.

BACKGROUND: Founded in 1901, with a current membership of 150,000, the purpose of the AJL is to promote volunteerism, develop members for voluntary participation in community affairs and demonstrate the effectiveness of trained volunteers.

The AJL focuses on services for children, youthful drug and alcohol abuse, domestic violence, child care, the elderly, urban revitalization, health care, the arts, and concerns of women.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: None

DATE: March 9, 1984 (3:15 p.m. - 5:30 p.m.)

PARTICIPANTS: Approximately 150 - 200

OUTLINE OF EVENT: President enters, delivers brief remarks and departs.

REMARKS REQUIRED: Brief remarks

MEDIA COVERAGE: White House Pool

PROJECT OFFICER: Mary Ann Meloy

REGRET  
Date 2/27/84  
EJR

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

February 8, 1984

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR., DIRECTOR  
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

FROM: FAITH R. WHITTLESEY *FHW*

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OUTLINE OF EVENT: President enters, delivers brief remarks and departs.

REMARKS REQUIRED: Brief remarks

MEDIA COVERAGE: White House Pool

PROJECT OFFICER: Mary Ann Meloy



July 17, 1984

223377

PR007

Dear Dr. Johnson:

Thank you for your recent letter in follow-up to my letter to you of April 23, 1984.


I appreciate your letting me know further of your thoughts on this matter. Again, I regret that we were unable to arrange for a meeting with the President for Reverend Taylor. However, we appreciate the candid advice and counsel that you provided, and I will be glad to pass along your continued concern to the appropriate offices in the Administration.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR.  
Director, Presidential  
Appointments and Scheduling

The Reverend Tyler Johnson  
The First Presbyterian Church  
4 Everett Street  
Newport, Rhode Island 02840



# The First Presbyterian Church

BROADWAY AND EVERETT  
AT EQUALITY PARK

4 EVERETT STREET  
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND 02840

DR. TYLER JOHNSON, PASTOR

MRS. MAUREEN KOEBERLE, SECRETARY  
(401) 847-1749

June 29, 1984

RECEIVED

JUL 2 1984

SCHEDULING  
OFFICE

Mr. Frederick J. Ryan, Jr.  
Director, Presidential Appointments and Scheduling  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Ryan,

I am equally embarrassed because of the delay in my returning a reply to you, in response to your nice letter of April 23, 1984.

Just a moment for recounting, I sent to you an article by the editor of THE PRESBYTERIAN OUTLOOK, Dr. George Laird Hunt, who was extremely distressed by refusal of the President to meet with the Moderator of our General Assembly. I enclosed to you my reply to him, stating that that the President could not see everyone.

I certainly understand and appreciate the fact that the President has demands far exceeding the capacity for one human being. Because of the nature of his office, the news media often carries some of the people with whom the President does spend time.

Therefore, Mr. Ryan, I guess I am distressed that the President could not give ten minutes to the Moderator of the Presbyterian Church, SINCE HE IS CONSIDERED TO BE A MEMBER OF THE SAME DENOMINATION! His pastor from California, Dr. Moomaw, gave both the invocation and benediction at his inauguration three years ago. It is our hope that he will also give the inauguration following this next election.

I realize your heavy responsibility in guiding the many well-wishers and those who would like a visit with their President. Frederick, I would think the large number of the more liberal churchmen would be much more understanding if the President could have made time for our Moderator. It does seem that he does have time for Jerry Falwell and others of the far right.

I think he is doing a great job. I do not concur with those who are savage in their attack upon him. Anyone who is so heavily against anyone obviously is misguided. Even educated people often tend to blame one person (the President) for all the sins of the nation when actually there are two hundred and thirty million people responsible.

Mr. Frederick J. Ryan  
Page Two

Of course, time has passed and our General Assembly has met and a new Moderator, Mrs. Hazel Nelson, has been elected.

Thank you again for your letter, I did not wish an audience with President Reagan but I had hoped he would listen to the leaders of his own church denomination, especially when they hold views somewhat different from his.

Sincerely in Christ,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Tyler Johnson". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the typed name.

Rev. Tyler Johnson

April 23, 1984

223377

4500

PROOF

RM 033-11

DDI Hunt, George

Dear Dr. Johnson:

We regret that due to the large volume of mail for the President, we were unable to reply to your recent letter before now.

We appreciate your letting us know of your interest in arranging a meeting with the President for Reverend J. Randolph Taylor, Moderator of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A). Although the President would enjoy having the opportunity to meet with Reverend Taylor, the demands of his official responsibilities are such that he cannot visit with everyone that he would like to see. Due to the extremely heavy schedule that he faces at this time, we are unable to arrange for such a meeting. However, if Reverend Taylor would like to put his concerns in writing, I will be glad to see that they received the appropriate attention.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR.  
Director, Presidential  
Appointments and Scheduling

X

Dr. Tyler Johnson, Pastor  
The First Presbyterian Church  
4 Everett Street  
Newport, Rhode Island 02840

HJR:JAJ

6  
Handwritten

# The First Presbyterian Church



BROADWAY AND EVERETT  
AT EQUALITY PARK

4 EVERETT STREET  
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND 02840

DR. TYLER JOHNSON, PASTOR

MRS. SALLY LUCAS, SECRETARY  
(401) 847-1749

26 March 84

President Roland Reagan  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

I read the enclosed editorial about you in a recent PRESBYTERIAN OUTLOOK. I was distressed and wrote a kind, but strong letter criticizing the tone of the editorial.

The editor wrote to me (His letter is enclosed.).

Would it not be possible to allow a ten minute meeting with the Moderator of the Presbyterian Church in the USA, Dr. Randolph Taylor, arranged through your Washington pastor, Dr. Louis Evans, of the National Presbyterian Church?

I think this would accomplish much good, among the more "main-line denominational people" of which there are quite a few.

Not sure if I should add, it would help this year, from what they write, and will write.

Sincerely, in Christ,

*Dr. Tyler Johnson*

I voted for you and am an evangelical Presbyterian.

# The Presbyterian Outlook

An independent nationwide weekly committed to the health and wholeness of the  
Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.)

GEORGE LAIRD HUNT, editor  
JAMES S. BROWN, Publisher

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Editor-Emeritus — Aubrey N. Brown Jr.

— • —  
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— • —  
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— • —  
ISSN: 0032-7565

Volume 166. Number 10.

Issue for March 12, 1984.

## EDITORIALS

### "Get Saved or Get Out"

President Reagan's new liaison to Protestant religious groups is Carolyn Sundseth. At the recent National Religious Broadcasters Convention she remarked that with White House Counselor Edwin Meese moving to the position of attorney general, there were no longer any "saved Christians" at the top. She then added, "If you want to know how to pray for the president, pray that anyone directly around him gets saved or gets out."

That remark drew fire from Americans United for Separation of Church and State, which called on the president to publicly repudiate what it described as "a blatant call for religious bigotry."

Asked to comment on the storm she raised, Mrs. Sundseth said, "I still believe it, but I wouldn't say it again."

What caught our eye in the Religious News Service story was its identification of Mrs. Sundseth as a former Presbyterian elder who left our church in the 1970s to become a non-denominational

charismatic. Anything about Presbyterians, former or otherwise, always leaps out through the bottom of our bifocals.

Mrs. Sundseth is the White House liaison to all Protestant groups. The sad thing is that she is not. How can she be, when she so blatantly adopts the viewpoint of fundamentalism at its worst?

This White House has no intention of listening to the mainline religious establishment. When Moderator Taylor, upon the express direction of our General Assembly, sought an appointment with President Reagan, he was told that the president would not be available to him. Yet, the president is available to any so-called evangelicals who court his favor and whom he can expect to agree with him.

"Get saved or get out." I don't think Mrs. Sundseth learned that when she was a Presbyterian and I doubt if most charismatics feel comfortable with such a remark, either. Maybe she learned it when she was "first secretary" to brewer and right-wing political financier Joseph Coors in Colorado.

But anyone capable of such intolerance is unqualified to be White House liaison

with Protestants. She got the job, we are told, because she is a committed Christian. Committed to what? to whom?

—G.L.H.

ated purposes. BPU is using its influence to achieve full and equal participation by black people in the life of the Presbyterian Church. It is using its regional and

## CROSS-CAUCUS CONFERENCE SETS GOALS

Representatives of the five racial/ethnic caucuses of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) met in Los Angeles in January to discuss how to eliminate racial injustice from the denomination as well as society at large.

Thirty people participated. They came from the National Asian Presbyterian Council; Black Presbyterians United; La Raza ("the race") Presbyterian Caucus, Eastern Division and La Raza Presbyterian Caucus, Western Division; the Native American Consulting Committee, and the Third World Women's Coordinating Committee, as well as representatives from a related organization, the Council on Church and Race.

The occasion was the meeting of the Presbyterian Cross-Caucus Conference, which is composed of three delegates from each of the caucuses. James L. Shirley, former chairperson of Black Presbyterians United, a layperson, is chairman of the group.

During one session, Jovelino Ramos, director of COCAR, said, "The theological basis of the Plan of Reunion was the product of the North American mind. . . . It is very poor on the issue of racial justice."

Ramos further observed that "The General Assembly level is full of ethnic representatives and statements, but as one moves further down to synods, presbyteries and congregations, the church gets whiter and whiter."

The group focused on "Comprehensive Strategy for Racial Justice in the 1980s," a position paper adopted by the reunited General Assembly in 1983.

At one point, Claude Kilgore, Long Beach, Calif., of Black Presbyterians

United, said, "White brothers and sisters have borne a guilt trip for too long." Then he asked, "How can we move beyond that?"

Also discussed was a proposal for an "inter-ethnic theological colloquium/convention." Various caucuses have conducted their colloquia; a colloquium that crosses racial-ethnic boundaries is envisioned.

Ramos said that one question for such an inter-ethnic colloquium would be "How do different racial-ethnic groups and traditions relate to the Reformed [Presbyterian] Church tradition, and how can they enrich that tradition with their own?"

Participants at the conference were encouraged to actively contribute to the formulation of a contemporary confession of faith which the new Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) is to produce.

Mildred Brown, staff for the Third World Women's Coordinating Committee, asked, "How do we as former objects of mission now live in a pluralistic church with equal status and equal participation?"

The conference participants agreed upon common goals: leadership development for laity and clergy, adequate staff for ethnic-racial congregations, recruitment for the professional ministry, placement of women ministers, and pluralism vs. exclusion in the reunited Presbyterian Church.

The cross-caucus participants decided to meet again at Cook Christian Training School, Tempe, Ariz., on an undetermined date this fall. (Reported by Kenneth Goodman, associate executive of Los Ranchos Presbytery) □

for World Evangelization. Their members are active in many different organizations throughout the church; they are an "order" within organizations.

The [United] Presbyterian Center for Mission Studies has the same office address as the Pasadena-based Order for World Evangelization. The Center sees itself as primarily a research body, "analyzing the needs and opportunities for Christian mission in today's world." Some of its leadership is active in the Church Growth Movement.

United Presbyterians for World Mission is located in western Pennsylvania and has its roots in the United Presbyterian Church of North America. It made its first report to the General Assembly in 1977. It seeks funds to support missionaries and to make the needs known.

\* \* \*

There you have it: 14 organizations willing to enter into this special relationship to the Presbyterian Church, willing to be under the "direction, control and oversight" of the General Assembly, committed to causes growing out of the gospel. We hope these three articles have helped you understand them, and why other groups might choose to become "Ch. 9 Organizations" in the future. □

• WILLIAM BARCLAY'S essays on peace have been published by the Presbyterian Peace Fellowship in pamphlet form. The two essays are "Thou Shalt Not Kill" and "Christian Discipline in Society Today." The 51-page pamphlet by the well-known Bible scholar is available for \$2 from the Peace Fellowship, Box 271, Nyack, N.Y. 10960.

THE PRESBYTERIAN OUTLOOK  
512 E. Main Street  
Richmond, Va. 23219

George Laird Hunt  
Editor

March 16, 1984

Tyler Johnson,  
4 Everett St.,  
Newport, R.I. 02840

Dear Tyler:

I appreciate the gracious spirit of your letter of March 14.

I do not apologize for my editorial "Get Saved or Get Out," although the "brewer" phrase may have been gratuitous.

My main concern was that when the Moderator of the General Assembly of a major American denomination is directed by the Assembly to convey its actions to the President of the United States, the moderator deserved the courtesy of a reply from the president and an opportunity to do what the General Assembly directed him to do.

Mr. Reagan has all the time in the world to speak to religious bodies who agree with him and when it is to his political advantage to do so; but he has no time for the mainline churches who might tell him something he does not want to hear. His studied ignoring of the major bodies of American Protestantism and his appointing a person who has no understanding of them to be his liaison with Protestantism is something we have every right to protest.

As you can see, my editorial was a lot milder than my real feelings in this matter.

I am sure we can agree to disagree on this and still continue to enjoy your long friendship and support. Thank you for writing.

Sincerely yours,



George Laird Hunt  
Editor



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

MARCH 8, 1984

TO: FAITH WHITTLESEY  
FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR., DIRECTOR  
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING  
SUBJ: REQUEST FOR SCHEDULING RECOMMENDATION

RECEIVED

APR 4 1984

SCHEDULING  
OFFICE

PLEASE PROVIDE YOUR RECOMMENDATION ON THE FOLLOWING  
SCHEDULING REQUEST UNDER CONSIDERATION:

EVENT: Meeting with Rev. J. Randolph Taylor, Moderator  
of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) regarding  
concerns of Presbyterians about peace as  
expressed by the Presbyterian General Assembly  
June 1983.

DATE: ---

LOCATION: ---

BACKGROUND: See attached

REGRET <sup>JWD</sup>  
4-13-84

*Student copy  
to Dr Taylor  
Johnson*

EIR

YOUR RECOMMENDATION:

Accept  Regret  Surrogate  Message  Other   
Priority   
Routine

IF RECOMMENDATION IS TO ACCEPT, PLEASE CITE REASONS:

*The reunited church is now one of the largest  
Protestant denominations in America. It dispuses  
the complaint that the President only meets with the "religious  
right".*

FAITH RYAN WHITTLESEY

*FRW  
JRW*

RESPONSE DUE

*3/11/84  
3/11/84  
(Netta) x 7.*

TO

JEAN APPLEBY JACKSON

—  
Staff to  
Whittlesby

W  
P  
S  
S

1012 Santa Monica Drive  
McKeesport, Pennsylvania 15133  
January 15, 1984

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

I'm writing to inquire why you do not have time to meet with the Moderator of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), the Rev. J. Randolph Taylor, regarding the concerns of Presbyterians about peace as expressed by the Presbyterian General Assembly, June, 1983; yet do have time to meet with the Rev. Jerry Falwell regarding similar concerns about peace.

To wit, please note:

1) On December 1, 1983, the Rev. Jerry Falwell appeared on the Phil Donahue Show speaking about nuclear defense and offense in relationship to peace. When asked by a caller, how intimate his relationship with the White House is, Mr. Falwell admitted he has been in the oval office alone with the President once and has been invited to numerous social occasions where he has an opportunity to keep making known his views to the President.

2) On that same day the Moderator of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), the Rev. J. Randolph Taylor spoke at a meeting of Pittsburgh Presbytery, a body of laypersons and clergy. When Mr. Taylor was asked what happened as a result of the General Assembly's directive that he meet with the President regarding Presbyterian concerns about peace, Mr. Taylor answered that the President was written to request such a meeting, but that his office had replied the President was too busy to meet with him or other Presbyterian leaders.

Now, then, I understand the President's schedule is busy and never-ending, the same as a clergyperson's schedule.

However, I do not understand the difference in treatment between the Rev. Mr. Falwell and Presbyterian Church leaders, especially when past pictures have shown the President meeting with Baptists and other religious groups on a number of miscellaneous matters.

Therefore, please explain to me this difference in policy.

Yours most truly,

*Walter Paul Sylvander*  
Walter Paul Sylvander

Compt. M. Rawlin 7-10-84 W

~~REGRET~~

*File (inquired to R. Kimmitt)*

2874

RECEIVED  
APR 13 1984  
SCHEDULING  
OFFICE

Date 4/13/84  
EJR

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  
April 13, 1984

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

*M/S*

*223380  
1110*

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director  
Presidential Appointments & Scheduling *PROG 7*

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT *Rob* *CO104*

REQUEST: Meeting with Mexican Foreign Secretary Sepulveda, Treasury Secretary Silva Herzog and Commerce Secretary Hernandez *FG 012  
FG 020*

PURPOSE: To set the stage for the de la Madrid visit and to demonstrate the President's direct involvement in our relations with Mexico.

BACKGROUND: Secretaries Shultz, Regan and Baldrige were received by de la Madrid last year while in Mexico to review bilateral relations. This would constitute a reciprocal gesture.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: None.

DATE & TIME: Tuesday, April 17, as permitted by the President's schedule, for one-half hour.

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: Mexican Foreign Secretary Sepulveda, Treasury Secretary Silva Herzog and Commerce Secretary Hernandez. U.S. Cabinet counterparts (Secretaries Shultz, Regan, Baldrige) could participate in meeting if desired.

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: One-half hour meeting in Oval Office

REMARKS REQUIRED: NSC will provide talking points.

MEDIA COVERAGE: White House photo opportunity

RECOMMENDED BY: Robert C. McFarlane

OPPOSED BY: None known

PROJECT OFFICERS: Robert M. Kimmitt/Jacqueline Tillman

REGRET

Date

4/10/84

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 10, 1984

3188

RECEIVED

WS APR 13 1984  
SCHEDULING OFFICE

223382  
1110  
PROOT

CO 165

NSC # 8403188

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO:

FREDERICK RYAN, DIRECTOR, PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

FROM:

FAITH WHITTLESEY, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR PUBLIC LIAISON *FAW*  
ROBERT MCFARLANE, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

REQUEST:

For the President to host a White House concert of the Soviet Emigre Orchestra in honor of Andrei Sakharov.

PURPOSE:

To express support for Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov, the Soviet human rights movements and to recognize Americans working on behalf of human rights in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

BACKGROUND:

May 21 is the birthday of Andrei Sakharov, the Nobel Peace Prize winner and recognized leader of the human rights movement in the Soviet Union. In recent years, American supporters of Dr. Sakharov have organized public events in honor of him and other defenders of human rights to draw public attention to their oft forgotten struggle.

The Soviet Emigre Orchestra, an 18-piece all-string ensemble of world renown, is planning a U.S. and European concert tour as part of this effort. Their first concert will be at the Kennedy Center on May 16, 1984. The short concert at the White House would serve as a highly-publicized kick-off for this important tour, providing the White House an opportunity to honor Dr. Sakharov and the human rights movement in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION:

Sakharov Day Proclamation Signing Ceremony, May 1983 in the Rose Garden.

DATE:

May 5-15, 1984

LOCATION:

The East Room

DURATION:

1 1/2 hours (The President could limit his participation to 15 minutes).

PARTICIPANTS: 150 leaders of East European-American communities, prominent Soviet and East European dissidents residing in the United States, and presidents of human rights organizations.

OUTLINE OF EVENT: The President makes opening remarks. The orchestra would play several pieces (not longer than 30 minutes total). Guests would then go to the East Room for light refreshments (coffee and pastries).

REMARKS REQUIRED: Brief remarks

MEDIA COVERAGE: Full press

RECOMMENDED BY: Faith Whittlesey, NSC

PROJECT OFFICER: Linas Kojelis, x2741

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

223382

April 19, 1984

PR 007

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Soviet Emigre Orchestra  
in Honor of Andrei Sakharov

The President's schedule does not permit his hosting a White House concert of the Soviet Emigre Orchestra in honor of Andrei Sakharov.

*Paul B. Thompson for*

Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

3188 add-on

April 19, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: WILLIAM P. MARTIN *WPM*

SUBJECT: Soviet Emigre Orchestra  
in Honor of Andrei Sakharov

Attached at Tab I for your signature is a memorandum for Charles Hill indicating that the President's calendar does not permit his hosting a White House concert of the Soviet Emigre Orchestra in honor of Andrei Sakharov.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for Charles Hill at Tab I.

Approve   *✓*  

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment

Tab I      Memo for Charles Hill

cc: Steve Steiner

NSCIS - 4/18  
 pls try in syst  
 & hand carry to Ryan  
 ASAP -  
 KMS  
 I got #001.

**URGENT**

National Security Council  
 The White House

System # 1116  
 Package #

01 APR 16 P 2: 46

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y			
Bob Kimmitt	1	K	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	2		
Bud McFarlane	3	M	A
Bob Kimmitt	4	K	
NSC Secretariat	5		
Situation Room			

Done 4/18/16  
 Hand Carried  
 ASAP to  
 Ryan

I = Information    **A = Action**    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
 (Date/Time)

Bud: For your initials, if you agree.  
 Steve Steiner and Jack Matlock strongly  
 recommend you endorse.

RECEIVED 18 APR 84 08

TO RYAN, F

FROM MCFARLANE

DOCDATE 10 APR 84

WHITTLESEY, F

KEYWORDS: USSR

AP

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR PRES TO HOST SOVIET EMIGRE ORCHESTRA

-----

ACTION: MCFARLANE SGD SP TO RYAN                      DUE:                      STATUS C                      FILES WH

-----

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LENCZOWSKI

SESTANOVICH

ROBINSON

KIMMITT

MARTIN

COMMENTS

REF#                      LOG                      NSCIFID                      ( CB CB )

-----

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	C 4/18	Mcfarlane	SGD Memo	JM, SS, RK, WM

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE WH (9)

RECEIVED 18 APR 84 08

TO RYAN, F

FROM MCFARLANE

DOCDATE 10 APR 84

WHITTLESEY, F

THOMPSON

19 APR 84

KEYWORDS: USSR

AP

SUBJECT REQUEST FOR PRES TO HOST SOVIET EMIGRE ORCHESTRA

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ACTION.	MCFARLANE	SGD	SP	TO	RYAN	DUE.	STATUS	C	FILES	WH
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FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ROBINSON

KIMMITT

MARTIN

MATLOCK

LENCZOWSKI

COMMENTS

REF#	LOG 8402181	8402529	NSCIFID	( CB CB )
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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>C</i>	<i>Thompson</i>	<i>sgd memo</i>	<i>PT, WM, SS</i>

DISPATCH *JF 7/19* W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_ (C)

National Security Council  
The White House

8F

REC ED

System #

I

Package #

3/88 add on

APR 19 P 7:42

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	1		A
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	2		D
Situation Room			4/21/19

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_

(Date/Time)

## THE WHITE HOUSE

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

WASHINGTON April 10, 1984

TO: FREDERICK RYAN, DIRECTOR, PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

FROM: FAITH WHITTLESEY, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR PUBLIC LIAISON *FHW*  
ROBERT McFARLANE, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT *RF*  
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

REQUEST: For the President to host a White House concert of the Soviet Emigre Orchestra in honor of Andrei Sakharov.

PURPOSE: To express support for Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov, the Soviet human rights movements and to recognize Americans working on behalf of human rights in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

BACKGROUND: May 21 is the birthday of Andrei Sakharov, the Nobel Peace Prize winner and recognized leader of the human rights movement in the Soviet Union. In recent years, American supporters of Dr. Sakharov have organized public events in honor of him and other defenders of human rights to draw public attention to their oft forgotten struggle.

The Soviet Emigre Orchestra, an 18-piece all-string ensemble of world renown, is planning a U.S. and European concert tour as part of this effort. Their first concert will be at the Kennedy Center on May 16, 1984. The short concert at the White House would serve as a highly-publicized kick-off for this important tour, providing the White House an opportunity to honor Dr. Sakharov and the human rights movement in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: Sakharov Day Proclamation Signing Ceremony, May 1983 in the Rose Garden.

DATE: May 5-15, 1984

LOCATION: The East Room

DURATION: 1 1/2 hours (The President could limit his participation to 15 minutes).

PARTICIPANTS: 150 leaders of East European-American communities, prominent Soviet and East European dissidents residing in the United States, and presidents of human rights organizations.

OUTLINE OF EVENT: The President makes opening remarks. The orchestra would play several pieces (not longer than 30 minutes total). Guests would then go to the East Room for light refreshments (coffee and pastries).

REMARKS REQUIRED: Brief remarks

MEDIA COVERAGE: Full press

RECOMMENDED BY: Faith Whittlesey, NSC

PROJECT OFFICER: Linas Kojelis, x2741

Name	
Christina	6/27/81



*File  
Original  
returned to  
A. R. Whittlesey  
Barnett*

REGRET

4/18/84

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

RECEIVED  
APR 18 1984  
SCHEDULING  
OFFICE

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

April 17, 1984

TO: FREDERICK RYAN, DIRECTOR  
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

223383  
1110  
PROOF

FROM: FAITH R. WHITTLESEY *FRW*

REQUEST: President to Drop-by briefing for  
Evangelical Press Association.

PURPOSE: 250 editors and publishers will participate in the May 8 briefing. This Association could broaden the President's appeal to a more moderate group of evangelicals in mainline denominations. Almost every pastor in America is affected by this group, not to mention the thoughtful laymen affected as well. Many at this briefing are uncommitted politically. The desired outcome of this meeting is that these influential editors and publishers use their communication capabilities in support of the President.

PROOF  
RM

BACKGROUND: The Evangelical Press Association represents the more moderate wing of evangelicalism, those with evangelical theology yet who are in traditional Protestant Churches (Episcopal, Methodist, Lutheran, Presbyterian, etc.).

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: None.

DATE AND TIME: May 8, 4:00-5:00pm.

LOCATION: 450 OEOB

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Two 20 minute presentations with 10 minute Q & A for each on family issues and civil liberties. The President could stop in at any time for brief remarks.

REMARKS REQUIRED: Brief remarks - 5 minutes.

MEDIA COVERAGE: 250 editors and publishers.

RECOMMENDED BY: Faith R. Whittlesey

PROJECT OFFICER: J. Douglas Holladay

*File original returned to James Coyne*

SCHEDULING OFFICE

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

APR 18 1984

RECEIVED  
April 16, 1984

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FRED J. RYAN, Director  
Presidential Appointments & Scheduling

*223384  
1110  
PR007*

FROM: JAMES K. COYNE

REQUEST: Presidential drop by in Room 450

PURPOSE: To commend the efforts of Ameritrust Bank for their study and implementation of a private sector program to revitalize the economy of the upper midwest. Also, to encourage the gathered corporations and trade associations to respond.

BACKGROUND: Using the current economic recovery as the basis, Ameritrust Bank of Cleveland commissioned the Standford Reserach Institute to conduct a study on the status of and prospects for the economy of the upper midwest region (Wisconsin, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, Buffalo and Pittsburgh).

REGRET

Date 4/19/84

FJR They also asked SRI to recommend to the local business, labor and government leaders what actions must be taken to revitalize these economies.

The attached summary report describes the study and recommendations in greater detail. Suffice it to say, this effort is a shining example of the private sector responding to the President's economic program and accepting the challenge of revitalizing an important industrial sector of this country.

OUTLINE OF EVENT: President enters Room 450 and commends Ameritrust for its efforts and challenges the business community in the audience to respond. President departs.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: None

DATE: May 30, 1984, 10:00 am DURATION: 5 mins.

LOCATION: Room 450 OEOB

REMARKS REQUIRED: Brief

MEDIA: Open

PARTICIPANTS: Ameritrust Chairman  
Stanford Research Institute and representatives of all major corporations and trade associations (200)

RECOMMENDED BY: James K. Coyne

PROJECT OFFICER: James K. Coyne

ID # 223564

PROOF

**WHITE HOUSE  
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET**

*sg*

- O - OUTGOING
- H - INTERNAL
- I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 1/1

Name of Correspondent: Hedley Donovan

MI Mail Report User Codes: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

Subject: Request for a follow-up on question addressed to President in an interview in August, 1981

ROUTE TO:	ACTION	DISPOSITION			
Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>J C / Ryan</u>	ORIGINATOR	<u>1 1</u>	<u>NA</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>840526</u>
<u>PS Speakes</u>	Referral Note: <u>A</u>	<u>84105126</u>			<u>1 1</u>
	Referral Note:	<u>1 1</u>			<u>1 1</u>
	Referral Note:	<u>1 1</u>			<u>1 1</u>
	Referral Note:	<u>1 1</u>			<u>1 1</u>

- ACTION CODES:**
- A - Appropriate Action
  - C - Comment/Recommendation
  - D - Draft Response
  - F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure
  - I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
  - R - Direct Reply w/Copy
  - S - For Signature
  - X - Interim Reply
- DISPOSITION CODES:**
- A - Answered
  - B - Non-Special Referral
  - C - Completed
  - S - Suspended
- FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:**
- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
  - Code = "A"
  - Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.  
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).  
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.  
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

# RECORDS MANAGEMENT ONLY

## CLASSIFICATION SECTION

No. of Additional Correspondents: \_\_\_\_\_ Media: L Individual Codes: \_\_\_\_\_

Prime Subject Code: \_\_\_\_\_ Secondary Subject Codes: \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

## PRESIDENTIAL REPLY

Code	Date	Comment	Form
C		Time: _____	P- _____
DSP		Time: _____	Media: _____

**SIGNATURE CODES:**

- CPn - Presidential Correspondence**
- n - 0 - Unknown
- n - 1 - Ronald Wilson Reagan
- n - 2 - Ronald Reagan
- n - 3 - Ron
- n - 4 - Dutch
- n - 5 - Ron Reagan
- n - 6 - Ronald
- n - 7 - Ronnie
  
- CLn - First Lady's Correspondence**
- n - 0 - Unknown
- n - 1 - Nancy Reagan
- n - 2 - Nancy
- n - 3 - Mrs. Ronald Reagan
  
- CBn - Presidential & First Lady's Correspondence**
- n - 1 - Ronald Reagan - Nancy Reagan
- n - 2 - Ron - Nancy

**MEDIA CODES:**

- B - Box/package**
- C - Copy**
- D - Official document**
- G - Message**
- H - Handcarried**
- L - Letter**
- M - Mailgram**
- O - Memo**
- P - Photo**
- R - Report**
- S - Sealed**
- T - Telegram**
- V - Telephone**
- X - Miscellaneous**
- Y - Study**

33-1017

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Date: 5 24-89

TO: *Larry Speake*

FROM: **FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR.**  
*Director*  
*Presidential Appointments and*  
*Scheduling*

Information

Action *- for your appropriate*  
*disposition.*

Let's Discuss

HEDLEY DONOVAN  
TIME & LIFE BUILDING  
ROCKEFELLER CENTER  
NEW YORK 10020

*Attch to Ryan*  
*4/24/84*

RECEIVED  
MAY 11 1984  
G

May 14, 1984

Dear Mr. Ryan:

Thank you for your letter of April 24.

I am of course disappointed that the President is unable to schedule an interview with me. It would be most helpful, however, if the President would take one question, a "follow-up" on a question I asked him in an interview for Fortune in August, 1981. At the end of that interview, we had this exchange:

HD: "I take it you don't think this Administration is just a four-year blip off the long-term national direction?"

The President: "I sure hope not. I feel that we did just about a 180-degree turn in the course of government, and I'd like to feel that it reflects what the people out there are thinking, that they now have recognized we've been on the wrong course."

(This comment is quoted on page 70 of the enclosed article).

I would like to put the same question to the President as of May 1984, and would very much appreciate it if he would offer a comment that you could pass along to me.

Sincerely,



Hedley Donovan

/enc.

Mr. Frederick J. Ryan, Jr.,  
Director, Presidential  
Appointments and Scheduling  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

April 24, 1984

223564  
4620  
PROOF

Dear Mr. Donovan:

Mr. Michael Deaver has forwarded your letter requesting an interview with the President for your book on the modern presidency, and on behalf of the President, I would like to thank you for your interest.

The President is most appreciative of your thoughtfulness in writing and would very much enjoy the opportunity of meeting with you. Regrettably, though, we are unable to schedule such an interview due to the extremely heavy demands on the President's calendar.

In sending his regrets, the President has asked that I convey to you his warmest regards.

Sincerely,

FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR.  
Director, Presidential  
Appointments and Scheduling

X

Mr. Hedley Donovan  
Time and Life Building  
Rockefeller Center  
New York, NY 10020

FJR:ab

Scheduling Recommendation attached



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

TO: ✓ LARRY SPEAKES - MICHAEL MCMANUS

FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR., DIRECTOR  
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

SUBJ: REQUEST FOR SCHEDULING RECOMMENDATION

RECEIVED  
APRIL 2, 1984  
APR 4 1984

SCHEDULING  
OFFICE

REGRET

4-9-14

Date

EJR

PLEASE PROVIDE YOUR RECOMMENDATION ON THE FOLLOWING  
SCHEDULING REQUEST UNDER CONSIDERATION:

EVENT: Interview with Hedley Donovan for book he is  
writing about the Presidency.

DATE: ---

LOCATION: ---

BACKGROUND: See attached

YOUR RECOMMENDATION:

Accept \_\_\_ Regret  Surrogate \_\_\_ Message \_\_\_ Other \_\_\_  
Priority \_\_\_  
Routine \_\_\_

IF RECOMMENDATION IS TO ACCEPT, PLEASE CITE REASONS:

*We have visited with him.*

*qrb*

RESPONSE DUE 4/5/84 TO JEAN APPLEBY JACKSON

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

APRIL 2, 1984

MEMORANDUM

TO: ✓ MICHAEL MCMANUS - LARRY SPEAKES  
FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR., DIRECTOR  
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING  
SUBJ: REQUEST FOR SCHEDULING RECOMMENDATION

RECEIVED

APR 4 1984

SCHEDULING  
OFFICE

PLEASE PROVIDE YOUR RECOMMENDATION ON THE FOLLOWING  
SCHEDULING REQUEST UNDER CONSIDERATION:

EVENT: Interview with Hedley Donovan for book he is  
writing about the Presidency.

DATE: ---

LOCATION: ---

BACKGROUND: See attached

*What's the view on  
the first article he  
did? of good -  
OK*

YOUR RECOMMENDATION:

Accept \_\_\_ Regret \_\_\_ Surrogate \_\_\_ Message \_\_\_ Other \_\_\_  
Priority \_\_\_  
Routine \_\_\_

IF RECOMMENDATION IS TO ACCEPT, PLEASE CITE REASONS:

RESPONSE DUE 4/5/84 TO JEAN APPLEBY JACKSON

HEDLEY DONOVAN  
TIME & LIFE BUILDING  
ROCKEFELLER CENTER  
NEW YORK 10020

March 26, 1984

*Staff to  
Mr. Munn & Specialy*  
RECEIVED  
MAR 30 1984  
SCHEDULING  
OFFICE

Dear Mike:

I have been working for two or three years on a book on the modern Presidency. It covers the year I spent working in the Carter White House, and my encounters as a reporter and editor with eight other Presidents, starting with F.D.R. Some of the material has been published in Time and Fortune.

I of course see a chapter on the Reagan Administration as an important element of the book. The President was kind enough to give me a substantial interview for one of the Fortune articles, "Reagan's First 200 Days" (September 21, 1981). I hope very much that it will be possible to interview him again. I put this request to Dave Gergen last year and in renewing it now, I would be most grateful if the President can find time in his schedule for such a conversation.


I would not propose to engage the President on current policy problems, but would focus more on his views of the office, his reflections on the various styles of Presidential management and leadership, and his concept of the Presidential relationship with White House Staff, Congress, bureaucracy, press. If he were willing to offer some appraisals of past Presidents, from the perspective of his fourth year in the office, that of course would be fascinating. In short, I would be hoping for a relaxed, reflective conversation about the job, rather than Q and A about M-1, MX, etc.

My book is to go to press on May 15. Harper & Row will be publishing it in January. If the President were willing, excerpts from the interview


might appear in Time or Fortune, but if he preferred no use prior to publication of the book, that understanding would of course be honored.

With many thanks for your help, and best wishes

Yours,

  
Hedley Donovan

Mr. Michael K. Deaver  
Assistant to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

cc:  Frederick Ryan  
Director of Presidential Scheduling  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Chapter 17

## GOVERNMENT

# Reagan's First 200 Days

His quick triumphs have demolished fashionable theories about presidential leadership. Some doubters remain: U.S. allies and the bond market.

by HEDLEY DONOVAN

Quite a start.

Ronald Reagan, age 70, along with everything else he's been up to, has neatly stood on its head a cherished assumption of most students of the presidency. That is the assumption that vigorous, ebullient presidential leadership will just naturally be devoted to expanding the role of the federal government (and the Chief Magistrate) in our national life, and that any President of contrary outlook will necessarily be a cold, crabbed type, or at best likably lazy. Franklin Roosevelt was the exemplar of the bold, joyous activist, Coolidge and Hoover the chill nay-sayers, Ike the lazy nice guy. (Academic and journalistic students of the presidency tend to be Democrats.) So here comes Reagan, activist, militant, clearly relishing the job and the power, using it with gusto and skill to shrink the role of government and indeed the role of Presidents.

There are, furthermore, bright young and youngish Reaganite believers all over

*Research associate: Anna Cifelli*

At a table set up in the front yard at Rancho del Cielo, Reagan used 24 pens to sign his tax- and budget-cutting bills—the most sweeping domestic change since Franklin Roosevelt's Hundred Days.

Washington these days. These are articulate, attractive men and women in their 30s and 40s excited by their work in the White House, the executive departments, the staff offices up on the Hill. Like their President, they are glorying in their jobs in a government they are dedicated to contracting. Their élan is perhaps comparable to that of Kennedy's New Frontiersmen. Some old-timers say there has been nothing like it since New Deal days. All quite a jolt for the alumni of those earlier dispensations, who, though they know better, still tend to think all youthful idealists have to be liberals.

Yet another blow, struck by Reagan and the Reaganites, is against the theory, quite fashionable in Washington as late as 1980, that the whole governmental process is stalemated by conflict between Congress and White House. Many a thoughtful article and think-tank seminar pivoted on this theme—that in reaction against Vietnam and Watergate, Congress, press, and public had dangerously circumscribed the powers of the presidency, while Congress, through an excess of internal reform, had become a kind of anarchy, incapable of leading or of responding to presidential leadership. Could

there be a responsible Congress again? Could there be strong presidential leadership again? It is too early to discuss these questions, but at least for this season they do sound a little dated.

"Not since..."

With Congress returning from recess and Reagan due back this week from his ranch in the Santa Ynez Mountains, the second chapter of the Reagan presidency begins. The spectacular tax and budget successes of the first chapter may already be jeopardized by the stubborn refusal to open a very free market—the U.S. money market—to react as the free-market theorists Reaganites expected. Major economic legislation will again be before Congress. Social Security reform and new assault on other areas of federal spending. If overall federal spending ceiling must now be put in place vote by vote, department by department. Things could go wrong. The Administration will face important decisions in foreign policy and military policy, intimately related—in ways the Administration had previously downplayed—to economic policy. The divisive "social issues," dear to the ultra-right of Reagan's support, will begin to hot up.

*continues*

Among them: abortion, busing, school prayer. The air controllers' strike has become a kind of time bomb—for public-service unions, perhaps for all unions, and for Ronald Reagan. The cruel question: who (apart from the immediate victims) would suffer most from a big crash? The congressional elections of 1982 will suddenly seem just around the corner. The President is going to need all the momentum and prestige he generated during his first 200 days.

All new Presidents have a lot going for them, of course. Reagan's performance rating in the polls—63% say he's doing a generally good job—is about the same as Nixon and Carter registered at the same point in their first year, and well below Kennedy and Johnson.

In sheer personal popularity, however, Reagan probably stands higher than any President since Eisenhower. Journalists and their "veteran Washington observers" have been outdoing themselves in "not since" comparisons. Following his historic victory on the tax bill, it was generally agreed that Reagan had established a mastery on Capitol Hill not seen since the prime of Lyndon Johnson. And the whole



Even all duded up for his high-style inaugural ball, Reagan came across as an all-American nice guy.

Reagan economic program, enacted just about as he wanted it, in just over six months, is the most formidable domestic initiative any President has driven through since the Hundred Days of Franklin Roosevelt. It was legislated faster than L.B.J.'s Great Society programs, which it partly repeals. Even F.D.R.'s famous Hundred Days were less a philosophic whole than a series of rapid-fire ad hoc assaults on a variety of problems strewn across the Depression landscape. The Reagan package represents, for better or worse, a much more coherent economic

ideology than F.D.R. brought to office. So how did he bring it off?

Well, to start with, there is the now overwhelming bipartisan consensus that he is a master "communicator." Ugly word, yet it does convey something different from orator or spellbinder. But let other communicators note: Reagan deeply believes what he is communicating. He is not above touches of hype and showmanship. That is part of the work of communicating. F.D.R., whom Reagan often quotes and in some things admires, would not disagree.


Reagan is a Reaganite. He takes his campaign promises seriously. He believes those things he has been saying all these years. Nobody was totally ready for that in Washington.


#### Economics, Eureka, '32

And an undernoticed point: Reagan considers himself thoroughly grounded in economics—and likes the subject! He took his degree in economics (Eureka College, Illinois, 1932). He headed a complicated trade union for six years. He delivered hundreds of talks on economic themes to General Electric employees, to Republican banquets, on the radio. He ran a very sizable enterprise, the government of California, for eight years.

Along the way he acquired a circle of rich and very rich friends, and became a man of some affluence himself. He sees no harm in people enjoying their money; if the rich are going to have trouble getting into the Kingdom of Heaven, he doesn't seem to be brooding about it. At least two columnists, Joseph Kraft and Haynes Johnson, have worried that he is too impressed with financial success. But when he talks economics, Reagan is not just parroting the ideas of his California friends, nor of the various businessmen, bankers, and Ph.D. economists who now work for him in Washington. He feels

The President quickly established a cordial working relationship with the congressional leadership, including redoubtable Tip O'Neill, the man he was soon to whip on two crucial roll calls.





The staff work on the economic package was masterful, but a babble of conflicting voices has been heard on foreign policy, where the President's views aren't as highly developed and

as well known to his top people. The White House troika, from left: Chief of Staff James Baker, 51, Deputy Michael Deaver, 43, and Counselor Edwin Meese III, 49.

he's been working the territory longer than they have. He is comfortable with the heavy theories and the big numbers.

Some of what he knows, to be sure, is quite mistaken—for example, that government spending is the only cause of inflation. This is almost as gross an oversimplification as the Jimmy Carter view, maintained for many months, that OPEC price increases were the cause of inflation. This led Carter to the despairing theme that there was nothing much he or any other leader of a Western industrial nation could do about inflation. Reagan may underestimate the complexity of the inflation phenomenon, but he is right in thinking we are not helpless—and this in itself should improve the public psychology. Ironically, something that Carter did do, his courageous start at petroleum price deregulation, is helping give Reagan better inflation statistics in 1981 than Carter could show in 1980.

So Reagan is a man of certitudes. "Not since" Harry Truman, very possibly, has

a President been so confident he is right. There are plentiful hazards in that, given the world of 1981, but also many assets for a democratic leader. Reagan would not have chosen as one of his favorite messages the Reinhold Niebuhr line that Carter used to quote: "The sad duty of politics is to establish justice in a sinful world." Reagan is not a big ambiguity fan.

#### "No gloating"

A senior official asked to characterize the President from close up says almost instantly, "Competitive." During the budget and tax battles Reagan was dedicated not only to winning his economic points but to *winning*. He pushed himself and his staff hard, and even some of the losing Democrats said the coordination between President, White House staff, and Republican leadership on the Hill was a beautiful thing to see.

After the big tax win, Reagan's first instruction to his staff was, "No gloating." As everyone agrees, he is a nice guy, nor-

mal, fun to be with. (Most since ... ?) This surely lubricates his relationships with Congress.

He and his advisers came to Washington with a powerful sense of priorities. They were determined to concentrate on their budget and tax objectives, and as far as possible keep other issues off the front pages. They were convinced that the Carter Administration was constantly confusing Congress and the public with too many problems and programs. This intentness, combined with the unique zeal and talent of the 34-year-old David Stockman, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, equipped the Administration with comprehensive budget proposals and long-range economic projections within a month of Inauguration Day. The Reaganites have been well aware of the perishable opportunities open to a new President in his first year, and perhaps the fact that their President is 70 lent a little extra urgency.

But finally, for all the coherence of pur-

*He has made brilliant use of the bully pulpit,  
and the congregation was ready for the sermon.*

...se, all the communicating skills, all the  
charm and normality of Ronald Reagan,  
...ere had to be a receptive country "out  
...ere." Ronald Reagan reading the cue  
...rds for a Ted Kennedy speech "would  
...t generate any more support than the  
...ator has. Kennedy is a superb com-  
...unicator of an obsolete message, elec-  
...ic, when he is in top form, in behalf of  
...opworn ideas, where Reagan is reas-  
...uringly old-shoe in behalf of daring  
...eas. Since January 20 he has made bril-  
...iant use of the bully pulpit. And the con-  
...gregation was ready for the sermon.

He has, of course, been fortunate in  
...is opposition. The titular leader of the  
...emocratic party is in Plains, Georgia,  
...rtually invisible. The most visible Dem-  
...ocrat, the burly, genial Tip O'Neill, is  
...ie classic clubhouse pol. Kennedy and  
...fo...l, chieftains in the party's bat-  
...tered liberal wing, could rally only sad  
...ttle skirmishing parties on some of the  
...ix roll calls. The only possibility of stop-  
...ping the Reagan tax bill, though it turned  
...ut to be no possibility at all, lay in the  
...ot exactly "liberal" bill offered by the  
...ot exactly charismatic leadership of the  
...peaker and West Side Chicago's Danny  
...ostenkowski.

#### choice in packaging

There are ways of presenting the Rea-  
...an economic package that make it look  
...ke a rather modest restraint on previous  
...trends in federal taxing and spending. It  
...an be said, for instance, that the Reagan  
...cuts in personal-income taxes through  
...mid-1984 will barely offset inflationary  
...rocket creep and scheduled increases in  
...social Security taxes. It can also be point-  
...d out that the Reagan budget cuts still  
...eave federal spending in fiscal 1982 (start-  
...ng October 1) only 1% lower in real dol-  
...ars than in fiscal 1981—essentially a  
...Carter budget.

These figures presented Reagan Admin-  
...stration spokesmen with a temptation to  
...work both sides of the street. They could  
...om...i as soothing gradualists, and  
...ometimes they did. Or they could come  
...in as the proponents of a profound change

in the whole thrust of the U.S. political  
...economy. In the final weeks before the  
...showdown in the ostensibly Democratic  
...House, the Administration seemed to set-  
...tle on the more radical—and more ac-  
...curate—interpretation of its program.

Congress, for its part, improved con-  
...siderably on the "pure" Kemp-Roth that  
...Reagan had wanted. The 5-10-10 schedule  
...of personal-income-tax cuts, beginning  
...October 1, is more prudent than the 10-  
...10-10, starting July 1, that Reagan asked  
...for. Both the Administration and the  
...House Ways and Means Committee  
...glopped up the legislation with last-min-  
...ute bidding for special-interest votes. But  
...several of the House additions are sound:  
...relief from the "marriage penalty," end-  
...ing the unequal treatment of investment  
...income and "earned" income, adjusting  
...estate and gift taxes for inflation, and re-  
...fining the depreciation schedules.

#### Turning the Nimitz

It takes thousands of yards of ocean to  
...turn the Nimitz, and it takes at least two  
...fiscal years to turn the U.S. government.  
...The Reagan program is intended as the  
...beginning of a real turn. And just as L.B.J.'s  
...original Great Society programs had their  
...own built-in multipliers—though nobody  
...realized at the time how prolific—the  
...Reagan program, unless interrupted by  
...some counter-counterrevolution, will  
...have much greater effects from the mid-  
...1980s on than in the next two years.

The Reagan economic program is in-  
...deed the first serious attempt in half a cen-  
...tury to arrest the growth of government  
...and return in substantial measure some  
...choices and some dollars to the private  
...sector. Or let the private sector keep more  
...of what belonged to it in the first place,  
...as Reagan would argue. Reagan, of course,  
...would not say "private sector" but some-  
...thing more homely like "your own earn-  
...ings." He is too shrewd, incidentally, to  
...say "what you and I have earned," know-  
...ing that the public knows he has an ex-  
...cellent standard of living. The public really  
...doesn't mind that, but minds Presidents  
...pretending otherwise.

Politically, this is now Reagan's econ-  
...omy. After October 1, when the first in-  
...stallment of the tax bill goes into effect,  
...along with Reagan's first full-year budget,  
...it will become increasingly difficult to  
...blame the Carter Administration for the  
..."economic mess" that Reagan described  
...in his powerful TV pitch of July 27. Plen-  
...ty of messiness will persist, of course,  
...and the Reaganites will keep blaming the  
...Carterites, of course, but politically the ar-  
...gument will lose force month by month.

Starting October 1, the effects of the  
...first round of budget cuts will begin to  
...be felt in hundreds of federal programs—  
...not just by bureaucrats in Washington  
...but by citizens all over the country. But  
...the budget cuts of fiscal 1982 are small  
...change compared with what's coming.  
...The Reagan tax cuts—reaching \$150 bil-  
...lion in fiscal 1984 and \$190 billion in fis-  
...cal 1985—will create pressure for very  
...heavy budget cuts in the same years.


Reagan has frankly and repeatedly stat-  
...ed that this is just the point: "Government  
...can't spend money it doesn't have." Or if  
...you leave taxes where they are, wait for  
...government to reduce spending, and only  
...then distribute the benefits in tax cuts,  
...you will have a very long wait. The Rea-  
...gan tax-budget program is an effective  
...freeze on any new social programs dur-  
...ing this presidential term and an almost  
...certain guarantee of year-by-year reduc-  
...tions in many of the surviving programs.

#### Wall Street sat on its hands

Unfortunately government *can* "spend  
...money it doesn't have." Government is  
...doing so right this minute, in fiscal 1981,  
...spending approximately \$56 billion more  
...than it will take in. Government can print  
...money, and borrow in ways that amount  
...to the same thing. If Reagan is to meet his  
...goal of a balanced budget in fiscal 1984,  
...and fit greatly enlarged military spending  
...into the budget, the economy must re-  
...spond very vigorously to his tax cuts. Oth-  
...erwise, the choice would be nondefense  
...budget cuts so deep as to be almost un-  
...thinkable—fiscal 1984 is also presidential  
...year 1984—or substantial continued def-



Debra B. Smith/Butt Syg



The shots that rang out in front of the Washington Hilton on March 30 aroused a surge of support for Reagan, partly because, as Presidents are supposed to be, he was cool under fire. His speech a month later to a joint session of Congress was a tumultuous triumph.

and continued inflationary pressures heavy federal borrowing. s the fear of this outcome that seems ave soured the initial stock-market bond-market reactions to an econom- program that in so many ways has enor- sly bullish implications. Treasury ary Donald Regan complains that traders can't look beyond the next hours (interest rates won't come n very fast right away, and that's all raders notice). But at least some in- rs seem to be doing longer-range ying, up to four years. e federal deficit for fiscal 1982 already s \$10 billion to \$20 billion higher than Administration was projecting only months ago, because federal borrow- osts are staying higher than expect- nd because general business "soggi- " (Reagan's word) is damping down evenues. The balanced-budget goal is ing from fiscal 1984 to fiscal 1985, gh this is not yet conceded by the Ad- ministration. It will be well into next year e w e whether the tax cuts are ilating investment or consumption. e of each doubtless, but what mix?

Production and employment must be so stimulated that lower tax rates bring in higher tax revenues. Interest rates must start down soon; "expectations" must become progressively less inflationary. In line with its monetarist philosophy, the Administration had been strongly supporting the Federal Reserve's tight-money inclinations, though just recently (see box, page 70) it seems to be distancing itself a bit from the Fed. Senator Howard Baker had it about right: "What we are doing is really a riverboat gamble." He added that in his judgment it would work. That seems about right too. The hunch that it can work rests on faith, hope, and a process of elimination—nothing else, by way of an overall economic program, has worked very well in recent Administrations. Reagan-Stockman-Kemp-Roth was the only really big idea in town. Does Reagan have a foreign policy? In his first 200 days the President's strong tilt toward domestic policy reflected not only his own interests but a calculated decision that foreign issues should

not distract attention from his economic package. Both by the dynamics of world problems and by U.S. initiative, foreign policy will almost certainly loom large in Washington in the second 200 days. The Reagan Administration got off to a ragged start in foreign policy. There were bobbles, zigzags, and quite a babble of conflicting voices. Editorial writers and columnists were swift to ask: Do We Have a Foreign Policy? If we had one, it seemed at times to consist of "the Haig question"—will he be able to stick it out or will "they" (the White House staff, possibly even the Pentagon) get him? Yes, we do have a foreign policy. It is beginning to be articulated by the Secretary of State—not a bad arrangement—in reasoned public statements (though A Haig off-the-cuff gets tied up sometime in contradictions and can turn very combative, not so much toward the Russians as toward Americans who might question his views). At a meeting in the White House in late July, the President said he wanted the personal sniping at Haig to stop. It seemed to stop. But Haig and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger con-

## *Progress in diplomacy could be a welcome rationale for scaling down Pentagon budget projections.*

tinue to express quite divergent policy views to the President—Reagan says he likes to have Cabinet officers argue in front of him—and then somehow the views do get aired in print.

White House Counselor Edwin Meese III points out that the "multiple sources of comment" dry up after a decision has been reached at the presidential level. True enough. The question is whether the rest of the U.S. foreign-policy establishment knows how to get its work done in the interim, and whether foreign governments are needlessly confused, or even feel encouraged to play to whatever factions or rival schools of thought they think they detect in Washington.

This couldn't happen if Reagan's foreign-policy views were as highly developed as his domestic-policy views, and as well known to his top people. So though a Reagan foreign policy can be discerned, the delicate question remains: does Reagan himself know enough—or care enough—about it?

### **A fine hand**

It is in some ways refreshing to have a President who does *not* feel a deep pull toward foreign policy, who would settle for changing the U.S. But alas, the world out there can also transform the U.S., not necessarily for the better.

There are Reaganites as well as critics who will tell you we are lucky not to have had a major foreign-policy crisis so far this year. A contrary view is that a crisis would have made the Administration—and the President—get their act together sooner. Poland, on and off the brink all year, has certainly helped sharpen up "contingency" thinking.

The political and journalistic battlefields are littered with people who underestimated Ronald Reagan. He is never going to plunge as deep into the detail of foreign policy as Carter and Nixon did, in part as refuge from domestic affliction. Reagan is more sophisticated in foreign affairs than he was last January 20, as he should be. He is a little less the campaign-trail Reaganite, a little more sensitive to

the complexity of this world, much as he despises complexity.

Al Haig (pointing out that his testimony is self-serving) says that when Reagan gets into a foreign-policy problem, you see "a fine hand that is both responsible and engaged, and yet not mucking around in the details so that people get so gunshy they are afraid to do anything until they have an OK." A good definition of a good top executive in almost any field, though the foreign-policy responsibilities of the President of the U.S. are unique.

### **Rhetoric and reality**

U.S. foreign policy never changes as much with a party turnover as the election-year oratory would have suggested. The nation's fundamental interests remain, and the ways that intelligent people seek to advance them can't vary wildly from one Administration to the next.

There are hard-liners and softer-liners in the Reagan Administration, as there were in the Carter Administration, though the debate takes place further over toward the hard end of the spectrum. Interestingly, two Carter officials from the "hard" side of that house, Zbigniew Brzezinski of Columbia and Samuel Huntington of Harvard (sometimes known as Zbig's Zbig) have both spoken quite well of the Reagan foreign policy. From the milder wing of the Carter Administration, Cy Vance attacked the Reagan decision to sell arms to China as "needlessly provocative" and found the Reagan Administration generally engaged in "posture" rather than policy.

Some of the Administration rhetoric has indeed been reckless, with Reagan and Haig both openly suggesting the Soviet empire is on its last legs. That line has now been toned down, perhaps in recognition that it might not be helpful in the Polish situation, perhaps for fear that it might undercut the case for the U.S. defense buildup.

SALT negotiations could be resumed next year. For domestic political reasons, negotiations might become almost essential to the Reagan Administration, at the

point in 1982-83 when defense spending really begins to bite. Progress in diplomacy could be a welcome rationale for some scaling-down of Pentagon budget projections. Reagan has insisted that any SALT treaty must impose actual reductions in the strategic nuclear armories, not merely limitations on future growth. Each side has some obsolescent weapons, of course. An agreement can be imagined that would satisfy the Reagan formula and still contain a good many provisions familiar from Carter's SALT II.

The problems are piling up. Besides the central issue of Soviet relations, two other situations clamor for attention and whatever fresh insights the Reagan Administration can bring:

■ The Middle East was parked on the back burner for several months, but couldn't be kept there. In less than 90 days, starting in early June, the Israelis attacked the Baghdad reactor, Begin barely won his election, the Israelis carried out their bloody attack on the Palestinian quarter of Beirut, the fragile Lebanon cease-fire was negotiated, the U.S. tut-tutted Israel and then resumed the delivery of F-16s, Sadat visited Washington, Begin was due to visit, congressional polemics resumed on the sale of AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia, the Libyans lost two jets in their attack on U.S. Navy planes over the Mediterranean. The Reaganites feel the same conflicting urges that Carter and previous Administrations knew: between the desire to cultivate the moderate Arab states—to be "evenhanded"—and the tug toward Israel. The tug is not only a matter of U.S. voting patterns. There are anti-Soviet hard-liners, more in this Administration than the last, who feel the Israelis are such a stout ally—never mind any sentimental arguments—that they should get just about anything they ask for. The current oil glut can also make it seem less compelling to cultivate the Arabs.

■ The Western Alliance is under severe strain. The allies complain that the U.S. is exporting unemployment and recession with our brutally high interest rates and high-priced dollar; the fact that many

*continued*

## "We Can Have and Shou

Americans, starting with Ronald Reagan, devoutly wish the rates would come down does not make the allies feel any better. Germany is cutting back on its 1982 defense-spending commitment, blaming U.S. interest rates.

The U.S. and the allies are as far apart as ever in their views on East-West trade. The Reagan Administration—despite its inconsistency in lifting Carter's grain embargo—worryes about Western economies becoming dependent on trade with the East and seeks tightening of restrictions on high-technology sales to the Soviets. The cool German reply: "Bonn's grain is machinery." Western Europe is also going ahead with a \$10-billion gas-pipeline deal with the Soviets, despite Reagan's objections. All very familiar problems to Carter officials who tried to get our allies to take the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as seriously as we did.

No distinctive Reagan approach to the troubled condition of the Alliance is yet apparent. Haig's experience and prestige as former NATO commander help some. So did the generally firmer style of this Administration—until the U.S. announcement of neutron-bomb production, before the touchy Theater Nuclear Force negotiations had begun. This struck allied governments as clumsiness; they had enough trouble already with neutralist and pacifist sentiment in public opinion at home.

The U.S. defense buildup may impress the Russians; it can also be taken in Western Europe as an excuse to do less. Here again, much is riding on the Reagan economic package. It must bring U.S. interest rates down if we are to be a livable partner in the Alliance; it must deliver a vigorous enough economy to support our own defense promises.

### The Reagan Pentagon

Just as the U.S. economy now belongs to Ronald Reagan, politically speaking, so too it's beginning to be his Pentagon. This is quite unfair in a way, military leaders being what they are. If war broke out tomorrow, we would find out what sort of job the Carter, Ford, and Nixon

*continued*

*Interrupting his vacation for a week of work at the Century Plaza Hotel in Los Angeles, President Reagan made time for an exclusive interview with Hedley Donovan for FORTUNE. Excerpts:*

Mr. President, in spite of the bullish implications of your economic program the Dow Jones average is much lower than when you were inaugurated. Why?

Maybe the interest rates have something to do with that. But I also believe that business leaders are probably a better indicator than are the people on Broadway—Broadway, that's a Freudian slip, isn't it?—on Wall Street.

I'd rather go by the full-page ad in the papers the other day by one of the major steel corporations that they're going to embark on a \$750-million expansion. This is only one of many.

I guess I'm saying I'm not prepared to take Wall Street as a good critic or measuring point.

It does have some power to make its predictions come true.

Yes. But if things begin to flourish a little bit, maybe they'll want to climb on.

Well, in your own scenario, at what point would you look for what signs?

I think there's already a beginning psychological effect, one of optimism you can almost feel out there in the country. From my own study of economics—that's where I got my degree, not that I was a great scholar or anything—I've always had a feeling we've underestimated the psychological factor.

I think as we pass October 1 and people suddenly realize they are paying a little bit less in taxes, they recognize that the following year they're going to pay even less, business begins to respond to that. I think the incentives to save are going to create more money in the capital market. Then I think we're going to begin to see the effect.

As I understand it, the Administration had been encouraging the Fed in its tight money policy but then in a recent interview it sounded as if Don Regan was saying maybe we'd had enough of a good thing.

We were encouraging the idea that we must have a solid monetary policy where the increase in money supply is geared to industrial growth, [without] those extremes of pull it tight [and then] loosen it. I think what Don was saying was that we can have and should have some loosening of interest rates because they're now contributing to the inflation we're trying to cure.

Are you going to say that yourself?

Yes, I'm willing to say it. But we can't dictate to the Fed.

On the air controllers' strike, various professional labor-relations people are speculating that this might be a full turn in the history of unionism in America. Do you see it in those terms?

As an old ex-union president myself, I see it, no, as maybe the rejection of a turn. For 50 years the AFL encouraged the organization of public employees, [but these unions put] anti-strike clauses into their constitutions. The real change occurred in 1966 when Mike Quill took the transport workers out in New York and they got away with it and the whole thing broke down.

Would it disturb you if employers in the private sector treated this as some kind of turning point in how to deal with unions?

Well, yes it would, because I do believe in the right of employees to strike. I believe in collective bargaining. As a matter of fact, as president of the [Screen Actors] Guild, I led the first strike the Guild ever had.

To shift to the Pentagon, wouldn't it contribute a lot to public psychology about inflation if people could be convinced that this isn't an open-ended

# Have Some Loosening of Interest Rates'

spending situation? Is the 7% annual real increase sacrosanct?

I think of the 7% more as a ceiling. We didn't, in effect, say to the Defense Department, "Well, now you rush out and make sure that you increase spending by 7%." We said we thought that this was something that we could handle, and we know the speed with which we have to bring about a change in the military balance. The imbalance right now has opened what I call a very large "window of vulnerability."

But, no, you can't throw dollars at the enemy, if there's an enemy.

With, what, a 14½% increase coming up in fiscal 1982 and then about 7½% the next year, then three 7s on top of that compounded is a lot more than 7% a year. It's 10% or something.

This is one of the things that we've been discussing. There was a surge to get started in 1982. Well, then, do you take that as the starting point or not?

I would think that was one of the places where there was some give.

Yes. We're discussing all those things right now.

In defense, what's your own sense of priorities? What's most urgent?

While I don't underestimate the conventional buildup, I do believe that the greatest necessity right now is in the strategic area.

Do you feel the Soviets are ahead?

Strategically, yes I do.

You feel the window has opened?

Yes.

How long do you think it's open for? Five or six years?

We think we can get some things on line before that. That would be a kind of nervous five or six years.

On arms-reduction talks, other than a willingness by the Soviets to reduce, do you have any prerequisites like a change of Soviet policy on Afghanistan or on arms shipments to Cuba?

We've made it plain to them that we believe talks shouldn't just be limited to how many missiles each side has, that their performance in the world, their aggressive policy, has to be discussed. Are they going to continue that? If so, we have to prepare to deal with that.

On the Middle East, some people think we have lost control of our foreign policy because of strong domestic political pressures. At your present level of popularity and political strength and with the next presidential election three years away, can we establish our own sovereignty, so to speak, in regard to Israel?

I want to go forward with what started at Camp David and the idea of peace in the Middle East. There's no question about our moral obligation and commitment to Israel, but if we're to help bring about that peace, we have to establish a credibility with the more reasonable, the moderate Arab nations there so that they recognize that we're not trying to join with one side or the other. And I think we are making some strides. [Look at] the manner in which Saudi Arabia was willing to join us after [Ambassador Philip] Habib went to Lebanon in trying to arrive at a settlement there. It could not have occurred without the help of Saudi Arabia.

At your press conference at the ranch, when somebody brought up Haig-Weinberger debates, you said you liked to have your Cabinet officers debate in front of you. In terms of foreign policy, isn't there some danger in this?

Many times I've been asked in interviews, "Were there any surprises [about being President]?" And I kind of denied that there were, but I would have to confess that there is some surprise at the extensive leaks that occur in Washington. I wish there were more respon-

sibility not only in those who do the leaking but those who handle it without bothering to find out if it's true. We've done an awful lot in these several months to strengthen our relationship with our allies and to give them a confidence that we're not going to throw hasty surprises at them, but then they pick up the press and they read this and they're confused and they don't know what to believe.

I tell you, we find ourselves pleading with each other [in Cabinet meetings]. "Now, look, if we leave this unresolved issue here, please don't anyone say anything."

When Congress gets back and if you're able to command the same kind of cooperation from some of the conservative Democrats, does this put you on any kind of spot in the 1982 election campaign as to who you help and who you keep quiet about?

Well, I tell you, I've already voluntarily put myself on a spot. Those men who were helping on the economic program said, "You know, we wonder, though, are you going to be out there in 1982 trying to get us defeated?" And I had to tell them honestly, I said, "In my principles, there's no way that I could go in and campaign against any of you after what you've done and the positions that you've taken."

But then that makes it almost impossible for any Republican to run against them, doesn't it?

Well, that could well be, but then by the same token, I'd like to feel that maybe some of those Democrats are doing some soul-searching as to whether they're in the right party.

I take it you don't think this administration is just a four-year blip on the long-term national direction?

I sure hope not. No, I feel that we did just about a 180-degree turn in the course of government, and I'd like to feel that it reflects what the people out there are thinking.

Administrations had done in defense. But the new Commander in Chief is already putting his stamp on the defense establishment of the mid-1980s.

After heavy catch-up spending—14.6% in real growth in fiscal 1982 and 7.3% planned for fiscal 1983—the Reagan projections call for 7% real growth in each of the three following years. Secretary Weinberger freely admits the 7% is not based on any particular shopping list or grand strategic concept but is simply an estimate of what the economy could “afford.” The estimate assumes that the Reagan economic scenario is unfolding exactly according to plan—nondefense-spending cuts carried through as scheduled, the nation’s production vastly stimulated by the tax cuts, inflation sharply reduced, the budget moving into balance. The 7% real-growth figure was meant essentially as a signal to the world of a new American firmness. Some Administration officials will say privately that we might look adequately steadfast at 6% or 5% or 4% (all compounded, of course, on top of the huge increases of 1982-83) and put less strain on the economy.

Weinberger back in his days as OMB Director under Nixon came to be known as “Cap the Knife.” He says he still likes to think of himself as “a fiscal Puritan,” even as he plans to lay out \$1.5 trillion, give or take a hundred billion, over the next five years. Lucky for all of us he’s not a fiscal spendthrift.

Some of the 1982-83 surge in spending will go into the unglamorous “operations and maintenance” items that can have a fairly prompt effect on readiness. Improved command, control, and communications (C<sup>3</sup> in Pentagonese) for the strategic forces has a high priority. So does planning for a more versatile industrial mobilization base, capable of



Reagan has met most of the world's major leaders by now and is a little more sensitive to the complexity of this world, much as he despises complexity. Next: Menachem Begin.

sustaining long periods of tension or even a long conventional war, or several varieties of war—not just Doomsday.

New Defense Secretaries almost invariably are credited with new internal-management reforms, streamlined organization charts, reductions in paperwork. Weinberger does seem to have achieved a considerable decentralization of operational decision-making, while gathering the planning functions more closely into his own office. He is pressing for multi-year funding of major procurement contracts, which could yield important unit-cost reductions.

Meanwhile two very expensive decisions were pressing upon Weinberger in July and August. And even in California, during his on-and-off vacation, the President convened key members of his debating society (Meese, Stockman, Haig, Regan, among others) to discuss Weinberger’s recommendations on: 1) the basing of the MX missile system and 2) the development of a new manned bomber—whether to revive the B-1, dropped

by Carter, or wait for the “Stealth” bomber, advertised to be almost radar-proof, which couldn’t be ready until the early 1990s—or neither, or both. As this article went to press, the President still wanted more debate, and was also doing some careful listening to congressional views.

### De Gaulle next door

In his fine biography of Walter Lippmann, Ronald Steel quotes Lippmann’s acute perception about the leadership of Charles de Gaulle. It was not so much that he was a political leader within France—France was *inside him*.

Quite a lot of America is inside Ronald Reagan. He is two of America’s favorite characters, the nice boy next door and the lovable, opinionated uncle, getting on but pretty damn lively

for his age, cheerful, generous (5-10-10), great storyteller (has been known to shade one to make a point), no big egg-head but plenty of common sense. Reagan comes from two quintessentially American places, the Middle Western small town and Golden California. The years as a movie actor, far from creating a stagy celebrity, seem now to have merged role and reality—the good guy everybody wants to be, the American as seen by the American. This is a very different sort of leader from Franklin Roosevelt, the aristocratic Hudson River squire, or the dashing young Jack Kennedy, the Irish-American nouveau Brahmin—two rare species. The many Americans who revered them did not for a moment imagine these heroic figures were simply themselves called to Washington. In his plain American-ness, Reagan is more like Ford or Truman or Eisenhower. But he is a better politician than Ford or Truman, and has more of an idea what he wants to do with his presidency than Eisenhower had. It’s going to be a fascinating presidency; it is already. E

# A Vacuum in

Reagan appears to have two Secretaries of State, with contradictory impulses, but no coherent vision of his own.

by HEDLEY DONOVAN

The foreign-policy process, always a bit messy in our democracy, is now the subject of a novel experiment: Can the machinery work in the 1980s without the deep and consistent engagement of the President? It is a dangerous and fragile world out there. Nearly 50,000 nuclear warheads are now deployed in the Northern Hemisphere. Things will probably come out all right, but sometimes it takes strong nerves just to watch.

An eminent U.S. diplomat, over poached eggs and orange juice one recent morning, was speculating on what would happen if Ronald Reagan, over his breakfast, were to read a column by George Will ripping into the Administration for being soft on Russia. "You see," said the diplomat, "I think Reagan really imagines he's being tough with the Russians in the Polish business. If Will tells him he's not, I could worry that he might do something excessive to show how tough he is being." Will is the lively conservative columnist (see *Books and Ideas*, page 179) who is a friend of the President's and has been an ardent supporter. Just two mornings later in the *Washington Post*, Will ripped into the Administration for being soft on Russia (soft on China too). On the same day in the *New York Times*, the ultraliberal Anthony Lewis, usually appalled by the Administration, warmly praised its Polish policy in a column called "Reagan Gets It Right." This could have disturbed the President more than the Will column, if either bothered him at all. And a few days later, in Plains, Georgia, when Jimmy Carter was asked about Reagan foreign policy, he grinned one of his broader grins and said: "He's comin' toward me all the time."

The same day Carter was sharing this thought with FORTUNE, Henry Kissinger

*Research associate: Claire Makin Green*

published the second of two stern articles in the *New York Times*, expressing misgivings about Reagan foreign policy in general and particularly questioning Secretary of State Alexander Haig's intention to be seen meeting in Geneva with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko even while martial law was still being imposed on the people of Poland. This hard-line critique was especially interesting since Kissinger had once been anathema, as author of detente, to right-wing Reaganites, and since Haig, as an obscure colonel, had once been a staff assistant to Kissinger. When it was announced a few days later that Haig's meeting with Gromyko would be cut down from two days to one and that the main topic would be Poland rather than a start-up of strategic-arms negotiations, a State Department spokesman, sounding rather like Haig himself, said with some heat that this switch was in spite of, not because of, Kissinger's published advice.

## A tough agenda

The President as yet has done nothing "excessive" to straighten out George Will. But U.S. foreign policy was in a peculiar condition, to say the least, as Ronald Reagan settled into the second year of his presidency. He holds office in years bristling with danger to America—and bright with opportunity. The mix is not new, but the possible penalties and rewards have multiplied. Yet President Reagan has been content to approach foreign policy with a muddled management structure and a charming and perilous offhandedness about his own involvement.

U.S. diplomacy is facing four big tests right now. (Never mind the dozens of "normal problems.") There is a dove-vs.-hawk dimension in each of the tests. Yes, there are spots of dovishness, relatively

speaking, in the Reagan Administration, though the bird is more militant than a Carter-era dove.

In order of importance:

- The foreign-policy agenda is dominated by Poland, with its profound implications for the Soviet empire, for East-West relations, and for the Atlantic Alliance.

- The permanent Middle Eastern crisis could well worsen in coming weeks.

- The U.S.-China relationship, an important element in the world balance, has been brought to a "delicate stage" (Haig's own words) by our continued supply of weaponry to Taiwan.

- In El Salvador the leftist insurgency does endanger U.S. interests (perhaps not so gravely as Haig argues).

These four situations should make a powerful claim on valuable presidential time. And the key presidential appointees, it would seem to go without saying, should articulate Administration policy along agreed lines or, if policy is not yet agreed upon, keep quiet. Yet the two ranking Cabinet officers, Haig and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, ever since they took office have been conducting a running foreign-policy debate. Just in the last few weeks they have disagreed in public on one aspect or another of three of the four questions (all but China) cited above.

The managerial failure here is twofold. The President has been unable or unwilling to recognize the harm done by the Haig-Weinberger debates. But these two strong-willed men would have less to debate about if the President had worked his way through to clear foreign-policy views of his own.

"It is in some ways refreshing," said FORTUNE last September 21, "to have a President who does not feel a deep pull toward foreign policy, who would settle for



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# Leadership

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Call 611-1111





Secretary of State Alexander Haig has been fluffing his feathers at suggestions by his former boss Henry Kissinger that he has been too dovish over Poland. As Haig sees the question, it's better to go slow than march off and leave our allies behind. A confirmed Atlanticist, Haig has been filling top positions with men who share his views. His new Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Lawrence Eagleburger, 51, is a moderate within the current spectrum—and, like Haig, a former Kissinger protégé.

changing the U.S. But, alas, the world out there can also transform the U.S., not necessarily for the better."

### Out to lunch?

Today Reagan appointees loyally insist that the boss is very much on top of the big foreign-policy issues. It is hard to find people outside the West Wing of the White House or the seventh floor of the State Department who profess to believe that. The skeptics include Republicans on Capitol Hill and think-tank conservatives.

Few members of the Washington foreign-policy community think it necessary or even desirable for a President to plunge as far into the minutiae of foreign-policy decision-making as Jimmy Carter sometimes did. But Ronald Reagan represents a swing of the pendulum almost all the way out of the clock. Among the occupants of "modern" presidency—of a superpower but also a vulnerable America—several were relatively innocent of foreign-policy

experience. But none managed or chose to stay as far out of it as Reagan apparently did in his first 13 months.

He is gaffe prone, as we know, and can even kid himself about it, quite winningly. How do foreign governments read some of these extraordinary comments? He has said the Russian people have to eat "sawdust." Maybe some prisoners did in the Gulag; the general population is overweight from bread and potatoes. He told some Jewish callers he didn't understand all the fuss about the Fahd (Saudi Arabian) peace plan; it wasn't all that different from the Camp David agreements. But it is. He said the anti-nuclear demonstrations in Western Europe were the work of Soviet propaganda; the disturbing thing is that they are not.


In his last press conference he rambled into four or five historical errors about the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. He had been asked a silly question about a CIA "secret plan" of 20 years ago to draw us into Viet-

nam, and was there now a similar plot about Latin America? A sufficient answer would have been "No."


For months the casual Reaganisms enjoyed a remarkable immunity from ridicule: He can't really mean it, or if he did, he's so good-natured he'll cheerfully stand corrected. The immunity is wearing thin.

Ronald Reagan's courage, calm, and perseverance can be invaluable qualities in the conduct of foreign policy. One old diplomatic hand who knows him well says the President has "sound instincts" in foreign policy "when the options have been well prepared for him." But this puts almost the total load on the people around the President, and even if they become much more harmonious than they have been to date, it is not clear they can really do so much. A President needs to do more than just speak the final word. On Poland, for example, a probing President, without getting all the way down into the Polish army order of battle, might have been





## The Nationalists



his annual Defense Report, issued last month, Weinberger included a sharp lecture on the follies of Western economic support for Soviet military development. He favored throwing Poland into defile in January. Some State Department officials think they see strains of Fort Belknap thinking in the Pentagon. Weinberger denies being any sort of isolationist, or even a "global unilateralist" (a recent coinage by multilateralist Helmut Sonnenfeldt, former counselor to the State Department). In fact, Cap notes, he is Trilateralist, a daring reference to his past membership in the private U.S.-European-Japanese commission that has alarmed various Far Right kooks.

Weinberger is somewhat harder than Haig, who is not exactly a pacifist. Interesting anomalies: Though hard-liners are generally all-out supporters of Israel as an anti-Soviet bastion, Weinberger tends to be sterner than Haig when Israel has misbehaved and has angered Israel's arms-selling trips to Saudi Arabia and Jordan. On Central America, Weinberger is less hawkish than Haig, who has publicly rebuked him for his views.

### Medium hard

In the closing weeks of its first year, the Reagan Administration did move a certain distance from hard line toward medium hard. If an Administration's attitude toward negotiating with the Soviet Union is the touchstone, Reagan's important speech of November 18 was positive centrist. It was an eloquent appeal for serious negotiations on strategic-arms reduction, without "linkage" to Soviet behavior in Afghanistan, Africa, Southeast Asia, the Caribbean. Jimmy Carter had this speech in mind when he said Reagan was beginning to see the light.

Shifts in foreign policy are seldom so sweeping as campaign-year rhetoric would have suggested. Reagan has indeed moved partway toward Carter, just as Carter eventually moved halfway or more toward Nixon-Kissinger-Ford.

In foreign policy any President of the U.S. is playing from a strong hand, even



John Bowden

Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger isn't an isolationist but is willing to be way out front as lead trumpet in arousing the West to the Soviet threat. He is also willing to affront U.S. allies like Menachem Begin when they get in the way of U.S. interests. One source of Weinberger's hawkish advice is Richard Perle, 40, Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy. Oddly enough, Perle used to be chief aide to one of Israel's ardent defenders, Senator Henry Jackson.

pressing to see contingency plans for a U.S. response to an "internal" solution as opposed to a Soviet military intervention. We apparently had no such response ready. Our system assumes the President at the heart of foreign-policy making, while in domestic affairs Congress, at least constitutionally, can fashion national policy and sometimes does.

Last year Reagan's energies were heavily concentrated on his own domestic program. Given his urge to defend this program, foreign policy could remain a distinctly secondary interest. In June, however, he will make his first European trip as President, for a NATO meeting and the annual Western economic summit. Some of his advisers think he needs to be seen actively playing the role of world statesman, especially if the economy is not looking helpful to Republican election prospects in November.


Meanwhile Haig and Weinberger come across almost as rival Secretaries of State.

One is enough, and it should be Haig. If his primacy were affirmed by the President, Haig might become as influential a Secretary of State as his old boss Dr. Kissinger. The prospect could hardly displease him. He has ample ambition and a first-rate intellect to go with it. And except for Vice President Bush, who keeps a discreetly low profile, he is the only Cabinet-level figure with serious experience in world affairs. The famous Haig excitability and suspiciousness are his chief liabilities.

The line between State and Defense jurisdictions is never easy to draw—especially where arms sales, training missions, or negotiations over foreign bases are involved. But Weinberger regularly crosses the line. He is an able man, more relaxed than Haig, and closer to the President. Haig, a four-star general, doubtless feels there ought to be enough at the Pentagon to keep Cap busy.

Haig has been generally more solicitous of the NATO Alliance than Weinberger. In

At 6 foot 3, the new National Security Adviser, William P. Clark, 50, stands tall even next to fellow California rancher Ronald Reagan (6 foot 1). As an old friend of Reagan's and Weinberger's and a new friend of Haig's, Clark will try to get the three horses pulling in tandem.



Dennis Ryan/Sa

a President who isn't fascinated by the game. Taking into account all the constituents of national strength—military, economic, and technological—and the intangibles of international repute and internal stability, we are still the preeminent superpower.

Since the Truman-Eisenhower era, however, when our margin of preeminence was vastly greater than now, no Administration has made a broadly successful use in world affairs of our great assets. Perhaps Nixon and Kissinger came closest, though the pointless prolonging of the Vietnam war was a sorry mistake. We have survived this and other mistakes and humiliations that seemed more monstrous at the time than they do now. As Adam Smith wrote to John Sinclair: "Be assured, my young friend, that there is a great deal of ruin in a nation."

But the "correlation of forces" (as the Russians like to call it) can shift over time. The world does move. The world of Inauguration Day 1985 could look quite different from the world of March 1982.

In foreign policy a lot is riding on the success or failure of Reagan's domestic economic program. A revival in investment, in productivity growth, and in competitiveness is essential to our world position and prestige. And it is only from the resources of a vigorous economy that U.S. military power can be restored to prudent levels. There is strong sentiment in Congress for some slimming down of the Reagan military program. The cuts would probably not exceed \$100 billion, and shouldn't, off the five-year \$1.6 trillion in

spending the Pentagon wants. We have a lot of catching up to do.

The Russians will not oblige us by standing still. They will continue the relentless expansion of their military spending, at 3% real growth per annum, that they have been conducting for two decades. So the correlation of forces will not shift rapidly, but it should be somewhat healthier for the U.S. by the mid-1980s.

### The Polish watershed

Meanwhile the Soviet empire is in deep internal trouble, which should be good news for our side. In the first weeks after the imposition of martial law in Poland it often seemed that "Western disunity" was the main lesson of the event. The disunity is there, all right, but the chief moral of Poland is surely the weakness of the Communist system in Eastern Europe.

Many years ago the Polish United Workers' (Communist) Party and its Soviet masters had to bow to the powerful hold of the Roman Catholic faith on the people of Poland. It was a historic surrender for a Communist party to accept an institutional competitor for moral authority within the state. The authority of the Church, exercised carefully but with unmistakable independence, was greatly elevated by the election of a Polish Pope in 1978 (which might turn out to be one of the major

events of the late 20th century). And Solidarity, as it emerged in force in August 1980, was in many ways the child of the Church.

For 16 months Solidarity actually shared a measure of national economic and political power with the Communist Party, and it was developing claims to a greater voice. How fitting that nine million real workers should have challenged the "United Workers' Party." A genuinely independent trade-union movement is of course anathema to a governing Communist party.

Yet to suppress Solidarity, the Communist authorities had to call in still another institution, not independent but always with a potential for independence—the army. In pure Communist state structures, the military is clearly subordinate to the Party; any deviation can lead to "Bonapartism," the specter of a revolution captured by generals. When General Jaruzelski announced martial law on December 13, he took over as chief of the armed forces and Prime Minister of the state in the name of a brand-new, almost Latin American-sounding body called "The Military Council of National Salvation." In two speeches to the nation he barely mentioned the Party.

Thus events in Poland challenge the Soviet system at its most sensitive point: legitimacy. If the Party is not the sole vessel of truth about man and history, and if it is not the sole wielder of power within the state, then it is not *the* Party but *a* party. This heresy has profound implications for all of the satellite empire in Eastern Europe and indeed for the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is itself an empire of some 170 nationalities in which the Russians will soon be outnumbered. The Slavs who rule the empire do so not in the name of Russia but as the Party. The old men who in the next few years or months will choose the new Kremlin leadership intend to do so in

*continued*

## *U.S. policy on Poland leaves us plenty of room for ratcheting as events unfold.*

the name of the Party. When martial law was imposed in Poland, Enrico Berlinguer, the head of Italy's disaffected Communists, said the October Revolution, the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, was over.

Solidarity, in the end, was asking the Communist system, Polish branch, to commit suicide, and the Communist system, not surprisingly, declined. But it was a magnificent act, perhaps a very Polish act, for Solidarity to ask, and the story is far from over.

And what can the U.S. do about it? The Reagan Administration's reaction has indeed been cautious, as its right-wing critics say. The policy has the virtue, so far, of not getting us out too far in front of the Alliance, and leaving us plenty of room for ratcheting as events unfold.

### **Centrifugal forces**

"The Alliance will come out of Poland," says one U.S. diplomat, "much stronger than it went in—or kicked to smithereens." The growing centrifugal forces in the Alliance were all too clear in the divisions over the West's response to Afghanistan in 1979-80, and last year in the mass demonstrations in European cities against the deployment of U.S. weapons that European governments had requested in the first place. The Germans, Dutch, English have not gone into the streets in large numbers to protest martial law in Poland.

It is painful to Americans to be in dispute with countries we think of as our oldest and best friends in the world, the countries "most like us." The facts are so uncongenial that the Carter Administration kept insisting all was well with the Alliance (after a bad spell under Kissinger). The Reagan Administration officially insists all is well (after a bad spell under Carter). All is not at all well, as most U.S. diplomats will privately concede.

The NATO countries and Japan, on the basis of their tremendous economic growth in 1950-80, are understandably more independent than they were in the days when America had more power than all the rest of the world put together. They are less inclined to follow U.S. leadership

even when—or perhaps especially when—their own interests are being more immediately challenged than ours, as in Poland.

There are three areas where the West could get much tougher about Poland:

■ Further economic sanctions against the Russians. Reagan is in a box because of his feckless lifting of the grain embargo Carter applied to the Russians after Afghanistan. True, the embargo was leaky and merely inconvenienced the Russians. But they have had another very bad grain harvest since then (the third in a row).

If—a big if—the U.S. could line up some real support from Argentina-Australia-Canada, a U.S. grain embargo could impose heavy strain on the Soviet economy. Grain has high symbolic importance within the Alliance. We should not rule it out as a weapon. If we do, it's hard to persuade Western Europe to cut down on future industrial and high-technology sales to the Russians, let alone cancel the Siberia gas-pipeline deal. As the West Germans say, "Technology is our grain."

■ The Polish bank debts. It's not clear whom we would hurt most by throwing Poland into technical as well as de facto bankruptcy. Perhaps West German banks initially. The U.S. ambassador to Germany happens to be quite knowledgeable about banking: Arthur Burns thinks the German banks could manage. He also thinks we are seeing a struggle for "the soul of Europe." The longer martial law continues in Poland, the more unattractive to extend credit to the regime—in effect loans to enable a Communist regime to meet its interest obligations on previous loans.

■ A major political offensive. This could take the form of a renunciation of the Yalta agreements of 1945, and/or a renunciation of the Helsinki agreements of 1975. Yalta did not in fact "award" Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union (it even called for free elections in Poland), but it is often cited by the Russians as though it did. For us to renounce Yalta would amount to a declaration that the present location of the Iron Curtain is not sacrosanct. This is explosive stuff. We are already asserting a treaty right (citing Helsinki) to interest ourselves

in the internal affairs of Poland—to the great indignation of the Russians. That may be enough for the present.

### **Rebuilding the Alliance**

Longer range, the Alliance must come to some common policy about future credits—governmental and private, to the East. This is the real control point for all economic relations with the Soviet world (The Mitterrand government, despite its high-quality rhetoric about Poland, only last month gave the Russians further credits for purchase of French pipeline equipment.) There is no evidence that East-West trade has moderated Soviet behavior, but it certainly moderates Western behavior.

To reduce reliance on the nuclear deterrent, the West urgently needs a greater conventional defense effort. Our NATO allies have a larger total population than the U.S. and a comparable GNP. The time is long overdue for them to make a comparable contribution to the common defense. The failure to do so is a standing incitement to isolationism in the U.S.

Finally, it has become virtually a condition for continuance of the Alliance that the U.S. should be engaging in good-faith negotiations with the Russians on arms control. Whether anything can come of such negotiations remains unclear, but it would be folly not to make the effort.

The Reagan Administration is making the effort. It has assembled a rugged team to do the arguing for our side. The director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is Eugene Rostow, former dean of the Yale Law School. Paul Nitze is head of the U.S. delegation in Geneva for the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF, formerly TNF for theater nuclear forces). These are the weapons whose projected deployment in Western Europe has stirred such a furor. Nitze is a brisk and thoughtful man of 75 who has worked for seven Presidents. On arriving in Geneva, he said he would be "reasonable and tough." Nitze and Rostow, like the President, were members of the hawkish Committee on the Present Danger, which fought Senate ratification of SALT II.

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## Cap Weinberger says the President "just wishes everybody could be out at a ranch."

The Reagan Administration is right to continue the INF talks, martial law in Poland notwithstanding. The Russians have nearly 900 of their intermediate SS-20 warheads already in place, enough to lay waste to Western Europe. They deploy more every week. (Why?) The U.S. has said it will not deploy intermediate-range weapons if the Russians will dismantle theirs. This "zero option" is at the moment the only U.S. offer on the table.

The distinction between "intermediate" range weapons (the SS-20s can fly up to 3,000 nautical miles) and strategic (5,200 or more miles but easily retargeted for shorter flights) is somewhat artificial. If INF negotiations begin to get somewhere, they could merge into a new round of talks about the biggest weapons.

The Administration wisely views arms control as one component of, and not an alternative to, a comprehensive defense policy. Nor is arms control the sine qua non of peace, as some overeager U.S. negotiators of the 1970s tended to assume. The profound philosophical difference between our system and the Soviet system breeds the understandable fears that breed the hellish weapons. The weapons systems now have such a hair-trigger jumpiness (if you were President, would you "launch on warning" of incoming missiles?) that they are indeed a danger in themselves. But even if military technology were still back in the age of tanks and iron bombs, we would have the potential of fighting a long and terrible World War III against the Soviet Union for reasons each country would find sufficient. The mushroom cloud may have prevented just that.

### The East-West lens

Straight Communist ideology has had no serious appeal anywhere (including Russia) for a long time. William Hyland, a former deputy to Kissinger, says what still appeals in much of the Third World is simply the raw strength of the Soviets as a superpower, plus the model of how to operate a dictatorial state.

The Carter Administration was oversensitive to the sensitivities of the Third

World, and the Reagan Administration was right to reapply to the Third World an East-West lens. But the lens can cloud up.

Haig started out early in 1981 making a major U.S.-Soviet confrontation out of El Salvador, then began to back off, now is again treating it as a major threat to our security. The Cuba-Nicaragua-Salvador problem is a sensitive one for the U.S., not because of the intrinsic importance of these countries, which is trifling, but because of the geography, physical and psychological. One of the few real parallels between Vietnam and El Salvador is that we can so easily talk up the stakes. In Vietnam, ultimately, the commitment became the commitment. Pentagon snipers imply Haig inflates El Salvador because it is a safe battleground in our own backyard, not a tough proposition like Poland. In a strong speech last week the President promised decisive action to prevent "new Cubas" in the Caribbean area, and at the same time announced a generous economic-development plan for the region.

Haig has tried off and on to apply the East-West lens to the Middle East, and it is a valid perception for the U.S. The difficulty is that the Arab nations see Israel as a greater menace than the Soviet Union. All the Third World countries, behind their shield of weakness, support the Arabs in this, in the United Nations and wherever else it is convenient to assail the U.S.


The world oil glut has mercifully brought a cresting to the flow of money and political influence to the OPEC countries. This does not necessarily open up any new possibilities for a Middle East peace settlement. God knows (the expression is not used lightly) that our maddening mentor, client, and ally Menachem Begin does not make things easy. He may launch a major strike at any time against the PLO bases in southern Lebanon. The U.S. must try to discourage such an attack, cultivate but not overcultivate the "moderate" Arab states, and nurse along what remains of the "Camp David process."

The East-West lens doesn't quite tell us what to do about the People's Republic of China. It might seem we should stop sup-

plying Taiwan, to appease the PRC as a counterweight against the Russians. But this would not only go against a moral obligation felt by Reagan and many Republicans, but in realpolitik might also be a dangerous devaluing of America's word. The Reagan decision—more arms for Taiwan but not the most advanced—was a sensible compromise. As to the PRC, the question might arise even in these early 1980s as to how much technological or military assistance is in our long-range interest. One academic authority on East-West relationships, engaged in a government think-tank exercise in 1980, concluded that we must take care *how* the Soviet empire breaks up, which he believes it will, in the late 1980s or early 1990s, because "then there is China."

### Theme music

When President Reagan makes his next foreign-policy speech, he may try to satisfy the critics who have complained that his policy lacks an overall conception or any coherent theme. The theme might turn out to be as basic as: revival of the U.S. economy, rebuilding of U.S. military power, and reinvigoration of our alliances, for the purpose of—peace. That could be popular politics in the U.S., and to judge from various public-opinion polls abroad, a welcome message to our friends. Reagan plays the martial airs beautifully. He can also be, as he was in his November 18 speech, convincing and moving as the servant of peace. To develop a broad and coherent theme, however, and spell it out, will require strong and steady presidential direction of foreign policy.

Cap Weinberger muses that his old friend is "very deeply a man of peace." This President, you know, "just wishes everybody could be out at a ranch." Pedants may object that not everybody has a ranch, and some people don't even have jobs. Still we get the idea, and it's an appealing one. But Ronald Reagan himself will have to come back from the ranch, so to speak—back from lunch—if all of us are to enjoy our various versions of ranching. He did ask for the job. 

# REAGAN'S MAKE-OR-BREAK YEAR

■ This is the crucial year for the Reagan presidency. If a solid economic recovery takes hold, the President could claim his policies had been vindicated. He could congratulate himself and the country that "the course"—not too precisely defined—had been "stayed." He would have a shot at winning, if he chose to run in 1984, and in a second term could further pursue amended Reaganomics. But should the economy just keep on "bottoming out," quarter after quarter, his presidency would be pretty well washed up. Reaganomics and even Reagan, the likable man himself, could be fright words in U.S. politics for years to come.

To the lift that would come from some sort of recovery, even of a rather spiritless sort, foreign policy might add a powerful plus. President Reagan could be in a no-lose situation abroad this year and next. No-lose does not necessarily hold for the longer-term interests of the United States. But there are not too many plausible foreign policy developments that could do Reagan serious political harm in 1983-84, and it is possible to visualize two developments that could do him great political good. One would be an arms reduction agreement with the Soviet Union, signed at a summit with Yuri Andropov, perhaps a 50-50 possibility by the spring of 1984. The other, a longer shot, would be a breakthrough toward a Middle East settlement. A lack of progress in these areas would not damage Reagan commensurately; the difficulties are too well known. It is not clear whether the President himself now finds this equation an inviting aspect of problems that do not normally command his first attention. Some of his advisers certainly think about it a lot.

From November 2, 1982, through January 1983, Ronald Reagan was taking quite a pounding. His disappointment in the midterm elections was followed by the fiasco of the lame duck session he had insisted on. The economy was punishing the President. The senseless unemployment statistics kept rising. Finally, in early February,

*Hedley Donovan, a former managing editor of FORTUNE and editor-in-chief of Time Inc., served as senior adviser to President Carter in 1979-80.*



better figures came to hand and the President himself announced them. Reagan's general approval rating in the polls fell to a level below that of most of the postwar Presidents at the same point in their terms. The Carter comparison (Reagan behind 51-41) must be particularly galling to the President. Other polls showed either Walter Mondale or John Glenn comfortably defeating Reagan in 1984.

Press coverage and commentary were turning increasingly hostile. What was especially wounding in much of this wordage was the apparent ease with which journalists had found anonymous sources within the Administration to describe the struggles "across the mind of the President." This led the President to say he had "had it up to the keister with leaks."

Looking over this agitated political landscape, one seasoned student of the presidency, Richard Nixon, offered an interesting metaphor. Perhaps, Nixon mused, Reagan was having his "second Iowa"—a reference to Reagan's sharp setback at the beginning of the 1980 primaries season, which led him to shake up his staff and pull his campaign act together.

Many Republicans in the Administration and on Capitol Hill think the White House staff is still much too loosely organized—too many people can speak for the President, or at least be so interpreted. And the men who left the Cabinet this winter—Richard Schweiker from Health and Human Services and Drew Lewis from Transportation—



Don Regan complains that the Administration's estimate of 3.1% real growth this year is one of the "gloomiest" around. Stockman denies cooking the figures to produce a slow-looking recovery: "Why on earth would I want to do that?"

were not, in the words of one Republican leader, "the ones who should have left."

In policy, if not staff, Reagan has already made a major mid-course correction. It is doubtful whether any modern President has compromised so often on so many big issues as Ronald Reagan did in the period starting August 16, 1982. On that date he went on prime-time TV to defend the tax increase that in effect repealed a part (about 25%) of the massive tax cut he had so proudly signed a year before. In the lame duck session he accepted a gasoline tax increase linked to a jobs program (he had previously said it would take a palace coup to get any such bill past his desk). He is supporting a Social Security rescue plan that violates some of his longest-cherished ideas about provision for the elderly, a plan acceptable not only to Tip O'Neill but to that wily lobbyist for the aged, Congressman Claude Pepper of Florida. (In the presence of federal funds, Pepper, 82, has the moves of a man half his age.) And Reagan has signed his name—unhappily to be sure—to those staggering deficit estimates for the "out years," even proposing that another tax increase, repealing still more of his 1981 cut, might be necessary in 1985.

In foreign policy, the President has backed down on his sanctions against the Soviet pipeline. He backed off the "dense pack" basing fee for the MX missile. He has begun to show signs of give in the intermediate-range missile negotiations in Geneva and may accept some Soviet SS-20s in Europe after all.

All this dismays many of Reagan's earliest and most fervent admirers without as yet earning him any very loud applause from the moderates, who have so often called for just such "realism" and "flexibility." Some moderates in his own party are not sure but what he has been fatally wounded already. They are keeping some daylight between themselves and the White House. They may also question whether Reagan will really stay in their midst. It is a part of his sunny temperament and a part of his strength to deny that he has retreated at all.

**P**REPARATION of the Administration's 1983 economic proposals was a noisy process. Treasury Secretary Donald Regan admits to strenuous "wrangling" with Martin Feldstein, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, and OMB Director David Stockman over the cautious recovery projections built into the President's budget. Regan got burned, of course, when he predicted the economy would "come roaring back" in the spring of 1982.

Don Regan complains that the Administration's estimate of 3.1% real growth in GNP this year is one of the "gloomiest" around, compared with 45 private economists' estimates in the Eggert Blue-Chip survey. Their median guess was 4.2% real growth, fourth quarter to fourth quarter. FORTUNE's latest forecast is 4%. Feldstein himself began hedging a few days after the official numbers were out. He allowed that 5% might be in the cards. Stockman denies cooking the figures to produce a slow-looking recovery: "Why on earth would I want to do that?" But the reasoning that finally prevailed in the

RESEARCH ASSOCIATE *Louis S. Richman*

White House was that this Administration can't stand another major miscalculation on the optimistic side, while nobody will be mad if 1983 turns out better than predicted.

**W**HAT IS LEFT of Reaganomics? Quite a bit. Reaganomics was never pure supply-side theology. Taxes are lower than they would have been under a more conventional middle-of-the-road sort of President Reagan, for all his recent compromising, has made a difference. In spite of last year's take-back, mainly from business, Reagan's tax cuts more than offset the current and pending increases in Social Security taxes. This is assuming Congress lets the final installment of 5-10-10 go through on July 1, as it probably will. It is very doubtful that this Congress will enact the contingent tax Reagan has proposed for October 1, 1985—an excise tax on oil and an income tax surtax. This is in the budget for cosmetic purposes—an attempt to look fiscally sober without actually imposing new taxes before the 1984 election.

A much cleaner approach to out-year tax policy would be to pursue loophole closing and general tax reform with vigor, to drop the gimmicky contingent tax and drop the income tax indexing now scheduled to go into effect in 1986. Indexing would offset "bracket creep," at a cost to the Treasury of up to \$40 billion a year by 1988. Bracket creep, as FORTUNE and others have argued, is an inflation-era fraud upon the taxpayer, permitting Congress to increase tax collections, hence increase spending, without overtly raising tax rates. The writer believes indexing would be a still more insidious deception. It is simply bad public policy to let taxpayers think they are automatically protected against the inflationary consequences of deficits, thus cutting down the pressure on the all too open-handed Congress to hold down spending.

Under Reagan there has been more restraint on non-defense spending than a conventionally "moderate" Republican President would have tried to apply. He had significant successes in 1981-82—not in cutting non-defense spending, net, but in holding down the rate of increase. In 1983 he will at best have minor successes.


On another Reaganomic front, the President, in line with good laissez-faire doctrine, has stuck firmly to his free-trade principles. This takes political courage during a recession. He has pretty much handed the Toyota issue to the Democrats, and Mondale made some flagrant use of it. Indeed, the Democrats, in an odd historical reversal, seem to be evolving into the party of protectionism—which may be where the votes are in 1984.

In interviews with 30 or more Administration officials, members of Congress, and private economists, FORTUNE found nobody who claimed to have foreseen the length and depth of the recession—and none of them had run across anybody else who did. It is a safe guess that nobody in Washington has been more unpleasantly surprised than that old economics major (Eureka '32) the President.

The recession accounts for about half of the colossal 1982 and 1983 deficits. The rest is the "structural" deficit, the underlying mechanisms and urges that lead our polity, even in good times, to



Volcker, looking back, concedes Fed policy might have been improved "around the edges" in 1982. But it was not until the decline in the inflation rate became unmistakable in the first half that he felt it prudent for the Fed to ease.



AP/WIDEWORLD

Volcker, no Reaganaut, is the chief enforcer of Reaganomics.



AP/WIDEWORLD

Unemployed workers near St. Louis give Reagan a polite welcome.

want to spend more than we are willing to tax ourselves to pay for. "Entitlements" in the broadest sense—including the entitlement of politicians to be reelected. It is easy to make fun of Reagan's recent discovery of "cyclical" vs. "structural" red ink, a distinction he had not previously mentioned in two or three decades of deficit denouncing. The distinction, in fact, is valid.

Along with this insight, Reaganomics has now been invaded by a certain strain of involuntary Keynesianism. The deficit for 1983, the first fiscal year Reagan controlled the full cycle of budget-writing, will be about \$200 billion—more than all four of Jimmy Carter's deficits (in current dollars). In his budget message of January 30, Reagan proposed a deficit for fiscal 1984 of \$189 billion. The figures are so numbing it is hard to remember that only two years ago the Administration was projecting a balanced budget in 1984 and a \$6-billion surplus in 1985. As late as last fall, Reagan was going through the charade of urging a Constitutional amendment mandating balanced budgets. The idea was not mentioned in his State of the Union speech or the budget message. The President is quick to point out that Congress has a large say in what the final deficit figures look like—and he goes on that if his Administration made a mistake, it was in underestimating what a mess previous Presidents (apparently including at least a couple of Republicans) and Democratic-controlled Congresses had created. Bob Dole, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, wistfully recalls "some expert from HEW coming up here around 1969 and warning us if we didn't watch this Medicare thing, it could get up to \$9 billion in 1990." Now, the Senator notes, it's projected to hit \$100 billion plus in 1990.

**N** EITHER THE ADMINISTRATION nor Congress can do anything about the 1983 deficit—except by addressing the out-year deficits. Whatever political courage and imagination can be brought to bear on those appalling numbers could help bring down interest rates right now, and this, in turn, would help invigorate a recovery that would increase 1983 tax collections and cut unemployment benefit costs.

But the Reagan Administration is tacitly accepting the view of most private economists, conservative as well as liberal, that the huge deficit of 1983 is tolerable as a stimulus for a flat economy, and that the huge deficit of 1984 may not be a totally bad thing either.

It's after that the picture begins to terrify. If a recovered economy still can't come within \$200 billion to \$300 billion of balancing the budget, if booming private demand for credit has to compete with public debt financing on that scale, interest rates will zoom up again, and we could have the makings of a worse recession than 1981-82.

The chief enforcer of Reaganomics is a nonpartisan banker with an orthodox dislike of deficits and tax cuts you haven't earned. It has fallen to Paul Volcker more than any other individual in Washington to operate the recession—to carry out the tight money policy that has wrung the inflation out of the economy, at a heavy price in unemployment and idle capacity.

Reagan in the annual report of his Council of Economic Advisers offered a mixture of prediction and advocacy for Fed policy in 1983:



posed, Weinberger creates a curiously restful atmosphere for discuss-  
ginable—\$1.55 trillion in defense spending by 1988. "This guy," says  
use staff man, "single-handed is bringing down this Administration."




PHOTO BY AP/WIDEWORLD

After the recent rapid growth of the money supply he expects ex-  
pansion "at a moderate rate consistent with both a sustained recov-  
ery and continued progress against inflation." Only a few months  
ago he had mused aloud about bringing the Fed under Treasury con-  
trol. Secretary Regan had several times waxed publicly impatient at  
the Fed for not expanding money supply fast enough.

Volcker, looking back, concedes Fed policy might have been im-  
proved "around the edges" in 1982. But it was not until the decline  
in the inflation rate became unmistakable in the first half that he felt  
it prudent for the Fed to ease. He was increasingly concerned, too,  
at the effect of high interest rates on the solvency of debtor nations,  
and hence on the U.S. banking system. Finally, the tax increase of  
last summer was seen as an earnest of some fiscal discipline in Con-  
gress and the White House. The Fed knocked down the discount  
rate 3.5 percentage points between July and December, the stock  
and bond markets boomed, and the interest-sensitive auto and hous-  
ing markets finally showed signs of life. It could be argued that the  
President helped prolong the recession by not agreeing earlier to  
the tax increase of 1982.

What does Volcker want from Congress now? He chooses his  
words carefully, but it sounds as if he would stay "accommodative"  
if Congress and the Administration make progress (which he won't  
define) in controlling spending and if the first phases of an economic  
recovery don't send inflation rates up again.

It will be interesting to see if Volcker is reappointed when his  
term expires in August. He has been an exceptionally strong chair-  
man, even by the standards of an office endowed with an almost  
judicial independence. His replacement by a more accommodative  
chairman might hint that Reagan plans to run in 1984, though reap-  
pointment would not necessarily signal the contrary.

zero option fades.




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
**V**OLCKER'S MOST TROUBLESOME antagonist is no  
barn-burning prairie populist Congressman but an ur-  
bane Harvard graduate, once a newspaper book review-  
er, former director of OMB, Secretary of HEW, and  
Bechtel executive, Caspar Weinberger. It's not that the  
Secretary of Defense disagrees with Fed policy (or would think it  
proper to comment), but he has persuaded himself and the Presi-  
dent that we need defense spending increases that contribute might-  
ily to the impending budget deficits. The defense increases Wein-  
berger is urging also make it very tough, as a practical political  
matter, to get worthwhile non-defense cuts in federal spending.

In his vast E-Ring office in the Pentagon, Cap Weinberger calmly  
makes his case, head tilted back, fingertips touching, eyes often  
closed, perhaps because the questions are so familiar, perhaps for  
relief from all the reading matter running across his desk. He creates  
a curiously restful atmosphere for discussing the unimaginable—  
\$1.55 trillion, and the "force posture" it could buy over five years.

If the Soviets are getting a little more receptive to serious arms  
reduction talks—as the President himself has suggested—Weinber-  
ger says it is because they recognize that the U.S. has made a seri-  
ous start on rebuilding its defenses and under Reagan has the will to

Weinberger says, "I cannot afford to be wrong."






does Nancy want?

follow through. "They had considerable reason to think in 1980 they were opening a gap." The U.S. margin for error is still "extremely small." But if the other side has strategic superiority, as Weinberger and Reagan argue, it must be that the Soviets still think we can inflict unacceptable damage, or wouldn't they have attacked us by now? "I don't know if they believe that or not. I cannot afford to be wrong."

"This guy," says one angry White House staff man, "single-handed is bringing down this Administration." A Republican elder statesman who knows both Reagan and Weinberger well is not quite sure who is leading whom. Weinberger and Reagan so far have come up with a measly \$8-billion cut in defense outlays for fiscal 1984—more than half of it simply a downward adjustment from previous estimates of fuel costs and inflation. Congress, the Republican leaders included, will insist on bigger contributions from the Pentagon.

Everybody has long since agreed that defense spending must be increased. The 1980-81 Carter trajectory would have been about 5% a year in real money increases. Weinberger is trying for 10%. Congress should and probably will settle in the 7% neighborhood.

For the economy—as the deficit-discount rate calculations play out—and for the political fate of Reaganomics, the question is how soon and how much the President and his Defense Secretary will see they have to give. And that means, or should mean, giving up or spreading out the procurement of at least one major weapons system. Looking for cuts in the Pentagon budget, the temptation always is to go for the grubby "O and M" items, operations and maintenance—fuel, spare parts, ammunition, training exercises—no big thing in any Congressman's district, but all-important for readiness. Better to face up to the question of the MX or B-1 or how many nu-



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closer carrier groups. The Weinberger Pentagon must come up with a strategic rationale for what we need most.

Gerald Ford, longtime member of the House military appropriations subcommittee, has a sensible proposal: space out the procurement over six years instead of five. He doesn't believe there's any glaring "window of vulnerability," and if there were, it's hard to see much difference between closing it in five years or in six.

The Reagan defense program derives from a generally sound if slightly overheated view of the world. Weinberger makes unfortunate claims for the stimulative economic effects of defense spending, arguing that cuts would worsen the recession. He should stick with the Soviets, and the state of the world, and then refine our strategic shopping list for the realities of the 1980s.

**N**O REAGAN FLACK has ever suggested that the Boss once dreamed of playing Hamlet. It's just not his kind of part. Most of his staff believe, however, that he is still making up his mind about 1984. They believe and of course hope he will run.

One observer who thinks he won't run is Lou Cannon of the *Washington Post*, author of the excellent biography *Reagan*, who has been covering his man since his entry into California politics in the mid-Sixties. Cannon's "general hunch" is that despite his chipper public appearances the President feels the load, physical and psychological, more than you might think.

Those who think he will run say he likes the life that goes with the job, and likes most aspects of the job itself. He tried twice to be President (1968 and 1976) before finally succeeding, and no one-

term President has voluntarily walked away from the job since Cal Coolidge may or may not have meant to. (Truman had only one term of his own but had served all but three months of F.D.R.'s fourth term; L.B.J. bowed out under heavy pressure from his own party.)

It is unlikely the economy will be booming along so beautifully by Labor Day, which is about the deadline for announcing that Reagan could simply claim victory and go home to the ranch. More likely, he will see much left to do, and enough good economic news to make him optimistic that he could win a mandate to "finish the job."

Finally, he knows his withdrawal could bring on a rugged battle between the Republican Right and the Center. He is entitled to think he has the best chance of winning of any Republican around. And like any first-term President, he could probably persuade himself that his reelection would be as much for the good of the country as his party.

This analysis has made no mention of the preferences of Nancy Reagan, because the writer has no idea what they may be.

A guess: Reagan will decide to run, and the Democratic candidate must be considered the favorite. Reagan isn't likely to hold all the blue-collar support he captured from the Democrats in 1980. He wouldn't be running against Carter in 1984, and he can't very well run against "Washington" again. His only solid regional base right now is the West. Add his formidable political charms and skills, the frequent fratricidal urges among Democrats, and possible successes in foreign policy. The economy remains the make-or-break factor. The recovery will be vigorous enough to pull Reagan at least part-way back from his recent lows in the polls. But the Democratic nomination is, as they say, "worth having." A number of Democrats, at last count eight, seem to think so. □

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April 23, 1984

Dear Senator Hawkins:

Thank you for your April 16 letter supporting the request from Kathi A. Thomas, to interview the President while she is in Washington for Small Business Week activities, May 7-9.

Your interest is appreciated, and you may be assured that your recommendation has been brought to the attention of the White House Media Relations and Planning Office, where I am sure it will receive careful consideration.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

M. B. Oglesby, Jr.  
Assistant to the President

X  
The Honorable Paula Hawkins  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

MBO:KRJ:JID:jid

✓ cc: w/copy of inc to Merrie Spaeth - for further action

D

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DATE 4/23/84

FOR: FRED RYAN

FROM: M.B. OGLESBY, JR.

SUBJECT: Invitation to the President

APPROVE: \_\_\_\_\_ DISAPPROVE: X

COMMENTS:

PAULA HAWKINS  
FLORIDA

## United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

April 16, 1984

Kathy Jaffke  
Congressional Correspondence Director  
Legislative Affairs  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.E.  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Kathy:

Enclosed is a copy of correspondence from Kathi A. Thomas, Editor of "Communicator" to President Reagan which Ms. Thomas sent to me.

Any assistance you can provide in arranging an interview for Ms. Thomas with the President would be greatly appreciated.

Thank you for your kind attention to this matter.

Sincerely,



Paula Hawkins  
United States Senator

PH/jg

Enclosure

16

April 5, 1984

United States President Ronald Reagan  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I will be in Washington, D. C. on May 7 through 9 for Small Business Week activities hosted by the SBA. I am the Editor of the most widely-read minority newsletter in Florida (Central-Space Coast Minority Purchasing Council "Communicator") and during my short stay, I would appreciate an interview with you.


I realize this request is presumptuous since I do not represent a major news organization. I sincerely feel, however that the minority entrepreneurs in the State of Florida would be newly inspired by your words of support.

On a more personal note, I wholeheartedly support and agree with your policies and humanitarian efforts. I, like you, am a native Californian and will always consider Sacramento my home. I am not only aware of your small business concerns as United States President, but of your successes as Governor of California as well.

I understand that you are quite busy and may not have time for me during Small Business Week. I will, however, be extremely pleased with any amount of time you can spare to this cause. I can be contacted at the address below or at (305) 727-4163/4120.

Thank you for your kind consideration and, if we do not have a chance to meet, good luck in the upcoming elections.

Respectfully yours,



Kathi A. Thomas  
"Communicator" Editor  
Public Relations Director  
Central-Space Coast Minority  
Purchasing Council  
c/o P.O. Box 37  
Melbourne, Florida 32902

/as

**WHITE HOUSE  
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET**

PR 117  
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- O - OUTGOING
  - H - INTERNAL
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- Date Correspondence received (YY/MM/DD) 840426

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: William Timmons

DC Mail Report      User Codes: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: Recommendation that President Reagan meet w/ heads of Caribbean nations in July in SC Carolina

ROUTE TO:	ACTION	DISPOSITION
Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD
<u>DC SITH</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>84104126</u>
	ORIGINATOR	<u>C 84104126</u>
<u>SC RYAN</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>84104126</u>
	Referral Note:	<u>FR 8404129</u>
<u>SC RYAN</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>pls respond for MK's</u>
	Referral Note:	<u>Thanks. FR 0615</u>
		<u>FR 840426</u>
	Referral Note:	<u>Pending letter sent 9/27</u>

<b>ACTION CODES:</b> A - Appropriate Action C - Comment/Recommendation D - Draft Response F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be	I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary R - Direct Reply w/Copy S - For Signature X - Interim Reply	<b>DISPOSITION CODES:</b> A - Answered B - Non-Special Referral C - Completed S - Suspended	<b>FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:</b> Type of Response = Initials of Signer Code = "A" Completion Date = Date of Outgoing
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COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

*Ch ok 4/27*

June 15, 1984

Dear Bill:

This is in follow-up to my letter to you of April 30, 1984 regarding the meeting of the Caribbean leaders at the University of South Carolina, July 8-10, 1984.

As the President's schedule for July has developed we now find that he will be unable to participate in this conference. I regret that our response could not be more favorable, but I thought that you would like to know the outcome.

Again, thank you for letting us know of your interest in this invitation.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR.  
Director, Presidential  
Appointments and Scheduling

Mr. William E. Timmons  
Timmons and Company, Inc.  
1850 K Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20006

FJR:jaj  
bcc: Michael Deaver

*Jeon*  
*Please to*  
*see meeting*  
*with ASAP*  
*Dear Bill*  
*(Stop to Whalley's*  
*NSC)*



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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

JUN 07 1984

Per Wilma: re log #3464

1. RCM approved; per Kimmitt --  
Thompson should sign out to Ryan  
in DC and cc: Deaver/Sittman/  
McManus/Darman

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

TO: ✓ FAITH WHITTLESEY - ROBERT KIMMITT

FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR., DIRECTOR  
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

SUBJ: REQUEST FOR SCHEDULING RECOMMENDATION

RECEIVED  
MAY 1 1984  
SCHEDULING

PLEASE PROVIDE YOUR RECOMMENDATION ON THE FOLLOWING SCHEDULING REQUEST UNDER CONSIDERATION:

EVENT: Caribbean leaders economic summit

DATE: July 8, 9, 10, 1984

LOCATION: University of South Carolina  
Columbia, South Carolina

BACKGROUND: See attached.

YOUR RECOMMENDATION:

Accept  Regret  Surrogate  Message  Other   
 Priority   
 Routine

IF RECOMMENDATION IS TO ACCEPT, PLEASE CITE REASONS:

4/30 This would be an excellent opportunity to stress local support for the President's positions in the region.

*[Signature]* Faith Whittlesey

RESPONSE DUE May 5, 1984 TO JEAN APPLEBY JACKSON

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

TO: JIM CICONI - FAITH WHITTLESEY - ROBERT KIMMITT

FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR., DIRECTOR  
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

SUBJ: REQUEST FOR SCHEDULING RECOMMENDATION

PLEASE PROVIDE YOUR RECOMMENDATION ON THE FOLLOWING  
SCHEDULING REQUEST UNDER CONSIDERATION:

EVENT: Caribbean leaders economic summit

DATE: July 8, 9, 10, 1984

LOCATION: University of South Carolina  
Columbia, South Carolina

BACKGROUND: See attached.

YOUR RECOMMENDATION:

Accept\_\_\_ Regret\_\_\_ Surrogate\_\_\_ Message\_\_\_ Other\_\_\_  
Priority\_\_\_  
Routine\_\_\_

IF RECOMMENDATION IS TO ACCEPT, PLEASE CITE REASONS:

*Defer to NSC.*

*Jim Ciconi*  
*4/30*

RESPONSE DUE May 5, 1984

TO JEAN APPLEBY JACKSON

Cecil —

Hold until  
after LRSM

7JR —

Do you want this  
file to go w/

Proposal from Kimmitt?

ND

3464

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

TO: ROBERT KIMMETT & FAITH WHITTLESEY  
FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR., DIRECTOR  
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING  
SUBJ: REQUEST FOR SCHEDULING RECOMMENDATION

PLEASE PROVIDE YOUR RECOMMENDATION ON THE FOLLOWING  
SCHEDULING REQUEST UNDER CONSIDERATION:

EVENT: Caribbean leaders economic summit

DATE: July 8, 9, 10, 1984

LOCATION: University of South Carolina  
Columbia, South Carolina

BACKGROUND: See attached.

YOUR RECOMMENDATION:

Accept \_\_\_ Regret \_\_\_ Surrogate \_\_\_ Message \_\_\_ Other \_\_\_  
Priority \_\_\_  
Routine \_\_\_

IF RECOMMENDATION IS TO ACCEPT, PLEASE CITE REASONS:

RESPONSE DUE May 5, 1984 TO Jean Appleby Jackson

223732

PY PROOF

April 30, 1984

Dear Bill:

Your recent memorandum regarding the summit meeting of the Caribbean leaders at the University of South Carolina has been forwarded to me by Michael Deaver.

We appreciate your letting us know about this meeting. As the schedule for July is made, we will be glad to look closely at the meeting for possible involvement by the President.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR.  
Director, Presidential  
Appointments and Scheduling

Mr. William E. Timmons  
Timmons and Company, Inc.  
1850 K Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20006

FJR:JAJ  
bcc: Michael Deaver  
Netta Dickey to put with staffing

a "DC"  
ID  
223732

no incoming  
OR



TIMMONS AND COMPANY, INCORPORATED

1850 K STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 331-1760

April 20, 1984

223732

WILLIAM E. TIMMONS  
*President*

TOM C. KOROLOGOS  
*Executive Vice President*

HOWARD G. PASTER  
*Vice President*

KENNETH M. DUBERSTEIN  
*Vice President*

WILLIAM H. CABLE  
*Vice President*

MARY A. SIDLEY  
*Vice President*

MICHAEL J. BATES  
*Director of Research*

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE HONORABLE MICHAEL DEAVER

FROM: WILLIAM E. TIMMONS *WET*

SUBJECT: Caribbean Heads of State

I understand that fifteen leaders from the Caribbean countries (excluding Cuba, of course) will meet in Columbia, South Carolina at the University of South Carolina for a Summit Meeting on July 8, 9 and 10.

Since this is a little over a week before the Democratic Convention (July 16-20) and is certain to gain substantial news coverage, I recommend the President attend part of the event which has Hispanic overtones.

Also, the President has been to the University and had a productive visit, and President Jim Holderman is very supportive.

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National Security Council  
The White House

*wml*

System #

I

Package #

3464

RECEIVED

8-11-78  
AIO: *SP*

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	<u>1</u>	<u><i>SP</i></u>	
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>		<u>D Hand Carry</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

System # 2

Package # 3462

D

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	<u>1</u>	<u>←</u>	
Bob Kimmitt		<u>PK</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>J</u>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	<u>5</u>		<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u>4</u>		
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room	<u>3</u>		<u>DACOM</u>

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

84 MAY 1 11:34

CONTRACT

NO. 1000000000

DESCRIPTION

QUANTITY

UNIT PRICE

TOTAL

AMOUNT

DATE

BY

REMARKS

NO.

DATE

THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN

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MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION FOR THE FILE

223732

~~EXECUTIVE~~

PR007

DATE

~~LETTER, MEMO, ETC.~~

~~TO:~~

FROM:

SUBJECT:

~~CORRESPONDENCE FILED CENTRAL FILES CONFIDENTIAL FILE~~