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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name TAHIR-KHELI, SHIRIN: FILES

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SMF 3/12/2010

File Folder STATE-PAKISTAN-NUCLEAR [1979-11/27/1982]

FOIA

F96-128/4

Box Number 91890//

BATTLE

5

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
87282	REPORT	RE INDIA-PAKISTAN	1	ND	B1 B3
87283	CABLE	STATE 302444	1	10/27/1982	B1
87284	CABLE	STATE 308265	1	11/2/1982	B1
87285	CABLE	OTTAWA 07702	1	11/2/1982	B1
87286	MEMO	TAHIR-KHELI TO ROCHE ET AL RE MEMO TO EAGLEBURGER	2	11/3/1982	B1
87287	MEMO	EAGLEBURGER/KENNEDY THRU DAM TO SECSTATE RE MEMO TO PRESIDENT RE PAKISTAN	2	11/1/1982	B1
87290	MEMO	DRAFT SHULTZ TO THE PRESIDENT RE PAKISTAN NUCLEAR ISSUE	2	ND	B1
87292	MEMO	SHIRIN TO ROCHE RE PAKISTAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM	2	11/4/1982	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
87294	CABLE	SEOUL 11810	1	11/4/1982	B1
87297	MEMO	CLARK TO SHULTZ ET AL RE PAKISTAN	1	11/8/1982	B1
87299	PAPER	DRAFT OPTIONS RE PAKISTAN	1	ND	B1 B3
87300	MEMO	SCHNEIDER TO ROSTOW, ET AL RE DECISION MEMORANDUM FOR SECSTATE	2	11/10/1982	B1
87302	MEMO	VELIOTES, ET AL THRU EAGLEBURGER ET AL TO SECSTATE RE PAKISTAN	8	ND	B1 B3
87306	CABLE	ISLAMABAD 17646	1	11/18/1982	B1
87308	PAPER	RE US-PAKISTAN RELATIONS	5	ND	B1 B3
87743	PAPER	DUPLICATE OF 87308 W/EDITS	5	ND	B1 B3

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
87313	PAPER	PAGE 10 OF 87317 W/EDITS	1	ND	B1 B3
87317	PAPER	RE US-PAKISTAN RELATIONS	11	ND	B1 B3
87746	PAPER	INSERT FOR DRAFT LETTER TO ZIA	1	ND	B1

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Youth and Age in Iran

In the much digging and analysis that has gone into the ideas of Ayatollah Khomeini apparently one item was overlooked. That was the importance of three-score years and 10 to his Islamic Republic, despite the fact that much of the bleeding and dying for the new republic has been done by youth, that "bloodshed of the young people" which the ayatollah hopes to end with "Islamic laws and traditions." Khomeini's premier is 70. Khomeini himself 78. It is a revolutionary government, but not, at least in the persons of the leaders, what one would expect from that opposition to the shah which Iranian youth has demonstrated around the world.

And, in fact, much of what the Ayatollah has been advocating is the Islam of an earlier time, a time before Kemal Ataturk or Anwar Sadat. If it rejects the tradition of the caliph, and how that would jibe with the democracy that has been at the core of so many recent youth movements remains to be seen.

To be sure, youth is not always attracted

to that kind of democracy. It may be pulled toward Leninism or Maoism. It has sung "Youth, youth, springtime of beauty" to Mussolini and marched, in "ranks tightly closed," behind Hitler. And it may find, in the horsemen who carried the Koran over so much of the world in past centuries a greater appeal than, in Omar Khayyam's words, "grasping this sorry scheme of things entire and remaking it closer to the heart's desire."

For neither the experience of age nor the fresh view of youth in themselves offer much hope to a humanity that is growing increasingly restless on this increasingly crowded planet. The maturity of Khomeini and his choice, as head of government, Mehdi Bazargan, offers little more than the immaturity of those Iranian students who threw rocks and set fires around the Pahlavi home in California. If Iran is to work its way out of its present deadlock, it needs practicable ideas of government, adapted to the national culture and economy. And this means fewer slogans and confrontations, more cooperation — and compromise.

Birthday Wish for 'Linkage'

Having repaired to William Safire's political dictionary to trace the contemporary roots of the word "linkage," what should we find, but that yesterday was its 10th anniversary. So, happy linkage. It was on Feb. 6, 1969, according to author Safire, that Henry Kissinger, in a background briefing, explained President Nixon's view of "linkage between the political and strategic environment." The object then was to get some kind of Soviet help in calming down the Middle East as a condition of, or at least a proper background for, U.S.-Soviet strategic arms talks. Today, 10 years and many strained interpretations and dramatic developments later (SALT in relation to the mining of Haiphong harbor, for example) the argument over "linkage" and its implications continues. The Republicans meeting in Easton, Md., over the weekend endorsed the concept in a resolution calling on the United States to consider a SALT-2 treaty not just in the treaty's own internal technical terms, but also in terms of "the total military and foreign-policy relationship existing between the United States and the Soviet Union."

There are two things to be said about this. One is that the Republicans are to be commended for having avoided, at least in the text of their resolution, the deceptive catchall term "linkage" itself. The other is that what they call for is so self-evidently reasonable that you have to wonder how we came as a political community to be arguing about it in the first place. This kind of unexceptionable, almost bromidic instruction — of course the treaty must be considered in terms of our broader relationship with the Soviet Union — tends usually to acquire its aura of verbal danger and high political drama precisely by being veiled in the term "linkage." Are you for or against "linkage"? the test of SALT sympathies goes. The word has come at once to suggest too much and to mean too little. For some, the idea conveys a network of specific, contingent demands. Unless they (the Russians) meet a list of prescribed conditions around the world, we should not sign and ratify a treaty. Others, reacting to this idea of what "linkage" implies, come out roundly against the concept, denouncing any "linkage" whatever — which is frankly no less idi-

otic an approach than the intricately conditioned and overclassified approach they deplore.

Let us get rid of this freighted and misleading term. Let us liberate the arms debate from the tyranny of the "linkage" argument. It prevents thought, it does not illuminate it. Can anyone suppose that there is or should be no "linkage" between the strategic arms control arrangements we reach with the Russians and the web of other more and less serious and dangerous encounters we have with them? If no "linkage" of this kind is to be countenanced either as policy or in discussion, why is the SALT-2 negotiation a matter for concern by politicians and diplomats anyway? Why not, if that is the case (and it most surely is not), simply turn over the negotiation and approval of the deal to the technicians?

There is something disingenuous about the insistence of the anti-linkers that the SALT deal will come to us in a test tube, mercifully independent of all that bothersome political and human business that keeps mucking up relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. No verification system is good enough to be trusted entirely free of the human component that may either facilitate or impede it. The degree to which the Soviet Union is likely to exploit the opportunities for weapons development that will exist in the SALT-2 treaty is a suitable U.S. concern, and so are Soviet intentions in countless crisis points around the world. The Soviet Union, we might add, would themselves be made to consider such a treaty without taking due and intense account of related U.S. conduct and intentions.

The all-or-nothing-at-all argument needs to give way to a straightforward discussion of what external and background elements are relevant to completion of a SALT deal, not whether anything outside a narrow construction of the documents themselves deserves to be considered. The concept of linkage is legitimate and important. But somehow we suspect it is not going to get a reasonable airing until the term itself, perhaps as a 10th birthday gift to us all, is eliminated from the debate.

THE WASHINGTON POST.

The Indispensable Mr. Chi

Chi Chao-chu is hardly a household word in America. Yet Chi has been an indispensable man. If Teng Hsiao-ping had not brought the former Harvard man from the Chinese Foreign Ministry as his interpreter, his discourse with President Carter might have gone uncomprehended. The United States government, it turns out, does not employ anyone fully qualified as a simultaneous interpreter from English to Chinese.

That painful condition is the culmination of chronic neglect. Unless complemented by academic training in the history, culture, economics and politics of a given society, the knowledge of its language alone becomes a dull instrument — and practically useless in delicate diplomatic situations. Indeed, the

translators at summit meetings have often observed that they cannot properly convey nuance of meaning unless they are familiar also with the private views and policies of the principals. Yet the flow of bright young Americans into foreign-language study has slowed to a trickle. Many of the best university study centers are endangered by lagging support.

In 1972, President Nixon was able to speak with the Chinese leaders in Peking only through their interpreters. Seven years later, the humiliation — and perhaps damage — continues on American soil. Absurd, in any language.

THE NEW YORK TIMES.

In the International Edition

Seventy-Five Years Ago

February 7, 1904

NEW YORK — A recent investigation shows that servant girls are often led astray, driven insane and die after being lured into traps laid by managers of bureaus. The report finds a particular feature of evil in the men who lie in wait for immigrant girls who are seized in the streets, after leaving Ellis Island, by men who speak their languages. Friendless, they yield to persuasion, and accompany their new friends, and find themselves prisoners in disreputable houses. Hungarians, Finns and Russians are the chief victims of these insidious arrangements.

Fifty Years Ago

February 7, 1929

BERLIN — The Reichstag this afternoon ratified the Pact of Paris by a decisive margin. The Nationalists opposed the measure, on the grounds that the Allies had not disarmed, evacuated the Rhineland, or abandoned the thesis that Germany was solely guilty for the Great War. In preliminary debates the Socialist leader sharply attacked the American plan to build more cruisers, declaring that the world at present was in a state of suspense between those who wanted to avoid wars by preparedness and those who sought that goal in arbitration treaties.



"Serfs Are Fickle."

Nuclear Power in 3d World

By Tariq Osman Hyder

LONDON — "Oil primarily used for peaceful purposes can also fuel the engines of the war. Hence OPEC countries now declare that their oil will only be exported to countries accepting OPEC's control over all refineries and provided that the resulting distillate is covered by international safeguards against misuse." OPEC has yet to formulate such a declaration. Conversely the formerly secret London Club, the 15 developed capitalist and Communist nations of the Nuclear Suppliers Group has taken an even harder position on nuclear technology transfers. The resulting North-South impasse appears paradoxical to the average developed world citizen at a time when growing environmental concern is questioning the future of nuclear power. What are the issues at stake, what can be done to resolve them, and does it really matter?

Bargain Struck

For the developing world it is a question of technological discrimination affecting its economic survival; for the developed world, the fear of nuclear weapon proliferation. The first generation nuclear cycle consists of refining uranium ore, enriching it for the predominant light water reactors which burn up about 1 percent of the fuel's potential energy and then reprocessing the fuel to recover nearly all the uranium, some plutonium and radioactive wastes which can then more easily be disposed of. Nuclear weapons are produced either by more highly enriching uranium 235 or by using plutonium 239 produced in special reactor euphemistically termed "dedicated" facilities. Commercial nuclear plants, to run economically, cook the fuel as long as possible. This produces plutonium 240 which makes any weapon produced from power reactor fuel, inefficient and unpredictable to the point of impracticality.

The former cornerstone of non-proliferation was primarily designed to bring in the developed countries, in particular, West Germany and Japan. The treaty bargain was struck. Promise not to produce nuclear weapons, accept IAEA safeguards and nations will be allowed, may help, to develop all other nuclear capabilities. But even before the pact, for commercial and strategic reasons, by omission or commission, the West had already helped Israel, South Africa and India to develop unsafeguarded nuclear capabilities, and these countries remained outside the treaty.

After the inevitable Indian explosion, nonproliferation policy switched from motivations to a policy of technological restraints against further proliferation, with a concentration on reprocessing. The reason given is that present IAEA safeguards do not allow for a sufficient lead time for international action should a nation with a reprocessing plant abrogate safeguards and go nuclear. Meanwhile, presumably more responsible developed countries, West Germany, Italy and Japan have reprocessing plants as well as enrichment potential, and even the Netherlands sites a multinational enrichment plant, all capable of producing nuclear weapons. While IAEA safeguards are deemed inadequate for the others relatively relaxed safeguards are allowed for EURATOM and Japan.

For a number of reasons the present policy is extremely shortsighted. To begin with, Israel, South Africa and India must be brought into a nonproliferation regime, international or regional, before their neighbors will join. Secondly, any country wishing to go nuclear can build a small unsafeguarded graph-

ite natural uranium reactor and a small reprocessing plant for an outside cost of \$75 million. A typical commercial reactor costs around a billion dollars and must be safeguarded as well. Thirdly, a policy based on technical fixes, restraints, broken contracts and retroactive legislation is no substitute for consent in an age of eroding technological barriers. The costly and still secret gaseous diffusion process was no bar to the development of cheaper centrifuge and aerodynamic methods. Conceivably within 10 years the presently experimental laser enrichment techniques will bring nuclear weapons within the reach of any state willing to invest a modest amount in a tunable 15 micron laser.

700 Percent Rise

On the economic side nuclear energy is already generally cheaper and cleaner than alternative sources. However, known low-cost uranium reserves will not last beyond the beginning of the next century. Already since 1973 uranium prices have increased 700 percent. Reprocessing and recycling cuts fuel needs for various reactors from 50 to 20 percent. Right now the fissile equivalent worth of plutonium for existing reactors amounts to \$30,000 a kilogram. The next step will be the introduction of a breeder reactor that utilizes plutonium and depleted uranium to burn up at least 60 percent of uranium's energy, and by producing more plutonium than consumed it will stretch supplies by a factor of 60. A ton of uranium in a breeder gives as much energy as 2 million tons of coal. For breeders the fissile worth of

plutonium now amounts to \$1.8 million a kilogram. By the first quarter of the next century total oil output will only suffice for a population the size of Greece and Mexico. Barring an unexpected break through in solar or fusion research the world will be dependent on breeders. But at projected rates of growth the developed countries themselves will suffer for two decades from a shortfall of plutonium once breeders are introduced. Hence the present near monopoly of the developed world of uranium supplies and enrichment, reactor and reprocessing technology poses an unacceptable threat to the development of many nations who lack fossil fuels. Should the NSG prevail into the age of breeders it will make OPEC look like a pack of Boy Scouts next to the Mafia.

The developing world has already learned to its cost what it means to fall behind the technological learning curve. From the fall of Cueta at the end of the 15th century till the recent past its technological inferiority led to the loss of vast territories and populations, some for ever. The freedom that has been regained has yet to be given an economic dimension.

Tariq Osman Hyder is a director in Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He is currently on leave of absence as a research fellow at the Kennedy School's Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard and a visiting fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London. The views expressed are his own and not necessarily those of his government.

Letters

Bitter Experience

Because of the persecution by the cults of former cultists and their families I am truly afraid to sign this letter.

However I can only hope and pray that more information will come to light in such stories as "Suicide Is Reportedly Taught to Moonies" (IHT, Jan. 18).

All the cults, not just The Peoples Temple in Guyana, are capable of suicide. This is what brainwashing and cultism are all about. . . such complete control of the minds of the members that any act is possible if the leader so desires it. Believe me when I say this, for we know from bitter first hand experience, that what cults like The Children of God, Scientology, Hare Krishna, Moon's Unification Movement and countless others state publicly has nothing whatsoever to do with what actually goes on in their organizations. BEB.

Blois, France.

Collective Needs

I was astounded to read in your article entitled "Population" (IHT, Jan. 29) that the French "bring up children not just for themselves but for everyone" and that "parents deserve remuneration for the service they render society." With the world rapidly approaching its Malthusian limits, with pollution increasing and resources diminishing, this surely must be ill advised. Saying that "the disadvantages of a low birthrate . . . include a loss of manpower, shrinking internal markets and — most pressing — the jeopardizing of a social-security system in which younger workers support the old" is tantamount to saying India is better off than Australia or Switzerland. The view is expressed that a population reduced from 53 million to 14 million

could not "finance the collective needs of a country as large as France." Nonsense. A country's "collective needs" depend on the number of people, not its land mass, so France's needs would fall along with its population. In fact, with more natural resources per person, the average Frenchman would be considerably better off. The air he breathes would be cleaner, his flat in Paris and villa in Nice larger, and his commuting time shorter.

PJ. CRUMBINE.

Policy on Iran

There is no doubt that William Pfaff's column (IHT, Jan. 23), reporting that the people of Iran "had more progress than they can bear," has the ring of real authenticity. But he avoids the crucial question: What policy should the United States adopt or have adopted?

The unspoken inference that I favor is that the United States should concern itself more with possible external Soviet interference than in the purely internal struggle for power. We should defend the right of Iran (and other countries involved in domestic turbulence) to make its own political decisions.

ALFRED E. DAVIDSON.

Paris.

Prado Pictures

The Washington Post editorial entitled "No Staff at Prado?" published in the Jan. 18 IHT deserves the verdict of the heading to Anthony Lewis' article two days earlier: "Petitfog on the Potomac." The Post editorial is such a shocking bit of misinformation that one assumes it was banged out on an evening of desperate lack of more pressing news or perhaps nostalgia for another muckraking scandal of

Anthony Sampson

From London:

The indiscriminate arming of Iran was bitterly criticized at the time by people who may be entitled now to say "I told you so."

LONDON — The news that Iran has canceled British arms contracts, worth about \$2.5 billion, has been presented in terms of solemn outrage. The Financial Times referred to "savagely pruning," and "a major blow." No-one has been anxious to make the point, that it serves us right. But it has to be made, to avoid future disasters. And the consequences are far more serious than a mere setback in trade.

It is perhaps not surprising, in the face of all the Iranian confusion and turnabouts, that the British are not keen to retrace their past attitudes towards Iran. The old pro-shah lobbyists are ashamed with good reason of their uncritical support and confidence, while the anti-shah intellectuals are discomfited to observe a revolution which has such reactionary elements.

Few people can claim much foresight. The British, with their long past involvement in Persia, liked to think that they were wiser than the Americans. But they have been caught out just as badly, with proportionately much more at stake. British intelligence, which helped to reinstate the shah in 1953, became far too dependent on SAVAK and the CIA for its information, and hopelessly underestimated the Islamic groundswell.

British businessmen and bankers, lured by quick profits and oil deals, lost their caution and became entangled in a web of corruption, partly woven by themselves. And the British arms sellers, like the Americans, ran riot in this salesman's Golconda — supported by military experts who claimed that the shah's army was essential to Western defense. Now the gold-rush has collapsed, the corruption has helped to bring down the regime, and the weapons were either useless or counterproductive in trying to defend the shah against the danger from within.

Origins of Fiasco

But it is essential to look back at the origins of this dangerous fiasco. For the indiscriminate arming of Iran was bitterly criticized at the time by people who may be entitled now to say "I told you so."

The rush of arms to Iran could never be blamed simply on the shah's overwhelming military appetite. The real origins were to be found after the British withdrawal from the Gulf, when Nixon and the shah had their secret meeting in 1972 and Nixon, much influenced by the aerospace slump, promised the shah virtually any weapons he wanted. The pressure to sell arms was hugely increased by the oil crisis which gave the shah far greater need for foreign earnings.

In Washington a few senators warned of the dangers of paying for oil with arms — Sen. Church eloquently described the vicious circle in which the appetite for arms was constantly fed by ever-higher oil prices. But the symbiosis between the shah and the salesmen became still stronger.

The British were still more heavily dependent on arms sales than the Americans, and more reluctant to criticize. By the time the shah had ordered as many as 2,000 British

tanks — more than the entire British Army — the pretense that they were essential to the defense of an ally had virtually disappeared, and the government arms salesmen joked with unconcealed cynicism about the inability of Iranians to use them. There were serious criticisms, not only from the anti-arms lobby, but also from strategic experts. But the short-term arguments prevailed: The tanks provided foreign earnings, profits and jobs.

Cost of Cynicism

The true cost of that cynicism is now all too apparent. It is not just that the contracts have been canceled, that the earnings never came, and that the jobs will be lost. Much more serious is the whole distortion of priorities which was encouraged by the Iranian trade, and the consequences for the rest of the world.

The huge surplus of weaponry that was destined for Iran is already, according to arms dealers, causing a glut on the market, and particularly a slump in the prices of secondhand tanks. The British arms factories will now have several hundred surplus tanks to dispose of, of which the British Army can only make use of a few. The pressure to sell the tanks to other dubious countries, whether directly or indirectly, will thus become greater — and there are many countries, most notably South Africa, which are desperate for weapons and have devious routes for acquiring them.

The prospect of world diplomacy being determined by arms salesmen has always been alarming, and the case of Iran shows all the dangers. If the shah's priorities had been different, if the pressure from the West had been more concerned with selling housing, or hospitals, than with selling weapons, there might have been a chance of a balanced and ordered development. As it was, the unrestricted arms sales not only caused chaos in the Iranian economy — they also proved a very short-term economic benefit for the West.

Before the salesmen are allowed to invade a new territory, to sell the surplus tanks, missiles and aircraft, the West must work out the lessons of this fiasco. They must not only impose much stricter controls over arms exports — they must apply themselves to the fundamental need for alternative exports, to take the place of a trade which is both unreliable and deadly. And in the meantime there is no cause to waste sympathy on the companies whose orders have been so "savagely pruned."

The International Herald Tribune welcomes letters from readers. Short letters have a better chance of being published. All letters are subject to condensation for space reasons. Anonymous letters will not be considered for publication. Writers may request that their letters be signed only with initials but preference will be given to those fully signed and bearing the writer's complete address. The Herald Tribune cannot acknowledge letters sent to the editor.

Post's editorial face, but let this serve as a reminder that truth and accuracy remain prime requisites in a serious newspaper, even on the editorial page.

FRANK FAHY.

Madrid.

Budget Deficit

There is much discussion these days about laws and constitutional amendments that would forbid a federal budget deficit. In addition to the practical question of how such a rule would be enforced, I also wonder about the arbitrariness of the standard. It seems at least logical to require that the national debt in real dollars (corrected for inflation) not increase from one year to the next or that the national debt not increase as a percentage of GNP. By either of these standards President Carter's projected \$29-billion "deficit" for fiscal 1980 does not look so bad.

JOHN H. SCHWARZ.

Paris.

UNCLASSIFIED

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

Department of State

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ACTION NEA-07

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USIA

USINFO FOR P/RC
STATE FOR NEA/PAB

E. O. 12356 N/A

SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION - NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

1. ALL MAJOR ENGLISH LANGUAGE PAPERS INCLUDING DAWN, PAKTIMES, MUSLIM AND MORNING NEWS CARRY REUTER REPORT THAT U. S. HAS GIVEN OTHER NUCLEAR SUPPLIER NATIONS A LIST OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS THAT AMERICA KEEPS UNDER EXPORT CONTROL. OTHER HIGHLIGHTS OF THE REPORT INCLUDE SPOKESMAN ROMBERG REMARK (1) U. S. HAS HELD TALKS WITH OTHER NATIONS TO PREVENT EXPORT OF SENSITIVE ITEMS "TO NATIONS OF PROLIFERATION CONCERN", AND (2) DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN U. S. -USSR EXPERTS IN WASHINGTON ON EFFORTS TO CURB SPREAD OF NUCLEAR CONTROL.

2. COVERAGE IS IDENTICAL IN MOST. ALL INSIDED AND ALL EXCEPT MNEWS PLACED STORY IN SINGLE COLUMN SIX TO EIGHT INCHES DEEP. MNEWS GAVE THREE COLUMN HEAD AND CARRY ADDITIONAL MATERIAL ATTRIBUTED TO PPI WHICH SAYS INDUSTRIALIZED STATES ARE "TIGHTENING MEASURES TO STEM THE FLOW OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES." PPI QUOTING WASHINGTON POST ADDS THAT MORE DETAILED LIST IS DESIGNED TO "INCREASE OBSTACLES FACING COUNTRIES LIKE PAKISTAN."

3. HEADLINE EMPHASIS: PAKTIMES, MORNING NEWS, AND DAWN GAVE IDENTICAL HEAD, "U. S. CONTROL LIST GIVEN TO N-SUPPLIERS." MUSLIM HEAD READS: "U. S. TRYING TO PREVENT NUCLEAR EXPORT." HANSEN

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87283	CABLE STATE 302444	1	10/27/1982	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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87284	CABLE STATE 308265	1	11/2/1982	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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87285	CABLE OTTAWA 07702	1	11/2/1982	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

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87286	MEMO TAHIR-KHELI TO ROCHE ET AL RE MEMO TO EAGLEBURGER	2	11/3/1982	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ES —

8236513

See State Memo
to Pres on
Pan Nuclear.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 3, 1982

~~SECRET~~

TO: S/AL - Amb. Walters
ACDA - Mr. Rostow
PM - RAdm. Howe
OES/N - Mr. Devine
T - Mr. Sienkiewicz
M - Mr. Dunn
L - Mr. Michel
INR - Mr. Montgomery
S/P - Mr. Wolfowitz
P - Ms. Raphel

FROM: NEA - Howard Schaffer *Liber*

SUBJECT: Information Memorandum for the President on the
Pakistan Nuclear Issue

I would appreciate your sending comments/clearance on the attached memorandum to Bob Gallucci, (NEA/RA, Rm 5254A, x20930) by COB, Thursday, November 4.

Attachment:a/s

cc:NEA:DTSchneider
NEA/PAB:HEKirby

NEA/RA:RLGallucci:bam

DECLASSIFIED
Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1987
BY Smj NARA, DATE 3/12/10

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87287	MEMO EAGLEBURGER/KENNEDY THRU DAM TO SECSTATE RE MEMO TO PRESIDENT RE PAKISTAN	2	11/1/1982	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

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87290	MEMO DRAFT SHULTZ TO THE PRESIDENT RE PAKISTAN NUCLEAR ISSUE	2	ND	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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87292	MEMO SHIRIN TO ROCHE RE PAKISTAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM	2	11/4/1982	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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87294	CABLE SEOUL 11810	1	11/4/1982	B1

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87297	MEMO CLARK TO SHULTZ ET AL RE PAKISTAN	1	11/8/1982	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

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87299	PAPER DRAFT OPTIONS RE PAKISTAN	1	ND	B1 B3

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87300	MEMO SCHNEIDER TO ROSTOW, ET AL RE DECISION MEMORANDUM FOR SECSTATE	2	11/10/1982	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

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87302	MEMO VELIOTES, ET AL THRU EAGLEBURGER ET AL TO SECSTATE RE PAKISTAN	8	ND	B1 B3

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87306	CABLE ISLAMABAD 17646	1	11/18/1982	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

From Steve Adair

Latest version of draft memo to the President.

November 20, 1982

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/NOFORN (ATTACHED)~~

TO: CIA - Mr. McMahon
DOD - Mr. West
- Ms. Buckley
NSC - Mr. Guhin
NEA - Mr. Veliotis

FROM: M/N - Louis Dunn

SUBJECT: Draft Memo for the President on the Pakistan Nuclear Issue

The attached working draft will be discussed at the Monday afternoon meeting.

cc: M - Mr. Kennedy, 7207
INR - Mr. Montgomery, 6531
✓ PM - Mr. Raphael, 7317
OES - Mr. Devine, 7831
ACDA - Ms. Strang, 4678

Drafted by:
NEA/RA:RGalucci:rld
11/20/82 X21154

DECLASSIFIED
Dept. of State (60) 1100, July 21, 1987
BY enj DATE 3/12/10

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/NOFORN~~
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87308	PAPER RE US-PAKISTAN RELATIONS	5	ND	B1 B3

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

From Steve Aske
Latest version of
draft memo to the
President.

November 20, 1982

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/NOFORN (ATTACHED)~~

TO: CIA - Mr. McMahon
DOD - Mr. West
- Ms. Buckley
NSC - Mr. Guhin
NEA - Mr. Veliotis

FROM: M/N - Louis Dunn

SUBJECT: Draft Memo for the President on the Pakistan
Nuclear Issue

The attached working draft will be discussed at the
Monday afternoon meeting.

cc: M - Mr. Kennedy, 7207
INR - Mr. Montgomery, 6531
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OES - Mr. Devine, 7831
ACDA - Ms. Strang, 4678

Drafted by:
NEA/RA:RGalucci:rld
11/20/82 X21154

DECLASSIFIED
Dept. of State (S) 21, 1997
BY Amf Date: 3/12/18

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87743	PAPER DUPLICATE OF 87308 W/EDITS	5	ND	B1 B3

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Final Memo # ES 8236573

11/27/82



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

#1 implies verification problem because they
#2 nonstate

November 23, 1982

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/NOFORN (ATTACHED)~~

TO : CIA - Mr. McMahon
DOD - Mr. West
- Ms. Buckley
NSC - Mr. Guhin
M - Mr. Kennedy
P - Mr. Gompert
NEA - Mr. Veliotis
ACDA - Mr. Gray

FROM : NEA - Howard Schaffer

SUBJECT: Memo for the President on the Pakistan Nuclear Issue

The attached draft reflects the discussion of November 22. Would you please provide your final clearance to Lewis A. Dunn, M/N, 632-4252 by NOON WEDNESDAY NOVEMBER 24.

cc: INR - Mr. Montgomery
S/P - Mr. Wolfowitz ✓
PM - Mr. Raphel
OES - Mr. Devine

DECLASSIFIED
Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
BY Amf NARA, DATE 3/12/10

TAB

III

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
87313	PAPER PAGE 10 OF 87317 W/EDITS	1	ND	B1 B3

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 23, 1982

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/NOFORN (ATTACHED)~~

TO : CIA - Mr. McMahon
 DOD - Mr. West
 - Ms. Buckley
 NSC - Mr. Guhin
 M - Mr. Kennedy
 P - Mr. Gompert
 NEA - Mr. Veliotos
 ACDA - Mr. Gray

FROM : NEA - Howard Schaffer

SUBJECT: Memo for the President on the Pakistan Nuclear
 Issue

The attached draft reflects the discussion of November 22. Would you please provide your final clearance to Lewis A. Dunn, M/N, 632-4252 by NOON WEDNESDAY NOVEMBER 24.

cc: INR - Mr. Montgomery
 S/P - Mr. Wolfowitz ✓
 PM - Mr. Raphel
 OES - Mr. Devine

DECLASSIFIED
Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
BY Amf NARA, DATE 3/12/10

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87317	PAPER RE US-PAKISTAN RELATIONS	11	ND	B1 B3

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87746	PAPER INSERT FOR DRAFT LETTER TO ZIA	1	ND	B1

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