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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: TAHIR-KHELI, SHIRIN R.: Files

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File Folder: PAKIS: Nuclear - 1986 Box 91880 ~~7~~

Date: 6/30/98

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. report	re Pakistan nuclear program, 4p D, 6/14/00 NLSF96-128/1 #123	7/1/86	P1
2. map	1p D, 6/14/00 NLSF96-128/1 #124	n.d	P1
3. memo	Ronald St. Martin to John Poindexter re Pakistan, 4p D, 6/14/00 NLSF96-128/1 #125	7/9/86	P1
4. cable	180940Z SEP 86, 1p O 3/11/06 F96-128/1 #124	9/18/86	P1
5. cable	300859Z MAY 86, 4p P 3/11/06 F96-128/1 #127	5/30/86	P1
6. report	re: Pakistan, 1p D, 6/14/00 NLSF96-128/1 #128	12/3/86	P1
7. map	1p D, 6/14/00 NLSF96-128/1 #129	n.d	P1
8. memo	Richard Solomon to the Secretary re Pakistan, 5p D 3/11/06 F96-128/1 #130	7/17/86	P1
9. cable	291211Z MAY 86, 3p P 3/11/06 F96-128/1 #131	5/29/86	P1
10. cable	291211Z MAY 86, 5p D, 6/14/00 NLSF96-128/1 #132	5/29/86	P1
11. note	re Pakistan, 1p D 3/2/01 F96-128/1 #133	3/5/86	P1
12. Sit. Room note	re Pakistan, 1p D 10/19/01 F96-128/1 #134	3/5/86	P1, B3
13. memo	Peter Rodman to Donald Fortier re Pak Nuclear Problem, 3p D, 6/14/00 NLSF96-128/1 #135	3/26/86	P1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 1-4 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

INCLUDING FOREIGN SECRETARY NAIK; FOREIGN SECRETARY-DESIGNATE SATTAR; DEFENSE SECRETARY ZAIDI, FINANCE SECRETARY BEG; BANK OF PAKISTAN GOVERNOR KAZI; PAKISTAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION CHAIRMAN MUNIR KHAN; MFA ADDITIONAL SECRETARY, AMERICAS, HYDER; AND MFA

DIRECTR, AMERICA, NIZAMI. ACCOMPANYING THE CONGRESSMAN WERE AMBASSADOR HINTON; DCM MCCARTHY; AID DIRECTOR STAPLES; ECONOMIC COUNSELLOR SENS; POLITICAL COUNSELLOR WOLF; STAFFER BUSH; AND POLOFF MORIARTY. ALL PAKISTANI STATEMENTS REPORTED BELOW WERE IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS BY CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ. IN ADDITION TO THE FOLLOWING TOPICS, THE NINETY MINUTE DISCUSSION TOUCHED ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE (REPORTED SEPTTEL). END INTRODUCTION.

INDIA

3. DISCUSSING THE PROPOSED NON-AGGRESSION/FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION PACT WITH INDIA, FOREIGN SECRETARY -DESIGNATE SATTAR MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

FOIA(b)(1)

Redacted

FOREIGN SECRETARY NAIK ADDED THAT A NON-AGGRESSION PACT WOULD BE ONE OF THE MOST EFFECTIVE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES THE TWO COUNTRIES COULD USE IN THEIR ATTEMPTS TO BRIDGE THE WIDE GULF OF DISTRUST WHICH SEPARATES THEM.

AFGHANISTAN

4. GENEVA. SATTAR NOTED THAT THE MAJOR HURDLES STILL REMAINING AT GENEVA WERE THE TIMETABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL AND THE MONITORING MECHANISM. IN ADDITION, THE SOVIETS/DRA HAD ON THE PERIPHERY BEGUN STRESSING THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMPORTANCE OF OBTAINING IRANIAN ACQUIESCENCE IN ANY AGREEMENT. THE GOP FELT IT COULD NOT TAKE "PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY" IN OBTAINING SUCH ACQUIESCENCE, BUT WOULD BE WILLING TO SUPPLEMENT ANY EFFORTS UNDERTAKEN BY THE SOVIETS AND THE UN.

FOIA(b) (1)

5. MUJAHIDIN AGREEMENT. NAIK WENT ON TO NOTE THAT THE TIMEFRAME WOULD BE KEY IN OBTAINING MUJAHIDIN AGREEMENT. HE EXPECTED THAT SOME FIGHTING MIGHT CONTINUE DURING ANY SOVIET WITHDRAWAL, BUT FELT THAT THE RESISTANCE WOULD "CALIBRATE" THEIR ATTACKS DEPENDING UPON THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND. THE REFUGEES WOULD PROBABLY BEGIN TO RETURN TO AFGHANISTAN, ONCE IT HAD BECOME CLEAR THAT THE SOVIETS WERE SERIOUS AND HAD ACTUALLY BEGUN WITHDRAWING TROOPS.

6. MINISTER OF STATE NOORANI INSISTED THAT THERE WERE "NO ADVANTAGES" TO BE GAINED FROM ENTERING INTO DIRECT TALKS WITH THE DRA. "ONLY PITFALLS."
** END OF CABLE **

**** SECTION BREAK ****

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 11972

E.O. 1235: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PK
SUBJECT: CODEL SOLARZ: FOREIGN MINISTRY TALKS

MILITARY

7. DEFENSE SECRETARY ZAIDI ADMITTED THAT THE GOP HAD NOT YET WORKED OUT PRIORITIES FOR THE FOLLOW-ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. HE NOTED THAT AT THE LAST CONSULTATIVE GROUP MEETING THE GOP HAD SPELLED OUT ITS AREAS OF INTEREST AND PLANNED AT THE NEXT ONE TO FLESH OUT DETAILED REQUESTS. THE GOP FELT THAT THE ARMY AND NAVY HAD BEEN NEGLECTED OVER THE LIFE OF THE CURRENT PACKAGE AND THUS SHOULD GET MORE ATTENTION THE NEXT TIME AROUND.

8. ACCORDING TO ZAIDI, THE PAKISTANI MILITARY UNITS IN THE GULF WERE TRAINING CONTINGENTS. SAUDI ARABIA HAD BY FAR THE LARGEST CONTINGENT OF PAKISTANI TROOPS -- OVER A BRIGADE -- BUT THEY TOO WERE THERE FOR TRAINING PURPOSES.

-
ECONOMIC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9. BANK GOVERNOR QAZI NOTED THAT PAKISTAN'S EXTERNAL DEBT WAS AROUND 10-12 BILLION DOLLARS (US) AND THAT ITS DEBT SERVICE RATIO WAS NEARLY TWENTY PERCENT. ALTHOUGH A DROP-OFF IN REMITTANCES FROM THE GULF COULD BE EXPECTED AT SOME POINT, FIGURES FOR THE MOST RECENT FINANCIAL YEAR INDICATED THAT THOSE REMITTANCES HAD ACTUALLY INCREASED OVER THE PREVIOUS YEAR. (AMBASSADOR HINTON NOTED THAT THEY WERE STILL BELOW THE 1984 FIGURES.) CONVERSELY, THE DROP IN OIL PRICES SHOULD SAVE PAKISTAN SOME RS. 1200 CRORE (750 MILLION DOLLARS) PER YEAR, IF OIL PRICES AVERAGE FIFTEEN DOLLARS PER BARREL.

LIBYA

10. NOORANI STATED THAT PAKISTAN OPPOSED STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM BUT WONDERED WHETHER THE US RAID ON LIBYA HAD NOT BEEN COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WOULD BE VASTLY PREFERABLE, IF THE US COULD SECURE THE SUPPORT OF ITS EUROPEAN ALLIES. THE COMMON MAN IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD WOULD NECESSARILY CONSIDER ANOTHER MILITARY ATTACK AGAINST LIBYA AN ATTACK ON ALL ISLAMIC COUNTRIES.

THE MIDDLE EAST

FOIA(b) (1)

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 ** END OF CABLE **

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3			
4			
5			
6			

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 cy4 - suspense

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
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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 6-8 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

PAK-nuclear

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

MAJORITIES OF PAKISTANIS DISTRUST BOTH U.S. AND USSR,
FAVOR PAK DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR ARMS

Pakistanis Distrust Both U.S. and USSR But Prefer U.S.

Majorities of Pakistanis distrust the friendship of both the United States (63%) and the Soviet Union (75%), according to results of a February 1986 nationwide survey. Moreover, they believe the USSR to be a greater threat to Pakistan than traditional rival India by a ratio of two-to-one (49%-to-23%).

However, although a plurality (54%) opt for neutrality vis-a-vis the U.S. and USSR, those with a preference favor American over Soviet friendship by a ratio of three-to-one (35%-to-11%).

Support Remains High for U.S. Aid

Widespread distrust of American friendship does not prevent solid majorities of Pakistanis from supporting Pakistan's receiving military (63%) and economic (70%) aid from the United States. This support continues a trend observed in surveys since 1981.

Pakistanis Widely Favor Development of Own Atom Bomb

Although Pakistani President Zia has publicly denied any intent on the part of the GOP to develop nuclear weapons, the large majority of Pakistanis (87%) believe that Pakistan should "make an atom bomb."

The Pakistani public's support for their country's development of nuclear weapons capability no doubt springs in large part from fear of India's nuclear power capability: half (53%) said that India would use nuclear weapons against Pakistan in an Indo-Pakistani war.

More See Drug Use than Trafficking as Pak Problem

The vast majority (89%) believed that use of heroin and opium is a problem in Pakistan, according to a May 1985 survey. But only half (50%) were aware of Pakistan's role as a major site of production and trafficking. Most favored Pakistani government action to stop the use (87%), trafficking (87%) and production (86%) of heroin and opium in Pakistan.

July 14, 1986

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MAJORITIES OF PAKISTANIS DISTRUST BOTH U.S. AND USSR,
FAVOR PAK DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR ARMS

Drafted by:
USIA:P/RNA: Elaine El Assal
485-7123

Cleared by:
USIA: P/R: Nils H. Wessell *NHW*
485-2965

July 14, 1986

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Briefing Paper

United States Information Agency
Washington, D.C. 20547

Office of Research



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July 14, 1986

MAJORITIES OF PAKISTANIS DISTRUST BOTH U.S. AND USSR,
FAVOR PAK DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR ARMS

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Prepared by:
Elaine El Assal (P/RNA)

Approved by:
Nils H. Wessell, Director
B-6/14/86

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PAK-nuclear

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PRIORITY
P 291211Z MAY 86
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3102
INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 6826

ZYUW RUEHILA1791 1490030

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET SPECAT~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 11791

EXDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MNUC, PREL, FK
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR: SOLARZ CONVERSATIONS WITH GOP

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~
2. SUMMARY: DURING HIS MAY 24-25 VISIT TO ISLAMABAD, CONG. STEPHEN SOLARZ RAISED THE NUCLEAR ISSUE WITH ALL THE SENIOR OFFICIALS HE MET.

[REDACTED]

HE SAID THIS ISSUE HAS THE POTENTIAL TO DERAIL CONGRESSIONAL AGREEMENT NEXT YEAR FOR A FOLLOW-ON PROGRAM. HE URGED THE GOP TO TAKE STEPS TO ALLOW INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION, AND RETORTED TO GOP INSISTENCE ON A REGIONAL SOLUTION THAT IT SEEMED FOLLY TO ALLOW THE INDIANS A VETO ON U.S.-PAK RELATIONS.

FOIA(b) (1)

PM JUNEJO ON MAY 24 TOLD SOLARZ THAT AN ANTI-PAKISTAN LOBBY WAS VILIFYING HIS COUNTRY'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM. PAKISTAN DID NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO MAKE BOMBS, THOUGH INDIA, WHICH HAD TO BE A FACTOR IN PAKISTAN'S CALCULATION, HAD ALREADY SHOWN IT COULD EXPLODE A BOMB. JUNEJO ALSO NOTED THAT THE GOP HAD TO CONSIDER THE MASSIVE INDIAN ARMS PURCHASES WHEN TRYING TO EVALUATE GOI INTENTIONS.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (1)

FOIA(b) (1)

END SUMMARY

4. MR. SOLARZ DISCUSSED THE NUCLEAR ISSUE WITH THE PRESIDENT, PRIME MINISTER, MINISTER OF STATE NOORANI, PAEC CHIEF MUNIR KHAN AND, INFORMALLY WITH THE CHARGES OF THE UK AND AUSTRALIA. HIS PRESENTATION, WHICH WAS GENERALLY ALONG THE SAME LINES, IS SUMMARIZED BELOW, FOLLOWED BY SUMMARIES OF THE POINTS MADE BY EACH OF THE CONGRESSMAN'S INTERLOCUTORS.

5. THE CONGRESSMAN BEGAN BY NOTING THAT ALTHOUGH THE GOP HAD CONTINUALLY MAINTAINED THAT THE PAK NUCLEAR PROGRAM WAS PURELY PEACEFUL, THE USG BELIEVED THAT A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF THE PROGRAM WAS DEVOTED TO DEVELOPING A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY.

FOIA(b) (1)

++++ FOR J5 +++++
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SECDEF(9) USDP(11) ASD:A&L(1) ASD:PA(2) DR(1) DD(1)
ED(1) DI-1(1) JSO-1(1) NWS(1) VP(1) DIO(1) DE(1)
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PAGE 1 OF 1
291211Z MAY 86
SECT 01 OF 03

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PRIORITY
P 291211Z MAY 86
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0103
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-- ALL PAK NUCLEAR FACILITIES, INCLUDING KAHUTA, COME UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE PAEC, AND PAEC COMES UNDER PRIME MINISTER JUNEJO, WHO HOLDS THE PORTFOLIO OF MINISTER FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY.

~~SECRET SPECAT~~ SECTION: 02 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 11791

EXDIS

-E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MWJC, PHEL, PK
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR: SOLARZ CONVERSATIONS WITH GOP

[REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (1)

[REDACTED] VIA ASSERTED THE U.S. AND PAKISTAN HAVE A MUTUALITY OF INTERESTS. IF, DESPITE THIS, THE U.S. WERE SUBSEQUENTLY TO CONCLUDE THAT IT IS IN AMERICA'S INTEREST TO BREAK UP THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS -- BECAUSE, AS HE PUT IT, OF INDIAN INTRANSIGENCE -- THAT IS A DECISION FOR THE U.S.

FOIA(b) (1)

[REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (1)

[REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (1)

[REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (1)

10. MINISTER OF STATE NOORANI ON MAY 25 TOLD THE CONGRESSMAN THAT SOLARZ'S SUGGESTION FOR A PRIVATE INSPECTION OF PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR FACILITIES WAS NOT POSSIBLE BECAUSE IT WOULD NOT REMAIN PRIVATE. EVERYTHING IN THE U.S. LEAKS SOONER OR LATER. IF THE U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONSHIP IS TO WORK IT HAS TO BE ON A BASIS OF TRUST.

[REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (1)

[REDACTED] NO GOVERNMENT IN PAKISTAN CAN DO SOMETHING ON NUCLEAR QUESTIONS THAT INDIA DOES NOT DO.

12. MUNIR KHAN, DURING A MAY 25 MEETING SOLARZ HELD AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WITH SENIOR BUREAUCRATS, SAID:

[REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (1)

ACTION (R.M)
INFO CJCS(4) DJS(1) J3:NMCC(*) J3(3) J5(1)
SECDEF(9) USDP(11) ASD:A&L(1) ASD:PA(2) DR(1) DD(1)
ED(1) DI-1(1) JSO-1(1) NWS(1) VP(1) DIO(1) DE(1)
DB(4) OT(1) DIA(1) AT-A(1)
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
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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3104
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~~SECRET SPECAT~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 11791

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MWJC, PREL, FX
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR; SOLARZ CONVERSATIONS WITH GOP



FOIA(b)(1)

13. SOLARZ HAD A FURTHER PRIVATE TETE A TETE WITH
MUNIR KHAN AT RESIDENCE MAY 25



FOIA(b)(1)

HINTON-ET

ACTION (R,M)
INFO CJCS(4) DJS(1) J3:NMCC(*) J3(3) J5(1)
SECDEF(9) USDP(11) ASD:A&L(1) ASD:PA(2) DR(1) DD(1)
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