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File Folder LIBYA - CHAD

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Box Number 1

WILLS

44

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
87592	MAPS	RE. AFRICA <i>R</i> 7/18/2018 M1051/1	4	ND	B1 B3
87594	PAPER	RE. LIBYA-CHAD [W/NOTATIONS] <i>PAR</i> 7/18/2018 M1051/1	5	1/27/1986	B1 B3
87598	PAPER	RE. LIBYA-CHAD [PG. 2] <i>PAR</i> 7/18/2018 M1051/1	1	ND	B1 B3
87602	PAPER	RE. CHAD <i>R</i> 7/18/2018 M1051/1	6	5/1/1986	B1 B3
87605	CABLE	PARIS 08967 [W/NOTATION] <i>R</i> 2/28/2017 M1051/1	1	3/3/1986	B1
87608	NOTES	RE. LIBY-CHAD <i>R</i> 2/28/2017 M1051/1	3	ND	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

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NLR/MID51 #87594

BY fw NARA DATE 7/18/18

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

27 January 1986

Libya-Chad: Qadhafi's Next Moves

Summary

Libyan leader Qadhafi's current crisis with Washington probably will delay--but not deter--his pursuit of a more aggressive military posture in Chad. The level, pace, and timing of Libyan military activities will be determined by Qadhafi's assessment of possible French and US reactions and other foreign policy priorities.

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When he again devotes his full attention to Chad, Qadhafi most likely will choose small-scale incursions by mixed groups of Chadian rebels and Libyan forces. Such an approach would test local and international political support for Chadian President Habre as well as military capabilities of Habre's troops and Chadian dissidents. In our view, Qadhafi would accelerate his timetable for such action if he decided that Paris' preoccupation with legislative elections in March precluded a French military reaction.

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Qadhafi probably also would try to exploit any uncertainties in Paris over his next moves to extract political concessions that would weaken French support for Chadian President Habre. Qadhafi's actions also would be affected by his perception that a large-scale attack heightens the risk of a French military response. In any case, Qadhafi is not likely to do anything to escalate the military situation until he is reasonably confident that the current confrontation with Washington is behind him.

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reporting*

This memorandum was prepared by [redacted] of the Maghreb Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Information as of 23 January 1986 was used in its preparation. Questions and comments should be directed to Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, at [redacted]

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Libyan efforts to rebuild its eroding military position in Chad began in mid-1985 after the visit to Chad of several senior military officials. Their trip was quickly followed by the appointment of Colonel Abd al-Hafiz Mas'ud, one of Qadhafi's chief military advisers, as Libyan commander in Chad. Mas'ud immediately initiated a program designed to repair Libyan relations with Chadian dissident groups, which had been strained by Tripoli's reluctance to provide them with food, fuel, vehicles, and ammunition. He also began strengthening Libya's own forces in the north, which had been plagued by poor morale and logistic and maintenance difficulties.

Mas'ud was replaced last October by Colonel Ali Sharif--the most experienced of Libya's Chad commanders. Sharif's arrival, in our view, signaled initial preparations for renewed

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Libyan supported military action

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construction was completed at Ouadi Doum airfield, providing Tripoli with an initial capability to send fighter aircraft deep into southern Chad, including N'Djamena. Ouadi Doum also is serving as Libya's main logistics base in Chad, handling several transport aircraft daily. Fresh equipment, including armored vehicles and air defense missiles, has been moved into northern Chad as recently as this month.

Libyan Political Objectives

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Qadhafi almost certainly regards a pro-Libyan government in N'Djamena as key to destabilizing other moderate governments in sub-Saharan Africa.

Qadhafi probably believes a pro-Libyan government in N'Djamena would ensure Libyan access to the uranium resources of northern Chad. Foreign survey teams reportedly are continuing to survey uranium resources in this region.

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if they really exist

Heightened discontent inside Libya probably has also increased Qadhafi's concern that the United States, France, or Algeria may try to use northern Chad as a base for stirring unrest among tribesmen in the Libyan province bordering Chad--an area traditionally resistant to government control.

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Public statements by Libyan Foreign Secretary Turayki indicated that Libya's reneging on its troop withdrawal agreement with France in part was motivated by its perception that a Libyan withdrawal would open the door to Habre's recapture of northern Chad--an event Turayki implied would pose a security threat to southern Libya.

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Qadhafi's public statements over the past year repeatedly emphasize his belief--probably stemming from his Bedouin upbringing--that control over water resources is the key to domination in various regions. [REDACTED]

When Will Qadhafi Strike?

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Libyan military action any time soon is by no means certain, despite the continued strengthening of forces in Chad. In our view, a more aggressive Libyan military posture will only be initiated when Qadhafi becomes personally engaged because he recognizes that any miscalculation might prompt French military retaliation. Competing demands on him for decisions involving Libyan support for terrorism and subversion in other regions, as well as his sense of political opportunities or threats from foreign and domestic enemies might again distract him for a lengthy period as it has in the past. [REDACTED]

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or the
name

In our view, Qadhafi would speed up his timetable for military action if he decided that Mitterrand's preoccupation with French legislative elections next March minimized the chances of a French military response. The Libyan leader probably also would consider moving sooner if there were clear indications that French conservatives--perhaps more inclined to challenge Libya--were strengthening their prospects for gaining power in Paris. [REDACTED]

Likely Course of Fighting

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When Qadhafi gives the go ahead, we believe that military action will initially result in probing attacks by mixed groups of Chadian rebels and Libyans against government positions. Such incursions would be similar to last December's probe at Koro Toro, which resulted in a brief shootout with government forces. Such attacks would be designed to keep Habre off balance and stretch N'Djamena's already limited forces. In our view, they also would be intended to achieve quick, morale-raising

[Redacted]

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victories and help Qadhafi assess the effectiveness of his own force in Chad. [Redacted]

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These limited encounters involving Libyan backed rebels also provide Qadhafi with a barometer to test French intentions. He began feeling out French reactions by [Redacted]

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[Redacted] briefly deploying SU-22 fighter aircraft to Ouadi Doum airfield last October--and Paris responded with a temporary augmentation of troops and aircraft in neighboring Central African Republic. Qadhafi probably has drawn additional comfort from recent statements by Mitterrand that France has no defense agreement with Chad and is not the "policeman" of Africa. [Redacted]

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*intensity contrast
w/ Mitterrand
Whitehead
conversations*

A failure by Paris to immediately and decisively signal its resolve probably would prompt additional attacks, which could escalate in scope and intensity. We believe that France would have to return forces to Chad or conduct a limited air strike on Libyans and Chadian rebels to deter Qadhafi from continuing to increase military pressure on Habre. [Redacted]

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In the absence of French military intervention or an unexpectedly strong response by Habre's forces, Tripoli might become more open in its involvement in rebel attacks south of the 16th parallel. We anticipate initially the use of Libyan SF-260 light strike aircraft and as many as two battalions of armor or artillery. The taking of isolated government positions or seizure of territory might temporarily satisfy Qadhafi if he perceives that Habre's political position had thereby been weakened enough to stimulate coup plotting against him. We believe that Qadhafi might also consider moves such as relocating the rebel "capital" from Bardai in the Aouzou Strip to a captured government stronghold in an effort to underscore Habre's defeat. [Redacted]

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A decision by Qadhafi to adopt a more aggressive posture--including a march on N'Djamena--would again depend on his assessment of likely French reactions. Qadhafi almost certainly recognizes that the vulnerability of Libyan forces to French attack would make such an offensive extremely risky. At the same time, he would have to weigh the impact of French military action and even a limited defeat of his forces on his already deteriorating domestic position. [Redacted]

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If Qadhafi becomes convinced that the French will not intervene, we believe the Libyan force in Chad will signal its intentions before it undertakes such an invasion. The force does not yet have the strength it achieved during the final stages of its invasion in 1983, when the deployment of French troops to Chad prompted a ceasefire. Based on preparations for the 1983 invasion, we believe that Qadhafi is unlikely to launch a major offensive without strengthening Libyan air defenses and deploying fighter aircraft to northern Chad. He also probably will augment Libya's approximately 20 tank transporters there with about 80

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signal =>

[Redacted]

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nothing
of it

*more.

[Redacted]

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Political Maneuvering Likely

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Qadhafi at each stage of military activity will review his diplomatic options. The strengthening of Libyan forces in northern Chad has already been accompanied by political posturing. For example, Qadhafi's visits to Senegal and Mali in late November and early December were accompanied by [Redacted]

[Redacted] hints that he was receptive to a negotiated settlement with Habre [Redacted]

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In our view, Qadhafi will periodically play his diplomatic cards to try to exploit any reluctance by Mitterrand to confront Libya militarily in Chad. We believe Qadhafi probably hopes the French can be persuaded to reduce their support for Habre in exchange for an agreement by Tripoli to at least temporarily forego additional military action. In our judgment, Qadhafi believes backtracking by Paris on its support would seriously undercut Habre's authority and international prestige, and possibly prompt coup plotting in N'Djamena. [Redacted]

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In the event of a French attack on Libyan and rebel positions, we believe Qadhafi will focus his diplomacy on obtaining international condemnation of Paris and regional acquiescence in a "peacekeeping" force comprising mainly Libyans. Such maneuvering would be intended to legitimize the continued presence of Libyan forces north of the 16th parallel while making it difficult for Paris to justify additional attacks. He might also retaliate by targeting French personnel and facilities for terrorist attacks [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Implications for the United States

Qadhafi will be watching for indications of US willingness to step in for the French in Chad if Libya and the rebels defeat government forces. A US refusal to intervene, in our judgment, would encourage Qadhafi's aggressiveness by convincing him that Washington is unwilling to counter Libyan expansionism directly. A more assertive reaction from Washington probably would prompt Qadhafi to slow down his timetable for subversion in Chad. Qadhafi will not abandon his attempts to install a pro-Libyan government in N'Djamena, however, anticipating that Washington, and Paris, will decide at some point that the price of supporting Habre is unacceptably high. [Redacted]

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
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Libya-Chad

balanced...Ministers' goal was to foster dialogue between Iran and Iraq and possibly lead to declaration of neutral zone in Gulf. Iranian reaction has been favorable...Iraqis upset. GCC hopes mediation may start with indication of Iranian flexibility.
(S) Manama 3845

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs



AFRICA

CHAD-LIBYA:

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Chadian rebels are advancing south of the sixteenth parallel, and have clashed with government forces at Koro Toro. Both the size of the rebel force and the reported clash are unknown. CIA comments informally there are no definitive indications of large-scale Libyan ground or air support for this possible rebel offensive. France has warned Tripoli that movement south of the sixteenth parallel could prompt a French military reaction.

3.3(b)(1)

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MALI-U.S.: Following warnings from police, our embassy in Bamako will close for duration of Qadhafi's impending visit. Additional Malian security will be provided to counter any Libyan threats against Americans. (C) Bamako 7244

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DATE 7/18/18

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
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Morton

BY LV NARA DATE 7/19/88

DEB-40-86
May 1986



Defense Estimative Brief

Chad: Political and Security Trends for the Next Year (C)

Key Judgments (U)

(S) Military and political successes have strengthened President Habre's position domestically and internationally. Habre should further consolidate his rule over the next year, unless he seriously miscalculates his power, and for example, attempts a major military move in the north.

(C) Nevertheless, extreme poverty, ethnic fragmentation and military weakness will leave the country vulnerable to outside meddling and ensure Chad's equilibrium will remain fragile and subject to sudden reverses.

(S/NF) Neither government nor rebel forces will achieve the political or military momentum to radically alter the northern status quo, thus ensuring that Chad will remain divided and occupied. Libya will concentrate on improving its military position in northern Chad while revitalizing Chadian rebel forces. Tripoli will likely attempt to reopen the southern front using increased financial inducements to former southern rebels.

(S/NF) France will maintain its commitment to Ndjamaena but will continue to tailor its action to the level of Libyan activity to minimize costs and risks.

(S/NF) Habre will grow impatient with the status quo and may initiate risky military operations against stronger, better equipped Libyan garrisons. At a minimum, increased patrols and small-scale unconventional operations against rebels are likely in order to prevent a serious morale decline in his forces.

(S/NF) While France will remain the only nation likely to meet the majority of Chad's needs, US assistance will also be critical, making Chad an interesting test case for US-French cooperation in Africa.

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Discussion (U)

1. (S) Political Trends. Military successes in the north, progress in reconciling southern dissidents and reaffirmed foreign support have strengthened considerably President Habre's position domestically and internationally. Barring a series of missteps, perhaps including an ill-conceived military campaign against better-equipped Libyan forces in northern Chad, Habre should be able to continue to transform his image from factional to national leader and further consolidate his control over the next twelve months. Extreme poverty, ethnic fragmentation and military weakness, however, will leave the country vulnerable to outside meddling and ensure Chad's current equilibrium will remain fragile and subject to sudden reverses.

2. (C) Some further progress in consolidating government authority over Chad's critical southern region--where three-quarters of the population and all the country's known resources reside--is likely. Habre's astute policies of negotiation and amnesty for southern dissidents, many of whom are ex-members of Chadian national armies of the sixties and seventies, will likely continue, further reducing dissidence. Although Habre's northern warrior clansmen will still wield most authority throughout the country, government reshuffles and appointments of southerners to visible positions should help appease the war weary and factionalized south. The limited amount of patronage available for dispensing to the reconciled southern guerrillas will remain Habre's chief constraint.

3. (C) In addition to the improving security situation, other factors should help the regime's prospects in the south. A recently established political party, though ineffectual and hobbled by the same divisions plaguing society as a whole, is at least functioning and providing a forum for regional concerns. Additionally, the resumption of sufficient rainfall for cultivation is leading to the return of refugees from neighboring countries, increasing Ndjama's prestige. Southern pragmatism, the appearance of at least rudimentary reconstruction and public services, and the lack of widely appealing southern leaders will contribute to growing acceptance of Habre's regime as the best bet for breaking Chad's cycle of drought, famine, and insurgency.

4. (S/NF) Nonetheless, southern reconciliation will remain a fragile commodity. Various factors could reverse recent gains and lead southerners to resume armed opposition to the central government:

- return of drought and famine conditions,
- decrease in direct French budget subvention which would prevent paying southern ralliers,
- increased Libyan financial inducements to reopen the southern front,
- military defeats in the north.

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While prospects for Habre to consolidate his rule over southern Chad are good for the next year, continuing economic revival will be necessary for the longer term stability of the regime.

5. (S/NF) The Northern Front. Since neither side has the military or political wherewithal to radically alter the status quo in northern Chad, the country will remain divided and occupied for at least the next year. Despite the defeat and weakening of its surrogates, Libya is unlikely to abandon its designs on Ndjamena as long as Qadhafi remains in control in Tripoli. Most likely, Libya will concentrate on improving its military position--especially enhancing its resupply, air defense, and other operational capabilities--and revitalizing Chadian rebel forces while proceeding with the colonization and--for practical purposes--absorption of northern Chad into Libya.

6. (S/NF) With no negotiated settlement in sight, Habre will grow increasingly frustrated with the Libyan occupation of northern Chad. The chances that government forces will attempt risky operations north of the sixteenth parallel are considerable. Habre's pursuit of offensive weaponry underscores his desire to drive the Libyans out of Chad, but the President is unlikely to secure the French tactical air support necessary to retake and hold major Libyan garrisons such as Faya Largeau, the forward operational headquarters of Libyan and rebel forces. Other weaker targets, if captured, would prove difficult to resupply and defend against Libyan armor and air assets. Habre cannot afford serious battle losses, particularly in his key units already woefully shallow in leadership, and a significant defeat would reverse recent gains elsewhere and shake domestic and international confidence in his regime.

7. (S/NF) Even if no significant military action occurs, the threat from Libya will remain high. Libyan encouragement and backing of guerrilla attacks against forward government positions are likely once rebel forces are revitalized. Libya may also refocus on stirring up trouble in the south and attempt terrorist-style operations in Ndjamena. A newly established military presence in western Sudan also provides Tripoli the potential to turn the defender's flanks should the opportunity arise. In any event, the current relative tranquility will not long outlast any future imbalance between French and Libyan forces. Departure of the French or a perceived lessening of support for Habre would result in another round of aggression from the north.

8. (S/NF) France, for its part, will remain the only nation likely to provide the levels of security assistance in the form of materiel, logistics and training needed by government forces as well as the levels of budgetary support necessary to maintain government operations and provide for public services in the south. While France will remain committed to Ndjamena for

various reasons, the French are unlikely to enter into a formal defense agreement with Chad, preferring to reserve maximum flexibility as to how and when they utilize their forces in Chad. While the current French combat deployment to Chad will likely be lengthy, Paris will tailor its actions to the level of Libyan activity in order to minimize costs and risks. Thus, major changes in the military status quo are unlikely although minor changes in the sixteenth parallel demarcation line are possible.

9. (S/NF) Habre's Forces. Chad's armed forces (FANT), whose personality is torn between its desert guerrilla origins and its future as a conventional force, will remain the key to national survival as well as to Habre's tenure in office. While the 20,000-strong FANT should easily maintain the capability to defend against rebel forces, severe structural, logistic and resource constraints will greatly complicate its missions and hamper its development into a cohesive force able to defend fixed sites against larger conventional forces. Reliance on external aid for protection against Libya will continue for the foreseeable future.

10. (S/NF) Habre's dependent relationship to the FANT will serve to perpetuate many of its problems. Despite the need to move toward a more conventional force, Habre is unlikely to make more than cosmetic changes to FANT structure, tactics and strategy. Unwilling to trust leaders whose first allegiance may be to other regional or ethnic goals, he will continue to preserve the dominance of his own clansmen throughout the military. The chain of command will remain informal and largely in the hands of northern tribesmen. The benefits of a recently instituted rank system will be negated by a lack of correlation of rank to position, with northern commanders remaining outside the system. Superior fighting skills and courage of key northern-dominated units will remain the FANT's most important asset. Allowing the military to remain largely an agglomeration of regionally and ethnically-oriented armed factions, however, portends future problems, particularly at times of lessened external threat.

11. (S/NF) Moreover, morale, recently buoyed by combat, will likely decline as the relatively tranquil status quo continues. Harsh conditions of service, disease, supply shortages, and poor discipline and command and control in the field will weaken and degrade capabilities in the absence of military action--another incentive for Habre to mount risky northern operations. At the minimum, increased patrols and small-scale unconventional attacks against rebels will probably be undertaken. Alternatively, Habre will try to build up indigenous training resources. Both officer and NCO schools opened in 1985, but economic constraints will preclude unit training opportunities in-country and make individual specialist training impossible. Habre will likely accept any training opportunity he can find and further battalion-level training in Zaire, particularly for rallied southern commandos, is possible.


12. (S/NF) Implications for the United States. The direct and imminent Libyan threat to Chad ensures US interests in the country will remain high--far beyond the mostly humanitarian concerns normally associated with such a resource-poor landlocked country. Helping Ndjama counter the Libyan threat will require significant and long-term security assistance commitments from Chad's supporters. Chad's severe infrastructure and transportation shortcomings will enormously complicate such assistance efforts. Without considerable maintenance and logistic support, supplied equipment will deteriorate rapidly in Chad's harsh desert climate, a situation made even more difficult by the need to integrate equipment from numerous sources into the FANT's structure.

13. (S/NF) While France will remain the only western nation capable of meeting the majority of Chad's budgetary and security needs, US assistance will also be critical. As such, Chad provides a test case for significant US-French cooperation in Africa which could set a precedent for similar involvement elsewhere. US responsiveness to Chad's needs has not gone unnoticed by other moderate African leaders concerned over French dependability and willingness to meet their future security needs. Chad will remain a firm supporter of the United States in international fora, particularly with regard to any confrontations with Libya, as long as Washington appears responsive to Chad's security requirements.

PREPARED BY:

APPROVED BY:

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South Asia Division
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TAGS: MASS, CD, FR

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Al - Jerry called to alert me to this. Is US sending C-5As in to Ndjamena? Any action on this? JW

SUBJECT: GALAXY MISSION AFP REPORT

REF: NDJAMENA 281529Z FEB 86

1. WE HAVE SEEN AFP STORY REFERRED TO IN REFTEL. IT RAN AT 1354 PARIS TIME, 28 FEBRUARY, ON AFP WIRE. AS NOTED IN REFTEL, SOURCE OF INFORMATION WAS FRENCH MOD. IN RESPONSE TO FOLLOW UP PRESS INQUIRIES, WE CONFIRMED THAT INFORMATION WAS CORRECT BUT SAID ANY ADDITIONAL DETAILS WOULD HAVE TO COME FROM FRENCH.
2. FYI FRENCH TV CARRIED A REPORT DURING THE WEEKEND SHOWING GALAXY LANDING AT NDJAMENA AIRPORT. REPORTER NOTED THAT JOURNALISTS WERE NOT ALLOWED TO APPROACH AIRCRAFT DURING ITS UNLOADING. THRUST OF REPORT WAS THAT ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSES AROUND NDJAMENA HAVE BEEN GREATLY STRENGTHENED, PARTLY THANKS TO U.S. ASSISTANCE. RODGERS

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CMC TOR: 03 MAR 86 13:34
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NLRR M1051 #87605

BY fw NARA DATE 2/28/17

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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Q wants to break stalemate

James McLeod

Col Shroy
combat
expt

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Frank
train
Charles rebel

BY ~~Hand~~ NARA DATE 2/28/17
NIR/MDSI # 87608

SA-a

response to
fr. overflight

Q
Draw
unfald.
sign
note

1st deployment
SU-26
SF-260

known
sent
signal

1980-81

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Test to resolve

(3)

Q wants to move but is worried about the response

Strategy - Just with the rebels - This time he is an old

not ready for major effort - recognizing the fact that SI Chud & others

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

not same presence
as 1 1/2 yrs ago
(not as much)

2 of 4

no signs
air beyond presence

- 2000 troops level
below peak
1984

air presence
way below norms

2 of 4. no fighter
aircraft
in L for
Chad or
Treadon