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Last Updated: 04/18/2024



United States Department of State

*Bureau of Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs*

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 20, 1987

To: EB - Alix Sundquist/Kevin McGuire
Commerce - Ed Shykind
Interior - Marty Smith
NASA - Bob Watson
NOAA - J.R. Spradley
CEA - Steve DeCanio
DPC - Bob Sweet/Vicki Masterman ✓
OPD - Jan Mares

From: OES/ENH - Suzanne Butcher

Subject: Clearance of UNEP Governing Council Position Paper
on Ozone

According to my notes, I have not received your clearance on the position paper for the UNEP Governing Council (but in all the recent flurry of papers on ozone, I may have lost track.) The attached draft is only slightly changed from the draft distributed May 12. If I do not hear from you by Friday, May 22, I will assume you clear.

5/19/87 DRAFT

UNEP GOVERNING COUNCIL

PROTECTION OF THE OZONE LAYER:
CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL

POSITION PAPER

ISSUE

The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer was signed in March 1985, but only the U.S., Canada, USSR and Nordics have ratified. Negotiations on a Protocol to the Convention to control ozone-depleting chemicals have made substantial progress. The mandate of the Working Group needs to be expanded to cover all chemicals with significant ozone-depleting potential.

IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE TO THE U.S.

International cooperation in research, monitoring and data exchange, as provided in the Convention, is essential to protection against depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer. The risks of stratospheric ozone depletion are sufficiently serious to warrant control of known ozone-depleting chemicals, as will be provided in the Protocol. Unilateral U.S. controls would unfairly place the burden on U.S. consumers and industry, while not effectively protecting the ozone layer. The Convention and Protocol provide the opportunity for effective, equitable international measures to address this inescapably global issue.

U.S. POSITION

- (a) The U.S. urges all nations to sign and ratify the Convention.
- (b) The U.S. supports conclusion of an effective protocol at the Diplomatic Conference scheduled for September 1987 in Montreal.
- (c) The Working Group's mandate should be expanded to address not just chlorofluorocarbons but also other substances with significant ozone-depleting potential.

BACKGROUND

Convention

Attachment 1 lists countries which have signed and ratified. Japan, China, India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Indonesia, Nigeria, Malaysia, Singapore, Turkey, Venezuela, Algeria, Australia, and many other important and potentially-important producing and consuming nations have not signed.

Protocol

See attachment 2 (Circular 175) for background on history of negotiations and U.S. position. See attachment 3 for status of negotiations.

The March 1985 Diplomatic Conference which adopted the Convention established the Working Group to negotiate a protocol on control of chlorofluorocarbons. Since then, the important ozone-depleting potential of "Halon" compounds (used principally as fire extinguishers) has become known. The Protocol's controls should cover all the currently-known major ozone-depleting substances, and should provide for additional substances to be included in the future as appropriate in light of scientific, technical and economic developments. We understand that UNEP Executive Director Tolba plans to raise this at the Governing Council.

Among LDC's and newly industrialized countries ("NIC's"), only Argentina and Egypt have participated more than sporadically in the protocol negotiations. Most have not participated at all. Most non-OECD production is now low, but it is important that LDC's and NIC's participate so that growth of LDC/NIC production will not negate cutbacks by current producers.

TALKING POINTS

-- To be effective and fair, all the important ozone-depleting chemicals need to be addressed.

- o Halons are a relatively small part of the problem now, but their use is growing fast and, molecule-for-molecule, they are far more depleting than CFC 11 and 12.
- o Use of CFC 113 as a solvent in electronics is also growing fast.
- o We recognize that some nations consider some uses of some compounds essential. The proposed protocol allows each nation to decide for itself how to balance its use of the various chemicals within an overall limit, based on the ozone-depleting potential of each chemical.

-- All nations have a responsibility to participate in protection of the ozone layer. The protocol is designed to encourage early transition to safer substitutes and emissions controls.

STATEMENT

Mr. Chairman,

Protection of the stratospheric ozone layer is essential for the protection of this and future generations.

Adoption of the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer was a historic first step in addressing this important global issue.

All the participants in the ongoing negotiations on a Protocol to the Convention now recognize that the risks of depletion are sufficiently serious that measures must be taken to control emissions of ozone-depleting chemicals. The United States delegation would like to applaud the progress made by the Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts toward agreement on an effective Protocol.

But all their good work will come to naught if both the Convention and the Protocol do not enter into force. Only eight of the twenty ratifications necessary for the Convention to enter into force have been deposited. My Government urges all nations to accept our common responsibility and to sign, ratify and implement both the Convention and to participate in the negotiations to adopt an effective Protocol in September in Montreal.

FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

See p. 5 of Circular 175 (Attachment 2).

Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer

SIGNED AND RATIFIED (8 of 20 needed for entry into force):

U.S.
Canada
USSR
 Byelorussian SSR
 Ukrainian SSR
Norway
Sweden
Finland

SIGNED:

EEC
 Belgium
 Denmark
 France
 FRG
 Greece
 Italy
 Luxembourg
 Netherlands
 UK
 (not Ireland, Spain, Portugal)

Argentina
Chile
Egypt
Peru
Switzerland
Austria
Mexico
Burkina Faso
Morocco
New Zealand

UNEP GC Position Paper on Ozone Protection

Drafter: OES/ENH:SButcher
4549T 647-9312 5/6/87 revised 5/19/87

Clearance: OES/E:REBenedick
OES/ENH:JRouse
OES/ENR:EParsons
x IO/T:BPowell
L/OES:DKennedy
x E:MBailey
EB:ASundquist
x EPA/OIA:BLong
Commerce:EShykind
x Energy:RBradley
Interior:MSmith
NASA:RWatson
NOAA:JRSpradley
x OMB:RFairweather/DGibbons
x USTR:RReinstein
x OSTP:BBerger
CEA:SDeCanio
x CEQ:CNee
DPC:RSweet
OPD:JMares

ALLIANCE FOR RESPONSIBLE CFC POLICY
1901 N. FT. MYER DRIVE, SUITE 1204
ROSSLYN, VIRGINIA 22209
(703) 841-9363

May 18, 1987

The Honorable George P. Shultz
Secretary
Department of State
Main State Department Bldg.
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Secretary Shultz:

The Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy appreciates the opportunity to provide further input concerning the ongoing negotiations to obtain a protocol to the Vienna Convention for Protection of the Ozone Layer. In view of the recently completed Ad Hoc Working Group meeting, we felt it would be useful to reiterate the Alliance's position concerning the international agreement.

The most critical aspects in the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) negotiations are the broad coverage of chemical compounds, country participation and the establishment of a long-term management process for future decision making. Efforts to focus on attainment of reduction steps in this agreement are scientifically and environmentally unnecessary, economically unwise, and, we believe, imprudent from a negotiation standpoint.

We believe the current use or emission of CFCs for the near future does not present a threat to human health or the environment. The Alliance encourages that steps be taken to curtail additional growth in the production capacity of these compounds until such time as scientific analysis provides better information. Reduction steps, however, should be considered only as part of the future assessment process if deemed to be necessary at that time.

The Alliance has stated, however, that it will not oppose a freeze on the emission of the fully-halogenated compounds so long as it is accompanied by a periodic assessment of the scientific, economic and technological issues as a basis for future steps. An agreement to freeze the emissions of these compounds should be considered an effective environmental protection step. It should also be recognized as one that will impose significant costs on the U.S. economy.

According to a recently completed analysis of the CFC using and producing industries, a freeze on CFCs 11, 12 and 113 could lead to price increases of 300-400% by the mid-1990's. Costs to the economy would be approximately \$1 billion during the period 1988-2000. Annual costs would exceed \$180 million in the mid-1990's. PT.

A freeze will reduce aggregate projected CFC use by approximately 1.1 million metric tons by the year 2000, or the equivalent of about four years of current U.S. CFC production. This curtailment of CFC use over the next decade will create a significant market incentive for users and producers to search for substitute compounds and other environmentally effective processes.

Some EPA officials have acknowledged that a freeze will "eventually" spur the development of substitute compounds. The above economic analysis supports our assertion, however, that this development work will proceed rapidly.

The U.S. industry will have a more definitive answer concerning the availability of substitute compounds in 3-4 years. In our view, no agreement on a reduction step should be signed, assuming a freeze is achievable, until after the next scientific assessment is completed.

To our knowledge, neither EPA nor anyone else has completed an economic or environmental impact analysis of the reduction steps currently being considered at UNEP. Although, we do understand that EPA currently has a study in progress.]

Furthermore, an agreement to reduce CFC use and emissions prior to the known availability of acceptable substitute compounds may actually prove counterproductive. A reduction timetable that does not allow user industries the time to wait for development of appropriate long-term CFC substitutes may leave no other choice but to begin planning based on the currently available, but less desirable substances. Once such a commitment is made on the part of the user industries the desire for both users and producers to pursue development of new compounds will be greatly diminished.

These concerns greatly necessitate the need for a long-term management process for proper decision making.

Page Three

Finally, if we continue to seek reduction steps in the negotiation process without a proper focus on the trade and developing-nations issues, we may lose the opportunity to obtain a fair and reasonable agreement that protects both the environment and U.S. competitiveness in the world market. In our view the U.S. has placed too much emphasis on reduction steps rather than on a well-rounded agreement in the UNEP negotiations.

We urge you to consider these points as you give consideration to the U.S. position and hope to meet with you and your staff soon to discuss our economic analysis.

Sincerely,

Richard Barnett
Chairman

Enclosures

RB:sct

IDENTICAL LETTER SENT TO:

The Honorable George Bush
Vice President of the United States
Old Executive Office Building
17th Street & Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20501

The Honorable Edwin Meese III
Attorney General
Department of Justice
Main Justice Building
10th and Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530

The Honorable Clayton Yeutter
U.S. Trade Representative
600 17th Street, N.W.
Room 209
Washington, D.C. 20506

The Honorable James C. Miller III
Director
Office of Management and Budget
Old Executive Office Building
17th Street & Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20503

The Honorable Lee Thomas
Administrator
Environmental Protection Agency
401 M Street, SW
Suite 1200, West Tower
Washington, D.C. 20460

The Honorable George P. Shultz
Secretary
Department of State
Main State Department Bldg.
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520

The Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger
Secretary
Department of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Page Two

The Honorable Malcolm Baldrige
Secretary
Department of Commerce
Herbert C. Hoover Bldg.
14th Street and Constitution Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20230

The Honorable Elizabeth Hanford Dole
Secretary
Department of Transportation
Nassif Building
400 Seventh Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20590

The Honorable Donald P. Hodel
Secretary
Department of the Interior
Interior Building
18th & C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20240

The Honorable John S. Herrington
Secretary
Department of Energy
Forrestal Building
1000 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20585

ALLIANCE FOR RESPONSIBLE CFC POLICY

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For Immediate Release

For Further Information

Contact: Kevin Fay

(703)-841-9363

Alliance Chairman Says CFC Freeze Will Spur Development
of New Substitutes, Increase CFC Prices, and Cost the
U.S. Economy \$1 Billion

Washington, D.C., May 13, 1987 - The Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy testified in Senate hearings today that a freeze on emissions of CFCs 11, 12, and 113 at 1986 emission levels would increase CFC prices three to four times by the mid-1990's, costing the U.S. economy \$1 billion by the year 2000, and providing a significant market incentive for the development of alternative compounds to the current chlorofluorocarbons.

Alliance Chairman Richard Barnett released the results of the recently completed economic analysis in testimony before the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee. "An effective international agreement that freezes emissions of the fully-halogenated compounds, accompanied by periodic scientific, economic and technological review, is an adequate policy to protect the environment and to spur development of substitute compounds" said Barnett.

"Based on our analysis, CFC prices will rise immediately, more than doubling in price in the first year of a production freeze. In the mid-1990's, CFC prices are estimated to be three to four times higher than current levels, but will be expected to moderate in the late 1990's as new CFC substitutes become available. As a result of higher prices, new substitutes would be developed and new CFC capture and recycle technology would be applied by industry. The CFC price increases we anticipate will be a powerful market incentive and will make CFC substitutes competitive with current CFCs."

The analysis also projected that a freeze would curtail 1.1 million metric tons of projected CFC use by the year 2000, or the equivalent of four years production at current U.S. production rates.

The Alliance testimony supports the argument that draconian emission reduction programs are unnecessary either as part of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) negotiations on an international CFC agreement or as part of a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency program. A rapid phase down of CFC uses, as required by Senate legislation, would impede U.S. industry competitiveness in international markets, encourage greater use of hazardous compounds as CFC substitutes, and render billions of dollars of installed capital equipment useless. "Premature reduction steps could actually increase risks to workers and consumers, increase energy consumption, and ultimately reduce the market demand for the much discussed, but as yet unavailable CFC substitute compounds," added Barnett.

With regard to legislative proposals such as S. 570 and S. 571, that seek to reduce production of CFCs by 95% in six to eight years, the Alliance said that "it is impossible to place precise cost estimates on the impact of such a measure, but the cost would be enormous... As an example, a 95% rollback by 1993, as required in S. 571, could render approximately 18 million auto air conditioners valued at more than \$6 billion useless in 1993."

Capital stocks of installed equipment would become prematurely obsolete for many consumers and CFC-user firms, and this premature obsolescence cost could easily exceed \$10 billion per year.

The Alliance's economic analysis was constructed by Putnam, Hayes and Bartlett, Inc. of Washington, D.C. Copies of the Alliance testimony and economic analysis are available from the Alliance office, (703)-841-9363, 1901 N. Ft. Myer Drive, Suite 1204, Rosslyn, Virginia 22209.

ALLIANCE FOR RESPONSIBLE CFC POLICY
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Statement
of
Richard Barnett
Chairman
Alliance For Responsible CFC Policy

U.S. Senate Environment and Public Works Committee
Subcommittee on Hazardous Wastes and Toxic Substances
Subcommittee on Environmental Protection

May 13, 1987

Good morning Mr. Chairman, Committee Members.

I am Richard Barnett, Chairman of the Alliance For Responsible CFC Policy, and I am also Vice President and General Manager of York International, in York, Pennsylvania, a manufacturer of commercial, applied and residential air conditioning equipment.

On behalf of the members of the Alliance, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear before your subcommittee today to discuss issues concerning ozone depletion and the relationships between domestic and international efforts to arrive at an effective resolution of concerns for depletion of the earth's ozone layer and the need for development of compounds to take the place of current chemical compounds such as the fully-halogenated chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs).

As you know, in September of 1986, the Alliance issued a policy statement outlining seven points necessary for an effective and responsible policy with regard to CFCs. The statement was based on our assessment that the current use and emission of CFCs presented no known threat to health and the environment, but that uncontrolled growth in the use and emissions of these compounds should not be encouraged absent better scientific understanding.

The Alliance's policy statement then outlined the steps necessary to address the ozone depletion issue from the public policy perspective, namely:

- the negotiation of an international agreement on fully-halogenated CFC production capacity;
- research and development of CFC emission control technologies and processes;
- research and development of alternatives to the fully-halogenated compounds;
- avoidance of unilateral regulatory programs in the United States; and
- continued aggressive assessment of this complex scientific issue.

The Alliance continues to believe that this policy is sensible from the perspective of both environmental protection and potential economic impact of the U.S. economy. You will note in the Alliance's attached statement given at the most recent UNEP negotiating session, that the Alliance has also stated it will accept an emissions freeze at or near current levels for the fully-halogenated compounds so long as the international agreement provides for periodic scientific, economic, and technological review. The policy outlined we believe will most efficiently bring about the development of substitute compounds.

In your letter of request for testimony, you have raised several points and questions concerning these issues and their relation to the eventual development of substitutes for the current CFC compounds. The comments below and attached materials are provided in response to these points.

First, with regard to the status of the international negotiations, I feel it necessary to reiterate our view that the international agreement is the only means of developing an environmentally effective program without placing U.S. industries at a further competitive disadvantage. Domestic industries are already disadvantaged in the current negotiations. An emissions freeze would be much less burdensome to European and Japanese industries since the U.S. unilaterally acted to control aerosol uses of CFCs without gaining similar actions worldwide. Aerosol uses continue to be the single largest use of CFCs outside the United States.

A quick review of recent U.S. import and export data reveals that as much as 2/3 of U.S. trade imports and exports may use or rely on CFCs in one way or another. A unilateral program, with or without trade restrictions, that imposes greater costs on U.S. industries will place our industries at an international competitive disadvantage. If air conditioning, which currently accounts for more than \$1 billion in exports, becomes less energy efficient because of a unilateral regulatory measure, then demand for those products is likely to fall.

The government's efforts in this area should be to reach an effective international agreement that minimizes the costs to our economy but also promotes the development of substitute compounds. Attached to this testimony is an outline of what factors we consider to be important in this negotiation process.

Second, we believe that an effective international agreement that freezes emissions of the fully-halogenated compounds, accompanied by periodic scientific, economic and technological review, is an adequate policy to protect the environment and to spur development of substitute compounds. Our analysis indicates that a weighted production freeze on CFCs 11, 12, and 113 at 1986 levels would cost the economy approximately \$1 billion during the period 1988-2000, primarily due to increases in CFC prices. Annual costs would exceed \$180 million in the mid-1990's.

Based on our analysis, CFC prices will rise immediately, more than doubling in price in the first year of a production freeze. In the mid-1990s, CFC prices are estimated to be three to four times higher than current levels but will be expected to moderate in the late 1990s as new CFC substitutes become available. As a result of higher prices, new substitutes would be developed and new CFC capture and recycle technology would be applied by industry. The CFC price increases we anticipate will be a powerful market incentive and will make CFC substitutes competitive with current CFCs.

Also, the freeze is expected to curtail 1.1 million metric tons of projected CFC use by the year 2000, or the equivalent of 4 years production at current U.S. production rates.

This substantial unmet market will provide a significant stimulus for the development of substitute CFCs or other alternative compounds.

It should also be noted that a freeze at 1986 levels will actually be a reduction step if current world growth patterns are followed and implementation occurs between 1988 and 1990.

With regard to proposals in Senate bills S. 570 and S. 571 to initiate a 95 percent production rollback, it is impossible to place precise cost estimates on the impact of such a measure but the cost would be enormous. Currently 37 percent of CFC -11 and -12 production is used to service installed equipment. If CFCs are not available, capitol stocks of installed equipment would become prematurely obsolete for many consumers and CFC-user firms.

As an example, fully-halogenated compounds are currently used to operate 100 million home refrigerators and 91 million auto air conditioners. A 95% rollback by 1993, as required in S. 571, could render approximately 18 million auto air conditioners valued at more than \$6 billion useless in 1993. In subsequent years similar costs might be incurred.

Such a draconian measure as that contemplated by the Senate bills could actually bring on these undesirable impacts more quickly than the schedule contemplates as CFC producers lose economies of scale to operate their facilities and decide to leave the business entirely.

The massive consumer dissatisfaction with the effects of such a program and economic costs to society could threaten the viability of our ozone protection efforts.

Third, efforts internationally or domestically, to require short-term reduction steps are ill-advised. Although many CFC user industries are currently examining what can be done to reduce emissions in the short-term, it is not possible for the affected industries to produce estimates of what is achievable or what the potential economic impact of such CFC reduction requirements may be.

Reduction measures, particularly in the U.S. where we have unilaterally eliminated aerosol uses, that occur prior to the commercial availability of acceptable substitute compounds could lead user industries to choose currently available, but less desirable alternatives that are either more toxic, are carcinogenic, flammable, or less energy-efficient than the CFCs being used today. Premature reduction steps could actually increase risks to workers and consumers, increase energy consumption, and ultimately reduce the market demand for the much discussed but as yet unavailable CFC substitute compounds.

Industries that shift to currently available, but less desirable, substances are not likely to be interested in shifting again to the new compounds and thereby incurring redesign costs twice. Further, neither the Environmental Protection Agency nor anyone else has done analysis of the environmental or economic impact of adopting such restrictions. The Alliance believes it is unwise and unnecessary to negotiate any reduction measures as part of the current international negotiations. Such measures should be considered as part of the periodic assessment process we have advocated in the international agreement.

Fourth, both the international and domestic ozone protection efforts should focus only on the fully-halogenated compounds (CFCs 11,12,113,114, and 115) and the halons. Other compounds, such as CFC-22, that have little or no ozone depletion potential should be considered part of the solution and not part of the problem.

The international agreement should incorporate a management process that allows for the consideration and inclusion of additional compounds as is deemed necessary scientifically.

Finally, let me again emphasize that the international agreement is the only means of developing a program that is environmentally effective and minimizes economic disadvantages to U.S. industries. The international agreement should include effective trade restrictions for bulk chemicals and products containing

CFCs from non-signatory nations. Trade restrictions must be designed so they can protect domestic manufacturers by effective and vigorous enforcements of these restrictions.

In our view, a unilateral CFC program in the United States that attempts to govern the world economy through trade sanctions will only serve to further isolate U.S. industries in the world market. Such an effort should be discouraged.

The focus of the U.S. government's efforts should be to achieve a simple, fair, effective and enforceable international agreement with broad participation among the world community. The U.S. ozone protection program should be consistent with and no more stringent than the international agreement. It is in this manner that U.S. technological know how will provide for protection of our environment and ensure that we remain competitive in the world marketplace at the same time.

Thank you, I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

QUENTIN N. BURDICK, NORTH DAKOTA, CHAIRMAN

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PETER D. PROWITT, STAFF DIRECTOR
BAILEY GUARD, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

for Staff *A.A.* *Autism* *Blake - CC* *EPA* *Documents*
United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-8175

May 7, 1987

Honorable James C. Miller III
Director
Office of Management and
Budget
Old Executive Office Building
Room 252
17th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20503

Dear Dr. Miller:

This is to request a report of all communications to or from your staff within the last six months seeking to influence either the on-going rule-making at the Environmental Protection Agency or the conduct of the international negotiations with respect to the control of chlorofluorocarbons and other ozone-depleting substances.

On May 17, 1986, the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia ordered the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to sign, not later than May 1, 1987 "a Federal Register notice proposing regulatory action on CFCs or presenting a basis for a proposed decision to take no action." It is my understanding that since that time, the staff of the Environmental Protection Agency has been preparing a regulatory proposal. Concurrently, and in collaboration with other agencies of the Executive Branch, EPA staff and the Administrator personally, developed the United States position for the Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer.

In the international negotiations, the United States enjoyed considerable success, reportedly to the surprise of the manufacturers and users of CFC's and other ozone-depleting substances. Recently, there have been numerous press reports that the industry, and others representing industry interests, were seeking to, according to one account, "pull the U.S. back." There have been rumors and reports of industry groups, Executive Branch agencies, and others seeking to influence either the negotiations or the regulations or both.

Although it is my understanding that such attempts are not, in and of themselves, a violation of the law, it is also my understanding that these communications must be made publicly known through docketing or otherwise. Quite aside from the requirements of the law, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency has assured the Congress that such decisions would be made in a "fishbowl". OMB executives have committed to

maintaining records of communications received as well as those transitted to other agencies with respect to influencing environmental regulatory decisions.

Therefore, I would appreciate a report of all communications, whether written or oral, and meetings which were related to either the development of Federal regulation of CFC's or the United States negotiating position prior to the April 27-30, 1987 session in Geneva, Switzerland. The report should encompass communications between your staff and representatives of the users of CFC's; producers of CFC's; and any other persons whose communications are considered to be ex parte communications when made in the context of rulemaking or other proceedings. Such individuals would include, but not be limited to, representatives of environmental organizations, non-profit groups, and other branches of government.

It is my understanding that the member of your staff most actively and directly involved in these matters is Dave Gibbons.

For each of these individuals, I would appreciate knowing the date on which meetings were held, the attendees, their affiliations, and the subject matter which was discussed. Comparable information should be provided with respect to telephone conversations and written materials. In all cases in which either the development of regulations or the United States negotiating position were discussed, please state what position was being advocated by each party and, in any cases in which written materials were circulated, provide copies. This request is not limited to those cases in which factual information was conveyed, but specifically includes those in which opinions or policies were urged. It also includes any documents or other materials which are effectively equivalent to policies, such as oral or written instructions to those responsible for developing, implementing, or negotiating policy.

I recognize that this is an unusual request. But it has been widely reported and rumored that the United States position on further regulation of CFC's has been the subject of extraordinary pressure from industry groups and their spokesmen. It has also been reported and rumored that in response to these pressures the United States position has changed, not as a result of negotiations with other nations, but because of these industry arguments. Whatever any individual's view on the need for the regulation of CFC's or other substances may be, the arguments should be made and the merits debated in public. That is especially true in circumstances such as this where the global environment is at risk.

Because hearings on this subject have been scheduled for May 12, 13, 14, I would appreciate receiving your reply by not later than close of business of May 12, 1987.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Robert T. Stafford". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, sweeping initial "R".

Robert T. Stafford
Ranking Minority Member

RTS:cmp

DRAFT MEMORANDUM FROM NANCY RISQUE

Stratospheric Ozone Issue Development
April 30, 1987

ISSUE: What should be the Administration position regarding testimony before Senator Baucus' Subcommittee on Hazardous Waste and Toxic Substances on stratospheric ozone on May 13?

BACKGROUND: Senator Baucus telexed the following people to appear for hearings on stratospheric ozone: Secretary Don Hodel of Interior, Lee Thomas of EPA, Jim Miller of OMB, John Negroponte of State, Tony Calio of NOAA, and Jan Mares of OPD. They are to testify on:

- * the status of international negotiations on protection of the ozone layer,
- * the U.S. position for these negotiations,
- * the role of their agency in the conduct of said negotiations,
- * their role in development and assessment of the U.S. position.

The U.S. position was developed in November, 1986 by the State Department and EPA, and received inter-agency approval through a Circular 175 process coordinated by the State Department. This position has been used by the U.S. delegation in the three international negotiations toward a protocol for the control of ozone-depleting chemicals that have been held in December 1986 (Geneva), in February 1987 (Vienna), and in April 1987 (Geneva).

At the request of Justice, Interior, Commerce, OMB and OPD, a Domestic Policy Council Working Group recommended on March 30, 1987 that this issue be considered by the Council. The stratospheric ozone issue had been discussed previously by the Working Group at a March 2, 1987 meeting. Lee Thomas has agreed to present the issue to the DPC, and the Chairman Pro Tempore, Ed Meese, has concurred that the issue should be considered by the Council.

DISCUSSION: Now that this issue has been put on the Council agenda, it should fall under the protection of the President's policy development process. This could be said to have officially occurred on March 2, 1987 when the Working Group first discussed the topic. Looking ahead, it will be considered again by the Council Working Group next week, on May 6, and it is tentatively scheduled for a DPC planning meeting (without the President) on May 20. Depending upon the outcome of that meeting, the issue will be presented to the President later in May or in early June for his consideration and decision.

The President's decision, if he is asked to make one, would likely cover the extent of reductions in emissions of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), as well as the U.S. trade position with respect to CFCs. The President's decision would establish the framework for international and domestic action.

Regarding Senator Baucus' hearings, Administration officials who are called to testify should be free to describe the policy development apparatus and their role in the process. They should not discuss the content of issues under consideration by the Council.

Since the issue was the subject of an inter-agency review process prior to White House involvement, Administration representatives asked to answer questions about the issue prior to March 2, 1987. Again, officials may not discuss any aspects of the stratospheric ozone issue that are under consideration by the Council.

ALLIANCE FOR RESPONSIBLE CFC POLICY
1901 N. FT. MYER DRIVE, SUITE 1204
ROSSLYN, VIRGINIA 22209
(703) 841-9363

April 21, 1987


Mr. Jan W. Mares
Senior Policy Analyst
Office of Policy Development
472 Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Jan:

You have asked for our comments concerning the importance of eight criteria relating to the negotiation of an international agreement on chlorofluorocarbons. The attached document summarizes our views and stresses the importance of obtaining broader coverage of compounds and country participation.

An agreement that is too stringent initially could discourage participation thereby diminishing the effectiveness of the international agreement. Please contact us if you have questions regarding the enclosure.

Sincerely,



Kevin J. Fay

Enclosure

KJF:sct

FACTORS RELATING TO UNEP NEGOTIATIONS ON A CFC PROTOCOL

You have asked for our comments concerning the priority of the eight factors relating to the international negotiations of a protocol. Although some of the listed factors are related or have stages, the following comments reflect our views.

1. Coverage
2. Country Coverage
3. Timing
4. Trade
5. Scientific Review
6. Credit for Prior Reductions
7. Stringency
8. Developing Countries

Coverage: 11, 12, 113, 114, 115, 1301, 1211, Chlorinated Solvents

The Alliance supports the negotiation of an agreement covering all the fully-halogenated compounds (CFCs 11, 12, 113, 114, and 115), and agrees that the Halons (1301 and 1211) should also be covered. The chlorinated solvents fall into the category of CFC -22 as far as their depletion potential is concerned, and therefore, should not be covered at this time. The protocol should, however, provide an expedited mechanism to add or delete additional substances in future years as warranted by scientific and economic assessment.

Because of concerns by Japan and the European Economic Community (EC) it may be difficult to reach agreement on a production freeze on CFC 113 as it is critical to their electronics industries (as is the case in the United States). For purposes of the negotiation, an agreement to cap production capacity of CFC 113 (and the Halons) would be a significant accomplishment. (When the Japanese became concerned after the December negotiating session that -113 might be covered, they immediately announced proposed expansion of their production capacity). A production capacity agreement on 113 and the Halons would be a sufficient short-term step until the first scientific and economic assessment and has precedent in both the EC and Japan as they adopted capacity caps on -11 and -12 in the early part of this decade.

It is not desirable at this time to encourage expansion of production capacity of any of these substances in either developed or developing nations.

Country Coverage

As broad a coverage of countries as possible should be the goal of the negotiations. From a practical standpoint, however, it is most important to obtain the participation of the major CFC producer blocs (U.S., E.C., Canada, CMEA and Japan) and to encourage participation of developing nations who are seeking rapid industrial development or are rapidly growing in international trade (China, Korea, Mexico, etc.)

Initially, the emphasis should be to gain as signatories the current CFC producer nations and to discourage construction of additional production capacity for the fully-halogenated CFCs. Present world production capacity is likely to be sufficient until the first scientific assessment. (An effort should also be made to get countries who have signed the Vienna Convention to expedite their ratification process).

Timing

Timing is related to all of the other issues. Practically speaking, it will take 2-3 years for the protocol to take effect. The first step (an emissions freeze at or near current levels) should occur within a year of the official effective date. (Although the Alliance believes there is room for some moderate growth in the use of these fully-halogenated compounds, we will not oppose a short-term agreement on an emissions freeze so long as it is accompanied by a periodic review.) Additional steps should not occur prior to the first scientific, economic and technological assessment. No affirmative reduction agreement should be agreed to at this time. It may be desirable, however, to agree to a specific timetable for this review.

With regard to a Final Target, it is impossible to suggest a period of years given the current lack of understanding of the availability of CFC substitutes or emissions control technologies or without any better understanding of the scientific necessity of additional controls.

It is more appropriate to agree to a management process that provides for continuing periodic review, assessment, and decisionsmaking (e.g., every 3-5 years).

Trade

Given current difficulties with U.S. international trade activities and concomitant enforcement issues, it is important to establish trade rules that are easily enforceable and can give participating nations confidence and assurances of fairness. Simplicity is key. (Adequate safeguards concerning U.S. trade should also be worked out in detail among U.S. industry and government officials.)

Initially, the trade articles should cover only the shipment of bulk chemicals and it should restrict shipments to non-signatories. A monitoring system should be established to locate all production sites, the number is relatively small, and discourage the construction of new production capacity.

If covering bulk chemicals proves adequate, then it should be unnecessary to attempt to restrict trade in products containing CFCs or manufactured with CFCs. As exhibit I shows, we estimate that approximately 2/3 of the U.S exports and imports may use or rely on CFCs in one way or another. Enforcement of trade restrictions on these products would be a potential administrative nightmare, inviting certain retaliatory measures from some countries, damaging the ability of U.S. companies attempting to compete in world markets, and discouraging participation in the overriding environmental protection effort.

At this time, only the coverage and restriction of trade in bulk chemicals offers any assurances of enforceability and compliance by all countries.

Scientific Review

A scientific review and management process is absolutely essential to the effective resolution of this issue from an environmental and economic perspective, particularly in light of the range of scientific views and uncertainties, and the diversity of economic issues and conditions that must be considered.

The Alliance recommends that the protocol establish a date certain for the first scheduled assessment of scientific, economic and technological information. This first assessment should occur no earlier than 1990 and no later than 1992. The first assessment should also be the decision point for the determination of any voluntary targets consistent with scientific necessity and economic and technological feasibility.

Credit for Prior Reductions

It would be very desirable to receive credit for prior reductions, but probably infeasible at least in the first agreement. U.S. production is today roughly equivalent to its 1974 peak (if CFC 113 figures are included) and we are the largest per capita user of the compounds in the world. The U.S. dismantled 35% of its CFC 11 and 12 production capacity in the 1970's. It is not likely to be an attractive argument with the developing nations that we should get credit for our earlier unilateral action.

A preferred course would be to reach agreement on a freeze and not agree to any affirmative reduction measures at this time. Political and economic pressures will ultimately reduce the usage of CFCs as aerosol propellants in the EC and Japan over the next ten years.

Finally, the U.S. attempting to get credit for its unilateral aerosol ban inevitably leads to a discussion of the "essentiality" of uses. We would prefer that the marketplace make that determination.

The issue could be revisited at the time of the first science assessment and review.

Stringency

The Alliance does not believe that the current use or emissions of CFCs presents an imminent threat to human, health or the environment but does believe that it is responsible to reduce emissions of the fully-halogenated compounds where economically and technologically feasible. It is, therefore, more important to reach an international agreement that has broad coverage of chemicals and participation of developed and developing nations.

It is not possible for the industry to say at this time what is economically or technologically feasible and cost-effective to reduce emissions or to utilize acceptable CFC substitutes. Absent the short-term scientific necessity, it is more prudent to agree to this step, if necessary, in a few years after the effort to maximize chemical coverage and country participation is completed. An agreement that threatens short-term reductions may discourage country participation and encourage developing nations to seek some assured production capability. This would be counterproductive to our overall efforts.

The ultimate goal should be based on better scientific understanding and awareness of the availability of alternative technologies or chemical substitutes. Establishment of an ultimate goal in this initial agreement would not make economic sense in light of the current uncertainties for substitutes, and could discourage broad participation.

Developing Countries

The developing nations are projected to have significant growth in the coming decades, but as a percentage of current CFC utilization we do not consider them to be a significant problem for the next 5-10 years. The goal in the international agreement should be to allow these nations to have the technologies made possible by CFCs without encouraging them to construct their own production capacity.

In order to accomplish this goal, some concessions for developing nations should be allowed with the understanding that new technologies and substitute chemical formulations will be available as soon as possible.

This argues for establishing some allowance for developing nations and is a further argument in support of the adjusted production formula (production + imports - exports) where exports to participating developing nations could be allowed and not counted against a current producer nations emissions/production cap.

It is not desirable that concessions for developing nations be continued indefinitely, however, and the issue question should be revisited at the time of the first assessment and review.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

U.S.G. Position for
UNEP Ozone Protocol Negotiations
Third Session: April 27-30, Geneva

I. Controls

A. First Step

1. Freeze "emissions" at 1986 levels.
 - o include CFC 11, 12, 113, 114, 115 and Halons 1211, 1301.
 - o scheduled 0-2 years after entry into force
2. 20% Reduction
 - o include CFC 11, 12, 113
 - o scheduled 2-4 years after entry into force
 - o subject to amendment by contracting parties on consideration of the scientific, technical and economic assessments*
3. Voluntary freeze at 1986 levels and voluntary ban on (non-essential) aerosols within 1 year after entry into force.

B. Second Step

- o [20-50%] reduction
- o include CFC 11, 12, 113 *confirmation*
- o within 8-10 years after entry into force
- o subject to ~~continuation~~ by contracting parties on consideration of the scientific, technical and economic assessments*

C. Third Step

- o [20-95%] reduction
- o include CFC 11, 12, 113 *confirmation*
- o within 14-16 years after entry into force
- o subject to approval of contracting parties on consideration of the scientific, technical and economic assessments*

II. Scientific Assessment

- o Next major review in 1990, then every 4 years thereafter; minor reviews every 2 years; technical and economic assessments to be conducted in parallel with scientific assessments.

* Process for consideration by contracting parties to be determined.

DECLASSIFIED

~~Security State Waiver~~ 11/6/15

* *all* NARADATE 1/25/2017

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TIMETABLE

Year after entry into force	Calendar year	Action
0	1988	Entry into force
1	1989	Freeze at 1986 levels: CFC 11, 12, 113, 114, 115 and Halons 1211, 1301
2	1990	Major Review (scientific, economic & technical); consider <u>veto</u> of 20% reduction.
3	1991	20% reduction of CFC 11, 12, 113
4	1992	
5	1993	
6	1994	Major Review; consider <u>approval</u> of (20-50%) reduction.
7	1995	
8	1996	[20-50%] Reduction
9	1997	
10	1998	Major Review
11	1999	
12	2000	
13	2001	
14	2002	Major Review; consider <u>approval</u> of (20-95%) reduction.
15	2003	
16	2004	[20-95%] Reduction
17	2005	
18	2006	Major Review

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I. Controls

Voluntary freeze at 1986 levels and voluntary ban on (non-essential) aerosols within 1 year after entry into force.

A. First Step

1. Freeze "emissions" at 1986 levels.
 - o include CFC 11, 12, 113, 114, 115 and Halons 1211, 1301.
 - o scheduled 0-2 years after entry into force
2. 20% Reduction
 - o include CFC 11, 12, 113
 - o scheduled 2-4 years after entry into force
 - o subject to amendment by contracting parties on consideration of the scientific, technical and economic assessments*

B. Second Step

- o [20-50%] reduction
- o include CFC 11, 12, 113
- o within 8-10 years after entry into force
- o subject to confirmation by contracting parties on consideration of the scientific, technical and economic assessments*

C. Third Step

- o [20-95%] reduction
- o include CFC 11, 12, 113
- o within 14-16 years after entry into force
- o subject to confirmation of contracting parties on consideration of the scientific, technical and economic assessments*

II. Scientific Assessment

- o Next major review in 1990, then every 4 years thereafter; minor reviews every 2 years; technical and economic assessments to be conducted in parallel with scientific assessments.

* Process for consideration by contracting parties to be determined.

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Authority State Waiver 11/6/15
7. d/b MARADATE 1/25/2017

dlb
1/25/2017

U.S. POSITION PAPER
UNEP OZONE LAYER PROTOCOL NEGOTIATIONS
THIRD SESSION: APRIL 27 - 30, 1987
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

I. Background:

This is the third round of resumed negotiations under UNEP auspices on a protocol to control chemicals which deplete stratospheric ozone.

In the first session (December 1986) there was general agreement on the need for international measures to control emissions of ozone-depleting chemicals. However, differences remained over the scope, stringency, and timing of the controls, and other key issues (e.g., what to control, how to allocate national limits). The U.S. assumed a leadership role at this session, maintaining that the risk to the ozone layer warranted a scheduled phase-down of emissions of the major ozone-depleting chemicals. We also emphasized that the protocol should provide for periodic assessment and possible adjustment of the control measures, based on a periodic review of advances in scientific/technical knowledge.

In the second session (February 1987), and in discussions with the EC and other key participants since then, substantial progress has been made toward acceptance of the U.S. freeze-reduction approach. Other proposals which would seriously disadvantage the U.S. (e.g., proposals to allocate emissions limits on the basis of population and GNP) have been deflected. In addition, the EC, Japan, and possibly the USSR appear to be moving toward broadening coverage beyond CFCs 11 and 12, and have accepted the need for further reduction steps beyond the freeze. U.S. proposals for trade provisions and review mechanisms have also met with general agreement.

The third session is intended by the UNEP organizers and most other participants to resolve remaining issues, particularly the reduction process and schedule.

I. Overall Position:

The general objectives for the USG continue to be as delineated in the Circular 175 of November 28, 1986:

- A. A near-term freeze on the combined emissions of the most ozone-depleting substances;
- B. A long-term scheduled reduction of emissions of these chemicals down to the point of eliminating emissions from all but limited uses for which no substitutes are commercially available (such reduction could be as much as 95%), subject to C; and

- C. Periodic review of the protocol provisions based upon regular assessment of the science. The review could remove or add chemicals, or change the schedule or the emission reduction target.

III. Objectives for this Session:

- A. Keep the negotiations focused on elaborating a protocol based on the U.S. freeze-reduction approach (now included in the Chairman's text), and resist efforts to resurrect other options (e.g., Canadian, Soviet).
- B. Continue to press for as broad a coverage as possible of potentially major ozone-depleters (CFC 11, 12, 113, 114, 115, Halons 1211 and 1301).
- C. Focus attention on defining a meaningful initial reduction step beyond a freeze (of sufficient magnitude to induce technological innovation);
- D. Try to narrow stringency and timing ranges in the Chair's control article text.
- D. Maintain U.S. position on need for longer-term phasedown, consistent with overall negotiating goals (section II above).
- E. ~~Maintain and~~ elaborate earlier U.S. positions on trade and scientific assessment, which have received strong support.
- F. Strive for progress on the LDC issue, emphasizing an approach that will encourage LDCs to join but does not undercut our long-range environmental objectives.
- G. Work toward a mix of protocol elements which encourages as many producer and user countries as possible to become Parties (including Eastern Bloc countries).

IV. Positions on Specific Topics:

- A. Scope of Chemical Coverage: The delegation should strive to have all the major potential ozone depleters (i.e., CFC 11, 12, 113, 114, 115, halon 1211 and 1301) subject to the control article reduction schedule. However, after the freeze, the delegation may consider putting 114, 115, and/or the halons under a different control regime, as a means of encouraging broader country participation or achieving other key U.S. objectives.

B. Stringency and Timing:

1. Freeze: Virtually all delegations have accepted that the first step should be a freeze at 1986 levels, and the delegation should continue to support this. The delegation should also strongly support a timing of one year after entry into force for the freeze (the EC proposal calls for a timing of 2 years after entry into force). The delegation should also explore the possibility of having the freeze take effect prior to entry into force of the protocol via, e.g., a voluntary commitment in a Diplomatic Conference resolution.

2. Reduction Schedule: The Chair's text calls for a 10-50% reduction (in brackets) for the second phase, in an unspecified period of time. The EC's opening position is for a 20% reduction within six years after entry into force, with an "automatic" trigger -- i.e., it would go into effect unless amended by a two-thirds vote of the Parties.

Within the context of the Circular 175 authority, the delegation should continue to explore various combinations of reduction schedules, ranging between the EC proposal and the U.S. proposed protocol text. The delegation should not at this meeting definitively agree to specific terms, but rather aim for a bracketed text, consistent with the Circular 175 authority, for further review in Washington.

C. Calculation of emissions: The delegation should continue to seek a formula to use as the basis for control which: does not undercut the control measures, encourages innovative practices and technologies in support of those measures, maximizes trade freedom among parties, does not put the U.S. at a competitive disadvantage vis a vis other parties, and encourages the broadest participation possible.

Thus, the delegation should continue to pursue for this session the "adjusted production" formula (P + I - E - D). However, if agreement on this is not possible, and there appears to be no movement (by the EC in particular) the delegation may explore other formulas, on an ad referendum basis, which meet the above criteria.

If there is significant opposition to including "-D" (amount destroyed) in the initial base year calculation, the delegation may discuss letting $D = 0$ for the first 1-3 years after entry into force of the protocol. The delegation should reserve its position on whether "permanently encapsulated" should be counted in this term.

D. Trade between Parties and Non-Parties: The delegation should actively support trade provisions which: (a)

protect countries party to the protocol from being put at a competitive disadvantage vis a vis non-parties; (b) create an incentive for non-parties to join the protocol; and (c) discourage the movement of production to non-parties.

Therefore, the delegation should continue to support the trade article developed at the last session, and resist attempts to weaken it. The delegation should seek the drafting improvements recommended by the interagency trade issues group (see attached paper).

- E. Developing Countries: The delegation should continue to be open to an "LDC" provision, in order to encourage broader membership in the protocol. However, the delegation should stress that any form of exemption must not significantly undermine the environmental goals of the protocol.
- F. Scientific Assessment: The delegation should insist that scientific assessment be an integral part of the protocol. The delegation should support having a legal drafting group take the various texts for assessment mechanisms now on the table, and draft a composite text which provides for possible adjustment of the controls based on regular and emergency review of scientific, technical, and economic information. The report of the scientific sub-group from the last session, and the text of Article IV of the U.S. proposed text (tabled at first session, and largely accepted by the EC), should be used as a focus for this exercise.

Regarding timing of the reviews, the delegation should support having regular CCOL-level reviews at least every two years, a major review (like the NASA/NOAA/WMO/UNEP et al assessment) at least every four years, and emergency reviews when called for by the Parties.

- G. Entry into Force provisions: The draft protocol text (Article XII) calls for entry into force thirty days after deposit of nine instruments of ratification (etc.). At the first session, the USSR opposed the 9/30 format in favor of an 11/90 requirement. If this continues to be a major obstacle to Soviet concurrence on this article, the delegation may accept a 10/60 or 11/90 format.

The delegation should also seek to amend this article so as to ensure that the protocol enters into force only when a sufficient number of the major producer/user countries have deposited instruments of ratification (etc.). Thus, the delegation should propose that this article specify that of the number of instruments required for entry into force:

(a) 50% of total world consumption or production is represented; or

(b) a substantial majority (e.g. 75%) be from countries with an adjusted production (or whatever formula is agreed to) greater than a certain level (the delegation would agree to propose a specific value for this at a subsequent session).

The delegation should also seek to amend this article so as to avoid creating an incentive for some countries to delay entry into the protocol, while reaping the global environmental benefits of reductions by countries which became Parties at the outset. To this end, the delegation should seek to add the following at the end of paragraph 3 of this article:

"Any such Party shall assume all applicable obligations then in effect for all other Parties."

H. Other Legal/Institutional issues: The delegation should seek drafting improvements consistent with the substantive elements of U.S. position.

V. Other Issues:

- A. Future Session: In the event that it is not possible to complete work on the protocol at this session (which is likely) the delegation should support UNEP convening a fourth session in early July.
- B. Tactics: No members of the delegation shall advocate or indicate support for substantial negotiating element not in this position paper. All members of the delegation are required to obtain approval from the head of delegation before discussing with any person outside the delegation any fall-back position in this position paper.
- C. Press: All press inquiries shall be referred to the head or alternate head of delegation, or their designee.
- D. Budgetary Commitments: The delegation should not commit the USG to any activity which cannot be funded out of current appropriations.

Drafted by:

Jim Losey - EPA/OIA (382-4894)
Suzanne Butcher - State/OES (647-9312)
4/22/87

Clearances:

State:	Commerce:	CEQ:
EPA:	USDA:	OMB:
NASA:	Interior:	CEA:
NOAA:	DOD:	OPD:
USTR:	Justice:	OSTP:
DOE:	Treasury:	

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

Wed
2:00 5806
Climate
Friday 1:00pm

Thursday
3:30pm

U.S. Negotiating Strategy for
UNEP Ozone Protocol Negotiations
Third Session: April 27-30, Geneva

I. Controls

A. First Step

1. Freeze "emissions" at 1986 levels.

- o include all CFCs and Halons
- o automatic 0-2 years after entry into force

0-20

2. 20% Reduction

- o include CFC 11, 12, 113
- o automatic 2-4 years after entry into force

B. Second Step

20-50

- o ~~"up to"~~ 50% reduction, subject to science
- o include CFC 11, 12, 113
- o within 8-10 years after entry into force

} and other
tech &
compliance
info?
(ie. subst's
& LDC's.)

C. Third Step

50-95

- o "up to" 95% reduction, subject to science
- o include CFC 11, 12, 113
- o within 14-16 years after entry into force

II. General Provisions

- o Emissions. Define "emissions" as weighted "adjusted production" (P+I-E-D) (but consider other alternatives.)
- o Country Coverage. All major producing/using countries must sign; encourage potential major producers/users (e.g., China, India) to sign; allow (?) LDC's to join (but not if they get an emissions allowance)
- o Scientific Assessment. Next major review 4-6 years after entry into force, then every 6 years thereafter; minor reviews every 2 years (also include technical and economic assessments)
- o Trade Aspects. Support provisions to encourage compliance with controls.

0 Freeze at 1986 CFC 11, 12, 113, 114,115 and Halons
2 20% Reduction of CFC 11, 12, 113
4 Major Science Review
6
8 "Up to" 50% Reduction of CFC 11, 12, 113 Based
on Science
10 Major Science Review
12
14 "Up to" 95% Reduction of CFC 11, 12, 113 Based on
Science
16 Major Science Review

104

SUMMARY OF MOST-STUDIED SCENARIO FOR FUTURE EMISSIONS & THE IMPLICATIONS FOR OZONE CHANGE

DLA (17 APR 87)

● SCENARIO:


ASSUMPTIONS - * METHANE (CH₄) 1% / YR
 * NITROUS OXIDE (N₂O) 0.25% / YR
 CARBON DIOXIDE (CO₂) ~0.5-0.7% / YR (DOE ESTIMATE)

& WITH THIS: (A) CFC 11 & 12 - EMISSIONS FIXED AT 1980 LEVELS

- ** { (B) CFC 11 & 12 - 1 1/2% / YR
 (C) CFC 11 & 12 - 3% / YR

NOTES: * CURRENT GROWTH RATES
 ** THESE RATE ARE REASONABLE, SINCE THE AVERAGE GROWTH RATE FROM 1980-1985 WAS ~2%.

● IMPLICATIONS - GLOBAL COLUMN OZONE:




NOTES: 25-YR GROUND-BASED "DOBSON" DATA RECORD SHOWS THAT ~3% COLUMN OZONE CHANGES CAN OCCUR AS PART OF NATURAL VARIATION

IMPLICATIONS - VERTICAL DISTRIBUTION OF OZONE:

30 SHEETS 1 SQUARE
42-281
100 SHEETS 1 SQUARE
42-302
200 SHEETS 1 SQUARE
NATIONAL

"SIMILAR" TO
Ⓐ (CFC'S
1 1/2%/YR)

"SIMILAR" TO
Ⓑ (FREEZE AT
1980 EMISSION
LEVEL)



S2C: 8 ppbv Cl_x, doubled CH₄, 1.2 x N₂O, DOUBLED CO₂
S3C: 15 ppbv Cl_x, " " " "

LONG-TERM "STEADY-STATE" CONDITIONS


NOTE: • THE POINT IS THAT, EVEN THOUGH PREDICTED GLOBAL-COLUMN CHANGES MAY SEEN SMALL (±1% FOR Ⓐ & -4% FOR Ⓑ), THERE ARE SUBSTANTIAL LOSSES PREDICTED FOR 40 KM:


"Ⓐ" ~25% , "Ⓑ" ~50%

AND INCREASES IN THE LOWER ALTITUDES.

• SUCH CHANGES MAY INDUCE STANTANTUAL CLIMATE CHANGE.

DELTA 03
CASES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9





A = Freeze of all Cl-containing compounds at 1986 levels.
 • 100% compliance globally
 • CH₄ @ 1%/yr
 • N₂O @ 0.25%/yr
 • CO₂ @ 0.8%/yr (per Wuebbles et al., 1989)

This is similar to WMO (1986), and looks ~ same.

B = Freeze all Cl-containing compounds at 1986 levels
 • 100% compliance
 • CH₄ @ 0.07 ppm/yr
 • N₂O @ 0.20%/yr
 • CO₂ @ 0.7%/yr (per NAS 50th percentile)

C = Same as B, except CH₃CCl₃, Halon 1211 and Halon 1301 allowed to grow @ 2.5%/yr from 1985 to 2050 (constant thereafter)

D = Same as C, except CFC-113 allowed to grow @ 2.8%/yr from 1985 to 2050 (constant thereafter)

E = Same as D, except developing nations allowed to grow to current global average use per capita

F = Same as E, except 80% compliance globally. (Note: baseline rate for CFC-11 and CFC-12 is 2.5%/yr 1985 to 2050, constant thereafter).

G = No controls on 2.5%/yr growth, 1985 to 2050; constant thereafter.