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1. Report	Re: PLO Terrorism, 2 p. 11/2/00 NLSF-17-106 #37	7/22/81	P1/F1, F3
2. Report	Re: Syria-PLO, 1 p. " " " #38	9/24/81	P1/F1, F3

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[6/23/81]

~~Kemp~~
DLO

Faction-Ridden PLO Walks Policy Tightrope

Conflicting Signals, Threats Viewed in West as Disarray but Hailed by Partisans as Flexibility

By DOYLE McMANUS, *Times Staff Writer*

BEIRUT—To most Americans, the pattern is simply confusing, but to the diplomats who work for peace in the Middle East, it has become sadly familiar:

—Secret envoys of the Palestine Liberation Organization tell European and American officials that the PLO is ready to live in peace with Israel. A few months later Palestinian guerrillas kill six Jewish settlers in the West Bank town of Hebron.

—PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat sends a secret message to Washington hinting that he will recognize Israel if the United States recognizes the Palestinians' claim to a national homeland. A few months later Arafat's chief foreign policy aide vows that the PLO will never recognize Israel, "even if a Palestinian state is established."

—Fatah, Arafat's guerrilla faction within the PLO, adopts an official resolution calling for the "complete liquidation" of Israel. A week later Arafat disavows the measure as only "a suggestion."

—The PLO "parliament," meeting in Damascus, issues a declaration that strongly condemns terrorism of any kind. A few days later Palestinian officials say they do not consider their guerrilla attacks on Israel to be terrorism.

To European and American diplomats sympathetic to the Palestin-

One of a series.


ians, the baffling inconsistency of PLO pronouncements is a reflection of what they consider disarray and irresolution in the guerrilla movement. To the Israeli government of Prime Minister Menachem Begin, it is a sign of evil duplicity at the top of the PLO.

To Arafat's partisans, the apparent contradictions are actually a brilliant synthesis of toughness and flexibility.

"We are walking on a tightrope," Arafat's deputy, Salah Khalaf, said not long ago, "and we cannot stand 100% straight because then we would fall. So we bend, sometimes to the right and sometimes to the left."

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PLO: 'One Man's Moderate Is Another's Terrorist'



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But to other Palestinians, critics of Arafat's leadership, the conflicting signals coming from PLO headquarters here are evidence of failure—failure to free the guerrillas from a history of political paralysis and unite them in pursuit of realistic aims.

Outside the Middle East, these complex issues are sometimes boiled down into a more simplistic question: Are Arafat and his men "terrorists" or are they "moderates"?

Richard V. Allen, President Reagan's national security adviser, has said: "There's no question that we must identify the PLO as a terrorist organization—until it provides convincing evidence to the contrary. . . . One man's moderate is another man's terrorist."

But on closer examination, the unruly, factionalized PLO eludes such easy characterizations. The PLO won its terrorist label with a series of airline hijackings and international outrages that began in 1968 and peaked with the massacre of 11 Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics.

Outran Its Usefulness

But the organization officially renounced hijackings in 1974, when the leadership decided that tactic had outrun its usefulness in gaining world attention; no PLO faction has carried out a terrorist action outside Israel or the Israeli-occupied territories since 1978; and the number of attacks on Israel has decreased.

At the same time, the ill-defined title of "moderate" also fits badly. Arafat frequently proclaims his willingness to engage in peaceful negotiations, but he never quite reaches the point of acknowledging Israel's right to exist, before which even the most flexible Israeli government cannot be expected to negotiate.

"Arafat refuses to be pinned down on the essential questions," said a European diplomat who has been working on the Common Market's plan to bring the PLO into peace talks. "Until he makes up his mind, there is not much we can do."

A basic reason is the broad diversity of political organizations that make up the PLO, from the extremist fringe of die-hard terrorists (whose attempts to cross Israel's northern border by hot-air balloon and hang glider have been spectacularly unsuccessful) to conservative mayors like Elias Freij of Bethlehem and Rashad Shawwa of Gaza (who have only recently begun lending verbal support to the PLO in the face of Begin's uncompromising policies).

"The PLO is an organization made up of elements with various interests," Alexander M. Haig Jr., now secretary of state, observed to a French interviewer last summer. "Some are just and responsible while others are obviously dominated by the East, financially as well as ideologically."

More recently, Haig carefully described the PLO as "an umbrella organization containing some elements which have avowed terrorism."

The splinter groups on the left of the PLO, known loosely as the "Rejection Front" for their opposition to

any negotiations with Israel, represent only a small part of the organization's military strength (no more than 2,000 guerrillas out of a total of roughly 40,000) but they exercise considerable influence. The "rejectionists" are concentrated in the Palestinian quarter of Beirut, a squalid refugee-camp neighborhood that is as politically typical of the Arab world as Berkeley is to California—but that is where Arafat's headquarters are, so the fringe groups make up a large part of his immediate environment.

These hard-liners are quick to condemn Arafat and his men for any sign of moderation. And in this sense Arafat is a relative "moderate," for in the muddy streets of the refugee camps most of the pressures on him are from the left, not the right.

PLO officials often argue that one of the organization's greatest strengths is that it remains open to any faction; no one is expelled for disagreeing with Arafat. But that laboriously achieved unity also has a great dis-

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PLO: Failed Policy or Shrewd Flexibility?

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advantage, some critics say, for it gives the fringe groups a virtual veto over Arafat's halting diplomatic efforts. In 1974, when Arafat addressed the U.N. General Assembly in New York, he originally intended to declare his readiness to join a Geneva peace conference with Israel, PLO sources say—but the rejectionists threatened to split from the organization if he did, and so the passage was deleted.

"They will never make it to the stage of negotiations unless they solve this problem, and that means getting rid of the rejectionists," the European diplomat said. "Sooner or later, there will have to be a Night of the Long Knives"—a reference to Adolf Hitler's ruthless purge of a rival faction in the German Nazi party.

Arafat is subject to pressures not only from Palestinian factions, but from Arab governments as well—for

the PLO depends on these governments for most of its money and weaponry. The guerrillas are particularly sensitive to Syria's concerns, for the Syrian army controls all their supply lines in Lebanon.

"The PLO can't move very far these days without clearing it with Damascus," a Western intelligence source said.

The difficulty of keeping so many constituencies happy, from hard-line guerrillas to West Bank villagers to Arab and European governments, has led the PLO leadership into the habit of speaking to different audiences in different voices. Last summer's Fatah resolution calling for the liquidation of Israel was an example. After the tough-sounding measure was adopted, for the benefit of Fatah's own left wing, PLO officials simply assured European diplomats and Western reporters that it was unimportant. When the Israeli government said the resolution was proof that the PLO is merely a gang of

terrorists, Arafat said the text was unofficial and other Palestinian spokesmen said it had been misinterpreted. But the hard-liners insisted it was neither.

Is the PLO a terrorist organization? The question is complicated by the fact that different people use the word to mean different things. This year's session of the PLO "parliament," the Palestine National Council, issued a statement "strongly condemning terrorism and international terrorism," and Palestinian spokesmen point to the organization's clear policy against hijackings or other operations outside Israel and the occupied territories.

Yet PLO officials also declare openly that they hope to step up their guerrilla attacks against Israeli settlements. They argue that their operations against Israel and the Israeli-occupied territories should not be considered as terrorism, but instead as resistance to foreign military occupation, a concept recognized by international law.

To support that thesis, they point to none other than Menachem Begin, whose Irgun guerrilla group was outlawed as a gang of terrorists when Palestine was ruled

by Britain. In his younger days, Begin publicly claimed responsibility for the 1948 bombing of Jerusalem's King David Hotel, in which 88 people died, and for Irgun attack on Deir Yassin, a Palestinian village where British authorities said 254 Arabs were killed, many of them women or children (although Begin denied the report of high civilian casualties). Articulating a tenet that would be echoed by his Palestinian enemies, Begin wrote: "We fight, therefore we are."

Those justifications might help explain PLO attacks on Israeli military installations, or even on armed Jewish settlements in the West Bank, fortified colonies erected as part of a military security plan. But it is difficult even for Arafat to excuse the deaths of unarmed women and children.

"I am against it," he told an interviewer earlier this year. "I am against it, but it happens. But you have to ask these citizens, why are they living in my homeland? (By) living there, they are participating in this tragedy, they are participating in this crime with their govern-

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ment. . . Let them withdraw from my homeland."

PLO guerrillas know that their military arm is no match for the Israeli armed forces, and that in any direct confrontation they are more likely to lose than win. But even moderate and pragmatic Palestinians defend the idea that guerrilla warfare should be carried on for political, not military, reasons.

They say the attacks on Israeli settlements are "pin-pricks" that increase Israel's economic problems, discourage foreign Jews from immigrating, and force Israelis to confront the reality of Palestinian opposition to their conquest of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. They say the military operations are psychologically important to the scattered Palestinians, for they show that the PLO is capable of armed resistance on their behalf, no matter how inconsequential in military terms ("We fight, therefore we are"). And they say the guerrilla operations force Israel and the outside world to listen to the Palestinians' demands.

"You don't have to make peace with people who don't make trouble," says Shafik Hout, the PLO ambassador to Lebanon.

Two Basic Questions

If Arafat is ever invited to go beyond making trouble and begin making peace, however, he will have to answer two basic questions: Is he ready for a genuine, final peace agreement with Israel, and on what realistic terms?

Arafat has frequently hinted that the PLO will give up violence if the Palestinians are given an independent state in the West Bank area and the Gaza Strip. But the habit of guerrilla war is so deeply ingrained in the PLO that some of Arafat's own aides admit that they find it difficult to imagine themselves becoming civilian bureaucrats in a demilitarized Palestine.

"It's not going to happen tomorrow, so I don't worry about it," one said with a shrug.

Equally muddy is the question of the PLO's ultimate aims. Israeli spokesmen frequently charge that the PLO seeks nothing less than the destruction or annihilation of Israel, but some Palestinians say that all they want is an independent state and the right to return to their pre-1948 homes. In fact, the PLO now says it has never advocated the annihilation of Israel.

The oft-quoted threat, usually attributed to the late Ahmed Shukairy, Arafat's predecessor as PLO chairman, to "drive the Jews into the sea," was an invention of Israeli propaganda. Palestinian officials now claim. However, Shukairy often threatened Israel and the Israelis with destruction and his statements proved an embarrassment to more moderate Palestinian leaders.

But it can be difficult to pin down the Palestinians on their current objectives, a subject of almost constant debate and evolution.

Initially, after the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, the Palestinians' goal was blunt and clear: destroy the new regime, replace it with an Arab state and force the Jews who had settled in Palestine to return to Europe.

"The Right is anything that hastens the disappearance of Israel," an early Fatah manifesto said. "The only Good is anything that leads to the collapse of the usurper state. And Peace, peace is vengeance, vengeance against the butchers of Deir Yassin."

But in time, the Palestinians realized that the state of Israel had grown deep roots in the soil of Palestine, and they labored to find a policy that would take account of the Israeli reality. The first new formula, proclaimed in 1968 after years of debate, was to demand a single, secular democratic state in what used to be Palestine, "in which Jews, Christians and Muslims would live as equal citizens."

'Interim' Solution Proposed

If this did not mean the "destruction" of Israel, it still meant dismantling the specifically Jewish state that the Zionist movement had struggled to build. And the PLO failed to change an article in its covenant that declares the presence of Jewish immigrants in Palestine to be illegal. Israeli leaders dismissed the new formula as a sham.

By 1974, it was clear to Arafat and his men that the proposal for a secular democratic state was considered unrealistic even by those sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. After more passionate debate, the PLO's major factions agreed on a new doctrine: the "interim" solution of a Palestinian mini-state.

Under this formula—which is still the PLO's official policy—the Palestinians would agree to set up a state of their own in any part of Palestine from which Israel would withdraw, but would retain the ultimate goal of creating a secular state that would include the territory of pre-1967 Israel. Arafat has since said that a Palestinian mini-state would tacitly recognize Israel and would pose no security threat to the Jewish state. But he has also told his own people that it would constitute a first step toward the reunification of Palestine, a promise the Israelis find threatening.

To Westerners, Arafat has hinted that reunification is now only "a dream," and that a PLO state would renounce violence against Israel. But he has never said that in public to an audience of his guerrillas—most of whom are from pre-1967 Israel and still cherish hope of a return to Jaffa, Haifa and the Galilee, areas outside the

West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Nor has he ever gone so far as to propose a comprehensive peace plan on behalf of the PLO. "The Palestinians are always happy to react to other peoples' proposals, but you can't get them to initiate anything on their own," complains a former U.S. diplomat who dealt indirectly with the PLO during the Carter Administration.

In practice, these ambiguities of PLO policy have been tested in repeated attempts to persuade the guerrillas to accept U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which calls on Israel to withdraw from territories occupied in the 1967 Middle East War but also upholds Israel's right to a secure and independent existence. If the PLO accepted Resolution 242, then it could negotiate directly with the United States, which is now bound by a promise to Israel not to talk with the Palestinians unless they recognize the Jewish state's right to exist.

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PLO: Partisans Hail Conflicts as 'Flexibility'

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The Carter Administration attempted repeatedly to work out a formula under which the guerrillas could embrace the principles of Resolution 242, but failed. Arafat objected to 242 because it did not acknowledge the Palestinians' claim to a national homeland. He was not certain that he could gain the support of the entire PLO for a compromise and, in the end, he decided that the United States was not offering him enough for what he has called "the only card in my hand, the recognition of Israel.

Criticism of Arafat

Some of Arafat's hard-line critics believe he has already gone too far along the road toward concessions with Israel. But there are a few others, moderates and some leftists, who believe that the leadership has been too cautious, too attentive to the pressures of the radical guerrilla groups, and too wary of making concessions to join any negotiations. These PLO "doves," like Issam Sartawi, a U.S.-educated heart surgeon who held a series of meetings with Israeli doves, have been exposed to attack and intimidation from the hard-liners, and so rarely speak in public. If they did, they might agree with a British supporter of the Palestinian cause, Lord Nicholas Bethell, who recently wrote that the PLO's greatest need is for "a little consistent statemanship."

"Are they still resolved, as they sometimes announce, to destroy Israel root and branch?" Bethell asked. "Or are they resigned, as they declare on other occasions, to living in a Palestine Arab state side by side at peace with the Jewish state? We do not know, because their representatives will not make it clear. . . . And if we cannot be sure, far less can the Israelis."

But the doves and the hard-liners are both minorities in the PLO. Far more numerous are the fence-sitters, those who believe that Arafat has done well to be cautious in a time when Palestinians find so little sympathy for their demands in Jerusalem or Washington. They point out that Begin, in a recent campaign speech, promised flatly that he would never withdraw from any part of the West Bank or Gaza Strip; that both Begin and Israeli opposition leader Shimon Peres have vowed never to deal with the PLO, and that the Reagan Administration's first policy statement on the Middle East flatly condemned the PLO as a terrorist organization.

"When we get attacked like that, where do you find the possibilities for negotiation?" asked Khaled Hassan, a leader of Fatah's moderate wing. "And what do you expect us to tell the boys in the camps?"

Under such circumstances, these PLO members say, the organization can only function as a kind of holding operation, waiting in hope of better days. The moderates can spend their time working on a European peace plan that they admit is unlikely to succeed, and the hard-liners can continue plotting an armed struggle that they acknowledge may go nowhere. The main duty, as they see it, is merely to survive—and to stand in the way of any peace settlement like the Israeli-Egyptian treaty that does not meet their demands. It is a policy of short-term pessimism—and long-term resignation.

"No one else has a solution," said a senior PLO theoretician at the Palestine National Council. "One day or another, someone will get tired of the struggle. The question is, who is going to get tired first? We are determined that it will not be us."

Next: Life in the "shadow state" of Palestine.



John McEnroe holds championship trophy aloft over Bjorn Borg in four sets to win the men's singles championship. It was the first defeat in six years for Borg in English tennis tournament. (Details, Sports Section)

U.S., PLO: 7 Years of Secret Contacts

Reagan Continues Behind-the-Scenes Relationship Despite Official Policy

By DOYLE McMANUS, Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—Despite public pronouncements emphasizing that negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization are prohibited, the United States has been in secret contact with the PLO for at least seven years—holding discussions under four Presidents, from Richard Nixon to Ronald Reagan, on subjects ranging from the safety of American diplomats to the chances for Middle East peace. The Times has learned.

The official policy of the United States is that it will not deal with the PLO as long as the guerrillas—a gang of thugs, in President Reagan's words—refuse to recognize Israel's right to exist.

But the true pattern of U.S. intelligence operations and secret diplomacy has been quite the opposite. Beginning with clandestine talks initiated by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger in 1974, according to well-placed sources in Washington and Beirut, the United States has been talking to the PLO more often than not. The Carter Administration made two concerted attempts to bring the PLO into peace talks with Israel, carrying on extensive indirect negotiations with PLO chief Yasser Arafat. And, despite his rhetorical condemnations of the Palestinian guerrillas, Ronald Reagan's Administration has quietly continued low-level contacts with the PLO through both the Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Embassy in Beirut.

Secret 'Back Channel'

The history of contacts, more frequent and extensive than previously known, suggests that official dealings between the U.S. government and the PLO are not the exception—as it generally thought—but the rule.

Some of the talks have gone through a secret "back channel," an established line of communication between the CIA and the PLO intelligence organization, the "Jihaz al Rasd," or "Surveillance Department."

But there is a "front channel," too. The U.S. Embassy in Beirut has

made direct contact with PLO officials several times for conversations on the security of the embassy, which is in a Palestinian-patrolled area. According to some sources, those security talks have occasionally slipped into wide-ranging discussions on the situation in Lebanon. And the United States has negotiated indirectly with the PLO, President Jimmy Carter carried on a long, secret round of talks through officials of several Arab countries to try to prod Arafat toward recognizing Israel, but failed.

Whether the United States talks with the PLO, and on what basis, are issues that go to the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Most Palestinians—Arabs whose ancestors inhabited the land on which Israel stands—say they will accept no peace negotiations that do not include the PLO.

Diplomats' View

Many American diplomats in the Middle East maintain privately that no peace is possible without the participation of Arafat and his men. "It is not possible to get support for a settlement on the (Israeli-occupied) West Bank without the PLO," former Assistant Secretary of State Harold Saunders said recently, after leaving office.

But Israeli leaders, including Prime Minister Menachem Begin and the opposition leader, Shimon Peres, insist that they will never sit down with the guerrillas. "This organization is killing men, women and children, and it cannot be a party to negotiations," Begin said earlier this year.

Arafat and other PLO officials boast that they already have the de facto recognition of most of the world, but they still want the United States to recognize them openly, for that would greatly strengthen their claim to a place in negotiations.

Israel opposes any such recognition for the same reason. In 1975, the Israelis even exacted a written promise from Kissinger that the United States would "not recognize

Change of Direction

County Cutbacks Be Felt Swiftly

SKY, Times City-County Bureau Chief

In a new budget, county supervisors reversed the government's decision to cut the poor much resident Reagan Washington. Liberals protested the cuts, which hit health care hard. Liberals said that reductions were particularly harmful to the poor black and Latino residents who depend on county hospitals and clinics. Liberal Super-

part of the supervisors' cost-reduction plan. The discussion that preceded the vote was like the current debate in Washington over Reagan's economic program. Outnumbered, liberals protested the cuts, which hit health care hard. Liberals said that reductions were particularly harmful to the poor black and Latino residents who depend on county hospitals and clinics. Liberal Super-

Irish Hunger Strikers Seek Talks, Hint at Compromise

PLO: U.S. Keeps in Secret Touch With Arafat's Group

Continued from First Page

Major negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization as long as the PLO does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept (U.N.) Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338," the two basic U.N. resolutions on the Arab-Israeli conflict. That self-imposed prohibition remains in force today but, in practice, four successive administrations have found secret contacts with the PLO to be, in the words of one State Department source, "absolutely necessary."

In early 1974, several sources said, Kissinger and President Nixon decided that it would be useful for the United States to talk secretly with PLO officials, to size

Last of a series on the PLO.

them up first-hand and get a sense of how flexible they might be in future Middle East peace talks. On at least two occasions, Kissinger dispatched a member of his staff to meet with an Arafat aide, apparently in Europe. Israel and Jordan were notified of the contacts, a former official familiar with the talks said. "Nothing substantial came out of it, but Kissinger prided himself on keeping the lines open," he said.

The former secretary of state refused a request by The Times for an interview on the 1974 contacts. "He never personally had a meeting with the PLO, but beyond that he feels he cannot make any comment," Chris Wick, a spokeswoman for Kissinger, said.

Ironically, some of Kissinger's critics faulted his Mideast diplomacy for apparently ignoring the role of the Palestinians. In the light of the 1974 contacts, Kissinger now appears to have been more attentive to the Palestinian problem than the critics knew—even though he decided that there was little to be gained from serious negotiations with the PLO.

Kissinger's Promise

In the very next round of U.S.-Israeli-Egyptian negotiations—the second Sinai disengagement pact, in 1975—the Israelis demanded, and got, Kissinger's promise that the United States would not negotiate with the PLO. Kissinger gave the pledge readily, a source said, because his limited contacts with the guerrilla organization had already convinced him that there was no immediate hope of bringing Arafat to peace talks. But the secretary did not interpret his promise as meaning that all contact between U.S. officials and PLO members was prohibited. In 1976, when President Gerald R. Ford ordered the Navy to evacuate American officers from Beirut during the Lebanese civil war, U.S. diplomats and intelligence officers enlisted the PLO's help in providing security for the operation, and Kissinger later sent Arafat a message of thanks for his cooperation.

The CIA link with the Palestinians was used for wider purposes, well-placed sources said, including informal

Arafat objected to reference to Palestinian people as 'refugees'

exchanges of information between the two sides. They said the CIA's key PLO contact was Arafat's chief of intelligence, Ali Hassan Salameh—the man accused by Israel of having planned the PLO kidnapping of 11 members of the Israeli Olympic team at Munich in 1972. Salameh, also known as "Abu Hassan," was killed by a remote-controlled bomb in Beirut in 1979; the PLO accused Israel's intelligence agency of the murder, and the CIA lost a valuable source.

When Jimmy Carter took office as President in 1977, he initially took Kissinger's pledge not to negotiate with the PLO more literally. "He was a real Boy Scout on that," a former aide said with a shrug. But at the same time, Carter believed that the time was ripe to attempt a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and he believed that Palestinians—members of the PLO or non-members—should be involved. President Anwar Sadat of Egypt told Carter's secretary of state, Cyrus R. Vance, that the PLO was ready to declare publicly that Israel had a right to exist. In March 1977, to encourage the PLO toward moderation, Carter told a town meeting in Clinton, Mass., that he believed the Palestinians deserved a "homeland," but the PLO "parliament," the Palestine National Council, failed to reciprocate with an equivalent gesture.

Still, Egyptian, Saudi Arabian and Syrian officials told U.S. diplomats that the PLO could be persuaded to accept U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which guarantees the rights of all states in the Middle East (including Israel) to live in peace. If the PLO accepted 242, that would constitute tacit recognition of Israel's right to exist, would open the way to direct negotiations with the United States and might enable the PLO to join in eventual peace talks, American officials said.

There appeared to be only one basic problem: Arafat objected to the fact that Resolution 242 refers to the Palestinians only as "refugees," with no mention of any right to a homeland; and said he could accept the U.N. text only with reservations. In May 1977, Carter met with Syrian President Hafez Assad in Geneva and asked Assad to get Arafat's reservations on paper, one source said.

Meanwhile, the United States was also talking with Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Syria about the possibility of a

Geneva conference on the Middle East that might include Palestinian representatives as part of a single, unified Arab delegation. The arrangement was devised so that Palestinians could participate in talks without requiring Israel to recognize them as Palestinians. In June, the American project was set back when Begin, a relative hard-liner, replaced Peres as Israel's prime minister. But Carter decided to press on.

The news from the PLO side seemed good; in August, Vance visited Saudi Arabia and was told by Prince Saud al Faisal, the Saudi foreign minister, that Arafat was on the verge of accepting Resolution 242 in exchange for talks with the United States. PLO spokesmen confirmed that such a move was actively being considered. Carter again tried to encourage the guerrillas. "If the Palestinians should say, 'We recognize U.N. Resolution 242 in its entirety, but we think the Palestinians have additional status other than just refugees,' that would suit us OK," he said in Plains, Ga.

But behind Arafat's signals of flexibility, a major debate was going on within the PLO, the organizations's hard-liners were putting up stiff resistance to any tacit recognition of Israel. At one point, an American source says, the Palestinians suggested that they simply issue their reservations on Resolution 242, without a positive statement accepting the resolution itself. The United States rejected that idea.

PLO sources tell the story differently. They say the United States wanted to dictate the wording of their ac-

ceptance of 242 along with their reservations. American sources deny that account.

It was September or October before the State Department received the PLO's definitive reply. American and Palestinian sources said, and it appeared that the hard-liners had won. Some U.S. diplomats say they believe that Syria put heavy pressure on the Palestinians to stop their movement toward the United States, which would have reduced Syria's own influence with the PLO.

In any case, the guerrillas' terms were unacceptable. They agreed to accept Resolution 242, but only if the United States agreed to assist in the creation of an independent Palestinian state. Carter had never been pre-

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Los Angeles Times

pared to go that far. The negotiations collapsed.

A month later, Sadat decided to make peace on his own, and flew to Jerusalem for the visit that eventually led to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

The Egyptian-Israeli negotiations left the PLO out completely, and Arafat's guerrillas condemned them bitterly for that very reason. But in private, the Palestinians had not given up on the United States; they still wanted to know, sources said, whether negotiations could be resumed once the Egyptian-Israeli talks were over. Through the CIA-PLO "back channel," through private citizens such as Columbia University Prof. Edward Said, a Palestinian-American who acted as an informal intermediary, and through friendly Arab governments, the lines of communication were kept open even while Arafat's public denunciations of Washington were most fervent.

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PLO: For 7 Years, U.S. Has Maintained Contacts Despite Official Policy

Continued from 20th Page

Eventually, Arafat himself resumed sending signals of flexibility in Washington. In November, 1978, he told Rep. Paul Findley (R-Ill.), another would-be intermediary, that the PLO would renounce violence and recognize Israel if an independent Palestine state were established, and Findley reported the conversation to the State Department.

After Sadat and Begin signed their peace treaty in March, 1979, the Carter Administration again attempted briefly to draw the PLO toward negotiations, this time by working on a new U.N. resolution that would reaffirm Resolution 242 but also declare that the Palestinians have some right to a homeland, former officials in the Administration said. The idea was that the PLO might be able to accept such a resolution if it were presented as a take-it-or-leave-it proposition.

According to a British Broadcasting Corp. report, Secretary of State Vance enlisted a legal scholar outside the State Department to draft the text of such a resolution. But both Begin and Sadat objected strongly to the project on the grounds that it would complicate the unfinished Egyptian-Israeli peace process, and the United States dropped the idea.

Unfortunately for the Administration, the proposal stayed alive at the United Nations for a few more

days. U.S. Ambassador Andrew Young, seeking to avoid a Security Council vote that could force the United States to vote against its own proposal, met privately with the PLO's chief U.N. observer, Zehdi Labib Terzi. Israeli intelligence agents learned of the conversation but Young told Vance that the meeting had included no real negotiations. When Vance learned that he had been misled, Young resigned.

Young's conversations with Terzi on a procedural U.N. matter,

an arrangement that the Washington Post called "a distinct infringement of your normal liberties."

Later that year, the United States turned to the PLO for help. When Iranian students seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, taking 66 Americans hostage, the United States had no immediate means of putting pressure on the erratic government of the Ayatollah, Ruhollah Khomeini to free the captives. Very few foreign governments or organizations enjoyed any

dom, the United States would be compelled to recognize that the PLO could act as a responsible party in at least some negotiations.

But Arafat, like the rest of the world, had underestimated Khomeini's anti-American fervor. The Palestinian emissaries succeeded in gaining the release of the blacks and women among the hostages, as a gesture of Islamic charity, but their proposal that the other hostages be freed fell on deaf ears. And when Hani Hassan, the PLO ambassador in Tehran, tried to salvage some public credit for the release of the blacks and women, he drew an outburst of wrath from Khomeini. "The PLO had nothing to do with this," the ayatollah thundered.

The PLO is the only functioning police force in the once-elegant seaside district of Beirut, where the U.S. Embassy is situated, and in many of the districts where the U.S. ambassador must travel as part of his job. In 1976, Ambassador Francis Meloy Jr. was ambushed in his limousine in one of those districts, kidnaped and slain. The U.S. Embassy had no direct contacts with the PLO at the time, and when American diplomats finally did talk to the Palestinians, through an intermediary at the British Embassy

groups—would like those conversations to be quietly broadened, from the condition of the streets of Beirut to the political balance in Lebanon (as they already do, according to some sources) to the possibilities of a negotiated peace with Israel.

"The PLO is a force involved in the peace process) by virtue of its position in the Palestinian movement," former Assistant Secretary of State Saunders said recently. "That is not a policy statement by the U.S., Israeli or Jordanian governments. It is simply a political

A State Department official said Meloy 'might not be dead if we had (PLO) contacts in 1976.'

were less substantive than many of the Carter Administration's previous contacts with the PLO, but because they were unauthorized and because they became public knowledge, Young lost his job. In public, the Administration went to considerable lengths to avoid any appearance of contact with the PLO—perhaps to protect its private lines of communication. When Shafik Hout, the PLO "ambassador" to Lebanon, visited the United States in 1979 to lecture at several universities, he was granted a visa only on condition that he speak before no public gatherings and avoid all pub-

measure of trust from Khomeini, but one of the few that did was the PLO.

The idea of using the Palestinians as intermediaries seems to have occurred to several people at the same time. Rep. Findley suggested it, as did Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, almost immediately, the "back channel" swung into operation. Arafat sent two emissaries to Tehran, one of them, Brig. Gen. Saad Sayel, a graduate of a U.S. Army training program he attended in Kansas as a Jordanian officer. The PLO chairman clearly hoped that, if he gained the hostages free-

When Administration officials admitted in Washington that they had sought the PLO's help, there was consternation among those who considered the Palestinians merely terrorists. Rep. Millicent Fenwick (R-N.J.) said she was "staggered" by the news. "We must not deal with the mob, gangsters, unworthy tools," she said.

But in fact, the United States had been dealing with the PLO on such security matters for some years; only a month before the hostages were taken in Tehran, Palestinian guerrillas broke up a cell of young Iranians in Beirut who had been planning to take over the U.S. Embassy there.

'We must not deal with the mob, gangsters, unworthy tools,' Representative Fenwick said.


Meloy had already been killed. "Frank Meloy might not be dead if we had those contacts in 1976," a State Department official said.

Those security discussions have not been cut off by the Reagan Administration, despite the President's strongly pro-Israeli stand and his flat condemnation of the PLO as a terrorist organization. Israel apparently has not objected to them. "It has always been explained to us as part of your immediate concerns about the safety of your people," an Israeli diplomat said.

Some U.S. diplomats—the State Department's Arabists—as they are often called by pro-Israeli

fact. The question is how the PLO could be involved. The missing ingredient in the negotiating picture is an unequivocal statement by Palestinians and Israelis that they are ready to make peace with each other.

Reagan Administration spokesmen have said that they see no reason to negotiate with the PLO until the organization alters its policies. But the lines of communication will almost surely remain open, and the intermittent discussions on security continue, for one simple reason. In the words of a State Department veteran, "We can't send an ambassador out there without them."

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U.S., PLO reportedly have custom of secret dealings

By Doyle McManus
Los Angeles Times Service

WASHINGTON — Despite public pronouncements emphasizing that negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization are prohibited, the United States has been in secret contact with the PLO for at least seven years, holding discussions under four presidents from Richard Nixon to Ronald Reagan on subjects ranging from the safety of U.S. diplomats to the chances for Middle East peace, the Los Angeles Times has learned.

The official U.S. policy is that it will not deal with the PLO as long as the guerrillas — “a gang of thugs,” in President Reagan’s words — refuse to recognize Israel’s right to exist.

But the true pattern of U.S. intelligence operations and secret diplomacy has been quite the opposite. Beginning with clandestine talks initiated by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger in 1974, according to well-placed sources in Washington and Beirut, the United States has been talking to the PLO more often than not.

The Carter administration made two concerted attempts to bring the PLO into peace talks with Israel, carrying on extensive indirect negotiations with PLO chief Yasir Arafat. And, despite Reagan’s condemnations, his administration has quietly continued low-level contacts with the PLO through the CIA and the U.S. Embassy in Beirut.

Some of the talks have gone through a secret line of communication between the CIA and the PLO intelligence organization, the “Jihaz al Rasd,” or surveillance department.

But the U.S. Embassy in Beirut has made direct contact with PLO offi-



Yasir Arafat
His aid thought needed for peace



Henry A. Kissinger
Sent message of thanks

cial several times for conversations on the security of the embassy, which is in a Palestinian-patrolled area. According to some sources, those security talks have occasionally slipped into wide-ranging discussions of the situation in Lebanon.

The United States also has negotiated indirectly with the PLO: President Carter carried on a long, secret and ultimately fruitless round of talks through officials of several Arab countries to try to prod Arafat toward recognizing Israel.

Whether the United States talks with the PLO, and on what basis, are issues that go to the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Most Palestinians — Arabs whose ancestors inhabited the land on which Israel stands — say they will accept no peace negotiations that do not include the PLO.

Many U.S. diplomats in the Middle East maintain privately that no peace is possible without the participation of Arafat and his men.

But Israeli leaders, including Prime Minister Menachem Begin and the opposition leader, Shimon Peres, insist that they will never sit down with the guerrillas.

Arafat and other PLO officials boast that they have the de facto

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Philadelphia Inquirer
7/6/81
(1 of 2)

recognition of most of the world, but they still want the United States to recognize them openly, for that would strengthen their claim to a place in negotiations.

Israel opposes any such recognition, for the same reason. In 1975, the Israelis exacted a promise from Kissinger that the United States would "not recognize or negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization so long as the PLO does not recognize Israel's right to exist." That prohibition remains in force today, but four successive administrations have found secret contacts with the PLO to be, in the words of one State Department source, "absolutely necessary."

Early in 1974, several sources said, Kissinger and President Nixon decided that it would be useful for the United States to talk secretly with PLO officials, to size them up firsthand and get a sense of how flexible they might be in Middle East peace talks. On at least two occasions, Kissinger sent a staff member to meet with an Arafat aide. Israel and Jordan were notified, said a former official familiar with the talks.

In the next round of U.S.-Israeli-Egyptian negotiations, in 1975, the Israelis demanded and got Kissinger's promise not to negotiate with the PLO, a promise he made readily, a source said, because his limited con-

tacts with the PLO had convinced him that there was no immediate hope of bringing Arafat into peace talks.

But in 1976 there was contact on a separate matter. When the Navy moved Americans out of Beirut during the Lebanese civil war, U.S. diplomats and intelligence officers enlisted the PLO's help in providing security for the operation, and Kissinger later sent Arafat a message of thanks for his cooperation.

The CIA link with the Palestinians was used for wider purposes, well-placed sources said, including informal exchanges of information. They said the CIA's key PLO contact was Arafat's chief of intelligence, Ali Hassan Salameh — the man accused by Israel of having planned the PLO kidnapping of 11 members of the Israeli Olympic team at Munich in 1972.

When Carter took office in 1977, he initially took Kissinger's pledge not to negotiate with the PLO literally, but he believed that the time was ripe to attempt a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and he believed that Palestinians — members of the PLO or nonmembers — should be involved. President Anwar Sadat of Egypt told Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance that the PLO was ready to declare publicly that

Israel had a right to exist. In March 1977, to encourage the PLO toward moderation, Carter told a town meeting in Clinton, Mass., that he believed the Palestinians deserved a "homeland," but the PLO "parliament," the Palestine National Council, failed to reciprocate with an equivalent gesture.

Still, Egyptian, Saudi Arabian and Syrian officials told U.S. diplomats that the PLO could be persuaded to accept the U.N. Security Council resolution guaranteeing the rights of all states in the Middle East, including Israel, to live in peace. Such acceptance would constitute tacit recognition of Israel's right to exist, open the way to direct negotiations with the United States and perhaps enable the PLO to join in peace talks, American officials said.

Efforts to achieve this included use of secret channels and private citizens, but the efforts were in vain.

More public instances of contacts with the PLO were in 1979. U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young met privately with the PLO's chief U.N. observer, and when that meeting became public, Young resigned. Later that year, when Iranian students seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and took 66 Americans hostage, Arafat was asked to intercede with the students.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 23, 1981

Mr. Feith,

The attached paper is in reference to your discussion with Don Gregg last week regarding the PLO.

Charles Carr

22 July 1981

RT
File:PLC

ARTICLES

This article was prepared by the National Foreign Assessment Center.

Radical Palestinian Terrorism Likely to Resume

~~████████████████████~~ radical Palestinian groups are anxious to begin a new terrorist campaign against Israeli and U.S. targets and the pressure is mounting on Arafat to condone, at least unofficially, such attacks. The Israeli attack on the Tuwaitha Nuclear Facility in Iraq and the recent Israeli bombing of Palestinian offices in Beirut have given the radicals added ammunition in their opposition to Arafat and his moderate policies. These groups are likely to attempt terrorist attacks against U.S. and Israeli targets even if they do not get Arafat's acquiescence.
~~(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON)~~

Arafat ~~██████████~~ has been considering allowing some international terrorist attacks. The incidence of such attacks by Palestinians has fallen in the past few years because of Arafat's orders to cease international terrorist attacks in order to give the Palestinian cause a more legitimate and moderate image. Arafat has been under increasing pressure, however, by radical elements to resume terrorist attacks against Israeli and U.S. targets abroad because his diplomatic efforts have been unsuccessful.
~~(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON)~~

Arafat made a strong showing at the Palestine National Council meeting in April and thwarted moves by more radical elements to weaken his position. Nevertheless, there were reports even at that time that Arafat, in order to stave off radical criticism, had given the green light to planning for the resumption of international terrorist attacks in the event that no progress was made this year on a Palestinian solution.
~~(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON)~~

Recent events may force Arafat to concede to radical demands soon, even if it is only to privately permit selected attacks against Israeli targets abroad. U.S. targets, already included in operational planning by the radicals, could also be included. It would be hard for Arafat to defuse the momentum that has been gathering. Arafat may be persuaded to agree in the hope that such attacks would goad the West into speeding up their attempts to find a solution to the Palestinian question. He may also hope that by allowing attacks, he can retain some control over the radical groups and thwart attempts by several Arab states to gain more control of radical elements. Syria and Libya have been trying to buy influence with the more radical Palestinian groups and have been encouraging these groups to carry out more international terrorist attacks, especially against Israeli targets, in the hope that such attacks would embarrass Arafat and discredit the moderate Palestinian position.
~~(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON)~~

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22 July 1981

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Even if Arafat does not condone terrorist attacks by the radicals, he may not intervene if these attacks occur on a limited basis. There [REDACTED] is support even among certain leftist elements within Fatah, the moderate Palestinian organization headed by Arafat, for attacks against U.S. targets. ~~(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON)~~

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TRANSLATION OF AN INTERVIEW
WITH FAROUK KADOUMI, HEAD OF THE PLO 'POLITICAL DEPARTMENT,'
IN THE WEST GERMAN NEWSPAPER STERN, 30 JULY 1981

The conference room of the Hilton Hotel in Tunis is set in gold and turquoise. White stucco designs on the ceiling depict the unsuccessful struggle of big and mighty Carthage against small and rebellious Rome. Beneath, around a gigantic oval table, are seated the foreign and defence ministers of the 20 member states of the Arab League, with their delegations. The representatives of 220 million Arabs deliberate on measures against 3.5 million Israelis. It is a special meeting convened by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in the wake of the Israeli air raid on its Beirut headquarters, in the course of which 190 people died and some 600 were injured.

Since the 10th of July, the military clashes between Israelis and Palestinians on the Lebanese border had expanded into a regular war. Equipped with heavy weapons supplied by Libya, the Soviet Union and Syria, the Palestinians had been conducting a rocket bombardment on towns and villages in the north of Israel, in reply to the attacks carried out by Israel for months on Palestinian targets in Lebanon.

The conference, transferred to the night hours because of the Moslem fasting month of Ramadan, winds up shortly before 5 a.m. with a unanimous declaration of solidarity with the persecuted Palestinians and battered Lebanon. Those present agreed that, without US backing, Israel would not have been able to act in this manner, and warned the United States and all other countries against supporting Israel militarily and economically, failing which those countries would have to face severe Arab countermeasures.

The colleague of Arafat who is in charge of PLO foreign policy, Farouk Kadoumi, receives me in the morning in his hotel suite. He and all members of his delegation are thoroughly fatigued. They tell me that, for the past two weeks, they had

not slept for more than three hours a night. Already while we are drinking raven-black coffee a report comes in that, after Yasser Arafat, Israel's Prime Minister has followed suit, yielded to UN efforts and has agreed to a temporary ceasefire along the border. *Insha'allah* (With God's help), says Kadoumi.

Stern: And what now?

Kadoumi: *We have declared that we will not cross the Lebanese border in order to fight against Israel.*

Stern: You have been fighting against Israel across the Lebanese border by means of your rockets.

Kadoumi: *Provided the Israelis stop their air raids, their attacks by sea and by land against us, we shall cease (our rocket attacks).*

Stern: Menachem Begin...

Kadoumi: *...Begin the terrorist...*

Stern: ...justifies his preemptive strikes, as he calls them, with their success. For more than a year, until this rocket war, no Palestinian attack has taken place in Israel.

Kadoumi: *That is correct.*

Stern: But, time and again, a growing number of Palestinians have been intercepted coming from Lebanon who had been planning military actions in the interior of the country. They came on foot, by water, with glider devices by air.

Kadoumi: *That, too, is correct.*

Stern: Begin claims that, unless more frequent and vehement Israeli attacks were made on Palestinian targets in Lebanon, more numerous and more successful commando bands would probably cross the border.

Kadoumi: Does he say so?

Stern: At present it does not look as if any Arab or other would be ready to side with you in a war against Israel. You yourselves are not strong enough. Why then, when these isolated commando raids provoke such terrible Israeli preemptive or retaliatory strikes, do you go on with them? Or are you going to stop these actions, too?

Kadoumi: We must continue the military operations in the occupied territories. To have a small candle in your hand is preferable to permanently cursing the darkness.

Stern: Militarily, nothing is changed thereby and, politically, it does not gain you any friends in Europe, for instance.

Kadoumi: If nothing were changed thereby militarily, we would not be having all this hullabaloo about the Mid-Eastern crisis. Why, then, do they lock up our people; why do they torture them in the jails, murder them...?

Stern: But that cannot be the goal?

Kadoumi: How does a pearl evolve? An alien object penetrates the shell of the mussel. It disturbs the animal; it chafes it, hurts it. That is exactly what we are doing. Ultimately we shall find the pearl within the mussel.

Stern: But so long as oysters are not opened, they survive it.

Kadoumi: We shall never allow Israel to live in peace. We shall never allow it total security. Every Israeli will feel that: "behind every wall there might be a guerilla who is aiming at me."

Stern: You cannot expect Israel to put up with such behaviour passively.

Kadoumi: Most important of all - it was Israel that started it. Israel has escalated the situation. Israel is responsible for the casualties on both sides. We have no choice — unless we capitulate. And the actions in the occupied territories are our signal that we do not yield.

Stern: That is psychologically important for our people (RPT: for your people)?

Kadoumi: For our people and for the world as a whole.

Stern: Another alternative would be to talk to each other. But Menachem Begin has just now again explicitly forbidden the American special envoy Philip Habib to negotiate on a ceasefire with the PLO. The result was attained via the United Nations.

Kadoumi: That is precisely the correct institution.

Stern: Neither would you talk with an Israeli?

Kadoumi: With a Zionist? No. Because Zionism means the colonization of Palestine.

Stern: In that case, you act exactly like the Israelis. They say that to recognize the PLO as representatives of the Palestinians is out of the question. Apart from the Communists and a few orthodox (Jews), in whose view the establishment of Israel is an inadmissible anticipation of God's providence, you will not find any Israelis who would be ready to renounce their state. With whom, then, do you wish to talk?

Kadoumi: One cannot expect the Palestinians to talk with their enemy. Israel has occupied our country (RPT: keeps our country occupied) for 32 years, and the primary precondition is that it retreat from the occupied territories. Subsequently we shall be ready, within the framework of an international conference under the chairmanship of the United Nations, and with the attendance of all those involved in the conflict, to negotiate for a solution of the Mid-East crisis.

Note: "occupied territories" have been occupied for 32 years, not just since 1967.

Stern: When you say "occupied territories," what do you mean?

Kadoumi: For the present, the West Bank, the Golan Heights and the Gaza Strip.

Stern: That means - first of all the retreat, and afterwards you might talk.

Kadoumi: *First of all, the unconditional retreat. We have a documentary right on that part of Palestine. In 1947 there was a UN partition plan providing for two states.*

Stern: And which was turned down by the Arabs.

Kadoumi: *In that case we were like the mother who fought before King Solomon over her child. He suggested cutting the child in half. But the real mother said: "Let us live, let it not be divided."*

Stern: For this reason, the real mother gave the child to the other woman. Here there was a war instead. The country was partitioned for 19 years among Israel and Jordan. And, during that period, nobody ever mentioned an independent Palestinian state. Provided you were now to get this state on the West Bank and in Gaza - and there are not a few who would wish you to have it with all their heart - what would then happen to the remainder, to Israel in the 1948 boundaries?

Kadoumi: I shall make it perfectly clear to you. We shall never recognize Israel, never accept the usurper, the colonialist, the imperialist.

Stern: But then what?

Kadoumi: We shall fight for our right to return to our country.

Stern: Thereby you bind the hands of your friends.

Kadoumi: *Why?*

Stern: Your attitude means the destruction of the State of Israel.

Kadoumi: Yes, I want to destroy the enemy who keeps my homeland occupied, who has murdered my parents, my brothers and sisters. But we are not murderers; we do not want to lock them up in jails as they do to us. We have offered welcome and shelter to hundreds of thousands of them during and after the Second World War.

Stern: Not quite. There were enormous tensions and terrible armed conflicts.

Kadoumi: We are ready to live together with the Jews in a democratic state.

Stern: Which would be ruled by you, since you have the majority.

Kadoumi: Naturally.

Stern: There is all the difference between realpolitik and dreams.

Kadoumi: Dreams sometimes become true.

Stern: In your case, you need help for this. Libya has offered you protection over Lebanese airspace but the Syrians have not intervened in the recent fighting. Why not?

Kadoumi: Because this is a struggle between Palestinians and Israelis. The Syrians support us with weapons and with practical aid, but they do not want to become involved in a war into which the Israelis want to drag them with all their might. In my view, if an equilibrium of forces prevailed, the Syrians would not hesitate for a moment. But it has to be left to them to decide on the location and timing of the battle.

Stern: And Libya?

Kadoumi: Libya is far away. And, as for the protection of the airspace, that is for Lebanon to decide. We are not on Palestinian territory there.

Stern: In your opening address to the current conference you have denounced the US as an aggressor, and you have stated that the Soviet Union is your most trustworthy friends. One of the arguments with which Menachem Begin seeks to withhold potential aid from you is his claim that a future Palestinian state would necessarily be a Soviet satellite.

Kadoumi: We are a national movement. Everyone who can help us is welcome. The Syrians are helping us, as well as the Iraqis, the Libyans and the Chinese.

Stern: Does this aid take the form of arms?

Kadoumi: The Chinese were first. They provided us with arms. The Soviets, as well as the other socialist countries, provide us with both political and military aid.

Stern: And what do you demand in return?

Kadoumi: Really, what do the Palestinians have to offer?

Stern: Perhaps sometime in the future they will have something.

Kadoumi: But we are now talking about the present. Who can know the state of our relations with the Soviet Union in the future?

Stern: Are you looking for allies beyond any ideological orientation?

Kadoumi: Independently of any political and social system. If anyone would like to be our friends and help us with weapons - please, they are welcome.

Stern: Your Arab friends in the region are somewhat more reserved towards the Soviet Union.

Kadoumi: That might apply to Saudi Arabia. But King Hussein of Jordan has quite recently visited Moscow, and, to conclude from the joint communique, understanding between him and his hosts has been excellent. You see that there has been some change.

Stern: But it does not seem likely at present that, in an emergency, he would side with the Soviet Union.

Kadoumi: In case all-out war actually broke out, we would be the allies of the Soviet Union — for we prefer to be the friends of Communists, rather than to be the victims of the Zionist and imperialist occupation forces.

Stern: As we know, Communists, too, can be occupation forces.

Kadoumi: In the Arab world they are not.



Onondaga Valley Presbyterian Church

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SYRACUSE, NEW YORK 13207

LEONARD B. BJORKMAN, PASTOR

TELEPHONE: 469-0946

Dr. Raymond Tanter,
National Security Council,
Executive Office Bldg.,
Washington DC 200

file PLO

Dear Dr. Tanter:

My wife and I visited with you and Mr. Douglas Feith on July 7 and talked about the Palestine Liberation Organization. We mentioned that PLO leaders had said that, following the establishment of a West Bank/Gaza Palestinian state, the struggle to get the "rest of Palestine" would only be political, not military, in form. You mentioned that you had not heard this before and requested the reference for it. We are sorry that it has taken so long to get this to you, but matters such as vacation, some medical work, and then things getting going too fast at Church intervened.

So at long last, here are three articles in which this idea is put forth by various PLO leaders. One article is from the Christian Science Monitor, one from The Nation, and the last from Seven Days.

We are taking the liberty of enclosing one additional piece of literature, the updated news sheet from the latest issue (July/August 1981) of the superb Israeli peace journal, New Outlook. We thought that the distinctions about the PLO made by Gen (Res.) Shlomo Gazit were particularly interesting, as is the editorial following it, by Simha Flapan.

Again, thank you for the time which you spent with us on this issue.

Shalom and Salaam,

Len and Judy Bjorkman

October 7, 1981

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Findley says 'peace' bid by PLO definite

Latest Arafat gesture apparently ignored by US

By Daniel Southerland

Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

— Yasser Arafat, the Palestinian leader, has said more clearly than ever that he is ready to live in peace with Israel, but little response seems likely at this point from the United States.

If Mr. Arafat had said what he's saying now about a year ago — when President Carter appeared ready to open a dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) — it might have created a highly positive reaction here. But now all efforts in Washington are focused on securing an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Mr. Arafat's latest conciliatory declarations were greeted with minimal coverage by the American press and silence from the American Government.

American officials apparently believe that any goodwill gesture toward Mr. Arafat at this point might cause Israel to be-

come uncooperative, just as the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty negotiations move into their final stages.

Conditions not met

In August, 1977, President Carter called on the Palestinians to accept United Nations Resolution 242, which, in effect, trades Arab recognition of the State of Israel for withdrawal of the Israelis from Arab territories which they occupied in the 1967 war. Mr. Carter said that such acceptance would open an opportunity for the United States to start discussions with the Palestinians, as well as an avenue whereby they might participate in a Geneva peace conference on the Middle East.

At the time, the PLO seemed to be moving in the direction called for by Mr. Carter, but it stopped short of satisfying the conditions laid down by the President.

On Nov. 25 of this year, in lengthy conversations in Damascus with Rep. Paul Findley (R) of Illinois, Mr. Arafat said more clearly than ever before that if an independent Palestinian state were established on what is now the occupied West Bank and Gaza district, the PLO would "renounce any and all violent means to enlarge the territory of that state."

According to Mr. Findley, Mr. Arafat promised that such a Palestinian state "would live at peace with all of its neighbors" and would give "de facto recognition" to the State of Israel.

PLO acceptance seen

Mr. Findley, the senior Republican on the House Middle East subcommittee, received the assurances from the PLO leader in the course of a four-hour meeting during which the two men discussed each phrase of the Arafat statement in detail.

The congressman concluded that Mr. Arafat had agreed to the principles of Resolution 242 in sufficient detail to justify immediate talks between the US and the PLO. Last week Mr. Findley offered to discuss the Arafat declarations with President Carter and with a high-ranking State Department official. So far, he says, he has received no response from either the White House or the State Department.

"The pity is that our executive branch has given no recognition to the advance toward moderation which has occurred within the PLO," said Mr. Findley. "This puts the moderates in the PLO out on a limb. . . . If they get no recognition, they must ask themselves, 'Why take a chance?'"

This apparent trend toward moderation is not a totally new development. About six weeks ago, it was learned in Beirut that all the Palestinian guerrilla groups had agreed on a new program for the PLO which could open the way for PLO recognition of Israel. Some extremist phrases associated with the old program were removed from the new program, according to sources close to the PLO executive committee.

Arafat standing pat?

But while awaiting reaction from the United States, Mr. Arafat has apparently decided he has gone as far as he should in his public statements. In an interview Dec. 3 on the CBS television program "Face the Nation," Mr. Arafat stopped short of directly reaffirming what he had told Mr. Findley.

Some observers think Mr. Arafat missed a splendid opportunity, in his CBS appearance, to strengthen his case with the American public. Although the limitations of the Camp David accords are clear when it comes to provisions regarding the Palestinians, Mr. Arafat failed to provide any criticism of the details of the agreements.

He spent a good part of the interview digressing from the main points of the questions which had been raised, at one point lapsing into a description of the American weapons which Israel had used in its invasion of southern Lebanon earlier this year.

Gaza; it will thus encompass more than 70 percent of the Palestinian people and its area will be extensive enough to rehabilitate the refugees in the camps in Lebanon and elsewhere. Such a country can be at once an adequate expression of Palestinian nationalism and sufficiently viable to be a force for stability in the area. Whether it will be called Palestine, Palestine-Jordan, the United Arab Kingdom or the Republic of Palestine will be up to its population: but the Palestinian people cannot and should not be dissected into two states—a West Bank-Gaza state on the one hand and the Kingdom of Jordan on the other.

Can King Hussein be the linchpin for such a solution? There is no doubt that he can enter into meaningful negotiations with Israel only if he gets the blessing—overt or covert—of the more moderate elements within the P.L.O. If this happens, the present stalemate in which Israel and the P.L.O. are locked into a morass of mutual non-recognition can be breached, and a new beginning for Israeli-Palestinian coexistence can be envisaged, predicated on the right of each people to live in a sovereign state expressing its own national identity. □

Yael Lotan

To answer your questions I must first point out a number of facts which have become painfully obvious to anyone who knows Israel. In the past ten years there has been a grave deterioration in all

spheres of life in Israel. The country is in an acute crisis economically, socially, morally and politically (i.e., on the international level). If it was more secure in a military sense, perhaps one could accept all the other ills as inescapable sacrifices. But in reality the situation is very far from secure—bombs go off everywhere, public buildings are like fortresses, shells still fall on the cities and villages of the north, and the Israeli Army is embroiled up to its eyebrows in Lebanon.

These facts are indisputable, and so is their root cause—the military occupation of the territories seized in 1967. All the fine phrases about “an enlightened occupation” have proved to be so much double talk, and the precious acquisitions have turned out to be a cancer that is destroying the body politic which was Israel.

Now, to pretend that the Palestinian people are a new discovery, an invention of the left or of the Third World, is disingenuous at best. Palestinian Arab nationalism began in the 1920s, and has been a continuous struggle ever since. In 1947, the United Nations resolved that there should be two independent states in what was then British Mandatory Palestine, a Jewish and an Arab state. Granted, it is no fault of ours that the Palestinians were not allowed to achieve political independence then—but it should be plain by now that it is impossible to keep them down by force and still retain a semblance of political stability. King Hussein found this out; Israel is finding it out today.

What then should we do? In my opin-

ion *nothing* is worse than the continued occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. No mystagogical formulations will ever make it an acceptable status for the inhabitants. Their repression is undoing us all, and the Zionist dream is fast turning into a nightmare. We must therefore resolve to get out—not negotiate or haggle but simply *get out of there*. We may also express our hope that the political entity that will arise after our departure will see fit to establish neighborly relations with Israel. (I think they will want to do this for obvious reasons, one of them being the physical separation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.) Israel may also warn against any attempted buildup of offensive weaponry in these territories—and make it clear that it will act before such a buildup reaches threatening proportions.

But whatever happens after we evacuate these areas will be infinitely better than what is going on now. Israel before 1967 was a modest, decent and respectable little country, and the morale of its citizens was high. Today it is acting out a miniature *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, while remaining a beggar dependent on the handouts of friends. An independent Palestine is the only chance Israel has of surviving the twentieth century. With a bit of luck, we may even learn to become good neighbors. □

Yael Lotan is editor of Ariel, a quarterly magazine on Israeli art and culture sponsored by the Foreign Ministry of the Government of Israel.

ARTICLES.

■ BREAKING THE DEADLOCK

The Politics of The P.L.O.

MARTIN GARBUS

The current deadlock in the talks on autonomy for the peoples of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip underscores the indispensable role of the Palestinians in the peace process set in motion by the Camp David agreements. A lasting Middle Eastern peace settlement is impossible without addressing the demands of the Palestinians for self-determination, yet they are absent from

the bargaining table, and the one body that claims to speak for their interests—the Palestine Liberation Organization—is denied recognition by two of the parties to the talks. The Government of Israel refuses to accord diplomatic legitimacy to “terrorists” bent upon the destruction of Israel, and the United States supports its position. As President Carter said in his press conference of October 9, “We will not negotiate with the P.L.O. We will not recognize the P.L.O. until after the P.L.O. recognizes Israel’s right to exist and endorses United Nations Resolution 242 as a basis for Middle East peace.”

With equal obstinacy, the P.L.O. publicly withholds this recognition, although P.L.O. chief Yasir Arafat has emitted signals privately via third parties that he has sworn off terrorism and is ready to accept Resolution 242—if Israel recognizes the P.L.O.

Yet the political realities of the situation are more fluid than this diplomatic impasse suggests. Certainly, to Israel’s discomfiture, the P.L.O. has gained considerable support as

the bargaining agent for the Palestinian people in the last few years. Beginning with the conference of Arab nations at Rabat, Morocco, in 1974, when Jordan's King Hussein abandoned his nation's claim to speak for the Palestinians, more than one hundred sovereign nations have recognized the P.L.O. The Israelis say they cannot deal diplomatically with a group whose guiding National Covenant states: "The liberation of Palestine, from an Arab viewpoint, is a national duty to repulse the Zionist, Imperialist invasion from the great Arab homeland and to purge the Zionist presence from Palestine." But the P.L.O. covenant is not an immutable binding document. Actually, it is an evolving political statement that has been amended many times by the Palestine National Council.

For that matter, the P.L.O. is not a monolithic body, speaking with one voice. It is, rather, an umbrella organization composed of groups, factions and personalities representing a range of views. If we recognize that the diplomatic logjam is at bottom political and psychological, rather than legal, then an awareness of the factions and groups on the Palestinian side and what they stand for can at least highlight *political* realities, which present opportunities for circumventing the diplomatic impasse.

Within the P.L.O. there are nearly a dozen political parties—each with its own armed unit. Arafat, leader of Al Fatah, which he founded in 1965, is chairman of the P.L.O.'s governing fifteen-man Executive Committee. The Executive Committee was elected from the 300-member Palestine National Council, a body that convenes annually. The Executive Committee is dominated by Fatah. Very generally, the remainder of the P.L.O. can be divided into the groups that support Fatah's leadership and the "rejectionists" who, since 1974, have opposed what they claim is Arafat's eagerness to settle for "half of Palestine." Led by Dr. George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (P.F.L.P.), the rejectionist bloc has gained in political influence since Anwar el-Sadat's November 1977 visit to Jerusalem.

Militarily, however, the rejectionists are weak. They control less than 10 percent of the P.L.O.'s armed forces. Fatah can field 10,000 regular troops, plus another 10,000 militia. Under the terms of the Cairo Accords of 1969, the P.L.O. also governs the refugee camps in Lebanon where at least a quarter-million Palestinians live. The people in these camps are Arafat's constituency. And while the camps contain military bunkers, gun emplacements, training grounds and other military targets, they house a predominantly civilian population. Because of its governing responsibilities, the

P.L.O. is not solely a military organization; it is also a cumbersome bureaucracy, set up to administer the refugee camps. It manages schools, hospitals, factories, vocational workshops and social clubs. Pension benefits, unemployment allowances, disability payments and aid to the widows of fallen "martyrs" are doled out by a rather centralized hierarchy of paper-pushing officials. (Arafat's brother, a physician, is in charge of the string of clinics and hospitals operated by the P.L.O.) There are trade unions, writers' associations, women's groups and a host of other social-welfare committees operated by the organization. Much of this bureaucracy is financed by payroll taxes on the earnings of Palestinians working in the oilfields of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. Saudi Arabia also directly subsidizes the P.L.O.—and these payoffs in part explain why the organization is still dominated by an ideologically conservative leadership.

Arafat is no Marxist and hardly a revolutionary by any definition. Early in his career Arafat had connections with the extremely conservative Muslim Brotherhood organization. Arafat is first and foremost a nationalist. As an engineer he received his training in Abdel Nasser's Egypt and allegedly was once a partner in a large and profitable engineering firm in Kuwait. Despite the fractious nature of the coalition Arafat presides over, he has remained the single most important Palestinian leader for years. He has been "in office" longer than most other international figures. Thus, any discussion of the P.L.O. must start with his organization, Fatah.

Fatah's ability to endure is remarkable. William Quandt, until recently Zbigniew Brzezinski's Middle East adviser on the National Security Council, writing six years ago in *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism*, made observations about Fatah that are as correct today as they were then:

First, Fatah has been led by a small but relatively cohesive group of nationalists, several of whom have worked together for over a decade. Second, Fatah has developed a broad, nationalist appeal that can encompass supporters and recruits from nearly all ideological perspectives. Third, Fatah has declared its intention of avoiding inter-Arab quarrels, thus allowing it to receive aid and arms from Arab regimes as diverse as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Algeria, Syria, and Egypt. Finally, the simplicity of Fatah's nationalist political goals makes them understandable to the large mass of poorly educated Palestinians. By contrast, other groups have often engaged in highly sophisticated ideological debates that have little meaning to most potential recruits.

Arafat, through the years, has stayed in power by skillfully treading through a political mine field. Given the traditional and badly fragmented society from which he drew his support, and facing, more often than not, hostility from nearly all of the Arab countries, he owes his survival to more than exploiting anti-Israel feelings among nations. The "moderates," under Arafat's direction from the start, were in control of the weapons and money of the movement and particularly of its institutions. They, being less revolutionary would, prior to Camp David, have been prepared to accept a nationalistic peace tinged with Arabism.

In the past, Arafat, speaking for all of the centrists and

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rightists of Fatah, has been able to count on the support of the Syrian-sponsored al Sa'iq'a group (the second biggest organization after Fatah) and of the Marxist Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (D.F.L.P.) led by Nayef Hawatmeh, which also enjoyed Syrian support. Although Arafat tried to keep a broad base of Arab support, in the end he came to rely for money mainly on Saudi Arabia and the other conservative states of the Persian Gulf, as well as on Syria.

On their part, the rejectionists have depended mainly on Iraq and to a lesser extent on Libya and Algeria, although Algeria tried not to favor any group in particular. In addition to Dr. Habash's P.F.L.P., the radicals comprise the Iraqi-sponsored Arab Liberation Front (A.L.F.), the P.F.L.P. General Command of Ahmad Jibril, and two small groups, the Popular Struggle Front (P.S.F.) and the Palestine Liberation Front (P.L.F.). Many of them believe that the Palestinians' differences with Egypt and Jordan are really as great as their differences with Israel. While the P.F.L.P. will never dominate the Palestinian movement, it has had an impact far beyond its numbers. The depth of the rejectionists' opposition to any compromise with Israel is evidenced by their assassination of men like the P.L.O.'s London representative, Said Hammami, and several others who openly talked of negotiating with Israel (see Christopher Hitchens, "Blood Feuds Among the Palestinians," *The Nation*, September 2, 1978).

Such marked differences of opinion over basic policy help to explain Arafat's own shifting position. He can still exercise overall direction of the P.L.O.'s proceedings, but with each passing year it becomes more difficult. This was seen most clearly in the new alignments formed at the Palestine National Council meeting last January. For the first time, the radicals within the council were joined by the D.F.L.P. and the al Sa'iq'a in an alliance against Fatah. One of the major items on the agenda of the meeting had been an agreement to allow the P.F.L.P., which had pulled out of the P.L.O. in 1974, to resume its place on the Executive Committee. Arafat sought to increase Fatah's numbers on the Executive Committee in proportion to the additional P.F.L.P. representation, but was unable to muster the necessary votes. In order to prevent an open split within the P.L.O., the P.F.L.P.'s return to the Executive Committee was postponed and Fatah's domination of the committee continued. To demands by the radicals that he dissociate himself from "reactionary regimes," Arafat lashed back: "You may well attack these regimes, but I received \$67 million in 1978 from Saudi Arabia for the struggle in the occupied territories and every day I have to fill the bellies of 230,000 people in Lebanon."

The radicals and hard-liners within the Palestine National Council were able to make common cause against Fatah in part because of the new alliance between Syria and Iraq which removed the need for the rivalry between the D.F.L.P. and al Sa'iq'a and the Iraqi-backed radical groups—who had always had more in common than they could publicly admit.

This power shift inside the Executive Committee of the P.L.O. has placed Arafat on the defensive. As long as he is excluded from the Camp David structure of peace negotiations, he cannot produce anything concrete for his constituency. And so he has been, in the words of Sadat, "running after the Americans to establish a dialogue." If Arafat were to win U.S. recognition—even the kind of unofficial *de facto* recognition that would derive from face-to-face talks with U.S. officials—his hand against the rejectionist bloc inside the P.L.O. would be greatly strengthened. Indeed, it can be said that the political strength of the rejectionist bloc in the post-Camp David period stems precisely from Arafat's exclusion from the Washington-orchestrated negotiations. Knowing that Washington refuses to deal with Arafat has confirmed the arguments made by the rejectionists that any hint of a willingness by the P.L.O. to negotiate will be peremptorily rejected by the Israelis.

Arafat, after all, has engineered a number of shifts in the P.L.O.'s official position. One of the more significant of these occurred back in 1974 when the organization officially adopted the Transitional Program, which advocated that the P.L.O. assume sovereignty over *any portion* of "Palestine" subsequently liberated. The Transitional Program, drafted by Hawatmeh, does not supersede the P.L.O.'s National Covenant calling for a secular state in the whole of "Palestine." But Hawatmeh and others have frequently interpreted the program as meaning that once a sovereign Palestinian state is created in the West Bank and Gaza, "armed struggle" will be abandoned and a peaceful assimilation of the Jewish state sought, a gradualist approach that will take several generations. This strategy has been strongly supported by Abu Iyad, the deputy chief of the P.L.O., who recently said, "As for myself, I maintain that there will be no more subversive Palestinian activities the day we have a state to run, and above all to safeguard. Extremism will vanish from our ranks, even from those of the [rejectionist] front. . . ."

Abu Iyad's "revolutionary" statements elicited no response from the Israeli Government. They were reported so cursorily in the Israeli press that few in Israel knew about them. Then, on January 12, 1979, an article by Meir Merhav appeared in *The Jerusalem Post*, an independent centrist paper. Merhav's article, entitled "Falling on Deaf Ears," criticized the ostrich position of the Israeli Government "The latest instance of this contradictory obliviousness," Merhav wrote,

is the virtual silence, on the part of the government, politicians and the press, about the statements by Abu Iyad in the forthcoming book, *Palestinian Without a Country*. His statements that the P.L.O. will settle for a Palestinian mini-state on the West Bank and Gaza, that it will accord at least *de facto* recognition to Israel, that its main immediate goal is to obtain a locus for Palestinian national identity—no matter how circumscribed—are not essentially new. Nor is it news that all statements and resolutions to that effect have been consistently ignored by Israel. What is new in these statements is, first of all, the personality and authority of the person making them. Salah Khalaf, better known by his *nom de guerre* of Abu Iyad, is no less than the Chief of

Special Operations of Fatah, the P.L.O.'s controlling organization. He is Yasir Arafat's deputy and the archterrorist of the organization. When Abu Iyad declares that, upon the establishment of a Palestinian mini-state, the P.L.O. will forswear acts of terrorism and subversion, the declaration is at least worth listening to.

Abu Iyad's statements do not stand alone. In January 1979 a delegation of Americans, including Alan Solomonow, director of the Middle East Peace Project, met in Damascus with Farouk Kaddoumi, director of the political department of the P.L.O. leadership. An account of their meeting was reported in *Yediot Aharonot*, one of Israel's larger, more conservative papers.

Kaddoumi said that the P.L.O. could accept the autonomy concept if Israel would recognize the P.L.O. and Palestinians who live outside the West Bank and Gaza. The P.L.O. would agree to consider autonomy if: (1) instead of a transition period of five years until the establishment of a permanent status for the West Bank and Gaza, the transition were three years; (2) instead of Israeli forces in the autonomous area during the transition period, there were international forces, perhaps under United Nations auspices, and (3) the debate on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza at the end of the transition period were to leave open the alternative of a Palestinian state.

Kaddoumi denied that the P.L.O.'s present position is solely tactical and that once it gets an independent state it will then seek to absorb all of Israel. "We are willing," he said, "to agree to any international security guarantees and promises that Israel will demand." And then, in words similar to those Arafat used in speaking to Representative Paul Findley in January 1979, he said: "As soon as we have a state, we shall recognize Israel's secure borders and Israel's right to live in peace." He went on to say that some kind of gesture by Israel—an announcement of a willingness to make a symbolic withdrawal from the West Bank, for example—would produce a meaningful shift within the entire P.L.O. and enable the moderates to assume a more visible role.


One more example in this vein will suffice. In the autumn 1977 issue of the P.L.O.'s *Journal of Palestine Studies*,

Sabri Jiryis, head of the Israel section of the P.L.O. research center in Beirut, cited a resolution approved by the Palestinian National Council at its thirteenth session in Cairo in March 1977, calling for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state "*in part of the territory of Palestine*" (author's italics). He says this indicates that a considerable change has taken place in the attitude of the Palestinian national movements in general and the P.L.O. in particular. Nearly two years later, Jiryis told the Solomonow group, "Our official position is: A Palestinian independent state alongside Israel. The issue is trying to get a reaction from the other side."

The negotiations with the Palestinians will be arduous and may take years. An atmosphere must be created at the negotiating tables that will allow wounds to heal. Creating that atmosphere is in some ways as important as agreeing on boundary lines.

In Israel and Egypt, a great deal of time is being spent at present on the meaning of the word "autonomy," but not enough on the word and concept of "occupation." As the year goes on, the occupation will intensify; new settlements on the West Bank will incite new terrorism by the Palestinians. The recent Israeli decision to allow private citizens to buy land in the West Bank can only be seen by the Palestinians as a further provocation. The occupation is an occupation in the true sense of the word. Demonstrations are forbidden, children participating in peaceful protests are roughly treated, land and property are easily expropriated from Arabs under the pretext of national security.

Prior to 1976, one might have argued that the P.L.O. did not truly represent the Palestinians on the West Bank. But that view was dispelled by the West Bank mayoralty elections (won almost completely by candidates publicly pledged to the P.L.O.) and by the present political currents in the West Bank, most particularly by the political activism of young Palestinian students at Bir Zeit University. The new West Bank settlements are the best recruiting device the P.L.O. ever had. The mayors of the West Bank, along with the government in exile, uniformly rejected the Egyptian-



Israeli peace treaty. The only mayor on the West Bank elected in 1976 without P.L.O. support, Elias Freij of Bethlehem, called the Camp David accords "a legalization of Israeli occupation." The peace treaty has thus further succeeded in uniting the Palestinian Arabs.

Some feel that Prime Minister Menachem Begin has gone as far as he realistically can. He was elected primarily for his domestic policies and the probabilities are that his party will, because of domestic policies, lose the next election. Inflation is rampant and the Government seems helpless. The Israeli peace movement's growing influence was recently underscored when Moshe Dayan resigned in opposition to Begin's hard-line stance in the autonomy talks.

One cannot avoid the prospect that at some point, Israeli leaders will be sitting down for face-to-face negotiations with Palestinian leaders. A comprehensive peace settlement cannot be achieved without Palestinian involvement. In the harsh light of world opinion, Israel's refusal to talk with the only organization that claims to speak for the Palestinians looks increasingly untenable. Arguments against talking to "terrorists" miss the point—particularly so when you realize that there are many within the P.L.O. willing to lay down their guns in return for a mini-state in the West Bank and Gaza. The very complexity of the P.L.O., its internal factions and ideological differences, suggests that opportunities exist to influence the course of Palestinian leadership. Those who wish to see the survival of the state of Israel, as I do, should not let these opportunities pass. □

■ SAFEGUARDS & CIVIL LIBERTIES

Nuclear Power and The Constitution

JOHN SHATTUCK

There are many facets to the growing national debate over atomic power, but probably none is more important than the impact nuclear development is beginning to have on civil liberties. Because the nuclear debate has centered around more visible and immediate issues of environment, health, safety and weaponry, civil libertarians skeptical about the constitutional dimension of these issues have generally stayed on the sidelines. Recent events may have changed that. Secrecy, official deception, violations of due process and political spying have emerged as major byproducts of nuclear power.

One dramatic example is the nuclear Watergate that occurred when the Government systematically deceived the public for twenty-five years about the effects of nuclear testing on the health of soldiers and residents in Nevada and

Utah in the early 1950s. They were told they were participating in a great public experiment and that fears of health hazards were "Communist-inspired scare stories." Documents disclosed in Congressional hearings last spring showed that the Eisenhower Administration followed a policy of deliberately misinforming the public about the dangers of low-level radiation. This was as serious an abuse of power as Watergate, and far more lethal.

Secrecy and official deception have also been spawned by commercial nuclear development. *The New York Times* reported earlier this year about a man in upstate New York who worked for the Nuclear Materials and Engineering Corporation, a subsidiary of Atlantic Richfield Company. The man had been asked to go into a crawl space in a silo holding 1,700 tons of high-grade uranium ore to see how the silo could be emptied. He incurred a huge overdose of low-level radiation, and six months later contracted massive cancer of the intestines, liver and spleen. After his death, two men claiming to be Federal agents came to his widow's house and demanded his employment records, saying they were classified. Meanwhile, the company refused to turn over to the widow many of her husband's medical files, asserting that they had been lost or misplaced. In short, responsible officials seemed to be going out of their way to cover up what may have been a typical case of low-level radiation poisoning.

We have also learned about another kind of secrecy in *The Progressive* case. The broadest and longest prior restraint in American history was in effect during much of 1979 against a magazine seeking to publish information obtained from public sources about the H-bomb. The Carter Administration's secrecy mania in this case proved to be even greater than the Nixon Administration's in the Pentagon Papers litigation. Government lawyers sought ratification by the courts of a new "born classified" theory intended to impose an official hammerlock on all information pertaining to nuclear weapons.

Next, we have learned about major due process violations in the licensing and operation of unsafe nuclear power plants:

§ The breakdown of procedural regulatory authority in the Three Mile Island crisis last March was epitomized by a comment of Nuclear Regulatory Commission chairman Joseph Hendrie recorded during one of the commission's closed meetings at the height of the crisis: "What's that amendment that protects freedom of the press? Whatever it is, I'm against it." In late July, the much-publicized Citizens' Advisory Panel, which President Carter set up after Three Mile Island, was disbanded after only one meeting because the panel was demanding too much information from the N.R.C.

§ An indication of the public's attitude toward procedural shortcuts in nuclear regulation was the \$10-million jury verdict last March for the family of Karen Silkwood, a worker in an Oklahoma plutonium reprocessing plant who had sued the company for a wide variety of health and safety violations, and who died in an automobile accident that occurred under highly suspicious circumstances.

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Yasir Abd Rabbo

Seven Days Interview

The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (formerly the Democratic Popular Front) is a Marxist-Leninist organization under the leadership of Nayef Hawatmeh, an intellectual from a Christian family. In comparison with Al-Fatah and the pro-Syrian Al-Saiqa, the Democratic Front is a small organization; its membership is generally limited to educated youths.

However, it has played a crucial role in defining the program and goals of the Palestinian liberation movement. It was the first organization to spell out a preference for a secular, socialist binational (Arab and Jewish) state in Palestine. It spearheaded the call for the establishment of a separate Palestinian state in the occupied territories to be evacuated by Israel. And its leaders were among the first Palestinians in exile to seek contacts with progressive Israelis and Israeli publications.

We (David Dellinger, Don Luce, Ramsey Clark, Frederick Jameson, and I) met for about two hours with Yasir Abd Rabbo in the heavily guarded headquarters of the Democratic Front. Mr. Abd Rabbo, one of its leading ideologues, devoted most of his opening remarks to an analysis of United States policy in the Middle East as it affected the Palestinian question. Later he answered some questions we addressed to him. Following are some selections from that conversation. —EQBAL AHMAD

How do you expect U.S. policy to evolve in the near future, and what will be your response?

U.S. policy suffers from multiple strains and contradictory aims. The Carter administration has continued the policy devised during the Nixon government. But it must cope with the failure of Kissinger's strategy. It seeks to remove Soviet influence in the Middle East without wanting to reduce the economic and strategic gains of detente. Washington has now realized the impossibility of eliminating the Palestinian liberation movement, though it is unwilling to grant the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. Hence, the U.S. has changed its tactics, and now occasionally floats rumors about recognition of the

PLO and creates illusions of a settlement based on the restoration of Palestinian rights. The imperialists want to freeze the situation in the area; but given the conditions prevailing in the Middle East and in the Palestinian movement, this is an impossible goal. Hence, we expect a period of crisis, of desperate maneuverings and pressures against us, a period of escalating tensions.

The United Nations is scheduled soon to discuss an amendment to Resolution 242. Will the Democratic Front accept 242 if it is amended to include Palestinian rights?

We shall support a resolution which recognizes our rights to self-determination and to return and which moves us further toward the establishment of a Palestinian state. However, we believe that the U.S. will veto such a resolution. Even if it were passed, it could not be enforced anyway. In that sense the question of amending 242 is unimportant.

What kind of a Palestinian state do you envision?

We reject what is known as the Vance Plan of 1977—a Palestinian entity in the West Bank and Gaza—with minor adjustments. Disarmed; with open frontiers; and linked by special ties to Jordan. It is a cos-



Nayef Hawatmeh, leader of the Democratic Front. SYGMA

meticized version of the Allon Plan of 1967. We insist on an independent Palestinian state which will have full rights and obligations of sovereignty.

What will that state be like, what will its relations be with its neighbors?

We believe that at this stage the following is most favorable: (a) the establishment of an independent Palestinian state; (b) the organization and consolidation of that state by a front of national unity; (c) during at least the first five years this new state will have to absorb nearly a million incoming citizens. Its energies shall be devoted to reconstruction; (d) the reuniting of the Palestinian people and reforming of the state must be achieved in a democratic framework. We would prefer a parliamentary system with multi-proportional representation. Yes [he smiles] an arrangement rather similar to Israel's. But, at this stage, we shall need a system capable of absorbing shocks and conflicts, and of accommodating Palestinian social realities.

You seem to be committed to the establishment of a socialist state by parliamentary means. Is not your position similar to Euro-Communism?

Perhaps. We do not believe that there is only one road to socialist power.

The Democratic Front has been the indicator and champion of the goal of a secular, democratic, binational, socialist state in Palestine. What will happen to your original vision of a binational socialist republic when you accept a separate Palestinian state next to Israel?

This cannot be done by military means; we need a favorable terrain for political struggle toward a binational, socialist state. The establishment of a Palestinian state will create the necessary objective conditions for such a struggle. We believe that the establishment of a Palestinian state will put an end to Zionist expansionism, which is the mobilizing force in Israeli society. When you take it away, Israel will open up to class struggle and the pressures of the non-European elements currently suffering discrimination.

Also there are half a million Palestinians in Israel. They can be a major factor in a political struggle to end the theocratic, racist basis of the Zionist state.

We do not really know what the future of Israel will be. If it comes to terms with the Palestinian reality, if we establish our own state, perhaps Israel's meaning, its ideology, its dynamic as an expansionist settler state will have qualitatively changed. □

new outlook



news letter

July 1981

The rapid pace of events in the Middle East periodically requires us to put out a special newsletter, to supplement the regular issue of NEW OUTLOOK.

July, 1981, has been a particularly violent month. The Israeli Government initiated a series of "pre-emptive" raids against P.L.O. positions in Lebanon. The P.L.O. responded with Katyusha rocket bombing of villages and settlements in northern Israel. As the I.A.F. escalated the level of the raids to include P.L.O. offices located within civilian concentrations in Beirut, hundreds of civilians, men, women, and children were killed. In the course of the P.L.O. rocket raids on northern Israel, tens of Israeli civilian men, women, and children were killed and wounded.

After close to two weeks of violence, a cease-fire was arranged, through the offices of American envoy Philip Habib, and the U.N. Thus, for the first time, a major agreement has been worked out which involves both the Israeli government and the P.L.O. There is a feeling both in Israel and abroad, that the dramatic and tragic events of the past few weeks will have far-reaching implications for Middle East politics, and the future pace and nature of the peace process.

THE CHRONOLOGY -

"It is important to remember that in the past few months, the terrorist organizations have not initiated any bombings of Israeli villages, other than in response to activities that were initiated by the I.D.F...."

(Yitzhak Rabin - "Yediot Ahronot" July 19, 1981)

In order to illustrate the above comment, NEW OUTLOOK has gone to the archives of the "Jerusalem Post" in order to present the chronological development of the events during the recent crisis in the north.

I.A.F. RAIDS TERRORIST POSITIONS

(Hirsh Goodman - J.P. July 21, 1981)

The past two days of activity on the northern border follows 5 weeks of quiet, and it is not known what triggered Israel's Friday afternoon raid against terrorist positions. That raid was promptly followed by the Katyusha attack on Kiryat Shmona... Military sources in Israel reiterated that this was part of Israel's on-going pre-emptive fight against the terrorists, designed to keep them on the defensive and preclude attacks against Israel before they could be carried out.

TERRORIST TARGETS AGAIN BOMBED

(J.P. Reporter - July 15, 1981)

Israeli jets yesterday downed a Syrian plane that was interfering with the bombing operation against two terrorist bases in Lebanon, an I.D.F. spokesman said... A least 5 persons were reported killed, and 18 wounded, some seriously, in the 90 minute raid, concentrating near the coastal town of Damour, and around the southern market town of Nabatiyah, Reuter said. Phalangist radio in Beirut reported that 27 had died in the attack....

3 KILLED IN HEAVY ROCKET ATTACK

(J.P. Staff July 16, 1981)

Palestinian terrorists in Lebanon yesterday unleashed their heaviest attack in years against the northern border

town of Kiryat Shmona and Nahariya, killing 3 Israelis and wounding 25... The attacks began around 5:30 P.M. and continued intermittently for about an hour. U.N. observers indicated that the rockets came from Nabitya area, which was bombed on Tuesday by Israeli jets...

HUNDREDS OF CASUALTIES IN BEIRUT RAID

(J.P. Middle East Reporter and Wire Services, July 19, 1981)

The above headline was the secondary lead story on Sunday, July 19th, since the raid took place on Friday, July 17th, and there was no newspaper on Saturday, July 18th. The following story was the lead story on the same day.

GALILEE SHELLING CONTINUES AFTER RAID ON BEIRUT

Jeffrey Heller, J.P. July 19, 1981)

Sporadic terrorist shelling from Lebanon aimed at settlements along Israel's northern border continued throughout the weekend and into last night, following Israel's air raids on terrorist headquarters in Beirut on Friday.

A RESPITE

(Excerpts from the "Jerusalem Post" Editorial, July 26, 1981)

The cease-fire that went into effect on Friday, arranged through the good offices of U.S. envoy Philip Habib, has come as a welcome relief to all parties... The PLO has for the first time emerged as a party to military-political agreement with Israel - however much Begin has sought to screen out the fact - and Arafat has been able to project for world consumption an impression of political sensibility...

YITZHAK RABIN

The following are excerpts from a front-page article in the mass-circulation daily "Yediot Ahronot" (7/19/81), written by former Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief M.K. Yitzhak Rabin.

"My premise, in this instance is, that we cannot eliminate the strength of the terrorist organizations in Lebanon by military means, nor can we cause them to cease their activities... Even if the Israeli air-force were to continue its massive raids for a month, as it has been acting for the past week, even then the terrorists would not cease their activities. There is no military solution to this problem, because there is no intention to try to conquer Lebanon and hold on to it for any length of time... The problem is, how to prevent the terrorists from infiltrating and firing on Israeli territory... I believe that the contribution of the current raids to the prevention of infiltration is not very great, I would risk an estimate of 2 or 3 % effectiveness within the over-all effort to prevent terrorist activities... I doubt the effectiveness of striking at the infrastructure and the headquarters of the terrorists, as a method of preventing activity against Israel, perhaps the opposite is true... It is important to remember that in the past few months, the terrorist organizations have not initiated any bombings of Israeli villages, other than in response to activities that were initiated by the I.D.F...."

The current Government policy - constant and unselective raids, causes some damage to the terrorists, but it cannot stop the disruption of life in the Israeli villages in

the north. It's been a year since the Government began these initiated raids in the north, and as far as I can tell, it hasn't caused a weakening of the strength of the terrorists. The contrary may be true. For the past year we have witnessed a great increase in the strength of the terrorists of Lebanon... I don't want to say, that this great increase in their strength wouldn't have happened if it weren't for the current policy - but this policy certainly didn't prevent it. Who knows, perhaps it encouraged it? Perhaps the Israeli military pressure created a political base that enabled Arab and other factors to help the terrorists in a massive way?...

As a citizen of the State of Israel, I am not proud, and I am not happy about the fact, that the Israeli air-force was involved in any activity, in which so many civilians were killed and wounded...

There is no military solution for the problem of the terrorist organizations, only a political one. Without a comprehensive peace, we will have to spend much more time in a war against the terrorist organizations. We will not destroy the PLO through bombing from the air, and no-one should have any illusions about this matter..."

SHLOMO GAZIT

Prime Minister Begin is incapable of mentioning the P.L.O. without adding the adjectives "so-called", "terrorist", and "murderous organizations."

Gen. (Res.) Shlomo Gazit, the former head of military intelligence, who is currently President of Ben-Gourion-University in Be'ersheva, provided a different definition in an interview in "Davar" (7/24/81), which clearly distinguishes between terrorist, military, and political activity.

Quest: According to the reports, the terrorists are building an infrastructure and arming themselves with heavy weapons - with tanks, cannon, and missiles.

Quest: According to the reports, the terrorists are building an infrastructure and arming themselves with heavy weapons - with tanks, cannon, and missiles.

Gazit: But these are not the terrorists. We try to put them all into one category. Every Palestinian that we are fighting against is labled by us a terrorist. Actually, we should distinguish between 3 groups: The P.L.O., which is an anti-Israeli political organization of the Palestinians; the terrorist organizations, whose purpose is to carry out sabotage and terrorist activities against Israel and to be an agitator factor; and the Palestinian Liberation Army (P.L.A.), which was founded some time ago, whose purpose is to mobilize the masses of Palestinian youth into regular army units...

Quest: If we hadn't attacked the P.L.A. units, would we have calm on our borders today?

Gazit: If we hadn't attacked the units, it is reasonable to assume that the level of terrorist activity today would have been the same as in the past.

Quest: Did the targets that were attacked in Beirut belong to the terrorists?

Gazit: Only some of them. We also attacked a political office of the P.L.O. in Beirut, and we label it the terrorist headquarters. In my eyes, a terrorist is only someone who belongs to one of the terrorist organizations, including the headquarters and the planning bodies of the terrorist organizations, but not the political level.

Quest: Why not, after-all, it is the political level which is directing them?

Gazit: If you want to, you have the right to declare war on the entire P.L.O., including the political establishment, in all of its dimensions... Does that mean that you are fighting against everyone who has a membership card in the P.L.O. - young or old, politician or university lecturer. In the United States there are professors in universities, who are members of the P.L.O. council. Are you fighting against them?

Quest: How, in your opinion, should we act, in order to bring about an end to terrorist activity?

Gazit: In the end, the path to a solution, is the path that Israel is taking - the peace process and the search for a political answer. And we have to remember that the Arabs are intertwined. It is not possible to maintain a peace process with Egypt while waging, at the same time, war against another Arab element.

EDITORIAL:

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

Mr Begin has delivered a service of extraordinary importance to the PLO. For years the Israeli peace forces have been trying - without success - to convince the Israeli public that the Palestinian problem is at the heart of the Israeli-Arab conflict, that peace cannot be achieved without its solution and that no solution can be achieved by force. Mr. Begin has done it in one week.

For years the PLO has been trying to prove that it represents the whole Palestinian people, that neither a cease-fire nor a peace settlement can be achieved by excluding it from negotiations. They have achieved considerable recognition in the world, at the UN and in Europe, but not much in the US and nothing in Israel. Mr. Begin has changed this situation dramatically, in one stroke. He did not do it by talks and negotiations. He recognized the PLO as a partner to negotiations and elevated it to unprecedented prestige and legitimacy by indiscriminate bombing of population centers in Beirut, which shocked the whole world and provoked a revulsion of Israel's closest friends and allies.

Mr. Begin declared a total war against the Palestinian National Movement, initiated a system of unprecedented oppression of the Palestinians in the occupied territories struggling for their national rights and started a strategy of pre-emptive attacks to liquidate the PLO military infrastructure in Lebanon. The results were the opposite military infrastructure in Lebanon. The results were the opposite of his expectations. The PLO withstood the attacks in spite of the heavy casualties and terrible suffering of the innocent population and managed even to cause with its retaliation of Katyushas on civilian settlements not so many casualties but serious moral, psychological, and economic difficulties to Israel and a dangerous strain in its relations with the US.

As a result it was Mr. Begin himself, for whom the PLO is only a "gang of murderers", who was forced to accept indirect negotiations with the PLO and accept a cease-fire agreement signed by Mr. Arafat.

Mr. Begin has caused enormous damage to Israel's position in the world. With his speeches, acts and declarations, he strengthens the credibility of Arab propaganda that Zionism is full of racism and that Israel is a state executing apartheid and brutal oppression of 1.5 million Palestinians and pursuing a policy of military oppression against the Arab world.

Not long ago, Mr. Begin condemned Syrian artillery shelling of the town of Zahle, where the Phalangists installed themselves, as a "genocide" of the Christian population and called upon the democracies, the Church and the "Free World" to stand up against the continuation of Hitler's holocaust policies. This did not prevent him from bombarding civilian centers in Beirut on the grounds that it contains PLO "headquarters" (which are in fact offices of a political movement, not military bases).

The cease-fire is signed. Where do we go from here? Back to violence and military clashes with terrible suffering of civilians on both sides and an escalation to a major war? Or - forward to negotiations on a peace settlement? This requires a dramatic change of attitudes on both sides. Many Israelis begin to understand that a Palestinian State alongside and in peace with Israel could be a solution. Their numbers would increase and their influence become more effective if the Palestinians too reach the conclusion that only by negotiations, the recognition of Israel's existence and sovereignty, can they achieve their own self-determination. Statements like that of Mr Farouk Kadoumi to "Der Spiegel" that even an independent Palestinian state will not recognize and sign a peace treaty with Israel - are not likely to bring change in Israel's policies. The PLO has gained prestige by signing a cease-fire agreement. It can achieve more if it endorses an explicit peace program.

S.F.

Mr. Simha Flapan wishes to inform his friends that his house address is now 18 Bergson St., Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv 69106 (tel. 411 836).

File
SYRIA-PLO: Reining in Arafat

President Assad is attempting to weaken PLO leader Arafat's control over the Palestinian movement and align him more closely with Syria. (S)

Assad is upset with Arafat for not consulting Damascus in advance on key matters such as accepting the cease-fire in Lebanon in July and his discussions with French Foreign Minister Cheysson in Beirut last month. Even before the Cheysson visit, Assad showed his displeasure by ordering Arafat to close several Fatah offices in Syria. Now, [REDACTED] Assad has threatened to stop indefinitely all arms shipments through Syria for the PLO in Lebanon--a move that would deny the Palestinians their principal conduit for military supplies. ~~(S NF NC OC)~~

Damascus is also tightening its control over the pro-Syrian Saiqa Palestinian organization and encouraging the smaller groups within the PLO to oppose Arafat's free-wheeling behavior. [REDACTED] the Syrians are encouraging Fatah dissident Abu Nidal to stage terrorist operations to discredit Arafat and undermine his policy of limiting such operations to Israel and the Israeli-occupied territories. ~~(S NF NC OC)~~

The Syrians fear that Arafat, left unchecked, might find a way to open a dialogue with the US and with moderate Arabs on the Palestinian question, without reference to Syria. They are determined to bring the PLO under Syrian control, because they view their leverage over the Palestinians as the principal bargaining chip in any future negotiations for the return of the Golan Heights. ~~(S)~~

Arafat has sought to preserve his room for maneuver by moving some military assets in Lebanon to areas outside Syrian control and by stressing the PLO's intention to continue importing arms through Lebanese ports.

[REDACTED] Arafat hopes to counter Syrian political pressure by drawing closer to [REDACTED] Arafat's Fatah group, moreover, has contacts with Syrian dissidents and, if relations deteriorate further, could aid the anti-Assad Syrians. ~~(S NF NC OC)~~

people they used to look down on.

Those that can't modernize surely will die unless a president, Reagan or Carter, is so misguided as to save them. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel is one such company. It's paid one dividend in five years; the recession has devastated it and the estimated age of its equipment must be near double the industry average.

Kaiser Steel is another company that looks better dead than alive from an investor's point of view. It's been selling off its very valuable holdings in gas, oil, coal, and iron ore so that it has a lot of cash and a creaky California steel plant that can't compete. Recently Kaiser was awarded a chunk of the new Alaska gas pipeline business, but one suspects that was government-arranged charity. Such things can't go on forever. We hope.

Right now, for those who hunger after a steel investment, the Fool suggests a Canadian company, Stelco. They are going to get a nice chunk of that Alaska pipeline business, since a considerable part of the route goes through Canada. They've recently completed the first all-new steel plant to be built in North America in almost a generation, so they have the efficiency to generate profits, profits, profits.

An American firm your Fool recommends is Nucor, a thoroughly modernized steel-maker. Liberals will be delighted to know it has a non-union work force, so nobody's going to get uppity, and a management with a reputation for energy and imagination. Nucor not only makes steel, it also specializes in manufacturing steel joists, decking for factory floors and roofs. If all this tax incentive stuff does result in a big splurge of factory building our guys from Nucor should get their share of the business.

With both Stelco and Nucor you're not buying for the dividends—which ain't much—but with the hope that the price of the stock will zoom skyward and you'll get rich, rich, rich. But don't expect that to happen immediately.

Another stock that doesn't pay much in the way of dividends is Sony. You might want to buy in here on the if-you-can't-lick-'em-join-'em principle. Sony has developed such customer loyalty in the US that it's doubtful consumers will let protectionists keep their merchandise out of the country. Beyond that, Sony's hottest new seller, the Betamax video tape recorder, can't be kept out of the country because no American company has an American machine to market. VTR's with American labels are actually either Sonys or are made by Sony's chief rival, Matsushita. Moreover, there's every reason to think these recorders are going to be the next big home appliance buy. Drop us a line if you get rich.

One more treasonous pick—Bic. Yes, the people who make the ballpoint pens and the disposable cigarette lighters and razors. Bic is almost 60 percent French owned and very definitely French operated. Its people are very tough businessmen who make money by making these products cheaper than anybody else can. They are also first-rate merchandisers, as their principal competitors, the Gillette company, might tell you in a moment of exhausted candor.

Or you can buy American. But only the noble put patriotism over profit.

Nicholas von Hoffman

Nicholas von Hoffman is a syndicated columnist.

How the PLO became a moderate, peace-loving nation.

'Time' Against Israel

by Rael Jean Isaac

For the last seven years, and with accelerating tempo after 1977, *Time* has engaged in vigorous adversary journalism against Israel. In doing so *Time* has practiced subversion—literally, "the

Rael Jean Isaac is the author of *Israel Divided* (Johns Hopkins) and *Parties and Politics of Israel* (Longmans).

turning of a thing upside down or uprooting it from its position." *Time* is not simply inaccurate: it stands facts, words, and moral principles on their heads to achieve its portrait of the Arab-Israel conflict.

Time's coverage of Israel up until 1970 was reasonably balanced. After Nasser's death, *Time* began to shift blame for the

stalemate in the Middle East. The 1973 war brought a substantial tilt against Israel, leavened for a while with a certain disarming frankness. Thus on March 10, 1975, *Time* reported that Israel's enemies, in taxing the economies of Israel's friends, were taxing their loyalties, and noted "Western Europe appears willing to bargain away Israel's

security for access to oil." Only gradually did *Time* internalize constraints into principles. The process was complete by 1980. On April 14 *Time* raised the possibility that the growing number of supporters for the Palestinian cause was, in Israeli ambassador Yehuda Blum's words, "a sorry parade of nations supplicating the Arab oil gods"—only to dismiss this view in the same article as "a dangerous misapprehension of the Begin government." By 1980 it is hard to talk of a dual standard in *Time*: it now has no standards whatsoever in its coverage of the Arab-Israel conflict.

Since 1977, except for a two-week honeymoon in which Begin basked in Sadat's reflected glory after the signing of the peace treaty, Israel has been able to do no right. *Time* reacted to the Israeli elections of May 1977 with a stream of calumny. The new prime minister, Menachem Begin, who had led a parliamentary opposition party for 29 years, was repeatedly described as a "terrorist." In its first major story following the election, *Time* introduced Begin to its readers with the words "rhymes with Fagin." (Why not "Reagan" rather than the anti-Semitic Dickens caricature?) Apparently sending its fact-checkers home so they could not interfere with the rush of editorial inspiration, *Time* went on to report falsely that Begin's men "tortured two British soldiers to death," "massacred," "mutilated," and "raped" innocent villagers, and that Begin himself, after the sinking of the Irgun Ship, the *Altalena*, vowed to "see to it that the state of Israel sinks with us."

On the first anniversary of Begin's election, *Time's* former Jerusalem bureau chief Donald Neff offered a lengthy evaluation of Israel's prime minister. Neff announced that "all the worst fears, and more, of his critics" had come to pass and that Begin, "more than any other man, has set back the chances for peace in the Middle East." Neff went on to accuse Begin of being inflexible, myopic, hard-lining, deceptive, tiresomely preachy, self-righteously arrogant, and "totally insensitive to any problems beyond those of Jewish Israel." Neff sums up with the title of the *Time* essay,

Coming:

Washington's Toy Agency.

which he attributes to an unnamed diplomat—Begin is "Beyond the Pale."

In the slow negotiations following Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, Begin was repeatedly singled out for blame. On March 6, 1978, *Time* announced that "dispassionate observers" put the blame on Israel; on March 20 that Begin showed "scant willingness to make the kind of concessions that a peace agreement will require"; on September 11 that "Begin does seem to bear by far the greatest responsibility for the current impasse"; on September 18 that "most U.S. officials and experts agree that Begin has been considerably less willing to compromise than Sadat"; and on December 25 that "on balance Israel has been the less compromising and more frustrating negotiating partner." *Time*, unlike other Begin detractors, managed to transform its contempt for Begin into a contempt for Israel itself.

Time judged Sadat in terms of a different set of assumptions and expectations. On January 20, 1978, *Time* reported flatly that Sadat could not be expected to make any concessions: after coming to Jerusalem "he could not give up any more on Sinai, the Palestinian issue or Jerusalem." Sadat's periodic suspensions of the talks did nothing to cloud his image for *Time*; after one such suspension, the magazine editorialized that Sadat had "an almost mystical commitment to the peace process" (March 27, 1978). *Time's* editors were so carried away by their view of Sadat as visionary peacemaker that they interpreted his assault on Israel on Yom Kippur of 1973 as an expression of his yearning for peace.

Ironically Sadat started his peace campaign by going to war. The road to peace in the autumn of 1973 seemed totally blocked. . . . To coax some movement toward peace, Sadat made one of his swift, dramatic decisions. He chose to attack Israel.

Even more extraordinary, after the Camp David agreement was signed, *Time* concluded that "it was Begin who conceded the least" (October 2, 1978). Since Begin had given up the Sinai oil fields, air bases, and settlements, and agreed to a companion "framework" for the West Bank and Gaza, while Sadat had compromised on none of his demands (some were temporarily not pressed, such as Jerusalem, on which separate "letters of intent" were filed by the parties to the negotiations), *Time's* judgment clearly reflected its skewed vision.

What is *Time's* problem? In part, it is that *Time* does not take Arab statements "for internal consumption" as seriously as it takes those made to Western media and statesmen. That the Arabs want to drive Israel into the sea is old hat. That the PLO, even the fire-eating George Habash, is prepared to accept Israel is "news." But most importantly, *Time* gives weight and credibility to sources who tell the magazine's editors what they want to hear.

Malcolm Toon, formerly US ambassador to Israel and more recently to the Soviet Union, has pointed out that in closed societies (he was speaking of the Soviet Union, but the point applies equally well to the dictatorships of the Middle East) the way to understand the country's strategy is to read

statements in their own language and to their own people—rather than listening to gossip in the corridors of the United Nations or, worse, to misleading and ambivalent observations by . . . envoys sensitive and responding to the naiveté and wishful thinking of their American interlocutors. . . .

But it is precisely these envoys who too frequently constitute *Time's* source of information. *Time* habitually quotes Faruq Kaddoumi, for example, the PLO's envoy to the United Nations and Western capitals, whose job it is to present the PLO in an attractive light to foreigners. On October 3, 1977, *Time* asserted that "there was no progress on the basic issues of Israel's refusal to withdraw to its 1967 borders or to accept an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank." If, in the weeks between August 29 and October 3, *Time* had reported the public statements of Arab leaders, it would have been difficult to avoid recognition that the basic question was not Israeli withdrawal but Arab refusal to accept the existence of the state (see sidebar).

Moreover, without the glowing reports of previous weeks on the moderation of Arafat and Habash, *Time* would have found it difficult to treat Israel as a legitimate subject for American pressure. As it is, on October 3 *Time* included a feature "How to Lean on Israel"—remove the exemption of the United Jewish Appeal, cut back on military assistance, deny loans on favorable terms, refuse to deliver a promised nuclear power plant, end joint ventures, reduce support in international forums, abstain on anti-Israel votes in the UN, further publicize US disagreements with Israel, and publicly inquire

The Record 'Time' vs. Reality

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service is among the most reliable of sources for information on the Middle East. Its *Report on the Middle East and Africa*, one of eight such regional reports available through the Department of Commerce, appears five times a week. During the five-week period between August 29 and October 3, 1977, the Carter administration was trying to find a way to reconvene the Geneva Conference (Sadat did not make his famous trip to Jerusalem until late in November), the Arab states insisted on PLO representation and Israel refused to attend if the PLO attended. *Time's* coverage was sharply and consistently at odds with FBIS reports during this stage (and most other stages) of the peace process.

Time, August 29: While Israel's Menachem Begin was digging in deeper on the West Bank issue, off in Beirut his Palestinian foes last week took a big if unheralded step toward peace. *Time* has learned that after extensive negotiations . . . the so-called Palestinian "rejectionists" have decided to end their defiant stand against peace on any terms with Israel and agree with the larger Palestine Liberation Organization on the goal of securing an independent state on the West Bank and in Gaza. . . . The deal was crucial. . . . [T]he continuing holdout of the rejectionists, notably the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, headed by hard-lining George Habash, had muddled the Palestinian position. . . . [O]ne of the rejectionists explained "We feel this is the time for

the Palestinians to stand together.

FBIS, September 12, Algiers: Interview with George Habash, leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. "We reject [242] because the Palestinian struggle is based on the premise that Palestine is an Arab country afflicted with Zionist colonialism. The armed Palestinian revolution will continue until the complete liberation of Palestinian soil is achieved."

Time, August 29: "We're not blocking peace," says a P.L.O. spokesman, "Israelis." To press that point Yasser Arafat plans . . . to push for a new UN resolution . . . [which] will meet Carter's injunction by explicitly accepting 242, but it will also include his very words on the Palestinian homeland. "We would be very much surprised if the U.S. vetoes the President's own language."

FBIS, September 26, Algiers: Abu Hassan, PLO representative in Algeria, asked about the PLO attitude to 242 said: "The PLO says no. Israel is an alien body in the Arab sea. This body is bound to disappear given the effective medicine—a united Arab front."

Time, September 19: In a rare show of unanimity 21 Foreign Ministers of the Arab League adopted in Cairo what one Western diplomat called "the last hurrah of the moderates." He meant an 8 point working paper. . . . Significantly the document distinguishes between territory occupied after the 1967 war and Israel's 1948 boundaries—a tacit admission that Israel has a right to exist as a state.

FBIS, September 7, Riyadh: Arab Foreign Ministers approved an 8 point working

paper prepared by the Arab League Political Committee. . . . It called on all states to give no aid to Israel and to halt immigration to 'the occupied Palestine and Arab territories.' [This call to countries to forbid emigration of their citizens to Israel obviously does not distinguish between Israel's boundaries before and after the 1967 war.—R.J.I.]

FBIS, September 8, Riyadh: Saudi Arabia's Information Minister Muhammad Yamani reaffirmed Saudi Arabia's position on the Palestinian question referring to foreign press campaigns casting doubt on the kingdom's position. Crown Prince Fahd had underscored to President Carter the kingdom's support for "the full rights and demands of the Palestinians written with their own hands." [This is a reference to the Palestinian Covenant, 13 of whose 32 articles call for the destruction of Israel.—R.J.I.]

Time, October 3: One bar to P.L.O. participation [at Geneva] is Washington's insistence that the organization endorse United Nations Resolution 242, which calls for "secure border" for all nations in the area—an implicit recognition of Israel's right to exist. The P.L.O. has refused to accept the resolution since it refers to the Palestinians as refugees rather than as a nation with rights.

FBIS, September 12, Algiers: Interview with George Habash. "Our rejection [of 242] does not stem from the consideration that 242 only talks of refugees but that it talks of recognition of Israel and secure borders."

FBIS, September 12, Cairo: Zuhair Mohsen [head of military operations for the PLO] again rejected 242 because according to him "it recognizes Israel's right to exist."

R.J.I.

about the treatment of what *Time* calls "political prisoners." (*Time* repeatedly talks of thousands of "political prisoners," the term suggesting that these are individuals imprisoned for their opinions. These are individuals sentenced for crimes, including formation of PLO cells and attacks on Israeli civilians. The term "political prisoner" is no more appropriate in this case than it is to the convicted criminals in the United States dubbed "political prisoners" by Andrew Young.)

In seizing almost exclusively upon Arab "private" statements, *Time* in these five weeks was not simply providing partial information, but "disinformation," information deliberately provided to mislead Western media about Arab, and especially PLO, intentions. Nothing that *Time* claimed had happened or was

about to happen actually transpired then or later. The October 10 edition of *Time* did not admit that it had been misinforming its readers for weeks; instead it announced that a PLO resolution, reaffirming an earlier 1974 resolution, was "more moderate in tone" because in calling for a state to be created on any soil given up by Israel, it dropped the 1974 clause that designated such a state a base for further struggle against Israel. This was wrong: the PLO had explicitly renewed the 1974 resolution in its entirety. But what is more interesting is that *Time* finally allowed its readers to know that a state in the West Bank and Gaza had been specifically designated by the PLO as a base against Israel only when it erroneously reported that the clause had been dropped. Up to this point *Time* had repeatedly described the

readiness to establish a state in land relinquished by Israel as proof of PLO "moderation."

Time eventually grew tired of falsely predicting that the PLO "will drop the most offensive passages from its Covenant" immediately prior to PLO or Palestine National Council meetings. There is no reference in *Time* to the meeting on May 31, 1980, of Al Fatah, repeatedly described by *Time* as the most "moderate" of the PLO's constituent organizations, at which it rededicated itself to the liquidation of the Zionist entity, "politically, economically, militarily, culturally and ideologically." Nor does *Time* ever explain why the PLO is so reluctant to change the Covenant, despite repeated predictions that it will be altered. Nor will readers learn from *Time* that on February 21,

1980, Nabil Ramlawi, the PLO's London representative, stated that the Covenant "is no less vital to the PLO than is the Proclamation of Independence and the Law of Return to the Zionists," nor that on March 4, 1980, the PLO's Abu Ayyad asserted "it is impossible to alter the Covenant"; nor that on March 26, 1980, PLO spokesman Abu Sharar asserted that the Palestinian Covenant "defines the PLO's struggle." In other words the destruction of Israel is the central demand Palestinian Arabs make on themselves, other Arabs, and the world. The obligation to "liquidate the Zionist entity" is as "sacred" to the PLO as national independence is to Israel.

Time replaced its predictions about changes in the PLO covenant with reports that the PLO has "de facto" recognized, is recognizing, or will recognize Israel. As recently as October 6, 1980, under a headline "Arafat's Nudge: Inching Towards Recognition?" *Time* reported that Arafat, at a communist-sponsored peace conference in Bulgaria, spoke to four Israelis. *Time* finds this a highly significant event and asserts that the "decision of the PLO leader to make so conciliatory a gesture" lends credence "even to some Israelis" to a remark made by Morocco's King Hassan the previous week that the PLO was ready to accept Israel. While *Time* points out that the Israelis were members of the Communist party, it fails to mention that the Israeli Communist party is the channel through which Israeli Arab Nationalists express their rejection of the Jewish state. No wonder Arafat said he was happy to meet "the peace forces of Israel."

But *Time* is not content with subverting the facts. *Time's* use of words like "peace," "moderation," and "democracy" verges on Orwellian doublethink. Prior to President Sadat's 1977 visit to Israel, a time when there was no indication that any Arab state was willing to make peace with Israel, *Time* informed its readers week after week that the Arabs sought "peace." On May 9, 1977, *Time* reported that Jordan's King Hussein was "pessimistic about Israel's willingness to make peace"; on May 23 that Assad of Syria said a Palestinian state was necessary for "peace"; and on July 25 that Arab nations "sincerely believe that the only road to peace leads through the White House." After Sadat's visit, when the Arab states mounted a virtually solid rejectionist front, *Time* continued to assert that "peace" was their target. On December 5, 1977, *Time*

wrote that although the rhetoric from Damascus was "pure vitriol," Assad "basically is as committed to peace talks as Sadat." Although by mid-1978 Hussein had made clear his unwillingness to negotiate with Israel, *Time's* conclusion on May 29, 1978, was that Hussein felt Carter was incapable of obtaining the concessions needed "to permit a peace settlement."

Time never explores what it is that Arab leaders mean when they say they seek "peace." But Iraqi president Ahmad al Bakr had already performed this service quite succinctly. "We hope the forces of peace will strengthen their struggle of solidarity with the Arab liberation movement," said al Bakr, "and will work toward the liquidation of the imperialist Zionist aggression." Syria's Assad also defined peace in an interview with an Arabic paper: "The October War expressed our will to regain occupied Arab land and the Palestinian Arab people's usurped rights. Anyone who fights for the homeland is a fighter for peace." When in September 1977, 21 Arab foreign ministers called for peace based on the right of return, of self-determination, and of an independent state, *Time* described it as "the last hurrah of the moderates." But the foreign ministers were merely reiterating the PLO formula which had been devised in 1964, three years before Israel captured the West Bank and Gaza. *Time's* "last hurrah of the moderates" was well understood in the Arab world as a call for peace to follow the destruction of Israel. The PLO also clarified its understanding of peace. The Palestine National Council has asserted that it refuses to accept UN Resolution 242 because it recognizes "a partial peace" instead of "a permanent peace." A partial peace, as the PLO defines it, exists while Palestinian rights have not been realized in full. Permanent peace is the liquidation of Israel.

DEMOCRACY IS another term which *Time* applies in extraordinary fashion to the Arab world. *Time* entitles its October 24, 1977, article on the PLO, "Democracy Gone Wild." *Time's* headline certainly suggests that something is amiss, but the average *Time* reader is not likely to feel that too much democracy warrants excessive censure. According to *Time*, Arafat was only the first among three million Palestinian equals and maintained his leadership by "force of personality." *Time* did take note of conflicts among rival group-

ings and asserted that in moments of "extreme crisis for the PLO debate is suspended and democracy begins (or ends) at the barrel of a gun." But surely the point of democracy is that even in moments of crisis, decisions are made by votes, not guns.

Time's depiction of the PLO as a democracy cannot be discounted as a one-time aberration. On May 14, 1980, *Time* called the 100-member Palestine National Council "probably the most democratic institution in the Arab world." But there are no elections in Palestinian camps; ironically, the most democratic institutions in the Arab world are the elected city councils on the Israeli-occupied West Bank, made up primarily of Palestinian hard-liners. The only Arab press operating in conditions of relative freedom is also in the West Bank or in Israel proper. (Scarcely less remarkable is *Time's* use of the term "desert democracy" for Saudi Arabia (May 22, 1978). Though *Time* admits that Saudi Arabia has no parliament, no parties, not a single elected official, and that absolute power resides in the hands of the royal family, Saudi Arabia is "democratic" because even humble subjects have access to the ruler, to whom they can present complaints.)

Time takes up another treasured term of Western democracy, "self-determination," only to subvert its meaning. According to *Time*, the chief obstacle to a comprehensive peace is Israel's reluctance to grant the Palestinians what *Time* calls "true self-determination." But to Americans self-determination subsumes freedom of speech, a free press, and a multi-party system which gives the people the ability to change the men responsible for creating public policy. As political scientist Paul Eidelberg has observed, the "self-determination" exercised in Arab countries is that of ruling cliques—not at all what Americans have in mind by the term. Were the Palestinian Arabs to exercise self-determination, not only would their form of government deny the freedoms that give self-determination meaning, but that government would be committed to the destruction of Israel—the only country in the Middle East where those freedoms are enjoyed. (If *Time* means "national self-determination," Flemings and Walloons in Belgium, Welsh and Scots in England, Basques in Spain, Bretons and Corsicans in France, Kurds in Iraq, and Pushtus in Pakistan all would qualify better for sovereignty than the Arabs of Palestine.)

Even the simple word "moderate" is shorn of traditional meaning. As early as January 27, 1975, *Time* reported that the moderates "dominate the PLO." For several years thereafter *Time* variously described Arafat as "relatively moderate," "somewhat moderate," and just plain "moderate." When, following Sadat's trip to Jerusalem, the PLO murdered an Egyptian representative, *Time* had doubts. The solution: on March 27, 1978, *Time* reported that Arafat and the PLO have returned to a "policy of militancy" after "3½ years of relative moderation." Arafat was a "moderate" suffering from radical pressures. Arafat was restored to full-fledged moderation on May 15, lost the title temporarily after the Camp David agreements (on September 18, 1978, the PLO is actually described as "radical"), and regained it on January 29, 1979, when he was described as "relatively moderate."

SINCE ARAFAT is the leader of the world's major terrorist organization, it is reasonable to ask by what criteria *Time* judges him to be moderate. The answer, presumably, is "in relation to George Habash." By this token Stalin and Hitler could be called moderates, for both were pikers in mass murder compared to Mao Zedong who, according to the *Guinness Book of World Records*, may have been responsible for the death of twice as many people as these two European dictators combined. In any case there is no evidence that Habash is responsible for more murders than Arafat or would, if he could, inflict a harsher fate on the Jews of Israel. The differences between the two men seem to be simply on the level of short-range tactics.

Time similarly divides the Arab states into moderates and radicals without discernible reason for doing so. Since moderates and radicals do not differ in their attitude to Israel, one might suppose that *Time* was dividing these countries on the basis of their attitude to the United States—except that Syria, a Soviet client, is a perennial *Time* "moderate." When, following Sadat's trip to Jerusalem, *Time's* moderates joined the rejectionists, *Time* solved the dilemma by simply continuing to call some of the rejectionists moderate. Thus on July 24, 1978, *Time* talks of Egypt's "moderate Arab allies" when they were nowhere in sight. *Time* supplies a running series of apologies for the moderates: the Saudis "could not" publicly support Sadat because of their concern that this

would help the Soviet Union (December 12, 1977), Hussein wants to remain "an uncommitted moderating force" (December 26, 1977), Camp David "caught the moderate Arabs by surprise" (October 2, 1978). Why joining the rejectionists to attack Israel, Egypt, and the United States would hurt the Soviet Union or contribute to the cause of moderation, *Time* does not explain. Saudi Arabia's call for a *jihād* against Israel in August 1980 did not impair its moderate credentials for *Time*.

Although there is no state about which *Time* writes more respectfully, it is hard to see why Saudi Arabia should ever have been given the title of "moderate" in relation to the Arab-Israel conflict. Second to none in anti-Israel sentiment, chief bankroller of the PLO, it is of all Arab states the most viciously anti-Semitic. Before reaching its present state of obsequiousness, even *Time* noted (April 7, 1975) that King Faisal handed out the notorious Protocols of the Elders of Zion to visitors and that Saudi Arabia routinely refuses Jews entry to the country.

Time's use of "moderate" is even more bizarre when contrasted with its use of "intransigent." *Time* applies that word very sparingly to the Arab world: after 1977 it is used only to describe George Habash and the Iraqi leadership. But Israel is called "intransigent" so frequently that the word takes on the character of a Homeric epithet. When *Time* wanted to castigate South Africa's then prime minister Vorster, the Israeli prime minister was the only figure of sufficient turpitude to offer a worthy parallel: Vorster was "as intransigent as Golda Meir" (June 27, 1977).

Semantic subversion of a more subtle sort is apparent in *Time's* treatment of "terrorism." As early as March 17, 1975, in an article describing a PLO attack on the Savoy Hotel in Tel Aviv, *Time* variously calls those who staged the assault "commandoes," "fedayeen," and "guerrillas"—and uses the word "terrorists" only when quoting an Israeli statement. (In the same issue there is an article on the Baader-Meinhof: here *Time* has no hesitation in speaking of a "terrorist gang" engaged in "terrorist acts.") Sometimes *Time* does not even seem too sure if attacks on Israeli civilians should be termed terror at all. In an October 31, 1977, article on the problem of world terror *Time* declares that the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine is the most likely of the six major groups in the PLO "to spearhead

a resurgence of terror." Since terrorist operations against Israel by all these groups had continued unabated, this suggested that assaults on Israel did not count.

ANOTHER WAY *Time* removes the PLO's sting is by describing it as a social welfare organization. On July 18, 1977, *Time* reports on the PLO's factories that provide jobs for disabled *fedayeen* and Palestinian women in "handicrafts, ready-to-wear clothing, furniture building and filmmaking." On April 14, 1980, *Time* reports that the PLO "runs hospitals and clinics, dispenses social security benefits, sponsors trade unions and even associations for writers, poets and painters." *Time* lets us know (nice touch) that the PLO makes toys.

More important, by using "Palestinians" and "PLO" as interchangeably as "United States" and "Uncle Sam," *Time* gives the reader the impression that all Palestinians are PLO terrorists—or that the PLO is a nation seeking "self-determination." In the 1977 article on world terror, *Time* includes "the Palestinians" as one of five major terror organizations outside West Germany. Terrorism by the Palestinians can be expected to continue, says *Time*, if they "are not suitably represented at a Geneva peace conference." But for the most part *Time's* accent is on showing that the PLO are the Palestinians. Can four million people be terrorists? (*Time* rapidly escalates its estimate of the number of Palestinians: on October 24, 1977, there are three million Palestinians; on December 5, 1977, less than two months later, there are 3.4 million; three months after that, on March 27, 1978, there are 3.8 million, and on April 14, 1980, there are "nearly four million.") If, as *Time* repeatedly tells its readers, the Palestinians are a people seeking self-determination, and the PLO are the Palestinians, it follows that the PLO is a nation, not a terrorist organization.

The cumulative effect of *Time's* misuse of words is perhaps more serious than its inversion of facts. While the reader of *Time* may not learn the true facts elsewhere, he certainly could absorb the information if presented with it. But when new meaning is given to words, the impact is below the level of consciousness. What *Time* has done to the reader's vision of the world through the corrupt use of language is probably irremediable.

BY TRUDE B. FELDMAN
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WASHINGTON — With Soviet recognition of Yasser Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organization, the murder of Egypt's President Anwar Sadat and the battle in Congress over the sale of \$8.5 billion in U.S. arms for Saudi Arabia, the Middle East has become the new focal point of U.S. foreign policy.

In an exclusive interview — the first on the Middle East since he won the presidency — Ronald Reagan reveals his strategy for bringing peace to that troubled area.

Here are my questions and the president's replies:

Q: In the aftermath of President Sadat's death, do you think Egypt will adopt a new foreign policy?

A: So far, every indication we have is that there won't be. After the funeral, Secretary of State (Alexander) Haig and others had top-level meetings with the new Egyptian leader. President (Hosni) Mubarak assured us he intends to continue and follow through with the plans laid out by President Sadat.

Q: What about America's policy?

A: Some people say we don't have a policy in the Mideast. In fact, we've always had a policy. There are people in the press who say you don't have a policy unless you keep telling them what you're doing, so they can put it on the front pages. I don't happen to believe that's a good way to conduct foreign policy. I believe in quiet diplomacy — for example, the fact that we had the Saudis' help in arranging a cease-fire in Lebanon. We didn't have to get on the front page to do that. That was quiet diplomacy.

Q: What's your next step?

A: We'll continue what we've been doing, which is not to impose a settlement on the Mideast. We want to be in a position to help, wherever and whenever we can, to build on the Camp David, Md., process and bring peace to the region.

Q: Did former President Nixon stay in the Mideast — after Sadat's funeral — as your representative?

A: No, he did not. The night he left here, when the three former presidents visited me at the White House before flying to the funeral, Mr. Nixon told me he was going to go on to Saudi Arabia. That's the first I knew of it, and there was no discussion of it at all.

Q: Do you think the Mideast is a powder keg?

A: Yes, it is.

Q: How will you defuse it?

A: Moderate Arab states like Egypt want peace, and Israel wants peace. Together, they can be a force to keep the biggest troublemaker in the world, the Soviet Union, from making mischief in the Mideast.

Q: As for the autonomy talks, what will you do if they don't succeed?

A: I'm just not going to believe they'll be unsuccessful. Our ambassadors are sitting in on those talks, evidence again that we want to help wherever we can.

Q: King Hussein (of Jordan) will make an official visit to Washington on Nov. 2 when you'll meet for the first time. Will you urge him to enter the autonomy talks?

A: Yes, I'd like to. That's an ultimate goal. You see, Trude, the choice is between an Israel that cannot live without maintaining massive military power, that is surrounded by nations which outnumber it 100-to-1, that is constantly aware of elements which refuse to recognize its right to be a nation, and an Israel that can live in peace surrounded by Arab neighbors who acknowledge Israel's right to exist and have treaties such as Egypt has with her now.

Q: Will you eventually involve the Palestine Liberation Organization in peace talks?

A: I don't like to talk just about the PLO, because it is a self-declared voice of the Palestinian people. Whether it includes them or not, the Palestinian problem has to be solved, but it can't be solved until they are willing to acknowledge Israel's right to exist.

Q: But will we talk to the PLO?

A: I think this is part of what's at stake here. I think Saudi Arabia could be an element in this.

Q: You mean, to bring in the PLO?

A: Yes.

Q: And will you bring in the PLO through quiet diplomacy?

A: I think a solution has to be found for their problem.

Q: So it means talking to them eventually, even if it is through quiet diplomacy?

A: Providing they are willing to recognize Israel's right to exist.

Q: Why do you feel you can't be a credible leader in foreign policy without the sale of AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control Systems planes) to Saudi Arabia?

A: Because if what I propose doing is rejected, then I have no more bargaining power, I won't have any stature in trying to deal with those countries. They can look at me and say, 'How can we believe what he says if he can't deliver?' This will be their attitude, and other friendly leaders among our allies have said that it's essential to avoid that.

Q: What specific assurances are there that the planes won't fall into enemy hands or be used against Israel?

A: We'll work out understandings with Saudi Arabia about the sharing of information and so forth. There are also security measures that will be taken with regard to the planes. It is all worked out. And, of course, American personnel will be involved for a long time there in the training of air crews and the maintenance of the planes.

Q: Why is the sale in the interest of both Israel and the United States?

A: Israel will benefit for two reasons. One, I think the greatest threat in the Mideast, to both Israel and to the Arab nations, is the Soviet Union. Now, we saw a few weeks ago the ability of planes from Iran — low-flying planes — to bomb the oil installations of Kuwait. With ground radar, there would be only two minutes' warning of a similar attack aimed at the Saudi oil fields, so important to Japan, to our European allies and to ourselves. With the AWACS, they'll have enough warning time to get planes into the air and meet any attacker out over the Gulf to intercept them.

That's a practical consideration for all of us. But I think the main reason that it's in Israel's interest is that we want to continue the peacekeeping process with them, and we believe that here the Saudis are most influential. We think this was proven by their help in bringing about the cease-fire in Lebanon. We intend to continue working with them toward involvement of themselves and the other moderate Arab states.

Saudi Arabia is a leader of the moderate Arab states. I believe the Saudis are the key to spreading peace throughout the Mideast instead of just having it confined to Israel and Egypt. What is so difficult for many people opposed to the sale to understand, as they look fearfully at Saudi Arabia, is that Egypt, which had fought Israel, turned around and was the first to make peace and ally itself with Israel. Can't they believe this is possible for other nations as well, that other nations can do the same thing? That's what we want to do — try and persuade those other nations to do that.

This is our policy in the Middle East. Our goal is, with the security of Israel in mind, to bring about peace in that troubled region. I can't go into specific detail, because I think we are better off if we keep it in the area of quiet diplomacy.

Q: How would you describe U.S.-Israeli relations?

A: Let me put it this way: When I sat in this office and talked with Israeli Prime Minister (Menachem) Begin and told him we wanted to go through with the AWACS sale and explained our reasons — how we must involve other Arab states in the peace process, others that will do one day as Egypt did — he was not upset by what we were doing, although he said he'd maintain his present position. But then we discussed at length the U.S. relationship with Israel. When he left here, he told people that he

I believe this is true. Our relations are just fine. I wish the Israelis would understand they never had a better friend here in the Oval Office than they now have. I assured Mr. Begin that I recognize Israel is an ally and that from this relationship we both benefit.

Q: Why shouldn't the Israelis think AWACS is a threat to their security?

A: We see what's happening in Iran. We see the Soviets in Afghanistan. The Saudis are as fearful of the Soviets as the Israelis are, and as we are. And they recognize their great vulnerability — how simple it would be to put their single greatest asset, the oil industry, out of business. So they want to make sure that what happened to Kuwait can't happen to them. These were Iranian planes that just sneaked over and hit their oilfields — and Kuwait isn't in the war. The Saudis need this protection, and they've been most cooperative about the manner in which it will be used — sharing the information they get with us. This will be beneficial to us, with our own aircraft and our own ships in the (Persian) Gulf and the Indian Ocean. So there is no way that it is any threat to Israel.

Q: What about charges by some senators that you're swapping favors for Senate votes on the AWACS?

A: There has been no arm-twisting, and there has been no offering of deals or swapping of favors. Absolutely not. I don't do that. We haven't done any of it and, frankly, I'm disappointed in what some of the senators have stated.

Q: But is it worth the political capital you're spending?

A: Yes, it is, because if we don't keep on pursuing peace in the Mideast, who will?

Q: What about Sens. Mark Hatfield (R-Ore.) and John Glenn (D-Ohio)? Why are they so strongly opposed to the AWACS sale?

A: I don't understand Sen. Glenn at all, and I certainly don't agree with his statements that we were using unwholesome tactics. That was absolutely a distortion of the truth. Sen. Glenn wants AWACS planes there — only he wants them there under our control, totally. He believes they should be there for our security in protecting the Mideast. What he'd have us do is base American forces there or in a neighboring nation, and we haven't done that.

As for Sen. Hatfield, he is opposed to any arms sale. He believes the world would be better off if there were no arms. He is probably right — except, how do we get there? We're going to try to negotiate some arms reductions with the Soviet Union. But he is just opposed to distributing arms to anyone. Of course, it's kind of strange to call the AWACS a weapon. It does not even have a popgun on board, and it is very vulnerable to any attack. The only thing it can do is turn tail and run.

Q: In your Oct. 1 press conference, you implied that Israel and the Israeli lobby in the United States were interfering with your foreign policy by opposing the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia. Is that what you meant?

A: [REDACTED]

Q: One final question — will the Mideast be different now without Israel's Moshe Dayan and Egypt's Anwar Sadat?

A: Yes, it will be, because those two men were great forces. But I don't mean that in a pessimistic sense. Of course, we'll miss them, but there are other leaders who are just as dedicated to peace.

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lower house of the Spanish Parliament is expected to vote in favor of joining NATO at the end of this month, with a similar Senate vote following in November. The government of Prime Minister Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo would then formally express Spain's wish to join, whereupon the formal invitation would be sent.

West bank autonomy talks

DOUGLAWATSON of the Baltimore Sun in Jerusalem, Israel. Negotiations over proposed autonomy or limited self-rule for the 1.3 million Palestinian residents of the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip have resumed in El Aviv, as scheduled before the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. The talks among teams of experts from Israel, Egypt and the United States are the first more than a year except for two days of meetings in Egypt in September. They take on added importance as a result of Sadat's assassination. They are seen by both the Israelis and the Egyptians as an important test of the others' commitment to the 1978 Camp David, Md., agreements under which each pledged to offer the Palestinians an otherwise undefined "full autonomy." The aim of the talks is to define "full autonomy."

Skeptical view of Honduras vote

MICHAEL WDRUDGE of United Press International in Tegucigalpa, Honduras — Honduras is shakily lurching toward election to end 17 years of almost uninterrupted army rule. But ten skeptic politicians, pointing to allegations of rampant fraud in the voter registration rolls, wonder if the Nov. 29 balloting for president, and for congressional and municipal officials should not be postponed. U.S. officials are applying heavy pressure for elections, insisting the shift to civilian rule is imperative if Honduras is to avoid the leftist guerrilla movements lashing neighboring El Salvador and Guatemala. They and Honduran officials also argue the stagnated economy and widespread corruption under President Policarpo Paz Garcia, the late of three army generals to rule since 1973, has undermined popular support for the military. Military leaders are ruefully acknowledge Hondurans are getting tired of the army, which has ruled Honduras for all but two of the last 17 years.

India-France discuss jet sale

EDWARD CODY of the Washington Post in Paris — France and India are engaged in major negotiations over the purchase of 150 advanced Mirage-2000 warplanes for the Indian air force, a \$1 billion deal that would give India a major source of aircraft other than the Soviet Union and give France's Mirage production lines a new lease on life. The Indian government also is being courted by the Soviet Union, which is offering swift delivery of Mig-25s at prices well below those of the Mirage-2000. India is believed already to possess a reconnaissance version of the Mig-25, called the "Foxbat" in North Atlantic Treaty Organization terminology. India, however, is reported reluctant to become lopsidedly dependent on Soviet arms supplies, particularly on top of a recent agreement to buy and manufacture Mig-23s to replace its aging fleet of Mig-21s. The Gandhi government fed the French plane offers the best available response to the 40 F-16s that Washington has agreed to supply Pakistan, its traditional enemy.

New politics in Great Britain

LEONARD DOWNIE JR. of the Washington Post in London — The new centrist alliance of the upstart Social Democratic Party and the perennially also-ran Liberal Party won its first parliamentary election by a large

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SUBJECT: REAGAN INTERVIEW IN LOCAL PAPER

1. OCTOBER 25 ISSUE OF ARABIC-LANGUAGE AN-NAHAR FRONT-PAGES INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN UNDER HEADLINE: "FIRST INTERVIEW ON THE MIDDLE EAST. REAGAN: THE REGION IS LIKE A POWDER KEG. SAUDI ARABIA IS THE KEY TO PEACE. AT THE END THE PLO SHOULD PARTICIPATE." AN-NAHAR SAYS IT OBTAINED RIGHTS IN INTERVIEW CONDUCTED BY AMERICAN JOURNALIST TRUDY FELDMAN.

2. INTERVIEW CONTAINS FOLLOWING EXCHANGE:
Q: "IS IT POSSIBLE THAT THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION WILL BE INVOLVED IN THE PEACE TALKS?"
A. "I DON'T LIKE TO TALK ABOUT THE PLO ALONE BECAUSE IT HAS DECLARED ITSELF THE ONLY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIANS. THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM MUST BE RESOLVED WHETHER THE PLO REPRESENTS THE PALESTINIANS OR NOT, BUT IT CANNOT BE RESOLVED BEFORE THE PALESTINIANS RECOGNIZE THE RIGHT OF ISRAEL TO EXIST."
Q. "WILL WE TALK TO THE PLO?"
A. "I THINK THIS IS PART OF THE PRESENT BET, AND I THINK SAUDI ARABIA COULD BE A GOOD ELEMENT IN THIS."
Q. "DO YOU MEAN TO INVOLVE THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION IN THE PEACE PROCESS?"
A. "YES."
Q. "DO YOU MEAN TO INVOLVE THE PLO IN QUIET DIPLOMACY?"
A. "I BELIEVE WE SHOULD FIND A SOLUTION FOR THIS PROBLEM."
Q. "THEREFORE, THIS MEANS THAT THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF CONTACTING THE PLO THROUGH QUIET DIPLOMACY."
A. "ON CONDITION THAT THE PLO HAS THE INTENTION TO RECOGNIZE THE RIGHT OF ISRAEL TO ITS EXISTANCE."

3. REQUEST ENGLISH-LANGUAGE TEXT OF INTERVIEW PLUS ANY AVAILABLE INFORMATION OF FELDMAN JOURNALISTIC AFFILIATION.
BARRETT
BT.

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