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**Collection:** Kemp, Geoffery T.H.: Files  
**Folder Title:** (Palestine Liberation Organization)  
PLO (2)  
**Box:** RAC Box 7

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*Last Updated: 10/16/2023*

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: KEMP, GEOFFREY :Files

Archivist: dlb

File Folder: PLO 1981 (2 of 3)

Box ~~90222~~ <sup>7</sup> 90320

Date: 8/10/99  
Wills - F97-106

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>1. Letter</del>	<del>Richard Allen to Alexander Haig, 1 p. R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 #28</del>	<del>10/7/81</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>2. Memo</del>	<del>Kemp, Douglas Feith to Allen, re: Visas for Additional PLO UN Observers, 1 p. R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 #29</del>	<del>9/15/81</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>3. Memo</del>	<del>Paul Bremer to Allen, re: Expansion of the PLO Observer Mission to the UN, 2 p. R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 #30</del>	<del>9/10/81</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>4. Memo</del>	<del>Allen to Haig, re: Additional PLO UN Observers, 1 p. R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 #31</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>5. Memo</del>	<del>Copy of #4 with annotations, 1 p. R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 #32</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>6. Memo</del>	<del>Allen to Haig, re: Additional PLO UN Observers, 1 p. R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 #33</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>7. Notes</del>	<del>Handwritten Notes re: Japanese Ambassador Comments on PLO, 6 p. R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 #34</del>	<del>[10]/18/81</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>8. Report</del>	<del>PLO Information, 3 p. R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 #35</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
9. Report	Intelligence Appraisal Middle East: PLO Support to Central American Revolutionaries, 15 p. Part 4/4/06 NLSF97-106/1 #36	3/27/81	P1/F1 ,B2, B3

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

# PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** KEMP, GEOFFREY: FILES

**Withdrawer**

LOJ 4/25/2007

**File Folder** PLO 1981 (2)

**FOIA**

F97-106/1

**Box Number** 90220

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
<del>1</del>	<del>LETTER</del>	<del>RICHARD ALLEN TO ALEXANDER HAIG</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>10/7/1981</del>
			<i>mvh 3/11/08</i>	
<del>2</del>	<del>MEMO</del>	<del>KEMP, FEITH TO ALLEN, RE VISAS FOR ADDITIONAL PLO UN OBSERVERS</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>9/15/1981</del>
			<i>mvh 3/11/08</i>	
<del>4</del>	<del>MEMO</del>	<del>ALLEN TO HAIG, RE ADDITIONAL PLO UN OBSERVERS</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>ND</del>
			<i>mvh 3/11/08</i>	
<del>5</del>	<del>MEMO</del>	<del>COPY OF 4 WITH ANNOTATIONS</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>ND</del>
			<i>mvh 3/11/08</i>	
<del>6</del>	<del>MEMO</del>	<del>ALLEN TO HAIG, RE ADDITIONAL PLO UN OBSERVERS</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>ND</del>
			<i>mvh 3/11/08</i>	

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

*Kemp*

WASHINGTON

September 29, 1981

*PR*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*

SUBJECT: Mrs. Thatcher on the PLO

British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said Britain had decided against meeting the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) at ministerial level because of what she called the PLO's association with terrorism.

She was addressing a news conference after talks in which Kuwaiti officials said their government urged Britain and other members of the European Economic Community (EEC) to recognize the PLO.

She said Britain did not recognize organizations, only countries.

The Prime Minister added that Britain did not have ministerial meetings with the PLO "First, because of their association with terrorism and secondly . . . because of the statement of part of the PLO that their real objective is to drive Israel into the sea, to wipe it off the face of the globe."

cc: Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

PLO

RECEIVED 29 SEP 81 12

TO PRES

FROM ALLEN

DOCDATE 29 SEP 81

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

ISRAEL

THATCHER, MARGARET

KUWAIT

TERRORISM

SUBJECT: PM THATCHER STATEMENT ON THE PLO

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IP FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

PRES

RENTSCHLER

KEMP

FEITH

SCHWEITZER

TANTER

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

( H / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

MEMORANDUM

5693

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

9/29 to Darman  
1155

September 29, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*  
SUBJECT: Mrs. Thatcher on the PLO

British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said Britain had decided against meeting the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) at ministerial level because of what she called the PLO's association with terrorism.

She was addressing a news conference after talks in which Kuwaiti officials said their government urged Britain and other members of the European Economic Community (EEC) to recognize the PLO.

She said Britain did not recognize organizations, only countries.

The Prime Minister added that Britain did not have ministerial meetings with the PLO "First, because of their association with terrorism and secondly . . . because of the statement of part of the PLO that their real objective is to drive Israel into the sea, to wipe it off the face of the globe."

cc: Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

9/29/81 pent/jcp



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Kemp~~

5333

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON


October 7, 1981

Dear Al:

Jerry Bremer has notified us that State has approved issuance of visas to two additional PLO UN observers. I understand that you tried to keep the increase to one, but concluded that the PLO would likely prevail on appeal if we refused to grant both requested visas. (C)

Lest the Administration's position on the PLO be misconstrued, I wonder if it might not be better to fight on this issue, lose, and then submit, rather than to submit without contesting the issue? (C)

Sincerely,



Richard V. Allen

The Honorable Alexander M. Haig, Jr.  
The Secretary of State  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-106 #28

BY smf, NARA, DATE 11/8/01

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

5322  
AJ

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

September 15, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP *GK*  
DOUGLAS J. FEITH *DJF*

SUBJECT: Visas for Additional PLO UN Observers *(C)*

At Tab II is the memo by which State notifies you that it has approved issuance of visas for two additional PLO UN observers. This will double the size of the PLO's UN mission. *(C)*

State tried at first to keep the increase to one, but the PLO hung tough and threatened to appeal State's refusal to issue both requested visas. Believing that the appeal would likely be resolved in the PLO's favor, State decided to yield. *(C)*

State's Assistant Secretary for International Organizations, Elliott Abrams, favored sticking to the one-visa position. He fears newspaper headlines that will declare: "Reagan Administration Agrees to Double Size of PLO UN Mission." He believes it would be better to fight, lose before the appeals tribunal, and then submit, rather than to submit without a fight. Then, at least, no one could accuse the Administration of being soft on the PLO. Abrams said that an indication from the White House that it favored a hard line on this matter would likely cause State to reassess its decision to issue the visas. *(C)*

This matter must be handled with reference to our plan of action for Lebanon. We can hardly look for PLO cooperation in Lebanon while we kick the PLO in the shins at the UN. Should the PLO deny US cooperation in Lebanon, however, we might be looking for ways to demonstrate our disapproval. Abrams says that we might be able to get State to defer action on the visas through a memo from you to Secretary Haig. *(S)*

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the memo to Secretary Haig at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to Haig
- II Memo from Bremer

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-106 #29

BY *smf*, NARA, DATE 11/8/01

~~SECRET~~

Review Sept 15, 1987

~~SECRET~~





## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 10, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Expansion of the PLO Observer Mission to the UN

The Department has approved issuance of visas to two PLO Observers to permit them to join the PLO Observer Mission to the UN. As a result the permanent PLO Observer mission staff will expand from two to four officers. We had hoped that the PLO would reduce its request to one additional position rather than two, but they refused to do so.

Despite this expansion to four officers the PLO Observer Mission will remain one of the smallest observer missions to the UN. In making the decision to issue the visas, we considered both the strong legal arguments in favor of issuance and the adverse public reaction.

Section 11 of the 1947 Headquarters Agreement between the United States and the United Nations (61 stat. 3416) provides that the U.S. "shall not impose any impediments to transit to or from the Headquarters District of . . . persons invited to the Headquarters District by the United Nations. . . on official business". In 1974 the UN General Assembly, over our objections, invited the PLO "to participate in the capacity of observer to all sessions and work of the General Assembly and to observe all international conferences convened under the auspices of other organs of the United Nations".

A refusal to issue the visas would have led to consideration in the UN's Host Country Committee. Ultimately, the issue could have gone to binding arbitration, and possibly an International Court of Justice advisory opinion proceeding, either of which we would probably have lost. Such debate and legal process could have also called into question our practice, which is tacitly accepted by the UN, of excluding Soviet and other diplomats whose past activities show them to be a threat to our security.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GDS - 9/9/87


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NLS F97-106 #30BY smf, NARA, DATE 11/8/01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

We plan to reply to any public criticism by noting the legal situation as outlined above and by emphasizing our intention to expel any PLO mission members who engage in activities inconsistent with their UN duties. We continue to restrict movement of all PLO mission members to a 25 mile radius of Columbus Circle. They must request permission from the Department for any travel outside this area.

*for*   
L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESS BRIEFING PAPER

SUBJECT: PLO OBSERVER MISSION STAFF INCREASE

Q. Is it true that the State Department has issued additional visas to the PLO in order to double the size of the PLO Observer Mission to the UN?

A. We have authorized the issuance of two additional visas, bringing their total personnel number to four.

Q. Why would the State Department permit such an expansion of a terrorist organization?

A. The Headquarters Agreement between the US and the UN, ratified by the Senate on August 8, 1945, provides under Section 11, that "the federal, state or local authorities of the United States shall not impose any impediments to transit to or from the Headquarters district of persons invited to the headquarters district by the United Nations" on official business". On October 16, 1974 the UN, over our objections, passed UNGA Resolution 3237 (XXIX) which gave "Observer Status" to the PLO. This resolution invited the PLO "to participate in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly in the capacity of observer to all international conferences convened under the auspices of other organs of the United Nations".

Q. Is four the "magic number" or does the State Department intend to issue visas to the PLO Observer Mission in the future?

A. I am not going to consider hypothetical questions or to engage in a debate over numbers. Even with the two additional members, the PLO Observer Mission is still one of the smallest. We will closely monitor the activities of members of the PLO Mission to ensure that their activities remain consistent with their UN duties. We will expel any member who does not.

Q. Will the PLO Observer Mission continue to be placed under certain restrictions?

A. Yes, they will continue to be issued B-1 visas and limited, as is customary, to travel within a 25 mile radius of Columbus Circle. They must request permission from the Department for any travel outside this area.

Drafted: IO/UNP:Frank R. Provyn: <sup>FRP</sup>bfj

Clearances: IO/UNP:Phil Wilcox FW  
IO/UNP:R. Grant Smith RGS  
NEA/ARN:Jim Collins Jim Collins  
L/UNA:David Small David Small



~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

5322

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE ALEXANDER M. HAIG  
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Additional PLO UN Observers ~~(S)~~

~~L. PAUL~~

*The Department*

Paul Bremer has notified me that State has approved issuance of visas to two additional PLO UN observers. I understand that State tried to keep the increase to one, but has concluded that the PLO would likely prevail on appeal if we refused to grant both requested visas. ~~(S)~~

Lest the Administration's position on the PLO be misconstrued, it might be better to fight on this issue, lose, and then submit, rather than to submit without a fight. ~~(S)~~

It occurs to me also that it may be worthwhile to defer action on those visa applications until we see whether the PLO cooperates with our plan of action for Lebanon. ~~(S)~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Richard V. Allen  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

~~SECRET~~

Review Sept 16, 1987

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-106 #31

BY SM, NARA, DATE 11/8/01

~~SECRET~~

## THE WHITE HOUSE

5322

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Additional PLO UN Observers ~~(c)~~

*Jerry*  
L. Paul Bremer has notified <sup>us</sup> ~~me~~ that ~~the~~ State Department has approved issuance of visas to two additional PLO UN observers. I understand that State <sup>you</sup> tried to keep the increase to one, but ~~has~~ concluded that the PLO would likely prevail on appeal if we refused to grant both requested visas. ~~(c)~~

~~Best~~ *I wonder if it might not be*  
lest the Administration's position on the PLO be misconstrued, it might be better to fight on this issue, lose, and then submit, rather than to submit without a fight. ~~(c)~~ *controversy but issue?*

It occurs to me also that it may be worthwhile to defer action on those visa applications until we see whether the PLO cooperates with our plan of action for Lebanon. ~~(S)~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Richard V. Allen  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

~~SECRET~~

Review on September 16, 1987

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-106 #32

BY 2mf, NARA, DATE 11/8/01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Make this a letter instead of a memo*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Additional PLO UN Observers ~~(C)~~

5 → Jerry Bremer has notified us that State has approved issuance of visas to two additional PLO UN observers. I understand that you tried to keep the increase to one, but concluded that the PLO would likely prevail on appeal if we refused to grant both requested visas. ~~(C)~~

5 → Lest the Administration's position on the PLO be misconstrued, I wonder if it might not be better to fight on this issue, lose, and then submit, rather than to submit without contesting the issue? ~~(C)~~

~~FOR THE PRESIDENT.~~

Richard V. Allen  
~~Assistant to the President~~  
for National Security Affairs

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on October 6, 1987

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-106 #33

BY smf, NARA, DATE 11/08/01

*W. J. Paul 10-7  
D. J. [unclear]*



RECEIVED

81 SEP 16 A 7: 38

JANET COLSON




BUD NANCE

\_\_\_\_\_

DICK ALLEN

\_\_\_\_\_

IRENE DERUS

 5/

JANET COLSON

\_\_\_\_\_

BUD NANCE

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PETER

\_\_\_\_\_

CY TO VP

\_\_\_\_\_

SHOW CC

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CY TO MEESE

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SHOW CC

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CY TO BAKER

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CY TO DEEVER

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SHOW CC

\_\_\_\_\_

CY TO BRADY

\_\_\_\_\_

SHOW CC

\_\_\_\_\_

Comments:



[Oct] Wet 28 1981

Jaymora Anderson PLO

Keel

Ampt <sup>via</sup>  
- ready to add to P. number  
- Direct to Street.

Our people felt we could let  
him see points - not + he  
should understand our points  
not to interfere with us going.

At some time we had to  
to someone has to recognize  
our 242. of some things  
242 + part of journal.

Ampt report. He should provide  
see meeting effort for receipt

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-104 #37

BY smf, NARA, DATE 11/8/01

after the my <sup>we</sup> ~~rest~~  
being learned by GOI  
cited:

- PLO wanted to go to  
1977 Geneva Conference

- rejected

- I Point of Fall.

was announced after

prior consultation - ✓

PLW

- rejected by  
GOI

Thus, in spite of PLO offer,  
GOI rejects. & Israel obtains

la plus grande  
mission à son dévouement et  
à lui. Ses mérites le  
exposent lui-même à  
diverses et dantesques  
"This could be conveyed  
to us by Japan"

On lui a parlé, les  
commentaires en public. Il  
aurait annoncé lui-même  
à la Conférence  
Roue pour lui  
révéler à l'évidence

Not any. No relationship  
let as part of program with  
be able to tell program of  
with the last.

As for late in late  
in A FM & PM. Reason  
with full works - if program  
he would not be free to  
express his view. This  
was my person who was  
with PM & FM.

he is ready to do



letter about status of MO

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suggested.

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primary purpose was to

~~but~~ to under of 157 to more  
pure power found. Admonde/le

(P) has said "If MO accept  
901, 242 / 338 o letter  
then directly new situation with  
present"

Ans

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of govt in last long  
case. (cannot ply light)"

Not same as India. No  
leverage against Israel.

O. Dutt Fath comes to  
Izrael for official suit

P-1

PLO  
~~DF~~  
~~RF~~  
file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Strength of Palestinian Fedayeen Militia Groups

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Militia Strength</u>	<u>Leader</u>
Fatah	7,000 to 10,000	.Yassir Arafat
Saiqa	2,000 to 4,000	Issam al-Qadi
PFLP	500 to 1,000	George Habash
PDFLP	300 to 500	Naif Hawatmeh
PFLP/GC	200 to 250	Ahmad Jabril
ALF	300 to 500	Abd al-Rabim Ahmad
Other groups	500 to 600	

Information on this subject is very sketchy, and the figures here reflect our best estimates of each group's approximate strength.

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-106 # 35A

BY omf, NARA, DATE 11/8/01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
RDS-2, 12/12/86

MEMORANDUM

6482

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 9, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM:

RAYMOND TANTER *RT*

SUBJECT:

The PLO and the President's Press Conference

During the staff meeting of November 9, you inquired as to whether there are any organizations within the PLO that are not terrorist in nature. It was suggested that all of the organizations within the PLO are terrorist though there may be individuals who are not themselves terrorists within these units. My response was that the President should not brand all of the PLO organizations as terrorist since the PLO includes a number of social and political institutions. Indeed, the CIA's Palestinian Handbook states that:

Palestinian students' and women's groups, farm organizations, and professional unions are represented in the PLO and elect delegates to the National Council . . . . A PLO Research Center was established in Beirut in February, 1965, and a Planning Center in 1969. Another PLO agency is the Palestine Red Crescent Society. (U)

While there are non-terrorists institutions within the PLO, however, none of the Fedayeen groups disavow terror as an instrument. These groups include Fatah, the Syrian controlled Saiqa and the pro-Syrian Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command. These three favor a negotiated settlement, while the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine vacillates between favoring a negotiated settlement and not.

The rejectionists include the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the pro-Iraq Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Iraqi-controlled Arab Liberation Front and the Popular struggle Front, as well as Black June, which is close to Iraq. Note that the rejectionists are affiliated with Iraq; with the exception of the relatively independent Fatah, those who favor a negotiated settlement tend to affiliate with Syria.

See Tab A for Q & A on the PLO and Terrorism.

Geoff Kemp concurs.

cc: D. Feith; Bob Kimmitt; Chris Shoemaker



THE PLO AND TERRORISM

Q: Is the PLO a terrorist organization? Do all the PLO organizations engage in terrorism?

A: Although the PLO has agencies that carry out political, social, and humanitarian tasks, none of the main groups such as Fatah have renounced terrorism. As a result of a failure to renounce terrorism, a failure to accept UN Resolutions 242/338, and a failure to accept Israel's right to exist, the U.S. will not negotiate with the PLO.

PLO

National Security Council

RVA/JWN

Comment Sheet

Number

RAY TANTER

Date

18  
RE. Clark letter on Abu Eain

12/10/81

The attached was left with Bill Clark. No action necessary.

---

Action                      Coordinate                      Info

DUE DATE:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

9 December 1981

Dear Howard:

It has just come to our attention that at least one of your colleagues suggests introduction of a resolution to influence the Department of State toward a particular result in the Abu Eain extradition request.

Howard, I am charged with the determination of three fundamental legal issues in this serious case:

- (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the Magistrate's finding that there is probable cause to believe that Abu Eain committed a crime for which extradition is requested;
- (2) whether the crimes for which extradition is sought are political offenses and thus not extraditable crimes; and
- (3) whether he would receive a fair trial if extradited.

This case is not unlike those considered across the street from you in the Supreme Court. An attempt to influence the decision in the Abu Eain case by Senate Resolution or other political action would appear to be as inappropriate here as it would have been when the case was before the Supreme Court.

Given the complexity in this case, it would be inappropriate to render a decision before all proper concerns have been presented and considered. Anything less might prejudice the rights of the accused. According to the best judgments of legal counsel in both the Departments of State and Justice, the time frame in which I intend to act will be in compliance with statutory authority.

Sincerely,

William P. Clark  
Acting Secretary

The Honorable  
Howard H. Baker, Jr.,  
United States Senate.

Status of PLO Diplomatic Representation

The PLO is represented with varying status in over 100 countries in the world today. In some countries the PLO is accorded full diplomatic status (the term indicates that the host government acknowledges the PLO's office in that country has the status of an Embassy). In other countries the PLO is given partial status (use of diplomatic plates, passports, etc.) Finally, in many countries the PLO representatives form part of Arab League missions, have information or liaison offices, and are associated with various committees or associations. The following list is current.

Africa

Angola - Full  
Congo-Brazzaville - Full  
Jibouti - Full  
Ethiopia - Full  
Guinea-Bissau - Full  
Guinea, People's Revolutionary Republic of - Full  
Kenya - Full  
Mauritania - Full  
Mozambique - Status uncertain  
Mali - Full  
Somalia - Full  
Senegal - Full  
Tanzania - Full  
Uganda - Status unknown

Asia

Afghanistan - Uncertain but have an office  
Bangladesh - Partial  
Cambodia - Partial  
China (PRC) - Partial  
India - Full  
Iran - Full  
Japan - Information office  
Laos - Full  
Malaysia - Partial  
North Korea - Full  
Pakistan - Full  
Sri Lanka - Full  
Vietnam - Full

Eastern Europe - accredited to various parties, committees

Bulgaria - Partial  
Czechoslovakia - Partial  
East Germany - Partial  
Hungary - Partial  
Poland - Partial  
Rumania - Partial  
USSR - Partial  
Yugoslavia - Full

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NLS F97-106 #35B

BY anj, NARA, DATE 11/8/01



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Middle East - All countries with the exception of Oman, and Egypt, since Camp David, accord PLO full status

Western Hemisphere

Brazil - representative in Arab League Office  
Bolivia - Partial  
Canada - representative in Arab League information center  
Cuba - Partial  
Mexico - Information office  
Nicaragua - Full  
United States - Information office in Washington, D.C.

Western Europe

Austria - Full  
Belgium - Information office  
Cyprus - Full  
France - Information Office  
Greece - Full  
Italy-Arab League Office  
Malta - Partial  
Sweden - Information office  
Turkey - Full  
United Kingdom - representative in Arab League office  
West Germany - Information office

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



DEFENSE  
INTELLIGENCE  
AGENCY

00869

~~KEEP~~

Intelligence Appraisal  
Middle East :  
PLO Support To  
Central American  
Revolutionaries (U)


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27 MARCH 1981

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Intelligence Appraisal

**MIDDLE EAST:  
PLO SUPPORT TO  
CENTRAL AMERICAN  
REVOLUTIONARIES (U)**

FOIA(b) (3)

FOIA(b) (2)

This is a Department of Defense Publication  
Produced by the Defense Intelligence Agency





FOIA(b) (2)

FEDAYEEN SYMBOLIZE THE CONCEPT OF ARMED STRUGGLE

AK-47 IS BASIC FEDAYEEN WEAPON



FOIA(b) (2)




FOIA(b) (2)



MIDDLE EAST: PLO SUPPORT TO CENTRAL AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARIES (U)

Summary



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*The PLO leadership claims this assistance to the Nicaraguan and Salvadorian revolutionaries was and is at the insistence of the USSR and Cuba. However, there are more self-serving motivations that are believed to be behind the Palestinian-Central American leftist connection. So long as the PLO deems it politically, militarily, and economically profitable, we believe it will continue to support Third World revolutionary movements as a means to secure Palestinian national aspirations and to pressure the US to change its attitude on the Palestinian problem.*


Discussion

Background



A delegation of 15 PLO military and civilian specialists, under the orders of PLO Executive Chairman, Yassir Arafat, made a fact-finding mission to Nicaragua in early February 1981. Their task was reportedly to survey the needs of the Nicaragua Government's military and civilian institutions for aid and technical assistance. Moreover, this same delegation was to study the needs for additional Palestinian assistance to the guerrillas in El Salvador. Such aid would reportedly be transferred by way of Nicaragua. This mission appears to have gone well from both a PLO and Nicaraguan point of view. Indeed, even before it left Lebanon, Arafat reportedly told the delegation that the Palestinian revolution will give "complete support and assistance."


Immediately following the delegation's return to the Middle East, at least two Salvadorian rebel leaders were said to have traveled to Damascus and Beirut for talks with Palestinian officials. At that time, a more formal agreement apparently was negotiated for the transfer of arms from the PLO to Central America.



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FOIA(b) (2)



FOIA(b) (2)

FOIA(b) (2)

ORGANIZATIONS REPRESENTED WITHIN THE PLO

Functional Organizations

Military Organizations

Palestine Labor Organization

Al Fatah

Palestine Woman's Organization

Palestine National Front (PNF)

Palestine Students Organization

Arab Liberation Front (ALF)

Palestine Artists Organization

As Saiqa

Palestine Writers Organization

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)

Palestine Red Crescent

Palestine Orphans Trust

Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP)

Palestine Youth Organization

Palestine Research Organization

Popular Struggle Front (PSF)

Palestine Medical Organization

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), Jibril faction

Palestine Lawyers Organization

Palestine Teachers Organization

Palestine Artisans Organization

Popular Liberation Front (Abbass's splinter faction of the PFLP-GC)



[REDACTED] A similar development occurred in 1979 as the Sandinistas overthrew the Somoza government in Nicaragua. Though contacts probably were made and maintained well in advance of that year, the first reported negotiations for the transfer of money, arms, and training between the PLO and the Sandinistas apparently were held in late March. However, the PLO's decision to actively assist the Sandinistas appears not to have been made until three months later. On 24 June 1979, an official Palestinian radio broadcast in Beirut stated that the PLO "firmly and solidly supports the efforts for the rebuilding of a national government as the legitimate representative of the militant Nicaraguan people." That statement coincided with reports that Arafat's own organization, Fatah, had shipped 40 tons of weapons to the Sandinista revolutionaries. Less than a month later, an American transport plane was chartered to carry "medical supplies" from Lebanon to Nicaragua. However, its real cargo was discovered in Tunisia to be military equipment.

[REDACTED] Within a year of the fall of the Somoza government, the PLO was accorded an "office" with full diplomatic status in the former Israeli Embassy in Managua, and the PLO was recognized as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people." In more concrete terms, on 17 August 1980 the PLO and Nicaragua signed an accord calling for cooperation in commerce, agriculture, construction, banking services, education, and public information. The agreement also provided for an exchange of technical data and training, including armed forces development.

[REDACTED] Since the fall of 1980, the PLO has been advising and training the Nicaraguan military establishment. The most dramatic assistance has been with the Air Force. In September, some 30 PLO-Fatah Air Force personnel were assigned to Nicaragua.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] PLO leaders have stated that their involvement in both Nicaragua and El Salvador was and is at the urging of the USSR and Cuba. In exchange for cooperation, the PLO was promised increased military supplies for its forces in the Middle East. The reported visits to Cuba by PLO officials show that the Palestinians are probably coordinating their military activities in Latin America with the Cubans and undoubtedly are in close contact with Moscow. Indeed, the recent influx of heavy Soviet weapons to Palestinian groups in Lebanon tend to give credence to this.

[REDACTED] Although recent events suggest increased PLO-Cuban cooperation, Havana has little with which to entice the Palestinians. The Castro government has provided military training to Palestinians over the years, but its ties are closer to the more "Marxist"-oriented Palestinian elements. The main-line PLO leadership resents this and, as a result, Cuban-PLO relations below the surface are often strained and fraught with suspicion.

[REDACTED] For their part, the Soviets are probably more inclined to use the carrot rather than the stick to entice Palestinian support for their activities in Latin America. Although, Moscow and its European allies do supply the bulk of





equipment used by the entire Palestine resistance movement, it is believed Moscow would not cut the PLO off if the organization's leadership refused to go along with Soviet or Cuban subversive plots in Latin America. The maintenance of a "workable" Soviet-Palestinian relationship in the Middle East is probably viewed by the Kremlin as more valuable. Furthermore, given what appears to be far more extensive support from Cuban, Vietnamese, and other sources, Palestinian backing does not appear to have been crucial to either the Nicaraguan or El Salvadorian revolutionaries.

Therefore Yassir Arafat's claim that he is yielding to Soviet pressure could be designed more to insulate himself from Palestinian and Arab criticism for becoming involved in foreign ventures. Conservative Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, who form the backbone of the PLO's financial endorsements, do so with the understanding that their donations do not contribute to the overthrow of friendly sovereign states, particularly their own. Broadly speaking, the PLO receives money as an Arab liberation movement, fighting for Arab national aspirations against Israel, and not for foreign ventures. While the Palestinians' conservative Arab financial backers do not like the PLO-Soviet military arrangement, they concede it is necessary for the Palestinian movement to survive.

#### Ideological Contradictions

Assistance to and from non-Palestinian sources has been warmly given and received but primarily when such exchanges are believed by the PLO leadership to support its national goal. PLO help to non-Palestinian revolutionary movements does not mean the organization adheres to the idea of worldwide Marxist revolution. The PLO is comprised of a variety of subgroupings with different ideological motivations. The organization's dominant group, Arafat's own Fatah, believes in a nonideological approach to its goal -- the liberation of Palestine. To attain this goal, it embraces the concept of "armed struggle" as the prime force behind Palestinian nationalism and eventually the attainment of national rights.

Other PLO membership organizations, particularly the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), are ideologically bound to the spread of Marxist revolution worldwide. It is these groups that have helped and probably will continue to assist Soviet interests outside the Middle East on ideological grounds regardless of the consequences to the overall Palestine Resistance Movement.

Generally speaking, the PLO and Fatah prefer closer relations with nation states and those liberation movements and revolutionaries who are more nationalistic in their goals. On the other hand, Marxist-oriented Palestinian groups gravitate toward contacts with other "Marxists" and have been more worldwide in their operative goals. Italy's Red Brigades are believed to have stronger ties with the PFLP, though they also have had contacts with Fatah's radical wing. Even the Japanese Red Army (JRA) at one point associated itself with the PFLP while it was politically hostile to the PLO and Fatah leadership.

Because of the nature of the exile status of Palestinians, many of them who reside overseas are involved with local politics, but not, per se, with the PLO or its member groups. The head of the Communist Party in El Salvador, Shafik Jorge

FOIA(b) (2)

SAMED-SPONSORED FACTORIES EMPLOY MANY PALESTINIANS



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Handal, is of Palestinian parentage. However, his association with Latin American political parties is not believed to reflect Palestinian nationalism, goals, or particular involvement with "Marxist" Palestinian groups.

Motives for Involvement in Central America

The growing Palestinian involvement in Central America, as well as in other parts of the Third World, may therefore be better understood in the light of more self-serving economic, military, and political goals.

Economic

Independent profit-making enterprises are important to the PLO. Donations by the various Arab states are often tied to specific interests of the contributing government. For example, it is unlikely Libya would grant money to the PLO if it were to be directly funneled to the PLO-Jordanian Coordinating Committee for projects on the West Bank. Tripoli opposes the PLO-Jordanian linkage. The PLO leadership is aware that Arab donors expect a political quid pro quo for their contributions. Therefore, if the PLO is to have at least some operational independence, it must have independent financial resources.

SAMED (The Resistant), an arts and crafts center for the marketing of handicrafts made by Palestinian refugee camp residents, was founded under the PLO in Jordan in the late 1960s. At the outbreak of the Jordanian civil war in 1970, SAMED moved to Lebanon and began establishing vocational centers and factories for the production of clothes, leather goods, furniture, plastic products, and eventually military equipment. Though its purpose was primarily to provide work for unemployed Palestinians, it is assessed to have become a profit-making (rather than charitable) enterprise for the PLO. SAMED has also been associated with agricultural projects and light industries in Africa and possibly Asia. It

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It is believed that it has also served as a PLO broker for purchasing, selling, and transferring military equipment from various sources to buyers -- for a profit -- and it may be a conduit through which the Palestinians have recently provided military assistance to both Nicaragua and El Salvador.

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A more broadly based economic program may also be under consideration that would enable the PLO to establish profit enterprises in Nicaragua.

In addition to being an independent source of income, SAMED provides a network for Palestinians wanting technical training and experience. This helps to cement Palestinian loyalties to the PLO as their recognized governing authority in exchange for jobs. In developing states, these projects offer the recipient government the hope of developmental assistance tied to neither East nor West. In the PLO's view, this makes the recipient country more amiable to its cause.






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PLO NEEDS RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL FORUMS



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## Military

[REDACTED] The raison d'etre of the PLO is the attainment of Palestinian national aspirations. The PLO leadership believes that the concept of "armed struggle" is best suited to accomplish that goal. A military capability is therefore of prime importance. However, in the Middle East, Palestinian militancy has historically come up against the national interests of the particular Arab states bordering Israel. Despite verbal support for the Palestinian resistance movement, one by one the confrontation states have moved to suppress PLO activism. By 1971, Lebanon became the last area in which Palestinians could train and mount military operations against Israel -- free from Arab control.

[REDACTED] Most Palestinian military training takes place in Lebanon. Guerrilla ground force training provided to Third World revolutionaries in that country is usually basic and easily integrated into already existing Palestinian programs. This training is at negligible cost to the Palestinians, and the PLO probably views it as rewarding in terms of future coordination and cooperation. These contacts stimulate sympathetic reactions within the Third World. However, by confining their training to Lebanon, the PLO may feel it can avoid accusations of direct involvement in undermining another sovereign state.

[REDACTED] More technical military training for Palestinians, however, usually is conducted outside of Lebanon where facilities are better, such as the Soviet Union and Pakistan. Training that is not always associated with guerrilla or terrorist activities, such as for Air Force and naval personnel, is welcomed by the PLO in the belief the trainees will be able to form the backbone of a "conventional" Palestinian military establishment once a Palestinian entity is formed.

[REDACTED] The PLO, however, does have a problem of where to place such trained individuals and their equipment. Of particular concern appears to be where to base the PLO-Fatah Air Force. Palestinian pilots and aircraft would not last long in Lebanon given Israeli sensitivities. Flying with other Arab air forces -- Libya, Syria, Algeria -- has been one solution, but personnel are naturally subject to whatever operational constraints the Arab states decide to impose. Therefore, the PLO needs to find a haven where it can station its pilots, keep them under the organization's direct command, and still allow them to maintain flight proficiency. Nicaragua is an attractive option.

## Political

[REDACTED] The strongest motivation for Palestinian involvement in Central America appears to be political. The PLO leadership view its support to revolutionary movements, especially those whose prospects for success appear to be good, as an investment. By assisting a movement in coming to power in a state, the PLO secures an indebtedness for political payment to the Palestinian cause by the new government. That payment is particularly valued by the PLO when it translates into support and votes in international forums. Nicaragua, under Somoza, and El Salvador under the Junta, were supporters of Israel. That support has been eliminated in Managua, and the PLO probably is counting on it declining in San Salvador.

[REDACTED] Perhaps the most important rationale behind the PLO leadership's decision to become involved in Central America lies in internal Palestinian politics. Support to non-Palestinian revolutionary movements strengthens the PLO claim that it is in

[REDACTED]

step with other liberation struggles. It also undercuts accusations by the more "Marxist" Palestinians that the PLO leadership is too middle-class, too passive in its actions, and unfit to lead or control the Palestinian revolution. Indeed, in Nicaragua there appears to have been a covert power struggle between the PLO-Fatah elements and the PFLP as to who would be dominant and thereby determine the nature of the Palestinian involvement in that country.

### Outlook

[REDACTED] At present, the PLO leadership sees itself as gaining more than it might lose by supporting revolutionary movements in Central America and elsewhere. Otherwise, it is unlikely that it would comply with Soviet urgings, even with the promise of increased arms. Recent reporting states that Yassir Arafat attempted to justify the PLO involvement in Nicaragua and El Salvador to other Palestinian officials. Addressing them in Beirut, he said the actions were necessary on the grounds they were a way to gain Palestinian rights. According to Arafat, a solution to the Palestinian problems cannot be secured without the US. To force Washington to change its attitude on this core Middle East problem and the PLO, the Palestinian leadership will intensify its involvement with Third World revolutionary movements. This pressure reportedly would show the Americans that they had far more to lose by opposing such movements, particularly the establishment of a Palestinian state.

[REDACTED] Arafat appears to be more confident of the PLO's ability to influence US decisionmaking than is the case, but his statements indicate he views Palestinian involvement in Nicaragua and El Salvador as an element in securing Palestinian national aspirations. In this light, the PLO will probably continue -- if not step up -- its efforts to support Third World revolutionary movements. (Classified by DoD Dir S-5200.17 (M-2); review on 24 Mar 11)







With the compliments of

*John*  
John Edwin Mroz  
Director, Middle East Studies

INTERNATIONAL PEACE ACADEMY

*Geoff Kemp - 5/27/81*  
*As promised*  
*John*

777 United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017 212-986-3540



ISAM A. SARTAWI

May 19, 1981

John

Dear John:-

It was a great pleasure meeting you in Ditchley. Our talk was extremely useful and I hope that we will have the opportunity in the future to continue it.

I am enclosing, as I promised, the Nahum Goldmann interview with an African Diplomat which Chairman Asfari read at the PNC & which was distributed as an official document. Sorry I could not get it translated to English.

I very much look forward to our next meeting.

Warmest regards  
Sincerely  
Isam

## الفلسطيني أصبح مخيفاً وقد يحمل قنبلته النووية الى تل أبيب:

الكلام الذي نشبته في ما يلي هو جزء من حوار طويل جرى بين ديبلوماسي افريقي صديق للعرب وناهوم جولدمان ، الرئيس السابق للوكالة اليهودية وأحد قادة ( اليهودية الهادئة ) - اذا جاز التعبير في العالم .  
الديبلوماسي الافريقي نقل هذا الحوار الى ( اورينت برس ) التي اختارت منه اهم ما قاله جولدمان . الذي يعتبره الكثيرون ضمير اليهودية في هذا القرن يعتقد أن اسرائيل دخلت فعلا مرحلة الكارثة فيما لا تزال القيادات المتعاقبة تعيش خارج الحقائق . وهو يلاحظ أن الفلسطيني لم يمد ذلك الخائف بل أصبح ذلك المغيف أما التلويح بالقنبلة النووية الاسرائيلية فهو بنظره الرهان الأحمق لأنه موجه ضد اسرائيل بالدرجة الاولى وهذا بعض ما قاله جولدمان .

لا أعتقد أن بإمكان الديبلوماسية أن تلعب دوراً حاسماً في التقدم بالسلام خطوة أخرى الى الامام أما مشكلة رجال الطبقة السياسية الذين تماقوا على حكم اسرائيل فهي في كونهم لا يملكون رؤية واضحة لمقاهيم الصراع . ان أنهم يعتقدون أن اليهود عاشوا حقبة طويلة من الازلال وما داموا قد أنشؤوا دولتهم التي طانما حلحوا بها فان عليهم أن يؤمنوا ، ولو بوسائل انتحارية المناعة التي تحول بينهم وبين السقوط مرة أخرى في الهاشمية . أفهم أن يبحث شعباً ما عن القوة ، لكنني لا أفهم أبداً وقد لا أجد مبرراً أبداً ، لأن تتحول القوة الى فلسفة حياة . لقد كان بإمكان اسرائيل أن تقيم علاقات بناءة مع جيرانها فيما لو أخذت بعين الاعتبار أن الشعب الفلسطيني ليس مجرد حالة طارئة ينبغي طردها من الجغرافيا . واستطرادا من التاريخ . البدي حصل هو أن ديفيد بن جوريون وصل الى حد الانتشار الكامل تماماً ، كما هو الحال عند بعض الحاخامات المزيفين الذين كان يقتلهم الهذيان - وهو يشاهد أن دولة قامت ، وان باستطاعتها ان تعطي اليهود حججاً للتفوق على الآخرين . كان الآخرون هم العرب . لا أعتقد أن الامر في ذلك يعود الى القدر الميثولوجي فقط كان هناك من ساعد الصدفة بشيات ، والواقع أن الاتجاهات الاستعمارية التبسي سادت في القرن الحالي والقرن الماضي لعبت دوراً بارزاً في توظيف المقعد اليهودية وبعضها مبرر بشكل كامل ، في توسيع الهوة بين العرب واليهود .

أكثر يهودية من اليهود :

ان الذين يختزنن اتجاهات واضحة للكراهية ضد الالمان يستطيعون أن يتذكروا تلك الفصول المدمرة والمعاتية من التاريخ اليهودي ، ولكن من تراه يملك

فعلا من أجل تحويل السياسة الاسرائيلية نحو سلام حقيقي ، لقد كنت سعيدا جدا عندما علمت بأن رجالا عسكريين تخلوا عن أفكارهم السابقة وباتوا مستمدين لنتائج عن يد مل متواز للسياسة الاسرائيلية هذه لا تزال ، في الوقت الحاضر ، مجرد حالات احتمالية اذا أن زمام الامور ما برح في يد اولئك الذين يمتقدون ان التوتر هو العامود الفقري في الحياة اليهودية ، وهذا يعني أن علينا توقع مزيد من الحروب ، ولكن من سينتصر في النهاية ؟ انني أعترف كيهودي خبير الحياة جيد أن الحروب التي خمنتها علمت الصرب كيف يكونون أقوى ، وكيف يمتصون الهزيمة تلر الهزيمة وصولا إلى النتيجة الأخرى . هل هناك ما هو أفسس من أن لا تستطيع دولة ما أن تحصل ولو هزيمة واحدة ؟ هذا هو وضع اسرائيل الآن ؛ اتجاه مضاد للجدلية البشرية . والنعصر الدراماتيكي هنا يتمثل في الاعتماد السري على الولايات المتحدة أي أن اسرائيل في الوقت الحاضر ليست دولة مستقلة . لقد فاخر بن غوريون كثيرا بذلك الاستقلال لكن ورثته يعرفون أنهم يتحولون ، شيئا فشيئا إلى مرتزة ندى الامريكين .

جلد الالفصلي :

ان المستقبل قائم على فرضيات عديدة ومتناقضة ، وهكذا فقد نصل إلى ذلك اليوم الذي تكشف أمريكا فيه أن عليها أن تسقط اسرائيل من حساباتها الاستراتيجية ومن الاسف فانا لا نستطيع أن نتمثل بالافصى التي تستطيع أن تستبدل جلد ها الخارجي . اننا نملك جلدا واحدا وعندما نقده نقده أنفسنا . ان القادة الاسرائيليين هم الان في حالة ضياع لا حدود له وللمرة الاولى يشعر الرجال الذين كانوا يعتبرون أن بإمكانهم رسم حدود المنطقة ومستقبلها بأخذ يتهم المسك كرية انهم لا يستطيعون أن يعضوا الحرب ولا أن يصنموا السلام ، الا تجعل التبعة المطلقة للولايات المتحدة اليهودي يشعر بأنه يعيش في هولوكوست سياسي لقد اقترحت تحييد اسرائيل مناهيم بيغن بمثل التي ناصحا بعدم اثاره هذا الموضوع الذي يس سلامة الدولة لكنني اجبته بحزم بأنه اذا بقي مصرأ على عدم الاصناء لصوت العقل فان وقتا سيأتي لن يستطيع فيه على الاطلاق ان يصل إلى التحييد لأن الذين ساهموا في ولادة دولة اسرائيل بإمكانهم الان ان يساموا على موتها ولقد كان المفكرون اليهود اول من اشار إلى عجز العالم المزمع من الانتماء إلى أخلاقية مثالية ليس هناك من حل على الاطلاق الا من خلال الاعتراف بحقوق الفلسطينيين انهم موجودون فعلا وفي هذه الحال فان تجاهلهم يعني بكل بساطة تجاهل العالم الذي بات يعرف أن عليه أن يفعل شيئا ما حيال اولئك الذين فقدوا حقوقهم دون أن يرتكبوا أي ذنب بحق الشعب اليهودي ، والواقع أن الفلسطينيين لم يعودوا يتحدثون من موقع الضحية ، لقد استفادوا كثيرا من

الذرائع الثابتة للتديد تاريخيا بالحرب ؟ لقد كان هنالك أمريكيون وفرنسيون وبريطانيون وروس وألمان وحتى أتراك أكثر يهودية من اليهود . وهو لا كانوا ، والكثيرون منهم مسا زالوا يعتقدون أنه من الافضل ترك الشعوب الضعيفة تأكل بعضها البعض ما دام الهدف هو ابقاء التاريخ مرتبنا لأخلاقيات معينة . لست أعتقد ، بل أجزم ، أن اليهود يحصدون الآن ثمار ذلك الظلال التاريخي الذي وقعوا فيه ، حتى أن هناك مفكرين كبارا وقرواني الخطيئة عندما تغلبت لديهم غريزة الخيلاء على البرؤية العقلانية البعيدة المدى ، لقد كان أمرا مأساويا أن يحدث هذا ، فبعد ثلث قرن من قيام الدولة بيد واليهود مهددين بأنفناء أكثر من أى وقت مضى . ان الدعم الامريكى الذى يأخذ كل هذا الشكل الاحتفالي لا يعنى الاسرائيليين من أن يكونوا عرضة للخوف والوساوس السوداء . عندما وقع الرئيس أنور السادات وسناحيم بيجن اتفاقيات كامب ديفيد كنت سعيدا جدا لأن شمة يدا عربية على استعداد لكي تصافح بكل هذه الشجاعة يدا اسرائيلية ، ولكن هل تكفى هذه السعادة الشخصية كي تمتلئ الاشياء مصداقيتها التاريخية . ولقد اكتشفت بسدورى وبزيد من الاسف أن الفلسطينيين لم يكونوا هم الذين رسخوا الاطار الخاص بهم . هنا كان الخطأ الذى جعل من ذلك الانجاز العظيم مجرد جيفة بلوماسية وأنا لا أستعمل هذا التعبير بهدف التهديد وإنما بهدف اظهار الاسى ، فها نحن بعد حوالي عامين من اطلاق عملية السلام بين مصر واسرائيل نشعر أن القطار يسير على عجلسة واحدة . ان الذين صنعوا ذلك السلام المهييب يشعرون الان وأكثر من أى وقت مضى أن الخيال لا يجدى وحده في صنع تحولات كبرى ، ولا يد من الاحاطة الكاملة بالاسئلة التي يطرحها الواقع والتي ينبغي الاجابة عليها بسرعة وبمقلانية .

الخيار الاردني :  
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ومع ذلك فان هناك في اسرائيل من يخلط بين التخيل والتحليل . ان شمعون بيرز يتحدث عن الخيار الاردني الذى يرفضه الملك حسين والفلسطينيون معا ، لقد قلت لبييرز ألا يكون الوريث البارع لتلك الاخطاء التي حكمت السياسة الاسرائيلية ، ان لا يعقل أن يبدأ سيرته السياسية بمعالجة عرجاء للامور . لا أدري ما اذا كان مستعدا كي يفعل شيئا لتعديل وجهة نظره ، وهو بالمناسبة أسير رجال ( منهم حاييم بارليف ) لا يقاوم تصلبا عن مناخيم بينن الذى ما برح يعتبر السلام الذى أقامه مع مصر جزءا من خطة لاضاف العرب وليس انجازا لاحلال التناهم محل النزاع . أصبحت عجوزا ولم يعد بإمكانني أن ألعب دورا ضاعلا ولو على الصعيد المعنوى ، لكنني اعتقد أن هناك بين الاسرائيليين من بدأ يشعر بأن عليه تجاوز نقطة الدم التي يميش داخلها لأن القوة كأي امتياز انساني آخر ، لا بد أن تكون لها حدودها . وهذا الاتجاه لا ينحصر حاليا في دائرة الشمور ، بل أن هناك من بدأ يعمل

من التجربة الاسرائيلية ولم يعد هناك من مجال للحديث عن الفلسطيني الخائن فقد ولد الفلسطيني المخيف . ف .

المصـرب وولـدة بـدون اقتـصـاد :

العرب يراهنون الان على الزمن كان ثمة رجل مثل موشيه شاربه يعتقد أنه الرهان العقيم لأنه رهان الضعفاء لكن الذي حدث أن الاسرائيليين بدأوا يخافون فعلا من الزمن وفي كل يوم يمر لا يفقد الاسرائيليون حماسهم وتزداد رقيبتهم فسي الهجرة الى خارج الدولة وحسب ، بل ان الواقع الاقتصادي يأخذ شكل الكارثة الحقيقية وقد نفاجا بعد سنوات قليلة أن اسرائيل دوله بدون اقتصاد هذه هي الحقيقة فالارقام لم تعد ذات معنى والجزيرة التي تدفعها الولايات المتحدة لم تعد تجدى وفوق هذا كله فانه من اللامعقول ان نتحدث عن قدرة بيغن أو بيريز على مقارعة العرب اقتصاديا ، ان اصحاب الاقتراحات الجحيمية يعتقدون أن بإمكان السلاح النووي ان يحل كل هذه المشكلات التقليدية بهذه الطريقة المروعة يفكرون دون ان يعرفوا بأن هذا السلاح أصبح مشاطا ، وقد يكون من المرعب حقا أن نتصور فدائيا فلسطينيا يحمل قنبلته النووية الى احد مباني تل ابيب ويهدد بتفجيرها هناك قد يكون هذا شيئا ما ينتظرنا ، انني لا أشك لحظة واحدة بأن الرهان النووي جاء بالدرجة الاولى ضدنا ، لا أستطيع أن اذهب في تفاؤلي كثيرا لكنني أعتقد أن ايد يولوجيا القوة ستفكك ذات يوم في اسرائيل ، فانتفاهم مع العرب امرا ملحا للغاية وانا لم يحصل هذا في اقرب وقت فان علينا ان نتوقع ما هو أسوأ ، وأعتقد أن بإمكان الامريكيين الذين يدعون حيننا أن يصنعوا الكثير من أجل اسرائيل والكثير من أنسـ ينقظوها من نفسها ، سوف يمتير شمعون بيريز انني بدأت بقصف مواقعه في وقت مبكر جدا ، هذا الموتف لا يعفيني من القلق . . . انني مضطرب اكثر من أى وقت مضى وأشعر ان علينا ان نفعل شيئا ما قبل فوات الاوان . . .



# LET THEM SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES...

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PLO Leader, Farouk Kaddoumi

## A Warning to Washington

"If the United States or Israel believes that it can undermine the steadfastness of the PLO and Syria, it is mistaken. This would lead to a much wider war than the United States imagines - a war that would cover all parts of the world. Regardless of the cost, American interests would not escape the hands of the Palestinians... If the United States exposes the PLO to danger, we will not hesitate to strike at American interests wherever they are...

"As for the statement that there are 'moderate trends' in the PLO, let me say that there are no 'moderates' or 'extremists' in the PLO. There are clear objectives and clear policies which we are all trying to apply as quickly as possible by political, diplomatic and military means. No leader in the PLO can abandon any of our national goals...

"Our position on this matter (*mutual recognition by Israel and the PLO*) requires no clarification. We have said over and over again that we refuse to recognize Israel. This is an unchangeable, permanent policy... There are no ifs and buts. We say we will not recognize Israel (*even if Israel recognizes the PLO*)...

"No request has been made to us (*by the EEC*) to amend the pertinent article (*in the Palestinian National Charter*). That is all newspaper talk. It was reported, for instance, that (Austrian Chancellor Bruno) Kreisky made such a request to me. That is a lie, because I would never allow such a subject to be discussed. We can never allow any party to interfere in our affairs, especially in two major matters: our non-recognition of Israel and our refusal to amend our National Charter in any way. I hope I am making myself clear to everyone everywhere, especially to the European countries. We can never allow these subjects to be discussed with us, and if they are, our answer will be firm and clear, because we know that such questions are aimed at undermining our cause and dividing our people. Those who ask such questions do not have good intentions...

"It is our right to strike from all our Arab territory bordering Israel. Our people in the interior need our support, and to support them, we must go across Arab borders."

Farouk Kaddoumi, head of the  
"Political Department" of the  
PLO, in an interview with *Monday  
Morning*, Beirut, 6-12 April, 1981.

# ...AND THEY MEAN WHAT THEY SAY!!

By Lydia Georgi

# Farouk Kaddoumi: A warning to Washington

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**The PLO is braced for a Reagan offensive in Lebanon and threatens a war on U.S. interests around the world**

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The political chief of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Farouk Kaddoumi, has warned the administration of U.S. President Ronald Reagan that the PLO will attack American interests all over the world if Washington goes ahead with apparent plans to launch an offensive against the Palestinian organization and its allies.

In an interview with *Monday Morning* last Wednesday (April 1), Kaddoumi said all the signs indicated that the Reagan Administration was preparing to adopt more hostile attitudes toward the PLO and to give Israel the "green light" to attack South Lebanon.

Noting that the recent escalation of violence in South Lebanon

was accompanied by a similar escalation in Beirut by the rightist Maronite militias, Kaddoumi said these were clear signs of Reagan's intentions toward the PLO and its Arab allies, especially Syria.

"If the United States or Israel believes that it can undermine the steadfastness of the PLO and Syria, it is mistaken," he said. "This



## NO CONGRATULATIONS FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN

would lead to a much wider war than the United States imagines — a war that would cover all parts of the world. Regardless of the cost, American interests would not escape the hands of the Palestinians.”

Kaddoumi (Abu Lutf) also:

- Called on Saudi Arabia to exert more pressure on the United States, “to a point where the United States will feel that it has to choose between Israel and American interests in the Arab world.”

- Warned that if U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig, in his current tour of conservative Arab states, succeeded in forming a pro-American “Arab camp,” that would lead to the rise of an opposing “revolutionary, progressive Arab alliance” and trigger an inter-Arab conflict.

- Rejected the European call for “mutual recognition” between Israel and the PLO, stating that the PLO’s refusal to recognize Israel had no “ifs or buts” attached and that anyone who asked the Palestinians to change this position was exposing his ill intentions toward them.

- Described part of his talks with the Vatican’s Cardinal Agostino Casaroli and stated that a meeting between PLO Chairman Yaser Arafat and the Pope was not to be ruled out.

- Declared that neither the Palestinians nor anyone else had the right to challenge the Lebanese Army’s right to be present in South Lebanon or in any other part of Lebanon.

### OFFENSIVE

The Reagan Administration, Kaddoumi said, “has begun to launch political offensives against the socialist camp. The developments in Poland provide evidence of this. Washington is taking advantage of the situation there to take the

The Palestine Liberation Organization does not congratulate U.S. President Ronald Reagan on his escape from last week’s attempt on his life in Washington, PLO political chief Farouk Kaddoumi said last week.

In his interview with *Monday Morning*, the Palestinian foreign minister dissociated the PLO from the congratulations which Palestine National Council President Khaled Fahoum sent to Reagan after the abortive assassination attempt.

“I wish our brother Khaled Fahoum had not congratulated Reagan on his safety,” Kaddoumi said. “He meant well, but as one Arab leader once said, ‘The road to hell is paved with good intentions.’”

“The congratulations of our brother the president of the Palestine National Council were a personal initiative and are not to be taken as coming from the PLO. Palestinian diplomacy cannot possibly make such a statement, especially after the statement recently made by Reagan’s national security advisor, Mr. Allen, which expressed total hostility to the aspirations of the Palestinian people.”

Kaddoumi added: “The attempt to assassinate Reagan, who is accusing us of terrorism, clearly indicates that his own country is full of terrorism and is, indeed, a source of terrorism.”

In an interview with *Monday Morning* last November, after Reagan’s victory in the presidential elections, Kaddoumi said the new President, compared with his predecessor, was “the lesser of two evils.”

Last week, he said he had not changed his opinion.

He explained: “The advantage we have in Reagan is the same advantage we had in (Israeli Premier Menahem) Begin. Before Begin’s victory, the Israeli Labor Party was able, to a certain extent, to hide its fascist activities in the occupied territories. Begin did us a great service by exposing Israel as an expansionist, fascist entity and an advance post for international imperialism in the Middle East.

“And now Reagan and his aides have come to unmask Washington’s ugly face and reveal the truth about their inhuman attitude toward the Palestinian issue. They are exposing the American lies to international public opinion about Washington’s concern for human rights and peace in the world.


“Reagan has not changed American policy, but he is exposing it, and this will prompt the hesitant nations in the world to support the PLO and stand against the U.S., giving us more friends and more political power.

“Reagan is indeed the lesser of two evils.”

offensive, and it is also making use of the Afghanistan situation to implement its new offensive policy.

“In view of this, we expect the United States of America to strike in the Middle East, especially since the balance of power in this region is in favor of Israel,” he added. “The United States knows that the PLO has become a strong political

force in this region, influencing developments and in some cases directing them. It also knows that the PLO stands against imperialist expansion and is working to eliminate tension spots in the region and end Israeli occupation. Since Washington is taking the offensive in its general strategy, we expect it to take the offensive here — by adopt-



The PLO's Farouk Kaddoumi

ing more hostile attitudes toward the PLO and by giving Israel the green light to attack South Lebanon."

The PLO leader said that "the present escalation by the isolationists (in Beirut and the Beqaa), coinciding with the escalation in the South, is clear evidence of this plan."

The United States' objective, he said, is to "liquidate the Palestinian Revolution. It knows it cannot do this, but it wants to stir up more problems in the Middle East to consecrate its presence and frighten the so-called 'moderate Arab states' into entering military alliances and accepting American military presence in the region, which the U.S. is demanding on the pretext of stemming the Soviet tide in the Middle East."

The PLO will not be the only target of Washington's offensive in the Middle East, Kaddoumi said. "Most of the progressive forces in the Middle East will be hit, notably Syria, because of its friendship treaty with the Soviet Union and its truly heroic struggle against the Camp David agreements. Syria and

the PLO are in the same trench, facing these challenges."

#### WAR

He added: "If the United States or Israel believes that it can undermine the steadfastness of the PLO and Syria, it is mistaken. This would lead to a much wider war than the United States imagines — a war that would cover all parts of the world. Regardless of the cost, American interests would not escape the hands of the Palestinians... If the United States exposes the PLO to danger, we will not hesitate to strike at American interests wherever they are."

Further evidence that the U.S. was preparing to take the offensive in the Middle East in general and Lebanon in particular was provided by the recent statements made by Reagan's national security advisor, Richard Allen, and the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Charles Percy, Kaddoumi said.

Both American officials described the PLO as a "terrorist" organization and justified Israel's

attacks on South Lebanon, he said, adding: "By justifying Israeli aggression on the South, the Americans can be said to be facilitating wide-scale Israeli attacks and flinging the doors wide open to another war in the Middle East."

This was true despite occasional statements by American officials which gave the impression of a moderate U.S. attitude toward the PLO, like Secretary of State Alexander Haig's statement that there were moderate elements in the PLO, Kaddoumi said.

He noted that the U.S. had made several moderate statements about the PLO in the past, all of which were quickly withdrawn. Percy himself was said to have discussed with the Soviets the possibility of establishing an independent Palestinian state, "and here he is now affirming his hostile attitude to the aspirations of the Palestinian people."

"So despite all appearances, we cannot say that there are contradictions in American policy on this matter, or that Haig is different," Kaddoumi said. "As for the statement that there are 'moderate



### On Alexander Haig's Mideast tour:

- Saudi Arabia must exert enough pressure on the U.S. to make it choose between Israel and American interests in the Arab world
- In its talks with Haig, Jordan is urged to abide strictly by Arab summit resolutions
- If Haig succeeds in creating a conservative Arab alliance, an opposing alliance will rise and an inter-Arab conflict will follow



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## On the escalation in Lebanon:

- It is the beginning of the Reagan offensive on the PLO and Syria
- The PLA units in Beirut take their orders from the Syrian army, and the PLO has nothing to do with the fighting in the capital
- Neither the PLO nor anyone else has the right to oppose Lebanese Army deployment in the South or anywhere else in Lebanon



trends' in the PLO, let me say that there are no 'moderates' or 'extremists' in the PLO. There are clear objectives and clear policies which we are all trying to apply as quickly as possible by political, diplomatic and military means. No leader in the PLO can abandon any of our national goals."

No one in the PLO has the slightest hope that the U.S. will voluntarily change its Middle East policy, he said. "Only a change in the balance of power in the region, which will face the U.S. with a choice between its interests and the interests of Israel, can lead to a change in American policy. Unless the balance shifts, the U.S. will maintain its hostile policy, which does not serve the cause of peace in the region but consecrates the region's existing problems..."

"The liberation of Palestine is the task of all the Arab peoples, not of the Palestinian people alone. If those peoples do not feel that their rulers are doing their national duty in that regard, the day will

come when they will be able to force their leaders to enter the battle. The Arabs do not lack the material capability, weapons and manpower needed to enter the battle. What they lack is bold Arab leadership and Arab solidarity."

### SAUDIS

Kaddoumi added: "I'll say it very frankly: the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has the capability of exerting pressure on the United States of America. Its immense economic power places it in a position where it can exert direct influence on the course of international policies.

"The question is: will the Saudi Kingdom exert such pressure, and to what extent will it do so? That is up to the Saudi Kingdom decide in the light of its relations with the United States and the European countries. But it is our hope that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will increase its pressure to a point where the United States will feel that it has to choose between Israel

and American interests in the Arab world."

This is what the PLO hopes the Saudis will do in their forthcoming talks with Haig, Kaddoumi said. "We say this to the Saudis and not to the Jordanians because Saudi Arabia has the means to exert the required pressure, but we do not believe Jordan has those means."

Haig's tour, which started last Friday, will cover both Jordan and Saudi Arabia, in addition to Israel and Egypt.

Where Jordan is concerned, Kaddoumi said, "our hope that in the talks with Haig, it will abide strictly by the resolutions of the Rabat, Baghdad and Tunis Arab summit conferences."

He added: "We do not wish Haig success in his efforts to create a new Arab camp. The creation of such a camp would be faced by the rise of a revolutionary, progressive Arab alliance. If axes and alliances begin to be formed in this region, the struggle will become an inter-Arab struggle, God forbid.

"I believe that the states which are referred to as 'conservative states' are fully aware of this and will no doubt think a thousand times before taking such action."

The United States, Kaddoumi said, was making repeated attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of the Arab Gulf region. "Those attempts are now represented by the presence of American military bases in Oman. The Americans have made Oman their forces' bridgehead to the Gulf region. This position on the part of Oman is considered one of hostility toward the Arab nation and alliance with the Egyptian regime, which has opened its arms wide to American influence in Egypt, with no regard to the harm which this openness to American presence is bound to inflict on the Egyptian people in the long run."

In addition to its bases in Oman and presence in Egypt, the United States was trying to pressure the Gulf states into accepting American deployment in their region, Kaddoumi said.

"So far, the Gulf states have rejected these attempts, but the pressures are increasing, and so is the Gulf states' apprehension because of the continuing war between Iraq and Iran. The world's imperialist forces are taking advantage of this fear to justify their advent to the region.

"I hope that no such intervention occurs, that no invitation is issued to those forces to deploy in the Gulf."

### PERES

Asked how the PLO reacted to recent reports from Israel that the leader of the Israeli Labor Party, Shimon Peres, had held talks with Jordanian, Moroccan and possibly Gulf officials, Kaddoumi said he was keeping an open mind on the subject.

"A politician is suspicious by nature, because he is a man who

deals in possibilities," he said. "We cannot by any means confirm these rumors, especially since Israel is their source. On the other hand, we cannot deny them; we must not bury our head in the sand, as ostriches do when danger approaches. We must remember that there were similar rumors about Egypt and Israel once, and that those rumors were subsequently confirmed, when bridges were built between Israel and the Egyptian regime.

"We must be vigilant, and see to it that these rumors do not become a bitter truth which we can never accept."

Peres' Labor Party, which is expected to come to power in Israel after the June Knesset elections, is being portrayed as "more flexible" than the present Likud government of Premier Menahem Begin. Labor's political platform, published at the end of 1980, supports a return of part of the West Bank to Jordan — the so-called "Jordanian option" said to be favored by the Reagan Administration.

Kaddoumi said the PLO saw no difference between the basic positions of Begin and Peres. A Labor government in Israel would mean a change in leaders and tactics, but not in policy, he said.

As for the "Jordanian option," he added, "there is no such thing. Israel and the Reagan Administration know that the Arabs are opposed to this attempt to undermine the unity of Palestinian representation, and this is made perfectly clear in the resolutions of the Arab summits. We have not heard any Arab party come out in favor of this option."

A just solution of the Middle Eastern crisis can only come, "first, in the framework of the United Nations; second, on the basis of the Palestinian people's right to return, determine their own fate and establish an independent Palestinian state on their national soil; and

third, on the basis of full recognition of the PLO as a basic party (to the negotiations), equal to every other party," Kaddoumi said.

Any attempt to adopt another approach to a peace settlement in the Middle East, he charged, "can only be an attempt to split Arab ranks."

The PLO leader expressed unrestrained support for Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev's recent proposal for an international peace conference on the Middle East.

The Soviet initiative, he said, is "positive, constructive and built on the sound bases of total withdrawal from all Arab lands occupied in 1967 and the achievement of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to establish a Palestinian state."

### EUROPE

The Soviet proposal, by giving those details and ignoring Resolution 242 (which is unacceptable to the PLO and most other Arabs), has given "a new ceiling" to Middle East peace efforts, thus "embarrassing Western Europe," Kaddoumi said.

Western Europe's conception of peace in the Middle East, he explained, is summarized by the 1980 Venice declaration, "and the principles put forward in that declaration fall far short of the so-called minimum level defined by the Arab summit in Baghdad."

Both Western Europe and the United States have either rejected or ignored the Soviet proposal for an international peace conference on the Middle East.

3) Commenting on repeated European calls for mutual recognition by Israel and the PLO, Kaddoumi said: "Our position on this matter requires no clarification. We have said over and over again that we refuse to recognize Israel. This is an unchangeable, permanent policy."

## On the Arabs:

- Oman, by becoming the bridgehead of American forces to the Gulf, is expressing hostility toward the Arab nation
- The PLO hopes that the Gulf states will resist the increasing American pressure and reject U.S. military presence in their region
- The PLO is constantly trying to open all Arab fronts with Israel, including the Jordanian front
- Reports of meetings between Peres and Arab leaders cannot be confirmed or denied, but 'we must be vigilant'



Even if Israel recognized the PLO?

"There are no ifs and buts. We say we will not recognize Israel."

Kaddoumi said that news reports about a formal European Economic Community request to the PLO to amend the Palestinian National Charter to make mutual PLO-Israeli recognition possible were false.

④ "No request has been made to us to amend the pertinent article," he said. "That is all newspaper talk. It was reported, for instance, that (Austrian Chancellor Bruno) Kreisky made such a request to me. That is a lie, because I would never allow such a subject to be discussed. We can never allow any party to interfere in our affairs, especially in two major matters: our non-recognition of Israel and our refusal to amend

our National Charter in any way. I hope I am making myself clear to everyone everywhere, especially to the European countries. We can never allow these subjects to be discussed with us, and if they are, our answer will be firm and clear, because we know that such questions are aimed at undermining our cause and dividing our people. Those who ask such questions do not have good intentions."

The EEC's positions, and its peace initiative's chances of success, are not likely to improve when Britain's Lord Carrington becomes president of the European Council this summer, Kaddoumi said.

"The position of the EEC is the sum total of the positions of its 10 members," he said, "so I don't see any chance of a change in those positions when the British take over

the presidency — especially since the British position has not reached the minimum level acceptable by the PLO. The French position is more advanced than Britain's."

The PLO was not pinning much hope on the meeting which is expected to take place between Carrington and Arafat when Britain takes over the presidency of the EEC, Kaddoumi said, "but the meeting in itself will be a step forward in the British attitude toward the Palestinian cause and the PLO, and we welcome it."


### VATICAN

Asked if a meeting was likely between Arafat and Pope John Paul, Kaddoumi said, "Everything is possible," but he refused to say whether the possibility of such a



## On the EEC peace initiative:

- The PLO will not recognize Israel, whether or not Israel recognizes the PLO
- Those who ask the PLO to recognize Israel do not have good intentions
- There is no reason to hope for progress in the European position after Britain takes over the EEC presidency



meeting was discussed in his recent talks with Vatican Secretary of State Cardinal Casaroli.

His talks at the Vatican, Kaddoumi said, were held "after the Pope refused to receive the terrorist Yitzhak Shamir, the foreign minister of Israel."

"My meeting with Cardinal Casaroli was of considerable political significance," he said. "It demonstrated how the Vatican recognizes the PLO politically, appreciates its power in the region, is in sympathy with the national rights of the Palestinian people and is interested in settling the Middle Eastern crisis. The meeting also represented a firm denial by the Vatican of the lie circulated by the American administration to the effect that the PLO is a terrorist organization."

"Furthermore, my four-hour meeting with Italy's foreign minister was an eloquent answer to the rumors being spread by biased Italian media about an alleged link between the PLO and terrorism in Italy."

"In those two meetings, Italy and the Vatican demonstrated their belief in the justice of the Palestinian cause."

In the meeting with Cardinal

Casaroli, which lasted just under two hours (and not 45 minutes, as reported), "the Vatican expressed its conviction that the best solution of the question of Jerusalem lies in the internationalization of the holy city," Kaddoumi said. "It was argued that this solution was all the more desirable because there was a U.N. General Assembly resolution in 1947 calling for the internationalization of Jerusalem."

"Our response was that the 1947 resolution also called for the partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states, and that it was not permissible for anyone to choose one part of the resolution and ignore the rest. We said that if the Vatican wished to adopt that resolution, well and good, but the resolution was indivisible."

"We also pointed out that the Jerusalem issue was not a purely spiritual one, but a political question linked to the Palestinian situation and the rights of the Palestinian people. It would be totally unjust to separate the cause of Jerusalem from the parent cause, the cause of Palestine."

"We sensed great sympathy for our goals on the part of Cardinal

Casaroli, and it is our hope that this

dialogue with the Vatican will bear fruit in the near future."

### JORDAN

Meanwhile, the political dialogue between the PLO and Jordan shows no sign of bearing fruit in the foreseeable future.

"This dialogue was discontinued some time ago, the reason being that we were unable to arrive at any positive results," said Kaddoumi, who headed the PLO committee which held talks with the Jordanian government. "However, the Palestinian-Jordanian committee which is concerned with purely financial and economic affairs still stands. The committee, as you know, was formed in response to the Baghdad summit resolution calling for coordination between Jordan and the PLO to bolster the steadfastness of our people in the interior (West Bank and Gaza). It is important for this committee to continue its activities, and I am confident that all our Arab brethren understand the importance of our remaining on that committee in support of our people in the interior."

⑤ [Commenting on Israeli reports last week about a Palestinian rocket



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## On the Vatican:

- **My meeting with Cardinal Casaroli constitutes a firm denial by the Vatican of American lies that the PLO is a terrorist organization**

- **The Vatican supports the internationalization of Jerusalem, but our response is that it must also adopt the rest of the pertinent U.N. resolution, which calls for the partition of Palestine**

- **A meeting between the Pope and Arafat is possible**

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attack on Israel from Jordanian territory, Kaddoumi said: "It is our right to strike from all Arab territory bordering Israel. Our people in the interior need our support, and to support them, we must go across Arab borders."

Did last week's attack mean that the PLO was reopening the Jordanian front?

"We are constantly trying to open all Arab fronts without exception," Kaddoumi said. "This is true despite the fact that we have taken a decision not to strike across the Lebanese borders."

### SOUTH

Turning to Lebanese-U.N. plans to deploy more Lebanese Army troops in South Lebanon, Kaddoumi said the PLO had no objec-

tions to the proposed deployment.


"It is not permissible for the PLO or any other party to oppose the deployment of the Lebanese Army on Lebanese territory," he said. "Lebanon belongs to all the Lebanese people and to the Lebanese Army, which must have total freedom to deploy in any part of the country. It is only natural for the Lebanese Army to be present in the South, in the North, in the center and wherever it wishes to be present in Lebanon, without having to explain why. Let the Lebanese Army deploy in any part of its territory. We have no right to even make any comment on this."

He added: "But who, in fact, is blocking the deployment of the Lebanese Army in the South? It is that traitor to his country, Saad Haddad, and Israel. It is Israel, which aspires to the annexation of

South Lebanon, and the United States, which is justifying and encouraging Israeli aggression against the South. Those forces are the enemies of peace and the opponents of any just settlement in the Middle East."

Israel has come out publicly in opposition to any Lebanese Army deployment in the South, warning that if the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) went ahead with that plan, it would risk a "direct confrontation" with Israel. An indirect confrontation occurred two weeks ago, when Israel's ally in the Southern border strip, rebel Lebanese Major Saad Haddad, shelled UNIFIL positions in a Southern town where Lebanese troops were newly stationed, killing three U.N. troops and wounding over 30.

UNIFIL's new commander, Major-General William Callaghan of



Ireland, who is reported to have had heated talks with the Israelis after that incident, is insisting on the deployment of Lebanese troops despite the warnings from Tel Aviv.

"General Callaghan's position is an honorable and faithful expression of the principles and goals of the United Nations," Kaddoumi said. "It is his mission to prepare for the return of South Lebanon to Lebanese sovereignty. Any criticism of him cannot serve the cause of peace or facilitate the United Nations' duties in all parts of the world.

"But Israel and the United States cannot possibly be interested in those noble goals, because their goals are further expansion, more imperialist presence in the region, more exploitation of the Arab countries' resources, the strengthening of Israel to delay Arab libera-

tion movements, and the facilitation of the total take-over of South Lebanon as part of Israel.

"The people of Lebanon, however, will resist these attempts."

Asked whether he gave any credence to reports that UNIFIL's mandate may be allowed to expire next June if the present situation is maintained, Kaddoumi said: "The withdrawal of UNIFIL is no simple matter. It would be tantamount to an abandonment of its noble mission and its international duties. It would mean the defeat of the U.N. and the forces of good in the world."

#### BEIRUT

Kaddoumi emphasized the PLO's conviction that the eruption of violence in Beirut and the Beqaa, coin-

ciding with the Israeli escalation in the South, was part of the Reagan Administration's offensive against the PLO, but he also stressed that the PLO was in no way involved in the fighting in the Lebanese capital.

Reports about the Beirut battles indicated that they included artillery clashes between the Lebanese Army units stationed in East Beirut and the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) units deployed along the "green line" between the two halves of the capital.

"The Palestine Liberation Army is the army of the PLO," Kaddoumi said, "but some of its units take orders not from us but from the Syrian Army command. These Palestinian units are considered part of the Arab Deterrent Forces in Lebanon. We have absolutely no connection with these developments." ●