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Last Updated: 11/06/2023

Iran

0046

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 5, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL NANCE

FROM:

MAMIE McDONOUGH 

SUBJECT 

LETTER ABOUT IRAN

Attached is a letter for the President from the son of the late Shah of Iran, which someone sent to Joe.

I believe this comes under your jurisdiction; and am passing it on.

Many thanks.



December 1st, 1981

Dear President Reagan

I have the honor to enclose for your personal attention the summary of an analysis on the chaotic situation in Iran which has reached such magnitude that it cannot but lead to the inevitable collapse of Khomeini's tyrannical and communist-infiltrated regime.

The ensuing political vacuum added to the existing socio-economic calamities will surely invite the communists to take over with the direct or indirect intervention of the Soviets.

However, in a situation so replete with dangers, all hope is not yet lost and I am convinced that by carefully planning for the future, forces in Iran friendly to the West can still be successfully mobilized in a unified front to fill the void which will be left by Khomeini's departure from the scene.

As for myself, I have no personal ambition beyond witnessing my country's liberation and its honor, integrity and thousands of years of rich cultural heritage, once again restored.

I await your response.

sincerely yours
Adolf Pahlavi

I am writing this report to you at a critical juncture in the history of my country, and possibly at that of yours, with the intention of submitting to your administration the gist of many months of my deliberations, intensive consultations, and much soul-searching regarding the future of my country. I am speaking from years of experience and from the vantage point of a person who has some intimate knowledge of the workings and the twists and zags of the psyche of my countrymen-subtilities, sometimes referred to as "soft facts", factor, as or more crucial than the so-called "hard-facts" in any political equation. The knowledge of the "hard-facts" alone, in the words of Harold Isaacs, is confronted with the "soft-facts" of human experience, remembrances of things past, emotions, behaviors, so much more difficult to grasp, much less take effectively into account.

I have been pleasantly surprised to learn that my own analysis of events, leading to the departure of my brother, the meaning and nature of the present anarchy and the danger it poses for the stability of the region, and the best prognosis I can offer an allied government, coincide with your views and the views of many knowledgeable Iranians.

This paper, therefore, is an attempt to appeal to you directly, in the hope that your personal attention may be called to the increasingly urgent Iran problem. My guiding principle in doing so is my abiding faith in the lasting ties which link your country and mine together, and in our collective drive toward a better and brighter future for all mankind, the "Islamic" rebellion notwithstanding.

I must say at the outset, your remarks on world political pictures, in general, and on Iran, in particular, reflected an unusual perceptiveness, insight, and an unwavering resolve to right the wronged, to rectify the fallen, to regain the lost ground, and to stand firm in the face of the rising tide of the world terrorism and anarchy which, unchecked, may engulf us all.

Many analysts would tend to support your views that had there been a more cohesive U.S. foreign policy, less confusion among the top U.S. ranks, and, at the time, a more supportive American administration, my brother's government would probably not have fallen. Several corollaries would have also been valid: The Shah's Iran was indeed an island of stability

and a bulwark against communism in the region and in the vital Persian Gulf. Having the same interests as the free world, Iran might keep a highly volatile area from dangerous explosions. The West did not need to worry about the Strait of Hormuz or the reliability of its oil routes. There was no need for huge Indian Ocean carrier task forces, for the creation of rapid deployment forces, or the expression of nuclear intent if Russia were to invade Iran or unsettle the Gulf. Russia would never have invaded Afghanistan if the Shah had reigned, nor would Saudi Arabia feel the cold chills of encroaching radicalization. The world oil markets would not have turned on their heads and the possibility of an Iran invasion was non-existent. Finally, the prospect of physical disintegration of Iran and its takeover by communists was not even a leftist dream while the Shah ruled. In short, the fall of the Shah upset the balance of power and created a most testing period for the free world.

Naturally, all this is gone now. Iran, and the West, face a most trying period in their history and an agonizing time of unsettling disturbances, requiring a fool-proof recognition of realities, discarding of wishful thinking, and quick, but well-calculated responses. In my estimation, Iran is now half-lost, but it certainly is retrievable. To retrieve Iran, as the rear-guard of the Western alliance necessitates a hard look at facts (many of them "soft") and face the realities eye-ball to eye-ball.

In this discourse, I seek your permission to make an attempt, to first, point to the basic dynamics of the events of 1979, leading to the Shah's departure, briefly analyze the most important psycho-political factors, take a telescopic view at the current situation and what it may mean, and finally, proceed to outline a possible "retrieval" proposal for joint discussion and cooperative operation.

I believe the basic forces of unrest and an inclination to revolt, stem from the perpetual clash between the forces of renovation, modernization, on one hand, and a "cultural lag" or a "cultural lethargy" on the other. In other words, any ruler of any developing country faces this crucial dilemma of either forcing modernization on his people, or else, see them recede further and further into the niches and crevices of a forgotten, uncivilized era. The secret of success, it appears is to hold long enough to the "modernization position" until the "no-return"

threshold is reached. Iran also was certainly in the throes of such perennial conflict, about to reach the threshold of "no-return", when forces, much beyond our control, took us by surprise. The introduction of modernizing forces produced many economic and social dislocations and heightened the clashes between the old and the new values. As a result, the edges between the Westernized class and the old, traditionally-minded people sharpened to the cutting point. In hindsight, there were some tactical errors committed by the Iranian government, many of them, presumably, avoidable. But the revolt, which basically stemmed from a resistance to modernize, and a refusal to leap the gap (natural to many a human nature), together with the disturbing psychological turbulence it caused in many a human psyche, found a convenient refuge in two, traditionally-hostile centers; i.e., the mosques of the fanatic mullahs and the underground clubs of the international Marxists.

I must point to two important factors at this juncture. The first point is that religion and religious fervor took over Iran not because of the religion per se, or, the religious-minded people, but because religion provided the disturbed with a convenient, and "holy", cover, and an acceptable vent through which much of the hatred, jealousy and feelings of inferiority could be expressed. Khomeini's enormous and unfathomable hatred and his own personalized brand of Shiism provided an excellent and "sanctified" focus for the accumulated feelings of revenge. In essence, what many people meant to say (albeit unconsciously), was that what they considered loveable, but unattainable (because of their own natural resistance and anxiety-producing ventures) was bad, corrupt and damned. By so doing, not only did they relieve themselves of much anxiety (which by definition is highly disturbing), but also clothed their destructive and base impulses into the "holy" religious precepts. Khomeini, in a sense, is not a person. He is a phenomenon, a social-psychological movement that the Western world must understand and be prepared to deal with. At this writing, the rumblings of similar forces are heard in much of the muslim world. The secret of success is not (to the dismay and unhappiness of the faint-hearted sentimentalists and romantic liberals) to relax, but to press ahead, until the critical threshold of "no-return" is reached. Naturally enough, coupled with the social-psychological turmoil modernization causes and the "receptive" environments it creates, the Soviet forces find it opportune to act and exploit the situation. There are now, and there have been few, so-called "liberation" movements behind which the Soviets, directly, or indirectly, have not had a hand.

Be it as it may, what is now before us is not so much as to what might have happened had we adopted a different policy than we did, but what the current situation portends for Iran, and for the West, the presentation of an educated guess as to what lie ahead, and what opportunities, as well as common interests exist between the two countries which may necessitate a joint action.

A more intimate knowledge of the workings and the intricacies of a Khomeini-style government (with a view toward "soft-facts"), at the very outset, led many analysts to believe that the regime itself had very little chance of survival, much less a chance to build a new Iran and fulfill its many promises. Part of the reason for such a pessimistic prognosis was the rigid doctrine upon which Khomeini based his model of a "good" society, and an anachronistic nature of the applications deduced from such premises. Such rigidity it was obvious, was inconsistent with the demands and exigencies of the last quarter of 20th century civilization, and incompatible with the wishes and aspirations of the "technocratic" classes, who had become irrevocably westernized. Further, his persistence on the righteousness of a handful of Islamic jurists and his insistence to rule over millions of others whom he regarded as "minors", was bound to have highly damaging consequences, resulting in the establishment of a ruthlessly totalitarian regime and a murderous government.

Our prediction all along was that his government would crash, and that the "big bang", left unchecked, would create seismic reverberations of such magnitude that it would blow Iran to pieces. We figured that in the process some of the choicest pieces would go to the Soviet Union.

It is possible, as many analysts have pointed out, that the Soviet Union, at the outset, faced difficult choices in its dealings with the Islamic fanatics. But now, the outlines and contours of Soviet policy is quite evident. Although hard and irrefutable evidence is almost impossible to obtain (that kind of evidence is certainly kept in K.G.B. safes under tight security), experience, common sense, observation, and a rather close "neighborly" dealings with the Soviet Union necessitate the adoption of the assumption of the "worst possible scenario". We believe any hesitation in assuming anything less could lead to irretrievable losses and sorry consequences. The late Shah of Iran, after 40 years of personal and intimate experience with the Russians kept warning the western leaders of the ultimate aims of the Soviet Russia, and of its particular and specific designs in the Persian Gulf. In his

"Answer to History", he eloquently expresses his last warning, and wishes that they be heeded. He writes: "The western inability to see and understand clearly the grand design of the Soviet expansionism had never astonished me more than in the first months of my exile. I had lived as neighbor to the masters of the Kremlin my whole adult life. In forty years I had never seen any wavering of Russian's political objectives: a relentless striving toward world domination. Moscow had time. It could wait fifty years, accept a step or two backward, deal, accomodate, but never lose sight of its final aims. I favored detente and accomodation, but not from the position of weakness and indecision that marked the policies of American and European governments.....The 1980's promise to be a decade of harrowing danger. Russia will reach the apogee of her strength in 1983 and if current trends continue, the U.S. will reach its nadir, weaker than it has ever been as a world power".

Based on experience, we refuse to believe that the Russians would easily give up on Iran and withdraw from their ambitions without a stiff fight (probably covert, clandestine fight). Russian understands very well the significance, implications, and unprecedented opportunities made available to it by an unbelievable lapse of western memory and weakening of its resolve. We also are of the opinion that the Russians are carefully, but feverishly, charting the future course of their tactics and designs. It seems to us that the Soviets, ironically are basing their hopes on total discrediting of religion in Iran. Looking upon religion as a natural defense against the inroads of communism, they probably believe that Khomeini and company are excellent candidates to fulfil this promise. Alongside with this, they are relying on the Tudeh Party to furnish them and their agents (very possibly the top leadership of the Islamic-Marxist Mujahedeen and Marxist Fedayeen) with strategic, tactical, and psychological information and guidance, valuable information the Tudeh Party has gained through half a century of trial and terror. I think, as many others do, the ultimate beneficiary of an unchecked "crash" of Khomeini regime would be the Russians. The easiest way they could achieve their objectives is the establishment of several independent "people's republics. They could then move in as "advisors" and later on, if necessary, move in more obvious ways.

The strengthening of a nation's "natural" and indigenous values, traditions, and general beliefs, to act as defenses against communism, is basically a sound idea. But overstretching the idea, especially if it has to deal with religion, has its own dangers. This is especially so when religion takes the reigns of temporal

power in its own hands.

The rule of the clerics denotes more than inhuman cruelty, savagery, and murder. It also means an unrelenting effort to rob man of his spirituality and to leave him in the barren desert of faithlessness. The danger Khomeini-style government poses, therefore, goes far beyond the immediate. It creates unhealing wounds of rebelliousness, radicalization, and eventually, of despair. It is precisely this state of human personality the Kremlin rulers desire most. It is also this aspect of religious rule which worries us most, and which, should be carefully considered when "Islamicization" is considered in such countries as Pakistan, or used as a defense mechanism among the Afghan resistance movement.

If history is any guide, we think religion best serves its purpose, and endures the longest, when its sanctity is shrouded by the ambiguities of human imagination. With monarchy, as a time-honored, "natural" defense of the Iranians gone, at least temporarily, with nationalism discounted by Khomeini and his associates, the sole remaining barrier may also be destroyed soon.

In this long report, it is not my desire to dwell on the global foreign policy or philosophical questions. But I should like to take the liberty to comment briefly on the notion of "strategic consensus" and examine its implications as it may relate to Iran. From there on, I should like to offer a "plan", as basis for joint discussion, and hopefully, later on, cooperative action.

I must say I concur with the views of some analysts to the effect that the concept of "strategic consensus", is basically sound, in that it tries to revitalize the old alliances, yet, it suffers from some inherent weaknesses, in that it neglects the unique characteristics (and problems) each potential individual participant faces. Besides, the U.S. has to overcome a lingering image of an unreliable ally, whose basic "business" motivations have tarnished, and largely overshadowed, its principal image of a country, standing mainly for human freedom and dignity.

The world must still remember the strange and bizarre episodes surrounding a staunch friend and ally of the west, wandering from country to country, while his former friends bowed before a bunch of international terrorists. The unfolding of

such events must have made deep impressions on the minds of many a Middle-Eastern ruler.

In addition, unless a concerted effort is made to bring the various and disparate groups of many Middle-Eastern "sub-cultures" into the mainstream of westernization, and thus create socially homogeneous societies, the long-term effect of these otherwise well-intentioned efforts would remain in doubt.

With regard to Iran, a country intrinsically important for western interests, and extrinsically, crucial to the outcome of the perennial conflict between east and west, we have witnessed, unfortunately, very little, in the way of a coherent and realistic policy, beyond a widespread neglect, "benign" or otherwise.

We think the present situation in the Middle East, and particularly in Iran, as the rear-guard of the "strategic consensus", is replete with dangers - and opportunities. From the point of view of a non-involved outside observer; somewhat intimately familiar with the ups and downs of the political, and cultural nuances of the region, I venture to suggest a four-stage policy, in which each stage would logically follow the preceding one. In brief, these include, (1) the securing of Iran and returning it to the fold of the western partnership, (2) formulation of reasonable, rational, and realistic solutions for the problems of the region, including the Palestinian issue, (3) extension of "strategic consensus" to a "grand alliance" which may include countries as diverse as Iran and Israel. And finally, the formulation of a joint economic and military program, which, by means of an "osmosis" of manpower and economic resources, the countries of the region would be able to close the "window of vulnerability" in the face of internal subversion, and external blackmail.

If we agree that the establishment of a Khomeini-style government is prone to subversion and a cause of constant agitation, facing a bloody end, and an inevitable crash, I propose to make certain plans which may place us in control of the "crash". To do so, we have to take a look at and recognize the value of the potential of the "opposition" elements. Almost all information now reaching out of Iran confirms the notion of Khomeini's distinct isolation and a steep plunge of his "popularity". Further, we tend to regard his as an aberration, rather than a general trend, an overwhelming deluge, which is bound to self-destruct, but also leave tremendous amount of devastation in its path. The important point to recognize is that Iran is reaching a point in the development of events when the emergence of a "saviour" becomes both timely and desirable. Now, more than ever, people remind themselves of the "good old days", when they enjoyed

an overabundance of goods and services, full-employment, self-pride, security, and above all, personal safety and liberty, commodities so scarce in many parts of our present day world. I submit that the evolution of the thinking of the people provides us with an excellent point of departure and the regaining of a practical leverage. Rather than allow forces unfriendly to the west, (such as the Islamic-Marxist Mujahedeen) to fill the vacuum, I propose action and joint planning, to enable us, i.e., secular, middle-class, forces and the military, to organize, for eventual recovery. It is pertinent at this juncture to point one of the quirks, peculiarities, or "soft-facts", of Iranian perception, a perception at once replete with dangers and opportunities. Iranians, even the highly educated, and even the fanatics, share one common perception that without the blessing of the U.S., no movement, and no plan is going to succeed, no matter how ingeniously it is conceived. The U.S.'s lack of support, and enthusiasm, thus far, partly accounts for lack of a visible, credible, mobility on the part of the "opposition". One prominent columnist in a recent article, correctly made the following observation, in examining the possibilities. He wrote:

"One possibility is steadily growing chaos that will invite intervention by Moscow. But a pro-western outcome is also possible. It would take the form of a military regime supported by the bazaar, the tribes, and the conservative clergy.

The United States has available various means conducive to that outcome. It can encourage states that border Iran and are friendly to Washington, notably Turkey, Oman, and Pakistan to help the Iranian opposition. Washington can also use its influence to discourage infighting among Iranian exiles who by the mere fact of being in exile, cannot successfully lead the opposition in replacing Khomeini.

Such actions, of course, cannot be brayed aloud at the daily State Department briefings. But for my own part, I hope the Reagan Administration has not stopped groping for the key to Persian Gulf security in the darkness of Iran."

I also basically agree with the notion that, in the final analysis, the solution to Iran's problem, would have to be military. Right now, the potential for such massive mobilization of nationalistic forces do exist. Outside Iranian borders live thousands of some of the best officers of our armed forces, talented, educated, and sophisticated, who, would prefer to have died in a battle for their country than having been forced to

abdicate their honour and their homeland. Thousands of other members of Iran's armed forces are either chafing under the mullahs, or else, languishing in forced retirements. Plan could be arranged to induce mass exodus of members of our armed forces, to settle them in pre-designated training and staging areas. One other factor which has been responsible for the retardation of a unified and thriving movement is the financial factor. Naturally, undertaking such massive operations require the infusion of large sums of money. Ventures of such magnitude are beyond the financial means of any private individual or organization. We propose the encouragement of some of our wealthy and friendly neighbors to assist us financially, by extending us loans, payable, with interest, upon our return to our homeland.

The potential manpower available to our opposition, of course, includes some of the best educated and highly trained technocrats and professionals, various tribes, many mullahs and members of the armed forces who could pool their talent and utilize it in preparation for the final take-over and provide us with invaluable reservoir of human ability.

The role the U.S. could and should play is that of catalyst. Any direct and obvious role for America is certainly not desirable. But the U.S., in its "supervisory" role, could provide us with moral support, intelligence coverage, technical know-how, and friendly advice. Such role keeps the U.S. immune from any risks and minimizes any potential damage to it.

I refuse to liken the mullah rebellion in Iran to that of Bolshevik revolution, as some responsible Americans privately do, and the Iranian exiles to the white Russians. There are material and consequential differences. Our times are materially different from the decade of 1910's, and the international situation has irreversibly changed since Stalin's era. In my opinion, the problem I face in convincing our American friends to help lies in my yet-to-achieve goal of producing a convergence between our two perceptions of events, and the relative ease with which operations of this nature could succeed. To undertake operations of this type, naturally, requires imagination, boldness, and a desire to leave lasting impressions on human history. I see signs of all of these qualities in you, from your speeches and comments.

Today, Iranians are extending their hands toward their American friends, whom they regard as the only powerful source

of succorance. They realize full well that the future of Iran, and the best interest of their country, lie in their partnership with the West. They abhor living under the yoke of totalitarianism, be it a religious fascism, home-grown marxism, or an outright annexation by Moscow. They hope, as I do, that America will reciprocate by shaking their still extended hands.

To sum up, many analysts believe that the crash of the mullah-dominated, communist-infiltrated regime of the Ayatollah Khomeini is all but inevitable. My proposal is that by taking up joint planning, we make the inevitable crash a "controlled" crash. I submit that the only friendly forces to the West, with awesome potentials, a coalition of our armed forces, many tribes, the bazaar people, the minorities, the middle-class, should (and could) be mobilized in a unified front to fill the vacuum of Khomeini's receding power and influence.

To refuse to act and succumb to the temptations of "spontaneous recovery" could, at best, leave Iran under the influence of random factors, and at worst, drive it into the Soviet orbit. I certainly do not discount the risks involved. But I submit that great historic ventures take shape - and succeed - when to skeptics, the chances for success appear dim.

I do hope that the thoughts I have just submitted will deserve your kind attention. They are by no means a final or finished proposal. But I do not see why they cannot be turned into a carefully devised scheme once you agree with the basic principles.

I am seeking your approval for a serious consideration for future deliberations, the opening of a high-level channel of communication, and permission for the onset of intensive joint negotiations until an agreement could be reached which may with your approval. Needless to say, many fine points can only emerge and many details hammered out when a process of serious give-and-take starts between our two sides.

Iran

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 18, 1982

put into file

TO: CHRIS SHOEMAKER
FROM: GEOFF KEMP

Chris--

Please read! And return.

*I want to be
the observer (but
only in the summer).*

INTERNAL NSC ROUTING

ALLEN	LINHARD
BAILEY	LORD
BERTA	MYER
BLAIR	NANCE
CHILDRESS	NAU
COLSON	NORTH
DEGRAFFENREID	PIPES
DOBRIANSKY	POINDEXTER
FEITH	REGER
FONTAINE	RENTSCHLER
GOLD	RUSSELL
GREGG	SHOEMAKER
GUHIN	STEARMAN
JENNINGS	TANTER
KEMP	TYSON
KIMMITT	WEISS
KRAEMER	WETTERING

1/15/82

*any
action
necessary*

*Nuts file (but
show to Chris
Shoemaker first)*

Iran

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

put with

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- | | |
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| ALLEN | LINHARD |
| BAILEY | LORD |
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| DOBRIANSKY | POINDEXTER |
| FEITH | REGER |
| FONTAINE | RENTSCHLER |
| GOLD | RUSSELL |
| GREGG | SHOEMAKER |
| GUHIN | STEARMAN |
| JENNINGS | TANTER |
| KEMP | TYSON |
| KIMMITT | WEISS |
| KRAEMER | WETTERING |
| LENZ | ADMIN |
| LEVINE | |

1/15/82

*any
action
necessary!!!*

*Nuts file (but
show to Chris
Shoemaker first!!)*

P. O. Box 53088
Sam Houston Station
Houston, Texas 77052
January 11, 1982

Mr. William P. Clark
Presidential National Security Adviser
White House
Washington, D. C.


Dear Mr. Clark:

I am an Iranian citizen, former professor of Tehran University, I was also member of Iranian National Parliament during Shah's regime. I have had all of my higher education in the U.S.A. Because I was educated in America and I was member of the National Parliament, soon after Khomeini takeover, they were trying to find and execute me; therefore I escaped across border to Turkey. On December 14, 1979 from Ankara I sent a telegram to the former U.S. Defense Secretary, Mr. Harold Brown, when he was at NATO headquarters in Brussels. In that telegram I voluntarily proposed to overthrow Khomeini regime and set free American hostages, if U.S. (without being involved) gave us arms. I did not get any help.

Population of Iran is about 36 millions, according to a census taken by CENTO, 18 millions are Turkic and the other half consist of Farsis, Kurds, Arabs, Lurs, and Baluchis. In 10th century A.D. Turkic people of Iran throw out Arab Khalifat rule and from that time until 1920 without interruption, Iran was ruled by its Turkic people. I am from Iranian Azerbaijan and from famous Afshar clan (in early 18th century Nadir Shah Afshar conquered India for Iran). Besides being university professor, as a result of which thousands of Iranian youngmen know me, for the two years of my military service I studied in the Military Academy of Tehran and became a reserve officer in the Imperial Army of Iran. During 1964-66 I was a visiting professor in Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey. During 1975-77 I was technical adviser to the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources of Turkey. During these trips I came to know many distinguished people of Turkey. I know General Necdet Ozturun, assistant to General Kenan Evren; Prime Minister Admiral Bulent Ulusu, former Chief of General Staff, General Samih Seneger and several other generals and statesmen in Turkey. From my class there are about 100 000 in Turkey and over one million in Iran, besides that I am leader of Azerbaijan people. My home town Urumiah (Rezaiyeh) in Iran is only 45 kilometers from eastern border of Turkey. I you had taken an Iranian youngman and carefully trained him to help U.S. he would not have all of the qualifications which I have to help you.


It would be naive to think Khomeini will come to an understanding with U.S. He is not Iranian, racially he is Arab (he is descendant of Prophet Muhammad, if his claim is genuine; in very young age, he and his father have come from India to Iran). Khomeini is determined to eliminate U.S. influence in Middle East and destroy Israel. Those around him are either fanatic Moslems or Moslem-leftist, all of them anti-American. Rajavi is an international leftist and Beni-Sadr is also leftist and about two months ago in a press conference in Paris Beni-Sadr said "if we have to choose between Soviet Union and America, we will choose Soviet Union". Shahpour Bkhtiyar is incompetent and alone. He was a member of National Front Party; when he accepted to be prime minister of Shah, he was put out of party and he was excommunicated. You cannot find any Iranian with the loyalty which I have for U.S.

Obviously your adversary(Soviet Union) is trying gradually to move south and bring Persian Gulf region under its control. Once that is done, without firing a shot will get Western Europe in its fold. After that U.S. will be pushed out of Middle East and Africa and that will have most unfortunate affect on the U.S. Now it is time to do something to prevent loss of Persian Gulf region. Because I have had all of my higher education in the U.S.A. I feel an obligation to help U.S. against the adversary; also I want to help people of my country to gain liberty and democracy.

 If you give armament I can mobilize 2 divisions on Iranian soil close to border of Turkey, and I will be glad to have American observers stationed on Turkish border or in our bridgehead in Iran. I can overthrow Khomeini regime and take Tehran within two months, and then you will have all of the facilities which you had during Shah's regime and some more. In this plan U.S. is not involved and you have everything to gain. Because I know so many important people in Turkey, I can pass the armament transit over Turkey to Iranian border. In this plan no American will be involved or exposed to danger, I will be in front line and exposed to danger and that is what all of my ancestors have being doing.

Mr. Clark, give me a chance to help U.S. in my home grounds and save my country. In order to show that I possess common sense, I am enclosing some documents related to my scientific achievements. I will appreciate it much if you let me know your decision on this matter.

Very truly yours,


Professor Freydoun Afshar

Telephone: (713) 661-4610
Houston

Enclosures: 9

Faculty Of Engineering

FACULTY LIST

Parlar, Mustafa N. : Associate Professor (Dean of the Faculty), B. S., Illinois Institute of Technology; M. S., Northwestern U., Doctor of Electrical Engineering., Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute.

Professors

✓ *Ajsher, Freydown* : B. Sc., U. of Idaho., M. Sc., U. of Chicago., Ph. D. John Hopkins.

Garbrecht, Günther : Dr. Ing., Dipl. Ing., Technische Hochschule Karlsruhe.

Ordemir, Ismet : Y. Müh., İstanbul Teknik Ü., Doçent., İstanbul Teknik Ü.

Tokay, Melih : B. S., Ph. D., U. of Geneva.

Tombs, David : (Visiting - UNESCO), Ph. D., Imperial College, U. of London.

Veselinovic, Velimir D. : (Visiting - UNESCO Technical Assistance Advisor), Dipl. Ing., Faculty of Mechanical Engineering., U. of Belgrade, Yugoslavia.

Associate Professors

Dikmen, Murat : Y. Müh., İstanbul Teknik Ü., Dr. Müh., İstanbul Teknik Ü.

Erten, Hayri M. : B. S., Minnesota U.; M. S., Ph. D., Stanford U.

Kaaden, C. Van der : Dipl., Dr. of Science., Amsterdam U.

Özal, Korkut : Y. Müh., İstanbul Teknik Ü.

Somer, Tarık G. : B. S., Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute., M. S., Massachusetts Institute of Technology., Ph. D., U. of Maryland.

Stepan, Laszlo : (Visiting - UNESCO Technical Assistance Advisor), M. S., Electrical Engineering., Budapest U.



The Geological Society of America, Inc.

Memoir 119

**Taxonomic Revision of the
Superspecific Groups of the
Cretaceous and Cenozoic Tellinidae**

W 51048

FREYDOUN AFSHAR

Ankara, Turkey



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1969



Tehran University
Publications
No. 1738

PALEONTOLOGY

Volume I

INTRODUCTION

by

Freydoun Afshar

1979

GEOLOGY OF TUNCELI-BİNGÖL REGION OF EASTERN TURKEY

F. A. AFSHAR

Middle East Technical University, Ankara

ABSTRACT. — This region is located in the Taurus orogenic belt of the highland district of Eastern Turkey. Lower Permian metasediments and Upper Permian subcrystalline limestone are the oldest exposed formations of this region. Lower Cretaceous flysch overlies partly eroded Upper Permian limestone discordantly. The enormous thickness of flysch, tuffs, basaltic - andesitic flows, and limestones constitute deposits of Lower Cretaceous, Upper Cretaceous, and Lower Eocene; the deposits of each of these periods are separated from the others by an unconformity. Middle Eocene limestone is overlain discordantly by Lower Miocene marine limestone which grades upward into lignite-bearing marls of Middle Miocene and red beds of Upper Miocene. After Upper Miocene time, this region has been subjected to erosion and widespread extrusive igneous activities.

During Permian this region was part of Tethys geosyncline; in Triassic-Jurassic times it was subjected to orogenesis, uplift and erosion, and from Lower Cretaceous until Middle Eocene it was part of an eugeosyncline. It was affected by Variscan, pre-Gosauan, Laramide, Pyrenean, and Attian orogenies.

The entire sedimentary section above the basement complex is intensely folded, faulted, subjected to igneous intrusion, and during five orogenic episodes has been exposed and eroded.

INTRODUCTION

In the August of 1964 the Mineral Research and Exploration Institute of Turkey assigned the writer to undertake geologic study of the region which is the subject of discussion in this report. This region is located in the highland district of Eastern Turkey, extending from Karasu River in the north to Murat River in the south. It comprises the districts of Pülümür, Tunceli, Hozat, Mazgirt, Bingöl, and Kiğı (Fig. 1). With the exception of the area to the south of Mazgirt, this region has very rugged topography with numerous high peaks and deep valleys (Photo 1). The highest peak of this region, located 18 km east of Pülümür, is Bağırbaşa Dağı with an elevation of 3287 m above sea level, and the lowest point is located south of Göktepe village in Mazgirt district, where Munzur River leaves the region at an elevation of 900 m above sea level. In most of this region, except Bingöl area, the beds are dipping at high angle and differential erosion has produced prominent escarpments. Bingöl area is a basaltic plateau with enormous thickness of almost horizontal flows of extrusive rocks. Numerous streams of the area have cut deep and narrow valleys in this plateau (Plate I).

STRATIGRAPHY

PALEOZOIC

Permian

The oldest exposed rocks in this region consist of a series of sericitic schist interbedded with thin beds of quartzite. These metasediments of clastic origin grade upward into Upper Permian subcrystalline limestone of enormous thickness. One of

GEOLOGY OF MIANEH DISTRICT OF NORTHWESTERN IRAN

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ABSTRACT. — The area of this report is part of a structural basin situated south of Mianeh in which a thick section of Cenozoic deposits are preserved, whereas in most of the surrounding areas these deposits have been removed by erosion. In the vicinity of this basin, oldest rocks consist of coal-bearing terrestrial beds of Liassic age. Of the Cenozoic rocks the oldest are Eocene-Oligocene volcanic complex. Over the volcanics and separated from them by an unconformity there are about 3600 meters of sedimentary deposits. The major elements of this thick section consist of 290 meters of limestone of Upper Oligocene and Lower Miocene age, about 1360 meters of evaporite group of Lower and Middle Miocene, and 1800 meters of continental clastic red beds of Upper Miocene age. Over post-Miocene surface of erosion are deposited lacustro-terrestrial beds of Pliocene age.

The major structure of the area consists of an anticline of about 50 kilometers long with a NW-SE trend in which Miocene evaporite beds are exposed at its crest. There are several faults of small magnitude within Miocene formations.

INTRODUCTION

The primary concern of this study is the Oligo-Miocene formation of Mianeh district. This formation, which consists dominantly of limestone, is the result of an extensive marine transgression of Upper Oligocene and Lower Miocene times which covered greater part of Iran and extended to the eastern part of Turkey. At the present time the remnants of this once extensive marine formation are preserved in isolated structural basins of large and small dimensions (Fig. 1). In the central part of Iran they are preserved in the large Qum-Sinman structural basin, whereas they have been removed by erosion from the surrounding uplifted regions. Towards northwest of Qum they occur in isolated localities as far as the eastern part of Turkey.

The area of this report, which is situated about 10 kilometers south of Mianeh, is one of the major localities in which this formation occurs. Qizil Uzan River crosses this area about the middle; Teheran-Tabriz railway and highway passes through the eastern part of it (Fig. 2). With the exception of that highway the only other road suitable for motor vehicle traffic is the one which extends from Nikpay west to the copper mine at Maadan. This is a graded dirt road which is used only during the dry summer months. Where this road crosses Zanjan River and Qizil Uzan River, there are no bridges and when the water is high in these rivers it is impossible to cross them by automobile.

For surveying I used plane table to measure a section from Daghirman Darreh to the vicinity of Goiklar, which is a distance of about 20 kilometers. The other stratigraphic sections were measured by steel tape and connected by plane table survey to the main line of survey. The rest of the area was surveyed by means of Brunton compass and the distances measured by telemeter and steel tape.



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


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مجلس شورای ملی

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اداره حساب و معائنات

مورخه ۳۰۳۳۱۰۰۰

شماره ۲۸۸ پیوست

اداره محترم کارگزینی دانشگاه تهران

جناب آقای دکتر فریدون انصار نمایندگ محترم دوره نوزدهم
 قانون گزاری مجلس شورای ملی از ۲۰ خرداد ۱۳۳۵ الی آخر روز
 ۱۶ خرداد ۱۳۳۹ از مجلس شورای ملی مقرر در ریاست فرموده
 و تسور باز نشستگی پایه اداری خود را بمأخذ ۶۷ همد ماهه
 پرداخت فرموده و عیناً جز تسور آقایان کارمندان مجلس شورای ملی
 با اداره کل باز نشستگی کشور ارسال گردیده لذا با اطلاع میرساند
 چون دوره مجلس شورای ملی خاتمه یافته تسور باز نشستگی
 ایشان از ۲۰ خرداد ۱۳۳۹ بایستی وسیله آن اداره محترم
 وصول و ایصال گردد.

رئیس اداره کل حسابداری مجلس شورای ملی

رونوشت بجهت اطلاع جناب آقایان دکتر فریدون انصار نمایندگ
 محترم مجلس شورای ملی تقدیم میگردد.

رئیس اداره کل حسابداری مجلس شورای ملی

عماد

No. 288; Enclosure ----

Emblem of Imperial
Government of Iran

NATIONAL PARLIAMENT

Administerative Department

General Bureau of Accounting

Date: June 20, 1960
(30th Khurdad 1339)

The Respectable Personnel Bureau
of Tehran University

His Excellency Mr. Dr. Freydoun Afshar the Honorable member of 19th legislative session of National Parliament, from 10th of June 1956 (20th Khurdad 1335) until the end of 9th of June 1960 (19th Khurdad 1339), has received the salary from National Parliament and each month has payed his retirement installments at the rate of 7% and that sum together with the installments of personnel of National Parliament has been sent to the General Bureau of Retirement. Therefore, we want to inform you because the session of National Parliament is ended, their retirement installments from 10th June 1960 (20th Khurdad 1339) must be obtained and sent by that respectable bureau.

Chief of General Bureau of Accounting of National Parliament.

The copy, for informing His Excellency Mr. Dr. Freydoun Afshar, is presented.

Chief of General Bureau of Accounting of National Parliament.

Signature

(This is a translation from Persian language).

Fall & Winter 1976/77

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 22, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR DODIE LIVINGSTON

FROM: MICHAEL O. WHEELER *MW*

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to Honor
Hostages During Freedom Day

Per your request, attached is an approved Presidential message to be used at a ceremony in Newburgh-West Point, New York, this coming Monday to commemorate the first anniversary of the return of the 52 hostages held in Iran.

Attachment
Presidential statement

Presidential Statement on the Anniversary
of the Hostages' Return Home

A year ago today fifty-two Americans returned home from Iran where they had been held hostage for fourteen months. We greeted them then with Joy and thankfulness. We condemned their captors for demonstrating a cynical contempt for international law and for Iran's own law -- and for undermining the fundamental commitment of all civilized nations to the settlement of disputes through peaceful means.

We will never forget the courage and strength of these fifty-two Americans and their families throughout the crisis. We are proud to commemorate today the safe return of this brave group of Americans.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 21, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR ALLEN LENZ, NSC

SUBJECT: "Freedom Day" Ceremony, Newburgh, N.Y. - [REDACTED]

Attached is a request from Congressman Benjamin Gilman for a Presidential message for a ceremony in Newburgh-West Point, New York, this coming Monday commemorating the first anniversary of the return on American soil of the 52 hostages held in Iran. They say 24 of the former hostages will be present.

I would appreciate NSC/State advice as soon as possible. If a message is recommended, I would also appreciate a suggested draft or points to be included in the text.

Thank you.

DL *1ck*

DODIE LIVINGSTON
332-OEOB/Ext. 2941

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN
26TH DISTRICT, NEW YORK

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USMA BOARD OF VISITORS

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

January 19, 1982

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20000

Dear Mr. President:

On January 25, 1982, we will be marking the first anniversary of the touchdown of the 52 hostages from Iran on American soil after 444 days in captivity.

As you may recall, the first touchdown of the hostages on American soil took place at Stewart Airport in Newburgh, New York. The hostages were then transported by bus to West Point, some 17 miles away. The roads, as you recall, were lined by throngs of Americans giving our hostage heroes a warm welcome home.

The communities of Newburgh and West Point have chosen to mark the first anniversary of this touching day by dedicating a memorial plaque to the event at Stewart Airport. A bronze star is being set into the runway at Stewart on that day to forever mark the exact spot where the hostages first set foot on American soil. Finally, a luncheon is being held in honor of the hostages at West Point, at 12 noon on Monday.

As of this writing, 24 of the former hostages have accepted the invitation of the Freedom Day Committee to be guests of honor at the dedication ceremonies at 10 a.m. Monday morning, and at the luncheon at noon on the same day.

The local business and community leaders, the local, State, and Federal elected officials from the area, U. S. Military Academy Superintendent Scott, and myself, would all be very grateful if you could send a telegram of greetings to our hostages to be read either at the dedication ceremony Monday morning, or the luncheon later that afternoon.

You may be interested to know that "Freedom Day" will be a one-time commemoration, and will not be repeated in future years. Accordingly, this will probably be the last time that the hostages will be reminded of the stunning hospitality shown to them by the Newburgh area, and at the United States Military Academy.

I am sure you can see why a personal message from you will

PLEASE REPLY TO:

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The President
The White House
January 19, 1982
page 2

not only mean the world to the former hostages, but also to the many men and women who have worked hour after hour for the last few months to make Freedom Day a suitable commemoration.

If you do choose to send greetings, they may be addressed as follows:

Mr. Campbell K. Thompson
Chairman, Freedom Day
c/o Radio Station WGN
P. O. Box 3591
Newburgh, New York 12550

or, on Monday the day of the commemoration, a telegram can be sent to Mr. Thompson, c/o The Hotel Thayer, West Point, New York 10996.

If you have any questions regarding Freedom Day, please do not hesitate to contact Mr. Zarutskie of my Washington staff at 225-3776.

Thank you for your time and attention in this matter.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,



BENJAMIN A. GILMAN
Member of Congress

BAG:z

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

URGENT ACTION

January 22, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP *GK*

SUBJECT: Request for Presidential Message
to Honor Hostages During Freedom Day

At Tab B is a memorandum from Dodie Livingston forwarding a request from Congressman Benjamin Gilman for a Presidential message for a ceremony in Newburgh-West Point, New York, this coming Monday commemorating the first anniversary of the return on American soil of the 52 hostages held in Iran. They say 24 of the former hostages will be present.

Both the State Department and I agree that a message should be sent. At Tab A is a proposed message prepared by the Department of State for your approval.

At Tab C is a memorandum from Michael Wheeler to Dodie Livingston forwarding the approved text.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. That you approve the message at Tab A.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

2. That upon your approval, Michael Wheeler sign the memorandum at Tab C forwarding the approved text to Dodie Livingston for her further handling.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

Attachments

Tab A - Presidential statement

Tab B - Request from Dodie Livingston/Congressman Gilman

Tab C - Memorandum to Dodie Livingston from Michael Wheeler

REFERRAL

DATE: 21 JAN 82

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRES

SOURCE: GILMAN, BENJAMIN A

DATE: 19 JAN 82

KEYWORDS: IRAN

ANNIVERSARIES

CO

SUBJ: REQUEST PRES MSG TO HONOR HOSTAGES DURING FREEDOM DAY

REQUIRED ACTION: PREPARE DRAFT MSG

DUEDATE: 23 JAN 82

COMMENTS: ** URGENT DUE DATE. PLEASE COORDINATE W/ MR. KEMP OF THE
NSC STAFF
FOR ALLEN J LENZ

STAFF DIRECTOR

FOR NSC USE ONLY

FOR INFO

F

O MB C