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MEMORANDUM
OF CALL

IRAN

TO:

GK

YOU WERE CALLED BY— YOU WERE VISITED BY—

DR. FEKRAP

OF (Organization)

PLEASE CALL → PHONE NO. CODE/EXT. FTS

WILL CALL AGAIN IS WAITING TO SEE YOU

RETURNED YOUR CALL WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

NAME: Did you
Did you make copies
of his paper(s) &
return them to him?

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Home: 871-8508

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JS

DATE

11/19

TIME

2:30

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(JL)

(11) As you well know, a huge question mark is now hovering over the Iranian situation. The concern over Iran is well-justified. The significance, importance, and indispensability of Iran to the West, from a strategic point of view, is a well-documented reality. Should Iran fall to the Soviets (which it may, if the present indecisiveness continues for much longer), the U.S. should blame no other party, but itself, for the irreparable loss.

At this time, there are three major questions concerning Iran: 1) Will Iran be able to form a credible, moderate, and democratic government after the demise of Ayatollah Rohollah Khomeini; 2) If not, what is the likeliest post-Khomeini possibility; and, 3) What the role of the U.S. should be.

I will briefly address myself to each question.

The answer to the first question is in the negative. Essentially, democracy is an accident of history. To be born, it requires something more than laws, constitutions, and statutes. Democracy is a way of life. And a democratic government is an extension of the general outlook, beliefs, and ideals of a people.

In addition to this historical truth, the opportunity provided to the people of Iran, after the departure of the Shah, was grossly misused. An authoritarian country was turned into a totalitarian state.

Further, the ayatollah's theocracy, in its zeal to establish the rule of Allah on earth, has managed to radicalize many factions and parties. Had the ayatollah been willing to interpret Islam as a religion of compassion, amnesty, love, law and order, and had he turned Iran into a model state of revolutionary ideals (he had a chance to do just this at the beginning of the revolution), he would have turned himself into a world leader, would have elevated his stature to the level of a Gandhi, and would have spared Iran and the region the many agonies for which he has been a direct cause.

In addition to the Iranians' psychological and cultural background, which makes democracy an unsuitable technique of managing the affairs of the state, the ayatollah and his worldly lieutenants have successfully managed to create a volatile atmosphere, which could only calm down after considerable bloodshed.

At present, according to extensive reportings here in the U.S. and our own eyewitness reports, crime, corruption, lawlessness, economic breakdown, coercion, dictatorship, and even dark-age style inquisition are rampant at an all-time high.

The ayatollah will leave behind no visible successor. A successor of his stature and influence is indeed a historical creation and an answer to the needs and special circumstances of the time. That time is past now.

Nor will the ayatollah leave behind any legacy or example to even begin a moderate, democratic government. The Iranian society is now too fractious, too fragile, and faction-ridden. The center, namely the democratically-minded National Front members and sympathizers, has lost influence and power.

After Khomeini, if he lasts long, and barring totally unforeseen events, the chance of Lebanonization of Iran is very high. The country would probably drift into more chaos and armed internecine conflicts. In the process, the Kurds would be likely to consolidate their de facto autonomy, followed by other ethnic minorities in Baluchistan, Khuzistan, and, probably, in Azarbaijan.

The capture by Soviet proxies of any vital areas, such as Baluchistan, will deal a fatal blow to Iran -- and to the West.

In answer to question #2, the likeliest post-Khomeini regime, would probably emerge after armed conflicts and constant clashes between moslem fanatics and leftist guerrillas. The moslem radicals, mostly composed of common criminals, former common prisoners, smugglers, and generally unsavory elements, have neither the training, discipline, or motivation. The leftists, on the other hand, benefit from the large reservoir of talent, resources, intelligence, information, and material and moral support of the Soviet Union. The Tudeh Party, a most experienced communist party in Iran, would easily be in a position to provide the left with ideological, social, and strategic backing. The geographic proximity of Iran and the Soviet Union is certainly a plus for the left.

The inevitable fragmentation of the moslem fanatics, the general inability and ineptitude of the center, a lack of any democratic tradition in the country, would make the coming conflict a two-way battle.

It would not be difficult to guess as to who the winner will be.

As to question #3, the U.S., cold-bloodedly speaking, suffered a major loss by losing a staunch, unwavering, and strong leader in Iran - the Shah. Whether his departure from Iran could have been prevented, or, an orderly transfer of power could have been arranged, may be debatable. But, the fact remains that the U.S. administration was, at the time, in the grips of an unbelievable confusion. The so-called human rights campaign, its injection into American foreign policy, and its selective application, use (or abuse?), did produce a visibly debilitating, demoralizing, and, eventually, destructive effect on Iran.

What the U.S. finally achieved was the total destruction of a system which, despite its inherent shortcomings, had strong links to, and was the anchor of, the statecraft of Iran.

Now, however, there are bits and pieces to pick to salvage what remains of that once powerful and prosperous country. In the interest of Iran, the West, and the free world, the U.S. ought to embark on an activist policy.

There are several steps the U.S. could, and should, take.

(1) The U.S. should start to organize, support, and unify the various dissident groups and political exiles outside Iran. The U.S. support should be full-hearted, unwavering, and should consist of material, intelligence, and strategic assistance.

Some of the prominent generals of the Imperial Army, notably Generals Aryana, Jam (now in London), Oveissi, and Palizban, would have to be placed under a coordinated, unified command. Naturally, the political assistance should come from Dr. Shapur Bakhtiar, now living in Paris.

(2) Khomeini should be beaten by an antidote made of material used by him. It should not be difficult to find willing and prominent Islamic mullahs, ayatollahs, grand muffis, and scholars to denounce Khomeini as unislamic, and his preachings detrimental to Islam. Among the ayatollahs inside Iran, one could count on ayatollah Seyyed Kazem Shariatmadari (now under house arrest in Qum); ayatollah Shobeir Khaghani, the spiritual leader of the Arab-speaking Iranians (also

under house arrest); ayatollah Ghomi, an outspoken critic of Khomeini in Meshed (now under death threat); and ayatollah Mahellati in Shiraz. Every one of these ayatollahs, for personal, political, or religious reasons, are potentially powerful allies for a rejuvenated nationalistic movement.

(3) The U.S. should help organize the dissident, nationalistic resistance movements outside Iranian borders, provide links to dissident elements - including the armed forces units in Iran - and, help give wide and global publicity to them.

(4) Any assistance to the Khomeini regime is an exercise in futility. It would only serve to prolong the agony of millions, increase the vulnerability of Iran, and make a recapture of Iran more difficult. The Khomeini regime is historically, economically, and morally condemned to die. It would be in the interest of Iran, the U.S., and the free world, to accelerate his death.

The recent Iran-Iraq clashes have served to boost the prestige of the armed forces. It has thus prevented

-8-

its total disintegration. This is a positive development, which the U.S. should exploit fully in its attempt to save Iran.

(5) The final solution for Iranian problems must, by necessity, be a military one. Many neighboring states, fearful of a country becoming increasingly radicalized, irresponsible, and mindless, and thus, inadvertently stepping into a Soviet dragnet, would be glad to help.

(6) The only cultural-psychological factor still remaining in Iran (as demonstrated in the Iranians' determined effort to repel the Iraqi incursion), is nationalism and its links to the rich, undying cultural heritage of 2,500 years of history. A most visible - and durable - symbol of Iran's history has been the institution of monarchy. It seems now, the young crown prince of Iran, free from any past political burdens, could be cast as the overall leader of the movement. This would have the double benefit of preventing the possible rivalry among the movement's leaders and reviving the only link Iran has to its past.

(8) The risks to the U.S. are minimal. The lives of the hostages, precious as they are, must be weighed

against the infinitely larger gains. Restoration of a sane, stable, pro-Western regime in Iran can change the global, geopolitical picture overnight. The risk of exposure of the U.S. can be minimized or, hopefully, eliminated if the operation is executed in total secrecy.

(9) The human rights issue would have been acceptable, only if it were practical. If the choice were between democracy and dictatorship, freedom vs. slavery, liberty against enthrallment, the choice would have been easy. But, this simply is not the case. In practice, however, we often run into the situations when the choice is not black or white; but shades of black or shades of white. Competent and great world leaders, for the best interests of man, world stability, and sheer survival, must deal with taxing situations when the exigencies and the requirements force them to choose between more bloodshed and less bloodshed; evil and less evil, etc.

I hope and pray that the U.S., the only country in the world with the capacity and capability to bring about the desired changes, would act before the opportunity to act disappears.

Iran must be saved despite herself.

A final point to be made is that any grand strategy the U.S. might have had to revive Islamic fervor as a barrier against the influence of communism must be considered dead now. Religion, in general, and Islam, in particular, thrives where man relinquishes his own quality and independence. Khomeini's actions are a clear, definitive, and empirical demonstration of the cruel, barbaric, and totalitarian nature of religion.

The U.S., by supporting the nationalistic movements, will have to help them to recapture Iran militarily. But the recapture of Iran is clearly not the final solution. It buys time for the Iranians and the Western alliance to embark on a course of nurturing the development of moderate political structures in their country. Political power would have to be transferred to the political processes proportionate to their growth and maturity.

After all, there is no substitute for self-reliance, independence, and self-determination. This is a course which should be followed, not only in Iran, but in all nations now friendly to the West.

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SOME THOUGHTS
CONCERNING THE AMERICAN
HOSTAGES IN TEHRAN

THE PAPER IS STILL
RELEVANT DESPITE
THE TITLS

EYES ONLY

The drama of the hostages which dominated a good part of the American foreign policy, and even a good part of the daily lives of the Americans, since their seizure by Iranian terrorists on November 4, 1979, clearly put the American resolve, capability, and above all, the American ability to understand a foreign ideology under severe test. Under a situation of crisis, a crisis created not so much by mullahs, but by the U.S. itself, the foreign policy establishment demonstrated its ineptitude.

Let us briefly review, first, some of the "benefits" the U.S. conferred on the terrorists in the process of negotiations, secondly, review some of the antecedents, then, examine briefly the present ideology imposed on Iran, and finally, arrive at some conclusions, within the context of such understanding.

(1) The U.S., perhaps unwittingly, conferred respectability to an outlaw regime, whose basic philosophy and inner dynamics are based on destruction.

(2) Despite repeated denunciations of the act of the clerical regime in Iran as illegal, the U.S., nevertheless, conferred recognition to, and rewarded the terrorists for, the act of hostage taking. In so doing, the U.S. implicitly allowed a dangerous precedent to take shape and gain some degree of acceptance.

(3) The U.S., by its excessive emphasis on preservation of life, made certain world principles subservient to it.

(4) In its dealings with the clerical regime in Iran, the U.S. employed "conventional wisdom," failing to realize that the logic and rationale of the actions of the terrorist regime in Iran have little or no common ground with it.

(5) The U.S. naively assumed that by resolving the hostage issue peacefully it could re-establish old ties with Iran; avoid offending the sentiments of the "Islamic world;" maintain and strengthen the long-range policy goal of tightening the "chastity-belt" of religion around the Persian Gulf countries as a defense measure against the advances of Communism.

(6) Most important of all, the U.S. failed to realize that the hostage question was part and parcel of a Shi'a fundamentalist regime, and the the hostage question is inseparable from the nature of the regime itself.

It is easy to be wise in retrospect. But it is also easy to resort to the convenience of conventional methods and procedures, and continue to use the conventional, established wisdom, now clearly proved to be outmoded and ineffective, without broadening the horizon of this nation's outlook, and deepening the understanding of the potential trouble brewing everywhere in the Gulf region, partly as a direct result of the installation of the clerical regime in Iran. In this context, it might prove to be beneficial to glance quickly at some of the "by-products" of the U.S. policy toward Iran.

As a result of the disproportionate preponderance given to the question of hostages, almost to the exclusion of every other consideration:

(1) The U.S. missed many chances to take a harder look at the Shi'a religious regime in Iran; examine its ideology; scrutinize its potential impact; weigh

its disadvantages; and arrive at the formulation of long-term, sensible foreign policy goals toward the region, within the context of U.S. interests, and in relation to the possible Soviet intentions.

(2) The U.S. was almost surprised, and was incapable of demonstrating a coherent reaction to the occupation of Afghanistan. Only belatedly, faced with a fait accompli, the U.S. embarked on formulating a "protest reaction" with the unenthusiastic aid of her reluctant allies. A major question here is whether prior intelligence and preparedness, had it not been for nearly total engrossment in the hostage issue, could have prevented the Soviet assault, or, at least, could have made it more costly (for the Soviets).

(3) The U.S. alienated tens of thousands of Iranian exiles, the very individuals who had fled the tyranny of the clerical regime, and among whom were the best of the professional, technical, and managerial talent of the country, by imposing unjustifiable restrictions on their visas and their mobility. The U.S. government, by following this unexplainable policy, delighted the

Shi'a regime; disappointed many potential friends (among whom could very well lie some of the future leaders of Iran); and stifled the formation of a viable alternative to the terrorists.

(4) The U.S. naively thought that conciliatory gestures toward the clerical regime in Iran would win it over. In the process, it allowed the indefatigable efforts of the hard-liners, the leftists, and Marxists-Leninists to take root, and thereby, make any future efforts to turn the tide around much more difficult.

(5) Finally, the U.S. allowed the subversive elements in the neighboring countries to take shape; to solidify relationships; and form communication channels for future use. (The Libya-Syria-PLO-Iran-Lebanon, not to mention elements in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and other Arab Sheikhdoms.)

Was it possible to avoid the entrapment of the U.S. policy, and the taking of U.S. diplomats as hostages? The answer is, clearly, in the affirmative, for the following reasons:

(A) The U.S. entirely misread the intents of Khomeini and his associates and failed to understand the militant ideology of the brand of Shiism advocated by Khomeini. The U.S. also overestimated the power and influence of some of its "friends" amidst the revolutionary ranks. The Shi'a ideology is, in itself, too broad and big a topic to be dealt with in these pages, but some hints will be given later. Suffice it to say that a destructive and unmanageable movement was taken for, and portrayed as, a movement which, once the revolutionary fever subsided, could become constructive. The assumption was illusory, and the conclusion was, naturally, false.

(B) There were clear signs that the U.S. was headed for trouble, signs the U.S. optimistically ignored, and, apparently, dismissed.

(1) Khomeini's own lectures, statements, pamphlets, and finally, his magnum opus, The Islamic Government did not attract the close attention they deserved as a key to the future developments in Iran. Anyone who wished could easily see for himself the deeply-rooted delusions Khomeini held; the unshakeable religious premises he advocated;

and the grand design of an "Islamic Society" he envisioned. Nor were his tactics to achieve his goals any less apparent. He advocated a ruthless elimination of all those who stood between him and his objectives. The ensuing destruction was to be an inevitable outcome. So, the U.S. not only failed to study the ideology, but also failed to study Khomeini, the man. Again, even a cursory look could reveal a deeply tormented soul inside the man, hopelessly in the grips of a deep hatred, and an insatiable feeling of revenge. The hope that the time bomb would not explode, and if it did, it would bring minimal destruction, was too naive a hope.

(2) Mehdi Buzargan, then Khomeini's Prime Minister, repeatedly admitted his inability to cope with the rising tide of disorder and chaos, which were plaguing his government.

(3) The Tudeh Party and other leftists (primarily Mojahedeen and Fedayeen), joined by the extremist mullahs, were hard at work to inflame the passions of the public, and direct the sentiments of the masses against the U.S.

(4) There were visible cracks in the Buzargan government, ceaseless dissent, acrimonious infighting, and relentless pressure on it.

(5) Finally, there was the attack on the U.S. Embassy, and its short-lived occupation, the first time around.

The Seizure. After U.S. diplomats in Iran were captured as hostages, the U.S. embarked on a policy which was destined to fail right from the start.

(1) The U.S. allowed the myth of the "students," as distinct from the Iranian government, as the real culprits to continue to be believed. Apparently, this course of action was followed in order to excuse the act of the clerical regime, and make it appear as though the Iranian regime was not a party to the act. The regime used the U.S.' innocent "complicity" to its maximum advantage. It used the U.S. hostages to further inflame passions; to brand opposition as U.S. spies; to tighten its grip on the levers of power; and, otherwise, to suppress and annihilate all opposition. It is conceivable that the U.S. thought it

advantageous to go along, naively assuming that, in the process, the left would be dealt a heavy, if not fatal, blow. It didn't.

(2) Rather than follow either a hard-line-low-profile policy for the release of the hostages, or a hard-line-visible-swiftly-concluded course, the U.S., instead, chose the middle. It was doomed to be a failure.

The U.S. could have relegated the hostage question to the lowest of priorities; declared the act as illegal; and refrained from any references to terrorists as a "government;" and, otherwise, pursued its normal foreign policy abroad, officially ignoring the act of hostage-taking completely, but privately searching for ways and means of rescuing them. It must have been made known that foreign embassies, as well as embassy personnel, just like soldiers, face dangers, the so-called occupational hazards, and that their seizure could be one. It is a fact that the terrorists in Iran exploited the U.S. anxiety to return the hostages brilliantly. The second approach would have involved the above, mixed with only the quietest, behind-the-scenes negotiation, including the economic sanctions against the regime. The advantages of such a course

would have been two-fold: 1) it would have deprived the clerical regime from its world forum; and 2) it would have given the U.S. time to ponder the Shi'a revolt, its intents and policies, and its politico-economic implications in their broadest context.

Or, the U.S. could have taken the hard-line-visible course, declaring the U.S. hostages as prisoners of war; declaring the act of the seizure of the embassy as an act of war; and announcing a plan of progressively mounting step-by-step acts of punishment, beginning with the seizure of Lavan Island, the knocking out of Kharg Island, and a naval blockade of shipping.

In either case, the approach must have contained the all-important psychological elements of decisiveness, firmness, and clear intolerance for terrorism.

For the Reagan administration now, short of a brilliantly executed rescue operation, initiated and carried out inside Iran, or an outright invasion (clearly out of the question), the two basic options, as listed above, remain the only ones open to it. It should be noted, however, that neither of the two would

either guarantee the release, or, even the safety of the hostages. Should the Reagan administration decide on the second option, it should carefully consider all the repercussions and implications, military, as well as political, arising out of such an act. Uppermost among such considerations would have to be that any such act (which is, in essence, a military act) must include the overthrow of the regime, and its replacement by a new one (there would be a subsequent discussion of what, who, and how). Without adequate internal preparedness (preparedness inside Iran), careful coordination of common policies and procedures between the U.S. and its allies (in Europe and in the Middle East), and a possible tacit "understanding" with the Soviets, such an act, however, may backfire. An important component of the success of such a Plan would be its swift conclusion. Any possibility of being "bogged down" could produce disastrous results.

An interesting question to ask, at this point, is why the Khomeini regime did indeed commit such an obviously self-defeating act. And a related question is how it was, at all, made possible.

To answer the first question, it is necessary to know both Khomeini the ideologue, and, Khomeini the man. It is also necessary to know and understand the leftist movement in Iran, which, along with Khomeini's Shiism, must bear much of the responsibility for the present chaos, murder, and destruction going on in Iran. It must be clearly and unequivocally understood that in the final analysis, Khomeini and his regime have been a tool of, and a means to, the final objectives of the leftists. For it is only the leftists, and by extension, the Soviet Union, which stand to benefit from chaos, and ultimately, the disintegration of Iran.

Returning now to the points previously raised, namely, the question of the motives behind the animosity toward the U.S., in general, and the act of hostage taking, in particular, it should be noted that, in a sense, Khomeini the man, and Khomeini the ideologue, are pretty much inseparable. The personal views of Khomeini, regarding theological questions, have penetrated so deeply into the fabrics of religion, that they have given birth to a new religious doctrine. The theological acrobatics which have enabled Khomeini

to legitimize the rule of the Faghih (Islamic jurisprudenti), is beyond the scope of this writing. Suffice it to say that his claims are totally unfounded in Islamic theology; and his interpretations of, and justifications for, his policies are largely personal.

But it might be irrelevant, for the purposes of this writing, to delve much into theological disputes. Suffice it to say that Khomeini, as much as it can be determined, firmly believes in the basic soundness of his ideas and beliefs. To him, and to a handful of other mullahs, several basic, multi-faceted operations must be carried out. Among the most important ones:

(1) In Islam (Khomeini's brand of Islam, that is), religion is not a means of human salvation, but an end in itself. In other words, Khomeini speaks of Islam as if it were a separate entity, almost a semi-physical entity, in existence outside of, and apart from, human thought. In order to uphold it, everything, including man, must be sacrificed. This partly explains the utter lack of respect for human life, and ruthless butchery carried out under his regime since his ascension to power.

(2) The concept of Shihadah (martyrdom) acts as a powerful enticement for ignorant masses to recklessly kill, and be killed. Either way, an individual Shi'a is considered a winner. To kill a human (infidel) is to engage in a holy act. To be killed in the line of duty ensures the individual's ascension to heaven.

(3) In Khomeini's religion, everything is either black or white. There is absolutely no ground for compromise. For the will of God, as revealed to the Prophet Mohammed and interpreted by imams, is clear. They leave no place for ambiguity.

(4) It is against the backdrop of a literal, almost ritual, adherence to the Islamic rules that the faithful are distinguished from the faithless. Any deviation from the "straight path" is to receive punishment, ranging from flogging, to death by stoning. The individual mullah, carrying out the punishments, is merely an instrument of God. Period.

(5) All other faiths must either become subservient to Islam, or else, be dealt with harshly - by acts of war. The Jihad, or holy war, is specifically designed to symbolize the ultimate act of sacrifice in the path of Allah.

(6) In Khomeini's simplistic world, the cardinal virtue lies in a complete regression of Islamic societies to the mode of life as lived and exemplified by the Prophet and his true successors (the eleven, first-born, male descendants of the Prophet, and the twelfth hidden imam).

(7) Any vestiges of modernization, regarded as imports of infidel societies, on top of which lies the U.S., is considered blasphemous, and is to be rejected as forcefully as possible.

That Khomeini unshakably believes in what he preaches is of little doubt. Why he believes in such irrational, destructive, and ultimately self-defeating ideas is beside the point. What is important, politically, is that he does; and that he does have a huge, though diminishing, following.

Surrounding Khomeini are a small number of mullahs, who do share his beliefs. Next to the innermost layer of mullahs, lie other who don't. Prominent among them is Beheshti. They act and support Khomeini for a variety of other motives. Still there are other mullahs, whose views are clearly in opposition to Khomeini's. The most prominent in this category is Ayatollah Shariatmadari.

Following Khomeini are a huge number of ignorant masses, a distinct minority, but clearly willing, and able, to wreak havoc, and terrorize the rest of the population. The Tudeh Party is in tune, clearly, according to its own admission, for tactical reasons. The Fedayeen have broken ranks and are fighting. The Mojuhedeen have gone underground. The rest of the population, with the exception of the Kurds, are, by and large, disunited; and are living in terror and panic.

Before discussing what is termed in the following pages as the third solution, some digression, in a disjointed fashion, is necessary:

- A. (1) It serves no practical purpose, nor any political use or justification for the President-elect to involve himself directly in the hostage crisis. First, the office of the Presidency must be kept (officially) aloof from the squabble. This, in addition to preserving the dignity of the office, reserves the weight of the President's words to be used for most important occasions. Secondly, the President should refrain from using

abusive language. The use of insults triggers mutual hurling of abuse. The immediate result of all the exchanges is the lowering of the prestige of the office of the Presidency in the eyes of the world. And, thirdly, the President should carefully distinguish between a group of international terrorists, now ruling in Iran, and a majority of decent Iranians, who are opposed to the act of hostage-taking - and to the clerical regime. Continued careless mingling of the two is counter-productive.

- B. (1) The hostage question was made a political issue in the U.S. Giving the question international prominence disserved the best interests of the U.S.; gave unnecessary (and totally avoidable) prominence to the terrorists; and, in effect, crippled the foreign policy machinery of the U.S. government. This was done, probably, out of
- 1) lack of adequate knowledge about, and information on, the nature of the Shi'a movement; and
 - 2) out of some misguided recognition that the crisis could be used for political advantages,

especially at a time when the popularity of the President was plummeting at the polls.

(2) In Iran, the clerics took maximum advantage of the weakness, vacillation, and helplessness of the U.S. to (a) fan revolutionary zeal; (b) to suppress opposition; and (c) to outflank the virulent leftist opposition.

(3) Also in Iran, the mullahs realized, correctly, that as long as the hostages were kept as captives, any U.S. initiative to topple them would be kept off balance.

(4) The hostage question served as a most fitting mask to cover up the basest, destructive instincts of the unruly mobs (not uncommon among all human beings), and thereby, serve to set the all-important defense mechanism of sublimation in motion.

The Third Solution:

A credible foreign policy is considered viable to the extent that it assumes the qualities of being a creative, as distinguished from a reactive, foreign

policy. While a reactive foreign policy waits for a certain disconcerting episode to happen, and only then starts formulating reactions and taking countermeasures (a perfect example is the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and American response to it), a creative foreign policy anticipates troubles and reacts accordingly before the potentially inimical episode occurs. In this context, a creative foreign policy is preventive, while a reactive foreign policy is simply putative. A creative foreign policy is dynamic, comprehensive, evolutionary, resilient, and coherent; while a reactive foreign policy is static, disjointed, and fumbling.

Viewed in this light, the question of the hostages is far less important than the larger, and infinitely more important, question of Iran and its future. Again, viewed from this fresh outlook, the question of the hostages should immediately be relegated to the lowest of priorities; and the larger question of Iran must receive the highest, active consideration.

Since the real name of the game in international politics is (and will continue to be) the power play, any consideration to lesser, diversionary, and peripheral

questions may, in fact, absorb an unjustified amount of energy; and may, irreparably, damage the careful consideration of other vital issues. In terms of the dynamics of realpolitik, the fall of the Shah, and the ascension to power of the Khomeini regime are among the major losses of static, reactive foreign policy. And the hostages are (and should be considered) part of the casualties and losses of the situation in Iran, for which the U.S. must bear some degree of responsibility.

Again, viewed in this light, the U.S. should:

- 1) refuse to negotiate with the Khomeini regime; 2) continue to demand the unconditional release of the hostages (albeit in very low-key terms); and, 3) refuse to refer to the present regime as "government."

Such an approach would, automatically, deprive the terrorists of the use of the U.S. "anxiety" factor; would officially lower the priority of the hostage question; and, legally (as well as politically) place the categorization of the mullah regime in a limbo. While this approach would not, in any way, guarantee the release of the hostages, as any other approach would short of a total capitulation to the demands

of the terrorists, it has the advantage of taking the hostage issue off the agenda of priorities; would be consistent with the principles and highest standards of the civilized world, would discourage any future similar attempts by others; and finally, pave the way for consideration of other options which may arise in the future.

Having stated this, it may now be time to take a fresh look at the question in Iran itself.

To state that the integrity of Iran, its stability, and alliance is important to the West, and to the U.S., may be a repetition of a well-established principle. Iran is indispensable to the West, even if it were not a key to the all-vital region of the Persian Gulf region. Obviously, a chaotic and unstable Iran makes it vulnerable. The danger continues to exist that under Khomeini, or after him, under his associates, this country may disintegrate and fall into pieces. If so, the ultimate beneficiary would, obviously, be the Soviet Union. The Soviets, more out of a sense of being encircled, economic need, and strategic gain,

than ideological or historical urge, could easily gain a foothold there. This could probably come in the Southeast, in Baluchistan, and Bandar-Chah-Bahar. As a matter of fact, it is surprising that they have waited this long!

But, by some fortuitous design of the fate, America's loss of Iran is, as yet, partial. This means that there is still time to rectify the mistakes of the past. Indeed, if the U.S. decides to "recapture" Iran, the raw materials to be used are now more ready than ever. For this, a brief review of some major considerations:

(1) The Khomeini regime is, for all practical purposes, dead. And with the demise of his regime, the idea of experimenting with a religious government is also dead. It is now obvious that religion functions best as a counterbalance, and as an insulating factor against the invasion of alien ideologies, such as Communism, when it operates as concomitant, and not as an opposition to social change.

That Khomeini and his associates are still able to operate is, largely, the result of disunity and non-existence of a rallying point for his opponents, now a clear majority in Iran. For those most intimately familiar with the internal dynamics of politics in Iran, there is little doubt that Khomeini's emergence was made possible only after it became clear that the Shah was unwilling, or unable, to continue in power.

In any event, Khomeini's emergence can best be described as a tidal flood, overwhelming and powerful, but also highly destructive and short-lived. There are clear signs the end is approaching, and that a contingency plan must be readied to be rushed to the scene for reconstruction purposes.

The question which greatly interests the students of politics and social change is the future of Iran, both immediate, and long-range. With due consideration to the limits of these pages, it must be said, with some reasonable degree of certainty, that the most probable scenario, following Khomeini's demise, is a gradual drift of the country to a quasi-civil war. Left to itself, Iran would most likely be Lebanonized; and would, ultimately, disintegrate. All the elements

necessary for ultimate disintegration are already at work: Total immobilization of the economy; armed, leftist guerrilla factions; autonomy-seeking minorities; irreconcilable ideological differences; unruliness of the Islamic guards; and last, but not least, old and lasting scars left behind by repeated purges, executions, and senseless murders, perpetrated by Khomeini agents.

The Disadvantages of the Present Regime:

Any action delayed may indeed rob Iran, and the West, of opportunities, which may be irretrievably lost. It is in the context of the rescue operations of Iran that any retrieval of the hostages should be contemplated. The disadvantages of the continuation of the present regime in Iran, or anything similar to it, are obvious. Among them:

(1) An unstable Iran, continually being threatened by disintegration, radicalization, terrorism, and, ultimately, by Soviet penetration, either by proxy, or directly.

(2) Continued stability in Iran always poses the danger that the Shi'a revolution might be "exported" to the

neighboring countries. Among the most vulnerable: Bahrain, Quwait, Iraq, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia. An Islamic resurgence could also destabilize Pakistan (despite Zia's profession of Islam as the basis of his government) and spread Westward, as far away as Egypt and Morocco.

The dangers of a Moslem world in revolt, and a Persian Gulf in a perpetual state of turmoil could hardly be overstated. Any possibility that the Islamic resurgence might disturb the Soviet Moslem population, as a side benefit, is, by and large, dim.

The question may arise as to why a government, which seemingly enjoyed the support of millions of Iranians, should be overthrown?

The answers must be sought in both the legal and political realities of Iranian politics. To begin with, the reforms, sought so fervently by Iranian intellectuals and supported by the masses were indeed instituted and placed into effect, after the departure of the Shah and the appointment of Shahpur Bakhtiar as the prime minister. In fact, the referendum was an extralegal

proceeding, not foreseen, or approved, by the constitution of 1906. There is also the panic factor, widespread intimidation, and vote rigging indulged in by the Shi'a, which could easily invalidate the results of the referendum for the change of regime.

But more important is the compelling political realities in Iran. The most likely scenario, after the demise of Khomeini, with no other "leader" in sight, is more chaos, more bloodshed, more division, and continuous armed internecine conflicts. That prospect seems to be reason enough to intervene before our elusive opportunity slips out - for good.

The Alternatives to Khomeini

(1) The options to Khomeini's regime are very limited. The possibility of an eventual Marxist take-over, in the absence of any action on the part of the U.S. while the opportunity exists, is very real. Unless the U.S. is prepared to concede Iran to the Soviets, this option must be ruled out.

(2) The centrist regime, headed by the remnants of the National Front, must also be considered a dead possibility. The collaboration and subservience of its

leaders, most notably Mr. Bazargan and Dr. Sanjabi (briefly Bazargan's foreign minister and architect of aligning the Front with Khomeini) to Khomeini have discredited them - for good. In addition, they have demonstrated their inability to rule; ~~and their in-~~effectiveness to govern.

(3) Bani-Sadr-Yazdi-Ghotbzadeh option also suffers from the Bazargan syndrom. In addition, Ghotbzadeh is widely regarded as an opportunist, a thug, and a double agent. Yazdi is also widely viewed as a U.S. agent. Bani Sadr, the most prestigious of the trio, in collaboration with the other two, has been much too dependent on the clerics, and has been much too willing to go along with the clerical forces' plans for instigating Shi'a subversion across the Gulf. Also, all three have been active parties to the murders, executions, and other atrocities of the clerics.

Bani-Sadr, himself, is basically an arm-chair revolutionary, an incoherent, third-rate theoretician, and dedicated to Shi'a ideology.

(4) What other options may remain also suffer from one defect or another, unless a grand coalition of all, or most, opposition forces could be forged. The attempt may seem difficult. But in reality, it is not. There are movements already, in that direction, within the various factions. But no one movement, in and out of itself, could easily succeed, before various forces are unified. To unify, a rallying force or symbol is needed. In the process, the idea of the return of a constitutional monarchy as an umbrella institution, is, once again, receiving currency and wide acceptance.

The idea of a constitutional monarchy, an institution uniquely Iranian, must be considered on its political merits. Firstly, in the absence of monarchy, it is hard to imagine how any other government would be able to operate. The idea of a republic, a democratic republic, is simply not workable. A democratic government can only be sustained by, and take roots in, a democratic society. Democracy, in other words, is a way of life. And that way of life, the democratic outlook, is alien to Iranian culture. Iran has not been and will not be, a democracy in the foreseeable future. It can only have an authoritarian (but not totalitarian)

government, with a humane face. But, the establishment of a new, progressive, secular, pro-West regime could act as a beginning toward the ultimate of democracy and self-rule, only by controlled gradualism.

Secondly, the idea of a strong man, or a military junta, without restoration of monarchy, should also be ruled out. Among some of the obvious disadvantages of such a regime are the possibility of plots, coups, and counter coups, with the all-too-obvious danger of constant instability, and the institution of another reign of terror.

The idea of restoration of a constitutional monarchy becomes increasingly more attractive when the demographic realities of Iran are considered. As is well known, Iran, in a sense, is an empire, composed of multi-racial, ethnic, religious groups. Historically, as a matter of fact, the only factor which has kept the disparate groups together has been, not the Shi'a religion, but the institution of monarchy.

Eyewitness reports reaching out of Iran relate poignant stories of a rapid resurgence for the restoration of monarchy. Iranian intellectuals, within or

without the country, see no other viable, workable alternative for Iran; and the masses are beginning to support them. Most Iranians now realize that they must race against time, or, face the grave consequences.

How A Change Of Regime Could Be Accomplished

In the final analysis, the operation undertaken must, by necessity of present realities in Iran, be military in nature. But, there are many other factors which should be taken into consideration.

The nature of a military takeover must certainly be planned by military experts. But, considering the current situation in Iran, such as the number of arms in the hands of thousands of Iranians, and the possible resistance by armed guerrillas and Islamic guards, the following strategy, proposed in broadest of outlines, may be useful:

- (1) The Islamic regime must be kept off-balance all the time to prevent it from spreading its influence, and further consolidating its position. Obviously, the more chance it has to consolidate, the more difficult it will be to unseat it.

(2) Ferment internecine conflicts to allow the "revolutionary" groups to eliminate one another. This procedure would minimize the troubles of the final stage; would make the population war-weary; eliminate the sources of trouble; and set the stage for the final blow.

(3) The weakened and anemic regime then would topple with a final, determined, concerted blow staged from inside and outside Iran.

The Role Of The U.S.

The role of the U.S. should, obviously, be the role of a catalyst. In this connection, there are a number of factors which must be kept in mind:

(1) Secrecy. Secrecy is a cardinal virtue. Unfortunately, the U.S. Intelligence community has a tradition of "leaking" certain operations to the press, even before they start. In certain cases, agents, involved directly, or indirectly, go public, in order to claim credit or simply make "heroes" of themselves. Needless to say, such actions inflict considerable damage to the prestige of the U.S., to the credibility of its institutions, to the trust placed in it, and to the

success of the operation. The revelation that the return of the Shah, in 1953, was made possible by U.S. assistance handicapped him throughout his reign.

(2) The U.S. should secretly, but actively, convey its intention of support to the opposition groups, inside, and outside Iran. The truth of the matter is that the aims of the opposition factions have not gone far, because they have believed all along that the U.S. government, under President Carter, continued to support the Khomeini regime. Their thinking has been that as long as the U.S. continues to support Khomeini, no major accomplishment could be expected.

It would now be to the point to refer to some of the secrets of Iranian psyche. The knowledge of these secrets could help the U.S. to forge an effort to accomplish goals shared now by a majority of Iranians. Iranians, rightly or wrongly, attribute almost supernatural powers to the U.S. This notion is prevalent, even among the masses. If the U.S. gives its nod, the following would be miraculously accomplished,

(1) The disparate opposition groups outside Iran would coalesce under the broad umbrella and leadership of the constitutional monarchy.

(2) The hesitating neighbors of Iran, anxious to get rid of a radical regime in Iran, would extend their active assistance.

(3) The various opposition groups inside Iran (the Baluchis, who are staunch monarchists, the Turkmans, the Bakhtiariis, the Ghashghais, and even the Kurds, and most important of all, the Imperial Army) could get together

Millions of Iranian Turks, demonstrably anti-Khomeini, together with millions of ethnic minorities and middle-class Iranians, backed by the U.S., could constitute a credible, formidable force.

Any plan to divide Iran (e.g., into two spheres of influence, with the Soviets in the north, and the Americans in the south) has the obvious strategic disadvantage of bringing the Russians closer toward their ultimate goal.

Strategic World Aids

The chaotic, mindless regime of Ayatollah Khomeini has caused so much destruction in its wake, and brought so much resentment, inside and outside Iran, that it has easily made itself vulnerable to worldwide condemnation.

(1) Therefore, one of the major tools, to further discredit the regime, would be to launch a worldwide press and media campaign against it. Again, in this connection, it would be useful to note that Iranians are unduly susceptible to foreign broadcasts. Many opinions could be changed; and many positions could be discarded. The U.S. has a powerful tool at its disposal, i.e., the Voice of America, Persian Broadcast, now endowed by an exceptional Iranian talent, but largely abused, mismanaged, or misused.

(2) The U.S. could secretly sponsor the coalition of Iranian opposition, provide logistics, intelligence, and sanctuary support. Equally important would be the help Iranian neighbors would be more than willing to provide in the above areas.

(3) Worldwide denunciation by Islamic authorities and scholars of Khomeini's brand of Islam, his policies, and actions, could easily be staged. In reality, Khomeini's teachings run counter to the all-too sacred tenets of Islam. His version of Islam is heretical.

(4) Contrary to popular opinion, many influential, highly respected Shi'a leaders, even inside Iran, are opposed to Khomeini's teachings and practices. Notable among them are Ayatollah Shari'atmadari, Ayatollah Shobeyr Khaghani, and Ayatollah Ghomi. Outside Iran, Ayatollah Khoii, (now in Najaf, Iraq) could be of immense assistance.

In short, it must be pointed out, that Iranian opinions, just like the shifting sands of the Iranian deserts, are susceptible to quick changes. Except for a hard-core Shia resistance and Marxist counterattack, the million-people demonstrations should never be taken seriously.

Iranians, throughout centuries, have adopted an elaborate defense mechanism for self-protection against the vicissitudes of power shifts. They are extremely adept at making changes to adapt themselves to new

powers. Once they sense an imminent shift, it would surprise the world to find how many millions would again pour into the streets, this time condemning Khomeini, and praising the new Shah, Reza Shah, the Second.

Now, just a few words of advice for American foreign policy makers.

(1) American foreign policy has placed too much emphasis on "hard-facts" as a basis for the formulation of its policies. In the process, it has neglected to give due consideration to "soft-facts," people's perceptions, remembrances, behaviors, and personalities. These factors are as, if not more, important in determining the collective responses of a nation. It is proposed here that the U.S. should include soft-fact specialists in its deliberations of foreign policies toward a given nation. Soft-fact specialists, often nationals of other countries, but at once familiar with the West, are irreplaceable innovations.

The U.S. should try to deal with its allies on the basis of an equal partnership. It should give its Third-world allies the real sense, and act so, that

they are indeed equal. Injuring the sensibilities of other nations, knowingly or unknowingly, has cost the U.S much.

(3) As an added bonus in the Iranian-American common effort to recapture Iran, there is an added bonus of forging an alliance between the new Iran and some of its neighbors, including Iraq. The ideal outcome would be for Iraq to join efforts to overthrow the radical Syrian and Libyan governments; neutralize the PLO; and pave the way for a sensible Palestinian solution, with Jordanian involvement.

Finally, a liberated Iran, with a secular, nationalistic, pro-West government, under the institution of monarchy, gives Iran and its Western alliance only a second chance. The U.S. should help and encourage a steady, but controlled, and gradual effort to nourish and develop a moderate, democratic political structure in the country. It may take years of painstaking effort. But, for Iran and other Third-World countries now in alliance with the West, there is no surer way to survive than an eventual self-rule, nourished and nurtured by participatory democracy.

(3)

IRAN AND A POSSIBLE "RESCUE" OPERATION

Any attempt to re-capture the runaway Iran and return it to the fold of nations friendly to the West and in which the U.S. may play a central part, must assume the following:

(1) That Iran is indispensable to the security of the West;

(2) That the continuation of the present regime in Iran is to lead to further anarchy and further destabilization in and out of the country;

(3) That the civilian clerics, the likes of Bani-Sadr, Bazargan, Ghotbzadeh, Yazdi, etc., as well as the elements of the National Front, are not capable of restoring a credible, stable, moderate government in Iran.

(4) That the prolongation of the current anarchy is in the best interests of the Soviet Union and its allies. There seems to be a link between anarchy and

deterioration of economy, on the one hand; and growing disenchantment and a search for more radical solutions on the other, on the part of the populace.

(5) That a regime modeling itself on an ideology (such as a religion) necessarily binds itself to the tangles of its limitations, including economic limitations. In such cases, the political, psychological, social, and economic climate deteriorate dangerously to the point of disintegration. In cases such as these, the natural and indigenous national defenses, and indigenous immunity systems plunge deep to dangerously low levels, leaving the country exposed to alien exploitation.

(6) That the likeliest scenario awaiting Iran, upon the demise of its religious leader, is Lebanonization. Allowed to continue, other successive stages of Balkanization, Finlandization, and disintegration would emerge. The ultimate scenario dictates the establishment of certain "independent" republics, especially at the regions which make the ultimate access of the Soviet Union to prized strategic locations easier. Unstable, left-leaning Marxist regimes

have a notorious history of turning to the Soviets for "treaties of cooperation and friendship." The next easy step would be for the Soviets to enter the region with their army of "advisers," "at the request" of the Sovereign government.

What Is To Be Done?

There should be no illusion that the Iranian situation and the international political-economic atmosphere, as well as the power eruption between East and West, are vastly different from what they were in 1953. For this reason, attempts such as the one made in 1953 are neither advisable, nor practical.

To state this does not, by any means, denote that the U.S. is facing an impossible situation. But only that ingenious and imaginative solutions must be sought. These solutions are available now more than ever. The U.S., the Western alliance, and other friendly nations are facing a great challenge. They must be prepared to meet it - collectively.

The Contours of a Grand Alliance

Now, more than ever, opportunities are being made available in the Middle East region which, dealt with tactfully (and speedily), could lead to the formation of a grand alliance among the countries of the region. That the beginnings of a de facto alliance are taking shape is unquestionable. Once formalized, given shape, direction and purpose, it could prove to be potentially more powerful - and lasting - than formal alliances preceeding it, such as the Baghdad Pact or Gento. One reason for this, among others, is the "natural" development of events bringing nations and countries together which, hitherto, had been moving in different, and sometimes, opposite directions.

Examples of such "natural" ententes could be discerned among the triangle of Iraq-Jordan-Saudi Arabia. The triangle is indirectly linked to Pakistan and, to the South, to Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and, one step to the West, to even Turkey. The membership of the alliance could even be broadened to include such countries as Egypt, the Sudan, Morocco, and eventually, Isreal (repeat - Isreal).

The reasons for the development of mutual attractions among Middle Eastern countries are, of course, complex and many. But the most important reason is the perception of common threat posed by the Soviet Union and its allies, gradual but steady encroachment of its influence, and of course, the threat of internal subversion. The events of 1978 in Iran were, in essence, the result of a strange convergence of Soviet long-term plotting (mainly through its extensive revolutionary training programs), Western glaring midjudgment and default, and internal socio-economic dislocations. They came as a sobering shock to these countries. Not only a threat of external aggression loomed large before their eyes, but also the question of internal upheavals appeared to be closer to reality.

What is to be gained from the alliance?

Essentially, better and stronger security. But also, specifically, the mutual reliance could set in motion a vast array of exchanges of resources among the nations in a symbiotic relationship, which no one country, by itself, could ever gain. A measured flow

of resources among countries involved could provide the key for the stability and heightened resistance for the entire region against potential or actual adversaries.

That the Middle East is in turmoil now, more than ever, is probably an established reality. But it is also true that new potentials now exist, waiting to be exploited, some of which were unthinkable even a year ago. One such potential is Iraq.

Threatened by internal Shi'a revolt, Communist subversion, Kurdish insurgency, and of course, the no-win war with Iran, on the one hand, and disappointment with "fraternal" assistance from the Soviet Union on the other, Iraq is now amenable to a "tilt" to the West, toward the formation of the grand alliance. To bring it about, certain tactical maneuvers seem to be necessary.

(1) Iraq should begin changing its war pitch with Iran from an "Arab vs. Persian" struggle to the "struggle of Islamic states vs. a phony Islamic regime, supported by international terrorism." The change of slogan is necessary for two reasons:

(a) As a collective effort to isolate the Khomeini regime, as an unguenuine Islamic regime, from the rest of the Islamic world, and as part of an overall, comprehensive campaign aimed at its overthrow.

(b) As a face-saving device for Iraq to disengage itself from the Iran war, once the clerical regime is successfully overthrown.

(2) Indirect, but massive, support should start pouring from the West to Iraq, covering its rear, and its porous frontiers, as steps towards reconciling with Iraq and, eventually, making it link with other members of the "alliance."

Formation of an "alliance" among Middle-Eastern countries should have several more aims, in addition to providing a strong barrier against Soviet advances. Among them:

(1) Isolation of Syria, and the eventual overthrow of Hafez Asad, and its replacement by a non-radical, pro-West regime.

(2) Neutralization of the PLO as a radical, Marxist-infested terrorist organization, by drying up its financial life-supporting systems from oil-rich Arab nations, and depriving it of its sanctuaries in Iraq and Syria.

(3) Eventual entente among nations of the region toward a permanent settlement of Arab-Israeli conflict, possibly with the use of the "Jordanian Connection.

Iraq, it must be emphasized, should redirect its efforts, with full cooperation of other neighboring states, to arm and assist Iranian resistance movements to topple Khomeini's regime. Naturally, the prize for Iraq, like the prize for many other states in the region, would be the establishment of a secular, stable, anti-communist, pro-West regime in Iran.

The Iranian Question

As mentioned earlier, the best available evidence on Iran indicates that the present-Islamic regime will be incapable of imposing law and order in Iran. As a

matter of fact, the longer the Khomeini regime stays in power, the more chaos it is likely to produce, and hence, more alienation among the populace and wider exposure of the country to Russian exploitation.

Nor could any off-shoot of the Islamic regime, even headed by non-clerics, save the country. Part of the reason is the inherent destabilizing and debilitating character of any regime founded on an ideology. The situation becomes worse, once an "ideo-cracy" claims from and attributes its authority to God. A theocracy, then, has a built-in, destructive mechanism. It manifests itself in a never-ending race among its founders, as well as the populace, to outrace each other to attain still higher levels of "purity." Under the best of circumstances, such states are bound to be short-lived. Once the collapse comes, however, it comes with such explosive force that it tears the entire structure apart and blows it into many pieces.

There is now growing evidence that Iranians, especially the younger generations, already disappointed with the workings of a religious state, its falsehood,

contradictions, and cruelty, are growing pessimistic about a "rescue" operation from abroad. They are also becoming radicalized. An increasing number of Iranians are beginning to subscribe to the notion that any regime, including a Soviet-dominated Marxist regime, could be an improvement over the rule of the ayatollahs. While the prevalence of such notions is, obviously, dangerous, it also offers unlimited opportunities. Recognized as such - and exploited - it could facilitate the reconquest of Iran and the establishment of a sensible government.

The Options:

Clearly, the options open to the West are limited. One option may be to leave the clerical regime alone and let it run its natural course until the end comes. This option is, obviously, not feasible, unless it is assumed that the Soviet Union is also keeping its hands off. But, based on a wealth of public information, there is every reason to believe that the Soviets should be feverishly preparing themselves to benefit from the inevitable crash of the Khomeini regime. It does not require much imagination to assume that the KGB must have drawn up a master plan to win the long-awaited prize.

Option number two may be a Bani-Sadr type regime, backed by the army. While this option may appear to be reasonable at first, there are some serious reservations about it. To begin with, any religious regime has a built-in tendency to drive itself toward the heights of fanaticism and hard-line. There is not, and cannot be, a "moderate" religious regime. Once committed to its principles, a religious regime demands a complete and unwavering commitment on the part of its adherents. After all, the events in Iran, since the inception of the religious regime is a perfect example of what could be expected at later stages of development.

Secondly, a Bani-Sadr-type regime, that is, a mixed bag of religious-secular-Islamic-Western type of a government, would have to either draw its power from the law of the land (that is, the existing constitution), or it would have to resort to force.

In the first instance, the problem would be how to enforce the law in a country which has no tradition of abiding by the law, and little use for it. In addition, the existing constitution has many built-in features that virtually invite perpetual chaos and cripple the operation of the government.

In the second instance, namely the use of force, a Bani-Sadr type government will have to mount a formidable fire-power in order to overwhelm his own erstwhile allies - the Muslim Brotherhood forces, as well as the leftists. There is considerable skepticism as to whether the army would wholeheartedly back a member of the revolutionary council responsible for the summary execution of many of its illustrious generals.

A general rule of thumb for understanding the dynamics of Iranian politics is the interplay of power - visible, naked, brute power. Under the Ayatollah, Iran is ruled by the force of his personality and his influence over the gullible masses. With no lasting power structure to inherit the Ayatollah's rule, the likelihood that his regime would crash and explode after his death is great indeed.

Option number three, that is the prospect of formation of a government by Bakhtiar model is not bright either. A Bakhtiar-type government would also suffer from some of the Bani-Sadr syndrome. But his major problem is how to capture power, a problem that could not be solved until he creates a major power base, such as among the members of the armed forces.

Before examining the final option, some ground rules must be laid and some lessons learned from the Iranian debacle pointed out.

First, Iran is being now hotly contested between the East and the West. The final outcome would depend on the degree of determination, ingenuity and, above all, the ability of either power to recognize and exploit the psychological, social, historical, and cultural realities of Iran.

Regardless of whether the Iranian disaster was the outcome of the rivalry between the British and Franco-German interests, the Russian conspiracy, the Brzezinski Plan of tying a chastity belt of Islamic fervor around the "arc of crisis," or the result of simple-mismanagement and intelligence gaps, the end result falls short of the desirable outcome, by any sane criteria.

All the U.S. achieved was the unleashing of a highly destructive force, whose future directions and negative influence on Iran and the Middle East are

yet to be fathomed. Today, in Iran itself, mass official murder and imprisonment, torture and anarchy, poverty and the destruction of the nation's wealth are the order. ^{of the day} And foreign invasion and possible territorial annexation are stark realities of Khomeini's rule.

By contract, "the Shah's Iran" was indeed an island of stability and a bulwark against Communism in the region and in the vital Persian Gulf. Having the same interests as the free world, Iran might keep a highly volatile area from dangerous explosions. The West did not need to worry about the Strait of Hormuz or the reliability of its oil routes. There was no need for huge Indian Ocean carrier task forces, for the creation of Rapid Deployment Forces, or the expressions of nuclear intent if Russia were to invade Iran or unsettle the Gulf. Russia would never have invaded Afghanistan if the Shah had reigned, nor would Saudi Arabia feel the cold chills of encroaching radicalization. The world oil markets would not have turned on their heads, raising the price of a barrel of oil from \$14 in January 1979 to \$33 by mid-1980. The possibility of an Iraq invasion was non-existent. And, finally, the prospect of the physical disintegration of Iran and its takeover by Communists was not even a

leftist dream while the Shah ruled. In short, the fall of the Shah upset the balance of power and created a most testing period for the free world.

So far, the West seems to have been unable to respond.

Second, while the U.S. administrations have been plagued (politically speaking) by infighting, internal squabbles, vacillations, and reactions to various interest groups, the Soviets have enjoyed continuity of leadership, little or no internal dissension, and above all, no political "re-election" worries. With an iron-clad, experienced secret service, backed by a most powerful army, they are on the verge of expanding their influence and power to the four corners of the world. Of course, the Soviet Empire is not without its own soft spots and vulnerabilities. And it is precisely the recognition - and exploitation - of these weak spots which gives the free world any reasonable chance to survive. In the meantime, the harsh reality of the existing world must not escape the attention of the West. The Soviets would exploit any situation

and utilize any means to achieve their final objectives. It is only in the context of such a brutal race that the future of Iran should be considered.

Since the role of the U.S. in any post-Khomeini era is vital, and even indispensable, the U.S. should embark on a course of action with resolve and unwavering determination. The U.S. action should be such that it would maximize the chances of Iran's recapture. In the high tension world of today, little consideration should be given to the protests of liberal, sentimental circles. The plan to re-capture Iran is necessarily complex and multi-dimensional. The highlights of the plan follow:

If indeed it is agreed that leaving Iran to itself would involve high and unacceptable risks to the West, then the role the U.S. could play would involve two distinct, but simultaneous courses of action.

(1) In part one of the plan, the U.S. should follow a three-phased strategy: (A) To lessen, rather than increase aid to Iran in order to accelerate the inevitable death of the Khomeini regime. This objective could be achieved by keeping the regime constantly

off-balance, by fermenting discontent, and by following an increasingly graduated choking-off of the regime. The higher the dissatisfaction with the Khomeini regime, the more acceptable the "savior" regime will be to the Iranian people. (B) Ferment internecine conflicts so the "revolutionaires" would eliminate each other. By so doing, the troubles of the future regime would be far less. (C) Deal the final blow to a weakened, bleeding regime with as little resistance from its forces as possible.

(2) The second stage of the operations should run simultaneous with the first stage. This stage requires (A) preparatory phases; and (B) actual operations.

A.

(1) The role of the U.S. should be a "big-brotherly" supervisory, and catalytic role. The wink and nod from the U.S. is expected to have the miraculous effect of bringing not only the neighboring states in the Persian Gulf together, but it would also unite the warring, disparate "opposition" Iranians. Further, for the success of such operations, the U.S.'s vast intelligence apparatus is obviously indispensable. The U.S. also has access to a big array of "public

relations" machinery, such as its powerful international broadcastings, the Voice of America, etc. These could be put to a highly effective use.

Iranians, like many other third-world nations, attribute almost superhuman powers to the U.S. They believe that if the U.S. wishes to change course, it would succeed. They also believe that nothing can be done without the aid of the United States. Whether the belief is true or false is beside the point. The important point is to recognize the prevalent perception and utilize it to maximum advantage.

(2) Iran's neighboring states should jointly cooperate in the operation to rescue Iran. Under U.S. coordination and supervision, each country has something to offer to insure the success of the operations. Some, like Oman and Turkey, could provide the Iranians with training camps, sanctuaries, and staging areas. Others, like Jordan and Egypt, could help in setting up powerful radio stations beamed into Iran. Still others, like Isreal, could help with intelligence, planning, and commando operations. And Saudi Arabia could grant its help by extending loans to the Iranian opposition groups.

(3) One major step, once the mind and the heart of the participating parties has been set on the plan, is to transport thousands of Iranian officers to the training area from the U.S. and Europe. Word should be given to thousands of Iranian officers and NCO's to flee the country to pre-determined areas. The ranks of the future combatants could easily swell to tens of thousands, once a carefully constructed network of operatives in Iran encourage and facilitate their flight. Along with massive defections, highly effective equipment, such as fighter planes and helicopters should also be flown away.

It must be pointed out at this juncture, that any thinking that the Iran problem could have a political solution is to prove unrealistic. The Iranian problem could only be solved by resorting to arms. To seek a political solution in a nation which has no background in politics, the art of compromise, or the nuances of diplomacy is to face disappointment. Further, there are armed, trained, and disciplined Communists who would settle for nothing less than setting-up a Marxist state in the post-Khomeini era. And of course, the

largely rag-tag, but highly dedicated, Moslem fanatic force seeking to dominate Iran is also something to reckon with. Added to the situation is the armed Kurdish, tribal, and ethnic forces bent on destroying the remainder of a once-flourishing nation. The best prognosis for Iran, after the demise of Khomeini, therefore, is a gradual drift into a protracted, unpredictable, bloody civil war, if nothing is done to prevent it.

(4) The preparatory stage, therefore, requires a coordinated, concerted effort, on the part of the participants, to offer the Iranian resistance army, financial intelligence, logistics help, training, sanctuary, staging areas, and arms.

(5) The overall command of the Iranian units should be given to one of the top generals of the Imperial armed forces. At this stage, based on the best available evidence and information, it seems General Golamali Oveissi is best equipped to handle the job. He seems to have the widest contacts with many Iranian dissident officers inside and outside Iran. He also seems to be in touch with many politicians, bazaar people, tribal chiefs, and mullahs. Also,

in addition to his personal acquaintanceships, and information about many influential personalities, his personal knowledge of the geography of Iran is vast and comprehensive. His reputation of being a decisive and ruthless general (qualities most vital to the success of the operation) is likely to project resolve and determination.

(6) Mullahs, Islamic scholars, and other respectable personalities should start denouncing the Khomeini regime as un-Islamic. There are many Islamic scholars outside Iran (such as ayatollah Khoii in Iraq with a large Shi'a following) and inside, led by ayatollah Shari'at-Madari, who would be prepared to denounce Khomeini and support the new government. (It has probably escaped notice that in 1953, when the Shah successfully returned to Iran, the grandest ayatollah of all times, namely, ayatollah Boroojerdi, endorsed the Shah's government.)

(7) Inside Iran, army units, members of Commando forces, trusted tribes, and ethnic groups (Baluchis, Bakhtiaris, Ghashghais, Azerbaijanis, etc.) should be prepared and armed to act on signal.

The Imperial armed forces of Iran are recommended to fulfill this mission and be the major vehicle for a variety of reasons. One reason is their unwavering, and still much-alive, sense of loyalty to their late commander-in-chief and to his family. Secondly, the Imperial armed forces, despite sustaining major body blows, is still the country's best trained and most equipped force. Thirdly, as a result of continued humiliation and insults heaped upon it, its determination to regain its once prestigious position should be more than ever. And finally, it is the most trusted force which could be counted on to remain loyal to the new regime whose main ideological thrust will have to be secularism, nationalism, constitutional monarchy, anti-communism, and alignment with the West. Iran, once again, must be transformed into the unified, secure, prosperous, industrializing, enterprising, anti-communist, friend-of-the-West bulwark it was -- albeit with calculated moderation.

(8) There are now various political and military leaders who, by themselves, cannot command an imposing following. But, brought together, their joint efforts and cooperation could send shock waves to Iran, boost

the morale of the "opposition" to new heights, and further demoralize the clerical regime and their communist allies. Names such as General Oveissi, General Aryana, General Djam, and politicians like Bakhtiar and Amini could conceivably form a unified front under the banner of monarchy.

The saying that nothing succeeds like success is a highly significant tell-tale on human nature. Success (or the appearance of success) attracts support, creates confidence, and turns into a rolling, soon-to-become giant snowball.

One of the most important secrets of the fall of the Shah was visible cracks, tell-tale signs of wavering, indecisiveness, and failure to use the huge machinery at the Shah's disposal. The alliance of Mullah and Red "revolutionaries" took these for signs of weakness. The contradictory statements from the White House, together with a global vilification campaign, ^{against} the regime of the Shah emboldened the "revolutionaires" to mount their campaign of highly organized terror. The tactics used by the terrorists were so comprehensive, meticulous,

and calculated that its attribution to a largely inexperienced Iranian youth and a bunch of radical mullahs is impossible. The campaign must have been organized and directed by professionals.

In any event, the point to remember is that Khomeini won, and received the tumultuous support, not because of any love nurtured in the hearts of Iranians for him, but because the experienced Iranians clearly discerned the crumbling of the Shah's regime and the advent of new masters. They found it an expedient and life-saving step to go out and support the new regime.

For the unexperienced observer, and even for some self-appointed Western armchair "experts," the outpouring of support for Khomeini has been accepted at its face value. Not so, say the more experienced and seasoned observers of Iran, who intimately know the culture, psychology, the "fine-prints and the soft-facts" of Iran. For this reason, they believe a turnabout of events would not be difficult at all. As a matter of fact, one major reason why the Iraqi invasion failed to trigger the hoped-for mass uprising against the

Khomeini regime was that it failed to convince the populace that a credible, to-be-respected force was to arrive. The trick, and the secret of success in Iran, therefore, is to convince the populace that the fortunes of the mullah-communist alliance have been reversed, and their days are numbered.

Once the wagon starts rolling, the world would be surprised to witness the defection of ever-increasing numbers of Iranians, and even, of Khomeini's erstwhile apologetic supporters, to the new bandwagon.

This is the lesson of history, true among all humans, but more so, among Iranians.

The Khomeini regime, it must be pointed out, remains a distinctly minority "government." Khomeini has lost much of his charisma, his mythical stature, and his grip on power. Open criticism of the "Imam" and desecration of the portraits of "his holiness" unthinkable even a few months ago, are now among the daily occurrences in Iran. In addition, millions of ethnic Azarbaijanis, Kurds, Baluchis, Ghashghais, Turkmans, a sizable portion of the middle-technocratic-class have their opposition to him on record. Members

of Iranian armed forces are chafing under his regime and are desperately in search of a way to rebel. Many mullahs, among them some of the big names, have expressed their opposition to Khomeini, albeit in veiled terminology. The reason Khomeini is still in power is his ability to keep his opposing enemies constantly off-balance, and, the inability of the opposition to find and agree on a rallying point.

Why the Monarchy?

There are political justifications and necessities why the campaign to liberate Iran should be waged under the banner of monarchy, and why monarchy should be restored. Legally, the opposition has no recourse except to declare anything after Bakhtiar government null and void, illegal, and unconstitutional. The seizure of the government was the work of an organization of international terrorists and anarchists bent on destroying any and all vestiges of a lawful government. To have a basis to move and build upon, the liberating forces must have a starting point. The basis clearly is the constitution of 1906 which recognizes all kinds civil and political liberties while protecting one of

Iran's longest and most cherished traditions - monarchy. Politically, the nation, composed of many peoples of different ethnic origins, must be held together by the cementing power of monarchy which, traditionally, has transcended all ethnic, racial, religious, tribal, and geographic differences.

Further, with no democratic tradition to resort to, the likeliest scenario awaiting Iran, without a monarchy, would probably be a succession of military dictators, coups and counter-coups with their inherent instability. After the traumatic rule by the clergy, the only remaining rallying point, providing the country with any meaningful sense of nationhood, would be monarchy.

Realistically speaking, had the Khomeini regime declared a general amnesty soon after it took over, tried the accused in open courts of law ^{with due process}, respected the inalienable rights of people, continued to protect the sanctity of rights and lives of the individuals, kept the army intact, shown compassion and mercy, encouraged investment of creativity and talent, these pages would never have been written. But, instead,

he chose to allow his volcanic rage and revengeful personality to overwhelm the country and break its backbone. In the process, he permanently alienated many groups, religious, political, ethnic, professional, etc., whose very support would have been needed in the reconstruction of the country and the healing of many wounds.

Politically, he exposed the country to the intrigue, infiltration, and exploitation of Iran's powerful communist giant neighbor. To assume now, as some may still think, that somehow, miraculously, the country will get back on its feet, is nothing more than wishful thinking. Iran will be put on its feet once again, after a hard fight and careful, meticulous planning.

The young Shah of Iran, is increasingly gaining popularity among many groups and factions. The best available information coming from inside the armed forces shows almost absolute, unwavering loyalty to him, as the legitimate, legal, practical commander-in-chief.

Some unique characteristics of the institution of monarchy in Iran, which again might have escaped the notice of many observers has been its quality of

epitomizing Iran's spiritual, cultural, and historical heritage. The Shah, has always meant more than a head of the State. He has stood for an arbitrator, a point of reference, a father figure, a respected and revered elder, and the final authority in the complex hierarchy of an authoritarian Iran. It is a system, an institution, deeply embedded in the collective unconscious of all Iranians.

To individuals who know Iran and its culture, there is a pervasive feeling that monarchy, once again, is to play the vital, traditional role it has always played.

The Operation

For obvious reasons, mapping out a detailed scheme seems to be impossible at this time. For one thing, to prepare an operational plan requires a thorough study of the many aspects of the situation by a variety of experts. For another, a meeting of minds among all key participants is necessary. It is the experts who should determine the number, kind, and quality of "troops," their manner of recruitment, the kind and

quantity of equipment, the training and staging areas, the kind and quality of logistics support, the kind of coverage, the role and linkage of inside and outside participants, duration of training, and timing of the onset of the operations. The operation, however, is and must remain distinctly Iranian. The role of others, especially the U.S., should be supportive and must be kept secret.

The general outline of the operation, however, is clear. It takes maximum advantage of psychological warfare, sabotage, commando operations, surprise attacks, and a synchronized, coordinated onslaught from within and without the country.

As mentioned earlier, the most expert assessment of the Iranian situation seems to indicate that there is no political solution for the Iran problem. The only realistic solution, with any reasonable chance of success, is organizing a military campaign. But along with it, all resources available to the participants (and these could be impressive and formidable indeed) must be fully utilized. Nothing should be left to chance.

All available evidence points to the fact that once the U.S. gives the green light, the machinery will start rolling. Thousands of Iranians, among them some of the most highly trained military experts, will swell the ranks.

The choice is historic. But it is also obvious. To rely on a sure and trusted ally force seems to be the wise choice, especially in light of the knowledge that it would be momentous.

Some Closing Remarks:

An outside observer sometimes wonders at the politicization of such vital organs of the U.S. as defense, intelligence, and diplomacy. But more "wonder-ful" is the fact that these vital organs function at all.

The traumatic experience in Iran demonstrated luck may not be on the side of the U.S. at all times. From what has transpired, it is obvious that many who posed as "experts" on Iran had little expertise. They entirely missed a most vital element in Iranian politics, i.e., full consideration of the "fine prints"

and the "soft-facts" of life. It was a colossal mis-judgement which for Iranians cost their country, and for the U.S., a world. Had the Shah been certain of U.S. support, the tragedy of Iran would not have occurred.

It is hoped that the U.S., for the sake of stability, world peace, and human dignity - principles the U.S. has traditionally upheld - would not lose the opportunity available to it this time. It is the last and final opportunity for a nation, considered by many, including millions of Iranians, to be the last and only bastion of freedom.