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Last Updated: 11/06/2023

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: KEMP, GEOFFREY :Files

Archivist: dlb

File Folder: Iran, January 1981

Box 90218 90492

Date: 8/10/99

Wills - F97-106

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Memo	Harold Saunders to Mr. Newsom, 1 p. <i>R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 # 39</i>	11/6/80	P1/F1
2. Memo	Harold Saunders to Mr. Newsom, re: RDJTF War Game in Iran raises Important.....4 p. <i>D 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 # 40</i>	11/7/80	P1/F1
3. Memo	Zgigniew Brzezinski to Carter, re: Diplomatic Messages, 1 p. <i>R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 # 41</i>	1/18/81	P1/F1
4. Draft Cable	Carter to Chancellor Schmidt, 2 p. <i>R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 # 42</i>	n.d.	P1/F1
5. Draft Cable	Carter to PM Thatcher, 2 p. <i>R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 # 43</i>	n.d.	P1/F1
6. Draft Cable	Carter to PM Forlani, 2 p. <i>R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 # 44</i>	n.d.	P1/F1
7. Draft Cable	Carter to Pres. D'Estaing, 2 p. <i>R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 # 45</i>	n.d.	P1/F1
8. Draft Cable	Carter to PM Trudeau, 2 p. <i>R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 # 46</i>	n.d.	P1/F1
9. Draft Cable	Carter to Pres. Chevallaz, 2 p. <i>R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 # 47</i>	n.d.	P1/F1
10. Draft Cable	Carter to PM Suzuki, 2 p. <i>R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 # 48</i>	n.d.	P1/F1
11. Draft Cable	Carter to Sec. Gen. Waldheim, 2 p. <i>R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 # 49</i>	n.d.	P1/F1
12. Draft Cable	Carter to the Pope, 2 p. <i>R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 # 50</i>	n.d.	P1/F1
13. Draft Cable	Carter to King Hussein, 2 p. <i>R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 # 51</i>	n.d.	P1/F1
14. Draft Cable	Carter to Sultan Qaboos Bin Said, 2 p. <i>R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 # 52</i>	n.d.	P1/F1
15. Draft Cable	Carter to Pres. Sadat, 2 p. <i>R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 # 53</i>	n.d.	P1/F1
16. Draft Cable	Carter to Pres. Zia, 2 p. <i>R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 # 54</i>	n.d.	P1/F1
17. Draft Cable	Carter to Dep. PM Fahd, 2 p. <i>R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 # 55</i>	n.d.	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(5) of the PRA].

(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(5) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: KEMP, GEOFFREY :Files

Archivist: dlb

File Folder: Iran, January 1981

Date: 8/10/99

Page 2

Box ~~90218~~ 90492

Wills - F97-106

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
18. Draft Cable	Carter to PM Begin, 2 p. R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 #56	n.d.	P1/F1
19. Draft Cable	Carter to Pres: Bendjedid, 2 p. R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 #57	n.d.	P1/F1
20. Memo	Gary Sick to Richard Allen, re: British Interest in U.S. Iran Policy, 1 p. D 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 #58	1/23/81	P1/F1
21. Cable	Cable #231025Z Jan 81, 2 p. R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 #59	1/23/81	P1/F1
22. Paper	Abbreviated Analysis of Algiers Agreement, 2 p. Opc	n.d.	P5
23. Letter	Henry Precht to Bruce Laingen, 1 p. R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 #60	8/2/79	P1/F1
24. Paper	Planning for the Shah to Come to the United States, 4 p. R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 #61	8/1/79	P1/F1
25. Cable	Cable # illegible, re: Shah's Desire to Reside in the U.S., 1 p. R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 #62	7/25/79	P1/F1
26. Memo	Allen to Reagan, 1 p. D 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 #63	1/29/81	P1/F1
27. Memo	Alexander Haig to Reagan, re: An Independent Commission on the Iranian Agreements, 2 p.	1/28/81	P1/F1/P5

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
- G Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- F-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(5) of the FOIA]
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name KEMP, GEOFFREY: FILES

Withdrawer

LOJ 4/25/2007

File Folder IRAN, JANUARY 1981

FOIA

F97-106/1

Box Number 90492

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
21	CABLE	231025Z JAN 81	2	1/23/1981
			<i>MVH 3/11/08</i>	
24	PAPER	PLANNING FOR THE SHAH TO COME TO THE US	4	8/1/1979
			<i>MVH 3/11/08</i>	



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

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file
SWA-
RDF

November 6, 1980

~~SECRET~~

TO: P - Mr. Newsom
FROM: NEA - Harold H. Saunders Hal

Attached is a report prepared by George Lambrakis on an RDJTF War Game on Iran played at Fort Bragg October 23-30. George's account of the games and his perceptions on the dilemmas raised by the exercise may be of interest to you as you begin your travels for discussions in Europe on our Southwest Asia security strategy.

file

Attachment:

As stated.

Hal -
Thanks. I find
some of the premises
of this exercise
very doubtful.
Me

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-106 #39

BY smf, NARA, DATE 11/8/01

Iran, Jan 1981

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 3 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 18, 1981

Iran Neg's

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT: Diplomatic Messages

Many friendly nations have asked us for the earliest possible notification in the event of an agreement with Iran on the release of the hostages.

Attached are a series of sixteen messages from you to the heads of state of nations which have either cooperated with us or which have a particular concern about the hostage issue. The messages were drafted by State and reviewed by the NSC. They are prepositioned to be sent out immediately upon confirmation that an agreement has been achieved.

Recommendation: That you approve sending the attached messages once confirmation of an agreement is attained.

Approve (*verbal check of JC who said OK State notified*)
 As amended

~~SECRET~~

Rvw. 1/16/01

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

MLS F97-106 #41

BY Amf, NARA, DATE 11/8/01

~~SECRET~~

NEA/IWG:ADSENS:DW
26610
THE SECRETARY

NEA: PCONSTABLE
NEA/IWG:RELINDSTROM

EUR:GVEST
S/S-0:

FLASH

AMEMBASSY BONN

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 1/16/01 {THE SECRETARY}

TAGS: PEPR, PINS

SUBJECT: HOSTAGE RELEASE MESSAGE

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT:

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DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-106 # 42

BY Amf, NARA, DATE 11/8/01

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

12 OF BONN

BEGIN TEXT. WE HAVE CONCLUDED AN AGREEMENT TO FREE THE HOSTAGES. WE EXPECT THEY WILL SHORTLY LEAVE IRAN ON THEIR WAY HOME. I WANT YOU TO BE AMONG THE FIRST WHOM WE THANK FOR YOUR SPLENDID COOPERATION DURING THE PAST, VERY DIFFICULT YEAR. WE AMERICANS WILL ALWAYS REMEMBER HOW THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE STOOD SO STAUNCHLY WITH US THROUGH THE LONG ORDEAL. YOUR SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE ELOQUENTLY EXPRESSED THE CLOSENESS OF OUR TIES. THE KEY ROLE THAT THE FRG PLAYED THROUGHOUT THE CRISIS CAN NEVER BE ADEQUATELY RECOGNIZED.

I AM ASKING AMBASSADOR STOESEL TO BRIEF YOUR GOVERNMENT IN DETAIL ON THE ARRANGEMENTS WE HAVE REACHED WITH IRAN. WE HAVE ACHIEVED THE TWO OBJECTIVES WE SET FOR OURSELVES AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS: THE PRESERVATION OF OUR NATIONAL HONOR AND INTERESTS AND THE SAFE RELEASE OF OUR PEOPLE.

I KNOW THAT YOU AND THE GERMAN PEOPLE WILL REJOICE WITH ME, THE FAMILIES OF THE HOSTAGES AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN THIS DAY THAT WE HAVE SO LONG AWAITED. NO THREAT TO THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, NO DISPUTE BETWEEN NATIONS IN RECENT YEARS HAS BEEN SO COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE AS THE HOSTAGE CRISIS. YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT HAVE OUR PROFOUND THANKS FOR YOUR SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE. SIGNED
JIMMY CARTER. END TEXT. YY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NEA/IWG:ADSENS:DW
26610
THE SECRETARY

NEA:PCONSTABLE
NEA/IWG:RELINDSTROM

EUR:GVEST
S/S-0:

FLASH AMEMBASSY LONDON

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 1/16/01 {THE SECRETARY}

TAGS: PEPR, PINS

SUBJECT: HOSTAGE RELEASE MESSAGE

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER:

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DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-106 # 43

BY Smf, NARA, DATE 11/8/01

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1 2 OF LONDON

BEGIN TEXT. WE HAVE CONCLUDED AN AGREEMENT TO FREE THE HOSTAGES. WE EXPECT THEY WILL SHORTLY LEAVE IRAN ON THEIR WAY HOME. I WANT YOU TO BE AMONG THE FIRST WHOM WE THANK FOR YOUR SPLENDID COOPERATION DURING THE PAST, DIFFICULT YEAR. WE AMERICANS WILL ALWAYS REMEMBER HOW THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE STOOD SO STAUNCHLY WITH US THROUGH THE LONG ORDEAL. YOUR SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE ELOQUENTLY EXPRESSED THE CLOSENESS OF OUR TIES.

I AM ASKING AMBASSADOR BREWSTER TO BRIEF YOUR GOVERNMENT IN DETAIL ON THE ARRANGEMENTS WE HAVE REACHED WITH IRAN. WE HAVE ACHIEVED THE TWO OBJECTIVES WE SET FOR OURSELVES AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS: THE PRESERVATION OF OUR NATIONAL HONOR AND INTERESTS AND THE SAFE RELEASE OF OUR PEOPLE.

I KNOW THAT YOU AND THE BRITISH PEOPLE WILL REJOICE WITH ME, THE FAMILIES OF THE HOSTAGES AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN THIS DAY THAT WE HAVE SO LONG AWAITED. NO THREAT TO THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, NO DISPUTE BETWEEN NATIONS IN RECENT YEARS HAS BEEN SO COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE AS THE HOSTAGE CRISIS. YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT HAVE OUR PROFOUND THANKS FOR YOUR SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE. SIGNED JIMMY CARTER. END TEXT. 44

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~~SECRET~~

NEA/IWG:ADSENS:DW
26610
THE SECRETARY

NEA:PDCONSTABLE
NEA/IWG:RELINDSTROM

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S/S-0:

FLASH AMEMBASSY ROME

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 1/16/01 {THE SECRETARY}

TAGS: PEPR, PINS

SUBJECT: HOSTAGE RELEASE MESSAGE

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO PRIME MINISTER FORLANI:

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DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-106 # 44

BY smf, NARA, DATE 11/08/01

~~SECRET~~

PAM - Rome

~~SECRET~~

12 OF ROME

BEGIN TEXT. WE HAVE CONCLUDED AN AGREEMENT TO FREE THE HOSTAGES. WE EXPECT THEY WILL SHORTLY LEAVE IRAN ON THEIR WAY HOME. I WANT YOU TO BE AMONG THE FIRST WHOM WE THANK FOR YOUR SPLENDID COOPERATION DURING THE PAST, VERY DIFFICULT YEAR. WE AMERICANS WILL ALWAYS REMEMBER HOW THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE STOOD SO STAUNCHLY WITH US THROUGH THE LONG ORDEAL. YOUR SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE ELOQUENTLY EXPRESSED THE CLOSENESS OF OUR TIES.

I AM ASKING AMBASSADOR GARDNER TO BRIEF YOUR GOVERNMENT IN DETAIL ON THE ARRANGEMENTS WE HAVE REACHED WITH IRAN. WE HAVE ACHIEVED THE TWO OBJECTIVES WE SET FOR OURSELVES AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS: THE PRESERVATION OF OUR NATIONAL HONOR AND INTERESTS AND THE SAFE RELEASE OF OUR PEOPLE.

I KNOW THAT YOU AND THE ITALIAN PEOPLE WILL REJOICE WITH ME, THE FAMILIES OF THE HOSTAGES AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN THIS DAY THAT WE HAVE SO LONG AWAITED. NO THREAT TO THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, NO DISPUTE BETWEEN NATIONS IN RECENT YEARS HAS BEEN AS COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE AS THE HOSTAGE CRISIS. YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT HAVE OUR PROFOUND THANKS FOR YOUR SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE. SIGNED JIMMY CARTER.
END TEXT. 44

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NEA/IWG:ADSENS:DW
26610
THE SECRETARY

NEA:PDCONSTABLE
NEA/IWG:RELINDSTROM

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FLASH AMEMBASSY PARIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 1/16/01 {THE SECRETARY}

TAGS: PEPR, PINS

SUBJECT: HOSTAGE RELEASE MESSAGE

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO PRESIDENT GISCARD D'ESTAING:

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DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-106 #45

BY smf, NARA, DATE 11/8/01

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|2 PARIS

BEGIN TEXT. WE HAVE CONCLUDED AN AGREEMENT TO FREE THE HOSTAGES. WE EXPECT THEY WILL SHORTLY LEAVE IRAN ON THEIR WAY HOME. I WANT YOU TO BE AMONG THE FIRST WHOM WE THANK FOR YOUR SPLENDID COOPERATION DURING THE PAST, VERY DIFFICULT YEAR. WE AMERICANS WILL ALWAYS REMEMBER HOW THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE STOOD SO STAUNCHLY WITH US THROUGH THE LONG ORDEAL. YOUR SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE ELOQUENTLY EXPRESSED THE CLOSENESS OF OUR TIES.

I AM ASKING AMBASSADOR HARTMAN TO BRIEF YOUR GOVERNMENT IN DETAIL ON THE ARRANGEMENTS WE HAVE REACHED WITH IRAN. WE HAVE ACHIEVED THE TWO OBJECTIVES WE SET FOR OURSELVES AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS: THE PRESERVATION OF OUR NATIONAL HONOR AND THE SAFE RELEASE OF OUR PEOPLE.

I KNOW THAT YOU AND THE FRENCH PEOPLE WILL REJOICE WITH ME, THE FAMILIES OF THE HOSTAGES AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN THIS DAY THAT WE HAVE SO LONG AWAITED. NO THREAT TO THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, NO DISPUTE BETWEEN NATIONS IN RECENT YEARS HAS BEEN AS COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE AS THE HOSTAGE CRISIS. YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT HAVE OUR PROFOUND THANKS FOR YOUR SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE. SIGNED JIMMY CARTER.
END TEXT. 44

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NEA/IWG:ADSENS:DW
26610
THE SECRETARY

NEA:PDCONSTABLE
NEA/IWG:RELINDSTROM

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AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 1/16/01 {THE SECRETARY}

TAGS: PEPR, PINS

SUBJECT: HOSTAGE RELEASE MESSAGE

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU:

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DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-106 #46

BY anf, NARA, DATE 11/8/01

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| 2 OF OTTAWA

BEGIN TEXT. WE HAVE CONCLUDED AN AGREEMENT TO FREE THE HOSTAGES. WE EXPECT THEY WILL SHORTLY LEAVE IRAN ON THEIR WAY HOME. I WANT YOU TO BE AMONG THE FIRST WHOM WE THANK FOR YOUR SPLENDID COOPERATION DURING THE PAST, VERY DIFFICULT YEAR. WE AMERICANS WILL ALWAYS REMEMBER HOW THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE STOOD SO STAUNCHLY WITH US THROUGH THE LONG ORDEAL. YOUR SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE ELOQUENTLY EXPRESSED THE CLOSENESS OF OUR TIES. ONCE AGAIN WE THINK OF YOUR DIPLOMATIC STAFF IN TEHRAN WHOSE COURAGE AND GOOD WILL CAN NEVER BE FULLY APPRECIATED.

I AM ASKING AMBASSADOR CURTIS TO BRIEF YOUR GOVERNMENT IN DETAIL ON THE ARRANGEMENTS WE HAVE REACHED WITH IRAN. WE HAVE ACHIEVED THE TWO OBJECTIVES WE SET FOR OURSELVES AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS: THE PRESERVATION OF OUR NATIONAL HONOR AND INTERESTS AND THE SAFE RELEASE OF OUR PEOPLE.

I KNOW THAT YOU AND THE CANADIAN PEOPLE WILL REJOICE WITH ME, THE FAMILIES OF THE HOSTAGES AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN THIS DAY THAT WE HAVE SO LONG AWAITED. NO THREAT TO THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, NO DISPUTE BETWEEN NATIONS IN RECENT YEARS HAS BEEN AS COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE AS THE HOSTAGE CRISIS. YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT HAVE OUR PROFOUND THANKS FOR YOUR VERY SPECIAL SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE. SIGNED JIMMY CARTER. END TEXT. ♡

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NEA/IWG:ADSENS:DW
26610
THE SECRETARY

NEA:PDCONSTABLE
NEA/IWG:RELINDSTROM

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FLASH AMEMBASSY BERN

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 1/16/01 {THE SECRETARY}

TAGS: PEPR, PINS

SUBJECT: HOSTAGE RELEASE MESSAGE

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO PRESIDENT CHEVALLAZ:

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DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-106 # 47

BY anf, NARA, DATE 11/8/01

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~~SECRET~~

| 2 OF BERN

BEGIN TEXT. WE HAVE CONCLUDED AN AGREEMENT TO FREE THE HOSTAGES. WE EXPECT THEY WILL SHORTLY LEAVE IRAN ON THEIR WAY HOME. I WANT YOU TO BE AMONG THE FIRST WHOM WE THANK FOR YOUR SPLENDID COOPERATION DURING THE PAST, VERY DIFFICULT YEAR. WE AMERICANS WILL ALWAYS REMEMBER HOW THE SWISS GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE STOOD SO STAUNCHLY WITH US THROUGH THE LONG ORDEAL. YOUR SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE ELOQUENTLY EXPRESSED THE CLOSENESS OF OUR TIES. YOUR DIPLOMATS WORKED UNTIRINGLY THROUGHOUT THIS CRISIS. I AM WRITING PERSONALLY TO SEVERAL OF THEM.

I AM ASKING AMBASSADOR VINE TO BRIEF YOUR GOVERNMENT IN DETAIL ON THE ARRANGEMENTS WE HAVE REACHED WITH IRAN. WE HAVE ACHIEVED THE TWO OBJECTIVES WE SET FOR OURSELVES AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS: THE PRESERVATION OF OUR NATIONAL HONOR AND INTERESTS AND THE SAFE RELEASE OF OUR PEOPLE.

I KNOW THAT YOU AND THE PEOPLE OF SWITZERLAND WILL REJOICE WITH ME, THE FAMILIES OF THE HOSTAGES AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN THIS DAY THAT WE HAVE SO LONG AWAITED. NO THREAT TO THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, NO DISPUTE BETWEEN NATIONS IN RECENT YEARS HAS BEEN AS COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE AS THE HOSTAGE CRISIS. YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT HAVE OUR PROFOUND THANKS FOR YOUR SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE.
SIGNED JIMMY CARTER. END TEXT. 44

~~SECRET~~

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NEA/IWG:ADSENS:DW
26610
THE SECRETARY

NEA: PCONSTABLE
NEA/IWG:RELINDSTROM

EUR:GVEST
S/S-0:

FLASH AMEMBASSY TOKYO

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 1/16/01 {THE SECRETARY}

TAGS: PEPR, PINS

SUBJECT: HOSTAGE RELEASE MESSAGE

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI:

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PC ✓
GV ✓
REL ✓
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DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-106 #48

BY smf, NARA, DATE 11/8/01

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

12 OF TOKYO

BEGIN TEXT. WE HAVE CONCLUDED AN AGREEMENT TO FREE THE HOSTAGES. WE EXPECT THEY WILL SHORTLY LEAVE IRAN ON THEIR WAY HOME. I WANT YOU TO BE AMONG THE FIRST WHOM WE THANK FOR YOUR SPLENDID COOPERATION DURING THE PAST, VERY DIFFICULT YEAR. WE AMERICANS WILL ALWAYS REMEMBER HOW THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE STOOD SO STAUNCHLY WITH US THROUGH THE LONG ORDEAL. YOUR SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE ELOQUENTLY EXPRESSED THE CLOSENESS OF OUR TIES.

I AM ASKING AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD TO BRIEF YOUR GOVERNMENT IN DETAIL ON THE ARRANGEMENTS WE HAVE REACHED WITH IRAN. WE HAVE ACHIEVED THE TWO OBJECTIVES WE SET FOR OURSELVES AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS: THE PRESERVATION OF OUR NATIONAL HONOR AND THE SAFE RELEASE OF OUR PEOPLE.

I KNOW THAT YOU AND THE JAPANESE PEOPLE WILL REJOICE WITH ME, THE FAMILIES OF THE HOSTAGES AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN THIS DAY THAT WE HAVE SO LONG AWAITED. NO THREAT TO THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, NO DISPUTE BETWEEN NATIONS IN RECENT YEARS HAS BEEN AS COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE AS THE HOSTAGE CRISIS. YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT HAVE OUR PROFOUND THANKS FOR YOUR SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE. SIGNED JIMMY CARTER. END TEXT. 44

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NEA/IWG:ADSENS:DW
26610
THE SECRETARY

NEA: PCONSTABLE
NEA/IWG:RELINDSTROM

EUR:GVEST
S/S-0:

FLASH USUN NEW YORK

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 1/16/01 {THE SECRETARY}

TAGS: PEPR, PINS

SUBJECT: HOSTAGE RELEASE MESSAGE

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM:

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DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-106 + 49

BY Smf, NARA, DATE 11/8/9

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BEGIN TEXT. I AM PLEASED TO INFORM YOU THAT WE HAVE REACHED AN AGREEMENT TO FREE THE 52 AMERICANS NOW HELD HOSTAGE IN IRAN. WE EXPECT THEY WILL LEAVE IRAN SHORTLY ON THEIR WAY HOME TO THE UNITED STATES. I WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU WOULD INFORM OFFICIALLY THE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, THE REPRESENTATIVES OF MEMBER STATES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE OF THIS DEVELOPMENT.

WITH THE RELEASE OF OUR HOSTAGES, THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERS THAT IRAN HAS COMPLIED FULLY WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 457 OF DECEMBER 4, 1979 AND 461 OF DECEMBER 31, 1979 AND WITH THE JUDGMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE OF MAY 24, 1980.

THE UNITED STATES HAS GREATLY APPRECIATED YOUR TIRELESS PUBLIC AND PRIVATE EFFORTS, AS WELL AS THOSE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND OTHER MEMBER STATES WHO FOR THE PAST YEAR HAVE SOUGHT MEANS TO GAIN THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES. WE ARE PARTICULARLY INDEBTED TO YOU, THE MEMBERS OF YOUR STAFF, AND THE NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVES WHO SERVED ON THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION WHICH TRAVELLED TO IRAN LAST YEAR IN SEARCH OF A SOLUTION TO THIS CRISIS.

THIS LONG ORDEAL FOR THE HOSTAGES, THEIR FAMILIES, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES IS NOW OVER. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HOPES AND BELIEVES THAT WITH THE END TO THIS EXTRAORDINARILY DIFFICULT PERIOD FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ALL OF US WILL BE ABLE TO CONSIDER TOGETHER HOW WE MIGHT BEST ENSURE THAT SUCH AN OCCURRENCE IS NOT REPEATED SO THAT INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AMONG NATIONS CAN BETTER DEVELOP ON A NORMAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE BASIS. MY GOVERNMENT PLEDGES ITSELF TO THAT OBJECTIVE.

ONCE AGAIN, MR. SECRETARY GENERAL, MY GOVERNMENT EXTENDS ITS DEEPEST GRATITUDE TO YOU AND MEMBER STATES OF THE UNITED NATIONS WHO HAVE WORKED AND AGONIZED WITH US OVER THE PAST YEAR. SIGNED
JIMMY CARTER. END TEXT. 44

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NEA/IWG:ADSENS:DW
26610
THE SECRETARY

NEA: PCONSTABLE
NEA/IWG:RELINDSTROM

EUR:GVEST
S/S-0:

FLASH AMEMBASSY ROME

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 1/16/01 {THE SECRETARY}

TAGS: PEPR, PINS

SUBJECT: HOSTAGE RELEASE MESSAGE

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO HIS HOLINESS:

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DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F 97-106 # 50

BY Smf, NARA, DATE 11/8/01

~~SECRET~~

Pope - Ron

~~SECRET~~

| 2 OF ROME {POPE}

BEGIN TEXT. WE HAVE REACHED AN AGREEMENT TO FREE THE HOSTAGES. WE EXPECT THEY WILL SHORTLY LEAVE IRAN ON THEIR WAY HOME. THE PRAYERS OF MILLIONS OF PEOPLE AROUND THE WORLD HAVE BEEN ANSWERED AND THE HOSTAGES WILL SOON BE REJOINED WITH THEIR FAMILIES AT HOME.

I WISH TO EXPRESS TO YOU ON BEHALF OF THE HOSTAGES, THEIR FAMILIES AND ALL OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE OUR PROFOUND APPRECIATION FOR YOUR PRECIOUS SPIRITUAL LEADERSHIP AND CONTINUING EFFORTS TO ASSIST DURING THE LONG YEAR THAT WE SOUGHT FREEDOM OF THE HOSTAGES. I HOPE YOU WILL CONVEY ALSO TO THE MANY LEADERS OF YOUR FAITH OUR DEEPEST GRATITUDE FOR THEIR INVALUABLE EFFORTS TO FREE OUR PEOPLE.

LET US PRAY THAT WE SHALL NEVER AGAIN HAVE TO SUFFER DIFFICULT DAYS LIKE THOSE OF THE PAST YEAR. LET US PRAY ALSO THAT THE WOUNDS THAT HAVE BEEN INFLICTED BY THIS ORDEAL WILL BE QUICKLY HEALED, AND THAT THE AMERICAN AND IRANIAN PEOPLE MAY TURN NOW TO THE WORK OF PEACE AND THE REALIZATION OF THE VAST POTENTIAL OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES. SIGNED JIMMY CARTER. END TEXT. 44

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NEA/IWG:ADSENS:DW
26610
THE SECRETARY

NEA:PCONSTABLE

NEA/IWG:RELINDSTROM

FLASH

AMMAN

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 01/16/01 {CONSTABLE, P.} NEA

TAGS: PINS

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE CONCERNING RELEASE OF THE
HOSTAGES

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DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-106 # 51

BY smf, NARA, DATE 11/8/01

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1 2 OF AMMAN

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO KING HUSSEIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

3. BEGIN TEXT. WE HAVE CONCLUDED AN AGREEMENT TO FREE THE HOSTAGES. WE EXPECT THEY WILL LEAVE IRAN SHORTLY ON THEIR WAY HOME. I KNOW THAT YOU AND THE JORDANIAN PEOPLE WILL REJOICE WITH ME, THE FAMILIES OF THE HOSTAGES, AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ON THAT DAY WE HAVE SO LONG AWAITED. NO THREAT TO THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, NO DISPUTE BETWEEN NATIONS IN RECENT YEARS HAS BEEN SO COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE AS THE HOSTAGE CRISIS. WE THANK YOU MOST PROFOUNDLY FOR THE IMPORTANT SUPPORT YOU HAVE GIVEN US IN OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THIS TASK. SINCERELY, JIMMY CARTER.
END TEXT. 44

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NEA/IWG:ADSENS:DW

26610

THE SECRETARY

NEA:PCONSTABLE

NEA/IWG:RELINDSTROM

FLASH

MUSCAT

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 01/16/01 {CONSTABLE, P.} NEA

TAGS: PINS

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE CONCERNING RELEASE OF THE
HOSTAGES

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DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-106 # 52

BY anf, NARA, DATE 11/8/01

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| 2 OF MUSCAT

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO SULTAN QABOOS BIN SAID AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

3. BEGIN TEXT. WE HAVE CONCLUDED AN AGREEMENT TO FREE THE HOSTAGES. WE EXPECT THEY WILL LEAVE IRAN SHORTLY ON THEIR WAY HOME. I KNOW THAT YOU AND THE OMANI PEOPLE WILL REJOICE WITH ME, THE FAMILIES OF THE HOSTAGES AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ON THIS DAY THAT WE HAVE SO LONG AWAITED. NO THREAT TO THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, NO DISPUTE BETWEEN NATIONS IN RECENT YEARS HAS BEEN AS COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE AS THE HOSTAGE CRISIS. WE THANK YOU MOST PROFOUNDLY FOR THE IMPORTANT SUPPORT YOU HAVE GIVEN US IN OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THIS TASK.

4. WE CONTINUE TO HOPE FOR AN EARLY END TO THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ AND OUR POLICIES TOWARD BOTH COUNTRIES WILL BE DETERMINED WITH THIS OBJECTIVE IN MIND. SINCERELY, JIMMY CARTER. END TEXT. 44

~~SECRET~~

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NEA/IWG:ADSENS:DW
26610
THE SECRETARY

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NEA/IWG:RELINDSTROM

FLASH CAIRO

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 01/16/01 {CONSTABLE, P.} NEA

TAGS: PINS

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE CONCERNING RELEASE OF THE
HOSTAGES

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NLS F97-106 # 53

BY Amf, NARA, DATE 11/8/01

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| 2 OF CAIRO

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT SADAT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

3. BEGIN TEXT. WE HAVE CONCLUDED AN AGREEMENT TO FREE THE HOSTAGES. WE EXPECT THEY WILL LEAVE IRAN SHORTLY ON THEIR WAY HOME. I KNOW THAT YOU AND THE EGYPTIAN PEOPLE WILL REJOICE WITH ME, THE FAMILIES OF THE HOSTAGES AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ON THIS DAY THAT WE HAVE SO LONG AWAITED. NO THREAT TO THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, NO DISPUTE BETWEEN NATIONS IN RECENT YEARS HAS BEEN AS COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE AS THE HOSTAGE CRISIS. WE THANK YOU MOST PROFOUNDLY FOR THE IMPORTANT SUPPORT YOU HAVE GIVEN US IN OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THIS TASK. SINCERELY,
JIMMY CARTER. END TEXT. ♪

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THE SECRETARY

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NEA/IWG:RELINDSTROM

FLASH

ISLAMABAD

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 01/16/01 {CONSTABLE, P.} NEA

TAGS: PINS

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE CONCERNING RELEASE OF THE
HOSTAGES

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NLS F97-106 # 54

BY smf, NARA, DATE 11/8/9

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| 2 OF ISLAMABAD

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT ZIA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

3. BEGIN TEXT. WE HAVE CONCLUDED AN AGREEMENT TO FREE THE HOSTAGES. WE EXPECT THEY WILL LEAVE IRAN SHORTLY ON THEIR WAY HOME. I KNOW THAT YOU AND THE PAKISTANI PEOPLE WILL REJOICE WITH ME, THE FAMILIES OF THE HOSTAGES AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ON THIS DAY WE HAVE SO LONG AWAITED. NO THREAT TO THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, NO DISPUTE BETWEEN NATIONS IN RECENT YEARS HAS BEEN AS COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE AS THE HOSTAGE CRISIS. WE THANK YOU MOST PROFOUNDLY FOR THE IMPORTANT SUPPORT YOU HAVE GIVEN US IN OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THIS TASK. SINCERELY, JIMMY CARTER
END TEXT. YY

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NEA/IWG:ADSENS:DW
26610
THE SECRETARY

NEA:PCONSTABLE

NEA/IWG:RELINDSTROM

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JIDDA

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 01/16-01 {CONSTABLE, P.} NEA

TAGS: PINS

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE CONCERNING RELEASE OF THE
HOSTAGES

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NLS F97-106 # 55

BY anf, NARA, DATE 11/8/01

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| 2 OF JIDDA

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER FAHD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

3. BEGIN TEXT. WE HAVE CONCLUDED AN AGREEMENT TO FREE THE HOSTAGES. WE EXPECT THEY WILL LEAVE IRAN SHORTLY ON THEIR WAY HOME. I KNOW THAT YOU AND THE SAUDI PEOPLE WILL REJOICE WITH ME, THE FAMILIES OF THE HOSTAGES AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ON THIS DAY THAT WE HAVE SO LONG AWAITED. NO THREAT TO THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, NO DISPUTE BETWEEN NATIONS IN RECENT YEARS HAS BEEN AS COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE AS THE HOSTAGE CRISIS. WE THANK YOU MOST PROFOUNDLY FOR THE IMPORTANT SUPPORT YOU HAVE GIVEN US IN OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THIS TASK.

4. WE CONTINUE TO HOPE FOR AN EARLY END TO THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ AND OUR POLICIES TOWARD BOTH COUNTRIES WILL BE DETERMINED WITH THIS OBJECTIVE IN MIND. SINCERELY, JIMMY CARTER. END TEXT. YY

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NEA/IWG:ADSENS:DW
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THE SECRETARY

NEA:PCONSTABLE

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TEL AVIV

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 01/16/01 {CONSTABLE, P.} NEA

TAGS: PINS

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE CONCERNING RELEASE OF THE
HOSTAGES

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NLS F97-106 #56

BY Amf, NARA, DATE 11/8/01

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| 2 OF TEL AVIV

FOR CHARGE

1. ~~18~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.]

2. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINSITER BEGIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

3. BEGIN TEXT: WE HAVE CONCLUDED AN AGREEMENT TO FREE THE HOSTAGES. WE EXPECT THEY WILL LEAVE IRAN SHORTLY ON THEIR WAY HOME. WE KNOW THE ISRAELI PEOPLE SHARE WITH THE FAMILIES OF THE HOSTAGES AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THE JOY WE FEEL ON THIS DAY THAT WE HAVE SO LONG AWAITED. NO THREAT TO THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, NO DISPUTE BETWEEN NATIONS IN RECENT YEARS HAS BEEN AS COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE AS THE HOSTAGE CRISIS. THE TERMS FOR RESOLVING THIS ISSUE ARE HONORABLE ONES, REFLECTING THE POSITION TO WHICH WE HAVE HELD THROUGHOUT THE CRISIS. WE THANK THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL MOST PROFOUNDLY FOR ITS SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT FOR OUR EFFORTS TO THIS END.

4. WE CONTINUE TO HOPE FOR AN EARLY END TO THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ AND OUR POLICIES TOWARD BOTH COUNTRIES WILL BE DETERMINED WITH THIS OBJECTIVE IN MIND. SINCERELY, JIMMY CARTER. END TEXT. 44

~~SECRET~~

Redrafted

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SPECIAL CHARGES

NEA/IWG:ADSENS;NSC:GSICK:DW

DATE 26610

THE SECRETARY

NEA:PCONSTABLE

NEA/IWG:RELINDSTROM

DESIRED DISTRIBUTION

FLASH ADDRESSES ALGIERS ADDRESSES

INFO PRECEDENCE INFO ADDRESSES

SPECIAL HANDLING

CAPTIONS

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 01/16/01 {THE SECRETARY} S

TAGS: PINS

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE CONCERNING RELEASE OF THE
HOSTAGES

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DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-106 #57

BY anf, NARA, DATE 11/8/91

~~SECRET~~

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1 2 OF ALGIERS

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT CHADLI BENDJEDID AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
3. AS WE CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT FOR THE RELEASE OF THE AMERICANS HELD HOSTAGE IN IRAN, I WISH TO ACKNOWLEDGE TO YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, THE PROFOUND DEBT OF GRATITUDE THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE OWE TO YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES WHO HAVE ASSISTED SO TIRELESSLY AND SKILFULLY. NO THREAT TO THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, NO DISPUTE BETWEEN NATIONS IN RECENT YEARS, HAS BEEN SO COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE AS THE HOSTAGE CRISIS. CERTAINLY, WE WOULD NOT HAVE COMPLETED THIS AGREEMENT TODAY HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR THE ASSISTANCE OF YOUR GOVERNMENT-- THIS FACT WILL ALWAYS BE REMEMBERED BY THE UNITED STATES. WE THANK YOU MOST PROFOUNDLY FOR THE IMPORTANT SUPPORT YOU HAVE GIVEN US IN OUR EFFORTS.
4. I KNOW THAT YOU AND THE ALGERIAN PEOPLE WILL REJOICE WITH ME, THE FAMILIES OF THE HOSTAGES AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ON THIS DAY THAT WE HAVE SO LONG AWAITED. WE SINCERELY HOPE THAT THIS AGREEMENT WILL ALSO HELP PAVE THE WAY TOWARD A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF IRAN'S DIFFICULTIES WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. WE HAVE IN MIND PARTICULARLY AN END TO THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ. OUR POLICIES TOWARD THESE TWO COUNTRIES WILL BE DETERMINED WITH THIS OBJECTIVE IN MIND. YY

~~SECRET~~

Iran, Jan 1981

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 20 LISTED ON THE WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

50: File: Iran/1981

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
January 24, 1981

MEMO FOR RICHARD ALLEN

FROM: GARY SICK *js*

SUBJECT: Return of Americans

Yesterday I sent you some proposed language for a welcoming speech which raised the possibility of some international undertaking to put some teeth in the Vienna Convention on diplomatic immunity.

If there is any interest in following that line, it occurs to me that a further step which could build a case for sanctions would be a UN Commission to investigate the treatment of the hostages by the Government of Iran during their captivity. Such an inquiry would provide an interesting counterpart to the UN Commission of Inquiry which was undertaken at one point to investigate Iran's grievances against the United States. It could also provide a body of evidence which could lead to a formal UN resolution condemning Iran for its actions and, potentially, laying the basis for possible future action by the UN to institute formal sanctions against any nation which participates in abuse of diplomatic personnel.

I am not in a position to judge how such a commission could be structured in the UN context, but if there is interest in the idea, it could (and should) be pursued further with Ambassador Kirkpatrick in New York.

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INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 4836

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ GENEVA 00661

E.O. 12065: GDS 1/23/87 (HELMAN, GERALD B.) OR-M
TAGS: SHUM, UNHRC, IR
SUBJECT: IRAN HOSTAGE MISTREATMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS

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1402
1/27*

1. (~~ENTIRE~~ TEXT).

2. SUMMARY. THE FORTHCOMING SESSION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION OFFERS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR AN INITIATIVE CONDEMNING THE MISTREATMENT OF THE US HOSTAGES IN IRAN. I RECOMMEND THAT I BE AUTHORIZED TO TAKE QUICK, QUIET SOUNDINGS TO SEE WHETHER SUCH AN INITIATIVE WOULD FLY. END SUMMARY.

3. THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION BEGINS ITS SIX WEEK SESSION ON FEBRUARY 2. BECAUSE OF ITS RESPONSIBILITIES AND BROAD JURISDICTION, IT OFFERS A QUICKLY ACCESSIBLE PUBLIC FORUM IN WHICH TO REPORT ON AND SEEK CONDEMNATION OF THE MISTREATMENT SUFFERED BY US HOSTAGES IN IRAN.

4. THERE ARE RISKS TO SUCH AN EFFORT, CHIEF OF WHICH ARE:

-- WE COULD NOT IN THE END CONTROL A RESOLUTION, AND MIGHT END UP WITH ONE WHICH, IN THE INTEREST OF ACHIEVING "BALANCE," ENDS UP FUDGING THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MISTREATMENT, AND MUTING THE EXPRESSIONS OF CONDEMNATION.

-- THE RESOLUTION MIGHT NOT ACHIEVE THE OVERWHELMING SUPPORT WHICH WOULD BE NECESSARY TO GIVE IT THE KIND OF MORAL AUTHORITY WHICH WE WOULD WANT.

5. BUT THERE ARE ALSO ADVANTAGES. IF PROPERLY MANAGED,

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F79-106459

EOB:CSCE,NUCUN,NEA,SICK

BY Smf NARA, DATE 11/8/01

PSN:030390

PAGE 01

TOR:023/11:19Z

DTG:231025Z JAN 81

THE INITIATIVE WOULD SERVE AS AN EXPRESSION OF INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY ON BEHALF OF THE HOSTAGES AND IN CONDEMNATION OF THEIR MISTREATMENT. IT WOULD FURTHER GIVE LIE TO THE PRETENSIONS OF THE IRANIANS THAT THEY ENJOYED INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT AND THAT SOMEHOW THEIR ACTIONS HAD LEGITIMACY. THERE IS A NEGATIVE ADVANTAGE AS WELL. IF WE DO NOT MOVE IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, THEN QUESTIONS WILL BE ASKED PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY OF US TO EXPLAIN WHY WE HAVE NOT TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF THAT FORUM. DID WE LACK CONFIDENCE IN THE EVIDENCE?

6. AT THIS STAGE, I RECOMMEND WE CONTEMPLATE THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS:

-- WE SHOULD BE PREPARED IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION AT THE LEAST TO OFFER A DESCRIPTION OF THE MISTREATMENT OF OUR HOSTAGES. IF A MINI WHITE PAPER COULD BE PREPARED, WE COULD PUT IT TO VERY GOOD USE HERE.

-- AS FOR A RESOLUTION, WE SHOULD INITIALLY THINK IN TERMS OF ONE WHICH IS DEVELOPED AND LED BY A COMBINATION OF WESTERN GOVERNMENTS AND NON-ALIGNED. THIS WOULD PUT A RESOLUTION SOMEWHAT OUT OF OUR CONTROL BUT WOULD BE WORTH THE RISK IF WE FIND THE PROPER CO-SPONSORS. SUCH A RESOLUTION COULD CONTAIN SEVERAL ELEMENTS: CONDEMNATION OF HOSTAGE-TAKING; CONDEMNATION OF THEIR MISTREATMENT; AND AN EXPRESSION OF SATISFACTION AT THEIR RELEASE.

-- ALTERNATIVELY, WE COULD UNDERTAKE THE INITIATIVE OURSELVES, CHALLENGING OTHERS TO OPPOSE WHAT WOULD BE A CLEAR AND FORCEFUL STATEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND NORMS REGARDING HUMAN RIGHTS.

7. AT MINIMUM, I RECOMMEND THAT I BE AUTHORIZED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO BEGIN QUIET SOUNDINGS WITH SEVERAL OF OUR ALLIES AND SEVERAL KEY NON-ALIGNED. I WOULD ASK FOR THEIR VIEW ON AN INITIATIVE AND ASK AS WELL WHETHER THEY BELIEVE THEIR GOVERNMENTS WOULD BE WILLING TO JOIN THE EFFORT. IF I GET AN ENCOURAGING REACTION, THEN THE DEPARTMENT WILL BE IN A POSITION TO DECIDE WHETHER TO PRESS AHEAD. IN THAT EVENT, I WILL NEED A GOOD BIT OF BACK-UP MATERIAL, DOCUMENTING THE HOSTAGE MISTREATMENT, AND PREPAREDNESS ON THE PART OF THE DEPARTMENT TO WEIGH IN WITH VARIOUS CAPITALS REINFORCING MY PRESENTATION HERE. I WOULD LIKE TO BEGIN THE SOUNDINGS OVER THE WEEKEND, OR AT LATEST ON MONDAY.

HELMAN
BT

→ SICK
Iran

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 74
January 27, 1981

MEMO FOR RICHARD ALLEN

FROM: GARY SICK *GS*

SUBJECT: Commerce and Iran

An official in Commerce called me today for guidance in responding to an NBC request for a 60-second on-camera interview about U.S. commercial interests in Iran and the prospect of future U.S.-Iranian trade.

I told him I had no official guidance to offer, but that the policy decisions about future U.S. relations were still under consideration. Consequently, I thought it would be difficult to provide any useful answers to NBC questions, and it could possibly be embarrassing for him and for the Administration.

He agreed and said he would turn down the request.

*Thanks, The Right Counsel.
Sorry for the delay in
responding.*

GS
5 Feb 81

January 27, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD ALLEN
FROM: GARY SICK *JS*
SUBJECT: Hostage Suits

The letter at Tab B raises both policy and legal questions concerning prosecution of individual suits by former hostages against Iran or against the U.S. Government.

Policy. Arguments can be made that the U.S. should: (1) abrogate the agreement; (2) attempt to reject certain aspects of the agreement, e.g. voiding of individual claims in U.S. courts; or (3) accept the agreement as written. I have outlined very briefly the pros and cons of these choices and their policy implications at Tab A. Bob Kimmitt and I would welcome the opportunity to discuss this issue with you.

Legal. Depending on the policy decision, a series of legal consequences will result. The actual implementation of the policy, with all its legal implications, will be the responsibility of the Department of Justice in coordination with the Legal Advisor of the Department of State and Counsel to the Department of Treasury. Since the implementation of the agreement will itself have policy ramifications, the NSC should at least maintain a watching brief as the issue inevitably moves into the courts.

In my view it would not be appropriate for you or Admiral Garrick to respond to this letter in a substantive manner. The points which Mr. Coale raises are matters of legal interpretation which properly should be the responsibility of the Attorney General, pursuant to a general policy determination.

Recommendation: That you recommend to Admiral Garrick that the letter at Tab B be forwarded to the Attorney General for reply.

_____ Approve

_____ Disapprove

Robert Kimmitt concurs

ABBREVIATED ANALYSIS OF ALGIERS AGREEMENT

1. Abrogate Agreement

Pros

-- Clearly rejects concept of negotiating with terrorists or accepting the results of any agreement negotiated under the threat or use of force.

-- Makes explicit U.S. interpretation of the hostage incident as government terrorism and demonstrates to Iran that it cannot expect to do business with the U.S. using terrorist tactics.

-- Removes U.S. responsibility to implement the terms of the agreement, viz. voiding of individual claims against Iran; return of remaining \$4 billion of frozen assets; U.S. assistance in tracing assets of the Shah; transfer of private claims to a claims settlement procedure; withdrawal of U.S. suit in the International Court of Justice; etc.

Cons

-- Will require U.S. claimants to pursue their cases in U.S. courts (instead of a claims settlement procedure), where they will be subject to the Act of State doctrine and Sovereign Immunity. Their prospects of actually collecting on their claims will probably be significantly reduced.

-- The banks would probably lose the existing \$1.4 billion escrow account for security on disputed loans, thereby greatly reducing their prospects of obtaining payment from Iran. In addition, the U.S. Government may be liable to suits by the banks for reneging on this aspect of the agreement, thereby depriving them of fair compensation.

-- There will be considerable pressure for seizure (vesting) of the remaining Iranian assets to insure payment of claims. If assets are not vested, legal access to the money may be lost. If assets are vested, it will establish a precedent which is certain to be troublesome to other nations who invest large sums of money here. (Note that the British did not seize German assets during W.W.II for this reason.)

-- The Algerians will be severely embarrassed, since they acted, in effect, as guarantors of the reliability of U.S. word.

-- The issue of Iranian assets will remain a serious bone of contention between the U.S. and Iran for the foreseeable future and complicate any future efforts to restore more normal relations with the present government or its successor.

-- Doubts will be raised about the future willingness of a new U.S. administration to accept the obligations of a previous administration, and a precedent will have been established about U.S. good faith performance on obligations of a controversial nature.

2. Abrogate Certain Elements of the Agreement

This is a highly complex legal issue which would require analysis in depth by counsel. One approach would be to submit the agreement to the World Court for an opinion concerning its validity. If it was found to be invalid, then the Administration could choose to enforce unilaterally only those portions which are deemed to be in the U.S. national interest. Alternatively, the U.S. could simply announce that we do not intend to honor certain elements of the agreement (e.g. prohibiting claims by hostages against Iran) which are of questionable legal validity and appear to go beyond the mere restoration of the status quo ante. However, it is very doubtful that the Iranians would accept either the verdict of the ICJ or agree to perform only those parts of the agreement which we select. Rather, they would probably abrogate the entire agreement, and we would sustain the same tangible disadvantages as in 1. above.

3. Accept the Agreement.

Pros

-- Retains the benefits for U.S. claimants of a claims settlement procedure, with full security of \$2.4 billion of Iranian assets in escrow and binding arbitration of all contact and financial disputes.

-- Maintains the principle of obligations carrying over from one administration to another.

-- Provides a mechanism for settling promptly the many outstanding disputes between Iran and the U.S., thereby potentially removing obstacles to a reestablishment of more normal relations with Iran at some point in the future.

Cons

-- Would be subject to criticism that the U.S. had negotiated with terrorists and accepted an agreement under duress.

-- Would require the U.S. to implement the terms of the agreement in full, including the voiding of individual claims and their transfer to a claims settlement procedure; providing information to Iran about the location of the Shah's assets in the U.S. (if any); opposing claims by former hostages against Iran; withdrawal of U.S. suit in the International Court of Justice; and pursuing numerous anticipated legal challenges in the courts, in circumstances which may be distasteful since they can give the appearance of taking Iran's side in a legal dispute.


JAN 24 1981

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

33

January 22, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD ALLEN

FROM: ROBERT M. GARRICK
Rear Admiral USNR (Ret.) 

I would appreciate your reviewing the attached material from John P. Coale, and then discussing the same with me.

Attachment

LAW OFFICES

JOHN P. COALE
ARTHUR LOWY

227 Massachusetts Ave., N. E., Suite 310, Washington, D. C. 20002
(202) 544-7177


January 22, 1981

Admiral Robert M. Garrick
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Admiral Garrick:

I hope this letter to the President will be helpful in the present situation. I greatly appreciate you giving me the opportunity to express this point of view. This letter is somewhat of a thumb sketch of what I believe will be the hostages' viewpoint concerning this matter. If a further expression of this viewpoint is desired, of course I will be more than happy to do so.

Sincerely yours,



JOHN P. COALE

JPC/laf

JOHN P. COALE
ARTHUR LOWY

227 Massachusetts Ave., N. E., Suite 310, Washington, D. C. 20002
(202) 544-7177

January 22, 1981

President Ronald W. Reagan
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

On December 6, 1979, I filed a suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (28 USCS 1602) against the State of Iran. By the end of March 1980, this suit included five black captives released around Thanksgiving of 1979 and three Americans who spent eleven weeks in hiding and then escaped with the help of Canada. Also included are the members of these captives' families, who of course also suffered as a result of Iran's criminal acts. A copy of the Complaint is enclosed.

My associates and I are really the only people who have represented hostages held in Iran with the perspective of making them whole for the personal damages inflicted on them by their captors. Over the year, I have seen what this experience has done to these eight and their families, and can imagine the horrendous harm done to the fifty-two now returned. The horror stories and the constant fear of death are only now coming to the surface.

It is my feeling that the Carter administration has grossly underestimated the resolve that all of the former hostages have and will have to make claims against Iran. Originally, the main purpose of my clients' suit was to make a statement against Iran.

On January 9, 1981, Jimmy Carter signed an Executive Order entitled "Non-Prosecution of Claims of Hostages and for Actions at the United States Embassy and Elsewhere". Within this Order Mr. Carter purports to have the authority to order that these American citizens may not use their Courts to redress their grievances against Iran. Of course, it is my feeling that there are serious Constitutional problems with this action. At the least, it can be argued that the United States should compensate the hostages at fair market value for their claims. Enclosed you will find a Secret cable dated August 2, 1979 and one dated July 1979 that evidences the fact that the United States had good cause to know that the admission of the Shah would have the result that it did. To my knowledge, there is also a State Department document dated April of 1979 that goes into much greater detail concerning the danger of hostages being taken in Iran.

My clients gave me these documents and are adamant about suing the United States if they can't be compensated by Iran. I must say that Mark Lijek, a foreign service officer who is more representative of the fifty-two returnees than most of my other clients, feels the strongest about suing the United States. It is my intention to avoid such a class action suit at all costs since it no doubt would become an ugly media event.

Therefore, Mr. President, I propose as a class action claim for all sixty-five hostages that you revoke former President Carter's Executive Orders pertaining to the remaining Iranian assets and refreeze at least ninety-one million dollars under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 USC, Section 1702) and award 1.5 million dollars to each hostage just released and one million dollars to each hostage released earlier under your power to conduct foreign policy since this would set an example to terrorists throughout the world that they will have to pay the innocent victims of their criminal acts. I would also cite the World Court opinion of May 24, 1980 where the Court declared "that the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran must immediately take all steps to redress the situation resulting from events of 4 November 1979" and "that the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is under an obligation to make reparations to the government of the United States of America for injuries caused to the latter by events of 4 November 1979 and what follows from these events".

I must point out that the amounts suggested are small relative to the compensatory and punitive damages that would be awarded by our courts if these cases ever went to trial. From a political standpoint, this type of compensation would benefit the American people. All Americans have vicariously suffered with the hostages and share the hostages' resentment and need for revenge against Iran. I believe that Americans would be extremely happy to see their fellow citizens who have suffered so much be justly compensated. The compensation offered by the Carter administration, i. e., medical care, tax benefits, etc., is uniformly taken as an insult by my clients, and I am sure will be by the freed captives now in Germany.

If this issue of compensation is not addressed now and there is a long Court battle with the United States brought in as a Co-Defendant with Iran, the hostages' suffering will just be extended. As I have indicated before, I think it was very naive of the Carter administration to believe that at least a large percentage of the hostages will not file suit against both Iran and the United States.

President Ronald W. Reagan


January 22, 1981

Since the barbaric treatment the hostages received has come to the surface, there is a growing feeling in this country that the so-called deal made with Iran should be cancelled. Many argue that to cancel the entire agreement would harm the United States' credibility especially in the third world since Algeria played a large part in this agreement. There may be weight to the argument that a slight change in the agreement whereby the hostages are compensated from the Iranian assets as I have proposed above would difuse the growing popular demand that the entire agreement be voided and still not harm our credibility around the world.

The Iranian issue is going to be fought over for a long time to come, and I feel the humane thing to do is to keep the hostages and their families out of the frey.

I would like a further opportunity to express this point of view if necessary.

Most Sincerely,



JOHN P. COALE

JPC/laf
Enclosure



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 2, 1979

SECRET - EYES ONLY

*Show to
Tamm*

The Honorable
L. Bruce Laingen
Charge d'Affaires, a.i.
American Embassy
Tehran

Dear Bruce:

I was finally able to see your cable dealing with the same subject as the enclosed piece. I liked your thoughts very much and believe -- with a few details of difference -- we are in accord. My paper was prepared at Newsom's request with strict instructions not to cut anyone else in except those shown as clearing and Peter. So please protect me absolutely.

Sincerely,

[Signature]
Henry Precht
Director
Office of Iranian Affairs

Enclosure.

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-106 #60

BY smf, NARA, DATE 11/8/01

SECRET - EYES ONLY

Planning for the Shah to Come to the United States

This paper outlines some concepts we should address in considering the Shah's desire to come to the United States. We believe there are three broad questions:

- What new circumstances could justify a change in the USG position?
- What conditions should we seek from the Shah or state prior to his arrival here?
- What arrangements should we make for Embassy personnel to provide protection?

1. New Circumstances

The PGOI has laid out a plan for the adoption of a new constitution and election of a new government. If the plan is followed -- and that seems unlikely -- elections for an assembly of experts will be held on August 3. The assembly will conclude its work in one month; the draft constitution, which the experts will have reviewed, will be submitted to a popular referendum probably in September; and elections for a president and Majlis could take place as early as October. Because the Iranian government has placed a high priority on establishing a stronger and legitimate single authority for the country, we believe the PGOI and Khomeini will make every effort to meet this schedule. Even with the inevitable delays, there is a good chance that the process will be completed by the end of 1979.

Once it is completed, we should inform the new government that we wish to clear our decks of old issues on the agenda. One of those old issues will be the status of the Shah. We could inform the government that we have resisted intense pressures to allow him to come to the U.S. because we did not wish to complicate the PGOI's problems or our efforts to construct a new relationship. Now with the new government firmly established and accepted, it seems appropriate to admit the Shah to the U.S. The new government may not like it, but it is best to get the issue out of the way. This discussion with the new GOI should take place after it is in place some 2-3 weeks and some few days before the Shah would come here. In the meantime,

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~~we should begin to prepare the Iranians by telling them of the intense pressures for the Shah to come here -- pressures which we are resisting despite our traditional open-door policy.~~

If the constitutional process does not proceed and Iranian instability seriously increases, and if there is no prospect for Iran to settle down, there may be an argument for going ahead and admitting the Shah anyway to get that inevitable step behind us, but it will be necessary first to review how dangerous the situation is.

In either of these scenarios we should aim for a positive change in our position on the Shah by January 1980. If this plan is adopted it probably would not be advisable to disseminate it beyond a close circle in the Executive Branch; perhaps a few individuals outside might be informed so as to reduce pressures for a change. We would also have to discuss the issue with Members of Congress to indicate that we were addressing the issue and hope to resolve it successfully. This would reduce pressures which could lead, for example, to a Congressional resolution calling on the Administration to admit the Shah. However, this would increase the likelihood of leaks and our having to deal with the PGOI before we are ready.

2. Conditions

It would help substantially in explaining our position to the Iranians if the Shah were to renounce his family's claim to the throne. We believe the likelihood of his doing so is extremely remote, but the idea could be explored privately by trusted intermediaries so that if the Shah refused he would have no possibility of blaming the USG for a course he rejected.

Should the Shah refuse to renounce his claim, we should leave no doubt in the Iranian mind as to our attitude. We should make it quite clear publicly that we consider any claim to the throne by his family rendered invalid by the Iranian constitutional process, and we should make it clear privately to the Shah and his friends that we would not tolerate any counter-revolutionary acts here which might violate U.S. law, or our customary policies regarding political activities of persons admitted for temporary visits.

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(8)

3. Security

We have the impression that the threat to U.S. Embassy personnel is less now than it was in the spring; presumably the threat will diminish somewhat further by the end of this year. Nevertheless, the danger of hostages being taken in Iran will persist.

We should make no move towards admitting the Shah until we have obtained and tested a new and substantially more effective guard force for the Embassy. Secondly, when the decision is made to admit the Shah, we should quietly assign additional American security guards to the Embassy to provide protection for key personnel until the danger period is considered over.

* * * * *

Before proceeding further we should have more detailed work on the legal, security and Congressional relations issues.

3: 5:00

Drafted: NEA/IRN:HPrecht:amp
8/1/79 - ext:20313

Clearances: NEA - Mr. Saunders
L/NEA - Mr. Small

We should have a meeting with the NEA staff to discuss the proposed program. The NEA staff should be consulted on all matters relating to the program. The NEA staff should be consulted on all matters relating to the program. The NEA staff should be consulted on all matters relating to the program.

Review of the program should be completed by the end of the month. The NEA staff should be consulted on all matters relating to the program. The NEA staff should be consulted on all matters relating to the program. The NEA staff should be consulted on all matters relating to the program.

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BY smf NARA, DATE 11/8/01

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NO. 11652: RDS-3, 7/26/79 (TAR OFF, PETER)
FROM THE SECRETARY
TAGS: PIR

SUBJECT: SHAH'S DESIRE TO RESIDE IN THE U.S.

1. WE ARE AGAIN CONSIDERING HOW TO RESPOND TO THE SHAH'S CONTINUING QUERY TO US THROUGH VARIOUS CHANNELS REGARDING ESTABLISHING RESIDENCE FOR HIMSELF, THE SHAHBAU, AND HIS FAMILY IN THE U.S. (HE CAN REMAIN IN MEXICO AT LEAST THROUGH OCTOBER.) I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE YOUR PERSONAL AND PRIVATE EVALUATION OF THE EFFECT OF SUCH A MOVE ON THE SAFETY OF AMERICANS IN IRAN (ESPECIALLY THE OFFICIAL AMERICANS IN THE COMPOUND) AS WELL AS ON OUR RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN.

2. WOULD YOUR ANSWER TO THE QUESTION POSED IN PARA 1 BE DIFFERENT IF (A) THE SHAH RENOUNCED HIS CLAIM AND THAT OF HIS HEIRS TO THE THRONE, OR (B) THAT HE AGREED TO FORESWEAR POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF ANY SORT AND THAT THIS BE CONFIRMED PUBLICLY.

3. WE CLEARLY UNDERSTAND THAT THE KEY TO MINIMIZING THE IMPACT OF THE SHAH'S ADMISSION WOULD BE IN PATIENCE AND THE GOVERNMENT'S WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY IN SUCH A SITUATION TO CONTROL AND COMMAND THE SECURITY FORCES GUARDING OUR PEOPLE AND TO MINIMIZE ANY HOSTILE PUBLIC REACTION AGAINST OUR PEOPLE OR OUR RELATIONS.

SINCE THIS QUESTION IS BEING VERY CLOSELY HELD IN WASHINGTON, I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR NOT SHARING THIS MESSAGE WITH ANYONE ELSE ON YOUR STAFF. PLEASE SEND YOUR REPLY MODIS/CHEROKEE, FOR THE SECRETARY. WITH BEST REGARDS.

YALCE

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Iran, Jan 1981

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