

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library  
Digital Library Collections

---

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

---

**Collection:** Kemp, Geoffery T.H.: Files  
**Folder Title:** Golan Heights 1982  
**Box:** RAC Box 2

---

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Inventories, visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories>

Contact a reference archivist at: **reagan.library@nara.gov**

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-support/citation-guide>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

*Last Updated: 10/16/2023*

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** KEMP, GEOFFREY: Files  
**OA/Box:** Box 90492  
**File Folder:** Golan Heights 1982

**Archivist:** smf/smf  
**FOIA ID:** Systematic (no AR)  
**Date:** 11/27/00

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. paper	re Syria-Israel 52p <b>D 6/29/10 M098/15 # 56967</b>	1/82	P1/B1
2. minutes	re NSC Meeting 3p <b>R 6/29/10 M098/15 # 56968</b>	n.d.	<del>P1/B1</del>

### RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].  
 P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].  
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].  
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].  
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].  
 B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].  
 B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].  
 B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].  
 B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].  
 B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].  
 B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].  
 B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

17 DEC 87

Golan Heights/Other Mideast

GK: April - not seen by RT file  
This is what went for - changes can be made at lunch if necessary  
to the O before press conf. as made at lunch if necessary  
must

Your reaction to Israeli's annexation of the Golan Heights?

(The following is a carefully worded statement agreed to by your advisers and should be used virtually verbatim.)

- The U.S. is committed to a process of negotiations in order to achieve a comprehensive peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The Government of Israel's extension of its laws to the Golan Heights is a unilateral change in the status quo and therefore creates problems for implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, on which the Camp David Accords are based.
- The U.S. strongly deplores the Israeli ~~Knesset majority's~~ <sup>Government's</sup> unilateral action. [per Nick Velote]

What are we doing about it?

- Consulting with friends and allies and working in the UN on appropriate steps to ameliorate this matter. (Will not announce UN position until time comes to vote and resolution(s) have been studied carefully.)
- Have directed Secy. Haig to take certain actions vis-a-vis Israel that I will not discuss now. (FYI for RR only: Suspension of activities -- including planning for air and naval exercises -- anticipated under recently signed Memorandum of Understanding for strategic cooperation.)
- Understand that Israel, as any state, will take actions it thinks are in its interests, but they should try to take into account the interests of others, especially their friends.
- U.S. commitment to comprehensive peace remains -- as our Arab friends recognize.
- U.S. efforts in Lebanon continue with Phil Habib reporting last week that all parties involved desire to maintain the cessation of hostilities.

Status of Autonomy Talks

- Continuing in spite of Golan development.
- Solid, constructive attitudes by both Egypt and Israel in meetings in which we are participating as full partner in Camp David process.
- Expect Israeli withdrawal from Sinai to proceed on schedule (April) with broad participation of other countries in Multilateral Force and Observers. (MFO)
- Will consider change in level of our representation if situation warrants and it would contribute to advancing the

AWACS to Saudis - What have we gotten out of it?

- Purpose of transaction was to enhance their security -- and in so doing improve the stability and security of the entire region, a development essential to advancing the peace process.
- Saudis continue to be helpful in Lebanon reconciliation process, but that is beside the point of the AWACS sale.
- Looking forward to January meeting with Prince Fahd and to visiting with Sheik Yamani tomorrow. (Latter has not yet been made public.)



December 17, 1981

FYI ONLY

NOT for public comment:

The actions that State is taking vis-a-vis Israel include suspension of the activities anticipated under the Memorandum of Understanding for strategic cooperation against the Soviets recently signed between Israel and the U.S.

Suspended activities include delay in planning for:

- a. Military cooperation between the Parties, including joint U.S.-Israeli exercises in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea.
- b. Cooperation for the establishment of joint readiness activities including access to maintenance facilities and other infrastructure, consistent with the basic purposes of this agreement.
- c. Cooperation in research and development, building on past cooperation in this area.
- d. Cooperation in defense trade.

**CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL**

**SUITE 450 PARK SQUARE BLDG.**

**31 ST. JAMES AVENUE**

**BOSTON, MASS. 02116**


**Address Correction Requested**

# ISRAEL DEFENCE FORCES SPOKESMAN

15 December 1981



## The Golan Heights



THE GOLAN HEIGHTS - ADDENDA

The decision of the Israeli Government (14.12.81) to extend Israel's "law, jurisdiction and administration" to the Golan Heights nullifies the Israel Military Administration. Israel acted as a sovereign nation to bring civilian law to an area which had been under military regulations for the past 14 years.

The Israeli Government has therefore assumed direct administration of the health, welfare, agriculture, employment and education of the residents of the Golan Heights -- thus relieving the IDF of all other functions except the defense of the area against hostile activity.

*THE GOLAN HEIGHTS*

*Errata*

Page 4, 2nd line of 4th paragraph: "from the occupied territories"  
should read "from occupied territories"

page 8, 1st line of 2nd paragraph: "31.12.81"  
should read "13.12.81"

page 23, 2nd line of point 5: "ORBAT"  
should read "ORBAT (Order of Battle)"

Page 25, 1st line of point 10: "air-to-ground"  
should read "ground-to-air"

Page 25, 8th line of point 12: "at least 150"  
should read "at least 350"




## TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. TOPOGRAPHY
2. THE GOLAN HEIGHTS -- MILITARY IMPORTANCE
3. SYRIA'S CONTINUING WAR AGAINST ISRAEL
4. SYRIAN EXTREMISM IN WORDS
5. SYRIA'S POSITION ON THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS
6. THE SIX DAY WAR
7. THE YOM KIPPUR WAR
8. ISRAEL - SYRIA AGREEMENT
9. DETAILS ON SEPARATION OF FORCES ZONES
10. UNDOF IN THE GOLAN HEIGHTS
11. SYRIA -- GENERAL STATISTICS
12. SYRIAN ARMAMENT SINCE THE YOM KIPPUR WAR 1
13. THE SYRIAN ARMY -- 1980
14. SECURITY INCIDENTS
15. MILITARY COOPERATION BETWEEN SYRIA AND JORDAN
16. THE GOLAN HEIGHTS -- MILITARY ADMINISTRATION

## Topography

The Golan Heights is a plateau 67 km. long and 25 km. wide, bordered by the Upper Jordan Rift Valley and Lake Kinneret on the west. Topographically, the area is characterised by volcanic terrain of basalt stone, and deep wadis bordered by steep inclines. The Golan rises gently from south to north, with the upper regions reaching altitudes between 600 and 900 metres above sea level.

Shown in the illustrated map are the differences in elevation on the Golan Heights area. Note that the Golan rises to form the Hermon range and possession of the mountain's peaks affords a virtually unlimited view from the Mediterranean in the west, to Damascus in the east and Israel's Hula Valley, down to Lake Kinneret in the south.



THE GOLAN HEIGHTS - MILITARY IMPORTANCE

Militarily, the Golan Heights are important both strategically and tactically. Command of the high ground -- the Hermon peak and the row of extinct volcanoes extending in a north-south line -- is a vital component of Israel's early warning system. From this high ground, watchful eyes can maintain an awareness of any dramatic and threatening change in Lebanon to the north and Syria to the east.

As the settlements of Galilee knew full well during the years between 1945 and 1967, a hostile presence on the heights can make life intolerable in the valleys below. In times of war, such a hostile presence, supported by the modern weapons of war, would present a virtually insurmountable obstacle to tactical maneuver. During the 1973 war, for example, had the mass of Syrian armour and their arsenal of weapons stood initially on the western edge of the heights, not even the most heroic stand of front-line units would have been able to prevent heavy damage to the Israeli heartland, and very possibly serious incursions.

From an article published in Maarachot, May-June 1981, by Colonel Eli

The modern technological and electronic weapons permit strikes against distant targets. But the prime obstacle remains the line of sight to target; terrain, therefore, has no substitute when it comes to observation and fire control.

The experience of the Yom Kippur War teaches that a force in position on the Hermonit could (despite its inferiority of numbers) prevent a Syrian breakthrough and turn the wedge into a field of destruction. Without detracting from the heroism of the troops, the topographical facts and superiority of terrain permitted expression of the qualitative advantage of the Israeli soldier.




Location of IDF forces on the volcanic peaks gives them a double-edged weapon: First, observation control for the maintenance of early warning; secondly, a firm foothold and a base for fire control against an enemy attempting surprise. Not only is this advantage in IDF hands, but the very fact of IDF presence makes it difficult for the Syrians to obtain intelligence and to control their fire against targets to the west.

Israeli water sources are concentrated at the northern edge of the Golan Heights. The security of these sources would not be possible without a physical presence, and such a presence would not be possible in conditions of territorial inferiority. Thus, the securing of the water sources is dependent on the Mount Hermon "shoulder".

Any change in the (1973-74) ceasefire agreement and line would manifestly be an explosive charge waiting for detonation. The Syrian positions on Golan up till 1967 underline the importance of the Heights in their eyes -- this, with everything laid out on the palms of their hands.

The Syrian army is more modern, advanced, and experiences than ever before -- and is poised to attack; the IDF must, therefore zealously preserve the advantages gained from the existing lines.





## SYRIA'S CONTINUING WAR AGAINST ISRAEL

Syria is one of the most extreme Arab states, and is justifiably considered the most militant of the "confrontation" states. Syria continues to oppose Israel's physical existence and calls for a Pan-Arab war against the Jewish state. At the Fez Conference Syria opposed the Fahc plan. Pres. Assad declared in an interview to Kuwaiti newsmen Syria will never recognize Israel -- even if for argument sake Arafat should do so. For that reason she (Syria) negates Article 7 of the Saudi plan which recognizes the right of states in the region to live at peace, (as reported by Al Rai Al Am, 13 December, 1981).

Since 1976, Syrian occupation troops outrightly control over 45% of Lebanon, and additional 15% by proxy. Syria has rendered Lebanese President Sarkis a puppet (to the extent that Syrian occupation forces fired on the presidential palace on several occasions). In October 1980 the Syrians signed a "Friendship Treaty" with the USSR, and the according to 1981 US Government statistics there are presently 4000 Soviet advisors on Syrian soil (as well as a number of East Germans and a small number of Cubans).

Though there have been vicissitudes in Syria's relations with the PLO the Syrians have been one of that murder organization's prime patrons.

Syria refused to recognize UN Security Council Resolution 242, of November 1967, which called for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories within the frame of a just and lasting peace and Syria even refused to cooperate with UN Special Ambassador Gunnar Jarring. Her military failure in the Yom Kippur War, and the IDF's presence some 25 miles from Damascus at the end of the war, eventually compelled the Syrians to accept UN Resolutions 338 and 339 and to sign the Separation of Forces Agreement with Israel, on May 31, 1974. However Syria has not abandoned the military option against Israel. She has gone to war against Israel three times: in 1948; in 1967; and, in 1973 -- and has always got the worst of it.

At the 12th Pan-Arab Conference of the Ba'ath Party, July 1975 Syria agreed to continue the campaign against Israel in stages, in which the struggle will be waged via political, economic and military means, in order to gradually weaken Israel.

In accordance with this viewpoint, Syria is prepared for political bargaining on the diplomatic plane, but will not compromise on its maximalist territorial demands (complete Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 line) and the Palestinian issue (the establishment of a Palestinian state). Moreover, these Syrian demands are not coupled with the desire for good-faith negotiations with Israel, nor with the aim of achieving permanent peace and normalization with the State of Israel.

The Syrian Army saw itself as the only Arab army undefeated in the War of Independence because, at the end of the war, it was on "Palestinian" territory, even if its deep westward drive was blocked in the early stages at Zemach and Mishmar Hayarden. This assessment strengthened the Syrian willingness to confront Israel actively.

The Tel-Motileh incident in 1951 and clashes over the demilitarized zones and the Jordan waters' diversion plan were Syria's main opportunities for confrontation -- and, in these the Syrian Army was whipped time and again and, usually, refrained from prolonged engagement.

From 1960 to 1963, Syria methodically and constantly harassed civilian life in the Israeli settlements below the Golan Heights. Among other activities, the Syrians tried to prevent farmers from working their fields and shelled fishing boats on the Sea of Galilee.

In the early 1960's the National Water Carrier was nearing completion. The Arab states presented this enterprise as an act of aggression, and a 1964 summit conference of heads of state decided to divert the Jordan.

In 1964-65 Syria refused to cooperate in the Johnson Plan for division of regional water resources, and began an independent project to divert the Jordan waters a few kilometers from the Israeli border. This represented acute provocation since it threatened Israel's sole sources of water. Most of the diversionary work was done in Syrian territory and Israel was left no choice but to prevent execution of the plan by military means. Israel was compelled to respond to the provocation accompanied by continuous Syrian shelling with a series of retaliatory actions and counter bombardments. The "battle for the waters" quickly warmed up into a combined operation of tanks, artillery, and aircraft in strikes against the equipment used to divert the headwaters.

From 1965-67 Syria became the patron of the Fatah (activated in 1965), and granted the murder-organization bases, training facilities and military equipment, while periodically dispatching teams on terror missions inside Israel.

On the eve of the Six Day War, the aerial and artillery clashes were widespread. Syria brought the situation to a boiling point and prodded Jordan and Egypt into joining an overall offensive against Israel. The Six Day War resulted in the conquest of the Golan Heights by the IDF.

Between 1967 and 1973 the Golan frontier occasionally flared up; in addition to artillery bombardments, the Syrians sent terrorist teams on strikes against objectives inside Israel. In 1968 the Syrians set up a terror organization of their own -- El-Saika -- which they still finance, train and operate.

In 1973, Syria launched an offensive coordinated with Egypt. Within the opening moves Syrian forces succeeded in breaching the Israeli lines and in deploying over a considerable area of Golan. The war ended with Syrian defeat and a depleted Syrian Army. Since then the strength of the army has been restored and even increased (to over 3000 tanks and some 500 warplanes). Syria is now a vast arsenal with extremist policy trends and close Russian support.

In 1975, Syria entered Lebanon, which was in the throes of a civil war. The Syrians oscillated their support from the Leftists' coalition to the Christians and then to the Leftists (and PLO) again. Today over a division of Syrian troops (under the fict. name of "Arab Deterrent Force") are on Lebanese soil. These control 45% of their divided country outrightly -- over 60% by proxy.

The March 1979 Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt was strongly condemned by Syria in an attempt, together with Iraq, to coordinate the other Arab states in opposition to the treaty. The effectiveness of the Arab resistance was weakened somewhat by the friction between Iraq and Syria and Iraqi-encouraged Moslem brotherhood attempts to topple the Assad regime. The Iraq-Iran war exacerbated the divisions existing between Iraq and Syria and placed the Soviet Union in the delicate position of having to maintain the loyalties of two opposing "clients".



### Recent Tension between Syria and Israel

In the Spring of 1981, tensions flared up between Syria and Israel, as a result of the fighting between Christian Kataeb militias and Syrian troops around the city of Zahle, in the Lebanese Beqaâ. When the Syrians used attack helicopters to gain control of Mount Sanine (which overlooks Christian-controlled Zahle, which the Syrians were shelling, the route to Damascus and the Christian port city of Jounie) they violated a "red-line" thereby disrupting the delicate equilibrium which had governed their relations with Israel since the Syrian invasion of Lebanon. The IDF responded by downing two Syrian helicopters. The Syrians then moved SAM-6 missiles into Lebanese territory in positions which they had readied several weeks prior (and which would have been used for such systems irrespective of the helicopter incident).

Concurrently, Syrian SAM-2's and SAM-6's were moved into a bulge in the Lebanese border likewise south of Zahle (but within Syrian territory).

The deployment of Syrian missiles within Lebanese territory, constituted another Syrian transgression of the "red-line" and jeopardized Israel's aerial reconnaissance ability over Lebanon, and to a certain extent even Israel's freedom of overflight in Northern Israel.

Israel declared she would not tolerate such a situation.

On several occasions, Assad has used the Lebanese theatre as a safety valve to help dissipate domestic tensions and improve his inter-Arab standing, by sending Syrian combat aircraft to engage Israeli planes over Lebanon.

Such moves invariably result in the downing of the Syrian craft and in the increase of tensions between Israel and Syria.

SYRIAN EXTREMISM IN WORDS

The following quotations by Syrian leaders reveal Syria's intransigence and dedication to the destruction of Israel. These quotations demonstrate that the gap between Syria's goal of destroying Israel and Israel's desire to live at peace with her neighbors seems inseparable.

President Assad in an interview to the Kuwaiti Al Rai al Aam, 31. 12. 81: "Syria is opposed to (Art. 7 of the Fahd Plan) since recognition of Israel is unthinkable. Even should the PLO recognize Israel Syria will be unable to do so."

Radio Damascus quoting Syrian Defence Minister M. Tlass 17.11.81: "The Syrian masses and the entire nation declare: no recognition, no peace, no negotiations with Israel."

Radio Damascus quoting Syrian Defence Minister M. Tlass 20.10.81: "Our nation chose the road of conflict with the Zionist enemy and we shall continue on this road whatever be the difficulties or sacrifices."

Radio Damascus, a Friday sermon 22. 5. 81: "Blow o wind of the jihad uproot the children of Zion in the storm and destroy them."

President Assad 11. 4. 81: "Palestine precedes the Golan."

Syrian Foreign Minister Abd el Khalem Khaddam 18. 3. 81: "Syria places all of her weight at the disposal of the conflict against Israel."

President Assad (Radio Damascus 14. 1. 81): "Israel is a foreign growth in the Arab Nation and the entire region."

Syrian Information Minister Ahmad Iskander 18. 1. 81: "Syria ... is in the front line in the fight against Imperialism and Zionism. The quiet which reigns at times on the cease fire line does not mean that the state of war does not exist as past experience has proven."

Syrian Foreign Minister Abd el Khalem Kaddam (Radio Damascus 13. 1. 81): "All Arab resources should be channeled against the Zionist enemy."

Radio Damascus commentator 22. 12. 80: "Syria will speak to Israel in the language of iron and fire."

Althawra (official Syrian newspaper) 10. 5. 80: "Let the Arab Nation strike at and purify its ranks of them (Israeli agents) when national consciousness will reign amongst the Arabs .... then Israel's Tora and existence will come to an end."

---

SYRIA'S POSITION ON THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS

---

1. Syria was the first Arab state to declare that it would fight Sadat and his peace initiative to the finish. Faithful to this resolve, it was among the founders of the "Rejection Front", which arose in order to block Sadat's road to peace and to create a rift between him and the Egyptian people which would lead to his downfall. Syria's aim is to form a political and military coalition, which would seek to restore the former situation while keeping under constant review the possibility of military action.

2. The Syrian challenge to Sadat's peace policy is not merely an admission of discomfort at a rival's unexpected move, but is meant primarily to express total rejection of a peace with Israel based on free negotiations and mutual readiness to compromise. Syria, whose sterile attitude during the years following the Yom Kippur War blocked every international effort to reach an acceptable formula for settlement, claims that negotiations should be preceded by conditions imposed on Israel. It maintains that the final objective of the negotiations is merely the cessation of the state of war, and not peaceful co-existence on a basis of mutually acceptable relations. Egypt's gains from the peace treaty, and the Egyptian-Israeli willingness to work together for a solution of the Palestinian problem, have failed to induce Syria to drop its opposition to the peace process and its insistence on a return to the former state of "no peace, no war."

3. The Syrian trauma about everything connected with peace exerts a negative influence on others in its immediate vicinity who might be involved in an eventual settlement, namely Jordan and the Palestinians in the administered territories. Hussein, who has in any case adhered to the "rejectionist" line, is under constant pressure from his Syrian neighbor not even to think of a possibility of joining the peace process- a pressure reinforced for Hussein by his recollection of the Syrian armed intervention in his kingdom in September 1970. Pressure is also exerted on the Palestinians to maintain an extremist attitude ruling out any relaxation of the hostility to Israel. Syrian fear of a full peace with Israel is so deep-rooted, that even the political diversion tactics employed by Arafat in the West are regarded by Damascus as damaging to its radical position.

THE SIX DAY WAR-1967

In the years prior to the Six Day War and especially in the years 1966-67, the Golan Heights (under Syrian control), towering over Israel's northern border, became one of the most heavily fortified military positions in the Middle East theatre. The Golan summit, overlooking the Israeli valley, was a continuous line of fortified concrete positions stocked with tremendous quantities of arms and ammunition. The approach roads from the Israeli side to the Heights was topographically difficult terrain to transverse and completely open to Syrian observation.


By June 1967, the Syrians had concentrated over 250 tanks, 250 artillery pieces and 10 infantry brigades on the Heights.

In the first days of the 1967 war (when fighting was taking place on the southern and central fronts), the Syrians unceasingly shelled Israeli settlements at the foot of the Heights as well as deep into the Galilee. An attempt was made by a Syrian armored infantry brigade to capture Kibbutz Dan as part of a plan of advance on Safad.

On 6 June 1967 (the first day of the war), the IAF destroyed Syria's primary air power.

On 9 June 1967, the IDF established a bridgehead on the northern crest of the Heights and managed to break out and deploy along the entire Golan Heights. Within two days the entire Golan Heights fell into IDF hands and out forces stopped on the main road to Damascus, after the Syrians requested, via the UN, a ceasefire and Israel responded affirmatively.





-  ..... 9.6.1967
-  ..... 10.6.1967
-  ..... כוחות מונחתים מהאוויר  
 Air Borne Troops
-  ..... ישובים ישראליים שהופגזו  
 Israeli Settlements shelled
-  ..... קרבות שריון עקריים  
 Main Tank Combats
-  ..... הערכות אויב התחלתית  
 Initial Enemy Disposition

---

## THE YOM KIPPUR WAR

---

In the period prior to the Yom Kippur War the USSR supplied Syria with unparalleled quantities of military arms and equipment. The Syrians deployed the Russian arms and equipment in three parallel belts along the entire June 1967 cease fire line and extending to the Damascus suburbs. Similarly, the Syrians also received highly maneuverable AA missiles as well as anti-tank missiles.

This wide ranging Syrian arms build-up which was decided upon in September 1972, included clearly offensive weapons, such as FROG missiles and T-62 tanks. Syria was the first nation, excepting Soviet bloc nations, to acquire such modern weaponry.

The Syrians opened their offensive at 2:00 P.M. on October 6. The offensive included artillery and air bombardment with Syrian units along the entire line trying to break through. When these forces were contained the Syrians threw in the armored units in their infantry divisions. The Syrian attack was contained in the northern sector of the Golan Heights. However, the Syrians concentrated their main efforts on the southern sector and there they managed to advance approximately 15 kilometers to the northwest (towards the center of the Golan Heights)-until their attack was finally blunted.

On 7 October, approximately 24 hours after the Syrians had begun their attack, Israel opened with a limited counterattack in order to block off the Syrian advance and cut Syrian supply lines.

The main Israeli effort was launched on 8 October, when reserve forces entered the battle and participated in the combined attack which pushed back the Syrian forces, after they had been previously contained by small regular forces (which had been positioned on the Heights when war broke out), reserve forces which were then on duty and the IAF's airpower.

With the Israeli advance proceeding well, the Syrian attack broke-with the Syrians abandoning 1,200 tanks (part of which were in good operating condition). IDF forces captured, until the ceasefire, approximately 600 square kilometers of the heights, ranging from the Hermon in the north until half-way on the Kuneitra-Damascus road. As a result, the Damascus suburbs came under Israeli artillery range and important roads could be controlled by the IDF forces. At the conclusion of hostilities, IDF forces were positioned approximately 40 km from Damascus.

### STAGES OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR

#### 6 October 1973

Opening situation- On the eve of the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, Syria's deployment on the front line included 5 tank brigades, 2 mechanized brigades and 7 infantry brigades to the rear. The Sassa-Damascus theatre included an additional 2 armoured divisions, a tank brigade and an infantry brigade. These forces also featured a Moroccan expeditionary force. The Syrians concentrated a total of 1500 tanks and 460 artillery guns in the theatre. Israel's forces in the Golan Heights consisted of: 2 infantry battalions, an area brigade headquarters and 2 tank brigades (one at reduced strength). Thus, Israel deployed a total of 170 tanks.

#### 6-7 October 1973

The Syrian attack began at approximately 1400 hours, with a heavy artillery barrage and air attack on IDF positions and installations on the Golan Heights.

Three Syrian infantry divisions (under the cover of artillery fire) attacked with all the armour at their disposal. Their mission was to destroy Israel's defense lines, vanquish IDF forces on the Golan Heights and reach the Jordan River. The Syrian armoured divisions were to serve as reserve forces.



The Syrians made significant gains in the Rafid sector but were contained in the Quneitra salient. On the morning of 7 October, Syria's number 1 armoured division was dispatched from the Rafid salient to Kafr Naffakh.

Israeli forces succeeded in containing the Syrian attack in the Quneitra district while "Golani" forces were active in blunting the Syrian advance to the north. The IDF's second tank brigade was able to contain the Syrian advance at a heavy price--many IDF tanks and crews were lost.

At the same time, Israel's reserve forces were mobilized and quickly dispatched to the Golan Heights. On 7 October, reserve IDF armoured brigades were already fighting in the area of El-Al, the Ma'aleh Gamba route, the Yehudia route (the initial reserve forces in this brigade fought along the TAP line route as early as midnight, 6-7 October), and the Nafah region. IDF border posts stood up to the Syrian attacks and continued to radio reports and contain the enemy (with the aid of IDF tank units)- even though some of the outposts were surrounded.

The Hermon post was the only outpost to be captured by the Syrians. The Syrians captured the Hermon post via a helicopter-borne commando battalion attack. There were only 13 IDF combat soldiers in the post. An additional 40 soldiers were responsible for maintenance and supply services. During the entire battle to contain the enemy attack, IAF aircraft attacked Syrian forces on the front and rear.

#### 8-10 October 1973

Counterattack in the North- on the morning of 8 October, Northern Command went over to a large scale counterattack. The counterattack continued until the afternoon of 10 October, at which point the Syrians were pushed back

to the "purple line" (post-1967 cease fire line). The following IDF forces participated in the counter offensive:

- A. Moshe (Mussa) Peled's Division, attacked from the south (El Al-Rafid) and southwest (Ma'aleh Gamla-Rafid salient).
- B. Dan Lenner's Division, attacked from the west (Yehudia-Khushniye-Shuaf Sindrian).
- C. Eitan's Division which continued to contain Syrian attempts to break through to the west (in the Quneitra salient), and forced south from Kafr Nafah the Syrian forces which had managed to penetrate in the Golan.
- D. A Golani force unsuccessfully attempted (8 October) to capture the Hermon post, which had fallen at the outbreak of hostilities.

The counter offensive primarily consisted of armoured battles or IDF armour versus enemy anti-tank defenses. IDF armour was aided in its advance by artillery and air support.

11-24 October 1973

#### The Israeli Attack Into Syria

1. Following the Syrian retreat to the "purple line", IDF forces in the north pressed their counter offensive into Syria.
2. On the afternoon of 11 October 1973, Eitan's Division destroyed the enemy deployment in the Jubbata El-Khashab district (north of the Quneitra salient) and Dan Lenner's Division vanquished Syrian forces in the vicinity of Quneitra, on the Quneitra-Damascus axis. Moshe (Mussa) Peled's Division remained in the area south of Quneitra for containment purposes, in the southern portion of the Golan Heights.
3. During 11-12 October, these divisions captured portions of Syrian territory and Syrian positions according to the



following scenario:

A. Eitan's Division gained control of the northern enclaves, from the Hermon mountain slopes and Mazraat Beit Jinn (in the north), until Zomet Maas and the Quneitra-Damascus road, to the south.

B. Dan Lenner's Division captured the southern enclaves, from Tel Mashara, Tel Maal and Tel Marai, in the south until Zomet Maas and the Quneitra-Damascus road to the north.

C. Moshe Peled's Division continued in its containment assignment.

4. During 13-22 October, the three Divisions strengthened their control of the "enclaves" and warded off Syrian attempts, in coordination with Iraqi and Jordanian troops (which had joined Syria on the Golan Heights) to recapture the "enclaves" held by the IDF.

Moshe Peled's Division had meanwhile entered the enclaves and took a significant part in the fighting.

5. IDF forces proceeded, in this period, to capture additional key points:


A. Tel Shams, on the night of 13-14 October

B. Tel Antar and Alakiya, on 15 October.


C. Oumm Batne, on the night of 18-19 October.

6. On the night of 21-22 October, "Golani" forces captured the Israeli Hermon post (which had fallen at the outset of hostilities) and surrounding area, while IDF paratroopers captured, in an airborne operation, the Syrian Hermon positions and the Hermon peak.


Syrian Attack



Israeli Counter-Attack



Cease-Fire October 1973



THE "WAR OF ATTRITION"

(From the end of the Yom Kippur War to the Separation of Forces Agreement)

The cease fire agreement signed on 24.10.73 (concurrent with the Israel-Egypt ceasefire agreement) did not lead to quiet on the northern front. A few days after the signing of the agreement, Syrian forces started isolated fire-fights against IDF forces in the "enclaves". Following the signing of the first separation of forces agreement between Israel and Egypt (18.1.74), the situation worsened, and the number of shooting incidents increased as Syria hoped to improve her bargaining position in future negotiations with Israel.

Between March-May, 1974, the number of cease fire violations increased significantly and reached the level of a war of attrition. Approximately 1,000 incidents were noted during this period.

The Syrians shelled daily (with artillery and tank guns), IDF positions in the enclaves, and at times even settlements on the Golan Heights. On April 1974, the Syrians started to concentrate their fire at the Hermon posts, while simultaneously carrying out aerial bombing and penetration attempts. The IDF responded with artillery fire and aerial attacks.

The War of Attrition was waged at maximum levels until the signing of the separation of forces agreement, on 31.5.74.



ISRAEL-SYRIA AGREEMENTon the Separation of Forces (signed 31 May, 1974)

A- Israel and Syria will scrupulously observe the cease-fire on land, sea and air and will refrain from all military actions against each other, from the time of the signing of the document, in implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 338 dated October 22, 1973.

B- The military forces of Israel and Syria will be separated in accordance with the following principles:

1) All Israel military forces will be west of the line designated as Line A on the map attached hereto, except in the Quneitra area, where they will be west of Line A-1.

2) All territory east of Line A will be under Syrian administration, and Syrian civilians will return to this territory.

3) The area between Line A and the line designated as Line B on the attached map will be an area of separation. In this area will be stationed the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force established in accordance with the accompanying protocol.

4) All Syrian Military forces will be east of the Line designated as Line B on the attached map.

5) There will be two equal areas of limitation in armament and forces, one west of line A and one east of Line B as agreed upon.

6) Air forces of the two sides will be permitted to operate up to their respective lines without interference from the other side.

C- In the area between Line A and Line A-1 on the attached map there shall be no military forces.

D- This agreement and the attached map will be signed by the military representatives of Israel and Syria in Geneva not later than May 31, 1974, in the Egyptian-Israeli military working group of the Geneva Peace conference under the aegis of the United Nations, after that group has been joined by a Syrian military representative, and with the participation of representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union. The precise delineation of a detailed map and a plan for the implementation of the disengagement of forces will be worked out by military representatives of Israel and Syria in the Egyptian-Israeli military working group who will agree on the stages of this process. The military working group described above will start their work for this purpose in Geneva under the aegis of the United Nations within 24 hours after the signing of the agreement. They will complete this task within five days. Disengagement will begin within 24 hours after the completion of the task of the military working group. The process of disengagement will be completed not later than twenty days after it begins.

E- The provisions of paragraphs A, B and C shall be inspected by personnel of the United Nations comprising the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force under this agreement.

F- Within 24 hours after the signing of this agreement in Geneva all wounded prisoners of war which each side holds of the other as certified by the ICRC will be repatriated .

G- The bodies of all dead soldiers held by either side will be returned for burial in their respective countries within 10 days after the signing of this agreement.

H- This agreement is not a peace agreement. It is a step toward a just and durable peace on the basic of Security Council resolution 338 dated October 22,1973.



## DETAILS ON SEPARATION OF FORCES ZONES

1. The limited forces (and limited arms) region west of Line A or east of Line B will be 10 km. wide.

In every region the following forces will be permitted to be deployed:

A. Two army brigades which may include:

-75 tanks

-36 short range artillery pieces (122 mm or a similar calibre)


B. The combined military strength of each side cannot exceed 6000 soldiers.

2. In the area 10-20 km. west of Line A or east of Line B:

A. No artillery can be deployed with a range greater than 20 km.

B. The total number of artillery pieces permitted is 162- with a range not exceeding 20 km. No more than 450 tanks (of all models) can be deployed.

C. Ground-to-air missiles cannot be positioned closer than 25 km. west of Line A or east of Line B.



## The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force in the Golan Heights (UNDOF)

1. The UNDOF force in the Golan was established in accordance with the Security Council Resolution of 31 May 1974, extending for a period of six months. The mandate was renewed on 30 November, 1974, an additional six months until 31 May, 1975. Afterwards, the mandate was renewed twice, each time for a six month period. In Nov. 1981, the mandate was extended until May 1982.

### 2. UNDOF's Mission:

- a. supervision of the cease-fire
- b. checking of the Limited Forces Zones and separation of forces, in accordance with the Separation of Forces Agreement.
- c. Inspection of the terms of the agreement; ensuring that unauthorized forces and military equipment does not enter the thinned-out forces area. UNDOF must also prevent the construction of fortification in these zones.
- d. ensuring that only Syrian civilian personnel and policemen are allowed into the Syrian zones ( in accordance with the Disengagement Agreement).
- e. In addition, UN observers, who are an integral part of the UNDOF force, assist in inspecting the limitation of forces in the various thinned-out forces zones ( in accordance with the Disengagement Agreement).

### 3. Composition of the Force

The UNDOF force comprises 1280 individuals. The force is composed of the following units, which alternate every six months:

- an Austrian battalion comprising approximately 530
- a Finnish Battalion ( which replaced the Iranian battalion) comprising approximately 400.
- Two logistical and engineering elements of Canadians and Poles which together number approximately 260.
- observers from the UNDOF apparatus, numbering approximately 90, who are an integral part of the UN force in the Golan Heights.

The UNDOF Commander is Austrian General Grandel.

4. Generally, the supervisory tasks are performed by the Austrian and Finnish battalions, while the maintenance functions (engineering, hauling and supply) are carried out by the Canadians and Poles.
5. The UN observers are deployed at eleven observation points. They carry out periodic inspections of the ORBAT in the thinned-out forces zones (once every two weeks).
6. Headquarters for the Austrian battalion is situated north of Kanakir (holds 25 points in the northern sector).
7. Headquarters for the Finnish battalion is situated south of Quneitra (holds twenty-five points in the northern sector).
8. UNDOF headquarters is situated in Damascus.

SYRIA- GENERAL STATISTICS

1. Area (km 2): 185,180 Square kilometers
2. Population: 8.6 Million
3. Length of Syria-Israel Border (Golan Heights) 79 km.
4. GNP: \$12 Billion
5. Per capita GNP : \$ 1,500

SYRIAN ARMAMENT SINCE THE YOM KIPPUR WAR (October 1973 )

Since the Yom Kippur War the Syrian Army has been rehabilitated, has increased its strength and has improved in quality beyond any comparison with what it was in that war.

1. In 1973 the Syrians had 300-400 T-62 tanks. This tank is now in all the armoured divisions, and the total in Syrian hands is around 1,000.
2. As against the 1,500-1,600 tanks available to the Syrians in the Yom Kippur War, they now have 3,700 tanks.
3. Since September 1979, new T-72 tanks have been arriving in Damascus. At present the Syrian Army has 350 of these, with hundreds more expected.
4. In 1972 the Syrians had two armoured divisions, where they now have four.
5. A large part of the mechanized divisions are equipped with BMP troop-carriers, which are independently equipped with an artillery piece. During the Yom Kippur War the Syrians had 100-200 of these.
6. There has been a growth in anti-tank missile launchers from a few hundred in 1973 to 1,200 today.
7. The number of aircraft has increased by a third. Fighter aircraft have increased by 150(500 fighter bombers as compared with 350 in the Yom Kippur War).
8. The Syrian Air Force has received MIG 23s and 25s and Suchoi 22s, none of which were available in 1973. Mig 25s and Suchoi 22s arrived in September 1979.
9. 140 helicopters have been added, including 50 attack helicopters armed with anti-tank missiles.
10. The number of air-to-ground missile batteries has doubled from 34 to 80 -- including 30 batteries of SAM6. The Syrians have also integrated SAM9 missiles, which were not available in 1973.
11. The Syrians now have some 12 SCUD ground to ground missile launchers that they did not have in 1973.
12. Since the Camp David conference (1978), the Syrian Army has been reorganised, primarily as an attack force. This is particularly noticeable in a doubling of commando units, in an increase of long-range (Scud and Frog) missiles almost twice as many armoured units (Rifat Assad's force has become an armoured division). There has also been an improvement in quality of weaponry and in control systems. Since September 1979 (the eve of Assad's visit to Moscow) Syria has strengthened the Air Force with MIG 25 bomber - interceptors and Suchoi 22s, and has received at least 150 of the T-72 Soviet made tanks and hundreds more are expected to be delivered. The Syrians recently acquired from the USSR 122 mm self-propelled guns (already in Libyan hands) and which are considered to be of the most modern and sophisticated type.



Since the Yom Kippur War, Syria has purchased arms both from eastern bloc sources and the West at a cost of approximately \$7 billion. Most of the arms were acquired from the Soviet Union.

Following is a list of war materiel acquired by Syria, with a listing of the supplying nation and the quantity of arms purchased:

No.	Type of Combat Materiel	Quantity	Supplier
1.	Scud SSM	12 launchers	USSR
2.	FROG-7 rockets	100 rockets	USSR
3.	T-54/55/62 tanks	1800	USSR
4.	T-72 tanks	300 approx.	USSR
5.	APC's	Several hundred	USSR
6.	Artillery guns	1000 approx.	USSR
7.	Sagger anti-tank missiles	5000 approx.	USSR
8.	Tank transporters	Several hundred	USSR
9.	HOT missile for Gazelle transporters	600 missiles	France
10.	Gazelle helicopters	50	France
11.	Milan missiles	2000 approx.	France
12.	Sniper rifles	3000-4000	Austria
13.	Petya frigates	2	USSR
14.	Osa missile boats	7	USSR
15.	Komar missile boats	2	USSR
16.	Yevgenya minesweeper	1	USSR
17.	Vanya minelayers	2	USSR
18.	MiG 25/23 /21/17 Suchoi 22/20/7	480	USSR
19.	Mi- 8 helicopters	80	USSR
20.	Ka- 25 anti-submarine helicopters	9	USSR
21.	Ground-to-air missiles	60	USSR

The Syrian Army - 1980

- A. Manpower - approximately 225,000 soldiers
- B. Ground Forces -
- mechanized infantry divisions - 2-3
  - armored divisions - 3-4 (including Rifat Assad's division)
  - infantry brigades - 6-9
  - mechanised brigades - 3-4
  - armored brigades - 8
  - special forces battalions - 17 (Commando)
  - SSM brigades - 1-2
  - Tanks- approximately 3,700 ( T-72, T-62, T-55, T-54)
  - APC's - 1600
  - Artillery guns (120mm and above) - approximately 2300  
(the Syrians increased their number of heavy guns including 180mm artillery)
  - Scud SSM launchers - approximately 12
  - FROG SSM launchers - 24
  -
- C. Air Force and AA Defence
- Fighter-bomber aircraft - 500 ( MiG-25, MiG-23, MiG-21, MiG-17, Suchoi-22, Suchoi-20, Suchoi-7)
  - Helicopters - 95 ( Mi-8, Mi-6, Mi-4, Mi-2, Gazelle, and Ka-25 )
  - Transport Planes - 25
  - Surface to-air missiles - 80 batteries ( SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, and in addition SA-7, SA-9).
- D. Navy
- 12 Missile boats (Komar and Osa)
  - 8 Torpedo boats
  - 3 Minesweepers
  - 2 Frigates

## SECURITY INCIDENTS

---

( Since the Separation of Forces Agreement- 31.5.74 until 1981 )

---

1. 23 September 1974 - Light arms fire at IDF near Quneitra .
2. 23 October 1974 - Syrian aircraft penetrated Israeli - controlled territory, west of Quneitra.
3. 17 October 1975 - Three Syrian military aircraft crossed the separation of forces area and flew over Israeli-controlled territory in the Hermon region.
4. 20 October 1975- A Syrian plane crossed the separation of forces area and flew over Israeli territory in the Majdal Shams area.
5. 20 October 1975 - Several rounds of light weapons fire emanating from Syria, directed at an IDF patrol moving near the disengagement line, east of Masada on the Golan Heights. No injuries.
6. 20 November 1975. - A three man terrorist squad - belonging to Fatah - infiltrated from Syrian territory into Israel. The terrorists attacked a house in Moshav Ramat Magshimim (southern Golan Heights ). The terrorists murdered three seminary students and wounded two. One of the students was beaten with an axe and the terrorists intended to kidnap him back into Syrian territory - but the student succeeded in escaping and calling for assistance. The terrorists at that time escaped into Syria (they were armed with machineguns, handgrenades and axes ).
7. 7 March 1976 - A number of bazooka shells were fired from Syrian territory at an IDF patrol travelling in the Tel -El - Saki region, in the central Golan Heights area. There were no injuries. Fire was returned.
8. 3 May 1977 - Two Syrian aircraft (MIG - 17 ) penetrated into Israeli territory 9:45 A.M. in the Hermon stronghold region. Israeli forces opened with anti-aircraft fire.
9. 27 June 1979 - Five Syrian planes ( Mig - 21 model ) were shot down in a dogfight over Lebanese skies, after trying to attack Israeli planes which were on a mission against terrorist bases in south Lebanon.
10. 27 August 1979 - A number of rounds of light arms fire was directed at an IDF patrol, opposite Tel Faras.

11. 24 September 1979-Four Syrian aircraft (MiG-21) were shot down by IAF planes during an aerial dogfight over Lebanese territory. The Syrian planes disrupted an IAF patrol which was identifying terrorist camps in the vicinity of Beirut. IAF aircraft completed their mission and then returned home.
12. 7 October 79- An Israeli drone apparently shot down south of Hama.
13. 24 August 1980- Syrian fighter aircraft attempted to shoot down IAF aircraft which were on a routine patrol mission over Lebanon. A Syrian Mig-21 was shot down after a short dogfight and all Israeli planes safely returned home.
14. 31 December 1980. Two Syrian MIG 21's attempting to intercept Israel Air Force planes returning from an attack on terrorist bases were shot down in a dogfight over south Lebanon, approximately 8 kms. west of Metulla.
15. 18 December 1980. In the course of an IDF anti-terrorist operation in the area of Kafr Mahmoudia, three Syrian soldiers were unintentionally killed and two others wounded.
16. 20 December 1980. In reaction to the above events, Syrian gunners in Rihan and Lake Kroun in Lebanon shelled the villages of Dibin, Marjayoun, and Balatt, in the eastern sector of south Lebanon. In the course of the 200-300 shell bombardment, about five houses were damaged.
17. 13 February 1981. Syrian MIG 25 downed east of Beirut in a short air duel, when Syrian planes attempted to intercept Israeli aircraft.
18. 28 April 1981. 2 Syrian Mi-8 helicopters were shot down by Israeli aircraft over the Lebanese Baqaa.
19. 12 May 1981. A number of Syrian surface-to-air missiles were fired at Israeli aircraft on routine reconnaissance missions over the Lebanese Baqaa.
20. 14 May 1981. An Israeli drone on routine reconnaissance mission over Lebanon was shot down by a Syrian missile over the Baqaa region.
21. 22 May 1981. An Israeli drone on routine reconnaissance mission over the Lebanese Baqaa was shot down by a Syrian missile.
22. 25 May 1981. An Israeli drone on a routine reconnaissance mission over the Lebanese Baqaa was downed by Syrian missiles.
23. 13 June 1981. An Israeli drone on a routine reconnaissance mission over Lebanon and Syria failed to return to its base and was apparently shot down in flight.
24. 14 July 1981. While Israeli planes were carrying out an attack on terrorist ground targets in Southern Lebanon, Syrian planes attempted to interfere with the attacking planes. In the ensuing dog-fight, a Syrian MIG 21 was downed over Marjayoun. The pilot lost his life.
- 25 29 July 1981. A Syrian MIG 25 was shot down in a dog fight with Israeli planes which had been on a routine reconnaissance flight over Lebanon.

---

## MILITARY COOPERATION BETWEEN SYRIA AND JORDAN

---

Until 1975, military cooperation between Syria and Jordan amounted to Jordan's contribution to the Syrian war effort during the Yom Kippur war.

During the Yom Kippur War, Jordan dispatched an armored brigade to the Golan Heights (which returned to Jordan in January 1974) and later Jordan deployed a Divisional Headquarters. However, in the wake of improved bilateral relations following the Yom Kippur War, military relations also improved.

Military cooperation between Jordan and Syria received greater impetus after the meeting, in April 1975, between Assad and Hussein.

In June 1975 (during Assad's visit to Jordan), a joint cooperation committee was established which also dealt with military matters. These committees were to meet once every three months, alternating between Jordan and Syria--and would be chaired by the Prime Ministers of Jordan and Syria.

At the end of 1975, a joint military command exercise was held, on Syrian territory, to examine joint operational planning. Since, many Syrian and Jordanian officers have exchanged visits between the two countries. The visits included tours of the front line and visits at military schools and General Staff Headquarters. Syrian military instructors also visit Jordan for educational and instructional purposes.



At the start of January 1976, the camouflage colors of Jordanian APC's were changed to those used by the Syrian armed forces.

On 11 February 1976, the Jordanian government inacted a series of military rules in order to unify the military terms used by the Syrian and Jordanian armies. This, in order to improve coordination and integration between both armies (rank, salaries, promotions and punishments in the Jordanian army were adopted in accordance with Syrian standards). According to Western publications, Syria promised to supply Jordan with "AA" defenses in case of an outbreak of hostilities.

The establishment of military relations, reached at the start of 1976, has not significantly changed. Except for limited areas of cooperation, no significant breakthrough has been made towards the unification of both armies. Cooperation between Syria and Jordan has been reduced, in practice, to the matter of defending the common border area between them.

Sadat's peace initiative soured relations between Syria and Jordan (which were gradually improving since 1975), since the reaction of both countries was not identical. Military cooperation as well as routine contacts were slowed down.

No significant progress was discerned on other matters due to mutual suspicion and long-standing differences, such as: division of Yarmuk water resources, Jordanian support for the "Moslem Brotherhood" in Syria, and close relations between Jordan and Iraq (which was frowned upon by Syria).

The "Camp David" accords (September 1978) also raised suspicions among the Syrians who feared that Jordan would join the peace initiative. Upper echelon contacts were only renewed after the Syrians were sure that Jordan would not join the peace negotiations. The new situation created by the very real possibility that Egypt would withdraw from the Arab confrontation camp, raised the necessity of closer contacts between both states in order to examine new strategic approaches which would meet the problem.

During the first half of 1980, relations between Syria and Jordan cooled, primarily for the following reasons:

- A. Syrian weakness caused by domestic problems.
- B. Close relations between Jordan and Iraq.
- C. Members of the "Moslem Brotherhood" reach Syria after undergoing training in Jordan.

At the end of November 1980, tension between Syria and Jordan reached its peak when Syria concentrated 2 armored divisions near the Jordanian border. Both armies were put on alert status.

THE GOLAN HEIGHTS-MILITARY ADMINISTRATION

Upon the entry of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), in 1967, into the Golan Heights, a government and administrative structure was set up and a series of proclamations and orders published with the object of restoring public order and security, instituting stable, orderly administration and enabling the population to revert from war conditions to tranquillity.

Local law has remained in force, augmented by a second legislative stratum of proclamations and orders essential to the maintenance of proper administration and security. The IDF Regional Commander assumed all administrative, appointive, legislative and governmental powers.

At times, the Regional Commander in the Golan Heights issues proclamations directed at the Jewish settlements in the Golan. While these proclamations are modeled along Israeli civilian statutes, they are in no way meant to introduce Israeli civilian laws in the Golan Heights. Local law remains in force. However, when issuing orders, it is most natural for the Regional Commander to model his proclamations according to Israeli statutes.

Welfare

The concept of 'welfare' was not familiar to residents of the Golan Heights prior to the Six Day War. The needy received scant assistance from local villages and family.

In October 1968 the Israeli government decided to equalize the salary scale for wages paid on the Golan Heights to the accepted Israeli scale. In accordance with this decision, the level of welfare assistance was also raised to Israeli standards.

school was built, additional classrooms were rented, and a new school was opened in the building occupied by the Military Government's Representative in Majdl Shams.

Most of the schools were refurnished and a variety of equipment was added ( such as copying machines, sports equipment, etc.). Special attention was given to properly heating the schools in winter. New heating stoves were provided in the classrooms.

An advanced laboratory was established in the Massada High School, and outfitted with the latest equipment

The Ministry of Education supplies the schools with all the books and educational supplies, free of charge. Similarly, all students, including high school pupils study free of charge.

A variety of social affairs take place under the auspices of the school-excursions, study expeditions, parties and sporting activities. Similarly, school newspapers and yearbooks are published annually. Contacts with Israeli schools are maintained, including Ulpan Akiva in Netanya. Summer camps are often organized for the students (An example- one summer a group of children from Kfar Massada were the guests of the Bat Yam Municipality for two weeks.).

### Health

Since 1967, new infirmaries have been opened in all the villages, with Kupat Holim (Histadrut Health Insurance) responsible for medical services and hospitalization.

Preventive medical treatment is provided within the framework of the local infirmaries and infant care stations.

Examinations by the Geneva-based Red Cross, and local Red Cross representatives have yielded praise for the level of services provided to the residents by Kupat Holim and the Ministry of Health.

### Agriculture

Since 1967, a veritable revolution has taken place in the farming methods utilized by residents of the Golan. Primitive farming methods were replaced by modern mechanized farming techniques.

### Health Insurance and Social Security

The Department of Welfare took care of medical assistance for the local residents by insuring them with a comprehensive medical program, including hospitalization.

Today, residents of the Golan Heights are entitled to full Social Security benefits, such as: senior citizen pensions, three months paid maternity leave for working wives or a one-time payment on the occasion of a birth, subsidies on each child (based according to family size) unemployment insurance, and disability insurance.

### Employment

Under the Syrian regime, 70% of the residents had no profession or training of any kind. The population of the Golan Heights was mainly one of menial labourers and migrant workers.

In 1967-68 the Military Administration had to find work for hundreds of workers (approximately 1350 people were unemployed). In 1969, the office of Labour began to train the unemployed in the construction field (reading building plans, laying floor tiles, siding, etc.) and mechanics. Those of whom were interested, could also complete a course for carpet-weaving. Hundreds have benefited by learning a worthwhile trade.

Since 1971, local workers have benefited from Israeli wage scales, in accordance with the employment sector and job seniority.

### Education

Under the Syrian regime, the educational system in the Golan Heights was a shambles- both in terms of classroom furnishings and educational aids. Mandatory education was required for the first six grades-and even this was often not carried out in practice.

After the Six Day War, the Israeli administration expanded mandatory education to the first 9 grades.

Overcrowding was eliminated and the number of students per classroom diminished to an average of 26-28. This improvement took place after a new



Under the guidance of the Ministry of Agriculture, over 4000 new apple orchards were cultivated. Through the proper use of fertilizers, pesticides and irrigation, record crops were harvested. Modern agricultural techniques have brought prosperity to an area long neglected by the Syrians.

### Electricity

Millions of Israeli pounds have been spent on developing the Golan's electricity network. Prior to 1967, local villages were supplied with low quality diesel generators, which provided a haphazard electricity supply. The Israel Military Administration has connected several villages to the Israel national electricity network and provided Golan settlements with modern generators that benefit the villages with a dependable electricity supply.

### Transportation

After the Six Day War, only 28 vehicles were found on the Golan Heights (including tractors and bicycles). Presently, over 1000 vehicles can be found in the Golan (approximately one automobile for every second family).

### Religion

The Druze constitute the bulk of the population in the Golan Heights, exclusive of residents of Kfar Ragir who are Moslem Ahlewii.

The inhabitants enjoy total and absolute religious freedom, with the various communities having full authority and control of their internal affairs.

Among the services provided by the Administration are: financial contributions to the building or repair of mosques, rebate of taxes and customs duties collected on religious articles imported by ecclesiastical bodies; assistance in maintaining cemeteries and holy places.

Golan

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 19, 1982


Dear Mr. Lane:

This letter is in response to your letter to Judge Clark dated January 5, 1982.

Both Judge Clark and I have read your letter with interest and thank you for passing along your thoughts.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,



Geoffrey Kemp  
Senior Staff Member  
for Near Eastern and  
South Asian Affairs

Mr. Andrew L. Lane  
555 North Pantano Road  
Box 379  
Tucson, Arizona 85710

cc: Janet Colson (FYI)

January 5, 1982

Honorable William Clark  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Clark

I'm advising President Regan on Israel  
I hope you will read Anthony Pearson's  
Book of 1978 on the Attack on the U.S.S.  
Liberty in which 34 U.S. Sailors lost their  
lives and 171 were injured and then review  
the other acts of deceit and duplicity on  
the part of Israel. Urge our President  
to have enough intestinal fortitude to  
resist these continuing acts of  
tyranny on the part of the minority

For a long time we should have  
paid greater attention to the good  
advice of General Eisenhower.

Sincerely,  
Andrew L. Lane

*AL*

Jan 12

Loretta,

0348

*Keng*

FYI, the black "scrawl" on this letter  
is by Judge Clark and says "ack" for  
"Acknowledge." Thanks!

*make  
/ Please make  
"Thank you"*

Andrew L. Lane  
555 North Pantano Road  
Box 379  
Tucson, Arizona 85710

Sally

*Staff a salute  
Thank you*



## The Golan grab

When Prime Minister Menachem Begin signed the peace treaty with Egypt three years ago he declared that "in Jewish teachings, there is a tradition that the greatest achievement of a human being is to turn his enemy into a friend." It will sadden the world that Israel, contrary to that sentiment, once again seems to be doing everything to perpetuate the enmity of its neighbors. Mr. Begin's abrupt annexation of the occupied Golan Heights — without even informing the United States — not only flagrantly violates international law. It can only confirm the fears of Syria and other Arab states that Israel is an expansionist power and that Zionism is dangerous. How can this possibly serve the cause of Israel's long-term security?

To all intents and purposes, it would appear that UN Resolution 242, which has provided the foundation for the Middle East peace process, is no longer viable. Successive Israeli governments have supported that resolution, calling for Israel's withdrawal from land occupied in the 1967 war, including the Golan Heights. The terms of withdrawal are supposed to be negotiated, and in such a way that Israel is left with "secure and recognized borders." The late Israeli foreign minister Moshe Dayan was even prepared to give up the Golan Heights, despite their commanding vantage point and the physical protection they afford Israel.

But with one swift stroke, Mr. Begin and the Knesset have now undermined the chances of a peace agreement with Syria. The unilateral act also puts a cloud over the Camp David peace negotiations for autonomy of the West Bank. It is doubtful that President Mubarak of Egypt will do anything to disrupt the peace accord with Israel inasmuch as he awaits the handing back of the last chunk of Sinai still under Israeli control. But, if the autonomy talks break down, many believe

Mr. Begin could move to annex "Judea and Samaria" as well.

What should the United States, Israel's friend and partner, do given Mr. Begin's repeated acts of defiance? The Reagan administration cannot but feel frustrated to see US national interests so often undercut. Only recently it concluded an agreement on strategic military cooperation with Israel, yet Israel has now made a move with harmful strategic implications. Washington has criticized the Golan grab, but it is clear that mere public denunciations of Israeli actions do little good.

Has the time come for a stronger response? Some Mideast hands suggest the US ought to make clear to Israel that it must bear the consequences of its action and that it cannot count on American economic and military help to sustain its "ownership" of the Golan land. Threatening a cutoff of aid — or cutting it — is not pleasant business. But, at a time of such pressures on the federal budget, the American people may well wonder why they should continue supporting Israeli policies which are inimical to US interests.

This is not to fail to appreciate Israel's anxieties about the direction of US policy in the Middle East, including a tilt toward Saudi Arabia, and Israel's desire to compensate for recent diplomatic setbacks. Nor does it absolve Syria and other Arab parties of responsibility for provocative acts and failed opportunities to make peace. But Prime Minister Begin has taken an illegal step which cannot but add to instability in the Middle East and which seems to say that Israel intends to live by military might rather than by the rule of world law.

Such a policy can never turn "enemies into friends." On the contrary, it is a recipe for animosity and conflict. The brave people of Israel should want to turn back from this perilous course.



# Uncle Sam keeps the wolf from Israel's door

## Analysis

By Thomas Stauffer

Special to The Christian Science Monitor

### Washington

Prime Minister Menachem Begin's biting attack on the United States, while rejecting vehemently any taint of vassalhood, has focused new attention on Israel's extraordinary economic dependency on the US. Israel today is, indeed, all but totally dependent on US economic support, both overt and indirect.

A fragile and quite indispensable economic lifeline connects Tel Aviv to Washington, providing at no cash cost the weapons Israel could not buy elsewhere in the world, even if it were able to pay. It all adds up to an economic package exceeding \$3 billion per year. Any Israeli resentment and bitterness at their country's economic dependence would be understandable because the total aid package, including ripple (multiplier) effects, approximates almost one-half of Israel's national income.

Mr. Begin's confrontational posture vis-à-vis his US sponsor, however, may be as risky as the resentment is real, because Israel is totally and most uncomfortably vulnerable to the whim and indulgence of the US Congress, which must authorize or at the very least tolerate the complex and multi-dimensional array of US aid programs.

South African and Canadian Jewish communities furnish some \$150 million yearly to Israel, and West Germany still pays rather more than \$300 million in reparations from World War II. Otherwise, the entire burden of economic support falls on the United States, covering the current balance-of-payments deficit of \$5 billion.

US public aid over the last three years averaged \$3 billion annually, and the 1982 expenditure may once again rise — a rare counterexample to the slashed budgets of the administration's domestic programs. Almost half of US official aid consists of grants or instantaneously forgiven loans. The remainder is added to Israel's rapidly escalating foreign debt, which now approaches \$20 billion, equivalent to the unprecedented level of (almost) \$5,000 per capita.

Military "sales" constitute two-thirds of the total official aid, and Congress in the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 created a special financing device in order to reduce the visibility of this aid and forestall possible public criticism.

Thus, for example, in fiscal 1980 \$1 billion worth of foreign military sales were authorized for Israel's account. Immediately following the "sale," however, \$500 million of the loan was canceled and the residual \$500 million was added to the \$7-plus billion the State Department estimates Israel now owes the US government.

This debt involves grace periods of up to 10 years prior to any repayment. As a consequence of Israel's worsening economic malaise since 1973, it can service this debt only in the formal sense that installments are paid when due but are, in fact, funded through new US aid each year.

A further layer of aid flows from US-based Jewish organizations. The IMF reports such flows globally at almost \$1 billion per year, largely from the US. Such charitable contributions, except for Israeli Development Bonds, are fully tax-deductible and hence are tax expenditures in the US context.

At one time, hearings under Sen. J. William Fulbright revealed political uses of such funds; today United Jewish Appeal or Hadassah contributions have funded access roads in the Golan Heights or settlements in the occupied territories on the West Bank, but most flow into the Israeli economy.

Mr. Begin's critical economic stake in perpetuating US assistance extends still further into a third and murkier tier of economic assistance. For example, military sources indicate that some of the weapons transferred to Israel are underinvoiced at special discount prices, which particularly offends the Department of Defense (DOD) when Israel subsequently profitably sells US-source equipment at higher prices, as occurred recently with Iran.

Another form of implicit aid is a net of specially crafted contracts between the US DOD, or defense suppliers within the US, to support the Israeli arms industries. Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. recently

intimated that these would be expanded in the future, providing critically needed cash infusions for those firms. Israel Aircraft Industries has been particularly insistent on such support and has received subcontracts for manufacturing components for the F-4 and F-15 fighters.

In another transaction an Israeli shipping firm was accorded subsidies under the US Maritime Administration's shipbuilding program, but the precedent was quickly frozen when *Burmah Oil*, a British firm, applied for similar support.

Further assistance outside the formal foreign aid structure is the extensive and sustained support for Israeli universities and research institutions that is funded by

the Department of Education, the National Institute of Health, and other US agencies in the form of grants and contracts. These reportedly aggregate almost \$100 million per year.

The final tier of economic assistance involves special concessions on Israeli exports to the US. In spite of its high per capita income, over \$3,500 per year, Israel has been specially designated as a "developing country," which accords it reduced or zero tariffs under the Generalized System of Preferences. As a result, 96 percent of its \$1 billion exports to the US thus enter free of any tariffs.

*Dr. Stauffer is research associate at the Harvard Center of Middle East Studies.*



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

January 8, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR DICK PIPES

FROM: GEOFF KEMP *gk*

SUBJECT: Golan Heights Input for Minutes  
of NSC Meeting Held on January 5, 1982

Attached is my input on Golan Heights for the Minutes of  
the NSC Meeting held on Tuesday, January 5, 1982.

Attachment

Golan Heights

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 29, 1997  
By *smf* NARA, Date *11/27/00*

~~SECRET~~

Review January 8, 1987

~~SECRET~~

56968

Golan Heights

The discussion on the Golan Heights began at 1710.

Mr. Clark: Mr. President, it is now time to discuss the Golan Heights question and I am going to pass this over to Secretary Haig.

Secretary Haig: The Golan Heights question that we have to deal with, Mr. President, is the UN Resolution which is about to come up. Jeane will bring us up to date having spent the afternoon with a frothing Syrian. I did want to tell you that Begin, both in his meetings with Chuck Percy and in the oral message that an emissary delivered to me, has raised the white flag. They want to "cool it." They want to get into our good books. They have promised, essentially, that there will be no attacks on the Syrian missiles and no intervention into Lebanon unless there is major provocation. We have drafted a letter for you to Begin. We think we have played it right so far. Now we come to the question of sanctions. In the letter, incidentally, you are going to say that we will not support sanctions.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick: I just spent an hour with the Syrian Ambassador to the UN. It was like being in a wind tunnel. He

**DECLASSIFIED**

**NLRR M08-098/15 # 56968**

~~SECRET~~

**BY KML NARA DATE 6/29/10**

didn't even refer to Israel as a Zionist entity but rather a "crusader remnant" and said that that "crusader remnant" will be driven into the sea.

The President: Who is the Syrian representative?

Ambassador Kirkpatrick: He is the author of the UN Resolution. This proposes sanctions. They want all countries to stop trade, exchanges and all communication with Israel. It is very clear that we will not agree -- that we will have to veto. We ought to try to deprive the Resolution of the nine positive votes it needs for passage, then we don't have to veto. We are working with Zaire and Togo not to vote positively. If they do and we veto, we veto. I appealed to the Syrian to think positively.

Secretary Haig: If we are going to have to veto, the wilder it is the better.

The Vice President: What will the UK and France do?

Ambassador Kirkpatrick: If we veto, they may abstain.

The President: Maggie Thatcher has told me that their trade with the Arabs is very important and that this has her worried.

Mr. Meese: Because of the press, we better be sure we have some guidance. Is the guidance that we should say is that we are monitoring the situation and that it is our plan to vote against sanctions?

Secretary Haig: Well, let's wait until we know exactly what the Resolution is.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick: Actually, we have seen the Resolution. It will be presented around 3:00 tomorrow at the UN.

Secretary Weinberger: What if it doesn't succeed? Will they submit another one?

Ambassador Kirkpatrick: It is difficult to say. Syria is coming on very strong.

The President then concluded the meeting at 1720.