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# Were There Other Pollards?

*For a 'Rogue Operation,' the Israelis Sure Asked Good Questions*

By Lally Weymouth

**A**S THEY REVIEW the case of convicted Israeli spy Jonathan Jay Pollard, Justice Department officials are asking a troubling question: Is it possible that there are other Israeli spies—other Pollards, in other words—who helped frame the questions that the Israelis put to Pollard himself?

This question arises because of a little-noticed aspect of the case, the "tasking" of Pollard by his Israeli handlers. According to several U.S. government sources, Pollard has told Justice Department investigators that when the Israelis initially recruited him, they showed him copies of highly classified U.S. intelligence they already possessed and asked him to obtain additional material that was even more secret and sensitive.

To American officials, this tasking episode raised the possibility that the Israelis already had another spy in the U.S. government at the time they recruited Pollard. But when American investigators asked Israeli officials how they obtained the sensitive material used to task Pollard, the Israelis refused to answer. The Americans were furious.

Explains U.S. Attorney Joseph E. diGenova: "Direct and circumstantial evidence indicates that we should be concerned as a government about how Jonathan Pollard was originally tasked before he ever gave over information. What did they show him when they tasked him?" The prosecutor wants to know if there are other Pollards who have penetrated U.S. intelligence and, if not, who providing such classified material outside official channels.

The Americans who investigated the case say that they played straight with the Israelis but that the Israelis didn't play straight with them. "It apparently never occurred to anyone in Israel that the U.S. had a will to deal with espionage, no matter who was the perpetrator," says prosecutor diGenova.

The investigators' anger over the case stems partly from a trip to Israel in December 1985 by diGenova, State Department Legal Advisor Abraham D. Sofaer and Mark Richard of the Justice Department. They offered the three Israelis then said to have

been involved in the Pollard affair immunity from prosecution in return for cooperation. The three were Rafael Eitan, a former Mossad operative who headed the "Lekem" intelligence unit that allegedly recruited Pollard; Joseph Yagur, the science attache at the Israeli consulate in New York who is said to have obtained many of the documents from Pollard; and Irit Erb, a secretary at the Israeli Embassy in Washington who allegedly copied the documents.

**D**uring the meetings with the three Israelis and their lawyers, the Americans were told that a "Mr. X," whose name the Israelis refused to divulge, had introduced Pollard to Lekem. The role played by Mr. X, the Israelis said, had been only a minor one. The three Israelis involved in the affair didn't name Mr. X or elaborate upon his role—despite urgings by the Americans to be candid.

Mr. X turned out to be an Israeli air force colonel named Aviem Sella. For when Pollard eventually began to cooperate, he told U.S. investigators that his first contact with Israeli intelligence—his first "handler" as the court documents say—had been Sella. An Israeli war hero, Sella led Israel's air strike on the Iraqi nuclear reactor and helped decimate the Syrian air force during Israel's war in Lebanon. He was thought to be destined for chief of the Air Force and even possibly chief of staff one day.

Sella's charmed life began to change in 1984 when he came to New York to take a computer science course at New York University. While doing his studies, he got a call from an American acquaintance saying that a friend named Jonathan Pollard wanted to meet him, according to court documents. The meeting took place in the early 1984 in Washington, where Pollard was employed by the U.S. Navy as an intelligence analyst. According to the court documents, Pollard told Sella he wanted to work covertly to provide intelligence information to Israel that he had access to in his work.

They met again later at the Dumbarton Oaks estate in Georgetown, with Pollard bringing a suitcase full of classified documents to show Sella. According to court papers, "Sella then described other particular technical information which would be of primary interest to Israel and stressed that de-

fendant should obtain 'top secret' documents," according to the court record.

One question that intrigues American officials is how Sella got involved in the first place? Was he pushed into the operation by other Israeli military or intelligence officers?

Evidence that Sella was following orders from much higher up in the Israeli chain of command comes from several Israeli sources.

According to one usually reliable Israeli, a senior Israeli Air Force officer has told colleagues that Sella was acting on his orders, with the knowledge of a top-level military official. This source says that Sella was ordered to establish contact between Pollard and representatives of Lekem, the intelligence branch headed by Rafael Eitan.

Another sign that Sella was following orders is the reaction of other Israeli Air Force officers to the case. Recently, 22 of them went to Minister of Defense Yitzhak Rabin's office to declare their support for Sella and to endorse his promotion to become commander of Tel Nof air base—a step the Americans regard as a direct slap in the face. According to one Israeli journalist, the officers told Rabin they are tired of the military taking the rap for mistakes made at the political level.

Rabin, not wanting to offend either the Americans by promoting Sella or his officers by not promoting him, split the difference by giving Sella command of Tel Nof but denying him a promotion to brigadier general.

**T**he official Israeli position continues to be that the Pollard recruitment was a rogue operation run by Eitan and not authorized by the top levels of the government of Israel.

But diGenova argues that "the description of this as a rogue operation is in conflict with the facts on the public record." Although he admits it is impossible to pinpoint the exact level of official Israeli authorization, he says that "it's clear it was authorized by some high authority because of the extensive amount of information and the distribution of that information."

Noting that the operation was scheduled to last for 10 more years—had it not been discovered—diGenova concludes: "It had to be

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Lally Weymouth writes regularly about foreign affairs for *The Washington Post*.



Los Angeles Times  
15 March 1987 pg. IV-2

# Israel: Old Ally, Old Snoop

By James Bamford

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

**C**hristine Esfandiari did not know what to do. Anne, her next door neighbor, had just handed her a wedding album and asked her to keep it safe. Now Anne was imploring her to help get rid of a suitcase hidden under the stair of their Washington apartment building. The young woman pleaded with her to retrieve the case and meet at the Four Seasons Hotel. A short while later Esfandiari's husband brought the heavy case to the apartment but, after a sleepless night, decided to call Navy investigators.

Inside the suitcase was a pile of wrinkled documents bearing an assortment of red classification stamps ranging from secret to top-secret code words. This was only a fraction of the mountain of defense secrets Jonathan Jay Pollard and his wife, Anne Henderson-Pollard, had sold to the government of Israel—roughly, 864,000 pages total. According to Joseph E. di Genova, the U.S. attorney who prosecuted the case, the Pollards had "compromised the most documents ever."

That the nation's record for spying would be achieved not by the Soviet KGB but an ally working through a religious zealot is both disturbing and frightening. Especially so, given Israel's continuing cover-up of its involvement in the espionage operation. Nevertheless, from a historical perspective, these incidents are only the latest in a series of actions against the United States by Israel.

W. Raymond Wannall, who ran the Middle East desk of the FBI's intelligence division in the late 1940s and early 1950s, remembers that even then the Israelis "were very extensively involved in gathering information of a classified nature in this country." Nonetheless, he said, the Justice Department decided not to prosecute. Wannall, who retired in 1976 as assistant FBI director in charge of intelligence, called the Israeli spy network

*James Bamford, author of "The Puzzle Palace," an analysis of the National Security Agency, writes about intelligence issues.*

"very organized," run by a secret four-man panel: "One of the members of the board was at the United Nations, a second was at the Israeli Embassy in Washington, a third was a prominent industrialist in New York City and a fourth was a trouble-shooter who came back and forth from Israel."

In 1979, the Central Intelligence Agency produced a secret, highly restricted report on Israeli intelligence activity, "Israel: Foreign Intelligence and Security Services." The report has been cited in the media but the CIA refuses to confirm or deny its sponsorship. The study reflects a long-standing resentment and distrust within the CIA. This view, shared by many in the agency, in part stems from a widespread agency belief that Israel's military and intelligence services can commit any action without being held to account.

The report would suggest that the Israeli government has long viewed the United States as an adversary to be subverted rather than as a friend and patron. Among friendly countries, there has always been a gentleman's agreement that passive, non-intrusive espionage—such as by satellite—is permissible. For example, the United States has for years eavesdropped on British diplomatic communications and the British no doubt reciprocate.

Off-limits, however, is active spying, such as planting a mole in the friend's intelligence service or enticing a government employee to commit treason. Yet this is precisely what Israel has done. The CIA report claims that the United States ranks just below the Arab states on Israel's list of priority targets.

But most troublesome, according to the CIA study, is Israel's use of dual loyalty as a tool for espionage, as in the Pollard case. Despite a reported ban on the recruitment of foreign Jews for espionage, "The Israelis," says the CIA report, "are prepared to capitalize on nearly every kind of agent motivation. A substantial effort is made to appeal to Jewish racial or religious proclivities, pro-Zionism, dislike of anti-Semitism . . . blackmail is also used. Other recruiting techniques include the proffer of money." In addition, "Mossad [Israel's CIA] over the years has enjoyed some rapport with highly placed persons and government offices in every country of importance to Israel. Within Jewish communities in almost every country of the world, there are Zionists and other sympathizers, who render strong support to the Israeli intelligence effort. Such contacts are carefully nurtured and serve as channels for information, deception material, propaganda and other purposes."

The report goes further: "The Israeli intelligence service depends heavily on

the various Jewish communities and organizations abroad for recruiting agents and eliciting general information. The aggressively ideological nature of Zionism, which emphasizes that all Jews belong to Israel and must return to Israel, had had its drawbacks in enlisting support for intelligence operations, however, since there is considerable opposition to Zionism among Jews throughout the world. Aware of this fact, Israeli intelligence representatives usually operate discreetly, within Jewish communities and are under instructions to handle their missions with utmost tact to avoid embarrassment to Israel. They also attempt to penetrate anti-Zionist elements in order to neutralize the opposition. Despite such precautions, the Israelis frequently experience setbacks and there have been several cases where attempts at recruitment of Americans of the Jewish faith have been rejected and reported to U.S. authorities."

Perhaps the 1979 CIA had its own prejudices but since the Pollards' arrest last November, Israel has done little to counteract agency beliefs. On the one hand Israelis say the affair was an unsanctioned "rogue" operation, that those responsible will be "brought to account," that they will "spare no effort to investigate this case." Yet, the Israelis awarded those responsible with promotions, lied to the U.S. Justice Department and covered up the involvement of Pollard's principal handler. Finally, last week, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir reluctantly appointed a two-man panel to investigate the Pollard case.

The time is overdue for the Reagan Administration and Congress to consider calling in Israel's credit cards and begin a realistic reassessment of America's relationship in the Middle East. [

## Other Pollards...CONTINUED

known and authorized at levels above the operational level. This was not a rogue operation, a couple of people running amok."

One Israeli politician says "the cheap way out for Israel will be if the two-man commission appointed last week to investigate the matter decides to make Eitan and Sella the fall guys. "The best thing," he concluded, "is to make a credible report and then draw upon the bank balance (of American good will)."

Perhaps so. But it may take longer than the Israeli government imagines to heal the damage caused by what Israel's leading defense correspondent, Ze'ev Schiff, calls "the worst blunder I remember since I started my work here."

Pollard

Pollard

**Inner Cabinet Accepts Rotenstreich-Tzur Report**  
*TA270439 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English*  
 0400 GMT 27 May 87

[Text] The government is to meet in special session this morning to debate the Rotenstreich-Tzur report on the Jonathan Pollard spy case. The 10-man Inner Cabinet discussed the report last night and decided that, as the committee's findings lay responsibility collectively on the government, the full Cabinet should be asked to approve the document. More details in this report from Steve Weizman:

[Begin recording] [Weizman] In a session lasting until well after midnight, members of the Inner Cabinet discussed the Rotenstreich report, which blames the politicians as a whole for the events surrounding the Pollard operation. Finally, Cabinet Secretary Elyaqim Rubinstein read this statement to the waiting journalists:

[Rubinstein] The [Inner] Cabinet decided: 1) to publish the statement prepared for publication by the investigation commission; 2) to recommend to the government to be convened tomorrow to adopt the recommendations of the investigation commission. Thank you very much.

[Weizman] The document itself — or at least the part of it made public — criticizes former intelligence chief Rafi Eytan for not reporting to ministers on the activities of his Scientific Liaison Bureau [SLB] which recruited Pollard to spy for Israel in the United States. It also said Eytan's later appointment, after the Pollard affair came to light, as head of Israel Chemical Industries showed inadequate sensitivity. The report also describes as unreasonable the behavior of Pollard's handler, Air Force Colonel Avi'em Sela'.

Ultimately, the investigating committee decided that the buck stops at the government level and, although satisfied that neither Moshe Arens nor Yitzhaq Rabin as ministers of defense knew of the Pollard project until it became public, it says they bear responsibility for the activity of their subordinates and failed to carry out periodic checks and reassessments necessary to keep the SLB under control. It also blamed the present and former prime ministers — Shamir, Rabin, and Peres — for not responding properly when the affair came to light. The three acting as one, the report says, took insufficient steps to discover all the facts, with the result that following the decision to cooperate with Washington in investigating the case, incomplete information was passed to the United States, resulting in the loss of credibility for Israel.

All this was accepted by the three, who said they would advise the full Cabinet to do likewise. Peres, who was prime minister when Pollard was uncovered by U.S. agents, said he took full responsibility for his actions, which he regarded as having been correct. He made it clear that he regarded the Rotenstreich investigation as the only meaningful probe into the affair. The Knesset subcommittee of Abba Eban, he said, was rendered invalid by its political nature. Yitzhaq Rabin echoed Peres' comments:

[Rabin] I believe it is a political committee, and political considerations were in their mind. This is my simple answer to whatever they said.

[Weizman] The report is to be presented to the full Cabinet in a little over an hour from now. As during the Inner Cabinet meeting, there are likely to be arguments between ministers, but it is generally expected that despite that the government will follow the Inner Cabinet recommendations and adopt the Rotenstreich report. [end recording]

**Full Cabinet Approval**

*TA270855 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew*  
 0830 GMT 27 May 87

[Text] The Cabinet decided to accept last night's Inner Cabinet recommendation to adopt the Rotenstreich-Tzur report on the Pollard affair. This decision was reached against the opposition of Ministers Levi, Moda'i, and Ya'aqobi, and with the abstention of four ministers. We will now hear Cabinet Secretary Elyaqim Rubinstein read the Cabinet decision:

[Begin recording] [Rubinstein] The Cabinet met in the framework of the ministerial committee on security affairs to discuss the fact-finding committee's report on the Pollard case, and decided to approve last night's Inner Cabinet decision.

[Unidentified correspondent] What is the meaning of this decision, Mr Rubinstein?

[Rubinstein] As is known, last night the Inner Cabinet decided to recommend that the Cabinet adopt the fact-finding committee's recommendations, and the decision means that the Cabinet approved this recommendation.

[Correspondent] Why were the ministers not permitted to read the actual report?

[Rubinstein] As far as I know, the ministers may read the report.

[Correspondent] But some of the Cabinet ministers bear responsibility without even knowing what the final report states.

[Rubinstein] I do not think that the Cabinet decision should be interpreted in such a manner. I think that the decision, which was reached by a large majority, reflects the general understanding of the ministers, who supported it. This is the Cabinet decision as it stands.

[Correspondent] Mr Rubinstein, why was it not stated simply that the Cabinet approves the Rotenstreich report and bears responsibility for the Pollard affair?

[Rubinstein] I think that what was stated is self-explanatory — that is, in view of the fact that the Inner Cabinet recommended that the Cabinet adopt the conclusions and that these conclusions have been made public, the meaning of the decision is clear. [end recording]

The Cabinet ministers were not permitted to read the classified portion of the report, but it was agreed that following the Cabinet meeting the report would be placed in the Cabinet Secretariat, and only there will the ministers be permitted to read the classified part.

**Eban Reports Committee Findings to Knesset**  
*TA262200 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew*  
*1946 GMT 26 May 87*

[Statement by Knesset Member Abba Eban upon the publication of the Eban Committee findings into the Pollard affair, at the Knesset — live, broadcast in progress]

[Text] ...of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. By the way, I am not surprised that you prefer the somewhat pretentious name I use, the Eban Committee, when the alternative is using the full name of this subcommittee. Deputy Chairman Knesset Member [MK] Mikha Harish, MK David Magen, and MK Ehud Olmert, together with me represent here the majority of the subcommittee. I want to respond to questions, but I will try to review briefly the contents of the report, which we concluded today following 10 weeks of ongoing efforts. During these 2 and 1/2 months, we have accumulated thousands of pages and hundreds of hours of work, and it is impossible for all this work to be reflected in the slim report we are presenting to you.

The first comment is that this report is an open report. Behind it there is a secret report in which there is a great amount of knowledge and information about the operation of the intelligence systems. I hope that within a week or two we will complete the preparation of the secret report. However, it will be presented only for the perusal of the heads of the intelligence and security services, and also to the three ministers who control these systems. I will limit my remarks to the contents and meaning of the open report, which is published today.

First a note on this phenomenon: This is actually the first time that a parliamentary subcommittee has taken upon itself the initiative to examine, clarify and sum up an issue that is under internal controversy and has far-reaching external ramifications. Let me tell you frankly that there were many who doubted — on the basis of the structure of the Israeli system — whether MK's could free themselves from certain links — partisan and political — in order to make decisions while ignoring to a certain extent that they are under subordinate. I have never ignored the weight of these apprehensions. I think, however, that we see here the ability to rise above and free oneself from the kind of subordination which, from the nature of things, might have prevented the fulfillment of the roles of criticism and supervision by MK's in Israel. Second, we have reached a unified report. It is true that there were several reservations and suggestions to add certain information. In certain places there were even differences of opinion, and this is clearly reflected in these pages. However, on the great majority of issues, six MK's who are in Israel — naturally I wish success and a long life to our colleague Dr Burg, whose travels from Frankfurt to Budapest, Zurich, Madrid, Buenos Aires, and San Paulo I have followed with interest —

took upon ourselves this job. Also, we did not need to decide upon issues on the basis of one vote.

I want to open with the finding I believe to be the central one, especially, perhaps, in the eyes of the viewers, listeners, and readers abroad. Let me read this clause: We have investigated the basic issue of whether the political echelon did not know, and following a most thorough investigation and even every effort to find information that might contradict the assumption — after all, the importance and fatefulness of this announcement is clear in terms of our international relations and the public image of Israel — here are our conclusions. All the evidence brought to the committee by all the witnesses concerned with the matter indeed confirm beyond any doubt the conclusion that the operational levels — that is, the Science Liaison Bureau (SLB) headed by Rafi Eytan — decided on the recruitment and handling of Pollard without any checking, consultations, or receiving authority directly or indirectly from the political echelon. In my opinion this announcement, that the political echelon did not know about this operation, directly or indirectly, is the basis for understanding all the other clauses.

Nevertheless we should move to a clause which balances the impression of this announcement. Here we have for the first time, by the way, an independent institution which came in contact with various elements who supposedly had an interest in proving that the political echelon knew about this matter, because if this were the case, they — the state employees — would have been freed from all suspicions. I believe and hope that this finding will receive publicity. However, does this mean that this was a so-called unauthorized operation, what is known in English as a rogue operation [last two words in English]? The committee states unequivocally that this was not a rogue operation. Despite the fact that those who carry the political responsibility did not know and did not give permission — their permission was not even asked for — nevertheless those who headed this operation were not ordinary citizens; they were state employees who are subject to the Israeli administration, or to be more precise, to the defense establishment. They made all the arrangements, they did all the traveling, and they held all the contacts and debriefings. They used the state funds at their disposal. These people carried the operation under the command of Rafi Eytan, and this means that even though the deciding political echelon was not cognizant of the affair, nevertheless Israel cannot shake off the responsibility. We therefore recommend that Israel announce the following:

I will read the clause: Despite the lack of any ministerial knowledge or approval for the operation, the government would be wise to state unequivocally that the State of Israel admits its responsibility and will continue to act to correct the damages, because some of its employees were involved in this operation.

It is true that this is only a recommendation, but in another clause of the report we express regret that such a reaction...[changes thought] This should have been, to the committee's mind, the immediate reaction to the crisis after it became clear that Pollard was being operated. However, it is not too late, and this is our recommendation.

The word responsibility is the significant word here. Perhaps the lack of this word in Israel's initial reaction, when it was still in a



state of shock, perhaps the absence of this word unnecessarily exacerbated the tension.

Now we come to the person who took it upon himself to conduct this operation. The committee takes a grave view of Rafi Eytan, while noting his achievements and contribution to Israel's security, without any attempt to erase the glory of his past operations. With all this in mind, we state that in this case there was an enormous deviation from all authority. We have here a spectacle of a state employee, without the permission of the minister above him or any other echelon, who conducts this operation, travels internationally, and manages and finances this complicated operation to the point of entangling his country in a grave crisis involving the focal point of its foreign relations. In another place in the report the committee expresses its regret that, during a very sensitive and delicate stage of our dialogue with the United States, Eytan's position was not taken into consideration, to put it mildly. We express regret that nobody had the courage to punish him after his responsibility was uncovered. However, we are not making any recommendations at this point.

Another prominent figure in this drama is Colonel Avi'em Sela' — again, an Israeli hero, given his contribution to our aviation systems. However, despite our acknowledgement of those virtues, we express regret for the very fact that an Air Force officer was involved in an area remote from his area of expertise or the field with which he was acquainted. We regret that he himself failed to do enough to cut himself off from this irregular arena where, much as one may be brilliant in one area, his lack of brilliance and resourcefulness in a totally different area stands out. A brave and brilliant pilot, commander, and fighter he may be, yet he is no success story — indeed, why should he be a success story? — in this arena of intelligence. So we were displeased with his performance in this sphere and were likewise unhappy that he was sent out on several missions for which — he must be duly credited — he sought and obtained permission. Here we express the hope that those whose permission he needed to have — mainly the commander of the Air Force and the chief of staff — will in the future, in principle, refuse to allow military officers to be involved in this area. We applaud Defense Minister Rabin's announcement that he has already reached this conclusion, and we welcome his announcement that in the future IDF officers from all the branches will not be allowed to become involved in activities outside the IDF's purview — unless, of course, they obtain clear license not from military commanders but from the defense minister. That is to say, here we saw very vigorous, unauthorized activity by civil servants, two of whom I mentioned. I must unfortunately be consistent and state that the kind of supervisory mechanism that would have been called for from the Defense Ministry, particularly from its then director general, did not function and no supervision was carried out. Supervisory bodies did exist, as did committees, but they were not active. Had they operated, one could safely assume that these control committees would have enlightened the Defense Ministry directorate and the minister himself about the existence of activity that should have been seen as irregular. Again, that activity did take place free of any supervision, follow-up, or control, with nobody telling people what to do or giving them directions as to where they were heading, or what their chief missions should be.

Now we finally get to two questions. In view of our certainty that the operation was carried out by civil servants, what does this mean in terms of the responsibility of ministers, Cabinet members? According to the prevailing doctrine in Israel, as formulated by, among others, the honorable Justice Agranat in 1973, ignorance cannot be taken as an excuse to relieve the political echelon of its responsibility for operations carried out without its knowledge. The logic behind this is that the minister must establish a climate or atmosphere, by way of directives as well as standing orders, that make it clear to all his subordinates that they must report to the political echelon and the minister himself and never assume that they have license to carry out such missions, undertake excessive initiative, or be presumptuous in evaluating the range of permissible initiative. Besides, even in the absence of written directives, common sense would have required that a person dealing in sensitive and delicate matters refrain from engaging in them without consulting with the minister. In other words, there exists a certain stratum comprising extremely talented — occasionally even most brilliant — civil servants who believe that the political echelon should not be bothered, and they thereby assume too much. We hope that the criticism leveled here at this phenomenon will be acknowledged by the entire administrative system in Israel; hence the central complaint about ministers, particularly the two defense ministers who served during the time that Pollard was active.

Actually, the chief complaint is that, their ignorance notwithstanding, they should have implemented supervisory control and follow-up procedures and evinced greater curiosity, asking from time to time what this or that person was doing — particularly when confronted with a man like Rafi Eytan who is resourceful and very brilliant. A minister should assume that it is precisely brilliant, resourceful people who could be a risk, thereby justifying extra alertness, as less shining people might be less capable of putting themselves and others in jeopardy by going overboard in such a fashion. Thus, first of all with regard to Defense Minister Arens, during whose term Pollard began to be active under the guidance of Rafi Eytan, and later Minister Yitzhaq Rabin, who for 15 months allowed this phenomenon of Pollard to continue without his knowledge, the committee states that, had they implemented the appropriate and adequate supervisory means as well as a measure of nagging curiosity, it would have been possible for them to know. This is stated with reference to Minister Rabin and the activation of Pollard. Certainly had he known, he would no doubt have taken the necessary action regarding the operation, the rule being that the members of the political echelon occasionally stated in their appearances before us: Certainly if I had known, I would have stopped this; I would have put an end to it. Therefore, the lack of knowledge was really one of the reasons for the complication. We consequently noted that ministerial responsibility applies to Minister Arens with respect to his term, and to Minister Rabin with respect to his term.

I must say that parliamentary responsibility, of course, means that the responsibility actually filters upward and ends in fact at the top. Incidentally, however, this does not necessarily require any conclusion to be drawn; and whether or not conclusions are drawn, this no doubt does not depend on our committee and is

not something that is done automatically. It depends on the people themselves, the Knesset, and the political system.

I will therefore preempt you and would like to answer a question you have as yet had no time to ask because I have not let you do so, a question which has nonetheless been so frequently raised: A rather strange atmosphere prevailed in Israel as regards the work of the subcommittee. I have seen a collection of caricatures and for 1 week I had the honor of featuring in the image of an executioner operating the guillotine. The next day I was shown standing by the gallows. This morning someone portrayed me side by side with a kind of weapon that catapults rocks and shatters things, implying that the investigation of the committee is almost an act of war, knocking people over. This has no justification whatsoever, and this is not the kind of power either a parliamentary or any other committee has. In one article we emphasized in no uncertain terms that our committee is not a legal committee and consequently cannot set legal procedures or norms in motion. It therefore has no intention of passing personal judgment on any person, be he a civil servant or a member of the political echelon; furthermore, it is devoid of the power to do so. We do not determine the fates of people. This is not our job and we are unauthorized to do so. I am afraid that I have just caused many of the other caricaturists, who granted this notion of a fact-finding committee [va'adat bediqa] a certain macabre aura, some disappointment. Only the Knesset can deal with such things, and I have never heard in the annals of any nation that a subcommittee, respectable though it may be, can make or break governments.

[Replying to an interjection by an unidentified speaker, who says: That may not be a bad idea!] I must have tempted my colleague here to express himself. No, under no circumstances. This is a totally different issue.

The last article I will address regards the period that followed the exposure and arrest of Pollard. Here, of course, the period of lack of knowledge ended and the political echelon started acting. Here we experienced an internal dispute in the committee, which I assume was also reflected in the country as a whole: My colleagues and I actually saw fit to praise the activity of the political echelon at the initial stage of this period, as the basic resolution was first of all to rehabilitate relations with the United States and reach an understanding with it. This was the backdrop for U.S. missions in Israel and contacts between the three senior ministers with U.S. Secretary of State Mr Shultz on all levels, followed by commitments to cooperate, pull back missiles, call to account [last three words in English] all those involved, and dismantle the unit that included some people involved in this issue. My colleagues and I think that this activity was not only positive, but almost crowned with success, and that relations of faith and trust were truly reestablished. For months it seemed as though the tension had evaporated, until the fire rekindled. But this is not to say that the initial action was unsuccessful. So why did it ignite once more? Because an error was committed that actually weakened Israel's credibility, particularly as Colonel Sela' was never called to account and there was even talk about promoting him in rank and in position. Those of us who visited the United States could see how this rather unimpressive match sparked off a fire of great excitement.

There were other phenomena, which are outlined in the report, that caused U.S. anger, which seemed to have subsided, then rekindled. There were several tactical and operational mishaps. In public speeches the impression was created that Israel did not regard the U.S. issue too seriously. We obviously paid for these mistakes. We note, however, that at the end of the process basic relations with the United States have not been harmed and we are on the path of recovery. However, we noted the mistakes. One of them, as I have said, was the promotion of Sela'. There were others: the fact that Rafi Eytan's operation was not investigated, and as a result of this Israeli representatives gave strange testimonies, stemming from a lack of knowledge. And what do we have to say about the issue of responsibility here? Since the three ministers have announced that they consider themselves a team and that there is great solidarity, we say this — and people say that perhaps there is something new here — we do not speak about parliamentary [preceding word in English] responsibility for the mistakes; we speak about parliamentary responsibility for the decisions that were made. However, this responsibility of the three ministers is for the good decisions as well as for those that did not succeed. We are saying that the three ministers as a team are responsible for these decisions, the positive decisions as well as those that did not succeed. However, on the basis of the workings of the Inner Cabinet, we are saying that, despite this being a very tight triumvirate, there is nevertheless a concept of first among equals, and someone who serves as prime minister carries more responsibility and authority for decisions, both good and bad. I believe that I have expressed what my colleagues and myself think about the central issues. At this point I am available for your questions. I also hope that some of my colleagues will participate. [IDF Radio ends live coverage]

**Peres Interviewed on Committee Reports**  
TA270624 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew  
0515 GMT 27 May 87

[Telephone interview with Shim'on Peres, vice prime minister and foreign minister, by Mikha Friedman and Ilana Dayan — live]

[Text] [Friedman] Vice Prime Minister Shim'on Peres, good morning to you.

[Peres] Good morning.

[Friedman] The Eban committee's statement that the prime minister is first among equals and thus has greater parliamentary responsibility in fact lays most of the burden of responsibility on your shoulders.

[Peres] Responsibility for what?

[Friedman] For an act or blunder concerning the Pollard affair. Are you prepared to bear this responsibility?

[Peres] Just a moment, sir. You did not read the report.

[Friedman] Yes, so perhaps you could correct us.

[Peres] It lays responsibility on me as first among equals only after the Pollard affair broke.

[Friedman] And you are prepared to bear this responsibility?

[Peres] Definitely.

[Dayan] When you say that you are prepared to bear responsibility — and you said the same several minutes after the Eban report was released — what substance do you attribute to this responsibility?

[Peres] To be a proper vice prime minister. I do not think that Ehud Olmert and Eliyahu Ben-Elisar understand how to handle the United States better than I do. They may think so, and I may think differently. I bear greater responsibility, but they do not have greater wisdom. In this case, we are all more or less equal. I think I acted correctly. I assume the responsibility, and I have no need to apologize. Of course, I have my own question: Let us say that I am the first among equals; are the other equals not equal? In this instance, there was an explicit partisan approach but I have no need — neither personal nor parliamentary — to shirk one iota of my responsibility. I am convinced now, too, that I acted correctly and with political wisdom, and in my opinion I rescued the country from an extremely grave and difficult situation. It would of course be incorrect to say that this was very pleasant. I also have another question to put to the parliamentary committee: They were, after all, party to all these decisions at the time. They are not the public audit committee. Why did they not raise their voices against this policy at the time?

[Dayan] Did they know all the details, Mr Peres?

[Peres] I think they did.

[Friedman] Mr Peres, yesterday you said you are prepared to accept the recommendations of the Rotenstreich-Tzur committee which determined that the entire government bears collective responsibility. There are people who do not understand exactly how it is possible that the transportation and religious affairs ministers can be responsible to the same degree as the defense minister and the prime minister. This calls for an explanation.

[Peres] Everyone bears collective responsibility in a parliamentary regime. This is nothing new.

[Friedman] But for this there was no need to set up a committee.

[Peres] When something happens in the agricultural sector, the entire government also bears responsibility. The committee could have found that one individual bears more specific responsibility, but it did not do this.

[Dayan] Mr Peres, do you believe that the responsibility as assigned by both the Rotenstreich and Eban committees will satisfy the Americans, for whom, after all, the committees were also established?

[Peres] I do not think that we have to satisfy the Americans. I think that we must satisfy the truth. I only hope that the media will be precise in what was said. Here, you started off the morning

by saying that I am more responsible for the Pollard affair than others. This is completely untrue and was not stated by either of the two committees.

[Friedman] Then we apologize for that and retract it.

[Peres] That is very good of you, but you must ensure that your remarks are accurate in the future, because not only ministers but also journalists and Knesset members must be very precise in such matters.

[Friedman] We have no argument with that.

[Peres] Alright.

[Friedman] With the release of the reports by the two committees, do you consider the affair over?

[Peres] Yes, I think so. There is much malicious joy, of course, and the matter will certainly continue to reverberate somewhat. A severe blunder occurred; the committee asks how this mishap could have happened — both committees say this. As for myself, I repeat: I bear the entire responsibility; I am not apologizing, and I have no regrets. I think that the three Likud committee members were biased when they said that I did not tell the truth. How do they know what the truth was? How do they know what I knew?

[Dayan] The three Alignment members said in response that you said what you knew at the time as had been reported to you.

[Peres] Correct. I said what I knew at the time. How does Ben-Elisar know what I knew or did not know?

[Dayan] And in retrospect, did it become clear to you that what you knew was not the truth?

[Peres] Not only did it become clear to me but to everyone, including the committee. They mention this; they say that several people were not very accurate.

[Dayan] Do you know who was not accurate in reporting to you?

[Peres] I know exactly who was not accurate; I definitely know who it was.

[Friedman] Mr Peres, let us perhaps address one point which appears to us a matter of principle. The more moderate or let us say balanced report by the Rotenstreich-Tzur committee also mentions the word blunder, which is collectively attributed to the entire government. Is it comfortable living with this feeling?

[Peres] Of course not. But look, there are areas, in the field of communications for example, in which blunders occur. Blunders certainly occur in places, but there are also tremendous achievements I would like everything to be perfect. I am not so sure that perfection is evident in any sphere of life.

[Friedman] And should politicians be judged by the public, as Rotenstreich and Tzur claim, in the event of a blunder?



[Peres] Not unless they violated the law. I do not perceive any violation in this case. Say Messrs Ben-Elisar, David Magen, and Ehud Olmert believe the Americans should not have been given what was conveyed to them — that is their right. Incidentally, Mr Shamir thought as I did; Rabin thought the same; and the Inner Cabinet approved this.

[Dayan] You are referring to the return of the documents?

[Peres] Yes. When did they become so clever? Just because they call themselves a committee?

[Dayan] Mr Peres, in trying to summarize the last few hours and the committees' reports and what you said, mainly about the Eban committee, do you perhaps think that this committee's findings will ultimately cause damage?

[Peres] I am not in the habit of handing out grades. I noticed that, according to the media, there was a dispute within the committee up until the last moment. I have no idea what happened in the committee. Incidentally, here is another story: The Likud members came out and said: We were not pressured. During this entire period, I did not exchange one word with Eban, for good or bad, on this matter. Thus, I do not need to hand out grades. This is a parliamentary committee that will submit

its conclusions. I have not changed my opinion. I behaved correctly and, in my opinion, wisely and courageously. I assume that the three Likud members have a great deal of wisdom, but they are also influenced by additional considerations. That is all.

[Dayan] Mr Peres, we thank you very much.

[Peres] All the best.

**USSR Said To Agree on Two Conference Conditions**  
*TA270418 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew*  
0400 GMT 27 May 87

[Text] The Soviet Union accepts the principle that an international conference would not impose its will on Israel and its neighbors and that the negotiations would be conducted in a bilateral framework. This emerged from contacts at the United Nations between Israeli and Soviet representatives. Our correspondent in Washington reports that the Soviets made it clear that they regard 1987 as the target date for the convening of the conference. The Soviet Union does not consider it essential that the negotiations also deal with a Palestinian state, but it insists on the participation of a PLO representation in the talks.

**Rotenstreich-Tzur Committee Report Released**  
 TA281435 Jerusalem GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE  
 in English 27 May 87

["Report of the Rotenstreich-Tzur Committee on the Pollard Case; Communicated in English by the Prime Minister's Media Adviser" — GPO headline]

[Text] On the eleventh of Adar 5747, 12 March 1987, the prime minister appointed the following persons to serve as a two-member investigation commission into the Pollard case.

Following is the letter of appointment:

Jerusalem 11th Adar 5747  
 12th March 1987

To Advocate Dr Yehoshu'a Rotenstreich  
 Rav Aluf [Lieutenant General] (res) Tzvi Tzur

Letter of Appointment [Subhead]

A. On tenth Adar 5747 (3.11.87) the Cabinet decided to appoint a two-member investigation commission into the Pollard case.

B. In accordance with this decision I have the honor to appoint you with your consent, as an investigation commission into this subject. Dr Rotenstreich will serve as chairman of the commission.

C. In pursuit of your mission, you are authorized to receive any information both oral and written deemed necessary in your judgment concerning this case and from any person you think fit.

D. Your deliberations will be governed by the rules of secrecy pertaining to the preservation of the security of the state and its foreign relations.

E. I would be grateful if you were to present your report to the government through me, as soon as possible, including any recommendations you deem fit.

Yours sincerely,  
 Yitzhaq Shamir

The Report [Subhead]

Preamble

1. The commission held 35 sessions during which it interviewed 23 witnesses, several of whom were summoned several times to verify testimonies which had been given; in addition the commission held many meetings which were dedicated to internal discussions of its members. The commission also talked to various persons with a view to benefiting from information in their possession.

2. It should be emphasized that all the witnesses summoned by the commission appeared before it and, to the best of its knowledge, the testimonies given were complete. The commission

examined many documents and received every document it requested.

3. Whereas the matters considered by the commission touch upon the security of the state, the commission recommends that the report as a whole be classified "top secret" and that only the following part be released to the public.

4. It should be recalled that several of those involved in this matter have been indicted in the U.S.A. whereas others are still subject to a process of annulling immunity granted to them. For this reason, and in order not to infringe upon the personal rights of those involved to protect their own interests, the commission has confined itself to this form of publishing its conclusions, and it asks the understanding of the public for this step it has taken.

Extract of the Conclusions of the Investigation Commission for the Pollard Case [Subhead]

5. The Pollard affair began in the first half of 1984 and ended towards the end of 1985.

6. At that time the "Office of Scientific Liaison" (hereafter LEKEM), the organ responsible for recruiting and running Pollard, was headed by Refa'el Eytan.

7. The ministers of defense during that period were Mr M. Arens (from 2.24.83 to 9.13.84) and Mr Y. Rabin (as of September 1984).

8. After the arrest of Pollard, government activity in the matter was concentrated in the hands of then prime minister (S. Peres), the vice prime minister and minister of foreign affairs (Y. Shamir) and the minister of defense (Y. Rabin).

9. The above three ministers appointed a professional team to handle contacts with U.S. authorities on the affair. The team reported to the same three ministers and acted on their instructions.

Refa'el Eytan [Subhead]

10. When Refa'el Eytan was appointed to his position as head of LEKEM, he already had a most commendable career in security affairs and a vast experience in the field of intelligence.

11. Notwithstanding his claim that a part of the modus operandi of LEKEM was not to his liking, he did not act sufficiently to change the situation.

12. In spite of the fact that he sometimes initiated meetings with the political level, he did not consult with the relevant ministers on the recruitment and running of Pollard.

13. There was no room for the recruitment and running of Pollard.

14. There is room for criticism of the way LEKEM was administered during that period. At the same time Refa'el Eytan served, for a part of the period, as adviser to the prime minister on terrorist affairs and also dealt with other matters.

15. In the circumstances, the decision to dissolve LEKEM was correct. Refa'el Eytan was removed from the defense establishment after many years of service. This is to be viewed as very severe punishment.

16. The ministers who appointed Refa'el Eytan as chairman of the board of directors of Israel Chemicals Ltd, following the dissolution of LEKEM and the release of Mr Eytan from the defense establishment, did not show adequate sensitivity concerning the reverberations that this appointment might generate against the background of the affair.

#### Colonel Avi'em Sela' [Subhead]

17. The conduct of Colonel Avi'em Sela' was not reasonable during certain stages of the Pollard affair. His entanglement was, in part, the result of an excessive initiative to be involved in the Pollard case.

18. The pressures brought to bear on the chief of the General Staff and the minister of defense to promote Colonel Sela' and to appoint him commander of Tel Nof base, appear to us, and this is an understatement, unjustified. His resignation from this post, in view of the criticism that this appointment engendered both in Israel and abroad, appears to us to have been correct.

#### Responsibility of the Political Level During the Period Pollard Was Run [Subhead]

19. Pollard was recruited and run during the tenure of Minister M. Arens as minister of defense and continued to be run during the tenure of minister Y. Rabin as minister of defense. The difference between the two is the length of their tenure during the period of the Pollard case.

20. The two above ministers knew neither of the recruitment and running of Pollard, nor of the place of his employment and, obviously they were not asked to approve his recruitment.

21. The oversight system of the Ministry of Defense over LEKEM operated in a most partial manner, and did not monitor its activities closely.

22. Periodic checks and reassessments of the targets of the tasks and of operational policy of LEKEM were not carried out.

#### Responsibility of the Political Level For Handling the Pollard Affair Following His Arrest [Subhead]

23. The prime minister (S. Peres), the vice prime minister and minister of foreign affairs (Y. Shamir) and the minister of defense (Y. Rabin) acted in this manner as a united team which decided jointly on all lines of action.

24. The political level did not make a sufficient report to determine the necessary facts, in order that they might serve as a basis for decisions taken which were pertinent to the matter.

25. However, the decision in itself, which was taken at that time, to cooperate with U.S. authorities in investigating the case, appears to us as reasonable.

26. The professional team which was entrusted with dealing with the issue, questioned a part of those involved but did not consider that it was charged with the task of carrying out a complete debrief of the affair.

27. It is for this reason that, within the framework of the agreement reached on this matter, the team passed incomplete facts (for lack of sufficient information) to the U.S. authorities and thus damaged our credibility.

28. The criticism we have concerning the three ministers lies in the fact that they did not take sufficient care to determine the facts before they were passed on to the U.S. authorities.

29. However, it should be emphasized that this was the result of pressure of time, the shock of the affair, and the utter surprise with which it caught the political level, coupled with the sincere desire to cooperate with U.S. authorities within understandable security constraints.

#### Conclusions [Subhead]

30. The responsibility of the ministers of defense during the period Pollard was run is responsibility for the commission or omission of their subordinates and for the non-construction of an effective oversight system to monitor LEKEM. The responsibility of the ministers after the arrest is direct responsibility for determining the method of dealing with the affair.

31. In our system the whole government as one body bears responsibility before the Knesset. Whereas every one of the ministers who is charged with a ministry performs a specific function, from the point of view of membership in the government and parliamentary responsibility, every minister is an inseparable part of the overall body which is the government.

32. The government as a whole and every one of the ministers is duty-bound to ascertain that the appropriate conclusions stemming from this report are drawn and that the failures mentioned in it do not reoccur.

33. In our opinion the government as a whole should assume responsibility for the failures mentioned in the report which we have presented, and should announce this in public.

#### Report Annex Places Ministerial Responsibility TA282046 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 2000 GMT 28 May 87

[Text] Dr Yehoshu'a Rotenstreich, the head of the fact-finding committee which investigated the Pollard affair, discloses that an annex to the committee's report talks of ministerial responsibility and not only of collective responsibility. In his opinion, it is desirable that the government publish this annex since it does not contain any classified material. When this annex is published, Dr Rotenstreich said, all will realize that there is no whitewashing in the report, but rather a statement of clear, unequivocal facts.

As for the criticism Knesset Member Abba Eban leveled at the fact-finding committee's report, Dr Rotenstreich said that he greatly appreciates Abba Eban and that Eban is entitled to disagree with him. However, Rotenstreich added, he was afraid Eban did not read the annex attached to his committee's report which contains elements common to those in Eban's report. An ITIM correspondent says Dr Rotenstreich said this this evening upon returning from Switzerland.

**Government Releases Eban Committee Report**  
*TA281555 Jerusalem GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE*  
*in English 27 May 87*

["Report of the Subcommittee of the Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee on Intelligence and Security Services Regarding Jonathan Pollard; Communicated by the Knesset's Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee; released on 26 May 87 at the Knesset" — GPO Headline]

[Text] Part I [Subhead]

[GPO] Editor's Note: The following sections of the report deal specifically with individuals. The page numbers refer to the location of each section in the original report.

Defense Minister Moshe Arens (p.14) [Subhead]

Moshe Arens was minister of defense when Pollard began to transfer information. Minister Arens admitted and maintained that he had exercised no supervision over (Rafi) Eytan, as he was preoccupied with the Lebanon war, that Eytan's involvement in intelligence had come as a surprise to him, that his many meetings with Eytan were devoted to the topic of Shi'ite terrorism, that he had not been briefed on the Scientific Liaison Unit (SLU) when he took over as defense minister, and that the period of overlap between his tenure as defense minister and the Pollard operation had been extremely brief.

Rafi Eytan has a different version. According to him, precisely in August, shortly before handing the ministry over to Yitzhaq Rabin, Arens had heard reports from him (Eytan) which should have led him to increase his alertness.

We believe that the implication is that he did not fulfill imperatives of ministerial responsibility and that responsibility devolves upon him because of this fact.

Yitzhaq Rabin (p. 15) [Subhead]

Yitzhaq Rabin assumed the post of defense minister in September 1984. He served in the post for 14 months of the Pollard affair, so that he had ample opportunity to take note of phenomena which should have caused him concern. For during that period, particularly sensitive intelligence material arrived at a growing pace. Had Rabin exercised appropriate supervision over the activity of the SLU, he would of necessity have noted the grave significance of this material.

Nevertheless, Rabin evinced no effort to maintain procedures of scrutiny or to tighten control, as he was duty-bound to do. During

his term of office, the Pollard affair became a protracted phenomenon without Rabin being aware that the source was Pollard.

These data undoubtedly suggest that his salient personal duty was to exercise proper supervisory means which would have enabled him to know about the running of Pollard and to take the required measures vis-a-vis the operation.

The burden of ministerial responsibility devolving on him is beyond any doubt.

Responsibility of the Political Echelon — After Pollard's Fall (p. 26) [Subhead]

Prime Minister Shim'on Peres, Vice Premier Yitzhaq Shamir, and Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin testified before us that the decisions taken in the period following Pollard's exposure (from 11.22.85 and thereafter) were taken with the concurrence of all three of them.

Hence it follows that the three of them share responsibility for these decisions.

Under the parliamentary system that exists in Israel, the status of the prime minister is as first among equals.

Since Shim'on Peres was the head of the team that dealt with the affair, his parliamentary responsibility is preponderant.

Rafi Eytan (p.8) [Subhead]

1. Rafi Eytan bears full and direct responsibility for the decision to recruit and run Pollard. He did not report this to his superiors, and thus received no approval therefor. He was duty-bound to have understood that an action such as this was liable to imperil important interests of Israel, and to damage the friendly relations between Israel and the United States.

2. Rafi Eytan served the state for many years with unbounded loyalty and unflinching commitment, chalking up to his credit accomplishments in a range of tasks, which contributed to the country's security.

3. The opinion was expressed in the committee that the very fact of Rafi Eytan's appointment to head the SLU was in the nature of a mistake, casting heavy responsibility on the minister in question, Ariel Sharon. Eytan was given the dual position of heading the SLU — which is responsible to the Defense Ministry — and adviser in the war against terrorism, who is responsible to the prime minister.

In this view, an arrangement such as this was practically an invitation to inefficiency and for the danger that the holder of the two positions could easily evade supervision, due to his divided responsibility to two authorities.

With all due weight given to this consideration, a majority of the committee viewed the mistake of the appointment as wisdom after the fact. The majority opinion was that given the circumstance of time, and based on the situation which presented



itself at the time of the appointment, Eytan's appointment was considered to be natural in view of his abilities.

4. On the subject of Pollard, he did not evince wisdom, and even demonstrated injudiciousness, which caused the State of Israel numerous difficulties and harmed Israel-U.S. relations and relations with American Jewry.

Rafi Eytan was punished in that he was removed from his post as head of the SLU and was barred from engaging further in intelligence matters.

#### Avi'em Sela' (p.11) [Subhead]

1. Colonel Avi'em Sela' did not act judiciously as we would have expected of an experienced and high-ranking Israel Air Force officer such as him. Even if he believed — as he did — that he was doing loyal service to the country, common sense should have convinced him not to take part in work in which he lacked expertise.

2. In his appearances before this committee, Col Sela' was neither clear, consistent nor precise.

3. With this, it is incumbent upon us to recall that Col Sela', an outstanding pilot and exceptional commander, was personally punished in a harsh manner. It is doubtful whether he will receive his doctorate from New York University, since he can no longer return to the U.S.; he did not get the Air Force promotion he was supposed to get; he was forced to resign his control of the Tel Nof base; a large question mark hangs over the future of his career in the Air Force.

#### The Approvals Given for Sela's Involvement (p.12) [Subhead]

The IAF commander and the former chief of staff applied faulty judgment in this affair. They acceded to Col Avi'em Sela's request without carrying out a comprehensive check of their own so as to verify that a senior officer was not being used for a mission that would exceed his domain of command.

Approval should not be given for using a career-army officer within an intelligence framework outside the IDF, without the advance permission of the defense minister. It is to be regretted that former Chief of Staff Moshe Levi did not act accordingly in this affair.

We take note with satisfaction of the defense minister's announcement on the subject of utilizing army officers.

#### Part II. What Did the Political Echelon Know? (p.6) [Subhead]

When Pollard's arrest was reported, Prime Minister Shim'on Peres announced that in question is an operation which was carried out without the knowledge or approval of the political echelon. This was conveyed to U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz in an official and binding manner in a telephone conversation between Shultz and Peres which took place on the night between 30 November and 1 December 1985. A communique along these lines was also issued to the press.

The question whether the political echelon knew about Pollard's handling is such a significant point as far as national credibility and international ramifications are concerned, that we went to great lengths in order to clarify it completely. We did not hesitate to question all those who were capable of shedding light on the possibility that the political echelon did know, if such a possibility existed. We did not ignore the fact that some persons who appeared before the subcommittee would have personally benefited, by the nature of things, had it been possible to pin direct responsibility for their knowledge of the situation on one or more Cabinet members.

The clarification of this matter which we conducted led to the following conclusion which the committee accepted: The sum total of the evidence brought before the committee by all the witnesses concerned confirms beyond all doubt the conclusion that the operational echelons (namely: the Scientific Liaison Unit headed by Rafi Eytan) decided to recruit and handle Pollard without any check or consultation with the political echelon or receiving its direct or indirect approval.

The committee heard the contention that in intelligence operations of a certain kind it is best not to inform the responsible political echelon about exact details, the nature of the sources and the description of operations, and that it is preferable that the persons in the field refrain from requesting approval in advance from the political echelon for recruiting sensitive sources.

The committee rejects this stand as a rule. Although the head of an intelligence branch has discretionary power in exercising his authority, even in sensitive cases, as a rule he must report to the responsible political echelon in charge and/or to ask for its approval, since otherwise this echelon will be deprived of the capability to fulfill its duty of efficient supervision and of the possibility to prevent certain operations.

#### Rogue Operation or State Responsibility? (p.7) [Subhead]

Following Pollard's exposure, the Israel Government announced that in question was an operation carried out without the approval or knowledge of the political echelon. Subsequently, the operation was described as a "rogue operation," carried out privately by unauthorized persons.

The statement about the political echelon not knowing and not granting its approval is correct, whereas the description of the operation as "rogue" is baseless.

It is incontrovertible fact that the decision to handle Pollard as he was handled, as well as all the stages of implementation extending across a year and a half, were carried out by civil servants who received their appointments and drew their authority from the government, and more precisely, from Israel's defense establishment. All the actions of the operational personnel and the sums transferred to Pollard himself, derived from state resources without the approval or knowledge of the political echelon.

That the political echelon did not know and did not grant approval cannot annul the responsibility of the Israel Government in the situation which was created.

The assertion that the political echelon did not know is true, but it does not solve the problem of the national and ministerial responsibility deriving from the involvement of official personnel subordinate to the political echelon. The principle "noblesse oblige" is not satisfied if a rule is laid down that in every blunder or hitch only civil servants shall be subject to invigilation, while the responsible persons in the political echelon abandon them in the field.

The government has already implicitly recognized its responsibility: a) by undertaking to correct the situation; b) by undertaking to dismantle the unit which exceeded its authority; c) by pledging to call those responsible to order; d) by publishing the defense minister's apology on behalf of the government.

Despite the absence of any ministerial knowledge or approval for the operation, the government would do well to state unequivocally that Israel admits its responsibility and will continue to act to correct the damage, since some of its officials were involved in this operation.

### Part III. The Decision on Cooperation With the United States (p.19) [Subhead]

On the night between 30 November and 1 December (1985), at 0330 hours, the U.S. secretary of state phoned Israel's Prime Minister Shim'on Peres. In this talk the two discussed the nature of the cooperation between Israel and the U.S. in this affair.

The committee members are divided as to the significance of some of the commitments pertaining to this cooperation.

#### Stand of Committee Members Eban, Dinitz and Harish [Subhead]

The report about the exposure and arrest of Jonathan Pollard confronted the Government of Israel with a highly distressful situation. The impression was created that Israel had behaved towards the friendliest power ever known by the Jewish people in a manner incommensurate with the tradition of friendship, and with the values and interests shared by the two peoples. Apart from the bitterness and sadness which were reflected in the administration's stand, a media campaign extremely hostile to Israel developed. The prime minister and the vice premier held urgent consultations which were joined by the defense minister immediately upon his return to Israel from abroad. The three personages explained to the Inner Cabinet, to the public on many occasions, and to this committee, that they view themselves as the members of a team all of whom share responsibility for all the decisions taken; they did not make any objection or put forward any reservation about any of (those decisions). Our perusal of their statements before this committee turns up not a single crack or impediment in the approach or strategy they recommended.

The urgency of the pressure exerted by the U.S. to clarify the matter, together with salient indications that the political echelon

in the U.S. sincerely wished to contain and extinguish the blaze, compelled the three ministers to turn their attention urgently to the American front. To that end a committee of examination was established (Avraham Shalom, Hanan Bar-On and lawyer Ram Kaspi) to clarify and deal with the problems created with the U.S.

Beginning on 22 April (sic) internal consultations and exchanges of messages took place with the secretary of state in an effort to calm the administration and reach cooperation. A key milestone in the evolution of the Israeli strategy was a conversation held in the early morning hours (30 November-1 December) when Secretary of State Shultz phoned Prime Minister Peres. In this talk the prime minister clarified the following points to Mr Shultz:

a) Pollard was an aberrant situation, the political echelon was unaware of the matter, an unauthorized initiative had taken place without any official approval whatsoever; b) Israel undertakes full cooperation; c) Israel will allow free access to the Israelis involved; d) Israel will punish those responsible; e) the unit whose personnel involved themselves in the operation will be disbanded; f) Israel will return documents it received via Pollard.

These commitments were not unreserved. The prime minister requested that the interpretation to be placed on his undertakings be discussed between Hanan Bar-On, on behalf of Israel, and Under-Secretary of State Armacost on behalf of the United States.

Yitzhaq Shamir, who was then vice premier and foreign minister, informed us regarding the conversation that "there were consultations. It was clear that we were going to full cooperation in order to conclude the episode."

To the committee members' question about where it had been decided to return the documents and allow testimonies, Shamir replied that "this was spoken about in the meetings...Mr Peres spoke with the secretary of state about returning documents because they maintained this was American property. There was also talk about questioning Israelis, but this was also spoken of earlier. It was not something that popped into Peres' mind during the conversation."

The three ministers were and remain in agreement in giving backing to what Mr Peres told Mr Shultz in their phone conversation and in all decisions taken in the matter.

Our view is that the decision taken was the right decision, and that there was place for the phone conversation with Mr Shultz. After all, in Mr. Peres' eyes, Mr Shultz was — and justly so — not only the foreign minister of the country that was harmed, but was also a friend of Israel's seeking to extricate the relations of the two countries from the distress afflicting them. Moreover, the two ministers did not give Shultz an open-ended pledge. They put forward restrictions and reservations, making their activity contingent upon the protection of Israel's security and intelligence interests. They also placed restrictions on the place and form of the questioning. Furthermore, the three ministers made the cooperation contingent upon the granting of immunity to the three persons involved in the affair, and upon American agreement that the returned documents would not be used to convict Pollard.

These moves prevented a debacle and forged tight cooperation with Secretary of State Shultz. The senior political echelon in the U.S. reacted positively to the conversation with Mr Peres and to the messages that followed in its wake. Mr Peres and Mr Shamir received messages from Mr Shultz which were steeped in esteem and exuded friendship, evincing a desire on his part to contain the affair. There were grounds for believing that the tension was dissipating and that relations with the U.S. would (again be) smooth. It is difficult to describe as a blunder a diplomatic move which was crowned with this degree of success. The alternative to this policy would have generated a serious setback in relations between Israel and the U.S. with all that this entails. It would have generated an extreme and furious reaction by all the elements of American society, would have thrust Israel into a confrontation with Secretary of State Shultz and thereby with the White House as well. The result would have been reactions against Israel both among public opinion and in the Congress.

A few months later the situation again became embroiled, but the factors that caused this did not derive from the decision taken by the prime minister, vice premier, and defense minister to cooperate, or from the actual commitment which Mr Peres made to Mr Shultz. This aggravation did not stem from a strategy which the government adopted at the outset of the crisis. Its source lay in a mistake made by the committee of examination, which did not succeed in putting the entire picture before the political echelon, including the part of Col Avi'em Sela' in the affair, as well as several tactical and informational mistakes.

The foundations of the alliance with the United States are firm and deep, and Israel's policy of cooperation prevented harm being done to the central components of the friendship which the government and people of the United States feel for Israel.

#### Stand of Committee Members Ben-Elisar, Olmert and Magen: [Subhead]

On the night between 30 November and 1 December 1985, at 0330 hours, Secretary of State Shultz phoned Prime Minister Shim'on Peres. During their conversation Mr Peres agreed to spell out Israel's modes of cooperation with the U.S. in the affair. At the conclusion of the conversation, Mr Peres gave undertakings in a number of subjects:

1. The Israelis involved in the affair would be questioned by a representative of the U.S. Government.
2. The Pollard documents would be returned to the U.S.
3. The Scientific Liaison Unit would be disbanded and its personnel dismissed.
4. Disciplinary measures would be taken against those responsible for the affair.

There is no doubt that it was the duty of the Israel Government to propose immediate cooperation with the U.S. Government in the wake of Pollard's exposure, in addition to a full and unequivocal apology. The circumstances of Pollard's exposure, the justified American outrage, the fear of a serious blow to Israel-U.S. relations: all these justified an approach of cooper-

ation on this subject. The question is what should have been the manner and scope of the cooperation Israel should have proposed. Prime Minister Shim'on Peres's agreement to return the documents which had been brought by Pollard, was fundamentally wrong and caused extremely serious damage. These documents constituted the basis which led to Pollard's conviction and the life sentence imposed on him, and this despite an Israeli contention that an American commitment existed not to use them against Pollard. The incomplete ability to live up to the undertaking to return the documents caused a crisis of confidence between the U.S. and Israel.

The prime minister did not heed the advice of those who were dealing with the matter on his behalf, who believed that it was not possible to return these documents.

The decision to return the documents was not preceded by any discussion within the framework of the ministerial team or in any other forum. We found no minutes of any advance consultation, meeting, discussion or even telephone conversation in which this move was agreed on.

On the day following the conversation, the prime minister reported it to the ministerial team, and they assented to it. The ministers' assent to the prime minister's decision was a mistake, even though in the circumstances, after Mr Peres had given an undertaking to Mr Shultz, this could not be retracted without causing even greater damage. We do not accept the contention that an undertaking to return to documents was unavoidable. The cooperation with the U.S. was vital and involved also other channels of activity. Had Shim'on Peres directed that a proper investigation be conducted, as he was obliged to do, he undoubtedly would have refrained from proposing that the documents be returned, and perhaps even have refused to permit the questioning of the Israelis involved in the affair. But Mr Peres refrained from ordering an investigation or examining the requisite details, thereby becoming entangled in an undertaking he should never have given.

#### Part IV. The Operational and the Supervisory Echelons (p.13) [Subhead]

Although the ministerial responsibility for supervision and control is vested in the hands of ministers and is not transferable, it is natural that official personnel be entrusted with the task of supervision. A committee was in fact set up in the Defense Ministry to supervise the activity of the Scientific Liaison Unit. It emerged beyond all doubt that this supervision was not carried out in practice. Those responsible for the monitoring did not guide the SLU by means of questions or warnings, and did not make sure to report to their own superiors in the political echelon.

During the period in which the Pollard operation was underway the central responsibility for the supervision was borne by Defense Ministry Director General Menahem Meron. The director general carried out no scrutiny supervision beyond the administrative area.

This could not have been the intention of the ministers who set up the monitoring committee and placed the director general at its head.

In his appearance before the subcommittee, he tried to belittle the importance of his responsibility and at times did not even remember or preferred not to remember his involvement in matters relating to the SLU.

#### Additional Developments (pp. 24-25) [Subhead]

1. The prime minister, with the full agreement of the vice premier and the defense minister, appointed an examination team but did not initiate a thorough investigation which would clarify all the precise details of the episode. For a lengthy period considerable confusion prevailed, as a result of which Israeli figures at all levels came out with divergent statements, in various forms and in a variety of styles, both to each other and to foreign elements. Again the credibility of the Israelis was harmed — and this was and remains the central problem in Israel's struggle to restore its standing. True, it was justified to grant priority to dialogue with the U.S., but at the same time and at any rate immediately afterwards, duty dictated consolidating a correct, true and convincing version on the circumstances of Israel's involvement.

2. Instead, a completely baseless story was disseminated among U.S. Administration circles, which was incapable of convincing anyone anywhere.

3. An Israeli delegation left for the U.S. and returned five days later. During this time conflicting and confusing versions of Israeli elements continued to appear.

4. A meeting took place at the country club with an American delegation headed by Judge Sofaer. One of the serious mistakes made by the examination team at this meeting was to conceal the role of Avi'em Sela' as an important figure in the development of the episode, this without the knowledge of the political echelon. When this deception was revealed, the Americans were furious.

5. The U.S. Administration, and particularly the friendly elements in it, attributed great importance to Israel's undertaking "to punish the culprits." Here the American interest focused on two persons: on Rafi Eytan and at a later stage on Avi'em Sela'. Rafi Eytan was appointed director of the largest economic enterprise in Israel, with the Americans expressing their protest.

6. Several months ago great publicity was given to the intention to promote Col Sela' both in rank and in post. This step caused bitterness among the American people and the American public was vociferously outraged. By adding insult to injury and despite the red light set off by the American ambassador in his talks in Jerusalem, a statement was issued on the appointment of Col Avi'em Sela' as commander of the Tel Nof base. Meanwhile Col Avi'em Sela' resigned from his post as Tel Nof commander. His resignation calmed the stormy situation.

We express our satisfaction with Sela's resignation from his post, but we cannot ignore the mistake of Defense Minister Rabin in appointing him under these circumstances.

Part V. Shim'on Peres' Appearance Before the Subcommittee on Intelligence and Secret Services on 11.28.85, and His Remarks to the Inner Cabinet That Day (p.29) [subhead]

On 11.28.85 Prime Minister Shim'on Peres appeared before this committee. The committee members are divided as to the essence of Mr. Peres' report.

Stand of MK's [Members of Knesset] Ben-Elisar, Olmert and Magen: [Subhead]

The committee devoted considerable time to discussing the appearance of Prime Minister Shim'on Peres before it on 11.28.85, in the wake of Pollard's exposure.

At that session Mr Peres reported on the circumstances surrounding Pollard's recruitment to the Scientific Liaison Unit (SLU). According to Mr Peres' version, Pollard approached Israel on his own initiative and explained that he was a representative of American Intelligence. He showed appropriate documents to verify this. Already in the session on 11.28.85 MK Eliyahu Ben-Elisar expressed great doubt about the probability of this version.

Nevertheless, this version was also related to the Inner Cabinet in its meeting that same day. Earlier, at 2300 hours the previous evening, Mr Peres conveyed a message to Secretary of State Shultz containing this version.

Patently, if Pollard actually approached Israel from the outset, presenting himself as a representative of American Intelligence who was acting via unofficial channels, then his activity in Israel's service does not cast on us the same degree of responsibility as would be the case if Israel had recruited him as a full-fledged spy.

It goes without saying that it was important to use this version in order to lighten somewhat the difficulties we faced. However, this version is of course fanciful, groundless and devoid of any chance of succeeding, since Mr Pollard did not present himself as a representative of American Intelligence and did not present his papers as proof of this claim.

Circumstances of the Origin of This Version: [Subhead]

Immediately after the Pollard affair began to unravel, it became clear to various elements that there was a need to crystallize an Israeli version which would reduce to a minimum the damage that had been and would be caused.

Mr Peres maintained that already on 11.28.85, in a meeting that took place in his office following Pollard's exposure, he was given an incorrect report to the effect that Pollard had stated on his own initiative, that he was a representative of American Intelligence. When asked, Prime Minister Peres replied that when the report was made Rafi Eytan was sitting in his room and he (Peres) even confirmed these details.

Mr Peres maintained that at no stage did he hear any other [last word printed in boldface] description of the events, and he explained the incorrect report to the Knesset committee by saying that he himself was convinced that this was a true account of the affair.



The possibility that Mr Peres on 11.22.85 heard the version about Pollard's volunteering as though it were truthful, is extremely poor, for the simple reason that this version had its genesis three days later. It is impossible that on 11.22.85 Mr Peres heard a version that was not in existence.

Mr Peres maintains that Rafi Eytan took part in the meeting at which he was given the misleading report. Eytan's presence in fact reinforces precisely a version opposite to that of Peres's.

Immediately [last word printed in boldface] Pollard was exposed, Eytan stated that he assumed full responsibility for the affair. [sentence as received] He emphasized and reemphasized that no political level had known details relating to Pollard personally.

Under these circumstances, what reason could Eytan have had to mislead the political echelon in a matter which could be of no benefit to himself?

Moreover, Eytan on 11.27.85 submitted a document containing an Israeli version. It is beyond understanding why Eytan would prepare such a document while at the same time lending a hand to the dissemination of a story which would mislead the political level, while he was simultaneously making every effort to cooperate and even to assume responsibility personally.

The version which holds that Mr Peres was misled in this matter appears totally unreasonable. Mr Peres could and should have known exactly what had occurred and under what circumstances Pollard had been recruited to the SLU, and to the best of our impression, on [sentence printed in boldface] 11.28.85 he indeed should have known this. (Emphasis here and elsewhere in the original — GPO).

Several committee members asked why Mr Peres would want to relate such a crude version which could so easily be refuted.

On the surface this question sounds reasonable. Actually, it is not. Mr Peres did not in the least pretend to claim that Israel could and should reveal all the details of the story to the Americans, and indeed there is no doubt that it was essential to crystallize a reasonable, albeit partial, version.

The question was: Which version should be conveyed to Shultz? Mr Peres gave him the only version that was brought to his knowledge. That fact that this version was refuted does not attest to the fact that Mr Peres did not know it was a fabricated story. It is only proof that it was an unsuccessful invention.

One could forgive Mr Peres the use of this story which had no prospect of succeeding, had he not sought to present it as a truthful story to the members of the Knesset committee.

What is the reason that Mr Peres stumbled in speaking untruth to the Knesset committee? Various explanations could be adduced, but it is not our business to analyse Mr Peres's motivation in this matter.

Ultimately, there is no doubt that Mr Peres misled the Knesset committee and provided it with a report which was not true.

In his defense, it will be recalled, Mr Peres maintained that on 11.28.85 he did not yet know the truth, hence he erred in good faith.

We would very much like to believe this contention because of the great respect we hold for Mr Peres and his high position.

If Peres's contention is correct that on 11.28.85 he did not yet know the truth, then a very grave question arises regarding the nature of his functioning as prime minister — if a week after Pollard's exposure Peres did not know the details of the episode.

One way or the other, Mr Peres could and was duty-bound [last two words printed in boldface] to know the details. That he did not know them at this stage, in these circumstances, and while he was in contact with international elements (and) gave an incorrect report to the Knesset — all this speaks for itself.

#### Stand of MK's Eban, Dinitz and Harish [Subhead]

We firmly reject the allegation that Shim'on Peres ostensibly, knowingly provided incorrect information in a certain portion of his report during his appearance before the subcommittee on services on 11.28.85. We have full trust in the version of Shim'on Peres, according to which he conveyed the things as they were known to him at that time in the belief that they were true.

Because of the security sensitivity of these matters, we cannot detail all the data on which we base our stand. But two facts which can be published are sufficient to refute the allegation being made against Shim'on Peres:

1. On the same day that Shim'on Peres appeared before the subcommittee on services, 11.28.85, he also appeared before the Inner Cabinet and there read out the contents of a document containing the same information which Shim'on Peres had given earlier to the subcommittee. And at the conclusion of that passage Shim'on Peres said, according to the Inner Cabinet minutes: "What we wrote here is the truth."

2. The mistaken information reached Shim'on Peres from a document which is in the possession of the subcommittee, and which was definitely liable to prove misleading! MK Ben-Elisar himself acknowledged this in a discussion of the subcommittee on services on 3.27.87.

It is important to note that the difference between what Shim'on Peres knew and reported that day to the subcommittee, and the information which he found was correct afterward, had no influence whatsoever on the committee's findings or conclusions, beyond the debate which arose on this specific point.

We regret the decision of Knesset members to publish statements of condemnation against a citizen and public figure which are clearly — and without justification — aimed at harming his honor and his good name.

#### Part VI. Introduction (p 3). [subhead]

1. The Knesset regulations (4.(a).12) empower the Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee to discuss "the state's foreign policy,

armed forces and security." In 1982, at the initiative of the then-chairman of the committee (Moshe Arens), a number of subcommittees of limited composition were established in order to discuss in greater detail and depth sensitive topics which are within the committee's purview.

The subcommittee holds comprehensive and thorough discussions with the intelligence services. In Israel the principle of parliamentary oversight of the functioning of the intelligence establishments is maintained thanks to the work of this subcommittee. The subcommittee does not deal with operations, but it does take an interest in central situations and problems, provides counsel in the political spheres, and approves, on behalf of the Knesset, the provision of the required resources for the functioning of the establishments.

2. From the outset the prime minister thought — in appearing before the committee — that there was no place to conduct an investigation on the topic of Jonathan Pollard. Committee Chairman Abba Eban stated that concern for orderly administration, together with considerations of foreign policy, obligate the subcommittee to clarify the subject in all its aspects. On the same day Knesset Speaker MK Shlomo Hilel announced that he supports the realization of the Knesset's responsibility in this sphere, as in all spheres of the government's functioning.

3. On 11 March 1987 the Inner Cabinet issued a statement on its decision to establish an investigation committee into the Pollard case and to assist the subcommittee of the Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee in its work. This decision generated positive reactions in Israel and the world. Publication of the announcement concerning the commencement of the clarification by the Knesset subcommittee led to a considerable moderation in the stand of governmental and media elements in the U.S. vis-a-vis Israel. But the main emphasis in our activity originates in the national duty to contribute to the enhancement and improvement in the functioning of the establishments which we deal with. This includes spotting and examining hitches, to ensure their non-recurrence.

4. The work of the subcommittee began with a detailed report from Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin on 12 March 1987. We note with satisfaction that the government's pledge to assist the subcommittee was realized with all seriousness and thoroughness. All the ministers, officers and civil servants past and present appeared before us — some at their own initiative. All the documents we requested were provided, including the minutes of Cabinet and Inner Cabinet meetings.

5. The subcommittee has standing responsibility which exceeds the sphere of the Pollard case. Therefore it took advantage of the appearance of the ministers and the other interviewees in order to deepen its examination of the intelligence community. No country grants publicity to intelligence establishments and methods. Thus, most of the material which accumulated in the hands of the subcommittee for this clarification will be placed at the exclusive [last word printed in boldface] disposal of the ministers and security personnel whose responsibility relates to the subject under discussion. This report is no more than a miniscule portion of the comprehensive material that we accumulated. It refers to topics in which the Knesset and public have a special interest and

which can be published with security limitations. The full and secret report will be submitted to the perusal of those concerned.

6. The subcommittee does not have the status of a judicial institution, hence it does not follow procedures such as are customary in legal investigations. Thus the subcommittee does not intend to pass judgment in terms of personal conclusions which are liable to follow from its findings and evaluations. This stand is accepted by all the members of the subcommittee, and this report is worded accordingly. On the other hand, the subcommittee does reserve the right to express assessments and impressions, and to summarize the findings and conclusions, as is customary in proper parliamentary life.

7. It is the way of the world that a hitch which is revealed in an intelligence establishment has powerful reverberations, while intelligence successes are wrapped in silence. This report concerns a very serious hitch. The criticism levelled at a certain operation, which would have been better never to have seen the light of day, does not indicate a disregard of the achievements of the intelligence services, which constitute an essential component in Israel's vital security system. The resourcefulness, daring, and very often the heroism and sacrifice of the upholders of the intelligence missions are known and open before us. These services can take pride in their accomplishments and the results of their efforts, and the State of Israel owes them a debt of esteem and appreciation.

#### What the Report Deals With (p 5) [subhead]

8. This report concerns itself with the considerations, operations and decisionmaking procedures of the Cabinet ministers, civil servants and officers who were involved to one degree or another in situations that were created as a result of the employment of Jonathan Pollard. The first period to which this report applies began at the end of May 1984, when Pollard succeeded for the first time, at his initiative, in making contact with an officer in the Israel Air Force [IAF], Col Avi'em Sela'. From that time on, Israelis continued to maintain a connection with Pollard in the U.S., Israel and France until his arrest by the U.S. authorities on 19 November 1985. Throughout this period Pollard was run by Refa'el Eytan and his aides in the Scientific Liaison Unit.

9. The arrest, trial and sentencing of Pollard made this matter public knowledge and necessitated the involvement of the Cabinet and the Inner Cabinet. The people of Israel were surprised and appalled when they learned the details of an espionage operation executed by Israelis — civil servants — which led to a crisis in relations between Israel and the U.S. It is here that the problem arises of the government's responsibility towards the Knesset and the public. In addition, in the sphere of relations between Israel and the U.S. worrisome tension prevailed which encompassed very broad circles among the sympathetic American public. The government was called on to work for the repair of one important strand in Israel's fabric of international ties.

#### Part VII. Reservations of MK David Magen (p.9) [subhead]

1. The public report of the committee referring to the degree of responsibility of the Scientific Liaison head, Mr Refa'el Eytan,

does injustice to the man, to the personnel of the unit he was in charge of, and to the entire matter.

By the nature of things, the committee was unable to specify in this report, due to its being published, numerous details which would have attested to the nature of the unit Eytan headed. The clear conclusion stemming from these details is that the recruitment of Pollard and his handling were done with authority, and committee members indeed agree that Refa'el Eytan did not exceed the authority invested in him.

This was the reason that following Pollard's exposure Prime Minister Shim'on Peres stated that "we do not want an investigation, because it will reveal things we already know." Following suit, Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin told the Inner Cabinet on 28 November 1985: "There is no chopping of heads, nor will there be."

2. In the forty years of his work in the civil service, Rafi Eytan made a large and unique contribution. His brilliant achievements within the framework of his work in the various security branches were not and cannot be publicized, but it is a fact that all the committee members without exception have a personal appreciation for his tremendous contribution to Israel.

When Shim'on Peres became prime minister in the end of 1984, he saw to it — for incomprehensible and unclear reasons — that Eytan distanced himself from the Prime Minister's Office and someone else appointed in his place. Despite this injustice, Rafi Eytan did not leave the civil service and continued to invest all his efforts and talents in his work, which now shrank to activity in the Defense Ministry alone. During the period in which Mr Eytan headed the Scientific Liaison Unit, it reached the peak of its achievements. One of the security personnel who appeared before the committee expressed this as follows: "Until Rafi arrived we talked about a Scientific Liaison Unit, and since Rafi arrived we called the SLU — Rafi. The material Rafi Eytan was made of was more than once described by the highest echelon as 'priceless'."

3. In the first stages of Pollard's recruitment, Rafi Eytan understood the particular sensitivity of the issue and took the trouble to define the potential hazards of running Pollard in a detailed document. In the document, he issued instructions on special rules and caution. In retrospect, it emerges that Rafi Eytan's instructions were not fulfilled. His statement to the committee "I am willing to assume the responsibility" is not tantamount to the committee's agreement that he indeed bears all the responsibility. Rafi Eytan's attempt in his appearance before the committee to absolve of any mistake his superiors and the echelon subordinate to him, as well as others involved in the affair, deserves special appreciation as a gesture of friendship and fighters' comradeship but cannot lead the committee to the conclusion that the mistakes in the operation were those of Rafi Eytan and that all the responsibility devolves on him.

4. The claim that Rafi Eytan went too far in making use of the assistance of an IDF officer in an intelligence operation unconnected to the army is incorrect. It was established in the committee that Col Sela' aided the SLU only after Rafi Eytan

approached the IAF, who, in a letter to Col Sela', gave approval for his cooperation with the SLU.

5. The critical period prior to Pollard's fall was the summer and fall of 1985. At the beginning of June 1985, Mr Eytan was taken to the hospital when he was suffering eye problems. On 3 October 1985 his sight returned and he returned to working part time. I assume that in regular conditions he would have succeeded in ascertaining that his orders to halt the link with Pollard were being fulfilled; he was prevented from carrying out this action due to his illness. Here it should be recalled that even with his return to work in October, his sight was still physically limited.

6. Immediately with the failure of the operation, Mr Eytan took pains to inform the prime minister that he was assuming responsibility. This personal sacrifice came within the framework of his viewing the matter as one of life and death, and in the hope that the mishap would not turn into a complicated and difficult affair. Since this condition was not fulfilled, and mistakes made by the political echelon turned the "mishap" into an "affair," there is no point in acceding to Eytan's request and agreeing (sic). Thus, there was and is no place for the formulation appearing in the report that there were Americans who doubt the severity of the punishment meted out to Rafi Eytan.

With the exposure of Pollard, Rafi Eytan's world was destroyed. He was dismissed from his post (at the demand of the Americans), and a brilliant security career was lopped off brutally and roughly. It is inconceivable that there was allegedly place to take note of a petition not to quickly appoint him to a senior economic position. Not even the biggest sinner is punished twice for the same sin. Despite his considerable success as the prime minister's adviser of terrorism, Mr Shim'on Peres saw to it that he was dismissed from this post immediately he assumed the office of prime minister. And as if this were not enough, and despite the binding statement of the defense minister against the backdrop of Pollard's exposure that "there is no chopping of heads, nor will there be," Prime Minister Shim'on Peres was quick to punish Rafi Eytan and only Eytan by dismissing him from his position as head of the SLU. The questions must be asked: What is the source of the lust of certain elements to see Rafi Eytan's head "chopped off" for a third time?

#### Reservation of MK's Dinitz and Harish (p.27) [Subhead]

We are of the opinion that following the sentence, "Hence it follows that the three of them share responsibility for these decisions" (see GPO translation, Part I, p.2. "Responsibility of the political echelon..."), the following sentence should be inserted: "The three acted as a team by virtue of the positions they held in the government as prime minister, vice premier and foreign minister, and defense minister, and they bear responsibility together before the Knesset for their decisions."

#### Reservation of MK David Magen (p.28) [Subhead]

As of November 1985, a forum composed of three ministers — the prime minister, the foreign minister and the defense minister — dealt with the affair. True, it was explained that the aspects of the Pollard affair relate to security and to the plane of the Foreign Ministry, hence the special composition (of the team).

However, from the moment the affair became a tangled international episode, standing at the head of the political agenda, it should have been dealt with in a regular government forum. If the government wished to forgo its powers and transfer them to a team composed of just three personages, it should have taken an explicit decision to this effect.

**Reservations Relating to Sections Dealing With the Function and Responsibility of Moshe Arens and Yitzhaq Rabin in Their Capacity as Defense Ministers During the Pollard Operation — submitted by MK Mikha Harish (p.16) [Subhead]**

Instead of the version approved by the committee, I wish to note the following:

1. Moshe Arens was minister of defense when Pollard began to transfer meaningful information, get briefings and funds, and embark on the course which led to the hitch that is the subject of this report. Minister Arens admitted and maintained that he had exercised no supervision over (Rafi) Eytan, as he was preoccupied with the Lebanon war, that Eytan's involvement in intelligence had come as a surprise to him, that his many meetings with Eytan were devoted to the topic of Shi'ite terrorism, that he had not been briefed on the Scientific Liaison Unit (SLU) when he took over as defense minister, and that his tenure as defense minister had been brief.

2. This version constitutes a confession of sorts that Moshe Arens did not fulfill imperatives of ministerial responsibility with respect to Rafi Eytan and that responsibility should devolve on him because of this fact; the more so following Rafi Eytan's presentation of a picture entirely different from the one retained in Moshe Arens's memory. Rafi Eytan testified, on the basis of notes taken at the time, that he had spoken many times with Arens about topics that should have aroused the minister's curiosity and concern about the sources of the information and material he was receiving, and that expressly in August, a short time after transferring the ministry to Yitzhaq Rabin, Arens heard reports from Rafi Eytan which should have led to increased alertness.

3. The conclusion is that Minister of Defense Arens did nothing which could be interpreted as imposing supervision, or minimal authority, over the SLU, which was a Defense Ministry unit. It should be noted that Minister Arens was well versed in the professional matters handled by Rafi Eytan. His conclusion is that by any reasonable definition of the term "ministerial responsibility," responsibility should devolve on Minister Arens for that fateful period in 1984 when the Pollard affair began.

4. Moshe Arens's past and background should have led him to heed and be involved in SLU matters, on a scale exceeding that of all the defense ministers who preceded and followed him. Moshe Arens, who was familiar with the SLU due both to his personal and professional contacts and his public positions prior to his assumption of the defense portfolio, certainly knew that this was an organization dealing with delicate and problematic matters, necessitating control and scrutiny.

In view of the above, his responsibility is even graver considering the fact that Rafi Eytan fulfilled the role of SLU head only in a

part-time capacity, and that he agreed in advance that the SLU be directed by a person whose main attention was concentrated on a different topic, at a time when the SLU did not receive the necessary direction and attention which call for the full energy, mental capacity and responsibility of the responsible person.

5. Yitzhaq Rabin "inherited" a situation in which neglect of the matters of the unit headed by Rafi Eytan had become something of a tradition. He served in the post for 14 months of the Pollard affair. This means that he had ample opportunity to take note of phenomena which should have caused him concern. It is undeniable that the minister's defense and political experience could have afforded him expertise and sensitivity vis-a-vis the activity of Rafi Eytan and the SLU.

6. On the face of it, there are oversight systems in the form of monitoring committees, but the ministry administration did not question Eytan as to the purpose of the administrative assistance that he requested. Actually, Rafi Eytan's subordination is nothing but a formal myth.

7. Notwithstanding, during Yitzhaq Rabin's term, Rafi Eytan ceased to serve as the adviser on terrorism and his sole duty was to direct the SLU. As a rule, we received testimonies demonstrating that Yitzhaq Rabin evinced greater sensitivity than his predecessor in the post, in all matters relating to supervision of the SLU, and it is regrettable that this sensitivity did not lead to more vigorous action which might have prevented in good time the damage incurred by the eruption of the Pollard affair, whose origins lie in Moshe Arens's term as minister of defense.

8. In accordance therewith, it must be asserted that Minister of Defense Yitzhaq Rabin did not fulfill the imperatives of ministerial responsibility regarding the supervision of Rafi Eytan and the SLU.

**MK Simcha Dinitz' reservations Concerning the Section Dealing With Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin (p.18) [Subhead]**

1. In the first paragraph, the following should be omitted: "This means that he had ample opportunity to take note of phenomena which should have caused him concern." And this because intelligence material was brought to the desk of all the defense ministers prior to and following this period, without any indication of the material's source.

2. The second paragraph should be omitted and the following inserted in its place: "Material was submitted to the committee indicating that the minister of defense actually evinced alertness and even called the attention of the SLU chief to the risks involved in its activity."

**Rabin, Peres Blast Eban at Labor Meeting**  
*TA281831 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English*  
1700 GMT 28 May 87

[Text] And now to the uproar at the Labor Party's Central Committee. Over to Sabra Chartrand:



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MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
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מצ"ב דו"ח הועדה באנגלית.

לידיעתכם הדו"ח בעברית ובאנגלית בדיפ.

*[Handwritten Signature]*

הסברה/תכנים

השולח: עליונה סביר  
תאריך: 29.5.87

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Responsibility of the political echelon -- after Pollard's fall (p.26)

Prime Minister Shimon Peres, Vice Premier Yitzhak Shamir, and Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin testified before us that the decisions taken in the period following Pollard's exposure (from 22.11.85 and thereafter) were taken with the concurrence of all three of them.

Hence it follows that the three of them share responsibility for these decisions.

Under the parliamentary system that exists in Israel, the status of the prime minister is as first among equals.

Since Shimon Peres was the head of the team that dealt with the affair, his parliamentary responsibility is preponderant.

Rafi Eitan (p.8)

1. Rafi Eitan bears full and direct responsibility for the decision to recruit and run Pollard. He did not report this to his superiors, and thus received no approval therefor. He was duty-bound to have understood that an action such as this was liable to impair important interests of Israel, and to damage the friendly relations between Israel and the United States.

2. Rafi Eitan served the state for many years with unbounded loyalty and unflinching commitment, chalking up to his credit accomplishments in a range of tasks, which contributed to the country's security.

3. The opinion was expressed in the committee that the very fact of Rafi Eitan's appointment to head the SIU was in the nature of a mistake, casting heavy responsibility on the minister in question, Ariel Sharon. Eitan was given the dual position of heading the SIU -- which is responsible to the Defense Ministry -- and adviser in the war against terrorism, who is responsible to the prime minister.

In this view, an arrangement such as this was practically an invitation to inefficiency and for the danger that the holder of the two positions could easily evade supervision, due to his divided responsibility to two authorities.

With all due weight given to this consideration, a majority of the committee viewed the mistake of the appointment as wisdom after the fact. The majority opinion was that given the circumstance of time, and based on the situation which presented itself at the time of the appointment, Eitan's appointment was considered to be natural in view of his abilities.

4. On the subject of Pollard, he did not evince wisdom, and even demonstrated injudiciousness, which caused the State of Israel numerous difficulties and harmed Israel-U.S. relations and relations with American Jewry.

Rafi Eitan was punished in that he was removed from his post as head of the SIU and was barred from engaging further in intelligence matters.

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# From the knesset

5/27/87 360 In  
Jerusalem, 27 May 1987

## #31. REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE DEFENSE & FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICES REGARDING JONATHAN POLLARD - PART II

.87.05.27 (Communicated by the Knesset's Defense & Foreign Affairs Committee; released 26.5.87 at the Knesset)

EDITOR'S NOTE: The page numbers refer to the location of each section in the original report.

### What did the political echelon know? (p.6)

When Pollard's arrest was reported, Prime Minister Shimon Peres announced that in question is an operation which was carried out without the knowledge or approval of the political echelon. This was conveyed to U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, in an official and binding manner in a telephone conversation between Shultz and Peres which took place on the night between 30 November and 1 December 1985. A communique along these lines was also issued to the press.

The question whether the political echelon knew about Pollard's handling is such a significant point as far as national credibility and international ramifications are concerned, that we went to great lengths in order to clarify it completely. We did not hesitate to question all those who were capable of shedding light on the possibility that the political echelon did know, if such a possibility existed. We did not ignore the fact that some persons who appeared before the subcommittee would have personally benefited, by the nature of things, had it been possible to pin direct responsibility for their knowledge of the situation on one or more Cabinet members.

The clarification of this matter which we conducted led to the following conclusion which the committee accepted: the sum total of the evidence brought before the committee by all the witnesses concerned confirms beyond all doubt the conclusion that the operational echelons (namely: the Scientific Liaison Unit headed by Rafi Eitan) decided to recruit and handle Pollard without any check or consultation with the political echelon or receiving its direct or indirect approval.

The committee heard the contention that in intelligence operations of a certain kind it is best not to inform the responsible political echelon about exact details, the nature of the sources and the description of operations, and that it is preferable that the persons in the field refrain from requesting approval in advance from the political echelon for recruiting sensitive sources.

The committee rejects this stand as a rule. Although the head of an intelligence branch has discretionary power in exercising his authority, even in sensitive cases, as a rule he must report to the responsible political echelon in charge and/or to ask for its approval, since otherwise this echelon will be deprived of the capability to fulfill its duty of efficient supervision and of the possibility to prevent certain operations.

### Rogue operation or state responsibility? (p.7)

Following Pollard's exposure, the Israel government announced that in question was an operation carried out without the approval or knowledge of the political echelon. Subsequently, the operation was described as a "rogue operation," carried out privately by unauthorized persons.

The statement about the political echelon not knowing and not granting its approval is correct, whereas the description of the operation as "rogue" is baseless.

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## FROM THE KNESSET

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Jerusalem, 27 May 1987

**#31 REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE DEFENSE & FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICES REGARDING JONATHAN POLLARD -- PART III**

.87.05.27 (Communicated by the Knesset's Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee; released on 26.5.87 at the Knesset)

EDITOR'S NOTE: The page numbers refer to the location of each section in the original report.

**The Decision on Cooperation with the United States (p.19)**

On the night between 30 November and 1 December [1985], at 0330 hours, the U.S. secretary of state phoned Israel's Prime Minister Shimon Peres. In this talk the two discussed the nature of the cooperation between Israel and the U.S. in this affair.

The committee members are divided as to the significance of some of the commitments pertaining to this cooperation.

**Stand of Committee Members Eban, Dinitz and Harish**

The report about the exposure and arrest of Jonathan Pollard confronted the government of Israel with a highly distressful situation. The impression was created that Israel had behaved towards the friendliest power ever known by the Jewish people in a manner incommensurate with the tradition of friendship, and with the values and interests shared by the two peoples. Apart from the bitterness and sadness which were reflected in the Administration's stand, a media campaign extremely hostile to Israel developed. The prime minister and the vice premier held urgent consultations which were joined by the defense minister immediately upon his return to Israel from abroad. The three personages explained to the Inner Cabinet, to the public on many occasions, and to this committee, that they view themselves as the members of a team all of whom share responsibility for all the decisions taken; they did not make any objection or put forward any reservation about any of [those decisions]. Our perusal of their statements before this committee turns up not a single crack or impediment in the approach or strategy they recommended.

The urgency of the pressure exerted by the U.S. to clarify the matter, together with salient indications that the political echelon in the U.S. sincerely wished to contain and extinguish the blaze, compelled the three ministers to turn their attention urgently to the American front. To that end a committee of examination was established (Avraham Shalom, Menan Bar-On and lawyer Ram Caspi) to clarify and deal with the problems created with the U.S.

Beginning on 22 April [sic] internal consultations and exchanges of messages took place with the secretary of state in an effort to calm the Administration and reach cooperation. A key milestone in the evolution of the Israeli strategy was a conversation held in the early morning hours (30 November-1 December) when Secretary of State Shultz phoned Prime Minister Peres. In this talk the prime minister clarified the following points to Mr. Shultz: (a) Pollard was an aberrant situation, the political echelon was unaware of the matter, an unauthorized initiative had taken place without any official approval whatsoever; (b) Israel undertakes full cooperation; (c) Israel will allow free access to the Israelis involved; (d) Israel will punish those responsible; (e) the unit whose personnel involved themselves in the operation will be disbanded; (f) Israel will return documents it received via Pollard.

These commitments were not unreserved. The prime minister requested that the interpretation to be placed on his undertakings be discussed between HANAN Bar-On, on behalf of Israel, and Undersecretary of State Armacost on behalf of the United States.

END



Stand of Committee Members Ben-Elissar, Olmert and Magen:

On the night between 30 November and 1 December 1985, at 0330 hours, Secretary of State George Shultz phoned Prime Minister Shimon Peres. During their conversation Mr. Peres agreed to spell out Israel's modes of cooperation with the U.S. in this affair. At the conclusion of the conversation, Mr. Peres gave undertakings in a number of subjects:

1. The Israelis involved in the affair would be questioned by a representative of the U.S. government.
2. The Pollard documents would be returned to the U.S.
3. The Scientific Liaison Unit would be disbanded and its personnel dismissed.
4. Disciplinary measures would be taken against those responsible for the affair.

There is no doubt that it was the duty of the Israel government to propose immediate cooperation with the U.S. government in the wake of Pollard's exposure, in addition to a full and unequivocal apology. The circumstances of Pollard's exposure, the justified American outrage, the fear of a serious blow to Israel-U.S. relations: all these justified an approach of cooperation on this subject. The question is what should have been the manner and scope of the cooperation Israel should have proposed. Prime Minister Shimon Peres's agreement to return the documents which had been brought by Pollard, was fundamentally wrong and caused extremely serious damage. These documents constituted the basis which led to Pollard's conviction and the life sentence imposed on him, and this despite an Israeli contention that an American commitment existed not to use them against Pollard. The incomplete ability to live up to the undertaking to return the documents caused a crisis of confidence between the U.S. and Israel.

The prime minister did not heed the advice of those who were dealing with the matter on his behalf, who believed that it was not possible to return these documents.

The decision to return the documents was not preceded by any discussion within the framework of the ministerial team or in any other forum. We found no minutes of any advance consultation, meeting, discussion or even telephone conversation in which this move was agreed on.

On the day following the conversation, the prime minister reported it to the ministerial team, and they assented to it. The ministers' assent to the prime minister's decision was a mistake, even though in the circumstances, after Mr. Peres had given an undertaking to Mr. Shultz, this could not be retracted without causing even greater damage. We do not accept the contention that an undertaking to return to documents was unavoidable. The cooperation with the U.S. was vital and involved also other channels of activity. Had Shimon Peres directed that a proper investigation be conducted, as he was obliged to do, he undoubtedly would have refrained from proposing that the documents be returned, and perhaps even have refused to permit the questioning of the Israelis involved in the affair. But Mr. Peres refrained from ordering an investigation or examining the requisite details, thereby becoming entangled in an undertaking he should never have given.

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1030 hours

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5. The U.S. Administration, and particularly the friendly elements in it, attributed great importance to Israel's undertaking "to punish the culprits." Here the American interest focused on two persons: on Rafi Eitan and at a later stage on Avi'am Sella. Rafi Eitan was appointed director of the largest economic enterprise in Israel, with the Americans expressing their protest.

6. Several months ago great publicity was given to the intention to promote Col. Sella both in rank and in post. This step caused bitterness among the American people and the American public was vociferously outraged. By adding insult to injury and despite the red light set off by the American ambassador in his talks in Jerusalem, a statement was issued on the appointment of Col. Avi'am Sella as commander of the Tel Nof base. Meanwhile Col. Avi'am Sella resigned from his post as Tel Nof commander. His resignation calmed the stormy situation.

We express our satisfaction with Sella's resignation from his post, but we cannot ignore the mistake of Defense Minister Rabin in appointing him under these circumstances.

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11:15 hours

The possibility that Mr. Peres on 22.11.85 heard the version about Pollard's volunteering as though it were truthful, is extremely poor, for the simple reason that this version had its genesis three days later. It is impossible that on 22.11.85 Mr. Peres heard a version that was not in existence.

Mr. Peres maintains that Rafi Eitan took part in the meeting at which he was given the misleading report. Eitan's presence in fact reinforces precisely a version opposite to that of Peres's.

IMMEDIATELY Pollard was exposed, Eitan stated that he assumed full responsibility for the affair. He emphasized and re-emphasized that no political level had known details relating to Pollard personally.

Under these circumstances, what reason could Eitan have had to mislead the political echelon in a matter which could be of no benefit to himself?

Moreover, Eitan on 27.11.85 submitted a document containing an Israeli version. It is beyond understanding why Eitan would prepare such a document while at the same time lending a hand to the dissemination of a story which would mislead the political level, while he was simultaneously making every effort to cooperate and even to assume responsibility personally.

The version which holds that Mr. Peres was misled in this matter appears totally unreasonably. MR. PERES COULD AND SHOULD HAVE KNOWN EXACTLY WHAT HAD OCCURRED AND UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES POLLARD HAD BEEN RECRUITED TO THE SLU, AND TO THE BEST OF OUR IMPRESSION, ON 28.11.85 he indeed should have known this. (Emphasis here and elsewhere in the original.)

Several committee members asked why Mr. Peres would want to relate such a crude version which could so easily be refuted.

On the surface this question sounds reasonable. Actually, it is not. Mr. Peres did not in the least pretend to claim that Israel could and should reveal all the details of the story to the Americans, and indeed there is no doubt that it was essential to crystallize a reasonable, albeit partial, version.

The question was: which version would be conveyed to Shultz? Mr. Peres gave him the only version that was brought to his knowledge. The fact that this version was refuted does not attest to the fact that Mr. Peres did not know it was a fabricated story. It is only proof that it was an unsuccessful invention.

One could forgive Mr. Peres the use of this story, which had no prospect of succeeding, had he not sought to present it as a truthful story to the members of the Knesset committee.

What is the reason that Mr. Peres scumbled in speaking untruth to the Knesset committee? Various explanations could be adduced, but it is not our business to analyze Mr. Peres's motivation in this matter.

Ultimately, there is no doubt that Mr. Peres misled the Knesset committee and provided it with a report which was not true.

In his defense, it will be recalled, Mr. Peres maintained that on 23.11 he did not yet know the truth, hence he erred in good faith.

We would very much like to believe this contention because of the great respect we hold for Mr. Peres and his high position.

If Peres's contention is correct that on 28.11.85 he did not yet know the truth, then a very grave question arises regarding the nature of his functioning as prime minister -- If a week after Pollard's exposure Peres did not know the details of the episode.

One way or the other, Mr. Peres could and was DUTY-BOUND to know the details. That he did not know them at this stage, in these circumstances, and while he was in contact with international elements [and] gave an incorrect report to the Knesset -- all this speaks for itself.

Americans. The finger soon pointed toward televangelist Jimmy Swaggart, the current industry leader in terms of viewership. Swaggart hotly denied orchestrating a back-room takeover of PTL, and his position drew the support of all but one of his fellow televangelists. From atop his prayer tower, Oral Roberts condemned Swaggart, saying, "Somehow Satan has put something in your heart that you're better than anybody else."

**O**F ALL the TV preachers, none seemed to revel in his own success more than Jim Bakker. He grew up in humble surroundings. His father was a machine repairman in a piston-ring factory in Michigan. Jim's grades were generally poor, but he was outgoing—by his final year at Muskegon High School, he was class president. In 1959 he enrolled at North Central Bible College, where he decided on a life of Evangelicalism. It was there that he met 18-year-old Tammy Faye LaValley, whom he married in 1961. He was ordained an Assemblies of God minister, and Jim and Tammy spent the next five years crusading throughout the country.

In 1965 they met the Rev. Pat Robertson, who offered them a job with the fledgling CBN. In their first on-air appearance they hosted a Christian puppet show. Jim quickly moved up to become co-host with Robertson of "The 700 Club." In 1974, after a two-year stint with a California-based Christian network, Bakker moved to Charlotte, North Carolina, which would become his permanent base of operations. PTL began as a small regional ministry run out of a modest glass office building in Charlotte, but soon grew dramatically. In fact, PTL grew so fast that several times the operation was certifiably "over-extended," in the parlance of the accountants, who began to have a bigger say in the ministry's day-to-day operations. By the time he stepped down from PTL, Bakker's Heritage USA complex covered 2,300 acres, employed nearly 2,000 people, and contained his television headquarters, a luxury hotel, a shopping mall, a home for single mothers, and the third most-visited amusement park in the country.

As a fund-raiser, Bakker made it clear that his personal reputation was on the line, if not his future well-being, a technique only recently discovered by Oral Roberts. The Bakkers weren't afraid to bare their emotions to the viewing public. Tammy cried regularly on the show, and Jim often developed a paperweight-sized lump in his throat when he spoke about his future plans for Heritage USA. They were very ordinary folks with very big dreams, and viewers opened their hearts, and, whenever they could, their wallets. PTL reported \$129 million in revenues last year.

The end came swiftly, though. Jim, who would often say to his followers, "The Lord has us on a roller-coaster ride, and we're holding on for dear life," lost his grip on the PTL ministry almost overnight. Earlier this month, Tammy left the show after it was revealed that she had become addicted to prescription drugs. Then came the revelations of Jim's adulterous encounter in 1980, fol-

lowed by the Falwell "friendly takeover."

For its part, the Falwell organization insists that it is reluctantly playing the part of white knight. "This more than doubles the headaches," Falwell spokesman Mark de Moss told the *Washington Post*. "There's a big investment to protect and now we have the responsibility to protect it. . . . I've hesitated to use the word 'takeover.' I'd rather use the word 'rescue.'"

Still, the new Falwell-Bakker entity has combined revenues estimated at over \$250 million, which has certainly got to make the competition sit up and take notice. That includes Oral Roberts, who seemed to be taking a page out of the Jim Bakker book of fund-raising when he revealed God's ultimatum earlier this year. Not to worry, though. A Florida millionaire, Jerry Collins, has already made up the million-plus difference Roberts needs to reach his goal and save his skin. Barring some unforeseen act of God, Roberts will climb down from his 200-foot-tall prayer tower on April Fools' Day and face the TV cameras with a wink and a smile.

The victory, however, may turn out to be a Pyrrhic one for Roberts, just as Jim Bakker's success proved to be. Lately Roberts seems to be assuming that he operates in a moral vacuum—no claim is too preposterous, no pitch too brazen, if it's done in the name of God. But this sort of high-stakes approach carries with it the risk of rapidly diminishing returns. Even Roberts's credulous audience can only fall for it so many times. In the end, the TV evangelists will share the fate of the big-time corporations they've tried to emulate. The strong will survive; the bankrupt will be bought out.

TOM MCNICHOL

Tom McNichol is a Washington writer.

## POLLARD I

# OFFICIAL ROGUES

**I**SRAELI PRIME MINISTER Yitzhak Shamir still adamantly insists that the recruitment of an American citizen, Jonathan Jay Pollard, as a spy for Israel was a "rogue operation." As he put it on March 11: "The State of Israel has no connection with Pollard or his family. The State of Israel did not hire him and did not assign him espionage missions." This is arrant nonsense.

Jonathan Pollard was a civilian analyst and researcher for the U.S. Navy. In June 1984 he was assigned to the Anti-Terrorist Alert Center (ATAC) of the Naval Investigative Service's Threat Analysis Division. Initially a watch officer, monitoring the general flow of information on terrorism passing through the ATAC, Pollard became a specialist responsible for analyzing classified information

concerning potential terrorist activities in the Caribbean and the continental United States.

More important, Pollard had both a Top Secret clearance and a clearance for Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)—data on sophisticated U.S. technical collection systems as well as the fruits of their collection activities. And through his computer, he had access to data banks and “libraries” of highly sensitive Top Secret and SCI material. Anyone with authorized access to those information pools could query them about anything—not just information dealing with one’s official duties. Pollard also had clearance to enter and leave his work area without having his briefcase searched. In short, he was optimally situated to be a spy.

Prone to fantasies, Pollard seems to have seen himself as a hero in a Leon Uris novel. After his arrest in November 1985, he told U.S. authorities that as early as 1982 he had decided to become an Israeli intelligence agent. In the spring of 1984, he arranged to meet Col. Aviem Sella—a celebrated Israeli air force officer then on sabbatical at New York University. When Pollard volunteered to use his Navy position to serve Israel, Sella quickly accepted and started running him—very professionally—as a spy.

**S**ELLA AND POLLARD soon began holding secret meetings—at least one of them in an Israeli diplomat’s home in Maryland to which Pollard brought classified U.S. documents. While these were being copied, Sella went over Pollard’s performance and gave him new instructions—in which Sella emphasized Israel’s interest in Top Secret and SCI documents, and also made clear that Israel did not need or want additional U.S. information on terrorism.

In November 1984, at Sella’s direction, Pollard went to Paris, where he and Anne Henderson (then his fiancée, now his wife) spent a week being royally entertained. Sella introduced Pollard to his new case officer—Josef “Yossi” Yagur, a scientific attaché in Israel’s New York consulate—and to Rafael Eitan, a renowned senior Israeli intelligence officer who headed Lekem, a scientific and technical intelligence organization in the Ministry of Defense, for which Sella, Yagur, and now Pollard were all working.

The three Israelis gave Pollard additional instructions, again emphasizing that Israel didn’t need information on terrorism or counterterrorism, and describing in detail the specific weapons systems and other subjects on which the Israelis did want him to obtain highly classified U.S. documents. During these Paris conversations, Pollard was repeatedly told that he would be “taken care of” if apprehended, with Eitan stressing that any U.S. actions against Pollard could be “contained.” Eitan told Pollard he was “one of us.”

It was agreed that Pollard would be paid \$1,500 a month for his efforts—in effect, doubling his U.S. Navy salary. The Israelis also gave Pollard over \$10,000 in cash. This and other money not only covered Pollard’s and Henderson’s expenses in Paris, but also paid for a jaunt through France,

Italy, Austria, and Germany. In addition, Sella gave Anne Henderson a \$7,000 diamond and sapphire ring he had seen her admiring in a Paris shop window.

A few weeks later, Yagur and Pollard met, as planned, at the Maryland home of the Israeli diplomat. There Pollard delivered several suitcases of U.S. classified documents to Yagur, took his \$1,500, and met another Israeli—identified only as “Uzi”—who, with Yagur, gave Pollard new instructions, establishing a procedure that Pollard followed until his arrest 11 months later.

Every other Friday, Pollard delivered his documents to the Washington, D.C., apartment of an Israeli Embassy secretary, Irit Erb, where they were copied in time for Pollard to pick them up on Sunday and return them to his office on Monday—before anyone could notice they were missing. Once a month Pollard met Yagur at Erb’s apartment. During those meetings, Yagur would pay Pollard, review his production and performance, and give him fresh instructions.

This got a bit complicated, since by early 1985 Pollard was delivering thousands of pages of Top Secret, SCI, and other highly classified documents. Yagur’s reviews, however, were meticulous, and his “tasking” both detailed and explicit. He described specific information and even specific U.S. documents—about which he seemed well informed—that he wanted Pollard to provide. Yagur also repeated that he did *not* want Pollard to waste time on terrorism or counterterrorism. Yagur was clearly impressed with Pollard, and in early 1985 readily agreed when Pollard asked that his salary be raised to \$2,500 per month.

In the summer of 1985, Yagur told Pollard that Eitan wanted to see him again, in Israel. Pollard was about to get married, and the Israelis picked up the expenses for a three-week wedding-honeymoon trip to Israel and Europe, where the Pollards stayed in the best hotels and traveled from Venice to Zurich in a \$700 private compartment on the Orient Express.

**I**N ISRAEL, the mysterious “Uzi” hosted a dinner for Pollard, Yagur, Sella, and their wives; and Pollard, accompanied by Yagur, had several meetings with Eitan, then hospitalized in Tel Aviv. Reassuring Pollard again that Israel would protect him if he were caught, Eitan and Yagur pressed Pollard for even greater quantities of highly classified documents. When Pollard voiced concern about the added risk of detection, Eitan told Yagur to give Pollard an additional \$2,000—on top of the more than \$10,000 for his trip. He also told Pollard that in addition to his regular monthly salary, the Israelis would establish a foreign bank account for him into which they would pay \$30,000 a year for the next ten years.

When Pollard returned to Washington in late August 1985, his production sharply increased. He was impelled to work even harder when, a few weeks later, Yagur showed him an Israeli passport, with Pollard’s picture on it, issued in the name of Danny Cohen. Pollard was supposed to use this when he eventually “returned” to Israel.



Yagur also had Pollard make out signature cards for a foreign bank account in "Danny Cohen's" name, telling Pollard that \$30,000 had already been credited to that account, and reminding him that an additional \$30,000 would be deposited each year for the rest of the decade. This was a highly professional move. It got Pollard to increase his already substantial, increasingly risky espionage activity, and left him thoroughly hooked, since he could not get access to "Danny Cohen's" bank account without the Israeli passport—which the Israelis controlled.

**P**OLLARD'S intense activity proved to be his undoing. Perhaps sensitized by intelligence-related publicity during 1985—particularly publicity about John Walker and his Navy espionage ring—Pollard's Navy colleagues began to wonder why he kept asking for highly classified documents that had nothing to do with his official responsibilities. Some of these colleagues voiced their concerns to the Naval Investigative Service, which contacted the FBI.

When Pollard was first approached by NIS and FBI agents on November 18, 1985, and even when he was arrested on November 21—driving away from the Israeli Embassy, where he and his wife had unsuccessfully sought asylum—he dissembled to protect his Israeli intelligence colleagues. Sella, Yagur, and Irit Erb—whom Pollard and his wife had alerted—made it back to Israel before the United States became aware of their role in this operation or could do anything to stop them.

In December 1985 U.S. Attorney Joseph DiGenova, State Department legal adviser Abraham Sofaer, and Mark Richard of the Justice Department went to Israel to investigate the Pollard affair. They came away empty-handed. While professing a desire to cooperate, the Israelis were deliberately evasive. They gave the Americans some, but far from all, of the U.S. documents Pollard had passed, and they masked Col. Aviem Sella and his role in the operation.

The Pollard case was not discreet surveillance of the type that all governments keep on even their closest allies. It was the wholesale theft of ultrasensitive, highly classified internal U.S. documents that in their raw, "un-redacted," state the United States could never show to any foreign power without grave damage to its own security. Pollard gave the Israelis approximately 360 cubic feet of such documents. Some outlined U.S. military capabilities, training plans, and projected movements. Others contained sensitive intelligence on a variety of foreign nations and topics, in such detail that a professional analyst could discern what U.S. collection systems must have been used to acquire these data, the capabilities and limitations of those systems, and even, in some cases, the likely identities of human agents. No wonder Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger told the judge who sentenced the Pollards: "It is difficult for me . . . to conceive of a greater harm to national security."

The Pollard operation simply could not have been con-

ceived and conducted by a small handful of overzealous officers acting on their own. Consider the number of Israeli officials, official facilities, and equipment purchased with official funds that became involved, in the United States and in Israel: Rafi Eitan, Colonel Sella, "Yossi" Yagur, Irit Erb, the mysterious "Uzi," the Maryland home of the unnamed Israeli Embassy official, Erb's Washington apartment, the high-speed copying equipment that was required in the United States, the courier facilities that got the Pollard-provided documents back to Israel, the secure storage space that must have been required to house the documents, the staffs necessary to screen and analyze them.

An operation of this magnitude, political sensitivity, and intelligence value could not have been run for well over a year without the knowledge and support of quite a few Israelis—including, at an absolute minimum, officials at the highest levels of the Ministry of Defense. Not counting over \$10,000 worth of jewelry obtained for Pollard's wife, by the time of Pollard's arrest in November 1985 the Israelis had paid him around \$50,000 in cash for his spying, plus the \$30,000 they deposited in "Danny Cohen's" foreign bank account. If this operation had run for the full decade envisaged, Pollard stood to receive an additional \$540,000 or so. No intelligence service gets that kind of money out of petty cash. Moreover, most governments rarely supply a passport for a non-citizen, particularly one in a false name. I seriously doubt if any Israeli intelligence service, on its own, could document Jonathan Pollard as Israeli citizen Danny Cohen. That must have required the blessing of senior officials in both the Foreign and the Interior Ministries.

Neither Aviem Sella nor Josef Yagur alone could have given Pollard the kind of detailed direction that he received from both of them. Those tasking instructions must have been prepared by a staff in Israel whose members were aware of Pollard's past production, of everything Israel already knew about the subjects on which Pollard was directed to supply documents, the exact information gaps the Israeli government wanted to fill, and even the specific classified U.S. documents that the Israelis wanted. Such a staff would have had to have been housed somewhere, presumably in the Defense Ministry, and someone quite senior would have had to supervise it.

**I**N ISRAEL, the sensitivity and sheer volume of Pollard's production must have made the screening and handling of these documents a brisk cottage industry. The Israelis would have had to solve the problem faced by any intelligence service with a prolific, valuable, but ultrasensitive source: how to exploit that source's production to the fullest without compromising it. This takes the right kind of people, a fair number of them, plus high-level support and backing.

It is inconceivable that at least some Pollard-provided intelligence, with special restriction markings, was not provided to Israel's top political leaders, who must have known—at a minimum—that the Israelis had an

ultrasensitive covert penetration of the U.S. defense establishment. The intelligence provided by Pollard reportedly helped to facilitate Israel's air raid on PLO headquarters in Tunis on October 1, 1985. That raid had to have been approved, in advance, by the prime minister and his inner Cabinet—at least some of whom would have wanted assurances about the solidity of the intelligence on which that raid's planning was based.

**S**INCE POLLARD'S arrest, none of the Israelis involved has suffered in the slightest. Irit Erb and Josef Yagur returned hastily to Israel, but without any apparent damage to their careers. The Lekem was disbanded, at least in name, and Rafael Eitan retired from government service; but he was of retirement age anyway, and in poor health. Furthermore, he was given one of the most lucrative, prestigious post-retirement positions the government could bestow: the chairmanship of Israel Chemicals, Israel's largest state-run company. As for Sella, the government took pains to shield his very identity, not just Sella himself, from American investigators. Since then, his career has flourished. The day before a U.S. federal grand jury indicted him for espionage, and two days before Pollard was sentenced to life imprisonment, the Israeli government announced that Sella would be the new commander of Tel Nof, Israel's second largest air base.

From an intelligence standpoint, the Pollard operation was professionally brilliant and a great success for everyone involved—except Pollard and his wife. Politically, however, the operation was lunacy. Foreign Minister Shimon Peres has asserted that there are no more Pollards. Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin has been even more forceful: "Israel does not carry on espionage activities in the United States. There are no Americans or non-Americans who serve as spies for Israel against the United States." Israeli Cabinet officers could hardly be expected to say anything else. In this case, Israel is dangerously undermining its credibility by continuing to insist that the Pollard case was a "rogue operation."

If Israel's leaders truly value their good relations with the United States, they will drop these untenable denials, even at the cost of some political heartburn at home. If any Israeli intelligence service is using Americans as covert assets or agents, Israel should make sure that such operations are terminated immediately, and that their case officers are quietly brought back home. Any Americans involved should be told that their covert ties with Israel are permanently severed. For Israel, no intelligence "success" against the United States can possibly be worth the damage to the U.S.-Israeli relationship that another "rogue operation" would inflict.

**GEORGE A. CARVER JR.**

George A. Carver Jr., a professional CIA intelligence officer for 26 years, is now John M. Olin Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

## POLLARD II

# I SPY, YOU SPY

**T**HERE'S A NEW wrinkle in the story of espionage between the United States and Israel. In recent years, U.S. intelligence has occasionally "planted" agents in Volunteers for Israel, a program in which thousands of private American citizens, mostly Jews, have spent about a month informally serving in the Israel Defense Forces. These volunteers perform menial but essential chores on army bases across the country. Israel gets cheap labor, and the volunteers feel they have made a personal contribution to Israel's security. But according to two well-placed U.S. sources, elements in the American intelligence community (not necessarily the Central Intelligence Agency, I was told) thought that agents posing as "volunteers" could pick up some useful tidbits of information about Israel's military. It is unclear whether they managed to do so.

It now seems that such spying among friends is more common than citizens of the two countries might have thought. Of course, the major revelation in the ongoing saga of U.S.-Israeli spying was the Jonathan Jay Pollard affair—in which an American Jew was convicted of passing massive amounts of classified U.S. intelligence information to Israel. That crisis recently re-erupted with Israel's decision to promote air force Col. Aviem Sella, who was indicted by a U.S. grand jury on charges that he "ran" Pollard.

And the Volunteers for Israel revelation comes only a few days after Republican Senator David Durenberger of Minnesota, the former chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, let slip a few details about a more serious operation. Speaking to American Jewish political activists in Palm Beach, Florida, on March 15, Durenberger said that the CIA had "changed the rules of the game" in 1982 by authorizing an operation to penetrate Israel's military-intelligence community. Durenberger said that this decision apparently led to Israel's decision to run Pollard in Washington.

Six days after Durenberger's remarks, a *Washington Post* report by John Goshko and Bob Woodward confirmed that the United States has spied on Israel. It quoted two sources in Washington as saying that an Israeli military officer "who was unhappy with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon volunteered to provide limited, classified information to the U.S. government." The story says both governments had pledged not to recruit spies in each other's country, but also acknowledge that they can't refuse unsolicited "walk-ins"—such as Pollard himself—who volunteer potentially sensitive information.

According to the *Post* story, the Washington sources said the officer gave the United States "classified material" that was "not dramatic but useful" in a relationship that lasted until 1984. One of the *Post's* sources said he didn't know why the relationship was terminated. But Durenberger

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VOA FOR HORT SMITH; B1B FOR WALTER ROBERTS.  
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MACDILL FOR USIA ADVISER BRIAN BELL.  
STATE FOR NEA/IAI WILCOX, NEA/P BERGER.

E.O. 12356: N/A  
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION/PRESS REVIEW, MAY 28, 1987  
A) STORIES COVERED IN REPORT:

1. AFTERMATH OF POLLARD PROBE REPORTS.
2. INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE.

INTRODUCTION: ALL MEDIA CONTINUED TO FOCUS ON THE  
POLITICAL AND PARLIAMENTARY IMPACTS OF THE REPORTS.  
ALSO ON THE FRONTPAGES: THE SECOND TEACHERS' GENERAL  
STRIKE OVER BUDGET CUTS AND THE AFTERMATH OF IDF  
OFFICER NAFSU'S CASE.

B) SUMMARY OF TYPE OF COVERAGE:

1. AFTERMATH OF POLLARD PROBE REPORTS:

-- WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENTS REPORTED ON STATE  
DEPARTMENT DEPUTY SPOKESPERSON OAKLEY'S COMMENTS. TWO  
READ THEM AS A "SHARP REMINDER" THAT THE U.S. WISHES  
THAT THE GUILTY PARTIES BE PUNISHED.

-- ISRAEL RADIO AND PRESS FEATURED AMBASSADOR  
PICKERING'S REMARKS ON THE POTENTIAL LONG-TERM IMPACT  
OF THE AFFAIR.

- JERUSALEM POST'S MORRIS REPORTED THAT ISRAEL'S  
INTENDED REFUSAL TO GIVE THE U.S. THE SECRET SECTION OF  
THE ROTENSTREICH-TZUR REPORT "MIGHT OPEN A NEW AREA OF  
DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS."

-- HA'ARETZ EDITORIAL CALLED FOR THE RESIGNATION OF  
PERES, SHAMIR, RABIN AND ARENS.

-- DAVAR EDITORIAL STATED THAT "ALTHOUGH THIS  
GOVERNMENT MANAGED TO EMERGE FROM THE POLLARD AFFAIR IN  
ONE PIECE, IT HAS OUTLIVED ITS USEFULNESS."

-- THE JERUSALEM POST ARGUED THAT SINCE BOTH LIKUD AND  
LABOR WON'T ABIDE BY THE SPIRIT AND LETTER OF THE  
REPORTS' RECOMMENDATIONS, THE INQUIRIES WON'T DO ANY  
GOOD.

-- ISRAEL RADIO'S BEN-AMI COMMENTED THAT IN A SHORT  
WHILE THE ISSUE WILL NO LONGER BE A MEDIA EVENT.  
-- THE WEEKLY NEWS MAGAZINE KOTERET RASHIT FELT THAT  
THE U.S. WON'T LET THE GOI GET AWAY WITH "ONLY  
BROWBEATING AND KNUCKLE RAPPING."

2. INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE:

-- JERUSALEM POST'S MORRIS WROTE THAT "THE KEY TO  
PROGRESS NOW PROBABLY LIES IN MOSCOW ... THE SIGNS OF  
RELIEF IN THE LIKUD ARE PROBABLY PREMMATURE."

C) HEADLINES:

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MACDILL FOR USIA ADVISER BRIAN BELL.  
STATE FOR NEA/IAI WILCOX, NEA/P BERGER.

E.O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION/PRESS REVIEW, MAY 28, 1987

1. AFTERMATH OF POLLARD PROBE REPORTS:

"U.S.: INVOLVED PARTIES SHOULD BE PUNISHED" (YEDIOT),  
"WASHINGTON: DAMAGE CAUSED BY POLLARD AFFAIR WON'T GO  
AWAY SOON" (MAARIV), "U.S. STILL WANTS ACTION"  
(JERUSALEM POST), "ISRAEL WON'T GIVE U.S. SECRET  
SECTION" (JERUSALEM POST). "PERES, RABIN, SHAMIR AND  
ARENS MUST GO" (HA'ARETZ EDITORIAL), "WE MIGHT START  
LOOKING FOR ANOTHER SCANDAL; THIS ONE IS DEAD" (ISRAEL  
RADIO COMMENTARY).

2. INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE:

"THE KEY TO M-E PROGRESS NOW LIES IN MOSCOW" (JERUSALEM  
POST COMMENTARY).

D) SUPPORTIVE TEXT:

1. AFTERMATH OF POLLARD PROBE REPORTS:

1. JERUSALEM POST WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT WOLF BLITZER  
REPORTED: "U.S. LAW-ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES SAID  
YESTERDAY THAT THE RELEASE OF TWO ISRAELI REPORTS ON

THE POLLARD SPY SCANDAL WOULD NOT HAVE ANY EFFECT ON  
THEIR CONTINUING INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF THE  
CASE. THEY SAID THAT THEY WERE CONTINUING THEIR LEGAL  
PROCESS OF LIFTING THE IMMUNITY FROM CRIMINAL  
PROSECUTION EARLIER GRANTED TO THREE UNINDICTED ISRAELI  
CO-CONSPIRATORS, RAFAEL EITAN, YOSEF YAGUR AND IRIT  
ERB. THEY ALSO SAID YESTERDAY THAT THEY WERE CONTINUING  
THEIR INVESTIGATION INTO ALLEGATIONS THAT POLLARD MAY  
HAVE BEEN PART OF A BROADER ISRAELI SPY NETWORK  
OPERATING IN THE U.S. . . . THE U.S. ALSO ISSUED A SHARP  
REMINDER THAT IT WANTED ISRAELIS INVOLVED IN THE CASE  
BROUGHT TO ACCOUNT AS PROMISED BY JERUSALEM. STATE  
DEPARTMENT SPOKESWOMAN PHYLIS OAKLEY SAID . . .  
WASHINGTON HOPED THE REPORTS WILL CONTRIBUTE TO  
ENSURING THAT ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES LIKE POLLARD'S NEVER  
OCCUR AGAIN . . . WE HAVE ALWAYS SAID WE ARE CONCERNED  
ABOUT THE TREATMENT OF THE INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN  
POLLARD'S ESPIONAGE AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL  
UNDERTOOK TO CALL SUCH PERSONS TO ACCOUNT.' SOME U.S.  
OFFICIALS CHARGED THAT THE ISRAELI REPORTS AMOUNTED TO  
A 'WHITEWASH' BY AVOIDING ANY FLAT RECOMMENDATIONS  
CALLING FOR POLITICAL RESIGNATIONS."

11. YEDIOT WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT EROL GUINEY READ  
SPOKESWOMAN OAKLEY'S REMARKS AS "SERVING FIRM NOTICE ON  
ISRAEL THAT THE U.S. WISHES THE ISRAELIS INVOLVED IN  
THE AFFAIR TO BE PUNISHED." MAARIV WASHINGTON  
CORRESPONDENT OFRA YEHUDAH-LYTH FOUND IN OAKLEY'S  
REMARKS "OPEN IRRITATION WITH THE FACT THAT THE KEY  
FIGURES IN THE POLLARD AFFAIR HAVE NOT YET BEEN  
PUNISHED."

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USCINCEUR VAHINGEN IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY NIGOSIA IMMEDIATE  
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NEA; ROME AND JERUSALEM FOR VOA; VOA NEWS/CA.  
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MACDILL FOR USIA ADVISER BRIAN BELL.  
STATE FOR NEA/IAI WILCOX, NEA/P BERGER.

E.O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION/PRESS REVIEW, MAY 28, 1987

III. ISRAEL RADIO AND PRESS FEATURED AMBASSADOR  
PICKERING'S REMARKS AT BAR-ILAN UNIVERSITY THAT "THE  
IMPACT ON OUR RELATIONSHIP IN MY VIEW HAS BEEN MORE IN  
ITS POTENTIAL, AND I USE THAT WORD VERY CAREFULLY, TO  
ERODE THE LONG-TERM POPULAR SUPPORT IN THE U.S. FOR  
ISRAEL, THAN IT HAS BEEN AN IMPACT ON OUR DAILY WORKING  
RELATIONSHIPS, WHICH HAVE CONTINUED."

IV. JERUSALEM POST DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT BENNY  
MORRIS WROTE: "ISRAEL HAS NO INTENTION OF GIVING THE  
U.S. A COPY OF THE 45-PAGE SECRET SECTION OF THE  
ROTENSTREICH-TZUR REPORT ON THE POLLARD AFFAIR, SENIOR  
GOVERNMENT SOURCES INDICATED YESTERDAY. COMING ON TOP  
OF THE BLAND NATURE OF THE REPORT'S FINDINGS AND OF THE  
ABSENCE OF ANY DEMAND FOR PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN  
EITHER THE ROTENSTREICH-TZUR OR THE KNESSET  
SUBCOMMITTEE'S REPORT ON POLLARD, THIS REFUSAL MIGHT  
OPEN A NEW AREA OF DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO  
GOVERNMENTS .... IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE GOVERNMENT  
WILL ALSO NOT PERMIT THE TRANSFER TO THE U.S. OF THE  
SECRET ANNEXES, STILL UNCOMPLETED, OF THE KNESSET  
COMMITTEE REPORT .... COMMITTEE HEAD ABBA EBAN  
YESTERDAY SAID FLATLY THAT THE SECRET SECTIONS OF HIS

COMMITTEE'S REPORT WOULD 'ABSOLUTELY NOT' BE GIVEN TO  
THE U.S."

V. HA'ARETZ EDITORIAL SAID: "THE EBAN COMMITTEE  
REFRAINED FROM RECOMMENDING THAT SHAMIR, PERES, RABIN  
AND ARENS DRAW WHAT WE CALL 'PERSONAL CONCLUSIONS' FROM  
THE POLLARD PROBE REPORT. HOWEVER, ANYONE LOOKING  
CAREFULLY AT THE FINDINGS CAN HAVE NO DOUBT THAT, IF  
THE TERM 'MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY' MEANS ANYTHING,  
ALL FOUR MUST RESIGN. THOSE WHO FAILED TO CONTROL THE  
SYSTEMS UNDER THEIR SUPERVISION CANNOT BE TRUSTED TO  
RUN THE AFFAIRS OF THE STATE; ALL THE MORE SO AS THE  
POLLARD SCANDAL IS JUST ONE IN A SERIES OF FIASCOS,  
FROM THE IRAN ARMS DEAL TO THE CONTACTS WITH THE  
CONTRAS AND THE LAVI. THE POLLARD QUARTET ... EVEN  
MANAGED TO MESS UP ISRAELI-AMERICAN RELATIONS BY NOT  
HONORING ALL THE PROMISES THEY GAVE WASHINGTON AND BY  
EMBARRASSING AMERICAN JEWRY .... THEIR RESIGNATION IS  
ESSENTIAL TO REMEDY BILATERAL RELATIONS."

VI. DAVAR EDITORIAL SAID: "OUR CABINET ATTACHES NO  
PRACTICAL MEANING WHATSOEVER TO THE RECOMMENDATION THAT  
IT ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE POLLARD AFFAIR. ITS  
ADMISSION OF GUILT IS A REPETITION OF THE OLD RHETORIC  
WE HAVE BECOME ACCUSTOMED TO. ENJOYING AN UNSHAKEABLE  
KNESSET MAJORITY, THE GOVERNMENT CAN DO OR NOT DO  
WHATEVER IT PLEASES .... THUS, IT CAN AFFORD TO HAVE NO  
SCRUPLES ABOUT THE FATE OF THOSE WHO OPERATED POLLARD,  
AS WELL AS ABOUT STRIPPING THE TERM OF MINISTERIAL  
ACCOUNTABILITY OF ANY MEANING .... ALTHOUGH THIS  
QUARREL-INFESTED GOVERNMENT MANAGED TO EMERGE FROM THE  
POLLARD AFFAIR IN ONE PIECE, AND MIGHT YET SUCCEED IN

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E.O. 12356: N/A

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STICKING TOGETHER FOR DAYS AND MONTHS TO COME, IT HAS  
OUTLIVED ITS USEFULNESS."

VII. A JERUSALEM POST EDITORIAL SAID: "THE  
ROTENSTREICH-TZUR REPORT, THOUGH AUTHORED BY A  
DISTINGUISHED JURIST AND A FORMER CHIEF OF GENERAL  
STAFF, IS LITTLE BETTER THAN AMODYNE WHITEWASH. THE  
SO-CALLED EBAN REPORT IS IN LARGE MEASURE A LIVELY BUT  
STERILE DEBATE, MOSTLY ALONG LIKUD/LABOR LINES, AMONG  
THE PANEL MEMBERS. NEITHER DOCUMENT IS LIKELY TO HAVE  
MORE THAN A MINIMAL IMPACT ON THE STRUCTURE OF POLITICS  
IN ISRAEL AT THIS TIME, OR ON THE ABILITY OF THE  
POLITICAL ECHELON TO SET THE EXECUTIVE HOUSE IN ORDER  
... THE MORAL IS THAT, SO LONG AS THE MAJOR-PARTY  
LEADERS HAVE A MUTUAL STAKE IN STICKING TOGETHER, THERE  
IS NOTHING THE KNESSET, ESPECIALLY THROUGH A  
SUBCOMMITTEE, CAN DO TO SHAKE OR CHANGE THEM NO MATTER  
HOW GREAT THE PROVOCATION NOR HOW GREAT THE  
MISMANAGEMENT OF GOVERNMENT."

VIII. ISRAEL RADIO POLITICAL CORRESPONDENT ODED BEN-AMI  
COMMENTED: "THIS AFFAIR IS NOT GOING TO BE A MEDIA  
EVENT FOR MUCH LONGER. WE'D BETTER START LOOKING

ORWARD TO THE NEXT SCANDAL. THE PROBE PANELS WERE  
ESSENTIALLY SET UP TO APPEASE THE AMERICANS, BUT IT  
APPEARS THAT WE'RE TAKING THE AFFAIR MUCH MORE  
SERIOUSLY THAN THE PEOPLE ACROSS THE OCEAN.  
DOMESTICALLY, WE MAY HAVE A LITTLE MORE OF THE OLD  
PARTISAN SWORD CROSSING AND THAT'S IT."  
IX. THE WEEKLY NEWS MAGAZINE KOTERET RASHIT WROTE:  
"ONCE IT BECAME CLEAR THAT BOTH LIKUD AND LABOR SHARE  
THE BLAME FOR THE POLLARD FIASCO, THE DANGER OF ANY  
POLITICAL LEADER BEING PERSONALLY AFFECTED BY THE  
AFFAIR NOTICEABLY DECREASED. THAT IS INCIDENTALLY WHAT  
HAPPENED IN THE GSS SCANDAL (IN WHICH THE CABINET  
RESOLVED TO BE VERY LENIENT WITH TOP INTELLIGENCE  
OFFICIALS ACCUSED OF PERJURY). THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN  
THE TWO AFFAIRS, HOWEVER, IS THAT IN THE POLLARD CASE A  
PARTNER MORE SENSITIVE AND POWERFUL THAN ISRAELI PUBLIC  
OPINION IS BREATHING DOWN THE GOI'S NECK. THE U.S.  
ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC, AS WELL AS THE AMERICAN  
JEWISH COMMUNITY, ARE NOT GOING TO LIKE INQUIRIES THAT  
MAKE DO WITH ONLY BROWBEATING AND KNUCKLE RAPPING."

2. INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE:

JERUSALEM POST DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT BENNY MORRIS  
WROTE IN AN EDITORIAL PAGE ANALYSIS: "ISRAEL, FAR MORE  
THAN THE SOVIETS, NEEDS MIDDLE EAST PEACE (FOR ISRAEL  
IT IS AN EXISTENTIAL IMPERATIVE), AND ... THERE IS  
THOROUGH SYMMETRY BETWEEN ISRAELI AND SOVIET  
PARTICIPATION IN THE CONFERENCE. BRIEFLY PUT, THAT  
SYMMETRY MEANS THAT THERE WILL BE NO INTERNATIONAL  
CONFERENCE IF THE SOVIETS DON'T PARTICIPATE JUST AS

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TO USINFO WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
SECDEF WASHDC//USDP/ASD-PA// IMMEDIATE  
HQ USAF WASHDC//PRIB// IMMEDIATE  
HQDA WASHDC//SASA  
DIA WASHDC//  
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE  
USIS CAIRO IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY MANAMA IMMEDIATE  
AMCONSUL JEDDAH IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 05 TELAVIV 07329

STATE FOR NEA/IAI, INR, SP, P/M; R; FOR P/RC, P/F, P/F,  
P/FW, P/FN, P/M, HA.  
NEA; ROME AND JERUSALEM FOR VOA; VOA NEWS/CA.  
VOA FOR MORT SMITH; BIB FOR WALTER ROBERTS.  
AMEMBASSY ROME FOR MFO. JERUSALEM FOR ICD GREEN.  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN FOR POLAD AMB. LANE AND PAO.  
MACDILL FOR USIA ADVISER BRIAN BELL.  
STATE FOR NEA/IAI WILCOX, NEA/P BERGER.

E. O. 12356: N/A  
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION/PRESS REVIEW, MAY 28, 1987

THERE WON'T BE A CONFERENCE IF ISRAEL DOESN'T SHOW UP.  
FOR IF THE SOVIETS DON'T PARTICIPATE, NEITHER WILL  
JORDAN AND SYRIA - MEANING, NO CONFERENCE. IF ISRAEL  
DOESN'T PARTICIPATE, NEITHER WILL THE U.S. - MEANING,  
NO CONFERENCE . . . . THE KEY TO PROGRESS NOW PROBABLY  
LIES IN MOSCOW, NOT IN EUROPE . . . . IT IS FAR TOO EARLY  
TO WRITE OFF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE PROCESS, AND  
THE SIGNS OF RELIEF IN THE LIKUD, AUDIBLE THROUGHOUT  
THE LAND IN THE DAYS AFTER THE INNER CABINET MEETING,  
ARE PROBABLY PREMATURE.

MINIMIZE CONSIDERED FOR BEIRUT. LANE

EOT

**UNCLASSIFIED**