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*Last Updated: 09/22/2023*

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

KML 10/21/2011

**File Folder** GREECE (03/09/1983-03/29/1983)

**FOIA**

M11-412

**Box Number** 15

DRAENOS

9

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
121573	CABLE	ATHENS 3593 <i>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</i>	2	3/9/1983	B1
121599	CABLE	ATHENS 3608 <i>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</i>	3	3/9/1983	B1
121600	MEMO	WILLIAM CLARK TO GEORGE SHULTZ RE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE <i>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</i>	1	3/10/1983	B1
121603	MEMO	WILLIAM CLARK TO THE PRESIDENT RE SECURITY ASSISTANCE <i>R 11/5/2015 M412/1</i>	2	3/7/1983	B1
121605	MEMO	GEORGE SHULTZ TO THE PRESIDENT RE SECURITY ASSISTANCE <i>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</i>	2	3/1/1983	B1
121606	MEMO	DONALD FORTIER & ROBERT LILAC TO WILLIAM CLARK RE SECURITY ASSISTANCE (WITH NOTATIONS) <i>R 11/5/2015 M412/1</i>	2	3/4/1983	B1
121608	CABLE	ATHENS 4056 <i>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</i>	3	3/17/1983	B1
121610	CABLE	ATHENS 4060 <i>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</i>	1	3/17/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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**Box Number** 15

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
121613	CABLE	ATHENS 4122 <b>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</b>	1	3/18/1983	B1
121614	CABLE	ATHENS 4183 <b>D 3/18/2013 M412/1</b>	1	3/19/1983	B1
121616	CABLE	ATHENS 4185 <b>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</b>	4	3/19/1983	B1
121619	MEMO	DONALD FORTIER TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE TELEPHONE CALL <b>R 11/5/2015 M412/1</b>	1	3/21/1983	B1
121623	TALKING POINTS	RE SECURITY ASSISTANCE <b>R 11/5/2015 M412/1</b>	2	ND	B1
121627	CABLE	ATHENS 4605 <b>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</b>	1	3/29/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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121573

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 ATHENS 3593 19362 DTG: 091354Z MAR 83 PSN: 003823  
SIT097 DATE 03/25/83 TOR: 068/1600

NEGOTIATIONS.

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLSMCF JP SITP VP SIT EOB EOBP  
EOB: //TK//  
WNSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTWISE ON FURTHER DISSEM-ION)Y PRESS

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHTH #3593/01 0681359  
O 091354Z MAR 83 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4780

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 03593

NODIS  
FOR UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER AND ASSISTANT  
SECRETARY BURT FROM SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR BARTHOLOMEW  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: MARR, MASS, GR, US  
SUBJECT: DECA TALKS  
REF: ATHENS 3523

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING MID-DAY DISCUSSION HE HAD WITH  
PAPANDREOU, KAPSIS TOOK SOME IMPORTANT STEPS  
TOWARDS A US-GREEK BASE AGREEMENT AT MARCH 8  
NEGOTIATING SESSION. HE ACCEPTED THE FORM OF  
AGREEMENT WE PROPOSE AND THE US DRAFT DECA AND  
RELATED ARRANGEMENT (RA) AS THE WORKING TEXTS.  
HE TABLED (AND WE EXTENSIVELY DISCUSSED) A  
LIMITED NUMBER OF SPECIFIC LANGUAGE CHANGES ON  
VARIOUS DECA ARTICLES, IN EFFECT ACCEPTING OUR  
POSITIONS ON SOME KEY POINTS, NARROWING OUR  
DIFFERENCES ON OTHERS, AND REDUCING THE NUMBER  
OF REALLY HARD NUTS TO CRACK TO A HANDFUL (SEE  
SEPTEL FOR DETAILS).

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. HOWEVER, KAPSIS COUPLED THIS WORKMANLIKE  
PERFORMANCE WITH A STATEMENT THAT HE WAS  
AUTHORIZED TO PARTICIPATE IN ONLY ONE MORE  
NEGOTIATING SESSION ON THE DECA AND RA WITHOUT  
SOMETHING FROM US ON AID INCREASE. HE ALSO  
PRESSED HARD FOR LANGUAGE IN THE DECA ON  
PRESERVING THE BALANCE. HE HAD SHOWN GOG  
SERIOUSNESS AND WILL TO REACH AGREEMENT. BUT  
GOG COULD SIMPLY NOT BE IN POSITION OF  
CONTINUING TO MOVE ON POINTS OF SPECIAL  
INTEREST TO THE US, WHILE THE US CONTINUED  
TO REFUSE ANY INDICATION OF ITS POSITIONS  
ON POINTS OF SPECIAL INTEREST TO THE GREEKS.  
GOG NEEDED SOME INDICATION OF AID INCREASE  
TO BE ABLE TO SAY THAT ALL ISSUES OF  
IMPORTANCE TO BOTH SIDES ARE IN PLAY IN

4. KAPSIS SAID HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH PAPANDREOU  
A PERSONAL STATEMENT HE (KAPSIS) HAD MADE TO ME  
EARLIER ON A MARCH 25 DEADLINE FOR AGREEMENT OR  
SUSPENSION OF BASE OPERATIONS (SEE REFTEL).  
(I HAD HIT HIM HARD ON STATEMENT: "I FLATLY  
REJECT ANY DEADLINES OR THREATS. US WOULD  
REGARD THIS WITH UTMOST GRAVITY; RAISES  
PROFOUND QUESTIONS. GOG WOULD BEAR FULL  
RESPONSIBILITY FOR SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES OF ANY  
SUCH ACTION.") PAPANDREOU HAD SUPPORTED HIS  
STATEMENT, BUT DID NOT WANT TO UPSET GREEK-  
AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION OVER THE  
BASES QUESTIONS, AND HAD THUS RESERVED FOR  
HIMSELF ANY FINAL DECISION ON THE MATTER.

5. FOR MY PART, I REPEATED QUESTION OF SECURITY  
ASSISTANCE FOR GREECE WAS STILL UNDER REVIEW IN  
WASHINGTON. IF KAPSIS WAS ABLE TO HOLD ONLY ONE  
MORE NEGOTIATING SESSION, THAT WOULD LEAVE ME  
LOT OF TIME FOR SIGHTSEEING SINCE I HAD PLANNED  
TO REMAIN IN ATHENS READY TO WORK WITH HIM UNTIL  
MARCH 22. I WAS GLAD TO SEE PM STRESSING GREEK  
FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION, AND TALK OF DEADLINES  
AND SUSPENSION OF BASE OPERATIONS HAD NO PLACE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

IN THAT CONTEXT. KAPSIS HAD COMPLAINED ABOUT THE  
"HARSHNESS" OF MY TONE AND WORDS IN REACTING TO  
HIS PERSONAL STATEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT, BUT  
THAT WOULD BE MILD COMPARED TO WAY USG WOULD  
REACT TO ANY GOG MOVES IN THIS DIRECTION.

6. COMMENT: GREEKS HAVE NOW MOVED CONSIDERABLY  
AND IT IS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT THAT I BE  
AUTHORIZED ASAP TO PLAY THE UP TO \$220 MILLION  
FMS INCREASE TO KEEP THEM GOING. (BALANCE IS  
IMPORTANT FOR THEM, BUT AID NUMBER IS KEY  
FACTOR NOW.) THEY FEEL THEY HAVE MADE SPECIAL  
EFFORT TO MOVE TOWARDS US, BUT CANNOT CONTINUE  
ON WITH NOTHING FROM US ON AID INCREASE WITHOUT  
EXPOSING THEMSELVES POLITICALLY, GIVEN  
INTENSITY OF FOCUS ON AID QUESTION ACROSS THE  
POLITICAL SPECTRUM IN GREECE. THERE IS LITTLE  
DOUBT THAT KAPSIS WILL NOT MEET BEYOND  
THURSDAY, MARCH 18, SESSION (WE ARE OFF  
TONIGHT BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT) UNLESS AND UNTIL  
I HAVE SOMETHING ON AID. AND LONGER WE GO  
WITHOUT RESOLVING THE PROBLEM, THE GREATER

ATHENS 3593 19362 DTG: 091354Z MAR 83 PSN: 003823

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M412 # 121573

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

~~SECRET~~

2

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01                    ATHENS 3593                    19362                    DTG: 091354Z MAR 83                    PSN: 003826  
SIT096                    DATE 03/25/83                    TOR: 068/1601Z

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF MCF JP SITP VP SIT EOB EOBP  
EOB: //TK//  
WHSR COMMENT: PLEASE ADVISE ON FURTHER DISSEM-ION) Y PRESS

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHTH #3593/02 0681400  
O 091354Z MAR 83 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4781

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 ATHENS 03593  
NODIS

THE BUILD UP OF POLITICAL HEAT AND PRESSURE  
IN GREEK OPINION (FURTHER FUELED BY APPROACH  
OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE DAY MARCH 25), AND  
THE GREATER THE RISK OF BREAKDOWN IN THE  
NEGOTIATIONS (AND PRESSURE ON GOG TO DO  
SOMETHING ON BASE OPERATIONS). FINALLY,  
IF NEGOTIATIONS BREAK DOWN AT THIS POINT,  
POSITIVE STEPS GOG TOOK AT MARCH 8 SESSION  
COULD WELL STRENGTHEN THEIR CASE IN THE  
EYES OF CONCERNED POLITICAL OPINION HERE  
AND ELSEWHERE. END COMMENT.

7. PLEASE ADVISE. STEARNS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

121599

3

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01      ATHENS 3606      19362      DTG: 091636Z MAR 83 PSN: 004006  
SIT093      DATE 03/25/83      TOR: 068/1806Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB EOBP  
EOB: //TK//  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTTT-CHECKLIST-----ION) Y PRESS

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHTH #3608/01 0681642  
O 091636Z MAR 83  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4789  
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO JCS WASHDC  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2723  
USMISSION USNATO 1384  
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE  
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE  
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE  
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK  
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT  
USNMR SHAPE BE  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 ATHENS 03608  
EXDIS  
FROM U.S. SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR BARTHOLOMEW  
MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: MASS, MARR, GR, US  
SUBJECT: DECA NEGOTIATIONS: MARCH 8 SESSION  
REF: ATHENS 3523  
1. (ENTIRE TEXT)

2. BEGIN SUMMARY. IN MARCH 8 SESSION GREEKS  
ADDRESSED THE SPECIFICS OF U.S. PROPOSALS FOR  
A DECA IN A REASONABLE AND FORTHCOMING MANNER.  
AS A RESULT, CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS WAS MADE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

IN NARROWING DIFFERENCES ON THE ISSUES. AT  
THE SAME TIME, KAPSIS TOLD BARTHOLOMEW THAT HE  
WAS AUTHORIZED TO PARTICIPATE IN ONLY ONE MORE  
SUCH SESSION ABSENT AN INDICATION FROM THE U.S.  
OF ITS PROPOSALS WITH RESPECT TO SECURITY  
ASSISTANCE. END SUMMARY.

3. ARTICLE I -- KAPSIS BEGAN THE MEETING  
BY ASKING THAT A CLAUSE ON BALANCE BE INCLUDED,  
AS FOLLOWS: "THE BALANCE OF FORCES IN THE REGION, BOTH  
QUANTITATIVELY AND QUALITATIVELY, SHALL BE  
PRESERVED." HE STRESSED THE GREAT IMPORTANCE  
THE GOG ATTACHED TO THIS POINT: "WE WANT TO  
PUT TEETH INTO THE PHRASE ABOUT REGIONAL PEACE,  
STABILITY AND SECURITY. THIS IS THE HARD CORE OF  
OUR PROBLEM. IF THE U.S. ACCEPTED OUR LANGUAGE,

I WOULD TELL THE PRIME MINISTER THAT THE DECA  
IS IN HAND." KAPSIS ADMITTED THAT THE BASIC  
PURPOSE IS TO PRESERVE THE BALANCE WITH TURKEY,  
BUT HE DENIED THAT THEY WERE SEEKING LANGUAGE  
THAT MIGHT PROVE CONFRONTATIONAL. IT WAS SIMPLY  
A QUESTION OF ASKING THE U.S. TO ENFORCE ITS  
OWN LAW. FINALLY, HE NOTED POINTEDLY THAT HE  
HAD NOT ASKED FOR DELETION OF THE NATO REFERENCE  
IN ARTICLE I.

4. BARTHOLOMEW SAID THAT THE EXCHANGE OF  
LETTERS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME  
MINISTER HAD REFERRED TO THE PRINCIPLE IN WHICH  
THE GOG IS INTERESTED. THE LANGUAGE PROPOSED  
BY KAPSIS, HOWEVER, BECAUSE IT GOES BEYOND  
U.S. LAW, WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE U.S.  
GOVERNMENT. MOREOVER, WHATEVER THE GREEKS  
INTENDED, THE U.S. CANNOT ENTER INTO AN AGREEMENT  
THAT HAS THE FLAVOR AND CONTENT OF BEING A PACT  
BETWEEN TWO ALLIES AGAINST A THIRD. BARTHOLOMEW  
SAID THAT HE WOULD REPORT THE CONVERSATION ON  
BALANCE BUT THAT HE COULD NOT GIVE KAPSIS ANY  
GROUNDS FOR HOPE. KAPSIS SHOULD ALSO UNDERSTAND  
THAT FIRST PRINCIPLE IN U.S. LAW TO WHICH  
KAPSIS CONSTANTLY REFERRED REQUIRES THAT U.S.  
DEFENSE SUPPORT FOR GREECE BE FOR ENABLING  
GREECE TO FULFILL ITS NATO REPEAT NATO  
RESPONSIBILITIES.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

5. IN A RELATED AREA OF DISCUSSION, KAPSIS  
ASKED THAT THE U.S. BE PREPARED TO COMMIT ITSELF  
TO FY 1984 MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN THE AMOUNT  
OF \$650M, AN ASSISTANCE FLOOR TO BE INCREASED  
ANNUALLY, AND \$450M IN VARIOUS KINDS OF ECONOMIC  
AID. BARTHOLOMEW SAID GREECE WILL NOT GET \$650M  
IN SECURITY ASSISTANCE, THAT THERE WAS NO  
COMMITMENT WITH RESPECT TO A FLOOR OR ANNUAL  
INCREASES, AND THAT THERE IS SIMPLY NOTHING  
WE CAN DO CONCERNING ECONOMIC AID OF THE SORT  
MENTIONED. BARTHOLOMEW REPEATED WHAT HE HAD  
SAID EARLIER, I.E., THAT THE U.S. WOULD WORK  
WITH THE GOG ON A PROGRAM PROFILE FOR FUTURE  
DEFENSE SUPPORT. KAPSIS DID NOT REACT IN ANY  
WAY TO THESE CATEGORICAL REJECTIONS OF KAPSIS'  
REQUESTS.

ATHENS 3608      19362      DTG: 091636Z MAR 83 PSN: 004008

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M412 # 121599

BY KML NARA DATE 3/12/13

~~SECRET~~

4

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01          ATHENS 3606          19362    DTG:091636Z MAR 83 PSN: 004011  
SIT092          DATE 03/25/83                    TDR: 068/1810Z

FOR INCLUSION IN ARTICLE IV.

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DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001  
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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF MCF JP SITP VP EOB SIT EOBP  
EOB: //TK//  
WHSR COMMENT: F Y I ISTT-CHECKLIST-----ION)Y PRESS

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHTH #3608/02 0681644  
O 091636Z MAR 83  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4790  
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO JCS WASHDC  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2724  
USMISSION USNATO 1385  
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE  
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE  
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE  
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK  
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT  
USNMR SHAPE BE  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 ATHENS 03608

EXDIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
6. ARTICLE II, PARAGRAPH 1 (AUTHORIZATION) --  
KAPSIS SOUGHT INCLUSION OF LANGUAGE ON MUTUALLY  
WORKED OUT OR ANNUAL PROGRAMS, SAYING THAT  
IF THIS WERE NOT POSSIBLE HE WOULD INSIST ON  
DELETION OF THE WORDS, "EXCEPT AS MAY BE HEREAFTER  
FROM TIME TO TIME AGREED BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS".  
BARTHOLOMEW SAID HE WOULD CONSULT ON THESE  
PROPOSALS. THIS WAS ONLY CHANGE KAPSIS PROPOSED  
IN ARTICLE II.

7. ARTICLE IV (COMMAND AND CONTROL) -- KAPSIS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ARGUED THAT THE GREEK REPRESENTATIVE WAS GIVEN  
NO REAL AUTHORITY, AND LANGUAGE HAD TO BE  
INCLUDED IN THE DECA ITSELF THAT WOULD PUT THE  
GREEK REPRESENTATIVE IN A POSITION TO KNOW WHAT  
GOES ON AT THE FACILITY AND TO REPORT HIS  
OBSERVATIONS TO GREEK AUTHORITIES. BARTHOLOMEW  
EXPLAINED HOW VARIOUS PROVISIONS OF THE U.S.  
PROPOSAL IN FACT DO PUT THE GREEK AUTHORITIES  
AND REPRESENTATIVE IN A POSITION TO KNOW,  
BUT STRESSED U.S. PROBLEM WITH CONCEPT OF  
VERIFICATION OR ANYTHING THAT SMACKED OF  
INTERVENTION IN U.S. COMMAND AND CONTROL.  
KAPSIS SAID THAT THE WORD "VERIFY" OR  
"VERIFICATION" NEED NOT BE USED, AND GOG HAD  
NO INTENT OF INTERFERING. IT WAS AGREED THAT  
EACH SIDE WOULD CONSIDER APPROPRIATE LANGUAGE

8. ARTICLE VII (NATIONAL EMERGENCY PROVISIONS) --  
KAPSIS SAID THAT THE GREEK SIDE COULD NOT ACCEPT  
THE REFERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL LAW AS IT APPEARS  
IN THE U.S. PROPOSAL. HE ARGUED THAT, IF THE  
U.S. HAD INCLUDED THE TERM IN ORDER TO DIMINISH  
THE INHERENT RIGHT OF THE GOG TO TAKE RESTRICTIVE  
MEASURES, IT IS UNACCEPTABLE; IF THE TERM HAS  
A MORE GENERAL PURPOSE, IT CAN GO ELSEWHERE IN  
THE DECA, E.G., A PREAMBLE OR A SEPARATE ARTICLE;  
AND, IF IT SERVES TO PROTECT THE RIGHT OF THE U.S.  
TO SEEK INDEMNITY FOR ACTIONS TAKEN IN CONNECTION  
WITH A DECLARATION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY, THAT IS  
AN ACCEPTABLE NOTION BUT CAN BE COVERED ELSEWHERE.  
TURNING TO PARAGRAPH 2 OF ARTICLE VII, KAPSIS ASKED  
TO MAKE THE OBJECT OF CONSULTATIONS "THE MANNER  
IN WHICH SUCH MEASURES SHALL BE IMPLEMENTED"  
RATHER THAN "THE POSSIBLE NEED FOR SUCH MEASURES."  
BARTHOLOMEW ARGUED THAT PARAGRAPH 2 DOES NOT  
DEROGATE FROM GOG RIGHTS AS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 1,  
AND HE RECALLED THAT KAPSIS HAD SAID EARLIER THAT  
THE U.S. WOULD BE GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO PROPOSE  
ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION OR TO DEMONSTRATE  
THAT AN EMERGENCY DID NOT IN FACT EXIST. KAPSIS  
MADE CLEAR THAT HIS PRIMARY CONCERN HERE WAS  
THAT PARAGRAPH 2 NOT NEGATE PARAGRAPH 1, AND HE  
SUGGESTED ADDING A PHRASE AT THE END OF PARAGRAPH 2

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TO THE EFFECT THAT NO DEROGATION FROM PARAGRAPH 1  
IS INTENDED. FINALLY, KAPSIS OBJECTED TO THE TERM  
"NATIONAL EXISTENCE", WHILE BARTHOLOMEW SAID IN TURN  
THAT "NATIONAL SECURITY" WAS TOO BROAD. IT WAS  
AGREED THAT THE TWO SIDES WOULD WORK ON FINDING  
SOME MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TERM.

9. ARTICLE VIII (DEFENSE SUPPORT) -- KAPSIS,  
STILL CRITICAL AND UNAPPRECIATIVE OF THE  
CONCEPT OF BEST EFFORTS, SUGGESTED DELETING  
THE WHOLE ARTICLE OR ADDING A SENTENCE WHICH  
WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF COMMITTING THE GOG  
ONLY TO USE ITS BEST EFFORTS TO MEET THE  
DEFENSE SUPPORT INTERESTS OF THE U.S. AS  
PROVIDED FOR IN THE AGREEMENT. BYPASSING  
THIS OBVIOUS GAMBIT, BARTHOLOMEW SAID THAT  
PERHAPS THE WORDS "USE ITS BEST EFFORTS TO"  
COULD BE DELETED, BUT STATED THAT THIS WOULD  
NOT CHANGE THE MEANING OF THE ARTICLE FOR THE  
U.S.

10. ARTICLE XII (DURATION) -- KAPSIS BEGAN  
BY SAYING THAT THE GOG MIGHT ACCEPT AN  
INITIAL FIVE-YEAR PERIOD AS EARLIER PROPOSED  
BY THE U.S. AND AS NEEDED FOR THE PURPOSES

ATHENS 3608          19362    DTG:091636Z MAR 83 PSN: 004011

~~SECRET~~

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01      ATHENS 3608      1936Z      DTG: 091636Z MAR 83 PSN: 004012  
SIT091      DATE 03/25/83      TOR: 068/18127

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DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001  
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SIT: MCF MCF JP SITP VP EOB SIT EOBP  
EOB: //TK//  
WHSR COMMENT: F Y I ISTT-CHECKLIST-----ION)Y PRESS

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHTH #3608/03 0681646  
O 091636Z MAR 83  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4791  
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO JCS WASHDC  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2725  
USMISSION USNATO 1386  
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE  
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE  
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE  
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK  
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT  
USNMR SHAPE BE  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 ATHENS 03608  
EXDIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE OF PLANNING REQUIREMENTS. HE SAID THAT AN EIGHT-YEAR PERIOD WILL SIMPLY NOT SELL IN GREECE, WHEREAS FIVE WILL. BARTHOLOMEW, IN WHAT APPEARED TO BE A SUCCESSFUL EFFORT TO CONVINCE KAPSIS THAT THE ARTICLE AS WRITTEN PROVIDES A FULL RANGE OF OPTIONS FOR A FUTURE GOG, PURSUED THE FOLLOWING LINE: 90 DAYS BEFORE THE END OF THE FINAL YEAR OF THE INITIAL PERIOD, ANY GREEK GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE TO MAKE A POSITIVE DECISION, EITHER TO TERMINATE BY GIVING NOTICE OR TO CONTINUE BY DECIDING NOT TO GIVE NOTICE. BARTHOLOMEW ASKED KAPSIS WHETHER HE COULD TAKE THE ARTICLE AS WRITTEN,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WITH THE SOLE CHANGE BEING TO MAKE THE INITIAL PERIOD FIVE YEARS IN LIEU OF EIGHT YEARS, AS AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. KAPSIS ANSWERED AFFIRMATIVELY. BARTHOLOMEW SAID THAT HE WAS RELUCTANT TO GO BACK FROM EIGHT YEARS TO FIVE YEARS BUT WOULD CONSIDER THE MATTER FURTHER.

11. ARTICLE III (SOFA) -- KAPSIS SAID HE HAD NOTHING TO SAY ON THIS SUBJECT NOW, SINCE HE WOULD NEED EXTENSIVE ADVICE FROM LEGAL EXPERTS AND SINCE THE DISCUSSION WILL REQUIRE MORE TIME THAN WOULD BE AVAILABLE IN THE TWO SESSIONS (ONLY) THAT KAPSIS WAS AUTHORIZED TO CONDUCT IN THE ABSENCE OF U.S. INDICATION CONCERNING DEFENSE SUPPORT. HE DID SAY, HOWEVER, THAT HE CAN ACCEPT THE IDEA OF A SOFA SUPPLEMENTARY TO

THE NATO SOFA AND THAT THE GREEK SIDE WOULD BE WILLING TO EXAMINE THE SOFA LANGUAGE IN THE RELATED ARRANGEMENT.

12. GREEK LAW AND SOVEREIGNTY -- NOTING THAT THE U.S. PROPOSAL CONTAINED NOTHING ON THIS QUESTION, KAPSIS SAID THAT THE RELEVANT LANGUAGE FROM THE ORIGINAL GREEK NON-PAPER MUST BE INCLUDED. ("THE U.S. MILITARY AUTHORITIES AND SERVICES SHALL FULLY RESPECT THE GREEK LAWS, REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES WHILE THEY ARE ACTING WITHIN GREEK SOVEREIGN TERRITORY OR IN REGIONS WHERE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AGREEMENTS, CONTROL HAS BEEN ASSIGNED TO GREEK AUTHORITIES.")

13. THROUGHOUT SESSION, KAPSIS WAS WORKING FROM A PREPARED STATEMENT AND FOREGOING WERE THE ONLY POINTS IN THE DECA HE TOOK ISSUE WITH. AT END OF DECA DISCUSSION, BARTHOLOMEW SAID HE WANTED TO CONFIRM AGAIN THAT KAPSIS AGREED TO FORM OF AGREEMENT HE WERE PROPOSING, I.E., DECA AND RA. KAPSIS CONFIRMED THIS, BUT SAID HE MIGHT WANT SOME POINTS IN RA BROUGHT UP INTO DECA. HE SAID HE HAD SEEN ONLY A FEW SMALL PROBLEMS IN THE RA, AND DID NOT COMMENT ON IT FURTHER AT THIS SESSION.

ATHENS 3608      1936Z      DTG: 091636Z MAR 83 PSN: 004012  
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

14. AFTER HE HAD COMPLETED HIS REMARKS ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE U.S. PROPOSALS, KAPSIS SAID THAT THERE COULD BE ONLY ONE MORE NEGOTIATING SESSION IN THE ABSENCE OF SOME INDICATION FROM THE U.S. CONCERNING SECURITY ASSISTANCE. HE SAID THAT DISCUSSIONS COULD NOT BE EXTENDED UNDER ANY OTHER CONDITION. THE TWO SIDES WILL MEET ON MARCH 10. BARTHOLOMEW SAID THAT HE HAD PLANNED TO STAY IN ATHENS UNTIL MARCH 22 TO WORK WITH KAPSIS AND WILL REMAIN AVAILABLE FOR ANY DISCUSSIONS UNTIL THEN. STEARNS

~~SECRET~~



6

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Anita -  
 Where does something  
 like this go when  
 in suspense - ?  
 DF

file

1

566

7

National Security Council  
The White House

740 pm  
3-4-83

Package # 1412

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
<i>Boreni</i> John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>FB</u>	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	<u>✓</u>	_____
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	_____
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter	<u>5</u>	<u>✓</u>	_____
Staff Secretary	<u>6</u>	_____	<u>D</u>
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Forward to West Coast

\_\_\_\_\_

8

National Security Council  
The White House

8

1245P

Package # 1412

MAR 09 1983

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	_____	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	<u>2</u>	<u>Info already</u>	<u>passed to Fortier</u>
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____ <u>7g.</u>

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

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National Security Council  
The White House

572  
9

Package # 1412

7:30 pm  
3/9/83

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>M</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter	<u>5</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Staff Secretary	<u>6</u>		<u>D</u>
Sit Room			

I-Information   **A-Action**   R-Retain   D-Dispatch   N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP   Meese   Baker   Deaver   Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

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National Security Council  
The White House

549

Package # 1412

10

MAR 08 1983

1700P

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>J</u>	<u></u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>I</u>
Jacque Hill	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
Judge Clark	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
John Poindexter	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
Staff Secretary	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
Sit Room	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>

I-Information

A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Bud,  
 Sorry this is so late, but  
 I just got down to it. al  
 was fully on board. J

~~SECRET~~

121600

1412 add on

11

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~


March 10, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ  
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Greek-Turkish Foreign Assistance (U)

The President has approved an increase of up to \$220 million in FMS credits for Greece in the context of a successful completion of the base negotiations. He has also authorized approaching the Congress to work out an agreement to seek up to the additional \$220 million in FMS (1) in the context of a successful agreement and (2) provided our Turkish foreign assistance request is passed undiminished. Finally, the President has directed that the Budget Review Board be convened to consider the need for a budget amendment or supplement in light of the new Greek and other worldwide requirements. Such a meeting should occur as promptly as possible after the results of our approach to Congress are known. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

  
William P. Clark

cc: Secretary of Defense  
Director, OMB

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M412 #121600

BY KM NARA DATE 3/18/13

cc Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

C

33 MAY 10 PM 7:

F STATE

3 MAY 10 PM 7 29/

URGENT

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~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE NO. 522 CLASSIFICATION \_\_\_\_\_ PAGES one

FROM William P. Clark \_\_\_\_\_  
(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Log #1412-addon

TO (AGENCY) DELIVER TO: DEPT/ROOM NO. EXTENSION

B

Sec. George Shultz

5

D

Sec. Casper Weinberger

5/5

REMARKS:

URGENT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

74 10/20/11

13

WASHFAX

10 MAR 1983 20 58

NMCC-1W

# WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

# C

33 MAR 10 P 7:

## URGENT

## URGENT

# ~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE NO. 522 CLASSIFICATION \_\_\_\_\_ PAGES one

FROM William P. Clark \_\_\_\_\_

(NAME)

(EXTENSION)

(ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Log #1412-2110

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>EXTENSION</u>
<u>B</u>	<u>Sec. George Shultz</u>		
<u>D</u>	<u>Sec. Casper Weinberger</u>		

REMARKS: \_\_\_\_\_

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

94 10/20/11

# URGENT



**MEMORANDUM**

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**

~~SECRET~~

March 9, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: DONALD R. FORTIER *DF*

SUBJECT: Greek-Turkish Foreign Assistance

Attached for your signature at Tab I is a memorandum to Secretary Shultz on the Greek-Turkish foreign assistance package.

*Bob* Bob Kimmitt concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

OK                      NO  
✓                              —  
—                              —

That you sign the memorandum to Secretary Shultz at Tab I

Attachment:

Tab I                              Memorandum to Secretary Shultz

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec.34(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006  
BY NARA *KML*, DATE *10/26/11*

~~SECRET~~

(Unclassified upon removal of attachment)

~~SECRET~~

1412

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 7, 1983

RR

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*

SUBJECT: Security Assistance for Greece and Turkey

Issue

Whether to approve an increase of up to \$220 million in FMS credits for Greece upon successful completion of the Greek base negotiations and authorize an approach to the Congress to support levels for Greece and Turkey.

Facts

George Shultz has sent you a memorandum (Tab A) which points out that the disparity in our budget request for military assistance between Turkey (\$755 million) and Greece (\$280 million) has brought strong reactions on the Hill and in Greece. Congress wants a 7:10 ratio and may try to reinstate a balance. Our original FY 84 request for Greece was planned at last year's level, \$280 million, because U.S.-Greek base negotiations were in an early phase. At the time the budget was prepared, State, NSC and OMB agreed that any increase for Greece would be achieved through reallocation of funds within the FY 84 request within the budget. The higher level for Turkey, which you approved in October, is needed to help modernize Turkish forces' obsolescent equipment, more vital than ever given continuing instability in the Persian Gulf.

Discussion

If Congress moves to increase Greek funding unilaterally, we would suffer an enormous loss of leverage in the base negotiations. To deal with this problem and to give momentum to the base negotiations, Secretary Shultz is proposing that you approve an increase for Greece of up to \$220 million in FMS, provided, of course, that we reach an acceptable base agreement. The idea would be to use this figure to reassure the Congress that Greek needs will be adequately met and to forestall unilateral Congressional action. Moreover, we hope to use the new, enhanced aid level for Greece as an inducement for the Hill to safeguard the full amount of our requested funding for Turkey. Striking such an understanding with the Congress will strengthen our hand in negotiations with the Greeks by demonstrating unity and resolve by both branches of

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
BY: CW  
DATE: 11/5/15  
REF: M474 # 121605

government. State, DOD, and NSC staff see no way to obtain such funding out of our existing levels. OMB agrees with the \$220 million figure, but--citing the earlier understanding with State--would like to have the issue of providing additional funds explicitly reviewed by the Budget Review Board (BRB). I agree with Cap and George that additional funds are required to avoid doing serious damage to our overall program, but believe, too, that it is procedurally appropriate to convene to a BRB to explicitly consider the question.

RECOMMENDATION

<u>OK</u>	<u>NO</u>	
-----------	-----------	--

—	—	(1) That you approve an increase of up to \$220 million in FMS credits for Greece in the context of a successful completion of the Greek base negotiations:
---	---	---

—	—	(2) That you authorize an approach by the Administration to the Congress to work out an agreement in which the Turkish program will pass undiminished and we will seek up to \$220 million additional in FMS for Greece.
---	---	--

*DR*

—	—	(3) That you direct the Budget Review Board to consider the need for a budget amendment/supplemental in light of the Greek and other worldwide requirements, after the results of our approach to Congress are known.
---	---	---

Attachment:

Tab A	Memorandum from Secretary Shultz
-------	----------------------------------

Prepared by  
 Donald R. Fortier  
 Robert H. Lilac

83 MAR 1 P11 16

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

March 1, 1983

SITUATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*

SUBJECT: Security Assistance for Greece and Turkey

Issue for Decision

Congressional action on our security assistance proposals could seriously affect major U.S. objectives in both Turkey and Greece. The best way to protect both interests, as well as our overall security assistance budget, is to work out an agreement on the Hill as follows: (1) the Turkish program will pass undiminished; (2) upon successful completion of the Greek base negotiations, we will seek new (off-budget) authority to increase Greek FMS credits by up to \$220 million.

Background

As you know, we have allocated \$755 million in military assistance for Turkey in FY 1984, almost double the FY 1983 amount, in an effort to modernize Turkish forces and promote our interests in both the European and Southwest Asian contexts. Meanwhile, we have straight-lined Greece at \$280 million for FY 1984 while we await the outcome of negotiations on retention of important bases in that country.

The disparity has brought strong reactions on the Hill and in Athens, both of which want a 7:10 Greek-Turkish aid ratio, and we believe Congress will move to reinstate a "balance" in its coming mark-up. The danger is that the Turkish program will be gutted or the Greek figure substantially raised and earmarked, with adverse fallout for our Turkish goals, our leverage in the Greek negotiations, and the security assistance budget as a whole.

We must move now to protect the Turkish program and preserve our options in Greece, where the results of the negotiations will have real consequence for future Greek relations with the United States and with NATO. I propose we

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DECL: OADR

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NLRR M412 # 121605

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

attempt to work out an agreement on the Hill whereby our Turkish program will pass undiminished and we will pledge that, when a Greek base deal is clinched, the Administration will seek up to \$220 million more in new authority for FMS credits for Greece. This will, we believe, preserve our negotiating leverage with the Greeks regarding bases and induce them to accede to an acceptable arrangement. Also, we believe that a prospective increase of \$220 million in credits would satisfy the Hill with respect to Greek-Turkish balance. Such a figure would bring us near but not quite to the 7:10 ratio, which we oppose. Even if we are unsuccessful in negotiating a new agreement, the effort to obtain additional assistance for Greece will help demonstrate that the Administration worked seriously to reach an agreement, and will also be helpful on the Hill in getting what we want for Turkey.

I recommend this knowing full well that this Greek Government has been critical on some issues of importance to us, such as INF deployment and sanctions. Our practical interests, however, have remained largely unaffected. Papandreou's letter to you indicated his wish for an accommodation. Finding a compromise on assistance levels for Greece could turn out to be the key to our ability to work out an acceptable relationship with Athens and to sustain our support for Turkey.

A request to the Hill for a large increase in credits would of course force us to go above the current security assistance budget proposals. We must, however, do all we can to avoid Congress instructing us to take any prospective increase for Greece out of other security assistance programs. Our global security assistance levels are already perilously low, and any move to strip other programs to pay for an increase for Greece would have the most negative consequences.

Recommendation

1. That you approve an increase of up to \$220 million in new authority in FMS credits for Greece in the context of a successful completion of the Greek base negotiations:

Approve RR Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

2. That you authorize an approach by the Administration to the Congress to work out an agreement along the lines outlined in this memorandum.

Approve RR Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Cap Weinberger concurs in these recommendations.

HW  
19

1412

~~SECRET~~

**MEMORANDUM**

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**

March 8, 1983

INFORMATION

OCIA HAS SEEN

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: DEBORAH L. ROCHE *DR*

SUBJECT: Keel Memorandum on Security Assistance for Greece and Turkey

Al Keel sent you the cover note concerning the NSC-prepared memorandum on Security Assistance for Greece and Turkey (Tab A). His comments were already reflected in the Fortier-Lilac memorandum of March 4.

Attachment

Tab A Keel note to McFarlane, Fortier/Lilac memorandum on Security Assistance for Greece and Turkey

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006  
BY NARA KNL DATE 10/20/11

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

March 4, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: DONALD R. FORTIER  
ROBERT H. LILAC

SUBJECT: Security Assistance for Greece and Turkey

121606  
 #121606  
 BY CA MURDATE 11/5/15

At Tab A is a memorandum forwarded by Secretary Shultz to the President recommending a security assistance strategy for Greece and Turkey. The President's FY 84 request includes \$755 million in military assistance for Turkey, almost double the FY 83 amount. Our original budget deadlines came at a very early moment in the Greek base negotiations. For this reason we decided to set the FY 84 FMS figure for Greece at \$280 million, a "straight-lining" of FY 83 level. Also, at the time the budget was prepared, State and OMB agreed that any increase for Greece would be achieved through reprogramming within the budget.

Secretary Shultz is now recommending that the President approve: (1) an increase of up to \$220 million in additional FMS credits (off-budget) for Greece in the context of a satisfactory agreement on bases; and (2) an approach by the Administration to the Congress on agreeing to not diminish the Turkish level in return for a pledge of an increase for Greece.

We believe the strategy makes sense for the following reasons: 1) The large increase in Turkish levels is essential even to begin the program of modernizing Turkey's obsolescent, but potentially potent, armed forces. Turkey is critical not only for shoring up the Southern Flank but also for U.S. security objectives in the Middle East and Persian Gulf; 2) Congress is unlikely to swallow the large Turkish figure, however, unless they know with greater specificity what our actual intentions are with regard to Greece. Traditionally, Congress has insisted upon a 7:10 ratio between the Greek and Turkish programs; 3) If we did not take the lead ourselves in telling Congress what we were prepared to do for Greece, in the context of an acceptable base agreement, they would surely take matters into their own hands by either cutting Turkey, holding Turkish FMS hostage until the Greek negotiations are over, or unilaterally increasing Greece. This would make the Administration look weak and dramatically reduce our

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Declassify on: OADR

negotiating leverage. Conversely, if we can sew up an agreement with the Congress in advance, our negotiating position will be deeply strengthened and we will have the best lever we have had in years to safeguard the Turkish program. Finally, greater specificity on our figure for Greece could break the current negotiating stalemate by giving the Greek military a greater incentive in a speedy and successful outcome.

Two caveats deserve to be mentioned. Bartholomew has assured us that he will tell the Greeks the new number will not go up but could go down a) if overall funding levels are reduced in the Hill, or b) if the Turkish figure is cut. We have worked closely on this process with State, our base negotiator, and Defense in what has truly been an excellent cooperative effort.

Al Keel of OMB agrees that an increase of up to \$220 million for Greece is reasonable in the context of a successful negotiation. Because of his original understanding with State on achieving any such result through reallocation of funds within the FY-84 request, Al believes that the question of providing additional funds should be explicitly addressed by the Budget Review Board. State, DOD and NSC staff see no way of reallocating \$220 million at this time without doing enormous damage to our worldwide program. Bob Kimmitt, Bob Lilac, and I agree, however, that it is procedurally appropriate to have the BRB address the issue. We will need to move quickly on our approach to the Hill. The mark-ups that the strategy is designed to influence begin in little more than a week.

A proposed memorandum to the President is at Tab I forwarding Secretary Shultz's memorandum.

Attachments:

Tab I	Memorandum to the President
Tab A	Memorandum from Secretary Shultz

*P.S. Bartholomew leaves for Athens tomorrow (Saturday). His first negotiating session with the Greeks will be on Monday evening. Therefore, this is time-urgent.*  
*Barone*






EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

wecks

22

March 4, 1983

BUD —

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROBERT C. McFARLANE  
FROM: AL KEEL   
SUBJECT: Security Assistance to Greece and Turkey

My staff has worked with Bob Lilac and Don Fortier on the attached rewrite. I concur in the revised letter from Judge Clark to the President recommending the increase for Greece within the current budget ceiling, the approach to the Congress, and the referral of the budget amendment/supplemental to the Budget Review Board for Decision.

Attachment

BUD —

DAVE AND I both feel strongly  
THAT IT'S IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN DISCIPLINE  
IN THE SYSTEM BY GOING THRU THE NORMAL  
BUDGETARY PROCESS -- REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME.  
WOULD APPRECIATE VERY MUCH YOUR SUPPORT.

TX/  


~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

*10/20/11*

CLASSIFICATION

MODE

PAGES 08

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

DACOM # 191

RELEASER G.W.

PRIORITY

DEX #     

DTG 050215Z MAR 83

ROUTINE

TTY #     

FROM/LOCATION/

1. THE SITUATION ROOM

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. RADM POINDEXTER / SAN FRANCISCO TOR: 050501Z

INFORMATION ADDRESSES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

- 1. \_\_\_\_\_
- 2. \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

PACKAGE # 1412

*Bad M*  
*Judge J*  
 1983 MAR 5 02 15

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

RECEIVED 02 MAR 83 17

24

TO PRESIDENT FROM SHULTZ, G  
FORTIER  
LILAC

DOCDATE 01 MAR 83  
04 MAR 83  
04 MAR 83

KEYWORDS: SECURITY ASSISTANCE GREECE  
TURKEY FOREIGN ASSISTANCE  
CM

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

24 10/20/11

SUBJECT: SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR GREECE & TURKEY

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 11 MAR 83 STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

LILAC

FORTIER

DUR

HELM

KIMMITT

MYER

WHEELER

COMMENTS

REF# 8305833

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RECEIVED 02 MAR 83 17

TO PRESIDENT

FROM SHULTZ, G

DOCDATE 01 MAR 83

FORTIER

04 MAR 83

LILAC

04 MAR 83

KEYWORDS: SECURITY ASSISTANCE

GREECE

TURKEY

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

CM

SUBJECT: SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR GREECE & TURKEY

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

22 10/20/11

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 11 MAR 83 STATUS X/S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

LILAC

FORTIER

DUR

HELM

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WHEELER

COMMENTS

REF# 8305833

LOG

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( M / )

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<i>Clark</i>	<i>x</i> <i>3/09</i>	<i>add on for signature</i>		
	<b>MAR 10 1983</b>	<i>Clark's sig memo</i>		<i>index, hi of</i>

DISPATCH

*3/10*

W/ATTCH

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*raj* (CYMS)

RECEIVED 02 MAR 83 17 *26*

TO PRESIDENT FROM SHULTZ, G DOCDATE 01 MAR 83

FORTIER 04 MAR 83

LILAC 04 MAR 83

KEYWORDS: SECURITY ASSISTANCE GREECE

TURKEY FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

CM

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

*72 10/20/11*

SUBJECT: SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR GREECE & TURKEY

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 07 MAR 83 STATUS X/S FILES

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
LILAC	FORTIER DUR	HELM
		KIMMITT
		MYER
		WHEELER

COMMENTS

REF# 8305833 LOG NSCIFID ( M / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Lilac</i>	<i>S 2/27</i>	<i>Rec'd and Conn to</i>		<i>Same</i>
<i>McFarlane</i>	<i>ix 3/8</i>	<i>For info</i>		
<i>Clark</i>	<i>x 3/8</i>	<i>Pres for decision</i>		
<i>Pres</i>	<i>P 3/8</i>	<i>for decision</i>		
	<i>MAR 9 1983</i>	<i>Pres approved</i>		

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_ (C)

RECEIVED 02 MAR 83 17 *27*

TO PRESIDENT FROM SHULTZ, G DOCDATE 01 MAR 83  
 FORTIER 04 MAR 83  
 LILAC 04 MAR 83

KEYWORDS: SECURITY ASSISTANCE GREECE  
 TURKEY FOREIGN ASSISTANCE  
 CM

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

*24* 10/20/11

SUBJECT: SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR GREECE & TURKEY

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 07 MAR 83 STATUS P FILES

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
LILAC	FORTIER DUR	HELM KIMMITT MYER WHEELER

COMMENTS

REF# 8305833 LOG NSCIFID ( M / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>OMB</i>	<i>-</i>	<i>3/3</i>	<i>Comments/Concurrence</i>	
<i>Clark</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>3/4</i>	<i>Gov to Pres for decision</i>	
	<i>-</i>	<i>3/7</i>	<i>Recd O.M.B comments</i>	
<i>Lilac</i>	<i>X/S</i>	<i>3/7</i>	<i>Prepare memo for McFarlane</i>	
<i>President</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>3/7</i>	<i>For decision</i>	

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>McFarlane</i>	<i>3/8</i>	<i>For information</i>		
	<i>3/9</i>	<i>Pres approved recon</i>		<i>RD, DF, RH, RK, MY</i>
<i>Horton Lilac</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>3/9</i>	<i>For further action</i>	<i>3/11</i>
	<i>C</i>	<i>3/30</i>	<i>No further action</i>	<i>2, DF</i>

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE *(PA)* *4* (C)

~~SECRET~~

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 ATHENS 4056 04962 DTG:171528Z MAR 83 PSN: 015904  
SIT915 DATE 03/25/83 TOR: 076/1808Z

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EOB: //TK//  
WNSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTTISTLIST-----SEM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHNT #4056/01 0761532  
O 171528Z MAR 83 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**NLRRM412 #121608**  
**BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13**

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4938  
SECDEF WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE  
JCS WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE  
HQAC OFFUTT AFB NE NIACT IMMEDIATE  
DIRNSA FT MEADE MD NIACT IMMEDIATE  
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE NIACT IMMEDIATE  
HQESC KELLY AFB TX NIACT IMMEDIATE  
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE NIACT IMMEDIATE  
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK NIACT IMMEDIATE  
COMSIXTHFLT NIACT IMMEDIATE  
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT NIACT IMMEDIATE  
922SS HELLENIKON AB GR NIACT IMMEDIATE

INFO DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 04056  
EXDIS - MILITARY ADDRESSEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
922SS FOR CC; HQAC FOR CINCUSAC/SRC/ONLY  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: US, GR, MARR  
SUBJECT: GOG CLEARS RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS UNTIL  
MARCH 22  
REF: ATHENS 3992, 161956Z MAR 83

1. ~~SECRET~~- ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. SUMMARY: GOG HAS CLEARED RECONNAISSANCE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FLIGHTS UNTIL MARCH 22 AND WILL "COMMUNICATE"  
WITH EMBASSY BEFORE THAT DATE ABOUT FURTHER  
FLIGHTS. AMBASSADOR STRESSED U.S. VIEW THAT  
NOV., 1977 ARRANGEMENT IS VALID AND CANNOT BE  
UNILATERALLY ABROGATED. GOG DID NOT DISAGREE  
BUT IS CLEARLY IMPROVISING. END SUMMARY.

3. AS PROMISED, ZEPPUS OF GREEK MFA CALLED  
AMBASSADOR THIS MORNING ON ISSUE OF RECONNAISSANCE  
FLIGHTS (REFTEL). AMBASSADOR REITERATED OUR  
CONCERN OVER SHORT NOTICE, UNILATERAL GOG ATTEMPT  
TO ALTER AN EXISTING AGREEMENT, ONE WHICH U.S.  
CONSIDERS VALID. IN COURSE OF SOMEWHAT CONFUSING  
CONVERSATION (ZEPPUS IS NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE  
TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THIS ISSUE), THE FOLLOWING  
KEY POINTS EMERGED:

(A) THE GOG DOES NOT CHALLENGE THE VALIDITY OF  
THE 1977 ARRANGEMENT ON AIR OPERATIONS.

(B) THE GOG DOES NOT WISH TO INTERFERE WITH  
THE FLIGHTS.

(C) THEY DO WANT TO ESTABLISH A DIFFERENT PROCEDURE  
FOR GRANTING DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCES FOR THE FLIGHTS  
WHEREBY THE MFA RATHER THAN THE HELLENIC AIR  
FORCE (HAF) WOULD BE INVOLVED.

(D) WHEN INFORMED BY THE AMBASSADOR THAT THE  
AIR ATTACHE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ARRANGEMENT'S  
PROCEDURES, HAD RECEIVED CLEARANCE FOR MARCH  
FLIGHTS, ZEPPUS SAID "THEN WE ARE TALKING ABOUT  
APRIL". THE AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT THAT THE  
HAF LETTER REFERRED TO MARCH 17 AS THE CUT-OFF  
DATE. ZEPPUS SAID HE WOULD CHECK.

4. EMBASSY POL/MIL OFFICER RECEIVED ZEPPUS'  
SUBSEQUENT CALL IN WHICH HE STATED:

(A) THE HAF LETTER COVERED ONLY RECONNAISSANCE  
FLIGHTS FROM HELLENIKON (ZEPPUS MAY HAVE BEEN  
BACKING OFF FROM LETTER WHICH IN FACT  
INCLUDES, ALBEIT SECONDARILY, MPA FLIGHTS AT SOUDA.)

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

(B) AS OF 1800 MARCH 17, CLEARANCES FOR THESE  
FLIGHTS WOULD BE GIVEN BY THE MFA UP TO AND  
INCLUDING MARCH 22 (AIR ATTACHE SUBSEQUENTLY  
HEARD FROM HAF THAT CLEARANCE WAS GRANTED UNTIL  
1800 MARCH 24. WE ASSUME THAT ZEPPUS' VERSION IS  
CORRECT, BUT GIVEN GENERAL GOG CONFUSION, CANNOT  
BE SURE.)

(C) ON OR BEFORE THAT DATE, MFA WILL "COMMUNICATE"  
AGAIN WITH EMBASSY REGARDING SUBSEQUENT FLIGHTS  
TO "GET US TO THE END OF THE MONTH".

5. ZEPPUS CLEARLY DID NOT WISH TO BE DRAWN INTO  
DETAILED DISCUSSION. POL/MIL OFFICER COMMENTED  
ONLY THAT SUBJECT WOULD REQUIRE FURTHER DISCUSSION  
IN LIGHT OF U.S. VIEWS AS EXPRESSED BY AMBASSADOR  
THAT MORNING REGARDING CONTINUING VALIDITY OF 1977  
ARRANGEMENT.

6. COMMENT: AS THE BACKING AND FILLING OF THE LAST  
TWO DAYS DEMONSTRATES, THE GOG CLEARLY DOES NOT

ATHENS 4056 04962 DTG:171528Z MAR 83 PSN: 015904

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02    ATHENS 4056  
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TOR: 076/1809Z

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OP IMMED  
UTS2433  
DE RUEHTH #4056/02 0761535  
O 171528Z MAR 83 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

EXDIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4939  
SECDEF WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE  
JCS WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE  
HQ SAC OFFUTT AFB NE NIACT IMMEDIATE  
DIRNSA FT MEADE MD NIACT IMMEDIATE  
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE NIACT IMMEDIATE  
HQESC KELLY AFB TX NIACT IMMEDIATE  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE NIACT IMMEDIATE  
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK NIACT IMMEDIATE  
COMSIXTHFLT NIACT IMMEDIATE  
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT NIACT IMMEDIATE  
922SS HELLENIKON AB GR NIACT IMMEDIATE

EXDIS

INFO DIA WASHDC

EXDIS

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 ATHENS 04056

EXDIS - MILITARY ADDRESSEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
922SS FOR CC; HQSAC FOR CINCSAC/SRC/ONLY  
HAVE ITS ACT TOGETHER AND IS IMPROVISING AS IT  
GOES ALONG ON THIS ISSUE. WE WILL BE COMMENTING  
ON THE DECA IMPLICATIONS IN A SEPARATE MESSAGE.  
SUFFICE IT TO SAY HERE THAT THE RECONNAISSANCE  
FLIGHTS ARE CONTINUING WITHOUT, WE BELIEVE,  
PREJUDICE TO OUR CONTENTION THAT EXISTING



RECALLED

~~SECRET~~

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 ATHENS 4056

DTG: 171528Z MAR 83 PSN: 015905

AGREEMENTS IN GENERAL, AND THE 1977 ARRANGEMENT IN  
PARTICULAR, REMAIN VALID. END COMMENT. STEARNS  
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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01          ATHENS 4060          04962    DTG: 171613Z MAR 83 PSM: 016084  
SIT914          DATE 03/25/83          TOR: 076/1954Z

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WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTTISTLIST-----SEM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHTH #4060 0761628  
O 171613Z MAR 83  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4943

INFO USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 1416  
BT

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 04060  
EXDIS  
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR  
USMISSION USNATO FOR BURT WINDMULLER  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: HARR, MASS, GR, US  
SUBJECT: WHAT IS NEEDED TO GET BASE NEGOTIATIONS MOVING  
-            AGAIN  
REF: ATHENS 3745

1. (u) - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. LAST WEEK WE MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS TOWARD ACHIEVING A DEFENSE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION AGREEMENT WITH GREECE THAT WILL ASSURE UNIMPEDED USE OF OUR MILITARY FACILITIES AND ESTABLISH A FIRM AND SATISFACTORY BASIS FOR FUTURE COOPERATION IN THE SECURITY FIELD. THAT PROGRESS -- AND WITH IT THE PROSPECT FOR IMPROVED GREEK-U.S. RELATIONS ACROSS THE BOARD -- IS THREATENED BY A GROWING GREEK MISCONCEPTION THAT WE ARE DELIBERATELY HOLDING BACK OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE FIGURES FOR GREECE AS A NEGOTIATING TACTIC.

3. THIS VIEW IS HELD NOT ONLY BY THE PAPANDREOU GOVERNMENT, BUT ALSO BY PRESIDENT KARAMANLIS AND LEADING MEMBERS OF THE CONSERVATIVE OPPOSITION. LAST NIGHT AT KARAMANLIS'S RECEPTION FOR THE PORTUGUESE PRESIDENT, FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER MITSOTAKIS (NO FRIEND OF PAPANDREOU'S) TOOK ME ASIDE TO SAY THAT HE THOUGHT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WE GET THE DECA NEGOTIATIONS OFF DEAD CENTER BEFORE THE GREEK NATIONAL DAY ON MARCH 25. HE MADE CLEAR THAT THIS MEANT, IN HIS VIEW, PROVIDING THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WITH A PREVIEW OF WHAT WE ARE PREPARED TO SEEK FROM CONGRESS IN THE WAY OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR GREECE.

4. IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE DELAY IN AUTHORIZING REG BARTHOLOMEW TO INFORM THE GREEK NEGOTIATOR THAT WE ARE AIMING FOR A SUPPLEMENTAL OF UP TO DOLS 220 MILLION FOR GREECE IS CAUSED BY EMERGENCY NEEDS ELSEWHERE THAT COULD AFFECT THE OVERALL FOREIGN AID BUDGET. I DO NOT

UNDERESTIMATE THOSE NEEDS, BUT NEITHER DO I UNDERESTIMATE THE DAMAGE TO OUR POSITION IN GREECE IF THE GREEKS BECOME CONVINCED THAT WE ARE NOT TAKING THEIR NEEDS SERIOUSLY. AT THIS STAGE, THEY ARE NOT ASKING FOR A COMMITMENT. THEY ARE SEEKING AN ORAL, AD REFERENDUM INDICATION OF WHAT WE HAVE IN MIND. THIS IN TURN WILL PERMIT THEM TO PROCEED WITH THEIR OWN PLANS AND PRIORITIES.

5. WE NEED YOUR HELP IN GETTING IMMEDIATE AUTHORIZATION FOR REG BARTHOLOMEW TO GIVE THE GREEK NEGOTIATOR THE UP TO DOLS 220 MILLION FIGURE. HE SHOULD DO THIS SOON -- AND CERTAINLY BEFORE GREEK INDEPENDENCE DAY ON MARCH 25. CONFIDING IN THE GREEKS NOW WILL DO MORE TO MOVE THE DECA NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD THAN ANYTHING WE CHOOSE TO TELL THEM LATER. STEARNS

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NLRR M412 # 121610

BY KAL NARA DATE 3/18/13

~~SECRET~~

121613

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01                    ATHENS 4122                    97962                    DTG: 181421Z MAR 83 PSN: 017487  
SIT900                    DATE 03/25/83                    TOR: 077/1609Z

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WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTTKLISTLIST-----SEM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHTH #4122 0771424  
O 181421Z MAR 83 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4964

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 04122  
NODIS  
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR BARTHOLOMEW  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: MASS, MARR, GR, US  
SUBJECT: GREEK DECA TALKS  
REF: STATE 074151

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. VERY MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR PERSONAL ATTENTION  
AND ACTION ON THE GREEK ASSISTANCE FIGURE. I  
WILL BE RELAYING IT TO KAPSIS THIS EVENING.  
I'LL REPORT HIS REACTION PROMPTLY -- BUT PLEASE  
DON'T BE SURPRISED IF IT IS TO "BEWARE OF  
BARTHOLOMEW BEARING GIFTS." STEARNS

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NLRR M412 # 121613

BY KML NARA DATE 3/12/13

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121616

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01      ATHENS 4165      29962      DTG: 191442Z MAR 83 PSN: 019203  
SIT87B      DATE 03/25/83      TOR: 078/1823Z

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHTH #4185/01 0781500  
O 191442Z MAR 83 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4998  
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO JCS WASHDC  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2772  
USMISSION USNATO 1423  
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE  
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE  
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE  
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK  
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT  
USNMR SHAPE BE  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 ATHENS 04185  
EXDIS  
FROM U.S. SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR BARTHOLOMEW  
MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: MARR, MASS, GR, US  
SUBJECT: DECA NEGOTIATIONS: MARCH 18-19 SESSIONS  
REF: ATHENS 03754 (111659Z MAR 83)

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. BEGIN SUMMARY. BARTHOLOMEW CONVEYED U.S. PROPOSAL ON INCREASED FY '84 FMS CREDITS, STRESSING THAT A TOTAL OF \$500 MILLION WAS THE ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM AND THAT IT COULD WELL BE LOWER DEPENDING ON CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ON THE GENERAL BUDGET LEVEL AND ON INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY FIGURES. KAPSIS EXPRESSED FULL UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROPOSAL, NOTED IT FALLS SHORT OF THE 7:10 RATIO, ACCEPTED IT AS THE BASIS FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS ON ALL DECA ISSUES, RELATED IT TO A GREEK DECISION ON A FIGHTER AIRCRAFT PURCHASE, AND SERVED NOTICE THAT GREECE WILL NEED LANGUAGE IN THE DECA ON BALANCE. NEGOTIATORS DISCUSSED AUTHORIZATION AND TECHNICAL OPERATIONS, COMMAND AND CONTROL, AND ACCESS AND INTELLIGENCE, AND THEY AGREED TO ADDRESS SOFA WITH LEGAL ADVICE DURING THE APRIL ROUND. NEXT SESSION WILL BE ON MARCH 22. END SUMMARY.

3. BARTHOLOMEW MET ALONE WITH KAPSIS ON MARCH 18 AND MADE THE FOLLOWING VERBATIM PRESENTATION. "IN THE CONTEXT OF A SUCCESSFUL AGREEMENT ON THE

-----  
LINES WE ARE PROPOSING, THE USG IS CONSIDERING SEEKING ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION FROM THE CONGRESS TO PROVIDE UP TO \$220 MILLION ADDITIONAL FMS CREDITS FOR GREECE. THUS, THE TOTAL FY '84 PROGRAM FOR GREECE COULD BE AS MUCH AS \$500 MILLION FMS CREDITS. YOU MUST ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT THE MAXIMUM \$220 MILLION FMS INCREASE IS KEYED NOT ONLY TO A SUCCESSFUL AGREEMENT BUT ALSO TO CONGRESSIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FY '84 SECURITY ASSISTANCE BUDGET PROPOSALS."

4. KAPSIS GAVE HIS FORMAL RESPONSE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NEXT SESSION ON MARCH 19TH, FOLLOWING A MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER THE PREVIOUS EVENING IMMEDIATELY AFTER HIS PRIVATE MEETING WITH BARTHOLOMEW. HE SAID HE RECOGNIZES THAT THE PROPOSAL, REPRESENTING LESS THAN A 7:10 RATIO WITH RESPECT TO AID TO TURKEY, FOLLOWS THE PREVIOUS PATTERN, I.E., THAT THE ADMINISTRATION PROPOSES SOMETHING LESS THAN THAT RATIO. KAPSIS SAID PAPANDEOU HAD AGREED THAT THE TWO SIDES WOULD DISCUSS THE AMOUNT, AND HE ADDED THAT HE HOPED BARTHOLOMEW WOULD COME BACK NEXT TIME WITH SOMETHING BETTER. AGAIN NOTING THAT THE U.S. REJECTED THE 7:10 RATIO, HE SAID THAT THE GOG THEREFORE WANTED A STATEMENT ON BALANCE. WHILE HOPING THAT SOMEDAY BOTH GREECE AND TURKEY WOULD BE ORIENTED TOWARD THE NORTH RATHER THAN TOWARD THE EAST AND WEST RESPECTIVELY, HE SAID, IN THE PRESENT SITUATION GREECE CAN FEEL SAFE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ONLY WITH A BALANCE OF FORCES.

5. BARTHOLOMEW STRESSED THAT \$500 MILLION FOR FY '84 IS ABSOLUTELY A MAXIMUM POSSIBILITY, AND THAT THE FIGURE COULD WELL TURN OUT TO BE LOWER. HE SAID THAT THE FINAL FIGURE THAT THE ADMINISTRATION PROPOSES TO CONGRESS WILL BE AFFECTED BY CONGRESSIONAL REACTION TO THE ADMINISTRATION'S FY '84 SECURITY ASSISTANCE BUDGET PROPOSALS, INCLUDING THE GENERAL BUDGET LEVELS AND INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY FIGURES. IF, AS A RESULT OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION THE GENERAL LEVELS OR INDIVIDUAL LEVELS ARE LOWERED, IT COULD HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE GREEK FIGURE, WHICH COULD BE LOWER. THE ADMINISTRATION'S INTENT IS TO DO THE BEST IT CAN UP TO AN INCREASE OF \$220 MILLION, BUT THE CONGRESSIONAL OUTLOOK AS WELL AS THE DECA WOULD BE DECISIVE IN DETERMINING THE ACTUAL FIGURE. BECAUSE OF THE FLUIDITY OF THE SITUATION, IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT, AS BARTHOLOMEW HAD STRESSED AT MARCH 18 MEETING, THE FIGURE HE HAD GIVEN TO KAPSIS BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL.

6. KAPSIS INDICATED FULL UNDERSTANDING OF THE CAVEATS AND CONTROLS AS EXPLAINED BY BARTHOLOMEW.

ATHENS 4185      29962      DTG: 191442Z MAR 83 PSN: 019203

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NLRR MH12 \* 121616

BY Km NARA DATE 3/18/13

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01      ATHENS 4185      29962      DTG: 191442Z MAR 83 PSN: 019204  
SIT869      DATE 03/25/83      TOR: 078/1826Z

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WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTTAG-----ER DISSEM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHTR #4185/02 0781502  
O 191442Z MAR 83 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4999  
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO JCS WASHDC  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2773  
USMISSION USNATO 1424  
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE  
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE  
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE  
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK  
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT  
USNMR SHAPE BE  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 ATHENS 04185

EXDIS  
FROM U.S. SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR BARTHOLOMEW  
MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
HE THEN NOTED THAT A GREEK DECISION ON A FIGHTER  
AIRCRAFT PURCHASE, WHICH IN THE END WILL BE  
PRINCIPALLY A POLITICAL DECISION, IS A KEY FACTOR  
IN GREEK THINKING ABOUT THE AMOUNT OF SECURITY  
ASSISTANCE GREECE REQUIRES. HE MADE THE POINT  
THAT, IF THE GOG DECIDED TO BUY A FRENCH AIRCRAFT,  
IT WOULD DO SO WITH CREDITS RECEIVED FROM THE FRENCH,  
BUT THAT IF AN AMERICAN PLANE WAS SELECTED AND PAID  
FOR FROM FMS CREDITS, THERE WOULD BE VIRTUALLY  
NOTHING LEFT FOR THE OTHER GREEK MILITARY SERVICES.  
RETURNING TO THE SUBJECT OF BALANCE, KAPSIS SAID

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THAT THE GREEK REQUEST FOR BALANCE "QUANTITATIVELY  
AND QUALITATIVELY" IS MADE WITHOUT SPECIFIC REFERENCE  
TO FMS OR MAP, AND HE SAID THAT AGREEMENTS ON DEFENSE  
INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION COULD PLAY A ROLE IN SATISFYING  
THE GREEK REQUIREMENT. KAPSIS CONCLUDED BY SAYING  
THAT THE GOG AND GREEK PEOPLE EXPECT FURTHER MOVEMENT  
FROM THE U.S. ON THE GENERAL QUESTION OF ASSURING THE  
BALANCE.

7. RECALLING A PREVIOUS DISCUSSION ON THE SUBJECT OF  
MAP, BARTHOLOMEW SAID THAT THE U.S. CANNOT PROVIDE  
THIS KIND OF ASSISTANCE TO GREECE. ACKNOWLEDGING  
THAT HE WAS MOST INTERESTED IN THE POLITICAL  
MESSAGE CONNECTED TO MAP ASSISTANCE, KAPSIS ASKED  
WHY IT WAS EXCLUDED. BARTHOLOMEW SAID THAT MAP IS  
LIMITED TO COUNTRIES WITH SEVERE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

AND THAT APPLICATION OF ECONOMIC CRITERIA BY BOTH  
THE ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS DOES NOT PERMIT  
CONSIDERATION OF MAP FOR GREECE. WITH REGARD TO  
DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION, BARTHOLOMEW NOTED  
THAT HE HAD NOT YET RECEIVED ANY OF THE PROMISED  
PROPOSALS FROM THE GREEK SIDE. REPEATING WHAT HE  
HAD TOLD KAPSIS IN EARLIER MEETINGS ABOUT THE NEED  
FOR SPECIFICITY, COMPETITIVENESS, AND SOUND ECONOMICS,  
BARTHOLOMEW SAID HE WOULD CONSIDER GOG PROPOSALS THAT  
MAKE SENSE WITHIN THAT FRAMEWORK.

8. TURNING TO THE QUESTION OF FORM AND FORMAT,  
BARTHOLOMEW REPEATED HIS PROPOSAL THAT THE TWO SIDES  
NEGOTIATE AND SIGN SIMULTANEOUSLY A DECA AND RELATED  
ARRANGEMENT (RA). THAT WOULD CONSTITUTE THE ACHIEVE-  
MENT OF A DECA BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. HE SAID  
THAT, WHEN HE LEAVES FOR WASHINGTON ON MARCH 24, HE  
WOULD LIKE BOTH SIDES TO HAVE IN HAND THE TWO PAPERS  
IN A FORM THAT SHOWS EXACTLY THE STATUS OF AGREEMENT  
AND DIFFERENCES FOR THE NEXT ROUND OF TALKS IN APRIL.  
KAPSIS AGREED WITH RESPECT BOTH TO THE FORM AND THE  
OBJECTIVE, ADDING ONLY THAT HE ENVISAGES MOVING SOME  
MATERIAL FROM THE RA TO THE DECA.

9. LEAVING ASIDE DECA ARTICLE I ON SCOPE AND  
PURPOSES, BECAUSE OF THE ACKNOWLEDGED DIFFERENCES  
BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES ON THE QUESTION OF INCLUDING  
A STATEMENT ON MAINTAINING BALANCE QUANTITATIVELY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AND QUALITATIVELY, BARTHOLOMEW SAID THAT HE HAD  
RECOMMENDED TO WASHINGTON ACCEPTING THE GREEK  
PROPOSAL TO DROP FROM PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE ARTICLE II  
(AUTHORIZATION) THE CLAUSE, "EXCEPT AS MAY BE  
HEREAFTER FROM TIME TO TIME AGREED BETWEEN THE TWO  
GOVERNMENTS." HE HAD DONE SO ON THE UNDERSTANDING  
THAT THIS DID NOT PRECLUDE FUTURE US PROPOSALS  
FOR ADDITIONAL FACILITIES AND MISSIONS. KAPSIS  
AGREED WITH BARTHOLOMEW'S CONTENTION THAT THIS WAS  
THE CLEANEST SOLUTION TO THE GREEK PROBLEM, ADDING  
ONLY THAT THE ALTERNATIVE GREEK SUGGESTION OF  
REFERRING TO MUTUALLY WORKED-OUT PROGRAMS WAS INTENDED  
TO PERMIT RESOLUTION OF PROBLEMS AT THE WORKING LEVEL.  
KAPSIS THEN SAID THAT HE WANTED A CLEARER REFERENCE  
IN ARTICLE II TO THE FACILITIES, MISSIONS, AND  
ACTIVITIES INVOLVED. IN RESPONSE, BARTHOLOMEW UNDER-  
TOOK TO RECOMMEND TO WASHINGTON REPLACING THE PHRASE  
"PROVIDED FOR" WITH THE WORD "SPECIFIED" IN THE LAST  
SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 1 OF ARTICLE II. KAPSIS ACCEPTED  
THAT AS A SOLUTION. FINALLY, KAPSIS ASKED TO PUT  
BRACKETS AROUND THE PHRASE "INCLUDING LOCAL ARMED  
FORCES RADIO AND TELEVISION SERVICE" WHERE IT APPEARS  
IN PARAGRAPHS B.2.B. AND B.2.D. OF THE RA, EXPLAINING  
THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT FURTHER ON THIS AND  
NOTING THAT THE GOG IS CURRENTLY UNDER PRESSURE TO  
ALLOW PRIVATE TV IN GREECE. BARTHOLOMEW ARGUED  
THAT RADIO AND TV IS A VERY IMPORTANT MORALE FACTOR  
FOR U.S. FORCES AND DEPENDENTS, PARTICULARLY GIVEN

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

36

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 ATHENS 4185 29962 DTG: 191442Z MAR 83 PSN: 019206  
SIT866 DATE 03/25/83 TOR: 078/1826Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLSJP VP WHLR SIT E0BE0B KEMP  
EOB: //TK//  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTTAG-----ER DISSEM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEATH #4185/03 0781504  
O 191442Z MAR 83 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5000  
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO JCS WASHDC  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2774  
USMISSION USNATO 1425  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE  
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE  
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE  
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK  
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT  
USNMR SHAPE BE  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 ATHENS 04185  
EXDIS

FROM U.S. SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR BARTHOLOMEW  
MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
THE LANGUAGE PROBLEM IN GREECE. IT WAS AGREED THAT  
BARTHOLOMEW WOULD LOOK FURTHER INTO THE TECHNICAL  
ASPECTS OF THE QUESTION AS REGARDS INTERFERENCE OR  
COMPETITION WITH GREEK BROADCASTS.

10. KAPSIS EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS WITH RESPECT TO  
THE PROVISION OF TRAINING IN TECHNICAL OPERATIONS  
"ON A FULLY-REIMBURSABLE BASIS", AND SUGGESTED INSTEAD  
THAT PARAGRAPH C.1.C. OF THE RA BE CHANGED TO READ  
SIMPLY "FURNISHED UNDER IMET." THE THRUST OF KAPSIS'  
REMARK WAS THAT AVAILABLE IMET FUNDS MIGHT NNN ER

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

GREEK REQUIREMENTS. BARTHOLOMEW DID NOT ACCEPT THE  
SUGGESTED CHANGE AND SAID HE WOULD RETURN TO THE SUBJECT  
AT A LATER DATE.

11. KAPSIS SAID THAT THE GREEK SIDE ACCEPTS THE  
IDEA OF APPLYING THE NATO SOFA PLUS BILATERAL  
SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENTS, AND HE TOOK NO ACCEPTANCE  
TO ARTICLE III OF THE U.S. PROPOSAL AS WRITTEN.  
WITH REFERENCE TO THE RA, BARTHOLOMEW PROPOSED THAT  
THE TWO SIDES POSTPONE NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL APRIL,  
AT WHICH TIME BOTH THE LANGUAGE HE HAS PROPOSED AND  
ANY THE GREEK SIDE PROPOSES IN THE INTERIM REFLECTING  
ITS PERCEPTION OF PROBLEMS WOULD BE ON THE TABLE.  
HE SUGGESTED THAT LAWYERS FROM BOTH SIDES BE IN THE  
ROOM WITH THE SENIOR NEGOTIATORS, WHO WOULD, AS THEY  
DEEMED APPROPRIATE, REFER SPECIFIC PROBLEMS FOR THE

LAWYERS TO TACKLE SEPARATELY. BARTHOLOMEW STRONGLY  
EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT BOTH HE AND KAPSIS WOULD  
HAVE TO STAY ON TOP OF THE SOFA NEGOTIATIONS.  
KAPSIS AGREED.

12. ON COMMAND AND CONTROL, BARTHOLOMEW PROPOSED  
AD REFERENDUM INTEGRATING ALL OF THE LANGUAGE FROM  
PARAGRAPH E. OF THE RA INTO ARTICLE IV OF THE DECA,  
WITH AMENDMENTS DESIGNED TO MEET THE GREEK CONCERN  
THAT THE GREEK REPRESENTATIVE BE GIVEN SUBSTANTIVE  
AND PARALLEL RESPONSIBILITIES. (SEE PARAGRAPH 7 OF  
ATHENS 3756, DTG 1118510MAR83 NOTAL.) KAPSIS ARGUED  
THAT SUCH CHANGES WOULD STILL LEAVE THE GREEK REPRE-  
SENTATIVE AS A JUNIOR PARTNER, AND ASKED FOR LANGUAGE  
THAT WOULD GIVE THE GREEK REPRESENTATIVE THE FUNCTION  
OF REPORTING TO HIS AUTHORITIES ON IMPLEMENTATION  
OF THE AGREEMENT. BARTHOLOMEW ARGUED AGAINST ANY  
VERIFICATION OR WATCHDOG ROLE FOR THE GREEK REPRESEN-  
TATIVE AND HE SAID HE WOULD HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTY  
WITH ANY LANGUAGE THAT WOULD IN FACT OR IMPLICITLY  
GIVE THE GREEK REPRESENTATIVE A FUNCTION THAT IMPLIES  
THAT THE U.S. MIGHT NOT ABIDE BY AN AGREEMENT ENTERED  
INTO IN GOOD FAITH. KAPSIS ARGUED THAT IT WAS NOT  
A QUESTION OF THE GOOD FAITH OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT,  
WHICH HE ACCEPTED, BUT IT IS A QUESTION OF ASSURING  
IMPLEMENTATION AT THE WORKING LEVEL. BARTHOLOMEW  
SAID THAT THE DECA AND THE RA ALREADY PROVIDE FULL  
INFORMATION ON WHAT HAPPENS AT THE FACILITIES.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

KAPSIS SAID HE WOULD UNDERTAKE TO PREPARE ONE OR TWO  
ALTERNATIVE SETS OF LANGUAGE DESIGNED TO RESOLVE THE  
STATED PROBLEMS OF BOTH SIDES.

13. TURNING TO ASSISTANCE AND INTELLIGENCE, KAPSIS  
ASKED THAT THE PHRASE "IN THE EVENT OF SPECIAL  
CIRCUMSTANCES" BE BRACKETED IN ARTICLE V, ARGUING  
THAT IT IS NOT NEEDED GIVEN OTHER PROTECTIVE  
LANGUAGE. HE AGREED FULLY WITH BARTHOLOMEW'S  
STATEMENT THAT THE PROBLEM FOR THE GREEK SIDE IS  
NOT SUBSTANTIVE BUT INSTEAD PRESENTATIONAL, AND HE  
ACCEPTED THAT ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED AREAS WOULD BE  
A SPECIAL EVENT. KAPSIS HAD NO OBJECTION TO DELETION  
OF THE WORD "INTELLIGENCE" AS A MODIFIER OF RAW DATA  
AND REPORTS, AND HE ACCEPTED BARTHOLOMEW'S RATIONALE FOR  
PREFERRING THE WORD "REPORTS" TO "PROCESSED MATERIAL."  
ON THE LAST POINT, HE SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO CONVINCE  
HIS EXPERTS. BARTHOLOMEW SAID THAT IF THE GREEK SIDE  
PERSISTS TO THE END, HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO AGREE TO  
THE WORDS "PROCESSED MATERIAL", BUT THAT IT WOULD NOT  
MAKE ANY SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCE. REFERRING TO  
PARAGRAPH F OF THE RA, KAPSIS ASKED WHAT WAS MEANT  
BY "PRIOR NOTIFICATION." BARTHOLOMEW REPLIED THAT THIS  
WAS A PERFECTLY REASONABLE CONCEPT AND THAT IT WOULD  
BE A MISTAKE TO OPEN UP THE SUBJECT BY SEEKING MORE  
PRECISE DEFINITION. (COMMENT: WE EXPECT THAT KAPSIS  
WILL GO BACK TO THE QUESTION, AND WE WOULD APPRECIATE  
WASHINGTON'S ADVICE ON WHAT TIME PERIOD WOULD  
CONSTITUTE A REASONABLE PRIOR NOTIFICATION.)

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01                    ATHENS 4185                    29962                    DTG: 191442Z MAR 83 PSN: 019208  
SIT867                    DATE 03/25/82                    TOR: 078/1828Z

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SIT: CKLSJP VP WHLR SIT EOBEOB KEMP  
EOB: //TK//  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTTAG-----ER DISSEM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHTH #4185/04 0781506  
O 191442Z MAR 83 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5001  
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO JCS WASHDC  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2775  
USMISSION USNATO 1426  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE  
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE  
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE  
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK  
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT  
USNMR SHAPE BE  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 ATHENS 04185  
EXDIS  
FROM U. S. SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR BARTHOLOMEW  
MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

14. IT WAS AGREED TO HOLD THE NEXT SESSION ON TUESDAY  
EVENING, MARCH 22ND. STEARNS



TO MCFARLANE

FROM FORTIER

DOCDATE 21 MAR 83

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

*24 10/20/11*

KEYWORDS: GREECE  
FMS

TURKEY

BROOMFIELD, WILLIAM  
WINN, LARRY

SUBJECT: TELEPHONE CALL ON GREEK ~ TURKISH FMS REQUEST

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE:

STATUS X

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

( B *B* )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>C</i> MAR 22 1983	<i>Mcfarlane noted</i>		<i>DE</i>

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_ (C)

National Security Council  
The White House

588

Package # 90339

'83 MAR 21 P12:22

39

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>A</u>
Jacque Hill	<u>  </u>	<u>  </u>	<u>  </u>
Judge Clark	<u>  </u>	<u>  </u>	<u>  </u>
John Poindexter	<u>  </u>	<u>  </u>	<u>  </u>
Staff Secretary	<u>4</u>	<u>  </u>	<u>DR</u>
Sit Room	<u>  </u>	<u>  </u>	<u>  </u>
<u>Rath</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>Please ring up Broomfield for me.</u>	

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Call Baker 3<sup>30</sup> Today (3/21)

OBE

—

**MEMORANDUM**

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**

RCM HAS SEEN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 21, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: DONALD R. FORTIER *DF*

SUBJECT: Telephone Call on Greek-Turkish FMS Request

HFAC Subcommittee will begin its markup tomorrow of the FY 84 foreign assistance legislation. Confidentially, I just learned that key Republicans will be meeting this afternoon at 3:30 to decide on strategy for dealing with Greek-Turkish FMS request. State will try to call Broomfield and Winn--who must carry the load--to shore them up. I believe it is absolutely vital that both--and particularly Broomfield--also get a call from the White House before the 3:30 meeting to let them know how important this package is to the President. If we lose the early rounds, it will be difficult to recover later. Suggested talking points attached:

Bob Kimmet concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

OK                      NO

—                      —                      That you telephone Broomfield and Winn before the 3:30 meeting today.

Attachment:

Tab I                      Suggested talking points

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
REF M412/17/121619  
GV 11/5/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TALKING POINTS

- As you are probably aware, the President has agreed to submit a budget amendment increasing Greek security assistance by up to \$220 million in the context of an acceptable base agreement.
- In addition to facilitating our base negotiations, we hope this will make it easier for Congress to support our Turkish request as well.
- Your leadership on this matter is vital to U.S.
- There is no tilt by this Administration towards Turkey. Both countries are important to us--and to one another. The President's package reflects this fact.
- President is determined to rebuild strength of the Southern Flank. The weakness of this Flank is an invitation for political and military pressure. Unrest in Persian Gulf makes Southern Flank more important than ever.
- Turkish forces are badly obsolescent. Equipment is so old that even spare parts are hard to find, and those that exist are exorbitant to purchase.
- Recent studies demonstrate that if present trends are not checked, Turkey's combat equipment could be reduced in next few years to virtual ineffectiveness against modern forces from the outside.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
BY M42/1 #121623  
DATE 11/5/15

- Although the sums involved for both countries are large, they are small in comparison with our earlier aid programs to key NATO allies. Evidence exists that outside forces have put more money into trying to destabilize Turkey over last several years than we have for security assistance.
- In recent days Turks have been under heavy political pressures from Soviets who understand that a strong Turkey complicates their ability to undertake adventures in the Gulf.

1992

RECEIVED 25 MAR 83 09

43

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 24 MAR 83

FORTIER

06 APR 83

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

POINDEXTER

13 APR 83

24 10/20/11

KEYWORDS GREECE

AP

KARAMANLIS, CONSTANT

HS

SUBJECT. APPT REQUEST FOR PRES KARAMANLIS W/ PRES DURING MAY

ACTION. PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 14 APR 83 STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

FORTIER

MYER

TYSON

WHEELER

COMMENTS

REF# 8308430

LOG 8303157

NSCIFID

( HW HW )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	C 2/25	Rec'd Ryan Memos		DF, CT, RK

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

PA (CR)

REGRET

Date

4/21/83

THE WHITE HOUSE  
EJR WASHINGTON

No

1992

49

RECEIVED

APR 1 1983

SUBMITTING  
OFFICE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: WILLIAM K. SADLEIR, DIRECTOR  
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER *J.P.*

REQUEST: To schedule a half hour meeting between the President and Greek President Karamanlis when the latter comes to the U.S. to receive an honorary degree in the latter part of the spring.

PURPOSE: To show recognition for Karamanlis' support of U.S. interests in the ongoing base negotiations and other key areas.

BACKGROUND: Karamanlis is a long-time friend of the U.S. He is respected for having restored democracy to Greece, and he has used the powers of his office to encourage moderation in PM Papandreou's policies. The President had planned to meet with Karamanlis last fall at the Conference on Free Elections but Karamanlis was unable to postpone a prior commitment at that time.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: As Prime Minister, Karamanlis met with President Carter in 1978.

DATE AND TIME: During the last week of May

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: To be provided

OUTLINE OF EVENT: Meeting of one-half hour's duration. No other events required.

REMARKS REQUIRED: Talking points

MEDIA COVERAGE: Press pool photo

RECOMMENDED BY: Department of State

OPPOSED BY: None

PROJECT OFFICER: Charles P. Tyson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec.34(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008  
BY NARA KML DATE 10/20/11

PAGE 1 - 696

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 04/11/83//101

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE601  
UTS9512  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUEHTH #4605 0881317  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 291317Z MAR 83  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5117  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 04605  
NODIS  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PARM, INF, GR  
SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO HEADS OF STATE/GOVERNMENT RE INF  
REF: STATE 84709  
1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.  
2. CHARGE TODAY DELIVERED PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO  
DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KAPIS, STRESSING ITS  
CONFIDENTIALITY PENDING PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT AND  
NOTING THAT SUPPORTIVE GREEK STATEMENT AT THAT TIME  
WOULD BE APPRECIATED.  
3. KAPIS SAID HE WOULD TRANSMIT TEXT TO OTTAWA FOR  
PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU, WHO WOULD THUS SEE IT  
EARLY THIS MORNING. BERLIND  
BT  
#4605  
NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M412 #121627

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13