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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KML 10/21/2011

File Folder GREECE (01/03/1983-02/20/1983)

FOIA

M11-412

Box Number 15

DRAENOS

8

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
121555	MEMO	DON FORTIER TO WILLIAM CLARK RE BASE NEGOTIATIONS R 3/18/2013 M412/1	2	1/3/1983	B1
121556	CABLE	ATHENS 0256 R 3/18/2013 M412/1	2	1/8/1983	B1
121557	CABLE	ATHENS 0966 R 3/18/2013 M412/1	1	1/20/1983	B1
121558	CABLE	ATHENS 0504 R 3/18/2013 M412/1	2	1/12/1982	B1
121559	CABLE	ATHENS 0967 R 3/18/2013 M412/1	2	1/20/1983	B1
121560	CABLE	ATHENS 0998 R 3/18/2013 M412/1	2	1/21/1983	B1
121561	CABLE	ATHENS 1042 R 3/18/2013 M412/1	2	1/21/1983	B1
121562	CABLE	ATHENS 1053 R 3/18/2013 M412/1	1	1/21/1983	B1
121563	CABLE	ATHENS 1247 R 3/18/2013 M412/1	3	1/26/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

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KML 10/21/2011

File Folder GREECE (01/03/1983-02/20/1983)

FOIA

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
121564	CABLE	STATE 024523 R 3/18/2013 M412/1	2	1/27/1983	B1
121565	CABLE	GENEVA 0971 R 3/18/2013 M412/1	3	2/4/1983	B1
121566	CABLE	ATHENS 1830 R 3/18/2013 M412/1	2	2/4/1983	B1
121567	CABLE	STATE 034467 R 3/18/2013 M412/1	2	2/5/1983	B1
121568	CABLE	ATHENS 2233 R 3/18/2013 M412/1	4	2/11/1983	B1
121569	CABLE	ATHENS 2518 R 3/18/2013 M412/1	1	2/17/1983	B1
121570	CABLE	ATHENS 2553 R 3/18/2013 M412/1	1	2/18/1982	B1
121571	CABLE	ATHENS 2607 R 3/18/2013 M412/1	1	2/19/1983	B1
121572	CABLE	STATE 047758 R 3/18/2013 M412/1	1	2/20/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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MEMORANDUM

0018

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

January 3, 1983

WPC HAS SEEN

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: DON FORTIER *DF*

SUBJECT: Greek Base Negotiations

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M412 #121555

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

Dennis and I met last Thursday with Amb. Bartholomew to review the bidding on the Greek base negotiations. The negotiations revolve around three specific issues: 1) the nuts and bolts of our access to various bases and facilities; 2) the price tag; and 3) Greek demands for a security guarantee against Turkey. (On the last two issues the Greeks have in effect said either give us a guarantee or enough money to make one unnecessary - with "enough" defined as approximately \$1 billion per annum.)

Bartholomew has so far resisted Greek efforts to put money demands ahead of substance. Instead he steered the talks into consideration of a U.S. draft elements paper, which outlines the essentials of what we would need in any final agreement. We should know something about the Greek reaction to these proposals when Bartholomew returns early this month. (I plan to meet with Bartholomew again myself in Athens - if possible prior to my congressional delegation's meeting with Papandreou).

As the dynamics of the negotiations shift (that is, once we get a feel for the Greek position on the specific technical access elements) we will need to begin to deal more frontally with the question of funding. Another driving factor, of course, is the soon-to-be announced aid level for Turkey (which is significantly increased) and the "straight-lined" FMS figure for Greece. While Kapsis, Bartholomew's negotiating counterpart, seemed to accept the fact that we would not increase Greek funding over the 1982 level as long as we were still negotiating, his boss - Papandreou - may react more viscerally. And the same is true of our own congress.

With these considerations in mind, we discussed an approach in which Bartholomew would seek to work out early DoD approval for a specific FY-84 figure for Greece. This figure would be well below the Greek asking price, of course, and would be agreed to only if an acceptable base arrangement can be concluded. The figure would, though, be a significant improvement over Greece's currently projected \$280 million.

The purpose of arriving at a hard figure now is three-fold: First, to give the Greek military a stake in a quick outcome

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(for them, the sooner we reach agreement, the better the chances of getting money in the current funding cycle; for us, the sooner we reach agreement, the less our own negotiations are subjected to the explosive vagaries of Aegean politics). Second, to keep Papandreou from derailing the talks altogether. Third, to be better able to persuade the congress not to unilaterally increase Greek funding in the middle of a delicate negotiation - since without a hard figure, the congress may be wary of going along with us in concept.

As a general matter, the European office will avoid second-guessing or fine tuning on negotiating specifics (with due respect for human nature, I should probably add "unless the urge to do so is overwhelming."). Rather we will concentrate on possible holes in the logic of the overall negotiating process; on the availability and maintenance of leverage; on the political context in which the agreement must be managed, and ultimately, sold; on helping to referee disputes; and in general, on keeping you abreast of the process. We hope soon to have for you a broader strategy ~~piece~~ on the Southern Flank that will suggest a more integrated approach to the festering problems of that region.

485

National Security Council The White House

RECEIVED

Package # 0018 3

83 JAN 4 AIO: 11

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>I</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information
 A-Action
 R-Retain
 D-Dispatch
 N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

RECEIVED 04 JAN 83 10

TO CLARK

FROM FORTIER

DOCDATE 03 JAN 83

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

24 10/20/11

KEYWORDS: MILITARY BASES

GREECE

BARTHOLOMEW, R

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF MTG W/ BARTHOLOMEW RE GREEK BASE NEGOTIATIONS

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

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NSCIFID

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

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ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

C **JAN 1 0 1983**

Clark noted

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121556 5

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 ATHENS 0256 6 DTG: 081204Z JAN 83 PSN: 068719
SIT725 DATE 01/10/83 TOR: 008/1218Z

WERE NOT TRUE.

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTKLSTT

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHTR #0256/01 0081206
O 081204Z JAN 83
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3679

INFO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY 8688
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 4796
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 4117
NATO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 00256
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PBTS, PREL, MASS, CY, EG, GR, TU
SUBJECT: GREEK DEMARCHE ON CYPRUS AND EGYPTIAN F-4 SALE
- TO TURKEY
REF: ATHENS 251

1. ~~/~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. BEGIN SUMMARY: DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KAPSIS CONVOKED AMBASSADOR TODAY TO REQUEST U.S. REACTION TO REPORT THAT TURKEY WAS MOVING TOWARD PARTITION OF CYPRUS. REPORT CAME FROM SOVIETS, BUT GREEKS NEVERTHELESS FELT COMPELLED TO CALL IT TO OUR ATTENTION. KAPSIS ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT REPORTS OF PROJECTED EGYPTIAN SALE OF F-4'S TO TURKEY AND ATTEMPTED TO LINK THIS TRANSACTION WITH WHAT HE TERMED TURKISH REJECTION OF GREEK OLIVE BRANCH. AMBASSADOR SAID SOVIETS WERE OBVIOUSLY TRYING TO AGGRAVATE GREEK-TURKISH DIFFERENCES. AS FAR AS MORATORIUM WAS CONCERNED, AMBASSADOR SAID THE SOONER GREEKS WERE PREPARED TO RESUME DIALOGUE WITH TURKS, THE MORE RAPIDLY ATMOSPHERE WAS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

LIKELY TO IMPROVE. AMBASSADOR AGREED TO SEEK DEPARTMENT'S REACTION TO REPORTS. END SUMMARY

3. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KAPSIS CALLED ME IN THIS MORNING (JANUARY 8) TO EXPRESS GREEK APPREHENSION ABOUT REPORT IT HAD RECEIVED THAT TURKEY WAS PLANNING TO BACK TURKISH CYPRIOT INDEPENDENCE. KAPSIS SAID SOURCE OF GREEK INFORMATION WAS SOVIET UNION WHICH HAD INFORMED GOG IT HAD REASON TO BELIEVE DENKTASH WAS -- BEING ENCOURAGED TO PROCLAIM INDEPENDENCE OF NORTHERN CYPRUS. SINCE SOVIETS HAD OBVIOUS INTEREST IN FISHING IN TROUBLED WATERS, GOG WAS TREATING THIS INFORMATION WITH RESERVE, BUT COULD NOT AFFORD TO IGNORE IT COMPLETELY. SOVIETS MIGHT BE CONDUCTING DISINFORMATION, BUT ON OTHER HAND WOULD SEEM TO HAVE LITTLE REASON TO CONVEY REPORTS WHICH COULD EASILY BE DISPROVED IF THEY

4. I SAID WE HAD SEEN NO INDICATION THAT TURKEY WAS CONSIDERING A MOVE OF THIS KIND. IT SEEMED TO ME MOST IMPLAUSIBLE ON THE FACE OF THE MATTER. TURKEY WOULD HAVE NO INTEREST AT THIS TIME IN PROVOKING A MAJOR INTERNATIONAL INCIDENT. THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS SOURCE OF THESE ALLEGATIONS DISCREDITED THEM COMPLETELY. SOVIETS WERE PERFECTLY CAPABLE OF INVENTING NONEXISTENT THREAT OF PARTITION AND THEN LATER TAKING CREDIT FOR DETERRING ANKARA FROM IMPLEMENTING IT.

5. KAPSIS REFERRED TO PUBLIC STATEMENT MADE IN PRESS A FEW DAYS AGO BY DENKTASH WHICH SEEMED TO THREATEN SOME SUCH MOVE. I SAID DENKTASH HAD MADE MANY SIMILAR STATEMENTS IN THE PAST AND I HAD NO REASON TO BELIEVE HIS INTENTIONS WERE MORE SERIOUS THIS TIME. I SAID I WOULD, HOWEVER, REPORT GREEK APPREHENSIONS AND SEEK DEPARTMENT'S REACTION TO REPORTS CONVEYED BY SOVIETS TO GOG.

6. KAPSIS THEN REFERRED TO GREEK PRESS REPORTS (REFTEL) ABOUT PROJECTED SALE OF 35 F-4'S BY EGYPT TO TURKEY. IN VIEW OF RECENT TURKISH "REJECTION" OF GREECE'S PROPOSAL TO RESUME MORATORIUM, AS WELL AS UPCOMING TURKISH AEGEAN EXERCISES NEAR MYTILINI WHICH COULD WELL PRODUCE NEW AIR SPACE INCIDENTS, GREECE VIEWED WITH CONCERN MOVES TO STRENGTHEN TURKEY'S MILITARY POSITION WITHOUT OFFSETTING

ATHENS 0256 6 DTG: 081204Z JAN 83 PSN: 068719
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ASSISTANCE TO GREECE.

7. I SAID I HAD NO DETAILS BEYOND PRESS REPORTS OF REPORTED EGYPTIAN PLAN TO SELL F-4'S TO TURKEY. IF DEAL ACTUALLY TOOK PLACE, BASIC DECISION WOULD BE MADE BY EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT IF TERMS AND PRICE COULD BE AGREED UPON. AS KAPSIS KNEW, U.S. POSITION WAS THAT TURKISH DEFENSES BADLY NEEDED TO BE STRENGTHENED AND THAT SALE OF F-4'S WOULD BE IN INTERESTS OF NATO, NOT AGAINST INTERESTS OF GREECE.

8. KAPSIS SAID GOG WAS AWARE OF OUR REASONING, BUT DID NOT SHARE IT. HE WAS NOT "PROTESTING" THE REPORTED DECISION TO PERMIT SALE OF F-4'S, BUT SIMPLY CALLING OUR ATTENTION TO OBLIGATION TO MAINTAIN AEGEAN BALANCE OF POWER. IN GREEK VIEW, TRANSFER OF F-4'S TO TURKEY WOULD BE DESTABILIZING. KAPSIS THEN ATTEMPTED TO LINK NEGATIVE TURKISH ATTITUDE ON RESUMPTION OF MORATORIUM WITH WESTERN-- ESPECIALLY U.S. -- PLANS TO GREATLY INCREASE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY.

9. I REPLIED THAT, AS KAPSIS KNEW, TURKEY VIEWED

ATHENS 0256 6 DTG: 081204Z JAN 83 PSN: 068719

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NLRR M412 *121556

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 ATHENS 0256 6 DTG: 081204Z JAN 83 PSN: 068718
SIT728 DATE 01/10/83 TOR: 008/1216Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTCKLISTT

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHTH #0256/02 0081208
O 081204Z JAN 83
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3680

INFO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY 8689
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 4797
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 4118
NATO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 ATHENS 00256
MORATORIUM WITHOUT DIALOGUE AS ONE-SIDED. FOR THIS
REASON, IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR GREECE TO RESUME DIALOGUE
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. I WAS SURE THAT ONCE TALKS HAD
ACTUALLY BEGUN, TURKS WOULD HAVE EVEN GREATER INTEREST IN
KEEPING ATMOSPHERE CALM. KAPIS SAID GOG BELIEVED TWO-
MONTH PERIOD FREE OF INCIDENTS AND INVECTIVE WOULD BE
NECESSARY BEFORE A DIALOGUE COULD EFFECTIVELY BE RESUMED.
10 COMMENT: KAPIS HAS MADE SIMILAR DEMARCHE TO
BRITISH AMBASSADOR ON SUBJECT OF PURPORTED TURKISH PLAN
FOR PARTITION OF CYPRUS. WE WOULD APPRECIATE WHATEVER
INFORMATION DEPARTMENT CAN PROVIDE ON THIS, AS WELL AS
STATUS OF EGYPTIAN F-4 SALE TO TURKEY. STEARNS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

121557

7

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 ATHENS 0966 0227 DTG: 201633Z JAN 83 PSN: 008640
SIT616 DATE 01/24/83 TOR: 020/1910Z

NOV.

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6. IN REVIEWING STATEMENT WASHINGTON WILL NOTE THAT PARA (A) IS RE-WORK OF LANGUAGE ON PAGE 1 OF CPD PRESENTING FY 84 SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR GREECE. PARA (B) IS INTER-AGENCY CLEARED SENTENCE FROM PARA 6 OF "FRAMEWORK/COMMUNIQUE" PAPER. PARA (C) HAS EXACT OPERATIONAL LANGUAGE OF US PROPOSAL IN ARTICLE V OF DRAFT 1981 DECA TEXT AND ALSO TRACKS WITH LANGUAGE COVERED IN CURRENT AND EARLIER CPD ON GREECE.

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOBT KEMP
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHTH #0966 0201634
O 201633Z JAN 83 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3883
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
JCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
BT

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 0966
EXDIS: MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MARR, MASS, GR, US, TU
SUBJECT: DECA NEGOTIATIONS: CONTINGENCY STATEMENT
FY 84 ASSISTANCE FIGURES (S)
REF: STATE 14318

7. CONTINGENCY STATEMENT:
(A) US SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO GREECE AS WELL AS US MILITARY FACILITIES IN GREECE ARE NOW UNDER DISCUSSION IN US-GREEK TALKS ON A NEW DEFENSE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION AGREEMENT WHICH BEGAN IN LATE OCTOBER, 1982 AND ARE EXPECTED TO REACH A CONCLUSION THIS YEAR. THE CURRENT PROPOSED FY 84 SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR GREECE THEREFORE CARRIES OVER THE FY 83 LEVELS.
(B) THE USG HAS INFORMED THE GOG THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NEW DECA, THE USG WILL SEEK INCREASED LEVELS OF DEFENSE SUPPORT FOR GREECE ABOVE THE LEVEL IN THE CURRENT PROGRAM.
(C) US DEFENSE SUPPORT PROGRAMS FOR GREECE WILL ALSO BE GUIDED BY THE PRINCIPLE SET FORTH IN US LAW THAT CALLS FOR PRESERVING THE BALANCE OF MILITARY STRENGTH

ATHENS 0966 0227 DTG: 201633Z JAN 83 PSN: 008640
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

IN THE REGION.

8. DECA DELEGATION AND EMBASSY BELIEVE CONTINGENCY STATEMENT, AND ESPECIALLY STATEMENT ON BALANCE, WILL BE ABSOLUTELY CRITICAL FOR GOG AND GREEK PUBLIC OPINION ACROSS THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM. STEARNS

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE PROPOSES CONTINGENCY STATEMENT FOR USE WITH GOG, HILL, AND US AND GREEK PRESS WHEN FY 84 ASSISTANCE FIGURES BECOME PUBLIC. SINCE FIGURES COULD BECOME PUBLIC ANY DAY FAST WASHINGTON ACTION IS REQUESTED. END SUMMARY.

3. KARANDREAS DEMARCHE AND AIDE MEMOIRE ON EGYPTIAN F-4 SALE TO TURKEY (REFTEL) AND INITIAL KAPSIS/BARTHOLOMEW DISCUSSIONS (SEPTEL) UNDERSCORE INTENSE GOG CONCERN ON POTENTIAL IMPACT OF FY 84 ASSISTANCE FIGURES, AND KAPSIS HAS STRESSED THE NEED TO MAKE KNOWN WHEN FY 84 FIGURES COME OUT THAT "PRINCIPLE OF PRESERVATION OF BALANCE" WILL BE MAINTAINED IN THE EVENT A NEW DECA ACHIEVED. AT THE SAME TIME

ATHENS 0966 0227 DTG: 201633Z JAN 83 PSN: 008640

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WE FACE SIMILAR QUESTIONS ON FIGURES AND "BALANCE" FROM HILL (AS RECENT BARTHOLOMEW CONSULTATIONS INDICATED) AND FROM US PRESS.

4. LANGUAGE IN PARA 7 BELOW IS DESIGNED AS CONTINGENCY STATEMENT TO BE ISSUED BY DEPARTMENT ONCE FIGURES BREAK. BARTHOLOMEW WOULD INFORM KAPSIS OF STATEMENT WE PROPOSE TO MAKE AND ASK GREEKS LINE THEY PROPOSE TO FOLLOW. STATEMENT THEN WOULD BE USED AS NEEDED TO RESPOND TO QUERIES FROM THE PRESS AND HILL.

5. WASHINGTON-CLEARED "FRAMEWORK/COMMUNIQUE" IS DESIGNED TO BE PURSUED WITH KAPSIS ONLY AFTER FULL DISCUSSION OF ISSUES IN US "ELEMENTS" PAPER. AS FY 84 FIGURES MAY BREAK BEFORE THEN, WE NEED CONTINGENCY STATEMENT

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NLRR M412 # 121557

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

121558

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 ATHENS 0504 0124 DTG:121519Z JAN 82 PSN: 075109
SIT768 DATE 01/18/83 TOR: 013/0851Z

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WMSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTKLST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHTH #0504/01 0121522 (CCY TEXT AD155613 STU6486 410 MCN NAR)
O 121519Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3735

INFO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE IMMEDIATE
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT IMMEDIATE
USNMR SHAPE BE IMMEDIATE
JCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
NATO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY 8704
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 00504
CORRECTED COPY (TEXT)
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, GR, US
SUBJECT: GREEK DEMARCHE RE SOUDA LANDINGS
REF: ATHENS 336 DTG 101013Z JAN 83 (NOTAL)

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KAPSIS YESTERDAY ASKED AMBASSADOR FOR CLARIFICATION OF CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING UNSCHEDULED LANDINGS OF U.S. MILITARY AIRCRAFT AT SOUDA AFB LAST WEEK. AMBASSADOR PROVIDED SAME ACCOUNT THAT AIRA HAD EARLIER GIVEN TO GREEK AIR FORCE. KAPSIS APPEARED SATISFIED BUT COMMENTED ON SLIGHT BUT PERCEPTIBLE SOURING OF GREEK - U.S.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

RELATIONS SINCE DECEMBER. HE ATTRIBUTED THIS TO GREEK OPPOSITION CRITICISM OF GOVERNMENT. AMBASSADOR SAID WE TOOK NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR STATEMENTS OF GREEK OPPOSITION BUT RESERVED RIGHT TO AGREE WITH OPPOSITION LEADERS WHEN THEY SUPPORTED PRINCIPLES IN WHICH WE BELIEVED, SUCH AS NEED FOR NATO UNITY. BY THE SAME TOKEN, AMBASSADOR SAID, A STEADY DIET OF CARPING CRITICISM BY GOG, COUPLED WITH CONSISTENT GREEK RATIONALIZATION OF SOVIET MISCONDUCT, CERTAINLY SOURED OUR RELATIONS. GREEK OFFICIAL NEWS AGENCY AND PRESS THIS MORNING TERM KAPSIS' MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR "STRONG PROTEST" AND CONTAIN OTHER INACCURACIES. AMBASSADOR HAS CALLED THESE TO KAPSIS' ATTENTION BY TELEPHONE AND HAS HIMSELF SET RECORD STRAIGHT WITH NYT CORRESPONDENT. WE WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO WITH OTHER PRESS REPRESENTATIVES. END SUMMARY.

3. I WAS CALLED TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY LATE YESTERDAY AFTERNOON (JANUARY 11) BY DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KAPSIS, WHO REQUESTED CLARIFICATION OF CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING UNSCHEDULED LANDINGS OF U.S. AIRCRAFT AT SOUDA AFB JANUARY 5 - 7. I PROVIDED KAPSIS WITH FACTS AS SET FORTH REFTEL, REMINDING HIM THAT SAME ACCOUNT HAD ALREADY BEEN GIVEN BY AIRA TO HELLENIC AIR FORCE GENERAL STAFF. KAPSIS, WHO DID NOT SHOW MUCH UNDERSTANDING OF NORMAL AIR OPERATIONS THROUGH SOUDA, APPEARED SATISFIED WITH INFORMATION PROVIDED HIM. TONE OF OUR MEETING WAS BUSINESSLIKE BUT CORDIAL. PORTION OF MEETING DEVOTED TO SOUDA TOOK PERHAPS 10 - 15 MINUTES. WE SPENT A LONGER TIME IN GENERAL DISCUSSION OF CURRENT STATE OF GREEK - U.S. RELATIONS.

4. KAPSIS INTRODUCED LARGER IMPLICATIONS OF SOUDA EVENTS BY SAYING THAT HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO ARRIVAL OF U.S. NEGOTIATOR BARTHOLOMEW NEXT WEEK FOR NEXT PHASE OF DECA NEGOTIATIONS. HE THOUGHT -- "SPEAKING PERSONALLY" -- THAT SINCE BARTHOLOMEW LEFT IN DECEMBER THERE HAD BEEN A PERCEPTIBLE SOURING OF OVERALL GREEK - U.S. RELATIONS. HE CLAIMED THAT INCIDENTS OF THE KIND THAT HAD OCCURRED LAST WEEK IN SOUDA FURTHER COMPLICATED THE SITUATION.

5. I TOLD HIM THAT EMERGENCY LANDINGS OF THE KIND THAT HAD TAKEN PLACE WERE INEVITABLE FROM TIME TO TIME IN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AIR OPERATIONS. THE GREEK GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE AS INTERESTED IN THE SAFETY OF OUR PERSONNEL AND AIRCRAFT AS WE WERE. I ASSUMED HE WAS NOT SUGGESTING THAT THE AIRCRAFT IN QUESTION HAD IN SOME WAY AFFECTED GREEK - U.S. RELATIONS BY EMERGENCY LANDINGS AT SOUDA. KAPSIS DENIED ANY SUCH INTENTION, SAYING THAT GREECE DID NOT, OF COURSE, DENY FACILITIES TO AIRCRAFT WHICH REQUIRED TO LAND IN EMERGENCIES. THERE HAD BEEN, HE SAID, ADMINISTRATIVE "MISUNDERSTANDINGS" WHICH UNNECESSARILY COMPLICATED PROBLEMS AT SOUDA LAST WEEK. I SAID THAT I HOPED THAT MY ACCOUNT AND EARLIER ONE GIVEN BY AIRA HAD CLARIFIED THAT ASPECT. KAPSIS INDICATED THAT THIS WAS THE CASE.

6. HE THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT WHAT HE REALLY HAD IN MIND ABOUT THE CHANGED TONE OF GREEK - U.S. RELATIONS WERE UNHELPFUL PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND CERTAIN PRESS ARTICLES. I ASKED HIM WHETHER HE MEANT PRIME MINISTER'S PAPANDEOU'S PUBLIC WELCOME OF ANDROPOV'S INF PROPOSALS AND THE RECENT WARSAW PACT PEACE OFFENSIVE. KAPSIS SAID EMPHATICALLY NOT; RATHER, HE WAS REFERRING TO STATEMENTS OF THE GREEK OPPOSITION, WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED AS "MORE AMERICAN THAN THE AMERICANS." I ASKED KAPSIS WHETHER HE HELD THE

ATHENS 0504 0124 DTG:121519Z JAN 82 PSN: 075109

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BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

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THIS BUT DID NOT CARRY THE ARGUMENT FURTHER.

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MESSAGE:

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O 121519Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3736

INFO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT IMMEDIATE
USNMR SHAPE BE IMMEDIATE
JCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY 8705
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 ATHENS 00504
EMBASSY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE STATEMENTS OF THE GREEK
OPPOSITION. HE DENIED THIS WITH EQUAL VEHEMENCE BUT
SAID THAT SUCH STATEMENTS DID NOT HELP THE ATMOSPHERE.
I SAID THAT GREEK OPPOSITION LEADERS MADE STATEMENTS ON
THEIR OWN AUTHORITY AND THAT WE AGREED OR DISAGREED
WITH THEM DEPENDING ON THEIR CONTENT. WHEN AN
OPPOSITION LEADER LIKE FORMER PRIME MINISTER GEORGE
RALLIS CRITICIZED THE GREEK GOVERNMENT FOR PERMITTING
LEFTWING DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE U.S. EMBASSY OR
WHEN HE SPOKE IN FAVOR OF GREECE LIVING UP TO ITS
OBLIGATIONS IN NATO, I COULD NOT FAIL TO AGREE WITH
HIM. AS FAR AS ANY U.S. "INSPIRATION" OF SUCH
STATEMENTS WAS CONCERNED, THERE HAD BEEN NONE. I SAW
THE OPPOSITION LEADERS AS A MATTER OF COURSE BUT DID
NOT PRESUME TO COACH THEM ON THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE SAME WAS TRUE OF OPPOSITION NEWSPAPER EDITORS.

7. KAPSIS HASTENED TO SAY THAT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT
REGARDED AS PERFECTLY NORMAL MY CONTACTS WITH
OPPOSITION LEADERS AND OPPOSITION PRESS. NOR DID HE
WISH TO IMPLY THAT I OR ANYONE ELSE IN THE AMERICAN
EMBASSY HAD PLANTED STORIES CRITICAL OF THE GREEK
GOVERNMENT. HE WAS THINKING IN GENERAL TERMS OF THE
NEED TO IMPROVE GREEK - U.S. RELATIONS BY AVOIDING
UNHELPFUL PUBLIC COMMENTS. I SAID THAT I AGREED WITH
THE LATTER SENTIMENT AND HOPED THAT KAPSIS WOULD BEAR
IN MIND THAT A STEADY DIET OF CARPING CRITICISM OF
U.S. ACTIONS COUPLED WITH UNSTINTING PRAISE OF THE
SOVIET UNION AND THE WARSAW PACT WAS BEGINNING TO
CAUSE A SEVERE CASE OF AMERICAN INDIGESTION. KAPSIS
DENIED THAT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN GUILTY OF

8. THIS MORNING, THE OFFICIAL ATHENS NEWS AGENCY
BULLETIN AND THE GREEK PRESS ARE FULL OF INACCURATE
AND TENDENTIOUS ACCOUNTS OF MY MEETING WITH KAPSIS --
TERMING IT A "STRONG PROTEST" -- AND CLAIMING THAT
THE GREEK GOVERNMENT HAS ASKED US TO SUSPEND OUR
ACTIVITIES AT SOUDA (BEING REPORTED BY SEPTEL).
I HAVE TELEPHONED KAPSIS THIS MORNING TO SAY THAT,
IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT HE IS OBVIOUSLY BEING
MISQUOTED BY THE GREEK NEWS AGENCY AND THE GREEK
PRESS, HE MAY WISH TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT. IN
VIEW OF HIS OWN COMMENTS TO ME LAST NIGHT ABOUT THE
NEED TO IMPROVE THE CLIMATE OF OUR RELATIONS, I TOLD
HIM THAT THE VERSION OF OUR MEETING CONVEYED BY
GREEK PRESS ACCOUNTS SEEMED TO ME ESPECIALLY
UNFORTUNATE. I DID NOT REGARD HIS DEMARCHE TO ME
AS A "PROTEST" AND HE HAD NOT SO REFERRED TO IT HIMSELF.
IN ANY EVENT WE HAD SUPPLIED BOTH THROUGH MILITARY
AND DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS A SATISFACTORY ACCOUNT OF
WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED AT SOUDA. I TOLD KAPSIS THAT
I HAD ALREADY MADE CLEAR TO MARVINE HOWE OF THE NYT,
AND INSTRUCTED OUR PRESS OFFICER TO TELL THE
GREEK PRESS THAT WE HAD NOT ACCEPTED A GREEK "PROTEST"
AND THAT OUR MILITARY ACTIVITIES AT SOUDA AND AT OUR
OTHER FACILITIES WERE CONTINUING IN ACCORDANCE WITH
EXISTING AGREEMENTS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

9. KAPSIS CLAIMED THAT HE WAS NOT THE SOURCE OF
INACCURATE PRESS ACCOUNTS -- INCLUDING THE ACCOUNT
IN THE ANA BULLETIN -- AND SAID HE WOULD LOOK INTO
THE MATTER.
STEARNS

ATHENS 0504 0124 DTG:121519Z JAN 82 PSN: 074998

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3884
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 00967

EXDIS
FROM U.S. SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR BARTHOLOMEW
MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MARR, MASS, GR, US
SUBJECT: DECA NEGOTIATIONS JANUARY 19
REF: 82 ATHENS 20769 (231322Z DEC 82)

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. BEGIN SUMMARY. KAPSIS AGREED TO PROCEED WITH A DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES (AS ALREADY AGREED IN DECEMBER) ONLY AFTER EXTENDED DISCUSSION: HE STATED A GREEK REQUIREMENT THAT IN ANY EVENT A DECA WILL HAVE TO INCLUDE A SATISFACTORY STATEMENT ON PRESERVATION OF

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE BALANCE IN THE REGION. HE ALSO INSISTED THAT BOTH SIDES BE AUTHORIZED TO ANNOUNCE AGREEMENT ON THIS POINT IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH LOCAL REACTION TO RELEASE OF FY '84 SECURITY ASSISTANCE FIGURES FOR GREECE AND TURKEY. BARTHOLOMEW NOTED GREEK POSITIONS AND UNDERScoreD THE SERIOUS AND UNUSUAL NATURE OF U.S. OFFERS ALREADY MADE CONCERNING DEFENSE SUPPORT. THE GREEKS OBVIOUSLY EXPECT A SUBSTANTIAL REACTION TO FY '84 FIGURES AND ARE LOOKING FOR WAYS TO HANDLE IT. RECOMMENDATIONS BY SEPTEL. END SUMMARY.

3. OPENING SESSION OF THIS THIRD ROUND WITNESSED A CONCERTED ATTEMPT BY KAPSIS TO WRENCH A FIGURE ON INCREASED DEFENSE SUPPORT FROM BARTHOLOMEW AS A PRECONDITION TO PROCEEDING WITH DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES COVERED IN BARTHOLOMEW'S NON-PAPER OF

DECEMBER 17 (82 ATHENS 20527, 201416Z DEC 82). BARTHOLOMEW INSISTED THAT PROCEDURE DEVELOPED AT DECEMBER 20 SESSION BE ADHERED TO, AND REMINDED KAPSIS THAT, RECOGNIZING THE IMPORTANCE THE GOG ASSIGNED TO DEFENSE SUPPORT, THE USG HAD AUTHORIZED HIM (BARTHOLOMEW) TO TAKE A VERY UNUSUAL STEP IN THAT AREA -- UNUSUAL BOTH BECAUSE OF THE NATURE OF THE COMMITMENT AND BECAUSE IT WAS TAKEN SO EARLY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE OFFER OF A BEST EFFORTS PLEDGE, AN INCREASE IN DEFENSE SUPPORT OVER FY '83 LEVELS, AND A PROGRAM PROFILE - ALL IN THE CONTEXT OF AN ACCEPTABLE DECA - REPRESENTED SERIOUS UNDERTAKINGS BY THE USG, AND KAPSIS SHOULD APPRECIATE THEM AS SUCH.

4. FINALLY CONVINCED THAT NO FIGURE WAS FORTHCOMING, KAPSIS AGREED TO GO THROUGH THE ISSUES ONE BY ONE AND RESPOND TO BARTHOLOMEW'S NON-PAPER IN AN ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF US-GREEK AGREEMENT AND DIFFERENCES. BUT HE SAID HE WAS PROCEEDING ON THE BASIS THAT THE GREEK SIDE WILL REQUIRE IN AN OTHERWISE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE DECA "AN UNDERTAKING BY THE USG TO ENSURE THAT, THROUGH ITS PROGRAM FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE, AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. LAW, THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THIS REGION WILL BE PRESERVED BOTH QUANTITATIVELY AND QUALITATIVELY." BARTHOLOMEW SAID THAT USG ADHERENCE TO U.S. LAW IS A MATTER

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OF RECORD REQUIRING NO RESTATEMENT, "LEAST OF ALL A RESTATEMENT THAT WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT ONE WAY OR ANOTHER OF DEFINING OR EXTENDING" THE LAW.

5. KAPSIS THEN TURNED TO THE PROBLEM BOTH SIDES WILL FACE WHEN FY '84 TURKISH SECURITY ASSISTANCE FIGURES ARE PUBLISHED, STATING HIS POSITION AS FOLLOWS: "IN CASE, DURING THIS NEGOTIATION, NEW FIGURES ARE ANNOUNCED CONCERNING MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ANY OTHER NATION IN THE REGION, BOTH SIDES WILL HAVE TO BE AUTHORIZED TO ANNOUNCE THAT WE HAVE AGREED THAT A BALANCE OF FORCES WILL BE PRESERVED, IN ORDER TO AVOID DISASTER, IN THE FRAMEWORK OF A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE DECA." BARTHOLOMEW AGAIN NOTED PROBLEM WITH ANY STATEMENT THAT WOULD DEFINE OR EXTEND US LAW ON BALANCE. HE SAID HE WAS READY TO PURSUE FURTHER EARLIER DISCUSSIONS ON HOW BEST TO HANDLE THE PUBLIC IMPACT OF RELEASE OF FY '84 FIGURES.

6. DURING PRIVATE CONVERSATION BARTHOLOMEW TOLD KAPSIS RECENT GOG ACTIONS ON SOUDA LANDINGS

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INFO USMISSION USNATO 1235
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 ATHENS 00967

EXDIS
FROM U. S. SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR BARTHOLOMEW
MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
AND HELLENIKON RECONNAISSANCE RAISED QUESTIONS
WITHIN USG ABOUT GOG ADHERENCE TO STATEMENTS
ON NOT HARMING US INTERESTS AND POLICY OF NOT IMPEDING
EXISTING OPERATIONS. ANY FURTHER STEPS IN THIS
DIRECTION WOULD BE OCCASION FOR SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES.
KAPSIS GAVE VAGUE RESPONSE AND OBVIOUSLY WANTED
TO MOVE QUICKLY TO OTHER ISSUES.

7. DISCUSSION OF DECA ISSUES WILL COMMENCE ON
JANUARY 20.

8. COMMENT. KAPSIS' ATTEMPT TO REVERSE THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PROCEDURAL AGREEMENT REACHED SO PAINFULLY AT
THE END OF THE LAST ROUND (REFTEL) IS
IRRITATING TO SAY THE LEAST. BUT IT ALSO
PROVIDES A CLEAR INDICATION OF GOG CONCERNS
ABOUT THE LOCAL STORM THAT WILL BREAK WHEN
FY '84 FIGURES ARE ANNOUNCED OR OTHERWISE
PUBLISHED. THE GOG APPARENTLY BELIEVES THAT,
IN THE ABSENCE OF SOME MORE PRECISE U. S.
UNDERTAKING REGARDING THE PROSPECTIVE INCREASE
IN DEFENSE SUPPORT FOR GREECE, A STATEMENT
(OR STATEMENTS) ON BALANCE FROM BOTH SIDES IS
WHAT IS MINIMALLY REQUIRED TO DEAL WITH THE
REACTION AND LIMIT POTENTIAL NEGATIVE IMPACT
ON NEGOTIATIONS. RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW TO
DEAL WITH THE REACTION TO FY '84 FIGURES FOLLOW
BY SEPTEL. STEARNS

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3895

INFO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 8729
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AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI 4478
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USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0211
USNMR SHAPE BE
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USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 0433
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 00998
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y INFO ADDEE ADDED (WARSAW)
E.O. 12356: OADR
TAGS: ASEC, OREP, GR, US
SUBJECT: CODEL ZABLOCKI MEETS PAPANDEOU

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. DURING AN HOUR-LONG MEETING AT HIS RESIDENCE WITH CODEL ZABLOCKI, PRIME MINISTER ANDREAS PAPANDEOU REVIEWED GREECE'S RELATIONS WITH TURKEY, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THE AEGEAN QUESTION, AND DISCUSSED HIS VIEW OF POLAND. THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OF THE U.S. BASES OR THE CURRENT DECA NEGOTIATIONS.
END SUMMARY.

3. PAPANDEOU MET WITH CHAIRMAN ZABLOCKI AND OTHER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AT HIS HOME IN KASTRI AT 1230, 19 JANUARY. IN ADDITION TO THE CHAIRMAN, CONGRESSMEN BROOMFIELD, DELAGARZA, LAGOMARSINO, NELSON, AND VENTO PARTICIPATED. CHRISTOS MACHERITSAS, DIRECTOR OF PAPANDEOU'S DIPLOMATIC OFFICE AND AN EMBASSY NOTETAKER WERE ALSO PRESENT.

4. AFTER PLEASANTRIES AND REMINISCENCES OF HIS LIFE IN THE UNITED STATES, PAPANDEOU OUTLINED THE MAJOR ISSUES OF GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS. HE SAID THESE ARE: THE QUESTIONS SURROUNDING LAW OF THE SEA AND AIR SPACE IN THE AEGEAN, THE QUESTION OF THE MOSLEM

MINORITY IN WESTERN THRACE; AND CYPRUS. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT "PEACE IN THE AEGEAN IS GREECE'S NUMBER ONE PRIORITY."

5. PAPANDEOU SAID THAT TURKEY APPEARS TO BE SEEKING CONTROL OF ONE HALF OF THE AEGEAN. "WHY," HE ASKED, "DOES TURKEY SEEK TO SHARE THE AEGEAN?" HE COULD NOT SEE ANY REASON EXCEPT OIL "AND THERE IS OIL IN THE EASTERN AEGEAN." HE CONTINUED: "THAT IS A BUSINESS MATTER THAT COULD BE DISCUSSED." PAPANDEOU SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT IS "NOT MAKING THE AEGEAN SEA A GREEK LAKE BY ANY MEANS. THE ONE WEAPON WE HAVE IS (DECLARING) THE 12-MILE LIMIT -- BUT WE'RE NOT ABOUT TO DO THAT. TURKEY HAS SAID THAT WOULD BE A CAUSE OF WAR. OUR PURPOSE IS NOT TO HAVE A MILITARY CONFRONTATION WITH TURKEY." HOWEVER, HE ADDED THAT TURKEY SHOULD "RECOGNIZE OUR RIGHT" TO DO SO AND THAT SUCH A RECOGNITION WOULD "RELAX" THE ATMOSPHERE. GREECE, HE SAID, WAS BEING ASKED TO RENOUNCE ITS RIGHT TO EXTEND ITS TERRITORIAL WATERS FROM 6 TO 12 MILES. "IN RETURN FOR WHAT?" PAPANDEOU ASKED. "THERE IS NO QUID PRO QUO ... NOTHING TO MAKE A BARGAIN WITH." HE THEN ASKED "HOW LONG DO YOU THINK A GREEK GOVERNMENT WOULD STAY IN POWER IF WE GAVE UP THAT RIGHT?"

6. PAPANDEOU SAID THAT IN THE PROVINCE OF RODHOPI, IN NORTHEASTERN GREECE, THE MOSLEM MINORITY OF TURKISH ORIGIN IS ABOUT 50 PER CENT OF THE POPULATION

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

-- "PERHAPS THE MAJORITY." HE SAID THAT THERE HAS BEEN "INFILTRATION BY THE TURKISH SERVICE" TO START A "FIFTH COLUMN OPERATION." HE ASSERTED THAT BOTH GREECE AND TURKEY HAD THEIR ARMED FORCES DEPLOYED AS IF PREPARING FOR GREEK-TURKISH CONFLICT RATHER THAN ONE WITH THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES. HE CITED REPORTS THAT TURKEY IS SEEKING TO PURCHASE 292 MODERN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT WHILE GREECE IS PLANNING TO BUY "ONLY 100."

7. ON CYPRUS, PAPANDEOU SAID THAT WHILE GREECE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE ISLAND AND "WE ARE FOND OF CYPRUS," IT DID NOT RANK AS HIGH AS THE AEGEAN IN GREECE'S FOREIGN POLICY. "I HOPE THERE IS NO WORSENING OF THE SITUATION," HE SAID, ADDING THAT IF THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS DECLARED INDEPENDENCE AND "PARTITIONED THE ISLAND" IT WOULD BE A "VERY NEGATIVE DEVELOPMENT." "I THINK THE UNITED STATES IS STRONG ENOUGH TO PREVENT SUCH A DEVELOPMENT," HE SAID.

8. DURING THE BRIEF DISCUSSION ON POLAND, PAPANDEOU SAID HE CONDEMNS OPPRESSION IN POLAND. HOWEVER, HE IS CONVINCED THAT GENERAL JARUZELSKI IS NOT ACTING ON ORDERS OF MOSCOW. RATHER, THE PRIME MINISTER SAID, HIS ACTIONS ARE "THE ONLY THING" THAT PREVENT AN

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3896

INFO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 8730
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4813
AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI 4479
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 ATHENS 00998
ARMED RUSSIAN TAKE OVER OF THE COUNTRY. HE ALSO SAID
THERE IS A FIERCE POWER STRUGGLE IN WARSAW NOW AND IT
IS NOT CERTAIN THAT JARUZELSKI WILL EMERGE VICTOR.

9. PAPANDEOU THANKED CODEL FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO
EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH THEM AND SAID HE WELCOMED CONVERSA-
TIONS WITH AMERICAN POLITICAL LEADERS. HE ADDED THAT
HE HOPED SECRETARY SHULTZ WOULD VISIT GREECE IN THE NEAR
FUTURE. STEARNS

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 01042
ODIS
FROM U.S. SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR BARTHOLOMEW
OR EAGLEBURGER AND BURT
DEPARTMENT PASS DOD/OSD/ISP FOR PERLE
.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
AGS: MARR, MASS, GR, US
SUBJECT: DECA NEGOTIATIONS: KAPSI\$ REQUEST

~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

FIRST SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATING SESSION LAST NIGHT, LASTING SIX HOURS, WENT WELL. WE WENT THROUGH ISSUES IN US NON-PAPER, WITH KAPSI\$ RESPONDING TO OUR POSITIONS AND SETTING OUT CONCRETE GREEK POSITIONS. THERE IS A LOT LEFT TO DO, AND WE ARE STILL QUITE FAR APART ON KEY POINTS SUCH AS COMMAND AND CONTROL, BUT DISCUSSION ALLOWED SOME DIFFERENCES AND OPENED UP POSSIBLE LINES FOR ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE ON OTHERS. OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE WAS KAPSI\$' FLAT ASSERTION THAT NEW DECA WOULD AUTHORIZE US TO CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN AND CONDUCT THE FACILITIES AND ACTIVITIES THAT WE NOW DO UNDER EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS (INCLUDING ECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS FROM HELLENIKON), THOUGH THESE WOULD HAVE TO BE DESCRIBED IN THE NEW DECA, AS WE HAD AGREED TO DO. KAPSI\$ ALSO OPENED UP

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

RESPECT OF AVOIDING CUMBERSOME AND INTRUSIVE INTELLIGENCE ARRANGEMENTS THAT US HAD AGREED TO IN 1977 DRAFT DECA.

AT END OF SESSION, KAPSI\$ ASKED FOR ONE-ON-ONE AND ASKED ME TO TAKE DOWN AND CONVEY TO WASHINGTON FOLLOWING STATEMENT:
QUOTE:

IF WASHINGTON COULD AUTHORIZE YOU TO GIVE ME A DISCREET ASSURANCE THAT YOU WOULD AT SOME POINT BE PREPARED TO INCLUDE IN THE AGREEMENT A STATEMENT ABOUT THE "PRESERVATION OF THE BALANCE OF MILITARY STRENGTH" THEN MOST, IF NOT ALL, THE BRACKETS ON THE ISSUES DISCUSSED TONIGHT WOULD BE REMOVED AND YOUR POINTS ON INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS WOULD BE ACCEPTED, WITHIN HALF AN HOUR. I COULD ALSO

SIMPLY DROP SOME TROUBLESOME POINTS WHICH I DELIBERATELY AVOIDED AT TONIGHT'S NEGOTIATING SESSION. THE WAY COULD BE OPENED FOR A FULL AGREEMENT BY THE END OF NEXT WEEK. PLEASE GET AN ANSWER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
END QUOTE.

4. I REITERATED EARLIER POINTS ON DIFFICULTIES WITH DOING ANYTHING THAT WOULD DEFINE OR EXTEND EXISTING US LEGISLATION ON PRESERVATION OF BALANCE. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD AND AGREEMENT IN AGREEMENT COULD BE PUT IN TERMS OF LAW, E.G. "IN CONFORMITY WITH US LAW." I SAID THAT WERE WE EVEN TO CONSIDER SUCH A STATEMENT I WOULD PROBABLY IN CONNECTION WITH THE STATE AGAIN FOR THE RECORD THAT THE LAW DOES NOT MEAN 7:10 RATIO IN SECURITY ASSISTANCE OR ANY OTHER MECHANICAL DEFINITION OF BALANCE. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD AND WOULD ACCEPT THAT, AND NOTED HE HAD NOT MENTIONED 7:10, ENOUGH NO GREEK GOVERNMENT COULD TELL GREEK PEOPLE AND PARLIAMENT THAT IT HAD RELINQUISHED ITS REPEAT ITS INTERPRETATION OF "BALANCE" AS MEANING 7:10.

5. COMMENT: KAPSI\$ IS SURELY AWARE THAT US REPEAT US TABLED LANGUAGE IN ARTICLE V OF 1981 TREATY DECA, TO WIT: QUOTE: THE USG IN USING ITS BEST EFFORTS TO

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PROVIDE DEFENSE SUPPORT TO THE GOG SHIP. ALSO BE GUIDED BY THE PRINCIPLE SET FORTH IN US LAW THAT CALLS FOR PRESERVING THE BALANCE OF MILITARY STRENGTH IN THE REGION. END QUOTE. I CAN'T SAY WHY HE HAS NOT INSISTED ON BRINGING THE LANGUAGE FORWARD, OFFERED AS IT WAS TO A PREDATOR GOVERNMENT; PERHAPS HE HAS BEEN TOO PREOCCUPIED WITH THE BONANZA IN DEFENSE AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE THAT HE WAS LOOKING FOR DURING THE FIRST ROUND. IN ANY CASE, HE HAS HAD SEVERAL EARFULS FROM US ON HOW FAR OUT HIS WISH LIST IS AND ON MY UNWILLINGNESS TO GIVE HIM ANY FIGURES AT ALL AT THIS STAGE. HE MAY FINALLY REALIZE THAT LANGUAGE ON BALANCE IS ALL HE CAN GET NOW AND HOPE THAT IT WILL BE ADEQUATE TO DEAL WITH FY 84 FIGURES, I.E., IT WILL OFFER SOME EVIDENCE THAT USG IS NOT BACKING AWAY FROM "BALANCE" POLICY. WHILE US CONTINUED TO STATEMENT WHICH WE SUBMITTED TO WASHINGTON.

ATHENS 1042 0250 DTG: 211457Z JAN 83 PSN: 010074

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M412 *121561
BY KML NARA DATE 3/12/13

~~SECRET~~

15

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 ATHENS 1042 0250 DTG: 211457Z JAN 83 PSN: 010075
SIT584 DATE 01/24/83 TOR: 021/1551Z

NOT MEAN 7:10 AND THAT WE WOULD SO STATE PUBLICLY
IF QUERIED.

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

8. ANY GUIDANCE OR COUNSEL YOU HAVE TO GIVE ME
ON FOREGOING SHOULD REACH ME BEFORE MY NEXT
MEETING WITH KAPSIS JANUARY 24 AT 6:00 P.M.
STEARNS

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SIT
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTT LIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

ATHENS 1042 0250 DTG: 211457Z JAN 83 PSN: 010075

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHNT #1042/02 0211501
O 211457Z JAN 83
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3914

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 ATHENS 01042
NODIS

FROM U.S. SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR BARTHOLOMEW
(ATHENS 00966) INCLUDES LANGUAGE ON "BALANCE"
MUCH LIKE WHAT KAPSIS WANTS IN AN AGREEMENT,
GOG WILL CLEARLY WANT LANGUAGE IN BOTH PLACES.
US CONTINGENCY STATEMENT WILL HELP THEM RIDE
OUT IMMEDIATE STORM, BUT THEY WILL ALSO WANT
TO BE ABLE TO SAY THAT SIMILAR POINT ON BALANCE
WILL BE PART OF DECA.

6. PAPANDEOU GOVERNMENT (AND KAPSIS PERSONALLY)
IS DEEPLY WORRIED THAT FY 84 FIGURES WITH BIG
DISPARITY WITH TURKEY COMING IN MIDST OF DECA
NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE TAKEN HERE AS DELIBERATE
US DECISION TO BACK TURKEY AS OPPOSED TO GREECE,
AND SUBJECT THEM (AND KAPSIS PERSONALLY) TO
FIERCE ATTACK FROM ALL QUARTERS FOR INADEQUATELY
PROTECTING GREEK INTERESTS, PARTICULARLY IN DECA
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE US. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES,
THEY MAY FEEL THEY HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO MOVE
AGAINST THE NEGOTIATIONS AND/OR OUR OPERATIONS,
EVEN IF THEY PREFER NOT TO AND REALIZE SERIOUSNESS
OF SUCH ACTIONS FOR THEM AS WELL AS FOR US.

7. THERE MAY BE A GOOD DEAL FOR US HERE. IN
RETURN FOR A SENTENCE (APPROPRIATELY CAVEATED)

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WE ALREADY GAVE THE GREEKS IN 1981 AND WHICH
WE ARE PREPARED TO STATE PUBLICLY IN CONGRESSIONAL
DOCUMENTS AND PRESS STATEMENTS, WE ARE APPARENTLY
BEING OFFERED GREEK CONCESSIONS ON SUBSTANTIVE
ISSUES. BUT THE OFFER IS ALMOST TOO GOOD, AND
WE NEED TO PIN KAPSIS DOWN. I PROPOSE TO TELL
KAPSIS THAT WASHINGTON HAS AUTHORIZED ME TO EXPLORE
MATTER FURTHER. I WILL SAY I BELIEVE WASHINGTON
WOULD CONSIDER INCLUDING A SENTENCE IN AN AGREEMENT
(I.E., THE 1981 DRAFT DECA US SENTENCE IN PARA (5)
ABOVE) BUT FINAL DECISION WILL DEPEND ON WHAT
SPECIFICALLY HE (KAPSIS) MEANS BY "REMOVING GREEK
BRACKETS" ETC. ON OTHER ISSUES AND WE NEED TO NAIL
THIS DOWN BY DISCUSSING THE ISSUES. IN ANY EVENT,
WERE WASHINGTON FINALLY TO AGREE TO SENTENCE ON
BALANCE, IT WOULD BE ON UNDERSTANDING THAT WE DO

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

121562

16

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 ATHENS 1053 0250 DTG: 211557Z JAN 83 PSN: 010097
SITS83 DATE 01/24/83 TOR: 021/1607Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

ATHENS 1053 0250 DTG: 211557Z JAN 83 PSN: 010097

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SIT
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST LIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M412 #121562

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHTH #1053 0211557
O 211557Z JAN 83
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3922

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATHENS 01053

E.O. 12356: DECL: 1/21/91
TAGS: OREP, ASEC, GR
SUBJECT: CODEL ZABLOCKI VISIT TO ATHENS
REF: A. ATHENS 891, B. ATHENS 951

1. ENTIRE TEXT)

2. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT CHAIRMAN ZABLOCKI AND HIS COLLEAGUES MADE A SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO U.S.-GREEK RELATIONS DURING THEIR STAY HERE. THEY SAW VIRTUALLY ALL IMPORTANT MEMBERS OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION, AND HAD AMPLE OPPORTUNITY TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU, BOTH IN THE EP SESSIONS AND IN THEIR OWN SEPARATE MEETING WITH HIM AT KASTRI.

3. CHAIRMAN ZABLOCKI TRANSMITTED A CLEAR MESSAGE TO HIS GREEK INTERLOCUTORS WHICH EMPHASIZED TWO HOME TRUTHS-- THAT GREECE IS AN IMPORTANT ALLY OF THE U.S. WHOSE FRIENDSHIP WE TAKE SERIOUSLY, AND THAT U.S. FACILITIES IN GREECE SERVE GREECE'S SECURITY INTERESTS AS WELL AS THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES.

4. THE LATTER MESSAGE IS ONE THAT GREEKS FIND HARD TO ACCEPT. THE PAPANDREOU GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN ESPECIALLY RELUCTANT TO ADMIT THAT GREECE DERIVES IMPORTANT BENEFITS FROM U.S. FACILITIES. CHAIRMAN ZABLOCKI'S STATEMENTS CUT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CLOSE TO THE BONE AND THE OUTCRY FROM THE GREEK PRESS CONFIRMS THIS.

5. AFTER THE BREAST-BEATING HAS ENDED, WE THINK MANY GREEKS WILL ADMIT, AT LEAST TO THEMSELVES, THAT HIS REMARKS WERE MOTIVATED BY FRIENDSHIP FOR GREECE AND A DESIRE TO ENHANCE GREEK SECURITY.

6. REQUEST THIS CONFIDENTIAL ASSESSMENT BE PASSED TO CHAIRMAN ZABLOCKI. STEARNS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 ATHENS 1247 02744 DTG: 261339Z JAN 83 PSN: 016595
SIT025 DATE 02/20/83 TOR: 026/1519Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SIT SITTBEMP
EOB: NTS: CHECKLIST
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTLS. ADVISE AS TO FURTHER DISSEM. BERM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHTH #1247/01 0261341
O 261339Z JAN 83
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3976

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M412 # 121563

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 01247
NODIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MARR, MASS, GR, US
SUBJECT: DECA NEGOTIATIONS: GREEK REQUEST FOR
DECA LANGUAGE ON BALANCE
REF: (A) ATHENS 966; (B) ATHENS 1042;
(C) STATE 20668
FROM U. S. SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR BARTHOLOMEW FOR
EAGLEBURGER AND BURT

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I PRESENTED APPROVED CONTINGENCY STATEMENT (PARA 3 REF C) TO KAPSIS ON JANUARY 25 AND REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES DURING THE DISCUSSION THE ACCOMPANYING CLARIFICATIONS (PARA 6 REF C). OVER AND ABOVE CONSIDERABLE GROUSING ABOUT THE GUARDED NATURE OF THE LANGUAGE (A LACK OF SPECIFICITY AND A PERCEIVED LINKAGE OF THE IDEA OF BALANCE WITH BOTH THE LIFE EXPECTANCY OF U. S. LAW AND THE FULFILLMENT OF NATO RESPONSIBILITIES), KAPSIS' BASIC RESPONSE WAS (AS FORECAST IN REF B) THAT THE STATEMENT HAD TO BE AMENDED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT A U. S. COMMITMENT TO MAINTAIN THE BALANCE WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE DECA ITSELF IF STATEMENT WERE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TO HELP CONTAIN PUBLIC REACTION TO FY 1984 FIGURES WHICH MIGHT OTHERWISE OVERWHELM DECA NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAID MORE THAN ONCE THAT AN ESSENTIAL CONDITION FOR THE GOG IS A SUBSTANTIVE PROVISION ON BALANCE IN THE DECA, I. E., ONE THAT NEED NOT EXPAND ON U. S. LAW OR RELATE TO RATIOS, BUT ONE THAT WOULD SURVIVE ANY FUTURE CHANGE IN U. S. LAW. KAPSIS UNDERScoreD THIS LAST POINT BY PROPOSING A GOG PUBLIC STATEMENT THAT WOULD ANNOUNCE U. S. AGREEMENT TO MAINTAIN THE BALANCE. "AS IS ALSO REPEAT ALSO PROVIDED FOR-IN U. S. LAW," BOTH QUALITATIVELY AND QUANTITATIVELY.

3. I REJECTED OUTRIGHT THE NOTION OF MAKING ANY REFERENCE TO USG INTENTIONS OR OBLIGATIONS

~~SECRET~~

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 ATHENS 1247 02744 DTG: 261339Z JAN 83 PSN: 016595

INDEPENDENT OF U. S. LAW, WHETHER IN THE CONTINGENCY STATEMENT OR IN ANY DECA LANGUAGE. I ALSO TOLD KAPSIS THAT THE PHRASE "BOTH QUALITATIVELY AND QUANTITATIVELY" REPRESENTED IN EFFECT AN ATTEMPT TO DEFINE AND EXPAND U. S. LAW, AND I AGAIN FIRMLY RULED OUT SUCH A POSSIBILITY. I SAID THAT WASHINGTON IS EXAMINING THE QUESTION OF WHETHER TO INCLUDE ANYTHING ON BALANCE IN THE DECA BUT THAT, IF REPEAT IF WASHINGTON SHOULD DECIDE TO DO SO, ANY SUCH LANGUAGE WOULD SURELY BE RESTRICTED TO ADHERENCE TO PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN U. S. LAW.

4. KAPSIS CLOSED MEETING BY SAYING HE COULD NOT CONTINUE DISCUSSION OF DECA ISSUES WITHOUT FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS, WHICH HE WOULD SEEK.

5. COMMENT AND ACTION REQUESTED: WHEN WE MEET TONIGHT, I INTEND TO STAND FAST ON THE CONTINGENCY STATEMENT AS WRITTEN AND FIND OUT WHETHER KAPSIS HAS ANY NEW ANGLES OR INSTRUCTIONS TO PRESENT. TOMORROW NIGHT (THURSDAY, JANUARY 27), I WANT TO BE ABLE TO TELL HIM THAT WE CONTINUE TO CONSIDER THE CONTINGENCY STATEMENT ADEQUATE BUT THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO INCLUDE IN AN ACCEPTABLE DECA A PROVISION BASED CLOSELY ON THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF THAT STATEMENT, TO WIT:
"U. S. DEFENSE SUPPORT PROGRAMS WILL CONTINUE TO BE GUIDED BY PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN U. S. LAW

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WHICH INCLUDE ENABLING GREECE TO FULFILL ITS NATO RESPONSIBILITIES AND PRESERVING THE BALANCE OF MILITARY STRENGTH IN THE REGION."

6. IN MAKING THIS OFFER (SIMILAR TO OFFER U. S. MADE IN 1981 NEGOTIATIONS), I WOULD ONCE AGAIN REPEAT WHAT I'VE ALREADY TOLD KAPSIS ABOUT SPECIFIC RATIOS, MECHANISTIC FORMULAS OF ANY KIND, AND DEFINITION OR EXPANSION OF U. S. LAW. IF KAPSIS TAKES THE POSITION THAT A GREEK REPEAT GREEK PUBLIC STATEMENT MADE IN RESPONSE TO RELEASE OF FY 1984 FIGURES MUST SAY THAT THE U. S. HAS AGREED TO INCLUDE A PROVISION ON BALANCE IN THE DECA, I WOULD CAUTION HIM CONCERNING THE NECESSARY CAVEATS (RATIOS, ET AL) AND SAY THAT, IF ASKED, WE WOULD CONFIRM THE STATEMENT AND OURSELVES REITERATE THE CAVEATS, INCLUDING THE CONDITION OF AN OTHERWISE ACCEPTABLE DECA.

7. REQUEST WASHINGTON AUTHORIZATION TO PROCEED AS DESCRIBED IN TIME FOR JANUARY 27 MEETING. PRESS HERE REPORTS TODAY THAT BUDGET GOES TO

ATHENS 1247

02744

DTG: 261339Z JAN 83 PSN: 016595

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 ATHENS 1247 02744 DTG: 261339Z JAN 83 PSN: 016596
SIT024 DATE 02/20/83 TOR: 026/1519Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SIT SITTBEMP
EOB: NTS: CHECKLIST
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTLS. ADVISE AS TO FURTHER DISSEM. BERM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHTH #1247/02 0261343
O 261339Z JAN 83
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3977

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 ATHENS 01247
NODIS
CONGRESS MONDAY. STEARNS

121564 1

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 45231 DTG: 271520Z JAN 83 PSN: 018378
SIT738 DATE 02/20/83 TOR: 027/1656Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF JP WHLR VP SIT EOBT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: NODISLISTD IN SHULTZ REPORT---FURTHER DISSEM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #4523 0271548
O 271520Z JAN 83 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 6826

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M412 # 121564
BY KNL NARA DATE 3/18/13

~~SECRET~~ STATE 024523
NODIS
FOR SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR BARTHOLOMEW
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MARR, MASS, GR, US
SUBJ: DECA NEGOTIATIONS: GREEK REQUEST FOR DECA
REF: (A) ATHENS 1247, (B) STATE 20668

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. YOU WERE RIGHT ON THE MARK IN INFORMING KAPSIS THAT WE CANNOT MAKE ANY COMMITMENT ON THE BALANCE WHICH WOULD GO BEYOND OBSERVANCE OF U. S. LAW (PARA 3 REF A). ALSO WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO AGREE TO A PUBLIC COMMITMENT BY THE U. S. NOW TO INCLUDE ANY BALANCE LANGUAGE IN THE DECA SINCE, SO FAR, WE HAVE ONLY VAGUE GREEK ASSURANCES THAT WE WILL RECEIVE SATISFACTION ON OTHER MAJOR ISSUES.
3. AS YOU ARE AWARE, WE HAVE AGREED, IN THE CONTEXT OF AN ACCEPTABLE DECA, TO SEEK INCREASED SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND TO WORK WITH THE GREEKS TO DEVELOP A PROGRAM PROFILE FOR FUTURE DEFENSE SUPPORT. WE HAVE
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):
ALSO AGREED TO A PUBLIC STATEMENT WHICH STATES OUR INTENTION ON SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND REFERS TO OUR OBLIGATION UNDER U. S. LAW TO PRESERVE THE BALANCE OF MILITARY STRENGTH IN THE REGION.
4. IN OUR VIEW, USG EFFORTS AS DESCRIBED PARA 3 ABOVE, AND THE COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED IF YOU DECIDE TO USE IT, SHOULD ENABLE THE GOG TO MEET ANTICIPATED CRITICISM STEMMING FROM PUBLICATION OF THE FY 1984 FIGURES.
5. YOU SHOULD TELL KAPSIS THAT HIS CONCERNS HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY CONSIDERED IN WASHINGTON. IN RESPONSE, YOU HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO REVIEW WITH HIM THE

~~SECRET~~

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 45231 DTG: 271520Z JAN 83 PSN: 018378

CONSIDERABLE EFFORT USG HAS MADE TO HELP GOG MEET
POSSIBLE DOMESTIC CRITICISM OF FY 1984 FIGURES AND TO
INFORM HIM THAT USG IS NOT PREPARED AT THIS TIME TO
AGREE TO INCLUSION OF LANGUAGE ON BALANCE IN THE DECA.

SHULTZ

SECSTATE WASHDC 45231 DTG: 271520Z JAN 83 PSN: 018378

SECRET

PAGE 1 - 669

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/16/83/1047

SITUATION: CHECK
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE768
 STU0792
 PP RUEHC
 DE RUFHGV #0971 0351930
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH
 P 041928Z FEB 83
 FM USMISSION GENEVA
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7316
 INFO RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 1110
 RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 5511
 RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 7252
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7068
 RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 8993
 BT

~~SECRET~~ GENEVA 00971

EXDIS

FOR ACDA/ACTING DIRECTOR GEORGE

USSTART

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, START

SUBJECT: (U) AMBASSADOR ROWNY'S CONVERSATION WITH
 - FRG FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER, FEBRUARY 3, 1983

1. THIS IS START III-007. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT.
2. ON FEBRUARY 3 AMBASSADOR ROWNY MET WITH FRG FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER, AT THE LATTER'S INVITATION, AFTER GENSCHER'S ADDRESS TO THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT. ALSO PRESENT WERE FRG DISARMAMENT COMMISSIONER RUTH AND CD AMBASSADOR WEGENER. THE CONVERSATION COVERED START, THE START/INF RELATIONSHIP, AND START CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES (CBMS).
3. START/INF: GENSCHER PREDICTED THAT BY MAY THE SOVIETS WILL HAVE BEGUN A NEW POLITICAL-STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AIMED AT START, FOR THE PURPOSE OF GAINING US AGREEMENT TO INCLUDE UK/FRENCH STRATEGIC SYSTEMS IN INF. THE SOVIETS WOULD BE OPERATING ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ACHIEVING A START AGREEMENT WAS MORE IMPORTANT TO THE US THAN AN INF AGREEMENT, AND THAT INCLUSION OF UK/FRENCH FORCES IN INF WOULD BE MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE US THAN THE ALTERNATIVE OF INSERTING THEM INTO START. AS EVIDENCE, GENSCHER CITED HIS CONVERSATION WITH SOVIET INF REPRESENTATIVE KVITSINSKY, WHO CLAIMED THAT THE USSR'S AGREEMENT IN VLADIVOSTOK NOT TO COUNT UK/FRENCH SYSTEMS UNDER SALT WAS BASED ON THE IMPLICIT CONDITION THAT THEY BE COUNTED ELSEWHERE. "THAT ELSEWHERE," SAID

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NLRR M412 #121565

BY KHL NARA DATE 3/18/13

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

GENSCHER, "MIGHT TURN OUT TO BE INF." HE URGED THAT THE US NOT SUCCUMB TO TEMPTATIONS TO DECOUPLE THE NEGOTIATIONS.

4. ROWNY ASSURED GENSCHEER THAT THE US REMAINED COMMITTED TO NEGOTIATING INF WITHIN THE START FRAMEWORK. THE START AND INF DELEGATIONS COORDINATE CLOSELY, AND SHARE A SINGLE BACKSTOPPING APPARATUS. ROWNY SAID THAT THE RECORDS OF VLADIVOSTOK WERE NOT CLEAR, BUT THAT HE HAD HEARD FROM FORMER PRESIDENT FORD THAT NO DEALS OR CONCESSIONS WERE MADE THERE ON UK/FRENCH SYSTEMS. ARGUMENTS THAT SUCH SYSTEMS SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN START MIGHT HAVE PROPAGANDA VALUE BUT WERE DISINGENUOUS, SINCE THESE FORCES (162 WEAPONS) ARE OF TOKEN SIZE COMPARED TO THE SOVIET FORCES WHICH COULD BE APPLIED AGAINST UK AND FRENCH (10,000).

5. GENSCHEER ASKED IF THE SOVIETS HAD SOUGHT TO TRADE CONCESSIONS IN ONE NEGOTIATION FOR CONCESSIONS IN THE OTHER. ROWNY SAID THEY HAD NOT BUT DID NOT RULE OUT THIS POSSIBILITY. HE SAID THAT SOVIETS MIGHT, AT SOME FUTURE DATE, PROPOSE MERGING THE TWO NEGOTIATIONS.

6. START ROUND THREE: ROWNY SAID THAT DURING THE FIRST MEETING (FEBRUARY 2) KARPOV HAD BEEN AMIABLE AND CORDIAL AND HAD APPLIED THE "CARROT." AT THE PLENARY EARLIER THAT DAY (FEBRUARY 3) THE SOVIETS HAD HELD TO THEIR HARD LINE POSITION OF PREVIOUS ROUNDS. NEVERTHELESS, THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT BEEN POLEMICAL. THE PREVIOUS NEGOTIATING HISTORY HAS IDENTIFIED THE AREAS WHERE DISAGREEMENT EXISTS. CONCENTRATING ON THOSE AREAS FROM THE OUTSET HAS ALLOWED THE START TALKS TO PROCEED MORE RAPIDLY THAN MIGHT OTHERWISE BE THE CASE.

7. CBMS: RUTH ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY CHANCE FOR A SEPARATE AGREEMENT ON START CBMS. ROWNY SAID THAT HE WAS AUTHORIZED TO SEEK ONE, BUT IT WOULD BE TACTICALLY UNWISE TO SEEM TOO ANXIOUS, LEST THE US BE SEEN AS DEMANDEUR. THE US IN ANY CASE WOULD NEGOTIATE CBMS ON THEIR OWN MERITS, AND WAS NOT PREPARED TO MAKE CONCESSIONS IN START TO OBTAIN A CBM AGREEMENT. AMBASSADOR WEGENER ASKED WHETHER THERE WOULD BE ANY "INTERPLAY" BETWEEN THE US START CBMS AND MEASURES UNDER CONSIDERATION IN OTHER MULTILATERAL FORA. HE NOTED THAT CBMS PLAY WELL BEFORE THIRD WORLD AUDIENCES. HE IMPLIED THAT THE FRG IS HOPING US PROPOSALS CAN BE PORTRAYED AS PART OF A BROAD WESTERN INITIATIVE IN CONFIDENCE BUILDING.

ROWNY
BT

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

#0971
NNNN

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 ATHENS 1830 35464 DTG: 042033Z FEB 83 PSN: 031523
SIT996 DATE 02/20/83 TOR: 035/2037Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SITTBEMP
EOB: NTS: CHECKLIST
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTLS. ADVISE AS TO FURTHER DISSEM. BERM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHTH #1830 0352035
O 042033Z FEB 83 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRM412 # 121566

BY KML NARA DATE 3/8/13

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4205
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE
BT

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 01830
NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MARR, MASS, US, GR, TV
SUBJECT: LETTER FROM PM PAPANDEOU TO THE PRESIDENT

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.
2. FOLLOWING IS APPROXIMATE TEXT OF A LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER PAPANDEOU TO THE PRESIDENT WHICH IS BEING CABLED BY FOREIGN MINISTRY TO GREEK AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON FOR DELIVERY TO THE WHITE HOUSE. TEXT BELOW IS AS WAS READ INFORMALLY BY GREEK SIDE TO THE U. S. SIDE DURING DECA NEGOTIATING SESSION EVENING OF FEBRUARY 4. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KAPSIS HAS REQUESTED THAT CONTENTS OF LETTER BE CLOSELY HELD SO AS NOT TO PREEMPT OFFICIAL COMMUNICATION BY GREEK AMBASSADOR. THE FACT THAT A LETTER IS BEING SENT HAS ALREADY BEEN PUBLICLY REVEALED BY GOG. THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION OF THE CONTENTS OF THE LETTER.
3. BEGIN TEXT.
--MR. PRESIDENT:
THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSALS TO CONGRESS CONCERNING FY 1984 MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS CREATED GRAVE CONCERNS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FOR THE GREEK PEOPLE. I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THAT THE CONCERNS OF MY GOVERNMENT ARE AGGRAVATED BECAUSE THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSALS DEPART FROM THE LONG-STANDING PRACTICE UNDER THE 1978 AMENDMENT TO THE 1961 LAW CONCERNING PRESERVING THE BALANCE OF MILITARY STRENGTH IN THE AEGEAN REGION. AT THE SAME TIME, THESE PROPOSALS DIRECTLY ASSOCIATE THE LEVEL OF ASSISTANCE WITH THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A NEW DEFENSE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION AGREEMENT. ONE OF THE BASIC CONDITIONS THAT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT HAS PUT FORWARD FOR AN AGREEMENT IS THAT THE BALANCE OF MILITARY FORCES IN THE REGION SHALL BE PRESERVED BOTH QUANTITATIVELY AND QUALITATIVELY. A DIRECT RESULT OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROPOSALS FOR FY 1984 ASSISTANCE FOR TURKEY IS THAT, AS FAR AS THE GREEK GOVERNMENT IS CONCERNED, THESE PROPOSALS SHOULD ALSO DETERMINE

~~SECRET~~

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 ATHENS 1830 35464 DTG: 042033Z FEB 83 PSN: 031523

THE LEVEL OF THE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR GREECE FOR THE CORRESPONDING PERIOD. THE GOVERNMENT OF GREECE CANNOT IGNORE THAT, UNLESS THE BALANCE OF MILITARY FORCES IN THE REGION IS MAINTAINED, THE ALREADY FRAGILE BALANCE WILL BE UPSET WITH UNPREDICTABLE CONSEQUENCES. AS YOU WELL UNDERSTAND, THIS CREATES A CLIMATE NOT HELPFUL TO NEGOTIATIONS FOR CONCLUSION OF A NEW DEFENSE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION AGREEMENT AND MAY HAVE A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. LET ME EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WILL APPRECIATE THE CRUCIAL CHARACTER OF THE ISSUE BEFORE OUR TWO COUNTRIES. --SINCERELY, ANDREAS G. PAPANDEOU
END TEXT. STEARNS

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/10/83//222

SITUATION: PRES MSGS
SUBJECT CATEGORY: IN

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:
MESSAGE:

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M412 #121567

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

CE130

OO RUEHC RUEHTh RUEHRO RUEHAK RUEHUL

DE RUEHC #4467 0361930

ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK

O O 051907Z FEB 83 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO RUEHTh/AMEMBASSY ATHENS NIACT IMMEDIATE 7022

INFO RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 3235

RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 9195

RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 3728

BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 034467

EXDIS, ROME FOR ASST. SEC BURT, SEOUL FOR UNDERSEC. SCHNEIDE

E.O. 12356:DECL:OADR

TAGS: OPDC, MARR, MASS, GR, TU

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU

1. (~~SECRET~~-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. GREEK AMBASSADOR KARANDREAS FEBRUARY 4 HANDED THE ACTING SECRETARY A LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU TO PRESIDENT REAGAN.

3. AFTER READING THE LETTER, THE ACTING SECRETARY SAID WE UNDERSTOOD THE CRUCIAL CHARACTER OF THE ISSUE FOR GREECE AND RECALLED THAT WE HAD TOLD THE GOG THAT, IN THE CONTEXT OF AN ACCEPTABLE BASE AGREEMENT, WE WOULD RETURN TO CONGRESS FOR INCREASED FUNDING.

4. KARANDREAS ASKED IF THE LETTER COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE PRESS THE NEXT DAY FOR USE IN SUNDAY EDITIONS. MR. DAM SAID HE WOULD ASK THE WHITE HOUSE AND RESPOND PROMPTLY. HE NOTED THAT IF THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER IS MADE PUBLIC THEN THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY MIGHT ALSO HAVE TO BE MADE PUBLIC, AND WE WOULD GET INTO AN UNHELPFUL PUBLIC EXCHANGE. (LETTER WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RELEASED BY GREEKS BEFORE RECEIVING US RESPONSE).

5. ALSO PRESENT WERE ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY BLACKWILL, PM DEPUTY DIRECTOR RAPHEL, EUR/SE DIRECTOR GLEYSTEN, AND GREEK DESK OFFICER THOMPSON.

6. TEXT OF LETTER AS DELIVERED HERE BEING TRANSMITTED SEPTEL.

SENSITIVE

28

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 538

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/10/83//222

SITUATION: PRES MSGS
SUBJECT CATEGORY: IN

MES AGE / ANNOTATION:

7. FOR ATHENS:

WE THINK THIS LETTER REPRESENTS AN EFFORT BY PAPANDEOU
-- RESPONDING TO PUBLICATION IN GREECE OF THE AID LEVELS
-- TO WARD OFF DOMESTIC CALLS FOR PRECIPITOUS ACTION
SUCH AS BREAKING OFF THE TALKS OR CLOSING SOME US FACIL-
ITIES. THE TONE OF THE LETTER, PLUS THE RELATIVELY
RESTRAINED COMMENTS TO THE PRESS BY PAPANDEOU FEBRUARY
4 WHEN HE ANNOUNCED HE WAS SENDING A LETTER TO THE
PRESIDENT, SEEM TO INDICATE HE IS INTERESTED IN CONTIN-
UING THE BASE TALKS AND IN WORKING SERIOUSLY FOR AGREE-
MENT. WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN YOUR ANALYSIS OF THE
LETTER AND YOUR SUGGESTIONS AS TO OUR PUBLIC RESPONSE
AS WELL AS THE FORMAL REPLY TO IT. DAM

BT

#4467

NNNN

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

DECLASSIFIED

MESSAGE:

EHA116
OO RUEADWW
DE RUEHTH #2233/01 0421500
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 111455Z FEB 83
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4337
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 1319
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2634
RUQMQ6/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 8811
RUEHTH/AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI 4522
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 1319
RUDORRA/USNMR SHAPE BE
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RHFRAAB/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUFRRSHH/USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT
RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC

NLRR M412 #121568
BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 02233

EXDIS

MILITARY ADDEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC - MC FARLANE AND FORTIER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, MARR, MASS, GR, US

SUBJECT: KARAMANLIS DISCUSSES DECA, AEGEAN BALANCE AND
- PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE

REF: ATHENS 1980

1. (2 - ENTIRE TEXT)

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN A PRIVATE CONVERSATION, PRESIDENT KARAMANLIS EXPRESSED HOPE TO AMBASSADOR THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S REPLY TO PAPANDREOU WOULD REAFFIRM U.S. SUPPORT FOR AEGEAN BALANCE. KARAMANLIS BELIEVES DECA NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD, TO EXTENT FEASIBLE, BE SPEEDED UP SO OPPONENTS OF DECA ARE NOT GIVEN ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITY TO DERAIL NEGOTIATING PROCESS. END SUMMARY

3. AT A SMALL DINNER PARTY LAST NIGHT (FEBRUARY 10) HOSTED BY FORMER PRESIDENT TSATSOS, I HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE DECA NEGOTIATIONS AND RELATED MATTERS WITH PRESIDENT KARAMANLIS. SINCE THE DINNER PARTY WAS ORGANIZED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO PERMIT KARAMANLIS AND ME

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

TO TALK PRIVATELY BEFORE DINNER, I AM LED TO BELIEVE THE OCCASION HAD BEEN ARRANGED PRINCIPALLY WITH THIS IN MIND.

4. IN OUR CONVERSATION BEFORE DINNER, I TOLD KARAMANLIS THAT PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD OBVIOUSLY BEEN DRAFTED WITH EXTREME CARE. ASSUMING THE PRESIDENT'S RESPONSE WOULD ALSO BE MADE PUBLIC, I ASKED KARAMANLIS WHAT POINTS IN THE REPLY HE AND OTHER GREEK FRIENDS OF THE UNITED STATES WOULD ESPECIALLY BE LOOKING FOR.

5. KARAMANLIS SAID IMMEDIATELY THAT EVERY GREEK WOULD LOOK FOR THE PRESIDENT TO REAFFIRM THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT'S INTENTION TO MAINTAIN BALANCE IN THE AEGEAN. "THE INCREASED AID YOU HAVE JUST ANNOUNCED FOR TURKEY MAKES US THINK YOU ARE NO LONGER INTERESTED IN BALANCE," SAID KARAMANLIS. "I HOPE THE PRESIDENT WILL REASSURE US THAT THIS IS NOT THE CASE."

6. I TOLD KARAMANLIS THAT, AS HE KNEW, WE HAD ALREADY STATED PUBLICLY THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE SEEKING INCREASED LEVELS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR GREECE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DECA NEGOTIATIONS. WE DID NOT, HOWEVER, BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS ANYTHING SACRED ABOUT A 7 TO 10 RATIO. NOR DID WE BELIEVE, FRANKLY, THAT GREECE FACED A THREAT OF TURKISH ATTACK.

7. KARAMANLIS RESPONDED IN WORDS ALMOST EXACTLY LIKE THOSE PAPANDREOU HAS USED ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS. HE SAID, "YOU MAY NOT BELIEVE THAT WE FACE THE DANGER OF TURKISH ATTACK. YOU MAY NOT EVEN BELIEVE THAT WE FACE THE DANGER OF EXPANDING TURKISH INFLUENCE AT OUR EXPENSE IN THE AEGEAN. ALL GREEKS DO BELIEVE THESE THINGS, HOWEVER, AND BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THEM, YOU MUST TAKE THEM INTO ACCOUNT."

8. THIS LED PRESIDENT KARAMANLIS TO RECALL WHAT HE HAD SAID TO ME BEFORE, NAMELY, THAT THERE WERE NO BILATERAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GREECE AND THE UNITED STATES. WHENEVER OUR RELATIONSHIP BECAME TROUBLED, THE CAUSE WAS THE TURKISH FACTOR. I COMMENTED WE WOULD BE MORE THAN HAPPY TO ASSIST GREECE AND TURKEY TO IMPROVE THEIR RELATIONS BUT THE PAPANDREOU GOVERNMENT WAS NOT INTERESTED IN CONDUCTING DISCUSSIONS WITH THE TURKS. KARAMANLIS REPLIED THAT THE PAPANDREOU GOVERNMENT HAD MADE CLEAR IT WOULD CONDUCT DISCUSSIONS WHEN THE CLIMATE WAS RIGHT.

BT

#2233

NNNN

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

EHA117
OO RUEADWW
DE RUEHTH #2233/02 042150Z
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 111455Z FEB 83
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4338
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 1320
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2635
RUQMGG/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 8812
RUEHTH/AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI 4523
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 1320
RUDORRA/USNMR SHAPE BE
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RHFRAAB/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUFRRSHH/USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT
RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 ATHENS 02233

EXDIS

MILITARY ADDEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC - MC FARLANE AND FORTIER
9. REVERTING TO THE SUBJECT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S REPLY
TO PAPANDEU, PRESIDENT KARAMANLIS SAID THAT BASICALLY
WHAT THE GREEKS WOULD LOOK FOR WAS AN INDICATION THAT
THE UNITED STATES CONTINUED TO TAKE GREECE AND GREEK
CONCERNS SERIOUSLY. GREECE WAS NOT COMING TO US HAT IN
HAND BEGGING FOR INCREASED ASSISTANCE BECAUSE IT COULD
NOT PAY ITS OWN BILLS. THE INITIATIVE WE HAD TAKEN TO
DOUBLE OUR ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY COULD NOT BE IGNORED;
IT RISKED UPSETTING THE AEGEAN BALANCE AND THEREFORE
THREATENED VITAL GREEK INTERESTS. IF THE U.S. HAD NOT
DECIDED TO INCREASE ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY, SAID KARAMANLIS,
GREECE WOULD NOT SEEK ANY INCREASE.
10. LATER AT DINNER, KARAMANLIS ASKED ME WHETHER THERE
WAS A FIRM CUT-OFF DATE AFTER WHICH IT WOULD NOT BE
POSSIBLE TO SEEK ADDITIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR
GREECE. I REPLIED THERE WAS SOME ELASTICITY IN THE
AUTHORIZATION AND APPROPRIATION PROCESS, BUT THAT KEY
COMMITTEES USUALLY BEGAN THEIR HEARINGS IN THE SPRING.

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 174

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/16/83//047

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

KARAMANLIS SAID, QUITE ASIDE FROM THE CONGRESSIONAL TIME-
TABLE, HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO MOVE THE
DECA NEGOTIATIONS ALONG AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE.
DELAYS WOULD ONLY GIVE OPPONENTS OF THE DECA THE
OPPORTUNITY TO ORGANIZE THEMSELVES AND INTRODUCE NEW
OBJECTIONS. I SAID WE WERE JUST AS ANXIOUS AS THE
GREEKS TO SETTLE OUTSTANDING ISSUES PROMPTLY. STEARNS
BT
#2233
NNNN

SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~

121569

33

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 ATHENS 2518 36901 DTG: 171633Z FEB 83 PSN: 050568
SIT931 DATE 03/06/83 TOR: 048/1653Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLSKEMPLR JP VP EOB SITTBLAR NORT
EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: -----CHECKLIST-----FOR ACTION.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHNT #2518 0481633
O 171633Z FEB 83 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4427

INFO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
BT

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 02518

EXDIS
WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC-MC FARLANE AND FORTIER
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, HARR, MASS, GR, US
SUBJECT: MOLYVIATIS SPELLS OUT CONCERNS OF KARAMANLIS ON
- PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE AND DECA
REF: ATHENS 02233

1. ~~ENTIRE~~ TEXT)

2. AT HIS INITIATIVE, I HAD LUNCH TODAY WITH PETROS MOLYVIATIS, DIPLOMATIC ADVISER TO PRESIDENT KARAMANLIS. MOLYVIATIS TOLD ME HE WAS MEETING ME ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM KARAMANLIS WHO BELIEVED OUR CONVERSATION AT DINNER LAST WEEK (REFTEL) HAD BEEN INHIBITED BY PRESENCE OF OTHER GUESTS. APPARENTLY KARAMANLIS HAD NOT FELT FREE TO TALK ABOUT DECA NEGOTIATIONS AND HAD ASKED MOLYVIATIS TO FOLLOW UP.

3. I SAID THAT AT THIS POINT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO SAY WHETHER AGREEMENT COULD BE ACHIEVED. GREEK GOVERNMENT WAS INSISTING THAT WE INDICATE WHAT LEVEL OF SECURITY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ASSISTANCE WE WERE PREPARED TO SEEK ABOVE DOLS 280 MILLION WITHOUT GIVING US TANGIBLE AND RELIABLE ASSURANCES ON KEY ELEMENTS IN DECA. THERE WAS SIMPLY NO WAY IN WHICH WE COULD ACCEPT HINTS AND ALLUSIONS AS ADEQUATE ASSURANCES THAT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WAS PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE WITH US AN AGREEMENT THAT MET OUR OPERATIONAL NEEDS AND LEGAL REQUIREMENTS. THIS WOULD BE TRUE OF ANY GOVERNMENT BUT WAS PARTICULARLY SO OF ONE WHICH SPOKE PUBLICLY OF BEING "NONALIGNED" AND OF NEGOTIATING THE "TERMINATION" OF U.S. FACILITIES IN GREECE.

4. MOLYVIATIS ASKED WHAT IT WOULD TAKE TO MOVE THE DECA ALONG WHEN SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR BARTHOLOMEW RETURNED AT THE END OF FEBRUARY. I SAID IT WOULD TAKE A MORE FORTHCOMING GREEK ATTITUDE AND, ESPECIALLY, WILLINGNESS ON THE PART

OF THE GREEK SIDE TO COMMIT ITSELF TO SPECIFIC UNDERSTANDINGS ON KEY POINTS UNDER DISCUSSION BETWEEN KAPSIS AND BARTHOLOMEW.

5. MOLYVIATIS SAID HE EXPECTED TO BE SEEING PAPANDEOU TOMORROW EVENING (FEBRUARY 18) AFTER THE PRIME MINISTER'S RETURN FROM HIS OFFICIAL VISIT TO AUSTRIA. HE SAID HE WOULD MAKE THIS POINT TO PAPANDEOU BECAUSE KARAMANLIS BELIEVED STRONGLY THAT PACE OF DECA NEGOTIATIONS HAD TO BE ACCELERATED. KARAMANLIS FURTHER BELIEVED, HE SAID, THAT THERE WAS MORE RIDING ON DECA NEGOTIATIONS THAN CONTINUED OPERATION OF U.S. MILITARY FACILITIES IN GREECE. IF NEGOTIATIONS BROKE DOWN, KARAMANLIS FEARED THAT GREECE'S WHOLE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO, AS WELL AS WITH THE UNITED STATES, WOULD BEGIN TO UNRAVEL AND THAT HE WOULD BE POWERLESS TO REVERSE THIS PROCESS. THE COMING PHASE OF THE KAPSIS-BARTHOLOMEW DISCUSSIONS MIGHT THEREFORE BE A CRUCIAL CROSSROADS IN GREEK FOREIGN POLICY. IT WAS VITAL FOR GREECE THAT THE PAPANDEOU GOVERNMENT, DURING THIS ROUND OF TALKS, COMMIT ITSELF TO MAIN ELEMENTS OF DECA AND THEREFORE TO BASIC PRO-U.S., PRO-NATO ORIENTATION.

6. IN THIS CONNECTION, MOLYVIATIS SAID PRESIDENT REAGAN'S REPLY TO PAPANDEOU WOULD HAVE AN IMPORTANT EFFECT ON ATTITUDE OF GREEK PUBLIC AS WELL AS GREEK GOVERNMENT. ANNOUNCEMENT OF TURKISH AID FIGURES HAD CREATED ANTI-U.S. PRESSURES WHICH EVEN A CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

HAVE BEEN ABLE TO IGNORE. AEGEAN BALANCE WAS THE GUT ISSUE FOR ALL GREEKS-- OUR FRIENDS AS MUCH AS OUR ENEMIES. AS KARAMANLIS HAD TOLD ME LAST WEEK, EVERY GREEK WANTED THE PRESIDENT TO REAFFIRM THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT'S INTENTION TO MAINTAIN BALANCE IN AEGEAN. STEARNS

ATHENS 2518 36901 DTG: 171633Z FEB 83 PSN: 050560

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M412 # 121569

BY KAL NARA DATE 3/18/13

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

121570 34

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 ATHENS 2553 44901 DTG: 181001Z FEB 82 PSN: 051831
SIT912 DATE 03/06/83 TOR: 049/1001Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS EOBWHLR JP VP EOB SITBLAR NORT
EOB:

WNSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTCHECKLIST-----ER DISSEM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHTR #2553 0491001
O 181001Z FEB 82
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4431

INFO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
BT

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 02553

EXDIS
WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC - MC FARLANE AND FORTIER
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, MARR, MASS, GR, US
SUBJECT: TIMING OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S REPLY TO
- PAPANDEOU
REF: A. ATHENS 2518, B. ATHENS 2233, C. ATHENS 1981

1. ~~18~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. ON ASSUMPTION THAT TEXT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S REPLY TO PAPANDEOU IS NOW RECEIVING FINAL REVIEW, I WANT TO BRING TO YOUR ATTENTION FACTORS THAT AFFECT HOW WE MAY CHOOSE TO HANDLE DELIVERY AND RELEASE.
3. PRIME MINISTER PAPANDEOU IS SCHEDULED TO RETURN FROM STATE VISIT TO AUSTRIA EARLY FRIDAY AFTERNOON (FEBRUARY 18). ON SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 20, HE WILL BE IN IOANNINA IN WESTERN GREECE. HE RETURNS ON MONDAY, FEBRUARY 21, IN TIME TO GREET SOVIET PREMIER TIKHONOV, WHO IS ARRIVING ABOUT NOON. THIS MEANS HE WILL PROBABLY BE AVAILABLE ONLY FRIDAY AFTERNOON AND SATURDAY TO RECEIVE PRESIDENT'S

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

MESSAGE BEFORE TIKHONOV'S ARRIVAL.

4. I THINK IT IS HIGHLY DESIRABLE TO DELIVER THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE AND TO RELEASE TEXT BEFORE THE VISIT OF SOVIET PREMIER. THIS WILL ASSURE THAT MESSAGE IS READ ATTENTIVELY AND OBJECTIVELY BOTH BY PAPANDEOU AND -- EQUALLY IMPORTANT -- GREEK PUBLIC. IF DELIVERED AND RELEASED IN AFTERMATH OF TIKHONOV'S VISIT, PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE WILL INEVITABLY BE TREATED AS SOME KIND OF "RESPONSE" TO SOVIET INITIATIVES IN GREECE. THIS IS EXACTLY THE KIND OF IMPRESSION WE WISH TO AVOID. WHILE THERE WILL BE SOME TENDENCY EVEN NOW TO LOOK FOR A SOVIET ANGLE IN THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE, THE BYZANTINE THEOLOGISTS IN THE GREEK PRESS WILL BE LESS SUCCESSFUL IN THIS EFFORT NOW THAN THEY ARE LIKELY TO BE LATER.

5. ALTHOUGH, OTHER THINGS BEING EQUAL, IT WILL PROBABLY BE DESIRABLE FOR ME TO DELIVER PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MESSAGE PERSONALLY TO PAPANDEOU, THE MOST IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE TO GET THE TEXT OF THE LETTER INTO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN IN TIME FOR THE SUNDAY GREEK PAPERS. THIS MEANS EFFECTIVELY BEFORE 1800 HOURS (ATHENS TIME) SATURDAY AFTERNOON, FEBRUARY 19. IF IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR ME TO DELIVER THE LETTER PERSONALLY ON SATURDAY MORNING, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD HAVE THE LETTER DELIVERED TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S HOUSE OR OFFICE AS EARLY SATURDAY AFTERNOON AS POSSIBLE AND THEN UNILATERALLY RELEASE THE TEXT SIMULTANEOUSLY HERE AND IN WASHINGTON. THE GREEKS COULD NOT COMPLAIN ABOUT THIS PROCEDURE SINCE IT IS THE SAME ONE THEY ADOPTED WITH PAPANDEOU'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT.

6. PLEASE ADVISE. STEARNS

ATHENS 2553 44901 DTG: 181001Z FEB 82 PSN: 051831

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M412 # 121570

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 ATHENS 2607 85961 DTG: 191817Z FEB 83 PSN: 053988
SIT875 DATE 03/06/83 TOR: 050/2101Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS EOB HLR JP VP SIT EOB SIGR NORT
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTTCKLISTINED WITH VALLETTA 0424

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHTH #2607 0501819
O 191817Z FEB 83 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4450

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2667
BT

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M412 # 121571
BY KM NARA DATE 3/18/13

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 02607
EXDIS
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MARR, MASS, GR, US, TU
SUBJECT: PAPANDEOU'S INITIAL REACTION
- TO PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE
REF: ATHENS 2605

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. IN TELEPHONE CONVERSATION THIS EVENING, FEB. 19, PRIME MINISTER PAPANDEOU TOLD ME THAT HE FOUND PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MESSAGE "SERIOUS AND POSITIVE". HE DID NOT INTEND TO COMMENT PUBLICLY ON THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER. IT SPOKE FOR ITSELF. HE WANTED ME TO KNOW HOWEVER THAT HE APPRECIATED THE FACT THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD TAKEN SERIOUSLY THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED IN PAPANDEOU'S LETTER OF FEB. 4 AND HAD RESPONDED IN THE SAME SPIRIT.
3. I THANKED PAPANDEOU FOR HIS COMMENTS AND SAID THAT I HOPED THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER WOULD ALLAY GREEK CONCERNS AND ACCELERATE SATISFACTORY CONCLUSION OF DECA NEGOTIATIONS. PAPANDEOU SAID HE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH ME NEXT WEEK (PRESUMABLY AFTER DEPARTURE OF SOVIET PREMIER TIKHONOV) TO DISCUSS THIS AND OTHER SUBJECTS OF MUTUAL INTEREST.
STEARNS

~~SECRET~~

121572

31

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 77585961 DTG: 200012Z FEB 83 PSN: 054265
SIT871 DATE 03/06/83 TOR: 051/0247Z

FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES.

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

-- ALTHOUGH WE CAN IN NO WAY ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR ISRAELI ACTIONS OR INTENTIONS IN THIS MATTER, WE HAVE INFORMED THE ISRAELIS OF US-SOVIET EXCHANGES.

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

-- IN DOING SO WE HAVE CONVEYED TO THE ISRAELIS YOUR STATEMENTS ABOUT THE DEFENSIVE PURPOSES FOR WHICH THESE MISSILES WOULD BE DEPLOYED.

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB SIGR NORT
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS/CHECKLISTINED WITH VALLETTA 0424

-- WHAT ASSURANCE DOES THE SOVIET UNION HAVE THAT THE SYRIANS WTLN NOT USE THIS SYSTEM IRRESPONSIBLY?

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

3. IN RESPONSE, SOKOLOV, REITERATING POINTS MADE IN PREVIOUS EXCHANGES, SAID THAT THE MISSILES WERE MEANT FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES AND SOLELY TO PROTECT SYRIA FROM AIR ATTACKS FROM ISRAEL. HE ADDED THAT PREVIOUS SOVIET "ASSURANCES HAVE BEEN GIVEN IN FULL AUTHORITY AND FULL CONFIDENCE BY OUR SIDE."

MESSAGE:

4. SOKOLOV ALSO ASKED BURT WHAT THE ISRAELI RESPONSE HAD BEEN TO THE INFORMATION THE U.S. HAD PROVIDED ON SOVIET REPRESENTATIONS. BURT RESPONDED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD CONTINUED TO EXPRESS CONCERN ABOUT THE DEPLOYMENTS. HE EXPLAINED THAT IT WAS QUITE NATURAL FOR QUESTIONS TO REMAIN ABOUT THE CONCRETENESS OF SOVIET STATEMENTS ON

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #7758 0510021
O 200012Z FEB 83 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 2685

THIS ISSUE AND ASKED IF THE SOVIETS COULD PROVIDE ANY MORE INFORMATION ON WHAT THEY HAD DONE TO ENSURE THAT THE MISSILE SYSTEMS WERE DEFENSIVE AND ONLY FOR USE IN A DIRECT STRIKE ON SYRIA.

INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 5139
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 5595
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 2284
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 6935
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 6459
BT

5. SOKOLOV SAID THAT HE WOULD REPORT OUR FURTHER COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS TO MOSCOW. WITH REFERENCE TO BURT'S STATEMENT ABOUT U.S. INFLUENCE OVER ISRAELI ACTIONS, HE NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS "PROCEED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE U.S. HAS ENOUGH INFLUENCE TO MAKE ISRAEL'S REACTION RESTRAINED."

~~SECRET~~ STATE 047758
NODIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR, US, IS, SY
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO DOBRYNIN'S FEBRUARY 8 DEMARCHE ON ISRAEL/SYRIA

REF: (A) STATE 04007; (B) MOSCOW 0267; (C) STATE 7750;
- - (D) STATE 038417

6. BURT REPLIED, REPEATING AMBASSADOR EAGLEBURGER'S PREVIOUS STATEMENT TO DOBRYNIN, THAT WE DO NOT HAVE AS MUCH INFLUENCE OVER ISRAEL AS OTHERS SOMETIMES BELIEVE. SHULTZ

1. - ENTIRE TEXT

1. EUR ASSISTANT SECRETARY RICHARD BURT CALLED IN SOVIET EMBASSY MINISTER-COUNSELOR OLEG SOKOLOV FEBRUARY 19 TO PROVIDE FURTHER U.S. RESPONSE, AS PROMISED BY UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER, TO DOBRYNIN'S FEBRUARY 8 DEMARCHE (REF D) ON SOVIET PROVISION OF SA-5'S TO SYRIA, IN WHICH SOVIETS EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF ISRAELI

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SECSTATE WASHDC 77585961 DTG: 200012Z FEB 83 PSN: 054265

STRIKE AGAINST SYRIA. AFTER SUMMARIZING PREVIOUS EXCHANGES (REFTELS), BURT MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- IN ALL CANDOR I MUST SAY THAT NOTHING WE HAVE LEARNED IN OUR VARIOUS EXCHANGES OVER THE LAST SEVERAL WEEKS SUBSTANTIALLY DIMINISHES OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE DESTABILIZING EFFECTS OF THESE MISSILES. AS UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER MENTIONED BEFORE, THE RANGE AND CAPABILITY OF THESE WEAPONS MAKE THEM INHERENTLY DESTABILIZING BECAUSE THEY CAN BE USED FROM SYRIA FOR OPERATIONS WELL OUTSIDE SYRIAN TERRITORY. IT IS THEREFORE DESIRABLE THAT THE DEPLOYMENTS NOT OCCUR.

-- AT THE SAME TIME, WE HAVE NOTED "THE FULL CONFIDENCE" OF THE SOVIET SIDE THAT THESE MISSILES, IF DEPLOYED, WOULD ONLY BE USED IN CERTAIN VERY LIMITED CIRCUMSTANCES

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M412 # 121572

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

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