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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KML 10/20/2011

File Folder GREECE (11/09/1982-12/21/1982)

FOIA

M11-412

Box Number 15

DRAENOS

7

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
121543	CABLE	ATHENS 18356 PAR 3/18/2013 M412/1	4	11/9/1982	B1
121544	CABLE	ATHENS 18567 R 3/18/2013 M412/1	2	11/12/1982	B1
121545	CABLE	ATHENS 18918 D 11/7/2012 M412/1	2	11/19/1982	B1
121546	CABLE	ATHENS 19145 D 1/10/2013 M412/1	1	11/23/1982	B1
121547	CABLE	ATHENS 19246 R 3/18/2013 M412/1	1	11/25/1982	B1
121548	MEMO	DENNIS BLAIR & JEFFREY SCOTT TO ROBERT MCFARLANE & ALTON KEEL RE FY-84 AID LEVELS (WITH NOTATIONS) R 3/18/2013 M412/1	3	12/13/1982	B1
121549	CABLE	STATE 350126 R 3/18/2013 M412/1	2	12/17/1982	B1
121550	CABLE	ATHENS 20528 R 3/18/2013 M412/1	2	12/20/1982	B1
121551	CABLE	ATHENS 20529 R 3/18/2013 M412/1	3	12/20/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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File Folder GREECE (11/09/1982-12/21/1982)

FOIA

M11-412

Box Number 15

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7

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
121552	MEMO	L. PAUL BREMER, III TO WILLIAM CLARK RE MEETING <i>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</i>	1	11/24/1982	B1
121553	PAPER	RE ISTANBUL <i>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</i>	1	ND	B1
121554	MEMCON	RE CALL <i>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</i>	4	2/20/1981	B1

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121543

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 ATHENS 8356
SIT732 DATE 11/17/82

DTG: 091606Z NOV 82 PSN: 055625
TOR: 313/1627Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WANTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHNT #8356/01 3131609
O 091606Z NOV 82
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2731
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO JCS WASHDC
NATO COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 8566
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE
USNMR SHAPE BE
USDELMC
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
CINCUSAVEUR LONDON UK
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 18356
FROM SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR BARTHOLOMEW
BOHN ALSO FOR BURT/WARD/WINDMULLER
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MILI, MARR, GR, US, NATO
SUBJECT: DECA NEGOTIATIONS: GREEK POSITION DN APEX
- EXPRESS '82 CANCELLATION
REF: (A) ATHENS 18215 (061445Z NOV 82), (B) ATHENS
- 18281 (061631Z NOV 82), (C) USNATO 7075 (071359Z
- NOV 82)

1. ~~1~~-ENTIRE TEXT)
2. BEGIN SUMMARY: GOG IS TAKING THE POSITION THAT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):



3. GREEK DECA NEGOTIATOR KAPSIS SEIZED ON OCCASION OF NOVEMBER 8 SESSION WITH BARTHOLOMEW TO DEFEND AT LENGTH THE GOG WITHDRAWAL FROM APEX EXPRESS '82. SAYING THAT THE INCIDENT INDIRECTLY AFFECTS THE FORTHCOMING U.S.-GREEK NEGOTIATIONS, KAPSIS ASSERTED



4. KAPSIS ALLEGED THAT THE ORIGINAL PLAN FOR APEX EXPRESS '82 INCLUDED THE USE OF LIMNOS AS A TARGET BUT THAT ALLIED MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN NAPLES HAD DELETED THIS ELEMENT IN RESPONSE TO STANDING GUIDANCE ISSUED BY SYG LUNS NOT TO INCLUDE IN NATO EXERCISES AREAS THAT COULD RAISE POLITICAL PROBLEMS. WHEN A SPECIFIC EXPLANATION FOR THE DELETION WAS NOT FURNISHED, GOG HAD STRESSED IN WRITING ON SEPTEMBER 13 THAT THE INCLUSION OF LIMNOS WAS A "PRECONDITION" OF GREEK PARTICIPATION. NOT UNTIL NOVEMBER 5 DID GREECE RECEIVE ANY ANSWER, I.E., THAT LIMNOS WOULD BE EXCLUDED ON ORDERS FROM HIGHER AUTHORITY, AND WITHDRAWAL OCCURRED IMMEDIATELY. GREEK PERHREP VASSILIKOS CHALLENGED LUNS' AUTHORITY TO ISSUE SUCH ORDERS, RIGHTLY THE PREROGATIVE OF THE NAC, AT THE NOVEMBER 8 DCP MEETING: THE FAILURE OF EITHER THE MILITARY COMMITTEE OR THE DPC TO ADDRESS THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ISSUE LEFT GREECE WITH NO CHOICE BUT TO HOLD TO ITS NOVEMBER 5 DECISION TO WITHDRAW.

5. KAPSIS SUPPLEMENTED HIS PRESENTATION WITH AN HISTORICAL RECITATION DESIGNED TO SEAL THE LEGAL CASE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FOR GREEK MILITARY PRESENCE ON LIMNOS (AND SAMOTHRACE) AND EXPOSE THE TURKISH ABOUT FACE WITH RESPECT TO SOVEREIGNTY IN THE AEGEAN: THE LAUSANNE TREATY OF 1923 DEMILITARIZING THE ISLANDS, THE MONTREUX CONVENTION OF 1936 SUPERSEDING THE FORMER, AND THE SUPPORTING PUBLIC INTERPRETATION OFFERED BY THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE DAY; FOLLOWED BY PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT'S 1974 CLAIM THAT DEFENSE OF THE ISLANDS SHOULD BE A JOINT GREEK-TURKISH RESPONSIBILITY, DEFENSE MINISTER IRMAK'S 1975 STATEMENT THAT HALF OF THE AEGEAN BELONGS TO TURKEY, AND THE TURKISH ASSERTION OF 1976 THAT THE AEGEAN ISLANDS LAY LARGELY ON THE TURKISH CONTINENTAL SHELF. ECEVIT'S CLAIM WAS NOW A GIVEN IN NATO PLANNING, CONCLUDED KAPSIS, AND IS WHOLLY UNACCEPTABLE TO GREECE.

6. NOTING THAT HE WAS PRESENT IN HIS CAPACITY AS U.S. NEGOTIATOR FOR THE DECA, BARTHOLOMEW MADE THE FOLLOWING REMARKS:
(A) GREEK PARTICIPATION IN NATO IN GENERAL, AND IN NATO EXERCISES IN PARTICULAR, IS IMPORTANT TO THE U.S. AND TO NATO;

ATHENS 8356

DTG: 091606Z NOV 82 PSN: 055625

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR M412 # 121543

BY KNL NARA DATE 3/18/13

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 OO RUEHC RUEHDD
 DE RUEHTH #8356/01 3131609
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH
 O 091606Z NOV 82
 FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2731
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 INFO RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
 RUEHDD/NATO COLLECTIVE
 RUOMQG/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 8566
 RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE
 RUDORRA/USNMR SHAPE BE
 RUFHNA/USDELTC
 RHFRAAB/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
 RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
 RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
 RUFRRSHH/USDOCCSOUTH NAPLES IT
 BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 18356
 FROM SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR BARTHOLOMEW
 BONN ALSO FOR BURT/WARD/WINDMULLER
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: MILI, MARR, GR, US, NATO
 SUBJECT: DECA NEGOTIATIONS: GREEK POSITION ON APEX
 - EXPRESS '82 CANCELLATION
 REF: (A) ATHENS 18215 (061445Z NOV 82), (B) ATHENS
 - 18281 (0816312 NOV 82), (C) USNATL 7075 (071359Z
 - NOV 82)
 1. (~~S~~ ENTIRE TEXT)



3. GREEK DECA NEGOTIATOR KAPSIS SEIZED ON OCCASION
 OF NOVEMBER 8 SESSION WITH BARTHOLOMEW TO DEFEND AT
 LENGTH THE GOG WITHDRAWAL FROM APEX EXPRESS '82.
 SAYING THAT THE INCIDENT INDIRECTLY AFFECTS THE

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3

FORTHCOMING U.S.-GREEK NEGOTIATIONS, KAPSIS ASSERTED

4. KAPSIS ALLEGED THAT THE ORIGINAL PLAN FOR APEX EXPRESS '82 INCLUDED THE USE OF LIMNOS AS A TARGET BUT THAT ALLIED MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN NAPLES HAD DELETED THIS ELEMENT IN RESPONSE TO STANDING GUIDANCE ISSUED BY SYG LUNS NOT TO INCLUDE IN NATO EXERCISES AREAS THAT COULD RAISE POLITICAL PROBLEMS. WHEN A SPECIFIC EXPLANATION FOR THE DELETION WAS NOT FURNISHED, GOG HAD STRESSED IN WRITING ON SEPTEMBER 13 THAT THE INCLUSION OF LIMNOS WAS A "PRECONDITION" OF GREEK PARTICIPATION. NOT UNTIL NOVEMBER 5 DID GREECE RECEIVE ANY ANSWER, I.E., THAT LIMNOS WOULD BE EXCLUDED ON ORDERS FROM HIGHER AUTHORITY, AND WITHDRAWAL OCCURRED IMMEDIATELY. GREEK PERMREP VASSILIKOS CHALLENGED LUNS' AUTHORITY TO ISSUE SUCH ORDERS, RIGHTLY THE PREROGATIVE OF THE NAC, AT THE NOVEMBER 8 DCP MEETING: THE FAILURE OF EITHER THE MILITARY COMMITTEE OR THE DPC TO ADDRESS THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ISSUE LEFT GREECE WITH NO CHOICE BUT TO HOLD TO ITS NOVEMBER 5 DECISION TO WITHDRAW.

5. KAPSIS SUPPLEMENTED HIS PRESENTATION WITH AN HISTORICAL RECITATION DESIGNED TO SEAL THE LEGAL CASE FOR GREEK MILITARY PRESENCE ON LIMNOS (AND SAMOTHRACE) AND EXPOSE THE TURKISH ABOUT FACE WITH RESPECT TO SOVEREIGNTY IN THE AEGEAN: THE LAUSANNE TREATY OF 1923 DEMILITARIZING THE ISLANDS, THE MONTREUX CONVENTION OF 1936 SUPERSEDING THE FORMER, AND THE SUPPORTING PUBLIC INTERPRETATION OFFERED BY THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE DAY; FOLLOWED BY PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT'S 1974 CLAIM THAT DEFENSE OF THE ISLANDS SHOULD BE A JOINT GREEK-TURKISH RESPONSIBILITY, DEFENSE MINISTER IRMAK'S 1975 STATEMENT THAT HALF OF THE AEGEAN BELONGS TO TURKEY, AND THE TURKISH ASSERTION OF 1976 THAT THE AEGEAN ISLANDS LAY LARGELY ON THE TURKISH CONTINENTAL SHELF. ECEVIT'S CLAIM WAS NOW A GIVEN IN NATO PLANNING, CONCLUDED KAPSIS, AND IS WHOLLY UNACCEPTABLE TO GREECE.

6. NOTING THAT HE WAS PRESENT IN HIS CAPACITY AS U.S. NEGOTIATOR FOR THE DECA, BARTHOLOMEW MADE THE FOLLOWING REMARKS:
(A) GREEK PARTICIPATION IN NATO IN GENERAL, AND IN NATO EXERCISES IN PARTICULAR, IS IMPORTANT TO THE U.S. AND TO NATO;

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121544 5

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 ATHENS 8567 DTG: 121705Z NOV 82 PSN: 003499
SIT599 DATE 11/17/82 TOR: 316/1852Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHTH #8567/01 3161708
O 121705Z NOV 82
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2797
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION USNATO 1070
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2349
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 18567
EXDIS
FROM U.S. SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR BARTHOLOMEW
MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MILI, MARR, GR, US
SUBJECT: DECA NEGOTIATIONS: PRELIMINARY TALKS
- NOVEMBER 11
REF: ATHENS 18466 (101600Z NOV 82)

1. ~~ENTIRE~~ ENTIRE TEXT)
2. BEGIN SUMMARY. DISCUSSION OF STATUS OF FORCES, COMMAND AND CONTROL AND SUSPENSION OF INDIVIDUAL ACTIVITIES REVEALED CONTINUING SHARP DIFFERENCES IN U.S. AND GREEK VIEWS AS TO HOW THESE MATTERS SHOULD BE HANDLED IN A DECA. END SUMMARY.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. SOFA. KAPSIS DWELLED ON "EXCESSIVE" PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES THAT HAD BEEN ACCORDED TO U.S. FORCES AND THEIR DEPENDENTS OVER THE YEARS, EITHER AS A CONSEQUENCE OF ONE-SIDED AGREEMENTS OR, LESS OFTEN, ABUSES OF AGREEMENTS. AMONG PRINCIPLE GREEK CONCERNS ARE TAX EXEMPTION FOR CONTRACTORS, THE UNCONTROLLED DUTY-FREE ENTRY OF BOTH OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE GOODS. AND APO OPERATION, IN ADDITION TO ALLEGED MASSIVE ABUSES OF BX PRIVILEGES AND THE OPERATION OF A U.S. BANKING FACILITY NOT COVERED BY ANY AGREEMENT. BARTHOLOMEW STRESSED THAT IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES WERE NECESSARY IN THE INTERESTS OF OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY AND THE WELFARE OF U.S. FORCES AND THEIR DEPENDENTS. THE BASIC NATO SOFA OF 1951 MUST BE SUPPLEMENTED BY A BILATERAL AGREEMENT, AS IS THE CASE IN OTHER COUNTRIES WITH

WHICH THE U.S. MAINTAINS A BILATERAL DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP. THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE A SOFA AGREEMENT AS PART OF NEW DECA. WHILE THE GRANTING OF PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES TO FOREIGN FORCES MAY WELL PRESENT THE MOST GOVERNMENT WITH POLITICAL PROBLEMS, IT IS IMPORTANT TO RECOGNIZE THAT THERE IS A LIVELY INTEREST IN WASHINGTON, INCLUDING IN CONGRESS, IN THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH U.S. FORCES AND THEIR DEPENDENTS SERVE ABROAD.

4. COMMAND AND CONTROL. KAPSIS SAID THAT GREEK SOVEREIGNTY AND THE NEED TO SAFEGUARD GREEK SECURITY INTERESTS DICTATE THE REQUIREMENT FOR A SYSTEM OF VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE OF TERMS OF THE PROSPECTIVE AGREEMENT THROUGH A MONITORING AND INSPECTION SYSTEM. A DESIGNATED GREEK OFFICER AT EACH U.S. FACILITY WOULD HAVE TO HAVE THE RIGHT TO VERIFY THAT OPERATIONS ARE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGREED POLICY, THAT PROPER CONTROLS ARE MAINTAINED OVER PERSONNEL ACCESS TO THE FACILITY, AND THAT CUSTOMS CUSTOAND FISCAL CONTROLS ARE MAINTAINED REGARDING THE MOVEMENT OF EQUIPMENT. MOREOVER, THE GREEK OFFICER WOULD COOPERATE WITH THE U.S. COMMANDER "IN THE PREPARATION OF PROGRAMS CONCERNING OPERATIONS AND FLIGHT ACTIVITIES" AND IN ORDER TO IMPLEMENT EMERGENCY MEASURES WHEN AND IF ORDERED BY COMPETENT GREEK AUTHORITES, I.E., TO IMPLEMENT SUSPENSION OF SOME PARTICULAR ACTIVITY (SEE BELOW). KAPSIS

ATHENS 8567 DTG: 121705Z NOV 82 PSN: 003499
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SAID THAT THE U.S. COMMANDER WOULD OF COURSE HAVE FULL COMMAND OVER PERSONNEL, EQUIPMENT, MATERIAL, AND THE BASE MISSION. FINALLY, KAPSIS SAID THAT THE GREEK OFFICER, IN ORDER TO PERFORM HIS DUTIES, MUST HAVE ACCESS TO ALL AREAS, RAW DATA AND PROCESSED MATERIAL PRODUCED AT THE FACILITY. ONLY IN THIS WAY COULD HE ASCERTAIN WHETHER INFORMATION COLLECTED DID OR DID NOT CONCERN GREEK ACTIVITIES. BARTHOLOMEW UNDERScoreD THE PROBLEMS THAT INSISTENCE ON VERIFICATION AND EXTENSIVE ACCESS COULD INTRODUCE INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS. IN ANY EVENT, BOTH ARE UNNECESSARY SINCE THE GOG WILL IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS BOTH AUTHORIZE AND BE AWARE OF U.S. ACTIVITIES BY THE VERY TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT TO BE NEGOTIATED AND, TO SUPPLEMENT THAT, BY MEANS OF VARIOUS REQUIREMENTS TO BE ESTABLISHED FOR NOTIFICATION, APPROVAL AND REPORTING. THE IDEA THAT A WATCHDOG IS REQUIRED FOR MONITDRING COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT IS WHOLLY INCONSISTENT WITH THE DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP

ATHENS 8567 DTG: 121705Z NOV 82 PSN: 003499

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BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

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PAGE 01 ATHENS 8567
SIT598 DATE 11/17/82

DTG: 121705Z NOV 82 PSN: 003500
TOR: 316/1853Z

ACCESS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL, ARE PARTICULARLY
SENSITIVE ISSUES FOR U.S.G. STEARNS

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EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

ATHENS 8567

DTG: 121705Z NOV 82 PSN: 003500

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHTH #8567/02 3161710
O 121705Z NOV 82
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2798
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION USNATO 1071
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2350
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
CINCUSAVEUR LONDON UK
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 ATHENS 18567
EXDIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
BETWEEN FRIENDS AND ALLIES. HOWEVER, WE MUST
BEWARE OF PROVISIONS AND REGULATIONS THAT HAVE THE
EFFECT OF IMPEDING OR INTERFERING WITH OVERALL
EFFICIENCY OR WITH PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE OPERATIONS.
FURTHERMORE, WE CANNOT HAVE THE GREEK OFFICER IN
THE POSITION OF EXERCISING DAY-TO-DAY OVERSIGHT AND,
IN AN EMERGENCY SITUATION, CONTROL OF U.S. ACTIVITIES.

5. SUSPENSION. KAPSIS COMMENTED THAT THE LONG-
STANDING U.S. OBJECTION TO THE RIGHT OF SUSPENSION
OF INDIVIDUAL ACTIVITIES WAS BASED ON A U.S.
SUPPOSITION THAT A DECISION TO SUSPEND AN ENTIRE
AGREEMENT WOULD BE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO MAKE.
WHILE THAT MAY HAVE BEEN TRUE OF PREVIOUS GREEK

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

GOVERNMENTS, THIS GOVERNMENT WILL NOT HESITATE
TO SUSPEND THE ENTIRE AGREEMENT IF THE RIGHT TO
SUSPEND AN INDIVIDUAL ACTIVITY IS NOT AVAILABLE
AS A REMEDY IN EMERGENCY SITUATION. KAPSIS
ASSERTED THAT ANY FUTURE GREEK GOVERNMENT, NO MATTER
WHAT ITS POLITICAL COLOR, WOULD DO THE SAME.
BARTHOLOMEW SAID THAT A RIGHT OF SUSPENSION OF
INDIVIDUAL ACTIVITIES IS INCONSISTENT WITH TWO
PRINCIPLES: THE NEED FOR STABILITY, PREDICTABILITY
AND CALCULABILITY; AND THE COMPREHENSIVE NATURE OF ANY
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, I.E., THE INTERDEPENDENCE
OF ITS PARTS. SUSPENSION IMPLIES THE RIGHT TO
SEPARATE OUT INDIVIDUAL (BUT NOT NECESSARILY UN-
CONNECTED) PROVISIONS FOR SUSPENSION, AND THIS
RUNS COUNTER TO THE NEED FOR STABILITY. BARTHOLOMEW
WARNED THAT THE SUBJECT OF SUSPENSION, ALONG WITH

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File

Withdrawer

KM 10/20/2011

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File Folder

GREECE (11/09/1982-12/21/1982)

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Box Number

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restrictions</i>
	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		
121545	CABLE	2	11/19/1982	B1
	ATHENS 18918			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restrictions</i>
121546	CABLE ATHENS 19145	1	11/23/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 ATHENS 9246 DTG: 250959Z NOV 82 PSN: 023640
SIT926 DATE 11/29/82 TOR: 329/1043Z

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: --CHECKLIST--

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHTH #9246 3291036
O 250959Z NOV 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3028
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION USNATD PRIORITY 1100
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 2386
JCS WASHDC PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR VAH NGEN GE PRIORITY
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE PRIORITY
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK PRIORITY
USDDCOSOUTH NAPLES IT PRIORITY
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY
7206ABG HELLENIKON AB GR
BT

ATHENS 9246

DTG: 250959Z NOV 82 PSN: 023640

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M412 #121547

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATHENS 19246
7206ABG FOR CO
E.O. 12356: DECL: 11/23/88
TAGS: US, GR, MILI, MPOL, ELAB
SUBJECT: STRIKE BY GREEK WORKERS AT U.S. BASES:
APPROACH TO PAPANDEOU
REF: ATHENS 19162

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER PAPANDEOU LAST EVENING (11/24), AMBASSADOR RAISED SUBJECT OF STRIKE BY GREEK WORKERS AT HELLENIKON (REFTEL). HE TOLD PAPANDEOU THAT DURING COURSE OF DAY THERE HAD BEEN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SEVERAL SERIOUS INCIDENTS CAUSED BY WORKERS' ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL ACCESS TO THE BASE AND PASSIVE ROLE BEING PLAYED BY GREEK POLICE WHO WERE APPARENTLY UNDER INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO INTERVENE. SEVERAL CARS HAD BEEN DAMAGED AND THERE HAD BEEN A FEW INJURIES, FORTUNATELY LIGHT ONES. ATMOSPHERE WAS HIGHLY CHARGED HOWEVER AND REAL TROUBLE COULD OCCUR IF POLICE DID NOT TAKE MORE ACTIVE ROLE. USAF OFFICERS AT HELLENIKON WERE DOING THEIR BEST TO KEEP THE SITUATION UNDER CONTROL BUT MORE HELP WAS NEEDED FROM GREEK GOVERNMENT.

3. AFTER ASKING SEVERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT NUMBER OF STRIKING WORKERS AND THEIR GRIEVANCES, PAPANDEOU SAID THAT HE WAS CONFRONTED BY A LONG ARRAY OF SERIOUS LABOR PROBLEMS. THE BANK STRIKE DURING THE SUMMER, THE CURRENT TROLLEY STRIKE AND A PROTRACTED SIT-IN AT A PLANT

121548 MW //

MEMORANDUM

8439

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

December 13, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE
ALTON G. KEEL

WPC HAS SEEN

FROM: DENNIS J. BLAIR/JEFFREY F. SCOTT

SUBJECT: FY-84 Aid Levels for Turkey and Greece

The FY-84 aid package for Greece and Turkey has the potential for causing a major setback for our Eastern Mediterranean interests and for leading the Administration into an intense confrontation without a coherent plan. This state of affairs resulted from a unique sequence of decisions in the development of the overall security assistance program. What we need to do now is take a step back to see where those decisions have left us.

There is an Administration consensus that it is in the U.S. interest to increase our aid levels to Turkey substantially in order both to strengthen NATO's southern flank, and to assist U.S. capability to deploy to Southwest Asia. This consensus resulted in an FY-84 State request of \$775 million in military financing programs (grants and credits) for Turkey, up from the President's requested level of \$465M for FY-83. Based on a unanimous interagency recommendation, the President approved in October a "multi-year profile" for Turkey, at increased levels of aid.

Last June, at the same time the Administration was reaching this consensus, base negotiations broke down with the previous Greek government. They resumed last month with the new Papandreou government. Because of Papandreou's rhetoric and in the expectation of a tough negotiation, State requested \$280M in military financing programs for Greece, the same as FY-83.

Recently, the Congress has acted on the FY-83 bill. The Senate Appropriations Committee cut the Administration's request for Turkey from \$465M to \$400M. The House Foreign Affairs Committee left it at \$465M, but raised the Greek figure to \$325M to preserve the 7:10 ratio. These actions suggest the likely Congressional response to the President's 1984 budget when it is submitted next month.

If the President's 1984 budget includes the levels requested by State (\$775M for Turkey and \$280M for Greece), the following events are likely or certain:

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

NLRR M412 # 121548

BY KM NARA DATE 3/18/13

- The Greek lobby in the U.S. will explode, as will the Armenian lobby, the human rights interests groups, and other currently passive anti-Turkey groups;
- The Greek government may well break off the negotiations (Ambassador Stearns said that the requested aid levels would "doom the negotiation to early failure");
- The Congress will cut the Turkish levels;
- The Turks will feel set up and convinced that the Administration cannot deliver on its promises.

There are three options to handle this issue and keep the worst-case scenario outlined above from happening:

1. Inform the Greeks and the Congress that if we successfully negotiate a base agreement, we will seek more money for Greece for FY-84 in a supplemental and we will develop a "multiyear profile" for Greece as we have for Turkey.
2. Organize the intensive lobbying effort required to sell the levels we are proposing, to include substantial Presidential involvement.
3. Cut the Turkish aid level down to something the Administration can work through Congress with a moderate selling effort (possibly adding a token increase for Greece which could be reprogrammed should the negotiations fail).

The State and Defense Departments have recommended option 1, but OMB is unwilling now to commit to a supplemental of unknown size. Even with such a commitment, it is virtually certain that Congress will chop the Turkish figure anyway. Moreover, the major lobbying effort of option 2 stands only a small chance of success. The result will still be disappointment and mistrust on the part of the Turks.

Bureaucratically, State is divided on this issue: PM and T favor the State request; EUR would favor modifying the aid levels. DOD is strongly in favor of the State request. However, DOD is not the sponsor of the foreign assistance program, and would not bear the brunt of the Administration's effort on the Hill or the consequences of its failure.

We recommend a combination of options 1 and 3 above, reducing the Turkish level to \$650-700M (and possibly adding \$50M to Greece), with any "savings" to be placed in a special requirements fund. These could be used to help secure a successful base agreement with Greece.

While the Administration would be requesting a lower level for Turkey under this option, the chances of Congressional approval would be much higher. In addition, DOD's analysis shows that Turkish force modernization requirements require security assistance levels significantly above the State request. Therefore, at both the \$775M and the \$650-700M levels, it is not possible to satisfy Turkey's defense needs, but only to make limited progress toward that goal. The recommended (\$650-700M) level would still enable Turkey to start procurement of about 30 modern aircraft (its highest defense priority), and would represent almost a 50% increase over FY-83. It would not antagonize the Greek lobby and would put us in a stronger position in the base negotiations.

In summary, our goal is very simple: to provide as much of an increase in aid to Turkey as we can, while retaining our bases in Greece. Our current plans jeopardize that goal. We risk losing the substantial increase for Turkey and disrupting the base negotiations.

If you agree with this analysis, either we can draft a memo making these points to State or you may wish to make the points by phone with Bill Schneider and Richard Perle. We realize that our recommendation runs counter to current departmental positions. However, it is clear to us that those departmental positions will buy us a great deal of trouble. Policymakers must focus on the consequences of current positions.

^{our}
Bob Lilac concurs.

Dick Boverie concurs.

Go ahead to urge
OMB to make
cuts but also hold
out for the proposal
of multi-year funding
for Greece. Bill
Dull to Richard &

463

National Security Council
The White House

RECEIVED

Package # 8439

13

82 DEC 15 A10: 50

WPC HAS SEEN

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>I</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>I</u>
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
<u>BLAIR</u>	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>A</u>

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Bud,
This is the memo Al Keel
called you about.
J

RECEIVED 14 DEC 82 12

TO MCFARLANE

FROM BLAIR

DOCDATE 13 DEC 82

SCOTT

13 DEC 82

KEYWORDS: TURKEY

GREECE

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

24 10/20/11

SUBJECT: FY 84 AID LEVELS FOR TURKEY & GREECE

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

LILAC

DUR

MYER

HELM

KIMMITT

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8208287

NSCIFID

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

c 12/28

RCM HAS SEEN

Blair/Scott

DISPATCH

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FILE

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(*CR*)

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 01261 DTG: 170021Z DEC 82 PSN: 040875
SIT833 DATE 02/20/83 TOR: 351/0116Z

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EOB: /COMMASSIST/
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS/CHECKLISTCKLISI-----RTHERR DISSEM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #0126 3510027
O 170021Z DEC 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 6255

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M412 # 121549
BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

~~SECRET~~ STATE 350126
NODIS
FOR SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR AMBASSADOR BARTHOLOMEW
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MILI, MARR, GR, US
SUBJECT: (S) GREEK DEFENSE NEGOTIATIONS: SECURITY
ASSISTANCE

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. IN DEC 9 MEETING CHAIRED BY UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER, AND SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS, INTERAGENCY AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON THE FOLLOWING PROPOSAL WHICH AMBASSADOR BARTHOLOMEW IS AUTHORIZED TO USE WITH THE GOG AT AN APPROPRIATE POINT IN THE RESUMED TALKS: BEGIN QUOTE. IN THE CONTEXT OF AN ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE PREPARED TO SEEK INCREASED LEVELS OF DEFENSE SUPPORT ABOVE THAT PROPOSED IN THE CURRENT PROGRAM FOR GREECE (FY 84). THE U. S. WOULD ALSO WORK WITH THE GOG IN THE CONTEXT OF AN AGREEMENT TO DEVELOP A PROGRAM PROFILE FOR FUTURE DEFENSE SUPPORT, BASED ON MUTUALLY DEVELOPED REQUIREMENTS AND GOALS, WHICH THE U. S. IS WILLING TO DISCUSS IN SOME FORM OF A JOINT COMMISSION ON DEFENSE COOPERATION. END QUOTE.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. FYI: AS YOU KNOW, THE BASIC RATIONALE FOR AUTHORIZING THIS PROPOSAL IS TO PROVIDE GREEKS -- AT LEAST THOSE SYMPATHETIC TO US AND THE GREEK MILITARY -- SOME INCENTIVE NOT TO OVER-REACT TO OUR FY 84 SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROPOSALS (FYI: FMS FINANCING OF DOLS 280 MILLION FOR GREECE AND DOLS 775 MILLION FOR TURKEY) AND A BASIS FOR MANAGING PUBLIC AND PRESS REACTION, ASSUMING THE GOG WANTS AN AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, WE WANT TO AVOID A SITUATION IN WHICH THE GREEKS ATTEMPT TO POCKET THIS PROPOSAL AND THEN LEVERAGE US TO PROVIDE SPECIFIC NUMBERS AND LEVELS FOR EACH YEAR BEFORE WE SEE THE SHAPE OF AN AGREEMENT. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE AVOID ANY PROJECTION OF FY 84 OR OUT YEAR LEVELS AND STRESS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

16

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PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 01261 DTG: 170021Z DEC 82 PSN: 040875

THAT OUR PROPOSAL IS ONLY VALID IN THE CONTEXT OF AN
ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT. DAM

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17

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 ATHENS 0528 7136 DTG: 201425Z DEC 82 PSN: 045089
SIT814 DATE 12/27/82 TOR: 354/1657Z

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(PARA 6), JOINT TECHNICAL OPERATIONS (PARA 7), AND REVIEW OF "OBJECTIVES, PROVISIONS, DURATION, AND MANNER OF IMPLEMENTATION" (PARA 17).
END SUMMARY.

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

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EOB: /COMMASSIST/
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST-----CHECKLIST-----N)

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHTH #0528/01 354142Z
O 201425Z DEC 82
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3449
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2463
USMISSION USNATO 1175
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 20528

EXDIS
FROM U.S. SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR BARTHOLOMEW
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MILI, MARR, GR, US
SUBJECT: DECA NEGOTIATIONS: PRELIMINARY TALKS
- DECEMBER 17
REF: ATHENS 20527

1. ENTIRE TEXT)

2. BEGIN SUMMARY. BARTHOLOMEW HANDED KAPSIS "PERSONAL NON-PAPER" ON DECA ISSUES INTENDED TO INDICATE WAYS OF ADDRESSING MAJOR ISSUES IN AN AGREEMENT THAT COULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE U.S., THAT SHOULD SATISFY MANY GREEK POLITICAL AND

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SECURITY CONCERNS, AND THAT MIGHT YIELD A WORKABLE BASIS FOR AN AGREEMENT (TEXT IN REFTEL). KAPSIS UNDERTOOK TO STUDY THE "NON-PAPER" CAREFULLY. HE AND BARTHOLOMEW AGREED THAT ONCE THE TWO SIDES HAD AGREED ON BASIC ELEMENTS OF A DECA, NEITHER WOULD ATTEMPT TO BYPASS OR CHANGE THEIR REAL MEANING IN SUBSEQUENT, MORE DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS. BOTH ALSO AGREED ON THE CONTINUED IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING ABSOLUTE CONFIDENTIALITY. FOLLOWING A MEETING ON DECEMBER 20, TALKS WILL ADJOURN UNTIL JANUARY 19. READERS WILL NOTE "NON-PAPER" WITHHOLDS REPEAT WITHHOLDS WASHINGTON-AGREED "ELEMENTS" PAPER LANGUAGE ON: DEFENSE AGAINST ARMED ATTACK (PARA 1 OF AGREED ELEMENTS PAPER), AGGRESSIVE PURPOSES (PARA 2), MUTUALLY WORKED OUT PROGRAMS (PARA 3), GREEK LAW AND SOVEREIGNTY

3. BARTHOLOMEW DESCRIBED HIS NON-PAPER AS A PERSONAL EFFORT BASED ON HIS RECENT CONSULTATIONS IN WASHINGTON AND HIS TALKS WITH KAPSIS SINCE THEN, AN EFFORT THAT REFLECTS HIS VIEW OF A WORKABLE BASIS FOR AN AGREEMENT. HE WAS PROVIDING THE TEXT TO KAPSIS FOR PURPOSES OF CONVENIENCE AND CLARITY ONLY; IT IS AD REFERENDUM AND WILL HAVE TO BE REVIEWED AND DEFENDED IN WASHINGTON. FINALLY, ITS EXISTENCE IS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE QUESTION OF WHETHER ANY DOCUMENT WILL EMERGE FROM THESE PRELIMINARY TALKS.

4. BARTHOLOMEW POINTED TO THE MANY IDEAS HE HAD ADOPTED OR ADAPTED FROM PROPOSALS THAT KAPSIS HAD PUT FORWARD DURING THE TALKS THUS FAR: GREEK AUTHORIZATION OF FACILITIES AND ACTIVITIES AND THEIR IDENTIFICATION IN AN AGREEMENT; IDENTIFICATION OF ARMS AND EQUIPMENT; IDENTIFICATION OF LOCATION AND ACTIVITIES OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC AND CLASSIFIED AREAS AND AGREEMENT ON ANY CHANGES THERETO; GREEK ACCESS TO FACILITIES, WITH HIGHLY CONTROLLED ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED AREAS IN SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

UNDER SPECIAL PROCEDURES; POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE IN DEVELOPING GREEK NATIONAL TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES; INTELLIGENCE-SHARING, WITH CAVEAT KAPSIS UNDERSTOOD; GREEK INTEREST IN "APPROPRIATE RESTRICTIVE MEASURES" AND NATIONAL EMERGENCY PROVISIONS FOR CONSULTATIONS; APPOINTMENT OF A GREEK REPRESENTATIVE AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A GREEK SPECIAL AUTHORITY; ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT COMMISSION ON INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION; AND PROPER ID CARD PROCEDURE AND CONTROLS ON EMPLOYMENT OF FOREIGN CIVILIAN PERSONNEL. BARTHOLOMEW ASSERTED THAT ALL OF THE "ELEMENTS," TAKEN AS A WHOLE, LOOK TOWARD A REASONABLE REGIME THAT SHOULD HELP MEET EXPRESSED ALBEIT UNFOUNDED GREEK CONCERNS ABOUT DILUTION OF SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE, TARGETTING OF GREECE, PASSING INFORMATION TO TURKEY, AND USE OF FACILITIES FOR AGGRESSIVE PURPOSES.

5. BARTHOLOMEW ALSO NOTED THAT HIS NON-PAPER PURPOSELY OMITTED SOME FEATURES THAT KAPSIS HAD SOUGHT, ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY WOULD IMPEDE US COMMAND AND CONTROL AND EFFECTIVENESS AND SECURITY OF US OPERATIONS AND FACILITIES, WERE UNNECESSARY AND OFFENSIVE, AND, THEREFORE, WERE

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BY kml NARA DATE 3/18/13

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PAGE 01 ATHENS 0528 7136 DTG: 201425Z DEC 82 PSN: 045094
SIT813 DATE 12/27/82 TOR: 354/1658Z

NEGOTIATIONS. BARTHOLOMEW NOTED THIS STATEMENT WITH INTEREST.

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WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST----CHECKLIST-----N)

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHTR #0528/02 3541429
O 201425Z DEC 82
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3450
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2464
USMISSION USNATO 1176
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
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BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 ATHENS 20528
EXDIS

UNACCEPTABLE: A PROHIBITION ON FACILITIES AND ACTIVITIES NOT SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED BY THE GOG; A REQUIREMENT THAT PROGRAMS BE WORKED OUT ON A MUTUAL AND PERIODIC BASIS; ANY ACCESS TO NATIONAL CRYPTOGRAPHIC AREAS, OR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED AREAS IN OTHER THAN SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER SPECIAL AGREED PROCEDURES; JOINT MANNING OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES; AND VERIFICATION AND MONITORING SCHEMES AND MECHANISMS LIKE THE 1977 APPARATUS, OR ANY SIMILAR ROLE FOR THE GREEK REPRESENTATIVE. MOREOVER, ONLY CERTAIN TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE CAN BE SHARED. OTHER PRINCIPAL POINTS: THE SCOPE AND PURPOSES LANGUAGE IS UNDERSTOOD TO TAKE CARE OF THE GREEK CONCERN ABOUT "NO AGGRESSIVE PURPOSES" AND TO RECORD THE OFT REPEATED GREEK DISINCLINATION

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TO INTERFERE IN CONTINUITY, EFFECTIVENESS, OR VALUE OF FACILITIES AND ACTIVITIES; THE NATO SOFA WILL REQUIRE SOME SUPPLEMENTAL ARRANGEMENTS; AND THE LANGUAGE ON DURATION WAS DESIGNED AS A COMPROMISE THAT GOES TOWARD THE GREEK POSITION WHILE RECOGNIZING THE STRONG U.S. INTEREST IN A PRESUMPTION OF CONTINUITY.

6. KAPSIS CHOSE NOT TO GIVE ANY RESPONSE EXCEPT A GENERAL STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE NON-PAPER WILL REQUIRE CAREFUL STUDY, MOREOVER AND THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON THE MEANINGS RATHER THAN THE PHRASEOLOGY AND, ONCE AN UNDERSTANDING IS REACHED, SHOULD UNDERTAKE A JOINT COMMITMENT NOT TO STRAY FROM OR UNDERCUT THOSE MEANINGS INSUBSEQUENT, MORE DETAILED

7. BOTH SIDES EXPRESSED PLEASURE THAT THE PRESS HAD THUS FAR BEEN STARVED. THEY AGREED THAT IT IS NOW MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER TO PREVENT ANY LEAKS.

8. A SESSION WILL BE HELD ON DECEMBER 21 TO ENABLE KAPSIS TO GIVE A PRELIMINARY REACTION TO THE NON-PAPER BEFORE BREAKING FOR THE HOLIDAYS. TALKS WILL RESUME ON JANUARY 19. STEARNS

~~SECRET~~

121551

19

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 ATHENS 0529 7136 DTG: 201432Z DEC 82 PSN: 045209
SIT810 DATE 12/27/82 TOR: 354/1650Z

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHTH #0529/01 3541438
O 201432Z DEC 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3451

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 ATHENS 20529

NODIS
FROM U.S. SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR BARTHOLOMEW
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS DEFENSE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MILI, MARR, GR, US
SUBJECT: DECA NEGOTIATIONS: U.S. DEFENSE SUPPORT
- PRESENTATION TO GREEK NEGOTIATOR ON DECEMBER
- 17
REF: STATE 350126

1. (ENTIRE TEXT)

2. BEGIN SUMMARY. I PRESENTED U.S. PROPOSAL ON
DEFENSE SUPPORT TO KAPSIS ON FOLLOWING LINES.
- (A) U.S. CANNOT GO BEYOND "BEST EFFORTS" PLEDGE
IN DECA ITSELF.
- (B) U.S.G. HAS AUTHORIZED ME TO MAKE AN IMPORTANT
PROPOSAL, BUT ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF AN OTHERWISE
ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT, I.E., ONE THAT MEETS OUR
PRINCIPAL CONCERNS: THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD
BE PREPARED TO SEEK INCREASED LEVELS OF DEFENSE
SUPPORT ABOVE THE LEVEL PROPOSED IN THE CURRENT
FY 84 PROGRAM FOR GREECE; AND THE U.S.G. WOULD
WORK WITH THE GOG TO DEVELOP A PROGRAM PROFILE
FOR FUTURE DEFENSE SUPPORT.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

- (C) THERE CAN BE NO PROJECTIONS OR GUARANTEES
OF OR COMMITMENTS TO, SPECIFIC LEVELS OF DEFENSE
SUPPORT; GRANT AID OR \$1 BILLION A YEAR IN ANY
FORM, AS SUGGESTED BY GOG, ARE WAY OUT OF REACH.
- (D) ADMINISTRATION PROPOSALS FOR FY 84 CONTINUE
THE FY 83 LEVEL FOR GREECE.
- (E) THERE WILL BE A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE FOR
TURKEY IN ADMINISTRATION PROPOSALS FOR FY 84.
- (F) OUR JUDGMENT OF AN ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT
WILL BE DETERMINED BY HOW IT REFLECTS SUCH
SPECIFIC U.S. CONCERNS AND INTERESTS AS THOSE
I HAVE OUTLINED IN OUR TALKS AND NOTED IN THE
PERSONAL NON-PAPER I HAVE GIVEN YOU.

3. KAPSIS EXPRESSED FULL UNDERSTANDING OF THE

PROPOSAL AND THE CONTEXT AND SAID GOG WOULD STUDY
IT CAREFULLY. HE APPRECIATES REASONING BEHIND
STRAIGHT-LINING GREECE IN FY 84 BUT ANTICIPATES
VERY STRONG DOMESTIC CRITICISM WHEN FY 84 FIGURES
FOR GREECE AND TURKEY ARE ANNOUNCED, ALONG THE LINES
THAT THE U.S. IS EXERTING PRESSURE ON GREECE.

4. IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS BRACKETING REGULAR
SESSION I WARNED KAPSIS AGAINST STANDING PAT AND
LOOKING FOR MORE; STRESSED THAT GOG FAILURE TO
RESPOND COMMENSURATELY WOULD ON CONTRARY HARDEN
OUR POSITIONS; AND TOLD HIM TO CONSIDER GOG RESPONSE
IN CONTEXT OF VIEW THAT: A) RELATIONS WITH TURKEY
ARE ON UPSWING WHILE THINGS ARE UP AND DOWN WITH
GREECE; B) BASES ARE IMPORTANT, BUT THERE ARE
ALTERNATIVES AND GOG COULD EASILY PUT US OUT OF
MARKET.

5. FOR HIS PART KAPSIS EMPHASIZED GOG WANTED
AGREEMENT AND UPSWING IN RELATIONS WITH U.S.;
PAPANDREOU WANTED NO "COLLISION COURSE" WITH U.S.;
KAPSIS WAS ENCOURAGED BY U.S. EFFORTS; AND IT WAS
"PERFECTLY NATURAL" THAT U.S. OFFERS WERE RELATED
TO AN AGREEMENT THAT HAS "WHAT YOU REPEAT YOU
WANT," ON LINES OF MY NON-PAPER. END SUMMARY.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

6. ON DECEMBER 17, IN CONJUNCTION WITH DELIVERY
AND EXPLICATION OF "ELEMENTS" NON-PAPER CONTAINING
U.S. DESIDERATA FOR A DECA (SEPTEL), I MADE AN
ORAL REPEAT ORAL PRESENTATION ON DEFENSE SUPPORT
INCORPORATING THE PROPOSAL AUTHORIZED REFTEL. I
DID SO FIRST IN A PRIVATE MEETING WITH KAPSIS
AND THEN REPEATED IT WITH BERLIND AND ZEPPUS PRESENT.
I LEFT NO PAPER, BUT KAPSIS AND ZEPPUS RECORDED
MY REMARKS CAREFULLY. THE REPORT IN PARAGRAPHS
7 THROUGH 12 BELOW IS EXPRESSED IN NARRATIVE FASHION
SO AS TO CONVEY THE FLAVOR AND TONE AS WELL AS THE
SUBSTANCE OF MY PRESENTATION, AND IT IS ORGANIZED
IN A FORMAT DESIGNED FOR CLARITY AND EASE OF
SUBSEQUENT REFERENCES TO THE SUBJECT.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M412 # 121551
BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

SECRET

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PAGE 01 ATHENS 0529 7136 DTG: 201432Z DEC 82 PSN: 045215
SIT809 DATE 12/27/82 TOR: 354/1651Z

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WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST----CHECKLIST-----N)

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHTR #0529/02 3541439
O 201432Z DEC 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3452

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 ATHENS 20529
NODIS

7. BEGIN PRESENTATION. WE HAVE GIVEN CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO YOUR POINTS ON DEFENSE SUPPORT MADE DURING THE LAST ROUND AND THIS ONE. WE SIMPLY CANNOT GO BEYOND A "BEST EFFORTS" PLEDGE IN THE AGREEMENT ITSELF, I REPEAT, IN THE AGREEMENT ITSELF, ALONG THE LINES OF PARAGRAPH 4 IN MY NDN-PAPER. I AM HOWEVER, AUTHORIZED BY MY GOVERNMENT TO MAKE A VERY IMPORTANT PROPOSAL TO YOU ON HOW OUR BEST EFFORTS WOULD BE STRUCTURED TO HELP MEET GREECE'S DEFENSE NEEDS IN THE CONTEXT OF AN AGREEMENT THAT SATISFIED THE U.S.G.'S MAJOR CONCERNS.

8. BEFORE I MAKE THE PROPOSAL, YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT THE LEVEL OF DEFENSE SUPPORT PROPOSED BY THE ADMINISTRATION IN THE CURRENT FY 84 PROGRAM FOR GREECE SIMPLY CONTINUES THE FY 83 LEVEL. THIS IS BECAUSE THE ADMINISTRATION HAS NO BASIS FOR DOING OTHERWISE IN THE MIDST OF NEGOTIATIONS THAT WILL IN EFFECT DECIDE THE FUTURE OF OUR ENTIRE DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP. YOU SHOULD ALSO KNOW THAT THERE WILL BE A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE FOR TURKEY, SOMETHING YOU HAVE ALLUDED TO, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE TURKISH-U.S. DECA AND ITS BEST EFFORTS PLEDGE.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

9. THIS IS THE PROPOSAL I AM AUTHORIZED TO MAKE:
A. FIRST, IN THE CONTEXT OF AN ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT, THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE PREPARED TO SEEK INCREASED LEVELS OF DEFENSE SUPPORT ABOVE THE LEVEL PROPOSED IN THE CURRENT PROGRAM FOR GREECE (FY 84);
B. SECOND, THE U.S.G. WOULD ALSO WORK WITH THE GOG IN THE CONTEXT OF AN AGREEMENT TO DEVELOP A PROGRAM PROFILE FOR FUTURE DEFENSE SUPPORT, BASED ON MUTUALLY DEVELOPED REQUIREMENTS AND GOALS, WHICH THE U.S. IS WILLING TO DISCUSS IN SOME FORM OF A JOINT COMMISSION ON DEFENSE COOPERATION.

10. THERE ARE SOME CAVEATS OR CONDITIONS YOU SHOULD IMMEDIATELY UNDERSTAND:

- A. THE ADMINISTRATION PROPOSES, THE CONGRESS DISPOSES; AND CONSTITUTION REQUIRES CONGRESS TO VOTE ANNUALLY ON ALL FUNDS. SO THIS MUST BE UNDERSTOOD AS A STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY AND INTENT, NOT A GUARANTEE OF SPECIFIC LEVELS OF INCREASED DEFENSE SUPPORT AND NOT A COMMITMENT TO SPECIFIC LEVELS OF DEFENSE SUPPORT IN THE FUTURE, THAT IS, THE OUT YEARS.
- B. I CANNOT NOW GIVE YOU ANY PROJECTION OF INCREASED LEVELS OR OUT-YEAR LEVELS. DO NOT PRESS ME ON THIS. I CANNOT NOW EVEN SEE THE SHAPE OF AN ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT.
- C. BUT, I DON'T WANT TO MISLEAD YOU. ONE BILLION DOLLARS A YEAR AND GRANT AID YOU HAVE TALKED ABOUT ARE WAY OUT OF REACH.

11. WHAT I AM OFFERING HERE, IN THE CONTEXT OF AN ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT, IS AN EXCEPTIONALLY IMPORTANT PROPOSAL BY MY GOVERNMENT ON INCREASED DEFENSE SUPPORT AND ON A PROGRAM PROFILE FOR FUTURE DEFENSE SUPPORT.

- A. THIS HAS BEEN ARDENTLY SOUGHT BY GREECE IN THE PAST.
- B. WE MAKE AN OFFER ON THESE LINES ONLY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

RARELY UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES.
C. THESE TWO ELEMENTS CONSTITUTE A RARE AND VALUABLE UNDERTAKING AND WOULD HELP GREECE CONSIDERABLY IN MILITARY AND DEFENSE PLANNING.

12. I MUST STRESS THE PHRASE, "IN THE CONTEXT OF AN ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT WHICH MEETS OUR PRINCIPAL CONCERNS."

- A. OUR JUDGMENT OF AN ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT WILL BE DETERMINED BY HOW IT REFLECTS SUCH SPECIFIC U.S. CONCERNS AND INTERESTS AS THOSE I HAVE OUTLINED IN OUR TALKS AND NOTED IN THE PERSONAL NON-PAPER I HAVE GIVEN YOU.
- B. OUR PROPOSAL IS ONLY VALID IN THE CONTEXT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 ATHENS 0529 7136 DTG: 201432Z DEC 82 PSN: 045217
SIT808 DATE 12/27/82 TOR: 354/1653Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SIT KEMP
EOB: /COMMASSIST/
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST-----CHECKLIST-----N)

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
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O 201432Z DEC 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3453

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 ATHENS 20529

NODIS
OF AN ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT ON THESE LINES.
END PRESENTATION.

13. KAPSIS SAID HE WANTED TO STRESS THAT HE CONSIDERED THE PROPOSAL, ALONG WITH THE NON-PAPER, TO CONSTITUTE AN ENCOURAGING STEP IN ITSELF, SINCE IT REPRESENTS THE FIRST TIME THE U.S. HAS COME FORTH WITH "POSITIVE" VIEWS AS OPPOSED TO MERE REACTIONS TO GREEK VIEWS. (COMMENT. THIS IS OF COURSE INACCURATE, AND I CORRECTED HIM LATER.) HE SAID THE GREEK SIDE WILL OF COURSE NEED TIME TO STUDY BOTH VERY CAREFULLY. HE EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING THAT THE DEFENSE SUPPORT PROPOSAL WAS MADE IN THE CONTEXT OF AN ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT, ADDING THAT HE ASSUMED THE U.S. WOULD NOT SIGN AN UNACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT.

14. KAPSIS SAID HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE CONTINUATION IN THE ADMINISTRATION'S FY 84 PROGRAM OF FY 83 LEVELS FOR GREECE. HE UNDERSTOOD, BUT IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN INCREASE FOR TURKEY, AND DESPITE A PLEDGE OF ADDITIONAL DEFENSE SUPPORT FOR "THIS YEAR" (READ FY 84) PROVIDED AN AGREEMENT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

IS REACHED, THERE IS GOING TO BE A STRONG REACTION. FIRST OF ALL, THE FIGURES FOR PROPOSED LEVELS WILL BE ANNOUNCED DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS: BOTH THE GOG AND U.S.G. WILL FACE STRONG CRITICISM, "AND I WORRY WHETHER WE WILL BE ABLE TO PROCEED TO A SUCCESSFUL AGREEMENT UNDER SUCH CRITICISM." SECONDLY, CERTAIN POLITICAL GROUPS IN GREECE WILL INTERPRET THE U.S. PROPOSAL, IF THEY BECOME AWARE OF IT, AS A CARROT AND STICK APPROACH, I.E., IF THE GREEKS ARE GOOD BOYS, THEY WILL GET THE CARROT. KAPSIS UNDERLINED THAT HE WAS ONLY CALLING MY ATTENTION TO THE POINT, NOTHING MORE.

15. KAPSIS CHARACTERIZED MY STATEMENT ON DEFENSE SUPPORT AS "VERY INTERESTING," I.E., "NO PROJECTION

OF FIGURES, DON'T PRESS ME, I CAN'T SEE THE SHAPE OF THE AGREEMENT" (SEE PARA 10.B ABOVE). HE ASKED WHETHER HE COULD PRESS ME IF I COULD SEE THE SHAPE. (COMMENT: THE QUESTION WAS PUT ONLY HALF IN JEST, AND I REVIVED IT LATER AND REPLIED SIMPLY THAT I DON'T FEEL IN A POSITION TO GO BEYOND SAYING THAT IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO PURSUE THE MATTER FURTHER.)

16. KAPSIS THEN PARAPHRASED MY COMMENT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION PROPOSES, CONGRESS DISPOSES, AND THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES (SEE PARA 10.A. ABOVE). HE RECOGNIZED THE SITUATION, BECAUSE IT OPERATES IN GREECE AS WELL. THIS IS A PROBLEM TO FACE TOGETHER FOR MUTUAL INTEREST AND BENEFIT. KAPSIS THEN SAID IT WOULD NOT BE WISE TO SAY ANYTHING MORE AT THE MOMENT.

17. BY WAY OF SEEKING CONFIRMATION, I OFFERED THAT KAPSIS HIMSELF UNDERSTANDS THAT THE U.S. IS NOT PLAYING A CARROT AND STICK GAME AND THAT HE UNDERSTANDS THE LOGIC OF STRAIGHT-LINING GREECE DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAID, "I DO". I THEN SAID THAT, WITH RESPECT TO IMPACT ON OTHERS, I HOPED HE WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THERE WAS NO CARROT AND STICK GAME IN PLAY,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AND I SUGGESTED THAT WE WILL WANT TO CONSIDER THIS QUESTION CAREFULLY TOGETHER. KAPSIS NODDED IN AFFIRMATION AND ASKED WHEN FY 84 FIGURES MIGHT BE ANNOUNCED. I SAID THAT TECHNICALLY IT WOULD NOT HAPPEN UNTIL AFTER JANUARY 20, 1983, PROBABLY WITHIN TWO TO THREE WEEKS OF THAT DATE, IN CONNECTION WITH THE FY 84 BUDGET SUBMISSION. BUT I ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE FIGURES COULD COME OUT BEFORE THEN. KAPSIS SAID THAT PUBLICATION OF THE FIGURES WILL MAKE BOTH OF OUR LIVES MUCH MORE DIFFICULT. THE PRESENT GREEK GOVERNMENT IS A STRONG ONE, BUT THERE IS STILL A SERIOUS PROBLEM: IF THE GOG TELLS CRITICS THAT THE FIGURES ARE UNDERSTANDABLE AND THAT IT WILL REQUEST AN INCREASE UPON CONCLUDING AN AGREEMENT, THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION WILL BE PUT IN A DIFFICULT POSITION.

18. IN CONCLUDING THE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION IN THE TWO-ON-TWO SESSION, I UNDERSCORED THAT THE U.S. PROPOSAL, ALONG WITH MY NON-PAPER, REPRESENTED A CONSIDERABLE EFFORT ON MY PART AND THE PART OF MY GOVERNMENT, AND THAT TOGETHER THEY PROVIDE A WORKABLE BASIS FOR AN AGREEMENT. STEARNS

ATHENS 0529 7136 DTG: 201432Z DEC 82 PSN: 045217

473

National Security Council
The White House

RECEIVED

Package # 7370

82 DEC 21 P 6: 47

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>I</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>		
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>		<u>I</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Weds 12/22 Mtg
 2:30 pm

Note: Bailey Blair & Morris Met the
 Archbishops

MEMORANDUM

UNCLASSIFIED WITH **NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**
CONFIDENTIAL
ATTACHMENTS
INFORMATION

December 21, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: DENNIS C. BLAIR

WPC HAS SEEN

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Greek Orthodox Archbishop Iakovos, Wednesday, 22 December, 2:30 p.m.

Archbishop Iakovos will be meeting on 22 December with you, Secretary Shultz and Secretary Weinberger. He is concerned that this Administration is favoring Turkey too much, and neglecting Greece. As you know, our policy is a balance between the two countries, both of which we regard as valuable allies. We urge them to settle their own differences, especially on the Cyprus question, and we use our influence on both sides to urge mutually acceptable compromise solutions.

Iakovos has raised three specific questions, and attached are talking points on those subjects: the treatment of Greek Orthodox believers in Istanbul, the recently signed wartime co-located operating bases (COB) agreement with Turkey, and Cyprus. In addition, attached is the memorandum of conversation of the last meeting you had with the Archbishop, on February 18, 1981.

The Archbishop is addressed as "Your Eminence."

- Tab A Talking Points
- Tab B Memcon of Feb., 1981 meeting

DECLASSIFIED
Sec.34(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008
BY NARA KML, DATE 10/30/11

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENTS



S/S 8234873
United States Department of State

7370
24

Washington, D.C. 20520

121552

November 24, 1982

82 NOV 24 P11:06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Greek Orthodox Archbishop Iakovos

In response to Mr. Michael O. Wheeler's memorandum to me of November 10, there are attached briefing papers on the alleged harassment of the Patriarchate in Istanbul, Cyprus, and the recent U.S. decision regarding the modernization of airfields in Turkey.

We understand His Eminence has meetings scheduled with you and with Secretary Weinberger on December 8. A meeting with Secretary Shultz has been set for December 22.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachments: as stated

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRM412 # 121552

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Alleged Harassment of the Patriarchate in Istanbul

Background

The problems of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate stem from its historic location in a city which is now part of predominantly Moslem Turkey. Frictions have arisen over such issues as administration of church property, taxation and oversight of Orthodox church schools. These problems, however, do not seem so serious as to threaten the fundamental identity and existence of the Patriarchate. Officials of the Patriarchate oppose any public airing of their problems but favor quiet diplomacy. Church officials told two CSCE staff members who recently visited Turkey that they were confident they could resolve their own problems.

Suggested Talking Points:

-- We keep in close touch with the Patriarchate, especially through our Consulate General in Istanbul.

-- In general, basic rights and interests of the minorities in Turkey are being respected.

-- The Turkish government recognizes the protections guaranteed to minorities under the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, which are reaffirmed by the new Constitution approved November 7 by the Turkish people.

-- The Patriarchate does experience difficulties with respect to slow bureaucratic procedures in trying to resolve certain problems, such as upkeep of church properties. These problems, however, do not seem to have grown in recent years.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M412 # 121553

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

Cyprus

Background

The basic problem in Cyprus is finding some framework for national unity which will bring together the internationally-recognized state of Cyprus in the South and the Turkish Cypriot area in the North where there are currently about 20,000 Turkish troops. Talks between leaders of the two communities are being carried out under the sponsorship of a representative of the UN Secretary General. Greek Prime Minister Papandreou has suggested that an expanded UN force could replace the Turkish troops. The Turkish government has indicated it would only remove its troops in the context of a satisfactory overall settlement. We believe the intercommunal talks represent the best, perhaps the only way, to make progress in dealing with this difficult problem.

One aspect of the Cyprus problem is the unknown fate of persons missing from both Cypriot communities since the fighting in 1974. A UN Committee on Missing Persons was set up last year under the auspices of UNSYG Waldheim to investigate, but it is bogged down in procedural disputes.

Suggested Talking Points:

-- A just and lasting Cyprus settlement, acceptable to both communities, is a U.S. priority.

-- To emphasize our commitment, a Special Cyprus Coordinator has been appointed to coordinate U.S. support for the UN negotiating efforts.

-- Intercommunal talks provide the most appropriate mechanism for reaching settlement. We emphasize this position to all parties.

-- We support the Secretary General's mandate in facilitating the intercommunal talks.

-- (If missing persons issue is raised) We are concerned with the problem of missing persons, several of whom are Americans.

-- We support efforts to get the UN Committee on Missing Persons (CMP) back on track. The CMP remains the most promising vehicle for resolving this difficult problem.

UNCLASSIFIEDCollocated Base Facilities in TurkeyBackground:

In October 1982 the U.S. and Turkey initialled a NATO Collocated Operating Base agreement which will allow USAF aircraft to deploy to certain Turkish airbases in support of NATO operations. Some press reports have termed this agreement a modernization of Turkish airfields. It is correct that in peacetime Turkish forces will benefit from the improvements as well, but it is noteworthy that most of these bases (including the new ones) are for the defense of NATO's southeastern flank along the Soviet border near Iran. In any event, all improvements financed by the U.S. under that agreement will support the U.S. forces which will deploy to these airfields.

Suggested Talking Points:

-- We have initialled with Turkey a NATO Collocated Operating Base agreement which will allow USAF aircraft to deploy to certain Turkish air bases in support of NATO defense plans.

-- All improvements to these airfields will make them capable of supporting the U.S. forces which will deploy to them.

-- Turkey and Greece are both highly valued NATO Allies, and our policy is to work closely with both countries.

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28

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

121554

NLRR M412 * 121554

Memorandum of Conversation

BY KAL NARA DATE 3/18/13

DATE: February 18, 1981

SUBJECT: Call by Greek Orthodox Archbishop Iakovos

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.

The Secretary
Deputy Secretary-designate Clark
Counselor-designate McFarlane
EUR Assistant Secretary Vest
Robert L. Pugh, EUR/SE

Others

Archbishop Iakovos
Tom Korologos
Father Alexander

PLACE: Office of Deputy Secretary-designate

TIME: February 18, 4:45 p.m.

DISTRIBUTION: Embassy Athens, Embassy Ankara, Embassy Nicosia,
EUR, EUR/SE, HA

The Deputy Secretary-designate greeted Archbishop Iakovos for the Secretary and for himself, indicating that the Secretary regretted that a late requirement to take part in a meeting at the White House had prevented him from being with the Archbishop at 3:00 p.m., as had earlier been scheduled. The Archbishop described his tradition of calling on Secretaries of State, expressed his pleasure at the opportunity to meet Deputy Secretary Clark, and wished him well on behalf of the Greek Orthodox community as he took up his heavy burden. The Deputy Secretary expressed appreciation, commented that he understood the Greek Orthodox community numbered some 2.5 million, and asked about the Archbishop's responsibilities outside the United States. The Archbishop noted that his area

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(Drafting Office and Officer)

included Canada and South America, as well as the United States. In South America, his communicants were concentrated in a number of large cities, such as Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Santiago. Reminded by the Latin American reach of the Archbishop's responsibilities, the Deputy Secretary pointed out that the Administration had dramatic information regarding communist efforts focused through Cuba on El Salvador. He mentioned having shared this information recently with Roman Catholic Bishop Kelly, since the communist effort in El Salvador was directed against the church as well as against the current government. He added that the President had said many times that religion in America is healthy because of the separation of church and state, but also that constant communication with religious groups was essential.

Mr. Korologos observed that the situation in the Greek-American community was somewhat different in that the Greeks historically had been brought together by the church, which therefore played a larger role. He recalled that as a schoolboy when asked his nationality his automatic answer had been "Greek Orthodox." He urged that the Deputy Secretary call on the Archbishop, Father Alexander, or himself whenever any issue arose on which they might be helpful. Archbishop Iakovos expanded upon this theme, noting that he had been an American citizen since 1950. He observed that there were now four generations of Greek Americans and that the Greek Orthodox Church in America carried out many activities which would be unusual in Greece. They had mixed choirs, pews, Sunday schools, youth organizations, charitable organizations, classes for new immigrants, etc. The Deputy Secretary described his awareness of the great contribution Greek Americans make to American life, citing as examples former San Francisco Mayor Christopher and others prominent in public life in California.

The Secretary arrived at this point, greeted the Archbishop and expressed his regrets that the pressure of other business had precluded their meeting as originally scheduled. Archbishop Iakovos explained that he had asked for the meeting in order to pay his respects and to offer whatever assistance might be within his power as the Secretary began his important tasks. He added that the Greek Orthodox Church wished to have an impact and was particularly concerned about basic human rights, particularly in that they were in jeopardy in Turkey, the Balkan states, the Soviet Union and Cyprus. He was not submitting any memoranda as the meeting was not in his view a business meeting. He recalled having met the Secretary two years before in New York. The Secretary observed that in a change of Administration, interpretations were sometimes given to statements which distorted their meaning. He had been accused of having no concern about human rights; this was not true. The

previous Administration had expressed too much public concern, leading in some instances to the replacement of admittedly oppressive regimes by totalitarian regimes. He had pointed out that terrorism is the greatest violation of human rights and a matter of great concern to the United States. He believed that it was imperative to keep human rights as a major aspect of U.S. foreign policy, something inherent in all the work of the geographical bureaus rather than a subject to be set off in a separate office by itself.

The Archbishop stated his firm support for the Secretary's view on terrorism and commented that the European reaction had similarly been favorable. The Secretary stated that the Europeans were keenly aware of the threat of terrorism since they lived with it, particularly the Red Brigades in Italy and the problems experienced by Greece and Turkey. The Archbishop recalled that Greek Prime Minister Rallis had also praised the Secretary's stand. The Secretary recalled that Prime Minister Rallis was an old friend, as was President Karamanlis. He had been particularly happy to see the role played by Prime Minister Rallis in Greece's reintegration into NATO. The Archbishop observed that it had been the Secretary's own plan, formulated when he was SACEUR that was the basis for the solution. The Secretary confirmed this had been the case. With reintegration essentially accomplished, the Secretary felt that while the U.S. looked forward to the return of representative government in Turkey, it was essential that we take advantage of the relative flexibility of the current regime in Turkey, free as it was of partisan political impediments, to resolve some outstanding problems. He commented in this regard that he wished to talk to both sides regarding the Cyprus situation.

While he certainly did not wish to intervene in Greece's internal affairs, the Secretary hoped that there would be no political changes in Athens this year. The Archbishop stated that this would be a very critical year for Greece, and the Secretary indicated that the USG was very sensitive to this fact. The Archbishop then stated his desire that the base agreement be signed soon. The Secretary expressed his confidence in Ambassador McCloskey, who he felt would accomplish this task.

Mr. Korologos once again observed that the Greek-American community was brought together by the church and observed that it would be the Secretary's loss if he did not take advantage of its willingness to do whatever the Secretary might wish, particularly as it was able to reflect accurately the sentiment of the Greek American community on various issues.

The Archbishop reiterated that he had come to pay his respects and to offer prayers and to be available to reflect Greek-American feelings and attitudes. The Secretary observed the Greek Orthodox Church was a resource he had known of for many years; he knew how valuable it was, and he would exercise regularly the church's willingness to be consulted. He hoped not to call too often but knew that the Archbishop had always responded when asked.

Clearances: S/S:
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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November 10, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Request by Archbishop Iakovos to Meet with
William Clark

Archbishop Iakovos of the Greek Orthodox Church has requested a meeting with William Clark to discuss "harassment of the Patriarchate in Istanbul, Cyprus, and the recent U.S. decision regarding the modernization of airfields in Turkey."

The Department is requested to provide a short briefing memo on these three subjects for a meeting with Archbishop Iakovos. The papers are requested by November 24.

Michael O. Wheeler
Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary

Received in 5/5-I



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 16, 1982

22 10/20/11~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Proposed Meeting of Secretary with Archbishop Iakovos

I am responding to Elizabeth H. Dole's memorandum of October 25, 1982, recommending that the Secretary meet with Archbishop Iakovos, spiritual leader of the Greek-American community.

The Secretary will be happy to see the Archbishop and is making arrangements for a meeting.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "L. Paul Bremer, III".

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

REFERRAL

DATE: 16 NOV 82

MEMORANDUM FOR: ELIZABETH DOLE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: CLARK

SOURCE: BREMER

DATE: 16 NOV 82

KEYWORDS: GREECE TURKEY

CYPRUS MILITARY BASES

SUBJ: PROPOSED MTG OF SECRETARY W/ ARCHBISHOP IAKOVOS

REQUIRED ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION

DUE DATE:

COMMENTS:



FOR MICHAEL O WHEELER

STAFF SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

8233359

October 25, 1982



MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE SHULTZ

FROM: ELIZABETH H. DOLE *EHD*

SUBJECT: Meeting with Archbishop Iakovos

Archbishop Iakovos has informed me that he has requested a meeting with you, at your convenience, to discuss U.S. policy toward Turkey. His particular concerns center on harassment of the Patriarchate in Istanbul, Cyprus, and our recent decision regarding the modernization of airfields in Turkey.

The Archbishop is the spiritual leader of the Greek-American community, a symbol of their unity, and a revered figure throughout the Americas. He has met with the President on two occasions here at the White House and has been as supportive as he can be, given his religious status. The Greek Orthodox Church, with his full support, officially endorsed the President's tuition tax credit legislation and supported our pro-life efforts.

I would, therefore, like to recommend that you consider a meeting with His Eminence, as your schedule permits. If my office can be of assistance in the arrangements or provide any further information, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Thank you.

rec'd 10/27
10/27/82
5:00 PM

NW
36

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

October 29, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

SIGNED

THROUGH: DICK MORRIS *DM*

FROM: DENNIS *DB* BLAIR

SUBJECT: Request for Meeting by Archbishop Iakovos

Archbishop Iakovos has requested (Tab III) to meet with you to discuss his concerns about the recently concluded airbase agreement with Turkey, Cyprus, and the human rights situation in Turkey. Elizabeth Dole supports Iakovos' request to meet with you (her memorandum at Tab IV), since Iakovos has given us strong support on several domestic issues.

From your point of view, there is nothing to be gained from such a meeting. Iakovos will tell us our policy to Turkey is misguided, and you will have to explain patiently that it is in the U.S. interest to maintain a policy balanced between support for both Greece and Turkey.

However, you will be doing Elizabeth Dole a favor, and at least you will be demonstrating a willingness to listen to influential Greek-Americans, so I imagine you will wish to have the meeting.

I have drafted a reply for your signature to Iakovos at Tab I. At Tab II is Mike Wheeler's memo requesting background materials from State.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Iakovos at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

- Tab I Letter to Iakovos
- Tab II Wheeler memo to State
- Tab III Iakovos letter
- Tab IV Dole memo

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

37

November 8, 1982

Dear Archbishop Iakovos:

Thank you for your letter of October 21 requesting a meeting to discuss your concerns over Turkey and Cyprus. I am sure you are aware that it is our intention to pursue a balanced policy in the eastern Mediterranean, maintaining good relationships with all our NATO partners in this region.

Although my schedule is very full in the immediate future, I would like to meet with you on these matters. If you will have your office call my secretary Jacque Hill, we will be able to arrange a mutually convenient time.

Sincerely,



William P. Clark

His Eminence
Archbishop Iakovos
Archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Church
10 East 79th Street
New York, New York 10021



25 OCT 1982

38

GREEK ORTHODOX ARCHDIOCESE OF NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA
ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗ ΟΡΘΟΔΟΞΟΣ ΑΡΧΙΕΠΙΣΚΟΠΗ ΒΟΡΕΙΩ ΚΥ ΝΟΤΙΩ ΑΜΕΡΙΚΗΣ

10 EAST 79th STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10021 • TEL (212) 570-3500 • CABLE: ARCHGREEK, NEW YORK

October 21, 1982

Mr. William Clark
National Security Advisor
National Security Council
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. Clark:

The United States decision to modernize ten military airfields in Turkey is both unwise and unjust, coming at a time when the authoritarian junta of General Evren continues to suppress human rights under martial law and criminal intransigence on Cyprus continues to contravene in the U.S. Rule of Law.

American defense and foreign policy toward the Turkish military regime threatens not only to upset the balance of power in the volatile eastern Mediterranean but will exacerbate latent anti-American sentiment among close allies of proven loyalty.

Recalling our cordial meeting last year, I would like to speak with you personally on this serious matter and look forward to doing so in the immediate future.

Faithfully yours,

I A K O V O S
Archbishop of the Greek Orthodox
Church of North and South America

AI:mn

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

7370

October 25, 1982

28 All: 36

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM CLARK

FROM: ELIZABETH H. DOLE

SUBJECT: Meeting with Archbishop Iakovos

Archbishop Iakovos has informed me that he has requested a meeting with you, at your convenience, to discuss U.S. policy toward Turkey. His particular concerns center on harassment of the Patriarchate in Istanbul, Cyprus, and our recent decision regarding the modernization of airfields in Turkey.

The Archbishop is the spiritual leader of the Greek-American community, a symbol of their unity, and a revered figure throughout the Americas. He has met with the President on two occasions here at the White House and has been as supportive as he can be, given his religious status. The Greek Orthodox Church, with his full support, officially endorsed the President's tuition tax credit legislation and supported our pro-life efforts.

I would, therefore, like to recommend that you consider a meeting with His Eminence, as your schedule permits. If my office can be of assistance in the arrangements or provide any further information, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Thank you.

RECEIVED 27 OCT 82 14

TO CLARK FROM DOLE, E

DOCDATE 25 OCT 82

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

21 10/20/11

URGENT

KEYWORDS: GREECE TURKEY IAKOVOS
CYPRUS MILITARY BASES
AC

SUBJECT: APPT REQUEST FOR ARCHBISHOP IAKOVOS W/ CLARK

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 28 OCT 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
BLAIR	NORTH BOVERIE SOMMER	MYER KIMMITT HILL

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8204581 NSCIFID (H /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Clark</i>	<i>x 10/29</i>	<i>for signature</i>		
	<i>NOV 0 8 1982</i>	<i>Clark spl ltr</i>		
<i>Wheeler</i>	<i>S NOV 0 8 1982</i>	<i>further action</i>		
<i>State</i>	<i>D 11/10</i>	<i>Wheeler Sgd Memo to Bremer</i>	<i>11/24</i>	<i>DB</i>
	<i>2 11/16</i>	<i>Leid SIS 8233359</i>		<i>DB, Dole (orig)</i>

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>- 11/26</i>	<i>Recd State memo</i>		<i>Same</i>
<i>Blair</i>	<i>S 11/26</i>	<i>Prepare memo for Clark</i>	<i>11/29</i>	
<i>Clark</i>	<i>IX 12/21</i>	<i>for info</i>		
	<i>DEC 2 2 1982</i>	<i>Clark noted</i>		<i>MO, DB</i>

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE *PK* *(1)*