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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KML 10/20/2011

File Folder GREECE (08/20/1982-11/05/1982)

FOIA

M11-412

Box Number 15

DRAENOS

6

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
121526	CABLE	ATHENS 13681 R 3/18/2013 M412/1	1	8/20/1982	B1
121527	CABLE	ATHENS 14847 R 3/18/2013 M412/1	7	9/9/1982	B1
121528	CABLE	ATHENS 15109 D 1/10/2013 M412/1	1	9/14/1982	B1
121529	CABLE	STATE 261114 R 3/18/2013 M412/1	1	9/16/1982	B1
121530	CABLE	STATE 261305 R 3/18/2013 M412/1	1	9/16/1982	B1
121531	CABLE	STATE 269736 R 3/18/2013 M412/1	1	9/24/1982	B1
121532	CABLE	SECTO 13052 R 3/18/2013 M412/1	2	10/4/1982	B1
121533	CABLE	ATHENS 16510 R 3/18/2013 M412/1	1	10/7/1982	B1
121534	CABLE	STATE 285984 R 3/18/2013 M412/1	1	10/10/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
121535	CABLE	ATHENS 16941 PAR 11/5/2015 M412/1	3	10/15/1982	B1
121536	MEMO	DENNIS BLAIR TO WILLIAM CLARK RE US-GREEK NEGOTIATIONS R 3/18/2013 M412/1	1	10/20/1982	B1
121537	MEMO	L. PAUL BREMER, III TO WILLIAM CLARK RE US-GREEK NEGOTIATIONS R 3/18/2013 M412/1	1	10/19/1982	B1
121538	CABLE	ATHENS 17698 R 3/18/2013 M412/1	2	10/29/1982	B1
121539	MEMO	WILLIAM CLARK TO GEORGE SHULTZ, ET AL. RE BASE NEGOTIATIONS R 7/31/2013 M412/1	1	11/3/1982	B1
121540	MEMO	DENNIS BLAIR AND AL MYER TO WILLIAM CLARK RE NEGOTIATIONS WITH GREECE PAR 7/31/2013 M412/1	1	10/26/1982	B1
121541	DISTRIBUTION RECORD	RE BASE NEGOTIATIONS PAR 11/5/2015 M412/1	1	11/3/1982	B1 B3
121542	CABLE	ATHENS 18204 PAR 3/18/2013 M412/1	2	11/5/1982	B1

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121526

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 ATHENS 3681 DTG: 201315Z AUG 82 PSN: 053679
SIT148 DATE 08/20/82 TOR: 232/1321Z

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEH# 3681 2321316
O 201315Z AUG 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1311
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 1497
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0025

INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 4699
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 5774
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE 0358
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 1133
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 3575
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 1972
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 2172
BT

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 13681

EXDIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PORG, ICRC, SHUM, SREF, LE, IS
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: SICK AND WOUNDED
REF: A. GENEVA 8538, B. BEIRUT 5518, C. BEIRUT 5520

1. / - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PERICLES NEARCHOU OF PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU'S STAFF INFORMED US TODAY (AUGUST 20) THAT GREECE IS NOT REPEAT NDT PREPARED TO TAKE MORE THAN 300 SICK AND WOUNDED PALESTINIANS ORIGINALLY PROPOSED BY THE GOG. OF THE THREE HUNDRED, NEARCHOU SAID, CYPRUS HAD AGREED TO TAKE FORTY, WHICH MEANS GREECE WILL IN THE END TAKE 260. HE WAS EMPHATIC THAT GREECE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CANNOT GO BEYOND THAT FIGURE, I.E., 300.

3. GREECE HAD INDICATED TO THE PALESTINIANS THAT IF THE ICRC COULD NOT SUPPLY A SHIP TO TRANSPORT THE SICK AND WOUNDED, GREECE WOULD DO SO, NEARCHOU SAID. INFORMED THERE IS NOW A STRONG POSSIBILITY THE FLORA WILL BE AVAILABLE IN BEIRUT BY AUGUST 22 P.M., HE REQUESTED THAT GREECE BE GIVEN AS MUCH NOTICE AS POSSIBLE IF THE FLORA OR OTHER HOSPITAL SHIP IS NOT AVAILABLE SINCE GREECE WOULD NEED SOME TIME TO PREPARE ITS OWN VESSEL FOR THE TRIP. HE STATED THAT IF IN FACT GREECE FURNISHES THE TRANSPORTATION, THE SHIP WOULD BE "FULLY EQUIPPED AND MANNED" TO TRANSPORT THE SICK AND WOUNDED. HE HAD TOLD US EARLIER THAT HE HAD ASKED THE MINISTRY OF MERCHANT MARINE "TO RESERVE" A SHIP IN CASE IT MIGHT BE NEEDED. HE DID NOT REJECT

THE IDEA OF AN ADDITIONAL SHIP TO EVACUATE SICK AND WOUNDED TO EGYPT, BUT SAID IT WOULD HINGE ON A REQUEST FROM THE PALESTINIANS AND "WOULD HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED."

4. NEARCHOU STATED THAT GREECE IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE EVACUEES WHENEVER THE EVACUATION OCCURS. HE ADDED THAT THE GREEK AMBASSADOR IN BEIRUT HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH PALESTINIANS ON THE WHOLE QUESTION OF THE EVACUATION BUT HAS HEARD NOTHING FROM THEM.

5. NEARCHOU ALSO SAID THAT HE HAD TALKED WITH THE ICRC IN GENEVA, AND HAD DISCUSSED SOME OF THE DETAILS OF THE EVACUATION. HE HAD BEEN GIVEN THE NAME OF THE ICRC REP IN BEIRUT, INDICATING THAT THE GREEK AMBASSADOR THERE WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH HIM.

6. MINIMIZE BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS CONSIDERED.
STEARNS

ATHENS 3681

DTG: 201315Z AUG 82 PSN: 053679

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BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

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PAGE 01 ATHENS 14847 01 OF 03 092001Z
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1645

COPY 10 OF 20 COPIES

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 ATHENS 14847

NODIS //CORRECTED COPY ADDING LN TO PARA 12//

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MAPR, MILI, GR, US
SUBJECT: PAPANDEOU FURTHER DEVELOPS GREEK APPROACH TO
- DECA

REF: ATHENS 13441

1. ~~(S)~~-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. BEGIN SUMMARY: PRIME MINISTER PAPANDEOU VISUALIZES DECA NEGOTIATIONS PROCEEDING IN TWO PHASES. FIRST WOULD BE PRELIMINARY EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN U.S. AND GREEK NEGOTIATORS ON "POLITICAL" DIMENSIONS OF DECA, TO BE FOLLOWED BY SECOND PHASE IN WHICH DETAILED TECHNICAL AGREEMENTS WERE WORKED OUT BY FULL DELEGATIONS. PAPANDEOU BELIEVES THIS APPROACH TO BE CONSISTENT WITH U.S. DESIRE FOR EXPLORATORY EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. AMBASSADOR COMMENTED TO PAPANDEOU THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO THINK POLITICAL ISSUES COULD BE COMPLETELY DIVORCED FROM TECHNICAL ONES. SOME POLITICAL PROBLEMS INHERENT IN DECA CAN BEST OR ONLY BE SOLVED BY TECHNICAL MEANS. PAPANDEOU ACCEPTED THIS POINT, BUT SAID HE WANTED AT THIS STAGE TO AVOID FULL-DRESS, FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS. DEPUTY MINISTER KAPSTS WILL BE CHIEF GREEK NEGOTIATOR AND PRIME MINISTER BELIEVES THAT FIRST PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE

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PAGE 03 ATHENS 14847 01 OF 03 092001Z

CLOSELY, MAKING COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS TO OUR NEGOTIATORS WHEN I THOUGHT THERE WAS A NEED, BUT WITHOUT INVOLVING MYSELF DIRECTLY IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. BY THE SAME TOKEN, THE EMBASSY WOULD BE SUPPLYING GUIDANCE AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT, AS NECESSARY, TO THE NEGOTIATING TEAM AND I EXPECTED MY MINISTER-COUNSELOR, ALAN BERLIND, AND POLITICAL-MILITARY OFFICER, PETER COLLINS, TO BE INTIMATELY INVOLVED TO ASSURE EFFECTIVE COORDINATION BETWEEN THE WASHINGTON-BASED NEGOTIATORS AND THE EMBASSY.

6. PAPANDREOU THEN SURPRISED ME BY ASKING WHETHER IT WAS THE INTENTION OF THE AMERICAN SIDE TO BASE REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW, U.S. NEGOTIATOR, AND HIS IMMEDIATE STAFF IN ATHENS DURING THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. I REPLIED THAT NO SUCH PROPOSAL HAD BEEN MADE TO ME; THE ONLY INQUIRY FROM WASHINGTON OF WHICH I WAS AWARE CONCERNED ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT BY THE EMBASSY FOR THE NEGOTIATING TEAM. I ASKED THE PRIME MINISTER WHAT LED HIM TO BELIEVE THAT ANYONE INVOLVED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD IN MIND AN ATHENS-BASED OPERATION.

7. PAPANDREOU WAS SOMEWHAT EVASIVE IN HIS REPLY, SAYING SIMPLY THAT HE HAD RECEIVED AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT TO THAT EFFECT FROM A WASHINGTON CONTACT. THE REPORT HAD CAUGHT HIS ATTENTION, HE SAID, BECAUSE IT WAS INCONSISTENT WITH MY ARGUMENT TO HIM IN AUGUST THAT A WASHINGTON-BASED NEGOTIATOR WAS BETTER PLACED TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS AHEAD EXPEDITIOUSLY THAN AN EMBASSY OFFICIAL. I SAID I WAS STILL OF THAT OPINION AND BELIEVED WASHINGTON AGENCIES CONCERNED IN THE DECA SHARED IT. I THEREFORE THOUGHT HIS

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 ATHENS 14847

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CORRECTED COPY (ADDING LINE PARA 12)

SOURCE, WHATEVER IT WAS, TO BE MISTAKEN. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID HE HAD MENTIONED THE REPORT TO ENABLE ME TO COMMENT ON IT. HE REPEATED THAT THE SOURCE WAS "UN-OFFICIAL" -- A GREEK NEWSPAPERMAN IN NEW YORK OR WASHINGTON WHO HAD PICKED UP A RUMOR AND PASSED IT ON TO A MEMBER OF PAPANDEOU'S STAFF. HE ADDED HE WAS RELIEVED TO KNOW THE REPORT WAS GROUNDFLESS. TO BASE OUR DELEGATION IN ATHENS WOULD INEVITABLY EXPOSE IT TO COMPETING GREEK POLITICAL PRESSURES, WHICH WOULD BE MAGNIFIED BY PARTISAN GREEK JOURNALISTS.

8. OUR CONVERSATION TURNED TO THE WAY THE PRIME MINISTER HOPED THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD EVOLVE. HE SAW THEM, HE SAID, PROCEEDING IN TWO DISTINCT BUT RELATED PHASES: THE FIRST, POLITICAL, AND THE SECOND, TECHNICAL. IN THE FIRST PHASE, THE GREEK AND U.S. NEGOTIATORS WOULD EXCHANGE VIEWS ON THE ESSENTIAL OBJECTIVES AND CONDITIONS WHICH EACH SIDE SOUGHT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS WOULD BE DONE "AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL," WITHOUT THE FULL NEGOTIATING TEAMS BEING ASSEMBLED, AND WOULD BE DESIGNED TO CREATE AN AGREED FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH DETAILED AND TECHNICAL AGREEMENTS COULD BE REACHED LATER. THE GREEK NEGOTIATOR, SAID PAPANDEOU, WOULD BE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KAPSIS. HE THEREFORE BELIEVED THAT THE FRAMEWORK DISCUSSIONS

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PAGE 02 ATHENS 14847 02 OF 03 100851Z

SHOULD TAKE PLACE BETWEEN KAPSIS AND U.S. NEGOTIATOR BARTHOLOMEW. OTHERS WHO WOULD BE INVOLVED ON THE GREEK SIDE WOULD BE MACHERITSAS AND KOURIS. EVEN THEY, HE IMPLIED, WOULD BE IN THE BACKGROUND DURING THE INITIAL PHASE. PAPANDREOU SUPPOSED HE WOULD HAVE TO ADD TO THIS SMALL TEAM A GREEK DIPLOMAT SINCE THE GREEK FOREIGN SERVICE WAS COMPLAINING THAT HE DID NOT "TRUST THEM." THE PRIME MINISTER ASKED MY REACTION TO THIS CONCEPT.

9. I SAID, AS HE KNEW, THE AMERICAN SIDE FAVORED THE IDEA OF A PRELIMINARY AND INFORMAL EXCHANGE OF IDEAS TO REDUCE THE DANGER OF MISCALCULATION. THE KIND OF MEETING HE HAD IN MIND SEEMED GENERALLY CONSISTENT WITH THAT APPROACH. I THOUGHT, HOWEVER, THERE WERE POSSIBLE DANGERS IN TRYING TO DIVORCE COMPLETELY THE POLITICAL FROM THE TECHNICAL SIDE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. KAPSIS AND BARTHOLOMEW WOULD BE TACKLING ISSUES THAT MIGHT BE HARD TO RESOLVE IN PURELY POLITICAL TERMS. TO TAKE ONE EXAMPLE, THE PASOK GOVERNMENT HAD REPEATEDLY DECLARED IT WOULD REQUIRE ASSURANCES FROM THE U.S. THAT OUR FACILITIES WOULD NOT BE USED IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCES TO "THREATEN" COUNTRIES WITH WHICH GREECE HAD FRIENDLY RELATIONS. I COULD ASSURE PAPANDREOU THAT THE AMERICAN NEGOTIATORS WOULD NOT AGREE TO CONDITIONS WHICH EFFECTIVELY IMPAIRED THE ABILITY OF THE U.S. TO DISCHARGE ITS RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SECURITY IN THE REGION. THIS WAS ONE OF A NUMBER OF ISSUES THAT WOULD BE ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO RESOLVE IN PURELY POLITICAL TERMS. WE SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT POLITICAL PROBLEMS COULD HAVE TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS. FOR THAT REASON, IT WOULD BE UNREALISTIC TO TRY TO COMPARTMENTALIZE THE SO-CALLED POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE DECA.

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PAGE 03 ATHENS 14847 02 OF 03 100851Z

10. PAPANDEOU SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE POINT BUT, TO TAKE MY OWN EXAMPLE, UNDERSTANDINGS OF A POLITICAL NATURE COULD BE REACHED BEFORE DETAILED TECHNICAL AGREEMENTS WERE DRAFTED. AS FAR AS THE USE OF U.S. FACILITIES WITH RESPECT TO THIRD COUNTRIES WAS CONCERNED, HE COULD SEE A DISTINCTION BEING MADE BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND OPERATIONS. HE THEN CUT HIMSELF OFF BY SAYING THAT HE AND I SHOULD NOT ANTICIPATE THE PROBLEMS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. HIS CONCEPT OF THE KAPSIS-BARTHOLOMEW MEETINGS WAS, HE THOUGHT, ENTIRELY CONSISTENT WITH OUR DESIRE TO HAVE INFORMAL AND EXPLORATORY EXCHANGES BEFORE BEGINNING FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS. AN APPROACH OF THE KIND HE WAS SUGGESTING WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF PERMITTING THE TALKS TO BEGIN QUIETLY AND OUT OF THE GLARE OF PUBLICITY. IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE AND ONLY HARDEN THE POSITIONS FOR A LARGE TEAM OF U.S. NEGOTIATORS TO APPEAR IN ATHENS. QUIET TALKS WOULD PERMIT GREATER FLEXIBILITY. IF THIS KIND OF AN APPROACH WAS AGREEABLE TO US, PAPANDEOU BELIEVED THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PREPARED TO RECEIVE BARTHOLOMEW IN ATHENS IN ABOUT A MONTH.

11. I TOLD PAPANDEOU I WOULD GET BACK TO HIM IN DUE COURSE ABOUT THE NEGOTIATING METHOD HE HAD OUTLINED.

12. COMMENT: THE APPROACH FAVORED BY PAPANDEOU ENABLES HIM TO DEFER THE TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS FOR WHICH HE OBVIOUSLY BELIEVES THE GREEK GOVERNMENT IS STILL UNPREPARED. AT THE SAME TIME, IT WOULD GET HIM OFF THE HOOK WITH CRITICS ON THE LEFT AND RIGHT WHO ARE ASKING POINTEDLY WHY THE GREEK GOVERNMENT HAS DELAYED SO LONG IN STARTING NEGOTIATIONS. FROM OUR STANDPOINT, THIS APPROACH HAS THE ADVANTAGE OF AVOIDING A GREEK DRAFT BEFORE THEY HEAR OUR VIEWS. ALTHOUGH PAPANDEOU'S APPARENT INTENTION TO CONCENTRATE ONLY ON "POLITICAL" OBJECTIVES SEEMS TO BE

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PAGE 01 ATHENS 14847 03 OF 03 092002Z
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1647

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UNREALISTIC, I SUSPECT THAT UPON REFLECTION IT MAY ALSO SEEM SO TO HIM. AT THIS STAGE, I THINK HIS PREOCCUPATION IS WITH BEING SEEN TO HAVE STARTED NEGOTIATIONS RATHER THAN WITH ACTUALLY NEGOTIATING. THIS NEED NOT BE TIME WASTED FOR US. IT WILL TAKE A LOT OF PALAVER TO CLARIFY THE GREEK GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE. INFORMAL TALKS BETWEEN BARTHOLOMEW AND KAPSTS MAY BE THE BEST WAY TO BEGIN THE PROCESS. STEARNS

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	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>
121528	CABLE	1	9/14/1982	B1
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DE RUEHC #1114 2592109
O 162055Z SEP 82 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 4686

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 8043
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~~SECRET~~ STATE 261114

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP, GR

SUBJECT: GOG REQUESTS CALL BY PRESIDENT KARAMANLIS ON
PRESIDENT REAGAN

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AMBASSADOR KARANDREAS CALLED ON EAGLEBURGER SEPTEMBER 15 AND ASKED IF PRESIDENT REAGAN COULD RECEIVE PRESIDENT KARAMANLIS WHO WILL BE IN THE U. S. OCTOBER 18-23. PURPOSE OF KARAMANLIS TRIP WOULD BE TO OPEN THE "SEARCH FOR ALEXANDER" EXHIBIT AT THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM IN NEW YORK OCTOBER 20. ; E WOULD BE AVAILABLE AT ANY OTHER TIME DURING HIS STAY FOR A VISIT TO WASHINGTON, BUT WOULD COME TO WASHINGTON ONLY IF HE WERE TO BE RECEIVED BY THE PRESIDENT. KARANDREAS STRESSED CONFIDENTIALITY OF HIS APPROACH.

3. EAGLEBURGER NOTED THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE FOR OCTOBER WAS ALREADY RATHER FULL, BUT HE WOULD LOOK INTO THE MATTER

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AND TRY TO GIVE A QUICK RESPONSE. SHULTZ

DECLASSIFIED

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BY KAL NARA DATE 3/18/13

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 1305 DTG:162353Z SEP 82 PSN: 035301
SIT060 DATE 10/12/82 TOR: 260/0315Z

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MESSAGE:

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 4690

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FOR THE AMBASSADOR
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MARR, MILI, GR, US
SUBJECT: (S) APPROACH TO DECA

REFS: (A) ATHENS 14847, (B) ATHENS 15156

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PAPANDEOU'S APPROACH (REFTEL) GENERALLY FITS WITH OUR OWN WISHES NOT TO FORCE THE PACE OF NEGOTIATIONS AND TO AVOID DETAILED GREEK POSITIONS AND DRAFT BEFORE ANY EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. ACCORDINGLY, ON YOUR RETURN YOU SHOULD TELL PAPANDEOU THAT WASHINGTON AGREES TO KAPSIS-BARTHOLOMEW PRELIMINARY TALKS IN ATHENS AND THAT WE LEAVE IT TO GREEKS TO PROPOSE SPECIFIC DATES.

3. AT SAME TIME, WE WANT TO UNDERScore WITH PAPANDEOU POINT YOU MADE ON DIFFICULTY AND UNDESIRABILITY OF DRAWING SHARP LINE BETWEEN THE "POLITICAL" AND THE "TECHNICAL". WE THINK IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO CHARACTERIZE THE PRELIMINARY TALKS AS "POLITICAL TALKS"

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AIMED AT REACHING AN AGREED "POLITICAL" FRAMEWORK FOR SUBSEQUENT "TECHNICAL" NEGOTIATIONS. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE "POLITICAL" AND "TECHNICAL" SIMPLY CANNOT ALWAYS BE MADE, AND WILL ONLY COMPLICATE THE PROSPECTS FOR SOLUTIONS, FOR THE REASONS YOU SO APTLY STATED. NET RESULT WOULD BE TO SET OURSELVES AN OBJECTIVE WE ARE UNLIKELY TO REACH, WHICH WOULD BE A DISAPPOINTING BEGINNING FOR DECA PROCESS FOR OUR PUBLICS AS WELL AS OUR GOVERNMENTS. (FYI. WE SUSPECT THAT TO EXTENT DISTINCTION CAN BE MADE, MOST OF WHAT GREEKS WANT WOULD COME IN "POLITICAL" PHASE, WHILE WHAT WE WANT IS IN "TECHNICAL" PHASE. MOREOVER, WE WANT TO AVOID BEING DRAWN AB INITIO INTO A 1976 PRINCIPLES-STYLE EXERCISE. END FYI)

4. INSTEAD, WE THINK WE SHOULD APPROACH THE PRELIMINARY TALKS AS SIMPLY AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON GENERAL APPROACH AND OBJECTIVES AND MAJOR ELEMENTS OF A NEW AGREEMENT, AIMED AT AN ENHANCED MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING THAT WILL HELP BOTH SIDES IN SUBSEQUENT FORMAL DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS.

5. YOU MIGHT ALSO ASK PAPANDEOU HOW HE WANTS TO HANDLE PUBLICITY ON PRELIMINARY TALKS. WE WANT TO ACCOMMODATE HIS DESIRE TO HAVE THEM "BEGIN QUIETLY AND OUT OF THE GLARE OF PUBLICITY" BUT NOTE ANA REPORT ON "DISCUSSIONS" (REF B) AND EXPECT THAT KAPSIS-BARTHOLOMEW TALKS WILL GET CONSIDERABLE GREEK PRESS ATTENTION. IN CONJUNCTION WITH WORKING OUT DATES FOR TALKS, WE WILL WANT ALSO TO WORK OUT COMMON LOW-KEY PRESS LINE STRESSING THAT THESE ARE PRELIMINARY TALKS TO ENHANCE UNDERSTANDING OF EACH OTHER'S VIEWS AS A PRELUDE TO NEGOTIATIONS PROPER, AND SIMPLY STICK WITH THAT.

6. WE READ PARA 8 REFTel TO SAY THAT MAHERITSAS AND KOURIS (AND "GREEK DIPLOMAT") WILL NOT ACTUALLY BE IN ROOM WITH KAPSIS FOR PRELIMINARY TALKS. WE WOULD LIKE TO BE SURE ON THIS POINT SINCE IT OBVIOUSLY BEARS ON WHO BARTHOLOMEW WILL HAVE WITH HIM.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

7. AMBASSADOR IS COMPLETELY CORRECT IN CONCLUSION THE USG DOES NOT INTEND TO SET BARTHOLOMEW UP IN ATHENS. SHULTZ

SECSTATE WASHDC 1305

DTG:162353Z SEP 82 PSN: 035301

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NLRR M412 #121530
BY JKML NARA DATE 3/12/13

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121531

12

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 9736 DTG: 240238Z SEP 82 PSN: 045022
SIT491 DATE 09/28/82 TOR: 267/0256Z

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #9736 2670257
O 240238Z SEP 82 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 4840

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 8077
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 269736

NODIS

E. O. 12356: DECL; OADR

TAGS: PGOV, OTRA, (KARAMANLIS, CONSTANTINE)

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT KARAMANLIS WITHDRAWS REQUEST FOR CALL
ON PRESIDENT REAGAN

REF: STATE 261114

~~(S)~~ AMBASSADOR KARANDREAS INFORMED THE DEPARTMENT
SEPTEMBER 22 THAT PRESIDENT KARAMANLIS HAD DECIDED NOT
TO COME TO THE U. S. IN OCTOBER AS DESCRIBED REFTEL. HIS
REQUEST TO CALL ON THE PRESIDENT AT THAT TIME IS THEREFORE
WITHDRAWN. SHULTZ

DECLASSIFIED
NLRRM412 # 121531
BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

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121532

13

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 USDEL SECRETARY IN 2708 DTG: 040238Z OCT 82 PSN: 001270
SIT005 DATE 10/05/82 TOR: 277/0328Z

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHDT #2708/01 2770240
O 040238Z OCT 82 ZFF-6
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN NEW YORK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7040

INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USMISSION USNATO
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 SECTO 13052

EXDIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P), UNGA, GR, XF, MARR
SUBJECT: (U) SECRETARY SCHULTZ'S BILATERAL WITH GREEK
FOREIGN MINISTER HARALAMBOPOULOS ON OCTOBER 1

1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. SUMMARY. SECRETARY SCHULTZ MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER HARALAMBOPOULOS FOR A DISCUSSION WHICH TOUCHED ON GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS AND THE MIDDLE EAST. THE MAIN TOPIC WAS THE GREEK DECISION THAT THE ATMOSPHERE WAS SUITABLE FOR THE FIRST PHASE (POLITICAL ASPECTS) OF U.S.-GREEK NEGOTIATIONS TO BEGIN AT THE END OF OCTOBER IN ATHENS. THE SECRETARY ALSO CONVEYED

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

HIS APPRECIATION FOR THE ROLE OF THE GOG DURING THE EVACUATION OF THE PLO FROM BEIRUT. END SUMMARY.

3. PRESENT AT HALF HOUR MEETING WITH SECRETARY AT UN PLAZA HOTEL WERE FOREIGN MINISTER HARALAMBOPOULOS, AMBASSADOR KARANDREOUS, AND PASITAKIS OF MFA. WITH THE SECRETARY ON THE U.S. SIDE WERE REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW, RICHARD HAASS, EUR, AND DIRK GLEYSTEN, EUR/SE.

4. AFTER A BRIEF PRIVATE EXCHANGE WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON PROSPECTS FOR GREECE'S RELATIONS WITH TURKEY, THE SECRETARY SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE WERE SEVERAL POSITIVE EFFORTS UNDERWAY TO IMPROVE GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS. THE FOREIGN MINISTER AGREED, SAYING THAT ACTIONS ARE MAINLY IN THE PLANNING STAGE,

BUT THAT HE INTENDED TO MEET SOON IN CANADA WITH THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER. WHAT WAS WEEDED, THE GOG FELT, WAS TO DEVELOP PROCEDURES FOR MEETINGS SO THAT A REGULAR DIALOGUE COULD START. TO MOVE AT ALL, A CLIMATE NEEDED TO BE BUILT SO THAT BOTH SIDES COULD PREPARE THEIR INITIATIVES IN GOOD TIME, WITHOUT EXTERNAL EVENTS CREATING PRESSURES. HARALAMBOPOULOS SAID GREECE AND TURKEY HAD AGREED ON THEIR MORATORIUM ON ACTIONS THAT MIGHT IRRITATE EACH OTHER IN ORDER TO CREATE THE NECESSARY ATMOSPHERE. SO FAR, IT HAD WORKED, WITH A FEW EXCEPTIONS.

5. FOREIGN MINISTER HARALAMBOPOULOS THEN STRESSED THE SENSITIVITY OF THE GOG, THE PUBLIC, AND ESPECIALLY THE MILITARY TO ANY ISSUES AFFECTING GREEK SOVEREIGNTY OR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. HE SAID RECENT TURKISH ACTIONS HAD RAISED QUESTIONS NOT AT ISSUE SINCE 1923. HE SAID THAT IN RECENT YEARS, THE TURKS HAD CHALLENGED GREEK CONTROL OF THE AEGEAN BY ACTIONS RELATING TO THE CONTINENTAL SHELF, DIFFERENCES ABOUT THE FIR, AND CONTROL OF AIR SPACE WHERE ARRANGEMENTS HAD EXISTED FOR FIFTY YEARS WITHOUT OBJECTIONS FROM TURKEY.

6. HE SAID THAT 1973, AND THE EVENTS THAT LED TO TURKISH OCCUPATION OF CYPRUS, HAD LED TO A NEW PHASE IN GREEK-U.S. RELATIONS. SUBSEQUENT U.S.-GREEK NEGOTIATIONS HAD NOT SUCCEEDED AND GREECE HAD LIVED IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF FEAR OF TURKISH AGRESSION.

USDEL SECRETARY IN 2708 DTG: 040238Z OCT 82 PSN: 001270
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

NEVERTHELESS, THE VISIT OF SECRETARY HAIG IN MAY HAD CREATED A GOOD ATMOSPHERE. EMPHASIZING GREEK NEED TO FEEL THERE WAS A BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY, THE GOG HAD CONCLUDED THAT THE TIME HAD COME FOR NEW NEGOTIATIONS. HIS GOVERNMENT SUGGESTED THAT A GOOD TIME TO START WOULD BE THE END OF OCTOBER. THE GOG ENVISAGED NEGOTIATIONS IN TWO PHASES: (1) DEALING WITH THE POLITICAL ASPECTS, AND (2) COVERING TECHNICAL, LEGAL AND MATERIAL MATTERS. HE THOUGHT THE FIRST PHASE WOULD LAST ABOUT 3 MONTHS; THEY WOULD BE LED ON THE GREEK SIDE BY DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KAPSIS. PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT MR. BARTHOLOMEW WOULD HEAD THE U.S. SIDE. THE SECRETARY SAID HE AGREED WITH THE GREEK SUGGESTION RE THE TIMING OF THE START OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND CONFIRMED THAT BARTHOLOMEW WOULD BE THE U.S. NEGOTIATOR.

7. MIDDLE EAST. THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED HIS THANKS FOR GREEK HELP DURING THE PLO EVACUATION; IT HAD PLAYED A CRITICAL ROLE IN THE ACTION. HARALAMBOPOULOS READILY AGREED. HE REFERRED TO THE DEEP LINKS AND BONDS GREECE HAS WITH THE ARAB WORLD AND SAID GREECE COULD PLAY A USEFUL ROLE. THE SECRETARY AGREED,

USDEL SECRETARY IN 2708 DTG: 040238Z OCT 82 PSN: 001270

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BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 USDEL SECRETARY IN 2708 DTG: 040238Z OCT 82 PSN: 001272
SIT082 DATE 10/05/82 TOR: 277/0329Z

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NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

USDEL SECRETARY IN 2708 DTG: 040238Z OCT 82 PSN: 001272

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHDT #2708/02 2770242
O 041575Z OCT 82 ZFF-6
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN NEW YORK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7041

INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 SECTO 13052

EXDIS

NOTING THE LARGE NUMBER OF U.S. FIRMS THAT HAVE MOVED THEIR MIDDLE EAST REPRESENTATIVES TO ATHENS SINCE 1975. HARALAMBOPOULOS AGREED THAT THE ATMOSPHERE IN ATHENS WAS VERY GOOD; IT PROVIDED A LINK BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST, ETC.

8. THE SECRETARY ASKED THE FOREIGN MINISTER IF HE HAD ANY SUGGESTIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE. HARALAMBOPOULOS SAID A SOLUTION WAS CLEARLY DIFFICULT, BUT THOUGHT THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS MAY HAVE OPENED THE DOOR. HE HAD SPOKEN TO MODERATE ARAB LEADERS; ALL WERE AGREED THAT IF NO PROGRESS WAS MADE NOW, THERE WOULD BE WIDESPREAD VIOLENCE. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT THE PALESTINIANS HAVE BEEN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ENCOURAGED BY THE U.S. INITIATIVE, ACCORDING TO MODERATE ARAB LEADERS. THE LATTER HAVE TOLD THE GREEKS THAT THEY AGREE THAT THE U.S. CAN PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN REACHING A SOLUTION.

9. AS THE MEETING DREW TO A CLOSE, AMBASSADOR KARANDREOUS SAID THERE WERE JOURNALISTS WISHING TO BE INFORMED OF THE RESULTS OF THE MEETING. HE PROPOSED THAT BOTH SIDES AGREE TO THE SAME APPROACH. BEGIN QUOTE. THE TWO MINISTERS EXCHANGED VIEWS ON BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL MATTERS. THEY AGREED THAT U.S.-GREEK NEGOTIATIONS WOULD START BY THE END OF OCTOBER IN ATHENS, THAT THE FIRST PHASE DEALING WITH POLITICAL ASPECTS MIGHT LAST ABOUT THREE MONTHS AND THE PARTIES WILL BE LOOKING FOR A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION TO THE NEGOTIATIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE SECRETARY OF

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15

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 ATHENS 6510 DTG: 071614Z OCT 82 PSN: 007244
SIT814 DATE 10/12/82 TOR: 280/1934Z

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHTH #6510 2801614
O 071614Z OCT 82
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2124

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 16510

NODIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MARR, MILLI, GR, US
SUBJECT: KAPSIS PROPOSES TIMETABLE FOR DECA
REF: ATHENS 16381

1. ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AMBASSADOR SAW DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KAPSIS AT NOON TODAY TO DISCUSS TIMING OF PRELIMINARY ROUND OF DECA BETWEEN KAPSIS AND U.S. NEGOTIATOR BARTHOLOMEW. AFTER SOME BACK AND FORTH ABOUT DESIRABILITY OF BEGINNING TALKS AFTER COMPLETION OF GREEK MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS-- FINAL RESULTS OF WHICH WILL BE TALLIED WEEKEND OF OCTOBER 23-24 -- IT WAS AGREED THAT WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 27, WOULD BE LOGICAL DATE. ALTHOUGH THURSDAY, OCTOBER 28, IS NATIONAL HOLIDAY, OXI DAY, KAPSIS SAID HE WOULD BE PERFECTLY PREPARED TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS THAT DAY. KAPSIS EMPHASIZED THAT HIS OWN DESIRE, AS WELL AS THAT OF GREEK GOVERNMENT, WAS TO COMPLETE NEGOTIATIONS AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE AND HE WAS THEREFORE PREPARED TO DEVOTE AS MUCH TIME TO HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH BARTHOLOMEW AS WAS NECESSARY TO COMPLETE PRELIMINARY ROUND PROMPTLY. AMBASSADOR SAID HE WOULD SEEK BARTHOLOMEW'S CONCURRENCE WITH OCTOBER 27 STARTING DATE, BUT HAD NO REASON TO THINK IT WOULD NOT BE SATISFACTORY.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. AT REQUEST OF KAPSIS, AMBASSADOR THEN REVIEWED PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU'S REMARKS ABOUT MAIN ASPECTS OF DECA THAT PRIME MINISTER THOUGHT SHOULD BE COVERED IN PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS (RETEL). WHILE KAPSIS INDICATED HE HAD ALREADY RECEIVED PRIME MINISTER'S INSTRUCTIONS ALONG SAME LINES, AMBASSADOR GAINED IMPRESSION KAPSIS WAS HEARING PART OF HIS "INSTRUCTIONS" FOR THE FIRST TIME. AFTER COMPLETION OF AMBASSADOR'S SUMMARY, KAPSIS SAID HE WOULD ADD ONLY ONE POINT. HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE AT THE BEGINNING OF HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH BARTHOLOMEW TO AGREE ON A COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF BASIC AGREEMENTS AND ANNEXES TO BE SUBSUMED IN NEW DECA. GREEK GOVERNMENT HAD COUNTED 108 INDIVIDUAL AGREEMENTS AND SUB-AGREEMENTS REACHED WITH THE UNITED STATES SINCE WORLD WAR II. SOME OF THESE HAD NEVER BEEN PROPERLY CATALOGUED AND HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE WISE AT THE

BEGINNING OF HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH BARTHOLOMEW FOR THEM TO REVIEW TOGETHER LIST OF VALID AGREEMENTS.

4. AMBASSADOR RECALLED SIMILAR EXERCISE HAD BEEN NECESSARY IN 1975 DURING FIRST ROUND OF BASE NEGOTIATIONS. HE DID NOT RECALL FIGURE OF 108, BUT WHATEVER THE NUMBER OF VALID AGREEMENTS ACTUALLY WAS, AN AGREED INVENTORY WOULD ASSURE THAT TWO SIDES WOULD HAVE A COMMON POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR THEIR DISCUSSIONS.

5. KAPSIS THEN SAID THAT, IN LIGHT OF PRIME MINISTER'S DESIRE FOR INFORMAL, LOW-PROFILE TALKS, HE WOULD PROPOSE THAT HE AND BARTHOLOMEW FIRST MEET ALONE AND THEN BE JOINED BY ONE AIDE. IN HIS CASE, THIS WOULD BE CONSTANTINE ZEPPUS, HEAD OF THIRD DEPARTMENT POLITICAL AFFAIRS (FOR WESTERN EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS) OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. AMBASSADOR SAID HE THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE PERFECTLY SATISFACTORY TO U.S. SIDE. HE WOULD ADVISE KAPSIS OF THE NAME OF BARTHOLOMEW'S AIDE WHEN CHOICE HAD BEEN MADE.

6. IN CONCLUSION, KAPSIS ASKED AMBASSADOR TO INFORM BARTHOLOMEW THAT HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO THEIR DISCUSSIONS AND HOPED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO COMPLETE THE PRELIMINARY ROUND OF DECA RAPIDLY. THE GREEK GOVERNMENT, HE SAID, WAS SERIOUS ABOUT REACHING AN AGREEMENT AND WAS PREPARED TO DEFEND THAT AGREEMENT FROM ATTACK FROM THE LEFT OR THE RIGHT. THE AMBASSADOR

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SAID THAT KAPSIS WOULD FIND THAT THE U.S. SIDE APPROACHED NEGOTIATION OF A NEW DECA IN THE SAME POSITIVE SPIRIT. STEARNS

ATHENS 6510

DTG: 071614Z OCT 82 PSN: 007244

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NLRR M412 #121533

BY KML NARA DATE 3/12/13

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121534 16

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 5984 DTG:100118Z OCT 82 PSN: 010948
SIT798 DATE 10/12/82 TOR: 283/0431Z

3. WOULD LIKE EMBASSY'S REACTIONS AND ADVICE ON FOREGOING ASAP.

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #5984 2830129
O 100118Z OCT 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 5146

~~SECRET~~ STATE 285984

NODIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MARR, MILI, GR, US
SUBJECT: (S) DECA TIMETABLE

REF: (A) ATHENS 16510, (B) ATHENS 16381, (C) STATE 261305

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. BARTHOLOMEW CONCURS WITH OCTOBER 27 STARTING DATE. HE WOULD LIKE TO VISIT EUCOM AND AFSOUTH, ARRIVE ATHENS IN TIME FOR THOROUGH INITIAL WORKING SESSIONS WITH EMBASSY, AND DOVETAIL INITIAL VISITS TO U.S. BASES WITH FIRST SESSIONS OF KAPSIS-BARTHOLOMEW TALKS. BARTHOLOMEW WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY HIS EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT DAVID JONES. TENTATIVE SCHEDULE IS AS FOLLOWS:

- OCT. 21: EUCOM
- OCT. 22: AFSOUTH
- OCT. 23: ARRIVE ATHENS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

- OCT. 25-26: WORK WITH EMBASSY
- OCT. 27: TALKS WITH KAPSIS
- OCT. 28: OXI DAY - NO TALKS - VISIT NEA MAKRI AND HELLENIKON
- OCT. 29: TALKS CONTINUE
- OCT. 30-31: WEEKEND
- NOV. 1: VISIT SOUDA BAY AND IRAKLION
- NOV. 2: TALKS CONTINUE

4. OBVIOUSLY, BARTHOLOMEW AND KAPSIS WILL WORK OUT THE TEMPO AND SCHEDULE OF THEIR TALKS WHEN THEY MEET. THAT SAID, TENTATIVE THINKING HERE ENVISAGES AN INITIAL ROUND OF APPROXIMATELY TWO WEEKS, FOLLOWED BY A RECESS FOR CONSULTATIONS IN WASHINGTON BUILT AROUND THE THANKSGIVING BREAK, WITH A SECOND ROUND OPENING IN EARLY DECEMBER, POSSIBLY IN WASHINGTON IF KAPSIS AGREES. THIS PATTERN WOULD PROVIDE US AN OPPORTUNITY TO HEAR THE GREEKS OUT AND THEN GIVE US A CHANCE TO REFLECT IN WASHINGTON ON WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED PRIOR TO PROCEEDING FURTHER. THAT SAID, BARTHOLOMEW WANTS TO BE FORTHCOMING WITH KAPSIS IN WORKING OUT A SCHEDULE THAT MEETS GREEK VIEWS AND POLITICAL NEEDS AND AVOIDS ANY INTIMATION OF A DELIBERATELY SLOW PACE ON OUR PART. EMBASSY VIEWS ON THE FOREGOING WOULD BE WELCOME, INCLUDING THE DESIRABILITY OF EMBASSY'S FORESHADOWING THIS THINKING WITH KAPSIS.

5. OCTOBER 7 AP ITEM CITES A GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN TO THE EFFECT THAT QUOTE THE NEGOTIATORS WILL FIRST DETERMINE THE POLITICAL FRAMEWORK AND THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE NEW AGREEMENT AND THE DURATION OF THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

NEGOTIATIONS. AFTER RATIFICATION OF THIS BY THE FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL (KYESEA) AND BY THE CABINET, HE SAID, THE NEGOTIATORS WILL WORK OUT THE TECHNICAL DETAILS OF THE AGREEMENT. END QUOTE ULTIMATELY, THE POINT AND PURPOSE OF THIS FIRST ROUND OF TALKS WILL BE A MATTER FOR KAPSIS-BARTHOLOMEW DISCUSSION. BUT AS WE NOTED (REF C) WE HAVE PROBLEMS WITH NOTION OF REACHING AN AGREED "POLITICAL FRAMEWORK"

IN THESE TALKS AND WANT TO AVOID BEING DRAWN AB INITIO INTO A 1976 PRINCIPLES-STYLE EXERCISE. EMBASSY MIGHT, AS APPROPRIATE, REITERATE THIS POINT TO GREEKS AND ALSO INFORM THEM THAT WE, FOR OUR PART, INTEND TO FOLLOW LINE WITH PRESS (AS REQUIRED) THAT KAPSIS-BARTHOLOMEW TALKS WILL BE "AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON GENERAL APPROACH AND OBJECTIVES AND MAJOR ELEMENTS OF A NEW AGREEMENT, AIMED AT AN ENHANCED MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING THAT WILL HELP BOTH SIDES AS WE MOVE FORWARD IN THE NEGOTIATIONS." DAM

SECSTATE WASHDC 5984

DTG:100118Z OCT 82 PSN: 010948

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NLRR M412 # 121534

BY kml NARA DATE 3/18/13

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PAGE 01 ATHENS 6941 DTG: 151522Z OCT 82 PSN: 018411
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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

PRIORITY
DE RUEHTH #6941/01 2881527
P 151522Z OCT 82
FM AHEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2235
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO NATO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AHEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 2232
USINT BAGHDAD PRIORITY 1051
AHEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 4055
AHEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 2032
AHEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 1525
AHEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 1084
AHEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 4794
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT PRIORITY
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 ATHENS 16941
EXDIS
MILITARY ADDRESSEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (CARLUCCI, FRANK) GR, NATO, MARR, MILI, US, XF
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEETING WITH PRIME
- MINISTER PAPANDREOU

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. BEGIN SUMMARY: PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU INFORMED DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CARLUCCI THAT GREECE WAS ENTERING THE DECA NEGOTIATIONS WITH A POSITIVE ATTITUDE AND THE INTENTION TO BE AS FLEXIBLE AND FORTHCOMING AS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

POSSIBLE. HE AND CARLUCCI AGREED THAT PRELIMINARY EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN U.S. AND GREEK NEGOTIATORS WAS A SENSIBLE WAY TO START NEGOTIATIONS. AFTER HEARING DEPUTY SECRETARY GIVE SHORT ANALYSIS OF SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, PAPANDREOU SAID HE WOULD WELCOME MORE DETAILED BRIEFING ON SOVIET THREAT BY WASHINGTON SPECIALISTS. TIMING WILL BE WORKED OUT LATER WITH EMBASSY. IN DISCUSSING MIDDLE EAST, PAPANDREOU MADE STRONG DEFENSE OF ARAFAT AS MODERATE PLO LEADER WITH WHOM WE COULD WORK AND WITHOUT WHOM PLO WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY REVERT TO TERRORISM. COMMENTING ON IRAN-IRAQ WAR, PRIME MINISTER NOTED THERE WAS GENERAL FEAR THAT KHOMEINI VICTORY OVER IRAQ WOULD BE CATASTROPHY FOR ARAB WORLD. HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, APPEAR TO DISAGREE WHEN DEPUTY SECRETARY COMMENTED THIS WAS WAR NEITHER SIDE SHOULD WIN. REGARDING GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS, PAPANDREOU EXPRESSED SATISFACTION

WITH IMPROVED ATMOSPHERE AND DESIRE TO CONTINUE IT.
END SUMMARY

3. DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CARLUCCI'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU TOOK PLACE AT PAPANDREOU'S SUBURBAN RESIDENCE JUST BEFORE THE PRIME MINISTER WAS SCHEDULED TO DEPART ON OFFICIAL VISIT TO KUWAIT. THE MEETING LASTED ONE HOUR. ALSO PRESENT WERE AMBASSADOR STEARNS AND CHRISTOS MACHERITSAS, DIRECTOR OF PAPANDREOU'S DIPLOMATIC OFFICE.

4. DEPUTY SECRETARY CARLUCCI OPENED MEETING BY SAYING SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WEINBERGER, AFTER MEETING THE PRIME MINISTER IN BRUSSELS LAST YEAR, HAD HIMSELF HOPED TO VISIT GREECE. SINCE THIS HAD SO FAR PROVED IMPOSSIBLE, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY GLAD THAT CARLUCCI WAS ABLE TO MAKE THE TRIP. PAPANDREOU RECALLED HIS MEETING WITH SECRETARY WEINBERGER. AS A FORMER CALIFORNIAN, PAPANDREOU FOUND HE HAD SOME THINGS IN COMMON WITH THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND HAD GOTTEN ON WITH HIM WELL.

5. DEPUTY SECRETARY CARLUCCI THEN PROVIDED A THUMBNAIL SKETCH OF SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. IT WAS CLEAR, HE SAID, THAT EARLY SEIZURE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN WAS A PRIME SOVIET OBJECTIVE IN THE EVENT OF WAR. THEY CONSIDERED THIS REGION VITAL AND AIMED AT TOTAL CONTROL. THIS MEANT OUR FLEET PRESENCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN WAS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CRUCIALLY IMPORTANT. IT WAS MAIN OBSTACLE TO SOVIET STRATEGIC AIMS IN THIS REGION. COMPETING DEMANDS IN THE PERSIAN GULF LEFT US WITH A NAVAL PRESENCE OF ONE AND ONE-HALF BATTLE GROUPS IN THE MED AND INDIAN OCEAN. WE WOULD LIKE TO DO BETTER THAN THAT. OUR POSITION WOULD BE STRONGER IF THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT PERMITTED NUCLEAR POWERED NAVAL VESSELS TO TRANSIT THE SUEZ CANAL, BUT SO FAR THEY HAD BEEN UNWILLING TO DO THIS. DEPUTY SECRETARY SAID THAT AGAINST FOREGOING BACKGROUND IT WAS CLEAR WHY GREECE HAD CONSIDERABLE GEO-STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE FOR NATO IN THE DEFENSE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN.

6. IN THIS CONNECTION, CARLUCCI EXPRESSED SATISFACTION THAT DECA NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BEGIN ON OCTOBER 27. RECALLING THAT IN THE LAST PHASE OF THE 1981 DECA NEGOTIATIONS HE AND OTHERS AT THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT HAD SPENT A GREAT DEAL OF TIME TRYING TO RESPOND TO LAST-MINUTE GREEK DEMANDS FOR AIRCRAFT AND OTHER HARD-TO-OBTAIN ITEMS OF MILITARY HARDWARE, CARLUCCI SAID HE THOUGHT THIS WAS THE WRONG WAY TO NEGOTIATE THE DECA. HE PREFERRED THE APPROACH ADOPTED THIS TIME IN WHICH A

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NLRR M412/17/2535
BY GW NARA DATE 11/5/15

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18

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 ATHENS 6941
SIT626 DATE 10/21/82

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MESSAGE:

PRIORITY
DE RUEHTH #6941/02 2881529
P 151522Z OCT 82
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2236
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO NATO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 2233
USINT BAGHDAD PRIORITY 1052
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 4056
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 2033
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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 4795
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT PRIORITY
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE PRIORITY
BT

SECRET SECTION 02 OF 03 ATHENS 16941
EXDIS

PRELIMINARY ROUND WOULD PERMIT THE NEGOTIATORS TO FORMULATE AN AGREED FRAMEWORK. IN THIS CONNECTION, DEPUTY SECRETARY COMMENDED QUALIFICATIONS OF U.S. NEGOTIATOR BARTHOLOMEW AND SAID HE WAS SURE THE GREEK SIDE WOULD FIND BARTHOLOMEW WAS NOT ONLY AN ABLE NEGOTIATOR BUT THAT HE WAS APPROACHING FORTHCOMING TALKS IN A CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT.

7. PRIME MINISTER EXPRESSED GRATIFICATION THAT PRELIMINARY DECA EXCHANGES BETWEEN GREEK AND U.S. NEGOTIATORS SERVED INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES. HE ASSURED DEPUTY SECRETARY THAT GREEK GOVERNMENT WAS APPROACHING THESE NEGOTIATIONS WITH A POSITIVE ATTITUDE AND THE EXPECTATION

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THAT A NEW AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED. REFERRING TO CARLUCCI'S REMARKS ABOUT SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE MED, PAPANDEOU SAID THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT SUBJECT

[REDACTED]

DEPUTY SECRETARY CARLUCCI SAID THIS COULD EASILY BE ARRANGED AND AMBASSADOR STEARNS AGREED TO CONSULT FURTHER WITH PAPANDEOU, AS WELL AS WITH WASHINGTON AGENCIES CONCERNED, ABOUT TIMING AND FORMAT. PRIME MINISTER COMMENTED HE WAS SURE THAT OTHER GREEK OFFICIALS, MILITARY AND CIVILIAN, WOULD ALSO

8. DISCUSSION THEN TURNED TO MIDDLE EAST. PRIME MINISTER SAID [REDACTED]

13526
E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3(B)(6)

[REDACTED]

10. DEPUTY SECRETARY CARLUCCI OBSERVED THAT RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL WAS AT THE PRESENT TIME THE ONLY THING ARAFAT HAD TO SELL AND IT WAS OBVIOUS HE WANTED THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE PRICE. PAPANDEOU AGREED WITH THIS, BUT SAID HE WAS CONVINCED ARAFAT WOULD SETTLE FOR LESS THAN THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AVOWED PLO PROGRAM. TIME WAS OF THE ESSENCE, PAPANDEOU BELIEVED, BECAUSE IF ARAFAT FELT THE PLO WOULD BE TAKEN OVER BY THE MILITANTS AND WOULD REVERT TO TERRORISM.

11. COMMENTING ON THE [REDACTED] THE PRIME MINISTER SAID HE HAD BEEN IMPRESSED

[REDACTED]

12. DEPUTY SECRETARY CARLUCCI COMMENTED THAT THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR WAS PROBABLY ONE NO ONE SHOULD WIN. [REDACTED]

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PAGE 01 ATHENS 6941
SIT625 DATE 10/21/82

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STRENGTHEN IT. THE PRIME MINISTER REPLIED THAT THE
GREEK GOVERNMENT WOULD

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MESSAGE:

PRIORITY
DE RUEHTR #6941/03 2881532
P 151522Z OCT 82
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

13526
E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3(B)(6)

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2237
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO NATO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 2234
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SECRET SECTION 03 OF 03 ATHENS 16941
EXDIS



THE PRIME MINISTER AGREED AND
SAID HE HOPED THIS FAVORABLE ATMOSPHERE WOULD CONTINUE.
STEARNS



13. AMBASSADOR STEARNS ASKED PAPANDEOU



PAPANDEOU SAID

ESSENTIALLY



14. IN CONCLUSION THE DISCUSSION REVERTED TO THE DECA.
DEPUTY SECRETARY CARLUCCI STATED THE U.S. WOULD ENTER
NEGOTIATIONS WITH A FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE. WE VALUED
OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH GREECE AND WISHED TO PRESERVE AND

SECRET

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MEMORANDUM

7223

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

WPC HAS

October 20, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: DENNIS *DK* LAIR

SUBJECT: US-Greek Negotiations

Attached is an information memo from State describing the upcoming preliminary talks with the Greeks concerning our bases. These talks were requested by Papandreu in order to demonstrate to his public that he is moving on his promise to renegotiate the bases. They will provide an opportunity for both sides to get an initial feeling for the other's position.

Bob *PRStm* Ellac, Ollie *J* North, Peter *PRS* Sommer and Gen. *B* Boverie concur.

Tab A State memo

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NLRR M412 #121536

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET~~

October 19, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: US-Greek Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement
Negotiations

At the Greeks' suggestion, Reginald Bartholomew will begin preliminary talks in Athens October 27 with the Greek negotiator, Deputy Foreign Minister Kapsis.

Papandreou has said that he would like the talks to be low key and informal and that Kapsis will lay out general Greek views, without getting into "technical" details and actual negotiations. He mentioned these points in particular: (1) the Aegean problem and Greek need for security assistance monies from us; (2) ways to assure the Greeks that U.S. base operations do not harm Greek relations with friendly countries (mainly the Arabs); and (3) The Greek role in command and control of base operations. Ambassador Stearns thinks the Greeks are not yet ready for real negotiations but are under some political pressure to show the process is starting. We expect them to use the talks to outline maximal demands and probe for flexibility on our part.

We want to accomplish three things in this first encounter: (1) tone down Greek hopes or expectations on issues such as security assistance; (2) let them know we have our own desiderata for an acceptable agreement, such as operational flexibility and effective command and control of our own forces and facilities; (3) learn more about Papandreou's basic aims and attitudes towards our bases. Bartholomew will stay within the policy lines developed during the 1981 negotiations.

Bartholomew will be reporting and seeking guidance as developments warrant.

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BY KAL NARA DATE 3/12/13

L. Paul Bremer, III
L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

RECEIVED 19 OCT 82 10

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 19 OCT 82 23

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

24 10/20/11

KEYWORDS: GREECE

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

BARTHOLOMEW, R

MILITARY BASES

SUBJECT: US - GREEK DEFENSE & ECONOMIC COOPERATION AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 20 OCT 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BLAIR

LILAC

NORTH

HELM

BOVERIE

SOMMER

KIMMITT

MYER

BAILEY

COMMENTS

REF# 8231841

LOG 8103669

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

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Clark

18 info
OCT 25 1982

for information
Clark noted

- DB, LI, ON, PS, RB

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PAGE 01 ATHENS 7698
SITS33 DATE 11/05/82

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHTR #7698/01 3020454
O 291516Z OCT 82
FM ANEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2471

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 17698
NODIS
FROM BARTHOLOMEW
DEPARTMENT PASS OSD FOR PERLE, JCS FOR ADM. BIGLEY
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: US, GR, MILI, MARR
SUBJECT: DECA NEGOTIATIONS: KAPSIS/BARTHOLOMEW INITIAL
- TALK

1. ~~SECRET~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT).
2. FOLLOWING CEREMONIAL OPENING OF DECA DISCUSSIONS WITH MEDIA PRESENT AND BRIEF COURTESY CALL ON FOREIGN MINISTER HARALAMBOPOULOS, KAPSIS AND I MET PRIVATELY FOR ONE HOUR.
3. KAPSIS MADE LONG OPENING PITCH SPEAKING FROM PREPARED TEXT HE SAID WAS APPROVED BY PAPANDEOU. BASIC MESSAGE WAS THAT GOG DID NOT WISH TO HARM U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND WAS PREPARED TO REACH NEW AGREEMENT THAT WOULD PERMIT PRESENT U.S. BASE ACTIVITIES TO CONTINUE. BUT GOG WOULD NEED SOME POLITICALLY NECESSARY ELEMENTS, SUCH AS ASSURANCES ON "NO OFFENSIVE USES" AND ASSURANCES THAT CERTAIN ACTIVITIES WERE NOT DIRECTED AGAINST GREECE. (I TOLD HIM THEY WERE NOT.)
4. THAT SAID, GREEK FLEXIBILITY WAS LIMITED BY PRESSURE FROM LEFT, SHOWN BY KKE VOTE IN RECENT MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AND U.S. WOULD HAVE TO MAKE A "MAJOR EFFORT" ON ITS PART. U.S. WOULD FIND GOG PROPOSALS "VERY HIGH", BUT CLOSE EXAMINATION WOULD SHOW THEY WERE NOT. IN THIS CONTEXT HE BROACHED "SENSITIVE" IDEA OF RELOCATING HELLENIKON ACTIVITIES BECAUSE OF VISIBILITY AND GREEK NEED FOR SPACE.

5. KAPSIS SAID U.S. RESPECT FOR DE FACTO GREEK CONTROL OF AEGEAN AND "INDIRECT GUARANTEE" WOULD ALSO AFFECT GOG POLICIES AND CONDUCT OF NEGOTIATIONS. U.S. REFUSAL OF GUARANTEE WOULD IMPLY U.S. PASSIVITY IN FACE OF POSSIBLE TURKISH ATTACK AND LEND CREDENCE TO VIEW OF MANY THAT NEW U.S. PUSH TO SUPPORT TURKEY IS UNDER WAY.

6. KAPSIS SAID PAPANDEOU WANTED FIRST PHASE TALKS TO RESULT IN FIRM SIGNED AGREEMENT ON SET OF PRINCIPLES, AND HE HAD A 15-POINT PAPER TO TABLE ON THIS. WITH THAT

AGREEMENT, PUBLIC OPINION WOULD BE CALMED AND NEGOTIATIONS PROPER COULD TAKE AS LONG AS NECESSARY. KAPSIS SAW FIRST PHASE TALKS TAKING ANYWHERE FROM TWO WEEKS TO THREE MONTHS.

7. KAPSIS CONCLUDED PREPARED PITCH WITH LOW-KEY STATEMENT THAT IF WE FAIL TO REACH NEW AGREEMENT, GOG WOULD OF COURSE FEEL OBLIGED TO TERMINATE U.S. USE OF BASES.

8. I OPENED BY STRESSING MUTUALITY OF BENEFIT AND INTEREST IN U.S./GREEK DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP AND IN REACHING NEW AGREEMENT SMOOTHLY AND EXPEDITIOUSLY. IF GOG PUSHED THEME OF FAILURE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES, IN THE NEGOTIATIONS OR PUBLICLY, THIS WOULD CREATE BAD CLIMATE AND CONTEXT FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND REQUIRE U.S. TO ADAPT ITS APPROACH ACCORDINGLY AND MAKE APPROPRIATE CONTINGENCY PLANS.

9. ON THE AEGEAN PROBLEM AND GUARANTEE, I SAID WE SHOULD NOT BURDEN THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH OTHER PROBLEMS AND THAT U.S. IN ANY EVENT HAD GREAT DIFFICULTY WITH PROPOSALS THAT IMPLY WE MUST CHOOSE BETWEEN ALLIES OR SETTLE PROBLEMS BETWEEN THEM.

10. I POINTED OUT DIFFICULTIES WE HAVE WITH A "PRINCIPLES AGREEMENT" AND SAID TABLING HIS 15-POINT PAPER COULD LOCK US BOTH IN BEFORE WE HAD EVEN REALLY TALKED. I PROPOSED WE FOCUS THE PRELIMINARY TALKS ON THE DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OUR OBJECTIVES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, VIEWS ON MAJOR ELEMENTS IN A NEW AGREEMENT, AND ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS PROPER. WE WOULD SET ASIDE THE NOTION OF A PRINCIPLES AGREEMENT AND HIS 15-POINT PAPER, RECOGNIZING THEY BOTH EXISTED, AND HE COULD MAKE ALL OF HIS POINTS UNDER THE FOUR CATEGORIES MENTIONED WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO EITHER SIDE'S POSITION. (KAPSIS AGREED TO THIS APPROACH.)

11. FINALLY, I STRESSED U.S. HAD ITS OWN NEEDS BUT ALSO ITS OWN LIMITS ON WHAT IT COULD DO IN REGARD TO GREEK PROPOSALS AND THAT THESE LIMITS WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE CLEAR AS WE MOVED AHEAD. IN THIS CONNECTION, HELLENIKON RELOCATION WOULD BE MAJOR ENTERPRISE THAT WOULD BE VERY NEGATIVELY RECEIVED IN WASHINGTON SHOULD GOG DECIDE TO PURSUE IT.

12. WE AGREED SUBSTANCE OF PRELIMINARY TALKS SHOULD BE ESPECIALLY CLOSELY HELD IN BOTH GOVERNMENTS (PER PAPANDEOU'S PROPOSAL) TO MAINTAIN FLEXIBILITY, AND THERE SHOULD BE NO PRESS PLAY. HELLENIKON RELOCATION IDEA IS PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE, SINCE KAPSIS ASKED ME NOT TO PURSUE IT WITH WASHINGTON AT THIS TIME.

13. COMMENT: THE TONE THROUGHOUT WAS VERY CORDIAL (EXCEPT FOR BRIEF CHILL ON FAILURE POINT). GOG HAS NOW TOLD US THEY ARE PREPARED TO CONTINUE CURRENT U.S. BASE

ATHENS 7698

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PAGE 01 ATHENS 7698
SIT532 DATE 11/05/82

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DE RUEHTH #7698/02 3020456
O 291516Z OCT 82
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2472

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 ATHENS 17698

NODIS

ACTIVITIES, BUT WITH SOME POLITICALLY NECESSARY "ELEMENTS"
AND AT A HEALTHY "PRICE". THAT SAID, THE GOG APPROACH
IS SHAPING UP LARGELY AS EXPECTED. THEY WILL THROW OUT
A BARRAGE OF IDEAS TO TEST WHAT THE TRAFFIC WILL BEAR AND
PROBE FOR OPENINGS, THOUGH PERHAPS WITH MORE SPECIFICITY
THAN ANTICIPATED. CASE IN POINT IS IDEA OF HELLENIKON
RELOCATION, WHICH HAS CROPPED UP IN EARLIER NEGOTIATIONS
(BUT NOT IN 1981). IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHEN AND HOW
SERIOUSLY GREEKS PURSUE THIS OR INDEED OTHER SPECIFIC
PROPOSALS THEY MAY RAISE IN THIS PRELIMINARY PHASE.

STEARNS

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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7333

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 3, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

THE HONORABLE CHARLES Z. WICK
DIRECTOR UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

SUBJECT: Base Negotiations in Greece (U)

U.S. negotiations with the Government of Greece on a Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement are to begin with a new Greek government later this month. In support of these negotiations it will be useful for all agencies involved to have an inventory of the entire range of U.S. assets in Greece and some estimate of the costs to us of their denial or relocation. Toward this end, would you please provide a listing of your facilities in Greece to include: tenant organizations and a detailed statement of their operational, intelligence or other missions; the number of U.S. and foreign national personnel employed; and an assessment of their importance to U.S. objectives in the region; and a quantitative (if possible) or qualitative assessment of the cost to the U.S. of their relocation, if feasible, or denial. I would appreciate it if you could provide this information by November 10. The point of contact on my staff is Colonel Allan Myer (395-5004). (C)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:



William P. Clark

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NLRR M11-412 # 121537
BY RW NARA DATE 7/31/13

MEMORANDUM

7333

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

October 26, 1982

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: DENNIS BLAIR/AL MYER *DMB* *AM*

SUBJECT: DECA Negotiations with Greece: Inventory of Assets (U)

To support our upcoming negotiations with Greece on our bases, it would be extremely useful if we had an agreed inventory of just what assets we have in Greece, and a rough idea of what they are worth to us. Surprisingly, even though we have completed two unsuccessful rounds of negotiations on these bases, such an inventory does not exist. The NSC staff is the logical agency to compile one. (C)

Attached for your signature is a memorandum to the chiefs of relevant departments and agencies requesting that they provide contributions to such an inventory. We will consolidate the listing and issue to all concerned agencies the complete inventory. (U)

We understand [redacted] your initial reaction was favorable. (C)

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to State, Defense, CIA and USIA at Tab I.

Approve Disapprove

Tab I Memo to agencies

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NLRR M11-412#121540
BY RW NARA DATE 7/31/83

397

National Security Council The White House

'82 OCT 26 P1:07

Package # 7333

28

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Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	<u>5</u>		<u>D</u>
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

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COMMENTS

E.O. 12958
As Amended
3.5(C)

Subject: Base Negotiations in Greece

29

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DIRECTOR OSTP Room 360, OEOP				
DIRECTOR, USIA 1750 Penna. NW	1	11/4/82	9:58	<i>M. Parker</i>
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EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, FEMA 500 C Street, SW				
MANAGER, NATL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM (NCS) 8th & SO Courthouse Rd., Arlington, VA				
DIRECTOR, JOINT PROGRAM OFFICE (JPO) 1300 Wilson Blvd. # 1051, Arlington, VA				

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NLR 17421 # 121541
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PLEASE PRINT, TIME & SIGN THIS RECEIPT & RETURN TO:
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WHITE HOUSE

RECEIVED 26 OCT 82 15

TO CLARK FROM BLAIR
MYER

DOCDATE 26 OCT 82
26 OCT 82

KEYWORDS: GREECE
ECONOMICS

MILITARY BASES

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
24 10/20/11

SUBJECT: BASE NEGOTIATIONS W/ GREECE / INVENTORY OF ASSETS

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE DUE: 27 OCT 82 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION
CLARK

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BOVERIE
NORTH
KIMMITT

COMMENTS

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O 051651Z NOV 82
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2649

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 18204

NODIS
FROM SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR BARTHOLOMEW
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS OSD FOR PERLE, JCS FOR ADM. BIGLEY
USCINCEUR FOR GEN. W.Y. SMITH
E.O. 12958: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MARR, GR, US
SUBJECT: DECA NEGOTIATIONS: KAPSIS/BARTHOLOMEW PRIVATE

1. (ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AT KAPSIS' REQUEST, WE HAVE MET ALONE AFTER BROADER SESSIONS INCLUDING ZEPPODS AND BERLIND REPORTED SEPTEL (WHICH SHOULD BE READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH THIS REPORT).

3. KAPSIS HAS SLIPPED ME "NON-COPY" OF GREEK PROPOSED "BASIC PRINCIPLES FOR THE DECA" WHICH IS BASIS OF HIS POSITIONS. NOT SURPRISINGLY, IT IS A TERRIFIC MIX OF MAXIMALIST GOG POSITIONS, PASOK PLATFORM PLANKS, AND BOUNDLESS MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE "WISH LISTS"-- WITH A DASH OF APPARENT CONCESSIONS TO US HERE AND THERE. I TOLD HIM IT WAS SO DISTANT FROM OUR OWN IDEAS AND SO FAR BEYOND OUR LIMITS THAT I WOULD NOT SEND IT TO WASHINGTON AND WE SHOULD GO ON KEEPING PAPERS OFF THE TABLE AT THIS STAGE.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. HIS MAJOR OBJECTIVE NONETHELESS REMAINS A FIRST-PHASE AGREEMENT ON "PRINCIPLES" OR "POLITICAL FRAMEWORK" WITHIN THREE MONTHS OR SO. (I HAVE BEEN VERY SHARP ON DEADLINES AND HE HAS BACKED OFF.) HE SAYS PAPAANDREOU IS PERSONALLY (AND PUBLICLY) COMMITTED TO THE IDEA. I HAVE REITERATED THE PROBLEMS AND WE HAVE CONTINUED TO HOLD THE IDEA IN ABEYANCE WHILE WE TALK THROUGH VARIOUS ISSUES (WHICH I HAVE AT TIMES USED TO ILLUSTRATE THE PROBLEMS). WE WILL PROBABLY TACKLE THE QUESTION HEAD-ON EARLY NEXT WEEK.

5. MAJOR KAPSIS POINTS IN PRIVATE TALKS:

--- U.S. CAN BE SURE THAT GOG IS WILLING TO
- CONTINUE FACILITIES. GOG HAS NO INTENTION OF INTER-
- FERING WITH ANY OF OUR ACTIVITIES. IF U.S. HAS ANY

--- QUESTIONS ON THIS, "THE ANSWER IS A FLAT NO". THIS
- IS MAJOR DEPARTURE FROM PASOK PLATFORM WHICH COST
- GOG AND WE SHOULD RESPOND ACCORDINGLY.

--- GOG ALSO DOES NOT WANT TO CREATE UNNECESSARY
- PROBLEMS IN REACHING DECA BY PULLING IN OTHER
- ISSUES. NEW VOA AGREEMENT "FOR 20 OR 30 YEARS"
- WOULD BE NEGOTIATED AFTER DECA REACHED. (I AGREED
- VOA IS TOTALLY SEPARATE AFFAIR.) DIPLOMATIC
- TELECOMMUNICATIONS STATION (DTS) AT NEA MAKRI WAS
- ALSO A PROBLEM TO BE DEALT WITH AFTER DECA.

--- U.S. FOR ITS PART MUST BE FORTHCOMING ON GOG
- POLITICAL AND ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES. THEY ARE
- IMPORTANT FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL AS WELL AS
- SUBSTANTIVE REASONS. U.S. COULD NOT STAND ON PAST
- POSITIONS AS I SEEMED TO BE DOING. THERE WAS A NEW
- GOG AND THINGS HAVE CHANGED.

--- ON TURKEY, I WAS TAKING A "VERY HARD STAND".
- GOG HAD ABSOLUTELY NO INTEREST IN SEPARATING TURKEY
- FROM THE U.S. OR HARMING OUR RELATIONS. BUT "PLEASE
- FIND SOME FORMULA ON TURKEY". NO AGREEMENT WOULD
- BE ACCEPTABLE IN GREECE WITHOUT IT. "FORMULA" DID
- NOT HAVE TO BE IN THE DECA ITSELF (WHICH I HAD
- FLATLY REJECTED), BUT WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO BE
- MORE THAN A LETTER.

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

--- ABILITY TO "VERIFY COMPLIANCE" WITH TERMS OF
- THE AGREEMENT IS POLITICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE IMPER-
- ATIVE FOR GOG. CRITICAL POINT IS TO ENSURE THAT GREEK
- FORCES AND MOVEMENTS ARE NOT TARGETTED FROM FACILI-
- TIES AND THAT INTELLIGENCE ON THEM IS NOT "UNINTEN-
- TIONALLY" PASSED TO TURKEY.

--- ENSURING THAT "RELATIONS WITH FRIENDLY NATIONS"
- ARE NOT HARMED IS OF MUCH LESS IMPORTANCE. THIS WILL
- NOT BE MADE INTO A PROBLEM FOR US. WE CAN FIND
- WORDS.

--- HELLENIKON RELOCATION COULD BE GOOD FOR U.S.
- (HE HAS YET TO MENTION IT WITH OTHERS PRESENT, AND
- I THINK IT IS A PERSONAL IDEA.)



13526
E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3(b)(6)

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR M412 # 121542
BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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O 051651Z NOV 82
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2650

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 ATHENS 18204

NODIS
FROM SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR BARTHOLOMEW
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS OSD FOR PERLE, JCS FOR ADM. BIGLEY
USCINCEUR FOR GEN. W.Y. SMITH

- AND SELF RESPECT, AND THERE ARE MAJOR PRACTICAL AND
- SECURITY CONCERNS AT STAKE.

- HE SHOULD NOT ASK ME TO SOLVE HIS PROBLEMS
- WITH WORDS THAT MIGHT IMPLY U.S. FACILITIES HAVE
- BEEN, ARE, OR COULD BE AGGRESSIVE TOWARDS GREECE'S
- "FRIENDS" OR DIRECTED AGAINST GREECE ITSELF. WORDS
- COUNT FOR "ANGLO-SAXON NATIONS" (HIS PHRASE) AND
- CAN AFFECT OUR OPERATIONS AND POLITICAL RELATIONS
- AROUND THE WORLD.

- HELLENIKON RELOCATION LOOKED WORSE AND WORSE
- EVERY TIME HE RAISED IT. HE SHOULD NOT SOUR AND
- COMPLICATE THINGS BY PUSHING IT.



7. KAPSIS LIKES AND CAN TAKE (AS WELL AS DELIVER) PLAIN
TALK AND EXCHANGES HAVE REMAINED GOOD-HUMORED THROUGHOUT.
WE SHOULD BE READY FOR ONE OR TWO PRIVATE "STOCK-TAKING"
SESSIONS EARLY NEXT WEEK THAT SHOULD HELP CLARIFY AND
FILL IN THE PICTURE OF GOG APPROACH THAT IS BEGINNING TO
EMERGE. I MIGHT NOTE GOG HAS THUS FAR CONTROLLED PRESS
INFO ON TALKS FAR MORE TIGHTLY THAN EXPERIENCED "ATHENS
WATCHERS" THOUGHT POSSIBLE OR LIKELY.

ATHENS 8204

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

STEARNS

6. MAJOR POINTS I HAVE STRESSED:

- A MAJOR OBJECTIVE IN THIS INITIAL PHASE IS TO
- UNDERSTAND GOG BASIC APPROACH AND AIMS, AS WELL AS
- DESCRIBE OUR OWN. STATEMENTS ON CONTINUITY AND
- NON-INTERFERENCE ARE ENCOURAGING. BUT "TECHNICAL
- DETAILS" WILL BE VERY IMPORTANT FOR US IN THIS
- REGARD.

- GOG AGREEMENT TO CONTINUE FACILITIES IS NO
- CONCESSION, BUT IN GOG INTERESTS -- AND VERY HIGH
- PRICED AT THAT.

- GOG SAID IT WANTED BASES TO CONTINUE. BUT ITS
- POLITICAL AND ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES COULD, IF
- INSISTED ON, BE MAJOR OBSTACLES TO AN AGREEMENT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

- AND IN EFFECT, PRICE US OUT OF THE MARKET.

- MY POSITIONS ARE ROOTED IN IMPORTANT U.S.
- NATIONAL INTERESTS THAT DO NOT CHANGE SIMPLY BECAUSE
- GOVERNMENTS DO. I WOULD TRY TO BE HELPFUL, BUT WE
- CANNOT MEET GOG'S DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONCERNS BY
- CREATING PROBLEMS FOR OURSELVES.

- ANY REPEAT ANY "FORMULA" ON TURKEY IS A PROBLEM.
- THIS IS NOT WHAT OUR NEGOTIATIONS AND THE AGREEMENT
- ARE ABOUT.

- IF GOG INSISTS ON INTRUSIVE ARRANGEMENTS TO
- "VERIFY COMPLIANCE" AND ENSURE WE ARE NOT "ACTING
- AGAINST GREEK INTERESTS", WE ARE IN FOR REAL
- TROUBLE. SHALL NATIONS HAVE NO MONOPOLY ON PRIDE