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(Countries: Iran)

**Case file Number(s):** 480000-482999

**Box Number:** 92

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*Last Updated: 11/14/2023*

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF RECORDS MANAGEMENT  
(WHORM): SUBJECT FILE

**Withdrawer**

DLB 4/27/2010

**File Folder** CO071 (IRAN) (480000-482999)

**FOIA**

S10-306

**Box Number** 92

SYSTEMATIC  
529

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
90137	MEMO	DUPLICATE OF #90135; FRANK CARLUCCI TO CHIEF OF STAFF, RE: IRANIAN LETTER <b>R 5/19/2023 NSC/DEPT. OF STATE WAIVERS</b>	1	5/8/1987	B1 B6
90138	LETTER	DUPLICATE OF # 90136; LETTER TO HOWARD BAKER	2	4/21/1987	B6

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

C0071

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: MAY 11, 1987

8714918

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: MR. WM. T. O'HARA

SUBJECT: ENCLOSURES COPY OF NEWS ARTICLE WHICH HE FINDS  
DISTURBING, ON THE SALE OF \$900,000 OF  
COMPUTER EQUIPMENT TO IRAN

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
CAROL HORNBY	ORG	87/05/11		C 87/5/14 TR
<i>MS GREE</i> REFERRAL NOTE: _____	A	87/5/18	TR	C 87/05/20 TR
<i>State</i> REFERRAL NOTE: _____	K	87/05/21	TR	A 87/06/08
REFERRAL NOTE: _____		/ /		/ /
REFERRAL NOTE: _____		/ /		/ /
REFERRAL NOTE: _____		/ /		/ /

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: \_\_\_\_\_

PL MAIL USER CODES: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

- \*\*\*\*\*
- |                          |                      |                      |   |
|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---|
| *ACTION CODES:           | *DISPOSITION         | *OUTGOING            | * |
| *                        | *                    | *CORRESPONDENCE:     | * |
| *A-APPROPRIATE ACTION    | *A-ANSWERED          | *TYPE RESP=INITIALS  | * |
| *C-COMMENT/RECOM         | *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL | * OF SIGNER          | * |
| *D-DRAFT RESPONSE        | *C-COMPLETED         | * CODE = A           | * |
| *F-FURNISH FACT SHEET    | *S-SUSPENDED         | *COMPLETED = DATE OF | * |
| *I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC* |                      | * OUTGOING           | * |
| *R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY * |                      |                      | * |
| *S-FOR-SIGNATURE         |                      |                      | * |
| *X-INTERIM REPLY         |                      |                      | * |
- \*\*\*\*\*

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE  
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590  
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING  
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS  
MANAGEMENT.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
TRANSMITTAL FORMS/S 8714918DATE June 10, 1987FOR: MR. GRANT GREEN  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
THE WHITE HOUSE

## REFERENCE:

TO: President Reagan FROM: Mr. Wm. T. O'HaraDATE: May 7, 1987 SUBJECT: Encloses copy of news  
article which he finds disturbing on the sale of \$900,000 of  
computers to Iran.REFERRAL DATED: May 22, 1987 ID# 480270  
(IF ANY) THE ATTACHED ITEM WAS SENT DIRECTLY TO THE  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE


## ACTION TAKEN:

- A DRAFT REPLY IS ATTACHED.
- A DRAFT REPLY WILL BE FORWARDED.
- A TRANSLATION IS ATTACHED.
- AN INFORMATION COPY OF A DIRECT REPLY IS ATTACHED.
- WE BELIEVE NO RESPONSE IS NECESSARY FOR THE REASON  
CITED BELOW.
- THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE  
PROPOSED TRAVEL.
- OTHER (SEE REMARKS).

## REMARKS:

  
DIRECTOR  
SECRETARIAT STAFF

Draft:EB/EWT/FPC:ECastro *DMK fm*  
Clear:EB/EWT:RLPrice  
EB:DLamb *DM*





United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

JUN 8 1987

Dear Mr. O'Hara:

The President has asked that I reply to your letter of May 7, 1987, concerning the New York Times article on the sale of computer equipment to Iran and your belief that we should have no trade links with Iran.

As you may be aware, in November 1979 the United States imposed a trade embargo and a freeze on Iranian assets as a result of the taking of U.S. hostages. Those sanctions were lifted in January 1981 with the signing of the Algiers Accords, which provided for the release of the hostages by the Iranians. Since then, controls have been placed on a variety of items as a result of the Iran-Iraq War and Iran's support for international terrorism. These controls cover, among other items:

- items on our munitions list;
- aircraft, helicopters, related parts and components; outboard motors over 45 h.p.; militarized vehicles; police equipment; and chemical weapons precursors;
- items controlled for national security purposes if destined to a military end-user or end-use.

Under these published foreign policy controls, our export licensing policy is to deny the export of goods destined for a military end-use or end-user in Iran.

The newspaper article referred to four export license applications submitted to the Department of Commerce for the export of seven computers and some spare parts to a university, the state news agency, the state power authority, and the state telecommunications agency in Iran.

Mr. Wm. T. O'Hara,  
President,  
Bryant College,  
Smithfield, Rhode Island.

The equipment in each of these cases is low level technology, freely available from foreign suppliers. After careful review of the computer cases, it was determined that there was no significant military utility in these computers. Under current multilateral export control rules that the United States shares with our allies, these computers would receive licenses for export to the Soviet Union.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Michael E. Zacharia". The signature is written in black ink and is positioned above the typed name.

Michael E. Zacharia  
Deputy Assistant Secretary  
International Trade Controls

Drafted EB/EWT/FPC:ECastro  
Wang 705 5/29/87 x-72871

Cleared: EB/EWT:RLPrice  
NEA/NGA:LPiascik  
E:CRies  
DOC:DSchlechty } *ef*



8714918

T H E   W H I T E   H O U S E   O F F I C E

REFERRAL

MAY 22, 1987

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DIRECT REPLY, FURNISH INFO COPY

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 480270

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED MAY 7, 1987

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: MR. WM. T. O'HARA  
PRESIDENT  
BRYANT COLLEGE  
450 DOUGLAS PIKE  
SMITHFIELD RI 02917

SUBJECT: ENCLOSURES COPY OF NEWS ARTICLE WHICH HE FINDS  
DISTURBING, ON THE SALE OF \$900,000 OF  
COMPUTER EQUIPMENT TO IRAN

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN  
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE  
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE  
(OR DRAFT) TO:  
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE, 20500

SALLY KELLEY  
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON  
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE



480270

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

May 7, 1987

8714918

*C. Honking*

The President  
Ronald W. Reagan  
The White House  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I fully realize that at times there are circumstances concerning foreign policy that the average citizen is unable to understand. However, I am mystified by our government's insistence on maintaining links with Iran's current regime.

The enclosed article reporting a \$900,000 sale of computer equipment, albeit non-military, disturbs me. How often does our country have to be insulted and its citizens kidnapped before we exercise our greatest and most effective power -- economic pressure?

Sincerely,



Wm. T. O'Hara  
President

WTO/e

Enclosure

# \$900,000 of computer equipment set for Iran

NSC approves sale  
as 'nonmilitary';  
Weinberger objects

The New York Times

NEW YORK — The Reagan administration decided late last week to permit the shipment of a \$900,000 computer system to Iran, overriding the objections of Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, according to government and industry sources.

The decision was made by the National Security Council. It mediated the dispute between Weinberger, who vigorously opposed the sale of any equipment to Iran, and the Commerce and State Departments, which urged that the transaction go ahead.

The decision clears the way for the Digital Equipment Corp. to provide a Swiss company with \$900,000 of computer equipment that will be used in an electric power distribution system for Tehran.

The computers involved are not very sophisticated, and a White House official familiar with the transaction said it was approved after the NSC determined that the computers could not be turned to military use in Iran's war with Iraq. Weinberger had maintained that the United States should do nothing at all that would help the Iranian government.

Nonetheless, the question of whether an export license should be issued became a divisive issue within the Reagan administration.

## Shipment not illegal

The computer shipment will be the first major export to Iran since the disclosure last fall that the administration had secretly approved the sale of American weapons to Iran in an effort to gain freedom for American hostages in Lebanon.

"In the end, it was concluded that there was no legal way to hold up this shipment, although we need a review of our policy vis-a-vis Iran," one Defense Department official said yesterday. "The NSC is now going to try to set some policy about nonmilitary sales to Iran."

A Commerce Department spokeswoman, Desiree Tucker, said she could not comment on whether any decision had been reached because of rules protecting the confidentiality of companies seeking export licenses.

But a spokesman for Digital Equipment, Jeffrey Gibson, said that last Friday the company received "verbal authority to ship" the computer system and that the export license "should follow in about 10 days."

5

THE WHITE HOUSE  
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

CO 071

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: MAY 11, 1987

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: DR. AMIR HOUSHANG SEPEHR

SUBJECT: OPPOSES THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TAKING ACTION  
OF ANY SORT IN RECOGNITION OR CONTACT WITH  
THE MOJAHEDIN KHALGH AND ESPECIALLY MASSOUD  
RAJAVI, WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT \*

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME)		ACTION ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	DISPOSITION TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
LINAS KOJELIS		ORG	87/05/11		1/1
REFERRAL NOTE: _____					
REFERRAL NOTE: _____			87/05/13		87/05/24
REFERRAL NOTE: _____			87/05/19		87/05/22
REFERRAL NOTE: _____					
REFERRAL NOTE: _____					
REFERRAL NOTE: _____					

COMMENTS: \* SOME U.S. CONGRESSMEN ARE ASKING FOR  
CONTACT WITH THESE GROUPS

*State*

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: \_\_\_\_\_

PL MAIL USER CODES: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

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*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION          *OUTGOING          *
*                        *                        *CORRESPONDENCE:  *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED          *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL *           OF SIGNER *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED        *           CODE = A   *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET  *S-SUSPENDED        *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                        *           OUTGOING *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                        *                        *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE       *                        *                        *
*X-INTERIM REPLY       *                        *                        *
*****

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REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE  
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590  
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING  
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS  
MANAGEMENT.



UNCLASSIFIED

PLKOJE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
TRANSMITTAL FORM

87 JUN 1 A 7: 17

S/S 8714577

Date May 30, 1987

FOR: Mr. Frank C. Carlucci  
National Security Council  
The White House

REFERENCE:

To: President Reagan

Dr. Amir Houshang Sepehr

From: Iranian Nationalist Labour Party

Date: April 28, 1987

Subject: Opposition to U.S. Recognition of Mojahedin Khalgh

WH Referral Dated: May 19, 1987

NSC ID# (if any): 480274

       The attached item was sent directly to the  
Department of State.

ACTION TAKEN:

       A draft reply is attached.

       A draft reply will be forwarded.

       A translation is attached.

  X   An information copy of a direct reply is attached.

       We believe no response is necessary for the reason  
cited below.

       The Department has no objection to the proposed  
travel.

       Other (see remarks).

REMARKS:

  
Melvyn Levitsky  
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
*[Handwritten signature]*

WHITE HOUSE

07 MAY 31 06:20

MEMORANDUM

SITUATION ROOM (see memo)

- \_\_\_\_\_ The Department has no objection to the proposed
- \_\_\_\_\_ action.
- \_\_\_\_\_ No further action is necessary on the part of
- X \_\_\_\_\_ the Department.
- \_\_\_\_\_ A copy of the report is being furnished to the
- \_\_\_\_\_ Department.
- \_\_\_\_\_ A copy of the report is being furnished to the

ACTION TAKEN:

\_\_\_\_\_ Department of State  
The attached report was sent to the

NSC ID# (if any): 480334  
WH Reference Code: MAY 30 1981

Subject: Operation to U.S. Recognition of Afghanistan

Date: MAY 30 1981

From: Interdepartmental Group Report  
Dr. William H. Overholt

To: President

REFERENCE:

The White House  
Executive Secretariat

COPIES: Mr. Frank C. Cunniff

Date: MAY 30 1981

Page: 2

07 MAY 31 06:20

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

UNCLASSIFIED

*[Handwritten scribble]*



- United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520


May 22, 1987

Dr. Amir Houshang Sepehr  
Iranian Nationalist Labour Party  
P.O. Box 2061  
Canoga Park, California 91306

Dear Dr. Sepehr:

Your recent letter to the President on American foreign policy vis a vis Iran was referred to my office. Thank you for your comments and insights. My colleagues and I will keep them in mind as we continue to deal with the many problems you have described.

Sincerely,

  
A. Peter Burleigh  
Director of Northern  
Gulf Affairs



8714577

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

REFERRAL

MAY 19, 1987

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DIRECT REPLY, FURNISH INFO COPY

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 480274

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED APRIL 28, 1987

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: DR. AMIR HOUSHANG SEPEHR  
IRANIAN NATIONALIST LABOUR PARTY  
POST OFFICE BOX 2061  
CANOGA PARK CA 91306

SUBJECT: OPPOSES THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TAKING ACTION  
OF ANY SORT IN RECOGNITION OR CONTACT WITH  
THE MOJAHEDIN KHALGH AND ESPECIALLY MASSOUD  
RAJAVI, WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT  
SOME U.S. CONGRESSMEN ARE ASKING FOR  
CONTACT WITH THESE GROUPS

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN  
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE  
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE  
(OR DRAFT) TO:

AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE, 20500

SALLY KELLEY  
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON  
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

IRANIAN NATIONALIST  
LABOUR PARTY



Date: April 28, 1987

Ref:

حزب ناسیونالیست کارگران ایران

President of the United States of America  
Mr. Ronald Reagan:

Recently, we were informed that some of the United States Congressmen have asked your government to make contact with and recognize the oppositions of the Iranian Islamic regime and Mojahedin Khalgh, who are one of the most dangerous, extremist and political groups currently active abroad.

The American government must be aware that the extremist Mojahedin Khalgh, following the Marxism and Islamism ideologies started campaigning against the former regime and aggravated disturbances and insecurity in Iran by applying terrorist activities. This group works under the leadership of Massoud Rajavi, who is not clear how exactly became popular with the Soviet Union's K.G.B., England's Intelligent Service and probably, CIA. It is not clear how a young man would be so popular with such intelligent services. Even when five members of the terrorist group, Mojahedin Khalgh, including Massoud Rajavi were sentenced to death in Shah's regime, later on we found out that the British government and especially, Russia's Padgorni, Head of the Soviet Union, personally invited Mr. Mirfendereski, the Iranian Ambassador to Moscow, to the Kremlin Palace and asked him to go to Tehran by his private jet and take his official request to Shah and ask him to reduce Massoud Rajavi's sentence. Mr. Mirfendereski went to Iran and presented the Shah with his request. It is said that Shah paced the floor for a few minutes wondering who this young man was to be the center of attention of a superpower. Rajavi's colleagues were executed and he was imprisoned for life.

Rajavi remained in jail until after the revolution took place and also during Shahpour Bakhtiar's public service as President of the Cabinet. He was finally released from the prison along with other political prisoners and took control of the Mojahedin Khalgh group. With the help of Ayatollah Khomeini's followers,

..../

Iranian Nationalist Labour Party  
4/28/87  
page two

his group supported Khomeini's regime. With the accommodations that the Soviet Union, England, and probably CIA had provided him, he robbed and plundered the wealth of Shah's agents strengthening his forces. Needless to say, with the information on the documents and plans of the Iranian army secret centers which were easily handed to him by these agents, he immediately started collecting the bugs equipment and the electronic sensors that according to Iran's defensive plan by Pentagon's experts were installed in different spots at the border of Iran and Russia. They murdered some of the American army advisors in their houses in Tehran. By obtaining all the necessary weapons from the military bases and the army's warehouses Rajavi strengthened his little army, hoping that he will take over the country, he helped Ayatollah Khomeini's regime to grow in power. He even admired Ayatollah Taleghani as the "nation's father".

Ayatollah Khomeini discovered Mojahedin Khalgh's plot against the Islamic regime and began to firmly, per his plan and his decisiveness, cut off their hands by campaigning against them which resulted in Rajavi fleeing the country and thousands of his followers were executed as Iran's enemies and saboteurs. And many of innocent and naive young people were victimized.

It is obvious that CIA had not been unaware of those activities. After all, Rajavi and his followers were all trained in Palestinian military camps under the supervision of Yasser Arafat. It is necessary to remind you that Mojahedin Khalgh are very hot-tempered, tough, murderers and very revengeful. And if, for instance, this group comes to power with your support, they will not hesitate to dispose of some of the people from the oppositions, right or left, past or present regime, the present regime's supporters and the royalty followers, nationalists and other oppositions. Besides, what will the United States gain from this? We must warn you that you will come out of a small well and you will sink into a deeper one. It is surprising that the Congressmen who claim that they are democrats and liberals ask your government to be diligent in contacting and recognizing Mojahedin Khalgh, a group that not very long ago were harshly criticized by the State Department.

Mr. President, we do not know why the Congressmen and your government are so unaware and uninformed about Iran and the Middle East problems and keep making unretrievable mistakes that later on will bring about more breakouts for yourself, your government and the world.

.... /

Iranian Nationalist Labour Party  
4/28/87  
page three

Hasn't Mr. Schultz, Secretary of State, really reached an agreement, after his recent negotiations in Moscow, to more agitate the situation in Iran and Persian Gulf and to destroy our nation? Is this justly that the Iranian nation should encounter groups and leaders who are man-eaters every day?

Why American, Soviet and British governments must interfere so bluntly in the Iranian nation's internal affairs? If liberty and living in freedom in the American democracy mean this, then God save such freedom and liberty!

The Iranian Nationalist Labour Party condemns the American government if it takes action for any sort of recognition or contact with Mojahedin Khalgh and especially, Massoud Rajavi, who is living in Iraq, Iran's #1 enemy and a violator of neighboring territories, directly or indirectly, via your political agents or CIA agents.

Mr. President, from a real human's point of view, this is not right for your government or any other government, for that matter, to sit behind closed doors and make decisions for Iran or any other nations of the world. So that the governments and the systems in peaceful regions of the world reluctantly change so that you may take advantage of their failure, financially and politically.

On behalf of the Iranian patriots and as the leader of I.N.L.P. and the Party's High Council, once more, we firmly condemn any contact or recognition or renewal of any sort with Mojahedin Khalgh group and Massoud Rajavi, personally. We strongly proclaim to you, your government and the Congressmen that the reaction of the Congressmen is false. Consequently, you will endanger Iran's and your government, politically, socially and nationally. You should not be deceived by England's policy and you should minimize their deceitful advices.

The Party awaits your response and your State Department's reaction on the American Congressmen's comment. If you pay attention to their demand, you will eventually lose your allies throughout the world and directly or indirectly, you will cause a political uproar in the world. Iranian nation will not confirm such policy. Let the Iranians make their own decisions involving


.... /

Iranian Nationalist Labour Party  
4/28/87  
page four

their political, economical and social affairs.

Sincerely,

Sincerely,

  
Dr. Amir Houshang Sepehr  
Leader  
Iranian Nationalist Labour Party

AHS

Iranian Nationalist Labour Party  
P.O.Box 2061  
Canoga Park, CA 91306





THE WHITE HOUSE  
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

00071

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: MAY 15, 1987

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: MR. NADER MOGHADAM

SUBJECT: FORWARDS STUDY OF SITUATION IN IRAN

C.F.

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
		ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C D
HOWARD BAKER		ORG	87/05/15	NAN	C 87/05/15
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____				
FRANK CARLUCCI		RSA	87/05/15		C 87/05/15
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____				
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____				
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____				
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____				

COMMENTS: SON OF FORMER CHIEF OF SAVAK IN IRAN  
MEMO FROM FRANK CARLUCCI NOTING DUPLICATE  
COPY SENT TO HIM AND RECOMMENDING NO RESPONSE  
FROM HOWARD BAKER -- SEE ID #484662

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: \_\_\_\_\_

CS MAIL USER CODES: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

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*                       *                       *CORRESPONDENCE:  *
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*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                       *           OUTGOING *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                       *                       *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE       *                       *                       *
*X-INTERIM REPLY       *                       *                       *
*****

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REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE  
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590  
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING  
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS  
MANAGEMENT.

90.32

May 8, 1987

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

FROM: *FC* FRANK C. CARLUCCI *cd*

SUBJECT: Letter from Nader Moghadam

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NSC/State Waivers  
BY dm NACADATE 5/19/2023

Moghadam is the son of the former chief of SAVAK, who was executed shortly after the Iranian Revolution. He has also written to me, enclosing the same study that he sent to you. Bob Oakley of the NSC staff has met with Moghadam on my behalf. I do not believe that you need to respond to his letter.

Attachment

Tab A Letter from Nader Moghadam

5-14-

*Lorraine*  
*Close out the letter without response -*  
*Trak*



T  
A  
B  
A

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Much of the impetus for writing this report has been generated by a sense of moral obligation to my country, my late father, his colleagues and Iranian armed forces.

The youth of Iran has been the most victimized target both national and international levels during the reign of this totalitarian regime of fanatical radical clergy of the satanic Khomeini. More so because the emotional weight of the revolutionary process and the acerbity which the world brought to the condemnation of the Pahlavi era devastated the survivors of the regime so thoroughly that even today, eight years after the revolution, many of them hesitate to look the past squarely in the face or defend their remarkable record of collective achievement.

The palatable focal points of the controversy between United States with Khomeini's Islamic regime:

- 1) The West cannot afford to lose Iran because of the country's resources as well as its strategic location.
- 2) Khomeini has become increasingly more powerful and correspondingly less inclined to play the game according to the traditional values.
- 3) The Americans are particularly concerned about the internal contradiction of Iranian society, including corruption and repression, which may render the nation vulnerable to Soviet designs.
- 4) The Shiism of Imam Ali and his son Hussein, a religion of blind faith designed to maintain the oppression, the character of the society. His impact should be analyzed fastidiously. Especially Ali Shariati Shiism of Imam Hossein
- 5) The United States does not have established plans for combatting terrorism and consequently has been crippled by Iran.
- 6) The implication of the United States towards human rights was a catastrophe throughout the third and fourth world.
- 7) Iran-Iraq War has been a focus point of the selling of arms, which needs to be halted for the sake of the United States.

Unfortunately, still the previous and present administration does not understand the Iranian political tradition, culture (especially the cultural ideology and social psychology of Khomeini's Shiism), making just another controversial mistake concerning Iran. This catastrophe diminished the United States prestige, and disgraced this country and its people again around the world. Also it enhanced the great charmer, Gorbachev whom was going to woo hostages out of Khomeini's hand. This tremendous scandal not only caused the loss of credibility in the region, damaged the President's popularity as well as his prestige and party's image. Also it weakened countries or allies of the United States in the face of terrorist blackmail in the face of radical religious movement, whom they proclaimed as moderates. Isn't this a lesson that need not to be repeated. After eight years of Islamic Republic, Khomeini's zeal continues to abet in fostering and exporting terrorism spelling trouble all over the world.

Indeed for the past eight years, the United States, after the fall of the Shah's regime and launching, supporting Khomeini phenomenon and its Islamic Republic to the Iranian nation. But what I do not understand is that a nation such as United States of America as powerful and responsible should admit defeat and even incur it. Consequently, the lesson to be recognized neither President Reagan or Carter appeared able to commit to or develop a unified and comprehensive long range foreign policy concerning Iran. Still the United States has no answer to a fanatic like Khomeini and his followers, a true believer in the tradition of Hitler the most ruthless leader of the century. This religious movement, whom they proclaimed to be the moderates of Iran, e.g., Hasan Rafsanjani, Ali Khomeini, Mossavi Ardibili, Meskeni and his son-in-law Rey Sahahree, Mohtashami, Ahmad Khomeini, Montaszari, Da-aiee, Karami and others. "Moderate" contradicts the character of this totalitarian regime of fanatical radical clergy. This repressive regime of radical clergy (Fada' I Yan Islam) would change their political views to suit their own interests for their future political survival. Let us not forget their numerous contemptible and humiliating behavior toward this nation and its people. A country's dignity and integrity is far more valuable than any sum of money.

How can countries or friends relying on America, feel safe in their relations to the United States with its complicated, indecisive and non-unified foreign policy. The United States must not forget how sensitive Iran is geographically to Moscow. Historically, for many years the Soviet intention, and plan was to gain control of Iran's natural resources and to get a hold on a strategic location which could be the key to the eventual control of the world economy.

One issue that still puzzles me is the United States disjointed foreign policy towards terrorism. This approach not only confuses allies but gives comfort to enemies. Regardless of friendly relations, these countries will obviously first consider their self interest. The solution to terrorism is an unbending policy of "NO". Regardless of a rescue mission (victory or failure), dignity and integrity is far more important even if the rescue mission were to have some casualties. Iran is one of the core centers of terrorism. "Retaliation" is the answer, to a terrorist camp or destroyal one of the cities in Iran, Qom. The Iranian image is like a paper tiger or lion. All they can do is to preach.

President Reagan's Iran policy was found to be foolish and counter-productive and carried out unprofessionally by non-effective personnel, such as retired General Seacort and Lt. Colonel Oliver North. It threatened to shrink Reagan's presidency to irrelevance. The President was poorly advised and poorly served. The responsibility and burden of the presidency of the United States of America is far too important to be emotionally and irrationally jeopardized for the lives of five hostages. In many incidents regarding terrorist activities, the United States answer to terrorist activities was concession. Is this the answer to terrorist activities?

It is ironic that the common damaging and decaying factor of the Carter and Reagan administrations is the terrorist activities and the fall of American hostages held in Khomeini's web.

In regard to the selling of arms to Iran and in return is it moral right in foreign diplomacy or protocol to give the secret location of Iranian artilleries to Iraq's resulted in the loss of innocent lives. The devastating impact of this transaction to the Iranian people and leaders of other countries was horrifying.

This lesson to be derived and ought to be contemplated seriously. The Iranian mind, of course, is essentially intuitive and conjectural in its interposition of events. The humiliating exile of the Shah, the brutal massacre of the Iranian Populous, the mistreatment of Iranians in the United States and the resulting emotional stress eight years later still affect the Iranians (those exiled as well as those in Iran) thought process towards the United States. Their lack of trust, resentment and hatred is a critical consideration for future American/Iranian policy. Again this lesson to be learned from the past and present for the future implementation of policies should be the embracement of allies not the betrayal. The cementing of a trustful relationship key to regaining a hold in Iranian will halt the infiltration of Gorbachev's "Free" Communism.

United States human rights policy became a major tenet of American foreign policy, apparently in an effort to gain moral superality over the Soviet Union. The implementation of a human rights policy in Iran, Central America and other nations, was a disaster to the American foreign policy. The lesson to be derived here is in Iran. As in most second, third and fourth countries, the dialectical contradictions of the society did not admit to the establishment of a Western type democracy, nor of a Western approach to questions of freedom and human rights. To maximize freedom requires an ever increasing effort to maintain a dynamic balance among the existing contradictory power structures and political demands, emphasizing the traditional moderate institutions in order to gain a breathing spell for the democratic structures to Ter-institutional form and substance. Above all, it was only through such institutions that the means of violence might have been contained and kept out of direct political engagement.

President Carter and the present administration proved incapable of inspiring America's allies. In the Shah's case, the result was a lingering sense of doubt concerning his intentions--a disposition that apparently remained with him to the last day of his life, and in Reagan case the terrorist activities and Iran's arms scandal.

The most compelling phenomenon of the Pahlavi regime, however, remains its ultimate failure. The pro-Western Iranians and intellectuals sought the explanation in a stereotypical answer: by American treachery (The United States' indecisive President, his complicated non-unified foreign policy) implemented by British tricks and a variety of devil theories, Communist conspiracy and Israelis self-interest in the region.

This point ought to be contemplated seriously, historically in Iran, the traditional British deceit and self-interest and responsibilities in the Middle East is well documented and needs not to be repeated anymore. Also their close contact with the clergy, as well as their relationship with urban and rural traditional political notables. While both the British and the Soviets were a curse on Iranian Revolution, the outcome of these satanic events was based upon the establishment or foundation of "Ekvan Muslimian"

Muslim Brotherhood! Their fundamental issues were to create discordance between the Muslims (Shias & Sunnite).

The result, America lost a close sturdy ally which could have provided stability for Western interests in the Persian Gulf. That lost has cost United States billions of dollars because of the need to make alternative security arrangements for the years ahead.

At the highest policy making level I think the United States needs to stand by its profound friends. This is as important for country as it is for an individuals. In each cases it is not only a matter of morality, which in foreign affairs is sometimes spurned by the advocates of REAL-POLITIK; it is also a matter of expediency. Such a example matches your personal relationship and if a man starts to abandon his friends, he will no longer have many or any friends to abandon. Other wise the whole network and your reputation will collapse. Ultimately, a nation's foreign policy is a test of its character and its personal relationship. The United States foreign policy has opted for a policy built on alliances and mutual arrangements with friendly countries. If friend X sees friend Y being let down, he will waste no time in hedging his bets. American needs to stand by its allies or friends, and one day the United States shall see there will no countries or dear friends around it except through coercion.

The Carter administration, however, was never able to develop a unified and comprehensive policy concerning Iran. Contrary to the Shah's expectation, instead of leading opinion it proved to be its vacillating follower. Unique in the history of the America postwar presidency, the Carter administration had, in effect, pledged itself to executive weakness and, therefore structurally speaking, premeditated vacillation in foreign policy. Carter as president was not only unable to shape congressional opinion or impart to other opinion makers a sense of the national interest in their interpretation of the US-Iran relations, he even seemed unable to coordinate the statement of high-ranking officials of his own administration. The result was bewilderment in the Iranian, Nicaragua and the Afghanistan government.

The psychological impact of America's vacillation on both the supporters and opponents of the Shah's regime should not be underestimated. To most Iranians, the United States never behaved irrationally. Every move by the United States government is taken to mean a link in a chain of events and decision that represent comprehensively the American perception of its own interest. To an American, this position, or rather predisposition, may seem absurd. Nevertheless, it is a crucial characteristic of Iranian political thinking on which political analysis and prediction are based.

There are different cognitive and psychohistorical reasons for this Iranian predisposition. First, there are very few Iranians who fully understand the operational mechanism of the American political system. Second, a historically determined reverence for Western rationality as well as Communist propaganda have imparted to them an anthropomorphic notion of capital. America is capitalist. Capitalists control America. America's power is therefore judiciously and consciously used to enhance the interest of capital. Capitalists are seen to act as one great Capitalist represented by the President of the United States. And third, as a psychohistorical effect of the experience of colonialism, the average Iranian thinks that



nothing of much importance happens in Iran without the explicit or tacit involvement of the United States.

To the average Iranian, therefore, the United States' official vacillation on the one hand, and the media's denunciation of the Shah, on the other, did not suggest a possible bungling administration; it meant a premeditated decision to withdraw support from the Shah. Furthermore, religion succeeded at a time when a majority of the people whose cooperation was crucial to the success of the revolution, namely the various sectors of the modern middle, low class, had very little affinity with the brand of religion that spearheaded the revolution and took over the country after the collapse of the system. In fact, available evidence suggests that the clerical leaders were just as surprised as others at the turn of events.

The Shah's clerical enemies and the foreign countries interest condemned the Shah for his grossly exaggerated liberal opponents stressed repression, Savak atrocities, corruption, blind modernization cumulatively resulting in the curtailment of human rights by a one-man tyrannical regime.

Another confounding dimension of that reality is the Shah's system fell because the fragility of the Iranian political system resulted from the contradiction between the pattern of accumulation of political power and the institutional properties of the crown. Paradoxically, the weakness of the Shah's regime was a function of the strength of the institution he personally represented. The crown had certain institutional properties that determine the form and range of responses available to its incumbent. I shall argue that once the society has moved beyond certain levels of socio-economic change, the institution of the monarchy could no longer accommodate centralized and concentrated patterns of political relationships and their force could be maintained only if power could be successfully moved toward decentralization and deconcentration.

The mutually supportive interrelation between the United States and the Shah was seen as a pillar both of American influence in the Middle East and the Shah's power in Iran. Conversely, the presumption was that as long as this privileged inter-relationship remained in tact, neither American influence nor the Shah's power would decline. In fact, both the United States and the Shah publicly nurtured and encouraged this idea. Nevertheless, in spite of Carter's protestations of faith in the Shah, by the middle of 1978, the idea had begun to take root among the Iranians, including the Shah, as well as in foreign circles, that, objectively speaking, the privileged relationship had come to an end and that the United States was seeking ways to disassociate itself from the idea of the indispensability of the Shah and his policies. Given the nature of Iranian political culture, the subjective effect of this perception was phenomenal for both the Shah's supporters and his enemies. It helped to limit the Shah's options to military response which, as we have seen, he was unwilling to make, and to turn every other overture toward compromise and reconciliation into a belated attempt at appeasement. The relevant questions, therefore, resolve around the factors that helped produce this perceptual transformation.

It is ironic in the summer of 1977 my late father, General Nasser Moghadam (former Commander of Defense Intelligence and Director of Savak) on his visit to the United States, presented conclusive information to the

Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency regarding the Soviet Union infiltration and their invasion of Afghanistan and the future crisis of Iran. Two questions need to be asked at this point. First, why was the United States political system not able to respond to this information? Did the United States under-estimate his conclusive report or was it the malfunctioning of the information systems? Second, political fragility between the White House and your Intelligence agency and their execution of foreign policy. First, Afghanistan was invaded by Soviet Union and second, the Iranian failure. Unfortunately, when I picture the doleful and frightening past it is a very sad and emotional weight ending to a macabre story. Still now from the United States stand point, the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets has cost billions of dollars in weaponry in helping the "MOUDJAHEDINES" fighting for their sovereignty of their homeland. The Iranian revolution, invasion of Afghanistan and the critical circumstances in Central America affected the debt and international economy, the balance of power in the Middle East, Central America and the Soviet Union appreciation of American resolution. Although my father while remaining loyal to his country and people maintained faith and trust in the United States. Throughout his critical and sensitive long career in intelligence, he always displayed dignity, honesty, modesty, and friends and enemies were treated with the same respect. He was admired by his fellow officers as well as civilians for these characteristics. Despite the fact he tried so hard in maintaining and controlling bloodshed prior to the revolution. Unfortunately, due to President Carter's inability to coordinate high ranking officials in his own administration the United States has lost the most sincere and profound royal Iranian officers and civilians with utmost possible disgrace. His remarks can be verified by former DIA and CIA Directors, also the Honorable Carlucci. Thanks to Ambassador Sullivan and General Huyser for their mission accomplished.

The time is long past due when the United States should have adopted in future some general principles for dealing with such situations:

First, United States policy must recognize the limits of intervention yet the necessity to defend their interest.

Second, United States policy must understand the impact change in regional and global relationship.

Third, the United States must coordinate your diplomatic, economic and military action.

Fourth, which is the most important issue, an effective United States policy toward change abroad requires a balanced approach at Washington. Such an example is the difference of ideas and non-effective well-trained personnel. The Ambassador Sullivan and General Huyser mission. The Iranian arms scandal, General Seacort and Lt. Colonel Oliver North.



## IRAN TODAY

After eight years of totalitarian regime of radical fanatical clergy and oppression of Islamic Republic. It is a very sad ending to a macabre story. The United States lost a close and sturdy ally which could have provided stability for Western interests in the Persian Gulf. But perhaps the most poignant loss is Iranian's. Iran, on the point of becoming a viable and industrialized nation, has been wrenched back hundreds of years in its values and standards. The people have suffered deeply and emotionally. Men and women have been executed wholesale. The Gulf War drags uselessly on, bleeding away the human and material resources of both Iran and Iraq, although no one doubts that it would be settled in months if it were not for the sacrificial fervor of Ayatollah Khomeini. And the carnage is far from over, for it is no longer confined to Iran. Thousands have already been killed to satisfy Khomeini's ambition in the Muslim world, and we may still not have seen the worst. Khomeini's zeal in fostering and exporting terrorism spells trouble all over the world.

Let us elaborate or analyze the Khomeini phenomena. To understand Khomeini is not so much to understand Islam or philosophy, but his psychology; that Khomeini is a true believer in the traditions of Hitler. It seems to me that the experience of the past eight years supports this point. The Khomeini's framework is essentially an ideology rather than a government, a regressive revolution rather than State. It can therefore break with impunity every rule of international conduct, reenter pret every aspect of international law, input novel meaning to Islamic jurisprudence, and erect its own standards of value and decency.

To understand the Khomeini phonemon, one may also be tempted to study Islam and the Koran. Koran states "war is a blessing for the world for all nations. It is God who incites men to fight, fight until all corruption and all rebellion have ceased." The war the prophet led against the infidels were a blessing for all humanity. The Koran says: "war, war until victory. A religion without war is an incomplete religion. The MULLAHS with corrupt hearts who say that all this is contrary to the teaching of the Koran are unworthy to Islam. The Koran says: Those who imagine that our time on earth is a divine gift, those who believe that eating and sleeping like animals are gifts from God, say that Islam should not inflict punishments. But those who follow the teaching of the Koran know that Islam must apply the LEX TALIONIS, and thus that they must kill. Those who have knowledge of the suffering in the life to come realize that cutting off hands of someone for a crime he has committed is of benefit to him. In the beyond he will look those who, on earth, executed the will of God. Thanks to our God. Our young people are now, to the limits of their means, putting God's commandment into action. They know that to kill the unbelievers is one of man's greatest missions."

Summary of Islam; the outcome of lower clergy, the MULLAHS and ;the AKUNDS, fed on the society's superstition and ignorance, while they learned and the exalted drew the influence from the control of vast tracts of agricultural WAQF land and the payments of religious dues, KHUMS AND ZAKAT, by the faithful. Their urban base was centered in the BZAZAR, which controlled not only the flow of money, but also many of business transaction in food and primary consumer goods, through extended chains of retail stores.

The political influence resulting from this combination of moral and material power in the hands of the higher clergy had made them one of the most important factors in any political equations concerning the policy option of the society. Nevertheless, it is wrong to assume that they were all united in their approach to political power. Temperamentally, their approaches ranged from the sublime and religiously transcendent posture of AYATOLLAH BURUIJIRDI, the most exalted prelate in the SHIITE realm to the terrorist activities of group belonging to the FADA'YAN- Islam. (Stanlist Communism). The political ideology of SHIISM, however, tended to make religious opposition to antiseccular militancy extremely difficult, if not impossible. It is necessary to mention at this point the essential characteristic of this ideology within the general framework of Islamic political theology. The ETHOS of Shiism lies in its glorification of the concept of the IMAM as the manifestation of the primordial light, blameless and infallible. Unlike SUNNI Islam, in which the supreme authority resides theoretically in the IJMA (consensus) of the community of believers, it Shiism, The Islam is the repository of all knowledge and the sublime shepherd of his flock. The Imams were the prophet Muhammad's descendants through his daughter Fatima, and in line of Ali, his son-in-law and cousin. Nevertheless, it prescribed TAGLID, or the imitation or adoption as authoritative of the utterances of a MUJTAHID, a man of proven high morals, learned in Islamic jurisprudence and allowed to interpret religious sources, as a religious duty. To the layman, however, the sources of TAGLID, commonly known by the title of AYATOLLAH, assumes some of the characteristics of Imam, especially holiness and infallibility. The combination of emotional and intellectual attachment to the Ayatollah in turn, gives him almost absolute power over his followers, including, at times, over life and death, as when he orders his followers into JAHAD, the faithfuls' war in support of religion against the manifestation of infidelity.

Since Islam does not allow for clear separation of the temporal and spiritual realms, the tension between the secular and the religious authority has always remained a cardinal aspect of Iran's political life. This tension poses a latent challenge to the legitimacy of the secular authority. The most palpable and immediately perceived example of such a challenge is the propagate nation of the immortality and unlawfulness of paying taxes to the secular authority. Instead, the faithful are encouraged to pay their religious dues and the Imam's share. The question of money, therefore, has always been of prime importance in the relationship between the government and the clergy.

The higher clergy use their income for various causes, including the support of theology students in religious schools and the lower mullahs. Since these elements, in effect, constitute the core of the higher clergy's field forces, ability to support them is the sine qua non of the preservation of each Ayatollah's relative political influence. Traditionally, the secular authority has taken advantage of clerical vulnerability and tended to channel the required money to the more amenable among them. Obviously, the stronger the government, the less the perceived need to court the clergy; conversely, the more unstable the political system, the greater the clergy's leeway in drawing income from the government's coffers. This contentious relationship has tended to strengthen the ideological inclination of the religious elements toward the weakening of the secular authority. It is therefore not surprising that religious animosity to

secular authority in Iran traditionally reached its peak when the clergy's source of income were seriously threatened.

Relevant examples are the religious opposition to the land reform of 1963, which envisaged the distribution of part of the clergy-administered WAQF lands to the peasants, and the almost unanimous attack on the monarchical system after 1977, when the government subsidies to the higher clergy were reduced in the name of frugality and moral aristocracy.

Traditionally, these forces ran the gamut of political party ideologies from Stanlinist communism, represented by TUDEH PARTY, to fascist bands like the SUMKA and the SHAHIN. The interested foreign powers, especially the British tricks and the Soviets, aggravated the situation by playing these factions against one another according to the exigencies of their political and economic interest, and depending on the characteristics of the existing groups.

The palpable Hussein's focal point of Khomeini's strategy derives from Shariati's interpretation of Shiism and his description of the role hitherto played by its clerical mandarins. The new interpretation rarely received an audience among the masses. It was mostly confined to the University and some intellectual societies. Through these media, it gradually seeped out into an increasingly wider circle of the middle class intelligensia. Much in the manner of a discussion of Marx by people who have never read an original work by Marx, the latter tended to discuss Shariati as a possible panacea for the cultural impasses in Iranian society. Later, when Shariati had been quite lost in the Khomeini avalanche, the same intellectuals tended to speak of Khomeini as if he were another Shariati, again without ever having read any of the latter's relevant works. The result was that, in the summer of 1978 till revolution, among at least portions of the Iranian intelligensia, religion had been bestowed with a kind of respectability it had not enjoyed for many years. The religious organizational network proved an inimitable structure for revolutionary action. In the ordinary mosques of the realm, the Hossini Shia ideology operated at a different level. It stressed the sinfulness of the system, erected the vision of Shimir's (Shime Ibn Zil Jawshan was one of Hussein's main adversaries at the battle of Karbalo. He was instrumental in Hussein's death.). Infamy against the courage and innocence of Hussein raised the imagery of the Paraoth's helpless against the will of God, and insisted that the true religion was being sold out to the foreign devils. It also suggested that every man, woman and child was entitled to his or her share of the oil income and intimated that every family was due - the amount changing depending on the generosity of the speaker of the pulpit - some \$15 to \$45 a day which all would receive as soon as the system was overthrown.

Hussein lives as a courageous innocent, hero in the eyes of Shiism people. Of course, in reality, he is a brutal, vindictive, blood hungry, "hilteresqe" creature, as shown by his infamous battlecry JAHD during the Battle of Karbla.

This is a conclusive summary of Muslim religion; the religion should constitute human being relationships with the powers and principles of universe, especially with a deity or deities.

The most important quality of Khomeini ideology is its ahistoricity. It pretends to be conceptually free of temporal and spatial limitation. In this sense it is radically different from the ideology of other theoretic states based on Islamic fundamentalism.

This is natural but very productive. The temptation is based on the presupposition that Islam defines Khomeini's intellectual categories as it also disposes the religious public to respond favorably to his calling. The truth is that, like all other consummate religion and ideologies, Islam also has the capacity to yield itself to broad or strict construction, progressive or regressive interpretation, human or beastly conduct. It speaks of the necessity of change as well as plainness, of forgiveness as well as value of revenge, of the virtue of JIHAD, as well as the sanctity of human life. Rich in depth of scriptural pronouncement and breadth of tradition, it can support many different, and sometimes diametrically opposed, political and religious postures and behaviors.

"If one permits an infidel to continue in his role as a corrupter of the earth, his moral suffering will be all the worse. If one kills the infidel, and thus stops him from perpetrating his misdeeds, his death will be a blessing to him. For if he remains alive, he will become more and more corrupt. This is a surgical operation commanded by God the all-powerful." The latter, as demonstrated by the examples of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and other regional countries, strive to adapt fundamentalist thought to modern historical condition. They are basically conservative. Khomeini strives to do the opposite - adapt historically determined conditions to an essentially ahistorical view of the world. He is at once regressive, revolutionary, and utopian. Cumulatively, these properties portend an ominous future for the Iranian people and given the country's sensitive geopolitical situation, extreme danger for the world, especially to the United States.

The Frankenstein quality of Khomeini as a man is that he is a true believer. He believes in the absolute righteousness of his case, in the divinity of his own mission, and in the virtue of martyrdom. Such a predisposition is dangerous in any man, regardless of the cause he espouses. Extremism is the cause of the portrait, or in the hatred of Jews. The basic characteristic of total commitment is that it allows for total destruction with pride and impunity. Potentially, it condemns every circumstance of dialogical promise, renounces every humanistic virtue and transmutes every effort at compromise into pale and abject surrender. Its appeal is to the darker side of the human psyche as when one may secretly admire Hitler for having almost succeeded in destroying the world. Many also admire Khomeini for doggedly pursuing his own path in the face of seemingly irrefutable logic. The most important lesson of history is that it remains impervious to wishful thinking. It unfolds in response to the interaction of the totality of forces that assume objective reality in the course of time. Khomeini is, no doubt, such a force - and therefore historically significant in the Iranian people. The historical meaning of Khomeini phenomena is that it prolongs Iran's colonial dependence. Given its developmental aspiration and geopolitical condition, it is improbable that Iran can opt out of the world development process. Sooner or later, it will have to face the stark reality of its relapse into economic and technological stagnation. It will be largely determined by the longevity logical of the Khomeini regime and the behavior of the forces opposed to the Islamic Republic. Khomeini's

regime is self-destructive. It is essentially a negation, one of many possible antitheses to the Pahlavi system. Without the facts and fictions of the Pahlavi era, it loses all historical meaning. In this sense, it is also an aberration. It is historically irrelevant either to the developmental consciousness or the developmental requirements of the Iranian people. It is self-destructive not because it has a demonstrable tendency to opt for wrong policies, but rather because, as an inherent property of its "weltchauung" such a tendency is the sine qua non of its existence.

To survive, it must negate whatever the Shah expounded. The Shah stood for the future; Khomeini must emphasize traditionalism. The Shah stood for technology; Khomeini must extol primitivism and fatalism. The Shah stood for hard work and productivity; Khomeini must eulogize faith and martyrdom. This closed and vicious circle is inescapable. It not only traces the boundaries of Khomeini and his followers' sociopolitical vision, it defines the framework of the legitimacy.

The Khomeini system is inextricably bound to its moral and sociopolitical commitments because such commitments are its only claim to legitimacy and the only promise of survival. On the other hand, the inherent limitations of the regime's sociopolitical and moral stance will increasingly debilitate its capacity to confront the historical forces of development resulting from Iran's objective location within the world development process. The socioeconomic transformation of Iran during the past 20 years has been both profound and lasting in nature. The single most important demographic fact about Iran is the youthfulness of its population. Approximately 50 percent of the Iranian population is below the age of 18; and 75 percent is below the age of 30. The majority of the people, therefore, have no recollection of the basically illiterate, rural, fatalistic, and socially sedentary Iranian society of only 30 years ago. This point ought to be contemplated seriously because most of the teachers in the elementary and high schools are far more inclined towards leftist or liberal ideologies than to religious fundamentalism, a fact that explains Khomeini's insistence on the islamization of the school system. Obviously, a majority of Iranians are the product of a fragmented culture that, over the past 30 years.

Nevertheless, given the sociocultural and demographic characteristics of Iranian society and their mistrust towards the transformation of Khomeini and Islamic republic, the United States, their anti-American postures (Iranian society in exile and inside), the assumption ought to be that the longer the life span of the Islamic Republic, the greater the likelihood for the establishment of a leftist system. As applied to the Khomeini regime, the argument that the Islamic Republic is a bulwark against communism. Khomeini's view of the world precludes to accommodate the basic developmental the possibility of initiating meaningful socioeconomic policies to accommodate the basic developmental needs of the society. Progressively, more people in the professions, in intellectual circles, and among the middle class will be alienated, throwing the system into greater chaos, social alienation and economic despondency. For the believer, Islam has always been political oppression. As an oppressive system, Khomeini's totalitarian theocracy forces the people towards other psychological structure of its population, the most likely refuge against Islam as oppressive social, economic, cultural, and political presence may still prove to be the left and eventually end up in the wrong camp. But in my own per-

spective its member appeared to be well trained and organized and can be expected to manipulate in this chaotic situation to their utmost. For so many years the Soviets intended, and believed had long planning to gain control of Iran's natural resources and to get hold on a strategic location which could be the key to eventual control of the world economy. Since after the revolution there are a rising number of Soviet advisors in Iran, and certainly have grown more dependent on that half of the world for external support, due to anti-American postures in the region. This process typifies Soviet tactics that have been operated successfully over many years as a long term for drawing a nation into their sphere of influence. Historically, events show that Kremlin leaders have seldom been satisfied merely with this first step. They continue to work countries where there is internal discord until the target is their domain. It seems to me that the experience of the past eight years supports this point. The most glaring example of Soviet elements represented by TUDEH party represented by NURIDDIN KIYANURI.

Subsequently, on the eve of the revolution, the party adopted the tactical posture of giving full and unequivocal support to Khomeini and the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. As a result, for more than four years it was the only leftist party that was allowed to operate relatively freely in Iran. This period of freedom was obviously a breathing spell for the party to reorganize and place the right people in strategic positions. The extent of its success still remains to be seen, but it is reasonable to assume that the party did not waste this golden opportunity. Many of its leaders have been incarcerated and few were executed. Present socioeconomic trends suggest that both the West and the Soviet state system may be heading for troubled times. The Soviet system may prove particularly vulnerable as it shows relative inability to deal concomitantly with its infrastructural, defense, and consumption requirements unless the practical alignment with the West still give them "carte blanche" around the world regarding Iran.

Khomeini's main political supporters are divided into three factions. First: Khomeini's major political support is concentrated in the Islamic republican party whose leadership includes the clerics who have associated themselves with his line and they are the political maneuverers. They are compromisers who excel in peddling influence. They are the political heirs and stylistic imitators and impressive figure of Ayatollah Behesti, who early in the process of revolution assumed control of the organizational foundation of Khomeini's support in the mosques. They have placed themselves squarely under the Khomeini's umbrella and do not seem to avow or possess a particularly distinguishable ideology, other than what might be construed at different intervals as the Imam's line. Behesti was killed in the bombing of the Islamic Republic Party in June 1981. They are political manipulators and for that reason they now appear to have the reigns of governmental power, at least in the sense of the visible niches they occupy. Their prototype is Hujjatul-Islam Rafsanjani, the president of the Islamic Assembly, who has proved himself a master in the art of manipulating the other factions. Men like Mossavi Ardibili the prime minister, Ali Khomeini the president, Mohtashami commander of police forces, Meshkeni and his son-in-law President of clergy school in Qom, Rey Sahahree minister of information and the chief of Savama, Da-aiee President and the publisher of ETTELAAT newspaper and others. Their power and future survival depends largely on their desire to please Khomeini and partly to keep the armed

forces and the Guardian corps sufficiently occupied to prevent them making any political mischief, they tend not to opt for modernization in both domestic and international politics. Their main followers are the KUMITIHS and PASDARS, their political maneuverers are from entering and searching homes, arresting people, conducting interrogations, terrorism, seizing property, tapping telephones, questioning employee's religious and ideological beliefs, forcing people to spy on each other, dismissing civil servants, revolutionary courts and execution. At any rate the political future of maneuverers remains extremely dangerous and doubtful, because they operate under the ideology of FADA I YAN Islam, the hard core of radical clergy. Such an example, Ayatollah Burujirdi. They have totally lost their legitimacy and once Khomeini's umbrella is removed, they find themselves naked in a politically hostile environment. Consequently, the most pervasive feeling towards the maneuverers and their followers are disgust, hatred, and their elimination.

Second: The main body of Khomeini supporters the "FIGHTERS CLERGY" who hold power under Khomeini umbrella. The fighting clergy has itself been split into a number of warring factions. Their common denominator has been reduced to a single but fundamental understanding that they must hold onto power collectively, or perish individually. They therefore tend to present a more or less unified front against outsiders. Within their own rank, however, the struggle for power appears to have become progressively more intense. While individually they move in and out of different cliques, a process which may give them a superficial impression of normal politics, generally they fall into three ideologically divergent and probably irreconcilable factions. MAKTABIYUN, the extreme left. MUSTAZAFIN, MUSTAKBARIN, their ideology of Islam resembles the MUJAHIDIN'S ISLAM-I RASTIN. Anti-American and pro-Soviet. Once Khomeini is out of the picture, this potential factor gives them a decided advantage over the rivals.

Third: MAKATABIYUN are in competition faction to the right which calls itself HUUJATIAH. The Hujjatiyum are the protectors of the BOYDA-I ISLAM, the Islamic essence. They are the strict constructionists; they control the guardian council, the Islamic republic's equivalent of a council whose task is to pronounce on the legality and Islamic quality of the law. They also have a number of followers among the lower mullahs in the Kumiths, in organization like JIHAD-I SAZANDIGI, as well as some representation in the Islamic assembly. In this sense they are ideologically close to the strict and the traditional clergy.

Khomeini's regime is self destructive. Some in the regime will have to answer for the atrocities committed in its name. The charges of corruption, terrorism, brutality, thousands of innocent people have been massacred, the Iran-Iraq War, although no one doubts that it would be settled if it were not for the sacrificial fervor of the Ayatollah Khomeini and Israelis interest in the destruction of social and industrial regions. For the anti-Khomeini forces, looming disaster on one hand and the Soviets' historical willingness in Iran. For Khomeini and his radical barbaric followers of totalitarian regime of the Islamic Republic, the time is long past due.



## FUTURE OF IRAN

Is there a reasonable way out?

Eight years have now passed since the establishment of the totalitarian regime of Khomeini and the Islamic Republic in Iran. The regressive aspects of the revolution have been solidified into permanent policy and have become intertwined with the system's claim to legitimacy. In such areas as human rights, education, women's rights, and laws, as well as in the more technical realms of industrialization and environmental protection. The nation's natural impulse has been to strive for freedom, that is, to regain an equal status within the world community of nations, and to achieve individual freedom, in moral and material dignity at home. The catastrophe of the present regime and theocratic chaos, the natural demand of security and for the sake of Iran and the United States, that beneath the sordid appearance of the Islamic Republic hides some redeeming element as yet unknown to human conscience.

The United States, to regain the trust of the Iranian people, future political systems and their interests in Iran and the region must quickly act in the assistance of the transformation to a centralized system.

This study has tried to place the Iranian events in a theoretical perspective. The Iranian people are thought to be culturally habituated to following a leader. Leadership requires power. Power resides in the barrel of a gun. The natural leader, therefore, is a military figure with civil ambitions and charismatic qualities. The story is well known in the developing world. This nostalgic yearning for a savior is irrelevant, misleading, and dangerous. It is irrelevant because there is no such savior in sight. It is misleading because it overlooks the profound transformation of the Iranian society over the past 50 years. It is dangerous because, by concentrating mainly on the idea of charismatic leadership, it plays into the hands of the historical forces that, everywhere in the developing world, push for the ascendance of one man. Thus, it falls into the trap of personal power which everywhere arrives at an impasse in the face of the historically determined changes incurred in the socioeconomic base. Before embarking on a discussion of what is to be done, it may be useful to recapitulate, in summary form, some of its relevant points.

1. The transformation of Iranian society under the Shah's regime was both profound and permanent. It produced a nation that was almost new, with new capabilities and new frustrations.
2. The developmental process in Iran transformed the society from a state of essential cultural homogeneity to a state of cultural heterogeneity.
3. In terms of political culture, the fragmentation of Iranian society suggests that no conceivable political system there could enjoy total legitimacy. Correlatively, it suggests that no conceivable political system can govern the country without the application of a certain amount of force. However, a distinction may and ought to be made between force and terrorism.



4. Under conditions of cultural heterogeneity, the consciousness of the need for development, essentially derived from the objective experience of colonialism, favored the centralization of the political system and concentration of political power. The inevitability of the use of force speeded up the process.
5. In the early stages of Iranian national development, and perhaps up to about the end of the 1960s, centralized and personal power were favored by the requirements of socioeconomic development. Power appeared efficient and successful. In the later stages of recent Iranian national development, perhaps from the early 1970s onward, personal power began to lose its efficiency in accommodating the new requirements of the society. It lost its efficiency because its structure could no longer cope with the evolving dialectics of its social base.
6. The Shah's regime broke down under internal and external pressure mainly as a result of its inner contradiction. The Khomeini phenomenon was a catalyst which channeled all the contradictory forces into one concentrated assault. In spite of its appearance, it was neither a revolutionary force nor a viable alternative to the Shah's regime.
7. The Khomeini regime cannot endure because it is antithetical to the historical requirements of the Iranian society at this historical epoch. It feeds on chaos. It survives because of the dispersal of all other forces, the initial breakdown and subsequent involvement of the Iranian army in war, and the manipulation of international powers.
8. The emotional energy that has sustained the Khomeini regime is fast being exhausted. Clearly, it is reasonable to assume that Iran will be faced with a set of momentous political alternatives in the future. The general contours of the probable scenarios are more or less given. They would still represent either the extreme left, extreme right, or possibly a moderate center, upheld by the combined efforts of a variety of forces that had been actively involved in Iranian national development during the Pahlavi era.
9. It is imperative for those concerned inside and outside Iran not to make the same mistakes they committed under the Shah. It is unrealistic to think in terms of separating the process culminating in the fall of Khomeini from the process of erecting a new, viable political system. Power develops its own momentum as well as its own rules. The two processes, therefore, must be joined in a conceptually valid frame of reference that would unite the separate acts in a common ideological and strategic framework.

We have spoken of the Khomeini phenomenon not as a revolution in itself, but rather as the wrong revolutionary fuse with largely negative socioeconomic and political consequences. Nevertheless, the phenomenal explosion of Iranian society must be explained in terms of factors which can stand the test of historically valid analysis. We have tried to identify and explain these factors within the framework of the Pahlavi regime. The

gist of argument has been that, historically speaking, the regime far more than an autocratic system of government. In its 15 years, it was, in fact, a revolutionary force of considerable magnitude, if notions of revolution are not confined to acts of cultural transformations undergone over short periods of time by substantial sectors of the society. If the Shah's system was a revolutionary agent because it brought about, facilitated, or hastened infrastructural changes assumed to correspond to the expected changes effected by world historical movement. The point is not that the Shah's regime was the oppressive nor corrupt; besides, historically speaking, Iranians were quite accustomed to both corruption and repression, even though the social transformation they experienced was for them a novel phenomenon. It is rather that the liberal perceptions of repressions and corruption in Iran had been formed by nonfactual criteria and, therefore, had become impervious to empirically based evidence. The Shah's dilemma was the he had been caught in a web of events from which he could not extricate himself without resort to extreme violence. History will show, however, rather than yield to pressure to engage in offensive military action, his Intelligence Service (SAVAK), he had chosen, early in the process of the revolution, to leave his country on the grounds that the Iranian throne was not to be maintained on the foundation of bloodshed and fratricide. The most significant achievement during Phalavi Dynasty, of socioeconomic transformation, between 1963 and 1976 the average annual industrial growth exceeded 20 percent while the number of industrial plants and the size of the industrial workforce doubled. The GNP increased 13 times from \$4.6 billion in 1961/62 to \$53.5 billion in 1975/76. Per capita income went up eight times from \$195 to \$1,600 in the same period. By 1977 it rose past the \$2,000 mark and was expected to surpass \$2,400 by early 1979.

Again, given the sociocultural and demographic characteristics of Iranian Society, the longer the life span of Islamic Republic, the greater the likelihood for the establishment of a leftist system. As applied to the Khomeini regime, the argument that the Islamic Republic is a bulwark against communism is probably false; more plausible, it paves the way for communism. Khomeini's view of the world precludes the possibility of initiating meaningful socioeconomic policies to accommodate the basic developmental needs of the society. Progressively, more people in the professions, in intellectual circles, and among the middle class will be alienated, throwing the system into greater chaos, social alienation and economic despondency. For the believer, Islam has always been a moral and psychological refuge against economic, social, and political oppression. As an oppression system, Khomeini's Totalitarian Theories forces the people towards other psychological shelters. Given Iran's historical characteristics, including the structure of its population and their mistrust regarding United States, the most likely refuge against Islam as an oppressive social, economic, cultural, and political pressure may still prove to be the Left and eventually end up in the hands of wrong camp.

The Khomeini phenomenon, therefore, was basically an aberration of a historically necessary response to a political system which could no longer deal effectively with the emerging forces, expectations and demands of its socioeconomic environment. The incapacity of the system had very little to do with monarchy as an institution. It was, rather, a function of the form of accumulation of power that, in systemic terms, had become depressing and nongenerative. The Khomeini Phenomenon, aided and abetted by a multitude of

contradictory forces, was a spark that activated the frustrated, pent-up energy of the Iranian resource base into an explosive chain reaction that engulfed all the secular categories of the society and, as such explosions always do, led them along a path of destruction, characterized in the study as instinctual destructiveness or death on a national scale. The point becomes clear as a result of the street demonstrations of the Iranian déclassés, but rather by the revolt of its own cadres: the middle class, the bureaucrats, and the technocrats. No surprisingly, immediately after the collapse of the Shah's regime, the same members were driving into jail, exile, or underground. One by one, they began to rise against the prevailing theocracy. The Khomeini phenomenon must be presumed a reaction, an aberration, as noted above, and in that sense, doomed to failure.

As may be expected, at the moment there is no consensus on a preferred political system among the Iranians. The existential dimension of the proposed scenario, therefore, must delve into the historically significant characteristics of the Iranian nation in order to identify the salient factors that are relevant to the establishment of an acceptable form of participative policy. Specially, it must identify the forces and institutions that have historically played a positive role in the preservation of the integrity of the society and rationally assess their relationship to the evolution of a political system in which the optimization of freedom and participation achieve their greatest consonance with the requirements of socioeconomic development for a new Iran. Conversely, it must also determine and harness the centrifugal forces within the society, searching for ways in which apparently disruptive and conflicting tendencies might be brought together to enhance the integrity of the whole system.

Under what circumstances, then, is it possible to construct a political system in which an optional form of political participation consonant with the requirements of maintaining the integrity of the political system may be secured? The answer must be sought in the relations between two historical factors: the historical ethos of Iranian society manifested in the characteristics of Iranian political culture, and the reality of the prevailing political situation reflected in the relative effectiveness of those socioeconomic forces which will inevitably bear on the country's future political configuration.

Before we addressed the future options of the Iranian politics, these three issues ought to be contemplated seriously.

1. The Iranian Ethnic groups
2. The performance of liberals
3. Civil war

1. The Iranian Ethnic groups. The Khomeini Regime is, by definition, the antithesis of such asecularistic form of reference. Not surprisingly, the Kurds, Baluchis, Turkomans and other realize the fundamental contradiction between the essence of theocracy religious freedom. When the religion in question approaches totalitarianism in its sociocultural compass, the curtailment of freedom transcends the boundaries of religious e.g. narrowly understood, and extends to practicing all aspects of human personal and social behavior. In this sense, religious domination transmutes into

sociopolitical as well as economic domination. It becomes, in fact, a manifestation of domestic colonialism.

Thus, the systemic contradictions of the Islamic Republic cut across two axes. On the ethnic plane, they forbid unity and cooperation among the Persians, Kurds, Turks, Baluchis and others; on the cultural level, they alienated and expel all groups from different ethnic backgrounds that have attained some level of ideational transformation within the framework of world socioeconomic development. These ethnic groups have suffered immensely under the Islamic Republic.

This ethnic group remains a perpetual possibility and should be viewed as an endemic problem of future Iranian politics.

A cursory look at the map of Iran and the distribution of the population shows that the political support for Khomeini is and has been for a long time substantially confined to the areas bordering the country's central deserts. The Azarbaaijanis in the northwest, the Kurds and related tribes in the west, the Arabic-speaking minorities in the southwest and the Sunnis in the east, the Turkomans in the northeast, as well as the powerful Qashai, Luri and related tribes scattered around the country, have all demonstrated a readiness for anti-Khomeini political behavior. In addition, the Caspian provinces of Gilan and Mazandaran have been under the considerable sway of different leftist and non-religious organizations. Numerically, they all add up to half the Iranian population.

In view of the geographic distribution and manner of concentration of the Iranian ethnic populations, only a decentralized system of government can provide the minimal required structure basis for the satisfaction of demands for effective political participation. Under what kind of political system of the Iranian ethnic group is it possible to achieve the optimal form of decentralization of power commensurate with the requirements of both political participation and national integrity? The answer must begin with the analysis of the pertinent factors bearing on the response patterns of the elements which have been historically susceptible to separatist movements. The Kurds may be taken as the most prototype.

Two sets of arguments may be advanced as to why, under relatively acceptable political circumstances, the logical assumption ought to be that the centripetal forces pulling Iranian ethnic groups toward integration with the nation will be stronger than separatist tendencies toward independence. The first set relates to the advantage of continuing their association with Iran. In spirit of the separatist strains among certain Kurds or Baluchis, instigated by a condemnation of foreign incitement and ethnic loyalties, historical association with Iran has created significant attachments which should not be taken lightly, historically, the focal point of that attachment, manifested by Kurdish, Baluchi, or Turkoman tribes, has been the institution of Monarchy, a point that will have to be addressed and its political weight carefully measured.

Beyond the psychological attachment, two other basic internal factors must be considered. First, economically, all of the significant ethnic elements have much more to gain by remaining within the Iranian political system than by separating from it. It is a point of considerable importance

and, no doubt, will be weighed in any future calculation. Secondly, it must be assumed that no Iranian government, regardless of its ideological proclivities, can allow the separation of a part of the country without a fierce struggle. Insistence on separating from Iran will probably unite all other ideological factions against the separatists. Historical precedents suggest that no such movement has been or will be a match for a reasonably effective central government disposing of a reasonable military might. Finally, given the pattern of distribution of ethnic groups among the countries of the region, separation from one country does not automatically mean unification with other segments of the ethnic community. The Kurdish population, for example lives not only in Iran, but also in Iraq and Turkey. Thus, even if the Iranian government remains in its present state of disarray, and therefore incapable of defending the nation's territorial integrity, other countries will still present formidable obstacles to separatist movement. Unless an upheaval of the highest order caused a drastic reorganization of the regions, state boundaries, it is difficult to see how separatist movement can achieve their aim of ethnic unification. Rather, their action will fall in the area of political destabilization, and, in this sense, they become pawns of other interested power in spite of themselves.

2. The performance of liberals. In the faithful year of 1978, 1979, history had thrust upon the National Front Leaders of NIHZAT AZADI (the Freedom Movement) led by Bazargan and his followers, such as, Nazih, Madani, Karim Sanjabi, Baktiar, Forouhar and others. For years they awaited the coming a revolution for which they had labored to prepare the grounds. Consequently the removal and humiliation of the Shah could have been change enough. The perceived source of their grievances had been eliminated, and they could have made a fresh start in a climate free of fear and hatred. Many Iranians looked upon them as the potential saviours of the country. Many hoped that they would act as a true statesman, placing the good of Iran above their personal grudges, resentments, and grievances. Instead, they acted as pretty politicians, immersed in the cult of popularity, morbidly afraid, long on spite, and short on true grit. The performance of the liberals is well documented and needs not to be recounted in the future of Iran Politics. They have been tested, and their treachery for their territorial homeland never be forgotten, their characters still are not admired by the populace or common people. In fact they should be courted in the future Iran politics.

3. Civil war. The control system on which the Khomeini regime's power is based follows the totalitarian and repression pattern. From the standpoint of social psychology, the experience of repression may be perceived as a function of the relationship between the expectations and demands generated by the changing cultural patterns, and the institutional and practical impediments may be social, economic, cultural, or political. The more totalitarian the political system, the greater the scope and extent of its interference in socioeconomic and cultural aspects of human existence, and, therefore, the greater the possibility of willfully creating impediments to the emerging dangerous expectation. The future outlook calls for even greater caution. The amorphous nature of the prevailing forces within the county, the youthfulness of their membership, their cultural revenge, their commitment to their various causes, and the availability of weapons across the county, suggest the inevitability of military action in what, in the absence of careful political preparation, may turn into a protracted civil

war (Lebanese-type). Several possible outcomes are likely, none of which is in the interest of either the Iranian nation, nor the United States.

The following categories may be identified as the major sociopolitical forces which will play a salient role in the future of Iran: The intelligentsia, including the professionals and technocrats; the radical youth, constituting the central core of the present leftist movements; the white-collar employee in private and public sectors; the bazaar, including the guilds and shopkeepers; the clergy; the tribes; the non-Persian Shia or Sunni ethnic minorities; the army; the small landowners; the urban laborers; and the general peasantry; the Tudeh, Fada'iyan-i Khalq and other leftist faction, such as the Trotskyites and Maoists, on the secular left; mujahidin, Bani-Sadar and Shari'ati partisans on the religious left; Khomeini and his radical followers in line.

Efforts at prescribing preferred pictures of the future are often criticized as aspects of the imposition of one's own preference and will on a nation. It is argued that one must turn to the "people" in order to find out what the people's preferences are. The problem is, however, that under consideration of cultural fragmentation, the people are rarely in a position to indicate their preferences with any degree of precision or permanence. They react to the existing stimuli within the limitation of the existing political forces and political circumstances. The Iranian people, for example, went to the polls and voted overwhelmingly for the establishment of the present Islamic Republic. The turn-out was remarkable, even when one allows for the expected manipulation of the votes by the mullahs. By the same token, the people may be expected to vote differently under a different set of political turmoil.

To address future opinions of the Iranian politics, these three issues and factors ought to be contemplated seriously.

1. Iranian Army
2. Iranian army-civilian
3. Monarchy

One point that remains consistent or common-denominator in these three forces is the Iranian armed forces.

1. Iranian armed forces. The political attitude of the regular armed forces is likely to prove the most factor affecting the future of the Islamic Republic. The Iran-Iraq war forced the Khomeini regime to gather together the remnants of the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces to combat the Iraqi assault. After some initial set backs, and against most predictions, the Iranian military demonstrated a kind of capability which the Shah had boasted about, which his foes had ridiculed, and which now surprised friends and foes alike. In a year's time, it succeeded in driving the Iraqi armies out of Iranian territory and assuming a decidedly superior posture in both tactical prowess and technical capability. It did so in spite of constant interference by the pasdars, The Islamic Commissars.

The war has helped the armed forces streamline their organization and line of command, achieve a new esprit de corps, and a sense of pride in their professions and accomplishments. Even though it must now be assumed

that the organization of the army contains elements both committed to the Khomeini regime and opposed to it, nevertheless it remains the most organized and unified structure in Iranian society. Furthermore, its historical background, its military culture, its manner of evolution into one of the finest fighting forces in the Middle East, combined with the decimation of its ranks by the Khomeini regime, suggest a proclivity to anti Khomeinism in its ideological and professional outlook. This later point may be one of the reasons for the regime's and international forces reluctance to end the war in spite of the obvious devastation it has caused the country and the palpable strains it has created for the economy. For the sake of Iran and the United States interests in the Persian Gulf should intervene and stop the war as soon as possible. Such a scenario for the Iranian armed forces may be constructed to the regime similar to Pakistan as the proper model for the future of Iran.

2. Iranian army-civilian: The second issue addresses the politics of the military-civilian relations in the future of the country. A reasonable scenario will have to approach the military question from three dimensions: First, what would be the most desirable role for the military in Iran's future politics? Second, what would be the probable affects of the actual role the military will be called upon to play--in the process of the establishment of the new regime--on the future of military-civilian relations: Third and finally, given the characteristics of the Iranian political culture, under what system of government would the desirable role normatively ascribe to the military be most closely approximated?

Presumably, the most appropriate role for the military would be that of the guardianship of the nation's territorial integrity and its constitutional system of government. Within this framework, the military should refrain from interference in the internal politics of the country; it should leave the governing process to civilians who, as the duly elected and appointed servants of the state and the people, are expected to perform their official functions in accordance with the establishment laws of the land; and it should obey the civilian government regardless of the ideology of the party in power, as long as the constitutional frame of references is respected.

In fact, in most developing societies, the military either governs directly, or provides the framework and defines the limits within which the civilian government functions. In either case, military preponderance in politics constitutes an essential feature of political life. Such a scenario may be constructed to the regime similar to the Turkish military-civilian relations as the proper model for the future of Iran.

Third, Monarchy: Analytically, there are two sets of reasons why constitutional monarchy is the form of government most appropriate to future of Iran. The first set pertains to the characteristic of Iranian popular response. The only political institution the Iranian masses can respond to is monarchy. Monarchy is the only archetypal form of government which has been known, felt, and internationalized by the masses. Otherwise, among ideology, institution and charismatic leader, and not by what he represents in terms of ideology or form of government. Routinization of charisma, of course, may take different forms. Under the prevailing cultural circumstances in Iran, the probable pattern will not be very different from the



experience of other comparable societies: Charisma tends to fade and be replaced by stark force.

Constitutional monarchy, on the other hand, is basically perceived as an institution. The Shah would still represent a father figure (excluding his family), but within a set of expected rules and norms. This is the only explanation for the fact that the young heir to the Peacock Throne remains a viable alternative in the Iranian political psyche, in spite of the fact that he has no political experience, charisma, or force to commend him to the people. His influence derives from a spiritual domain and, under propitious circumstances, could be transformed into the kind of power that would perform the balancing functions required to safeguard the integrity of the political system. It would be only under these circumstances that other political institutions, foreseen in the monarchical constitution, may take root. Whether such a propitious situation obtains, depends more than is generally acknowledged on the awareness and political vigilance of other political actors, rather than on the young prince's personal propensities. Kings, like all other, are subject to the prevailing political culture, and, like others, learn the essentials of that culture through practice and example.

The second set of reasons pertains to the contradictions within the Iranian society. These contradictions manifest themselves in several arenas of conflict. While specifically these arenas may be innumerable, most of them would belong to the realm of problem-solving should a viable political system be established. Thus, conflicts arising from urban and rural policies, labor-management relations, modes of production and distribution of goods and services, or the nation's foreign policy posture, among others, would, one hope, be managed through the operations of the evolving political institutions. Of primary significance are the kinds of conflicts which relate to the framework of political decision making. Among these, the following three categories are of overriding importance: tension between secular and religious concepts of authority, Persian and non Persian components of the Iranian society, and military and civil preponderance in political power. these three issues remains at the core of the present turbulent conditions under any political situation, but may not yield themselves to complete resolution under any political situation, but if the aim is the establishment of a form of participative policy in which socio-economic progress and political freedom are to be secured and the nation's independence and integrity safeguard, they must be managed within the framework of a political structure suited to that constitutional monarchy, as envisaged by the 1906-7 Constitution, remain the most appropriate frame of reference. Also monarchies appear to be inherently antitotalitarian. In this connection, it may be interesting to note that, historically, all socioeconomically developed societies under monarchial constitutions have evolved into advanced democratic forms. No socioeconomically developed society has remained under purely AUTHORITARIAN rule, while many socioeconomically developed societies find themselves under totalitarian systems of government (the differences between these three types of systems are real and important). No suggestion of cause and effect relationship is intended here. Only that, dialectically speaking, it may be argued that, given logical relationships as well as historical tendencies, the chances that under constitutional monarchies socioeconomic development and political freedom will be positively correlated are greater than under any other

systems. This is essentially because, unless monarchies succeed in opening up their political requirements of socioeconomic development. Historically, therefore, monarchical systems may be viewed as a hedge, or a form of structural insurance, against totalitarianism.

It is difficult to imagine how the war might end--short of Khomeini's death, or his fall from power. Khomeini appears to remain adamant in his insistence that Saddam Hussein must go; an offer the Iraqi Leader, understandably, refuses to accept, or how far the Israelis' must achieve. In the face of impossible demands, the higher the casualties, and the greater the range of destruction, the more difficult it will be for the belligerents to arrive at mutually acceptable terms. The Islamic republic continues to abet terrorist groups in the region and beyond, inside Iran, political repression in its totalitarian form, social, economic, and cultural--remains the order of the day. The disenchantment with the regime, including not only the upper and middle classes, but also large portions of the MUSTAZAFIN. Thus, again Khomeini regime is an ultimatum to the United States and represents an invitation to communism in Iran.

Amendment NO. 1

The President of the Islamic Republic Ali Khamenei, Mohsen Rafiq-doust Notorious Commander of revolutionary Guard, Ali Velayati Minister of State Department, Mehdi Karubi one the main terrorist acting in TWA Flight and the terrorist leader in Mecca.