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*Last Updated: 11/13/2023*

*NR*

ID# 304178

THE WHITE HOUSE  
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

*0071*

**8515889**

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: MAY 13, 1985

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: DR. IMAM MUSA AL-MOUSAWI

SUBJECT: FORWARDS ARTICLE IN RESPONSE TO STATEMENT  
ABOUT THE IRANIAN KHOMEINI TERRORISM

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
LINAS KOJELIS	ORG	85/05/13		
<i>99 DOS</i> REFERRAL NOTE: _____	<i>R</i>	<i>85/05/21</i>		<i>C 85/05/14</i> <b>YI</b>
REFERRAL NOTE: _____				<i>A 85/06/04</i> <b>WIS</b>
REFERRAL NOTE: _____		/ /		/ /
REFERRAL NOTE: _____		/ /		/ /
REFERRAL NOTE: _____		/ /		/ /
REFERRAL NOTE: _____		/ /		/ /

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: \_\_\_\_\_

PL MAIL USER CODES: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

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*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION CODES:      *OUTGOING                *
*                       *                                     * CORRESPONDENCE:       *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED                *TYPE RESP=INITIALS    *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL      *           OF SIGNER   *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED              *           CODE = A     *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET  *S-SUSPENDED              *COMPLETED = DATE OF   *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                                     *           OUTGOING    *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                                     *                       *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE       *                                     *                       *
*X-INTERIM REPLY       *                                     *                       *
*****

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REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE  
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT. 2590  
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING  
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS  
MANAGEMENT.

W.H.

UNCLASSIFIED  
(Classification)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8515889

Date June 7, 1985

For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane  
National Security Council  
The White House

Reference:

To: President Reagan From: Dr. Imam Musa Al-Mousawi

Date: April 17, 1985 Subject: Forwards article in response

to statement about the Iranian Khomeini terrorism

WH Referral Dated: May 21, 1985 NSC ID# 304178  
(if any)

       The attached item was sent directly to the  
Department of State.

Action Taken:

       A draft reply is attached.

       A draft reply will be forwarded.

       A translation is attached.


XX An information copy of a direct reply is attached.

       We believe no response is necessary for the reason  
cited below.

       The Department of State has no objection to the  
proposed travel.

       Other.

Remarks:

*for*   
Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED  
(Classification)

85 MAY 7 P11:07

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

KHOMEINISIM IS A VIVID MATERIALIZATION OF  
NAZISM BUT IN A RELIGIOUS FORUM

One of the strangest subjects mentioned in the statements of Mr. Reagan and Secretary of State Mr. George Shultz were their direct threat to Iran, if Khomeini continues to promote terror against American interests.

What was strange in the statement was as if Mr. Reagan did not know what are in Khomeini's files until yesterday, and what this black file holds about the American hostages situation which lasted for 424 days in Tehran and how the threat did not affect Khomeini at all until he was forced to respond not because of fear from the U.S., but because of his dire need to funds held in the U.S. to help him in his war against Iraq.

How much more terror does President Reagan expect from Khomeini to do more than he did against American interests? Does he expect a louder explosion, more killing and destruction which will exceed the one that took place at the Marine's headquarters in Beirut and at the American Embassy in Kuwait.

If the American vital interests reflect world peace and non-confrontation with the Soviet Union, is there any Regime, except Khomeini's, which threatens

the world peace by refusing peace suggestion by Iraq for the past three years?

It is fortunate that Mr. Reagan and Secretary of State heard what Khomeini said just a few days ago about not being interested in a victory against Iraq, but what he really wants is to continue fighting, destroying, killing and mass suicide.

What Khomeini stated few days ago and for more than once stems from his radical concept of terrorism because he sees in it life to himself and his principals.

One of the stamps issued by the Iranian government few months ago depicts a picture of a radical terrorist named Mujtaba Nawab Safawi, head of an Islamic terrorist group who was executed in 1955 for his association in the killing of three Iraqi Premiers namely Abed Al Hussein Hagir, assassinated in 1948, Ali Razm Ara assassinated 1949, and Hussein Ala in 1955. The latter survived after he was shot in the head. The issuance of such a stamp is nothing less than a symbol for terrorism of the Islamic republic regime which is lead and inspired by Khomeini.

In spite of many differences, the only thing that unifies Khomeini and Colonel Kaddafi, is terrorism. While Khomeini claims to be shiite, Kaddafi claims to be Abathi and he sees the shiites to be non-religious blasphemists and heretics, at the same time Khomeini sees the opposite.

Kaddafi killed Imam Moussa Alsader the most beloved person to Khomeini's heart, the latter is still asking that the death of his friend be avenged. Khomeini refused to permit Kaddafi to visit Iran.

So what brings these two radical men who contradict each other completely together, except terrorism?

What does the support of Aldawa terrorist group by Khomeini mean? Members of this party after committing atrocities and destructive acts in Iraq fled to Iran to be welcomed by Khomeini, giving them large sums of money and weapons to commit terror acts against Iraq.

I heard, Ahmad son of Khomeini, a few months after the success of the Iranian Revolution saying, "I have in my possession at my house lots of dynamite enough to destroy a quarter of Tehran and that his father's supporters were ready to destroy vital installations in it if the shah refuses to leave the country or if his father is denied entry to Iran.

The assassination room which was established in Al Samawa Ministry (Intelligence) is headed by Ahmad, Khomeini's son, and is financed through Khomeini's private budget and through his office in Jamaran. The government does not contribute in financing the actions occurring in this room. The functions of this room included the killing of persons who are against the Iranian Regime.

What does it mean to have Khomeini's pictures hanging on the walls in the streets controlled by marchess of the "Islamic Revolution" in Lebanon. Khomeini's financial support to those terrorist organizations that calls themselves the "Islamic Holy War" in Lebanon is as clear as the sun itself.

After all this, what does the American President expect to see or hear from Khomeini and his Regime? Maybe he is waiting until Khomeini destroys the whole world and its civilizations, until then to discipline him.

Perhaps it is beneficial to tell Mr. Reagan the following story:

A man asked his friend to whip his son ten lashes if he caused any harm to the farm he was going to inherit. After the death of the father, his friend came to the son's home and whipped him ten times. The son became angry and yelled at his father's friend, "Why are you whipping me, knowing that I did not cause any damage to the farm. The man replied, "After the farm is damaged whips are of no use".

I would like to say to Mr. Reagan, after the area is destroyed, whips are of no use also. To make myself clear in my letter I must point out that the threats made by Mr. Reagan and his Secretary of State are nothing more than:



1) A U.S. military occupation and the removal of Khomeini, as it happened in Granada. This will not happen in spite of what Khomeini does to harm the American interests because it means a third world war and complete confrontation among the two super powers. Khomeini and others know very well that this risk will not take place.

2) The destruction of vital Iranian Installations. This will not affect Khomeini and he will not lose any sleep over it. Because losing these vital installations will not affect Khomeini's destructive mentality. That is why he did not respond to the call of peace offered him for many years, and if he died he would have saved Iran and its vital facilities from destruction; instead he is continuing his suicidal war caring less of what this war has caused, and is causing, in the way of complete destruction to Iran.

The difficult problem is understanding the intentions of those ruling Iran, and it is a result of the error in evaluating the mentality of those who sit on the Iranian Regime. The man who is ruling Iran is not a fair man able of controlling his urges by using his mind or exercising love and peace. He is however, a man who is mentally sick controlled by his eagerness to kill and destroy. The logic of this man is that, "If we win we are victorious and if we lose we are the winners." A mentality like this

cannot be intimidated by threats.

I say to Mr. Reagan that the world today faces a threat equal to that faced before the second world war, when Hitler started to market his Nazi mentality to Europe, that mentality which he started in its first provision in his book "My Struggle", writing that Germany cannot survive without expanding in Europe and without creating colonies to expand his power and control. The occupation of Austria and Czechoslovakia was the Prelude of the implementation of this belief. Today Khomeini is practicing exactly the same, that Iran cannot survive unless it exports its revolution to its neighbors and Islamic countries.

The Iran-Iraq War was the prelude of exporting his comprehensive revolution. So the only difference between Nazism and Khomeinism is that the first appeared in a national form which stated that Germany is above all, while the second appeared in a religious form and its motto is exporting the Islamic revolution by force. Kindly tell Mr. Reagan that he alone cannot put an end to Khomeini's evil and harm. His soviet counterpart Mr. Gorbachew also cannot alone put an end to the Iranian devil that means religious clothings, in spite of all the hate that Gorbachew carries in his heart to Khomeini. However, if these two leaders agree on the magnitudde of this huge damage which threatens humanity because of of the continuation of war in that vital region as the world, then they can end this war in one hour if they

both threaten Iran to stop fighting and accept peace! No matter how adventurous Khomeini is and how eager he is to destroy and kill, he has an inner illusion that affects him when the issue becomes an issue of life and death. (To be or not to be, that is the question). The same tactics which were exerted against Khomeini during the American hostage crises must be exerted now to force him to end the war without conditions.

The end of war means the end of Khomeini and his terrorist forces which he supports and trains to create havoc, destructions and killings all over the world.

---

Imam Dr. Musa Mousawi is president of the High Islamic Council of the Americas in Los Angeles. He was among the clergymen, including Khomeini, expelled by the shah. An Iranian of Iraqi descent, he spent part of his exile from Iran in Iraq and in Paris. After visiting Khomeini's new Islamic republic, he broke with the ayatollah.



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 4, 1985

Imam Dr. Musa Al-Mousawi  
President of the High Islamic  
Council of the Americas  
10880 Wilshire Blvd., Ste. 1918  
Los Angeles, California 90024

Dear Dr. Al-Mousawi:

Your letter of April 17 to President Reagan, along with its enclosed article on "Iranian Khomeini Terrorism," has been forwarded to this office for study and reply. I have read your article and the suggestions it contained with interest. Thank you for taking the time to send us your analysis of this problem.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Donald A. Roberts".

Donald A. Roberts  
Political/Economic Officer  
Office of Northern Gulf Affairs

8515889

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

REFERRAL

MAY 21, 1985

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DIRECT REPLY, FURNISH INFO COPY

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 304178

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED APRIL 17, 1985

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: DR. IMAM MUSA AL-MOUSAWI  
PRESIDENT  
THE HIGH ISLAMIC COUNCIL OF THE  
AMERICAS  
SUITE 1918  
10880 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD  
LOS ANGELES CA 90024

SUBJECT: FORWARDS ARTICLE IN RESPONSE TO STATEMENT  
ABOUT THE IRANIAN KHOMEINI TERRORISM

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN  
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE  
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE  
(OR DRAFT) TO:  
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY  
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON  
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

5.  
L. Kogelias

المجلس الإسلامي الأعلى في أمريكا

THE HIGH ISLAMIC COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAS

304178

8515889

مكتب الرئيس

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

April 17, 1985

President Ronald Reagan  
The White House  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

In reply to your statement about the "Iranian Khomeini Terrorism", I wrote the enclosed article which is sent to major newspapers in the U.S.A.

Your response on this issue will be much appreciated.

Sincerely,



Imam Dr. Musa Al-Mousawi  
President of the High Islamic  
Council of the Americas

Enclosures

# Los Angeles Times

4 Sunday

Thursday, April 22, 1982

MF/178 pages/Copyri

Thursday, April 22, 1982/Part II

11

## Iran Is Bled by Blasphemous Horror

### The World Recoils at Atrocities Done in the Name of God

By MUSA MOUSAVI

Iran has become a land where religious doublespeak pervades all sectors of public life, where oppression masquerades as "divine justice" and torturers and executioners pretend to be motivated by a concern for their victims' "eternal life." The methods and the results are reminiscent of Nazi Germany, while the inverted logic and twisted language bear striking resemblance to the Spanish Inquisition.

In a bold attempt to disguise his tyranny, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini is explicitly identified as God's "personal agent on earth," making the despotic regime of his henchmen nothing less than an Islamic "city of God." The situation is virtually unprecedented in the history of Islam and amounts to a sinister attempt to erase the boundary dividing civilization from barbarism.

In the lexicon of Iran's new doublespeak, political murder becomes "the wiping out of corruption on earth" and torture becomes "an act of cleansing and purification," while the Soviet Union and other traditional enemies of Islam are transformed into "friends of the Islamic revolution."

According to official government figures, more than 5,000 Iranians have atoned for their "corruption on earth" through death. Lifted from the Koran, the term is used to suggest that their activity constituted a personal assault on Mohammed himself. Among these "corrupters" were 80-year-old men and girls not yet 12 years of age, as well as 2,000 young Mujahedeen fighters, members of the very force that helped Khomeini seize power in the first place. The execution of children in particular is shamefully documented by the official press which, often lacking any other means of identifying executed youngsters, would run their pictures along with the demand that their parents come to collect the bodies.

Although the government admits only to 7,000 political prisoners, the actual count far exceeds 30,000. More than that number were accommodated in the shah's old politi-

cal prisons, now so crowded that Khomeini's people have been appropriating school buildings for even more detention space.

Last winter, after Khomeini ordered an investigation of prison conditions, Chief Justice Abdul Karim Ardabili was forced to acknowledge that extensive torture was carried out in Tehran's Evin and Ghasr prisons, which are run by the Revolutionary Guards. One especially grisly fact that emerged was the practice of taking large amounts of blood from condemned prisoners for use at the front in the war with Iraq.

Actions that other regimes carry out in shame and darkness are called acts of mercy in doublespeaking Iran. Khomeini's mullahs proclaim their rituals of torture to be for the purpose of "cleansing the soul," so that after death it will go directly to heaven. Chief Judge Ayatollah Sadegh Khalkhali (widely known as "the executioner") enunciated this perverted logic last fall in an interview with journalists who asked about the possibility of innocent people having been condemned to death. "What is there to worry about?" he retorted. "If they are innocent, they will go directly to Heaven. If not, our cleansing will aid in the ultimate salvation of their souls."

In the name of "protecting the revolution," the citizen is subject to five kinds of law pulling him in five directions at the whim of five separate entities. The Revolutionary Tribunal has its own police and prisons, as do the Ministry of Justice, the Revolutionary Guards and the Revolutionary Committees. The fifth arm of anarchy is the Religious Tribunal, which polices "morals offenses" such as wine-drinking and often orders executions on its own authority. These pursuits are abetted by the exhortation for parents and children to spy on one another "in the name of Allah."

In a further perversion of Islam, Khomeini's bizarre logic now casts the Tudeh (Iran's Communist Party) and the Soviet Union in the thoroughly unfamiliar role of "friends of the Islamic revolution," com-

pletely ignoring the Soviet war of extermination against Islamic partisans in neighboring Afghanistan.

Khomeini's rhetoric of religious zealotry seeks to create the impression that his regime is universally supported by Iran's Islamic community. Such is far from the truth. Outside a small circle of personal disciples, there is massive—albeit passive—resistance among the nation's ayatollahs and mullahs. Imam Mohammed Taher Shobel Khaghani, leader of Iran's 4 million Arabs, has been held incommunicado since he was arrested along with his wife and child in 1979. Ayatollah Kazem Shariat-Madari, spiritual leader of Iran's Azerbaijani minority, has for two years isolated himself in his own home as a means of protest. (This week, implicated in an alleged plot to assassinate Khomeini, he was stripped of his clerical rank and placed under house arrest.)

Despite its attempt to manipulate reality through the language of deception, current trends do not bode well for the future of the regime. Many observers believe that conditions are almost ideal for a communist power grab. This would precipitate a civil war between the far left and Iranian Islam, the basis of which is passionately, if latently, anti-communist. Khomeini and his followers would be caught in the middle. It is unthinkable that he would side with the communists and thus risk alienating the forces of religion. On the other hand, taking the anti-communist side would inevitably necessitate an abandonment of the anti-Westernism that has formed the very basis of his "revolution." In such a struggle, Khomeinism would lose its *raison d'être* and, with it, any hope of influencing the future of Iran.

*Imam Musa Mousavi is president of the High Islamic Council of the Americas in Los Angeles. He was among the clergymen, including Khomeini, expelled by the shah. An Iranian of Iraqi descent, he spent part of his exile from Iran in Iraq and in Paris. After visiting Khomeini's new Islamic republic, he broke with the ayatollah.*

NASTA

ID# 316058

THE WHITE HOUSE  
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

COO71  
State

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: JUNE 11, 1985

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE RICHARD D. LAMM

SUBJECT: WRITES CONCERNING THE TAKEOVER BY THE ISLAMIC  
REGIME IN IRAN AND THE BAHAI'S THAT HAVE BEEN  
EXECUTED OR ASSASSINATED

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION		
		ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C D	COMPLETED YY/MM/BB
ANDREW CARD		ORG	85/06/11	AC		13 A 850611
<u>State</u>	REFERRAL NOTE: _____	R	850617			AB A 851011
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____		/ /			/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____		/ /			/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____		/ /			/ /
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____		/ /			/ /

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 2100 \_\_\_\_\_

IA MAIL USER CODES: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

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*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION          *OUTGOING          *
*                       *                       *CORRESPONDENCE:  *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED          *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL *      OF SIGNER    *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED        *      CODE = A     *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET  *S-SUSPENDED        *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                       *      OUTGOING    *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                       *                       *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE       *                       *                       *
*X-INTERIM REPLY       *                       *                       *
*****

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REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE  
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590  
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING  
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS  
MANAGEMENT.



W.H.

UNCLASSIFIED  
(Classification)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8517879

Date July 11, 1985

For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane  
National Security Council  
The White House

Reference:

To: President Reagan From: The Honorable Richard D. Lamm

Date: June 7, 1985 Subject: writes concerning the takeover by  
the Islamic regime in Iran & the Baha'is that have been executed or assassinate

WH Referral Dated: June 17, 1985 NSC ID# 316058  
(if any)

         The attached item was sent directly to the  
Department of State.

Action Taken:

         A draft reply is attached.

         A draft reply will be forwarded.

         A translation is attached.


  XX   An information copy of a direct reply is attached.

         We believe no response is necessary for the reason  
cited below.

         The Department of State has no objection to the  
proposed travel.

         Other.

Remarks:

  
Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED  
(Classification)



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

JUL -9 1985

The Honorable  
Richard D. Lamm  
Governor of Colorado  
Denver, Colorado 80203-1792

Dear Governor Lamm:

A copy of your letter of June 7, 1985, to President Reagan has been forwarded to the Department of State by the White House.

The U.S. Government shares your concern over Iran's persecution of Baha'is and abhors the executions which have taken place. The Department of State has followed the plight of the Baha'is since the 1979 revolution and has worked closely with the Baha'i leadership in the United States to do everything possible for the Baha'is in Iran. We have cooperated with our friends and allies in supporting resolutions in the United Nations Human Rights Commission and various other international organizations condemning Iran's treatment of Baha'is, and have sought through a variety of means to draw the attention of the world community to persecution of the Baha'is. Baha'i refugees are given sympathetic treatment by U.S. consular and immigration officers charged with administering the refugee admissions program for Iranians, and approximately 10,000 Iranian Baha'is have been given either asylum or refugee status in the U.S. Nonetheless, we have little capacity to affect directly the policies of the Iranian regime.

It is indeed tragic that Iran has virtually criminalized the Baha'i faith and denies its members the most fundamental human rights. We note that Iran's present regime joined a consensus of the United Nations General Assembly in adopting the Declaration for the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief, and we have repeatedly called on Iran to abide by that declaration, which affirms the principle of respect for religious freedom.

Please be assured that the U.S. Government will continue, in coordination with its allies and other like-minded

governments, to support the United Nations Human Rights Commission in its efforts to halt the persecution of the Baha'i minority in Iran, and that we will continue our efforts through any other available channels to relieve the suffering of the Baha'is.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Jayne", written over the typed name.

Jayne H. Plank  
Director of Intergovernmental Affairs  
Office of Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs

3517879

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

REFERRAL

JUNE 17, 1985

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DIRECT REPLY, FURNISH INFO COPY

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 316058

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED JUNE 7, 1985

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: THE HONORABLE RICHARD D. LAMM  
GOVERNOR OF COLORADO  
136 STATE CAPITAL  
DENVER CO 80203

SUBJECT: WRITES CONCERNING THE TAKEOVER BY THE ISLAMIC  
REGIME IN IRAN AND THE BAHAI'S THAT HAVE BEEN  
EXECUTED OR ASSASSINATED

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN  
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE  
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE  
(OR DRAFT) TO:  
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY  
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON  
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

8517879

June 13, 1985


Dear Governor Lamm:

On behalf of the President, I want to thank you for your letter concerning the takeover by the Islamic regime in Iran and the Baha'is that have been executed or assassinated.

I have forwarded your correspondence to the Department of State for further review.

Thank you for bringing your concerns to the attention of the Administration. If I can be of any further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,



Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
Special Assistant to the President  
for Intergovernmental Affairs

The Honorable Richard D. Lamm  
Governor of Colorado  
Denver, Colorado 80203-1792

5  
Andy Card

#316058

# STATE OF COLORADO

**EXECUTIVE CHAMBERS**

136 State Capital  
Denver, Colorado 80203-1792  
Phone (303) 866-2471



Richard D. Lamm  
Governor

June 7, 1985

The Honorable Ronald Reagan  
President  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:


Since the 1979 takeover by the Islamic regime in Iran, more than 160 Baha'is have been executed or assassinated, including in some cases, teenage girls. Hundreds of Baha'is are being held in Iranian prisons without formal charges. Baha'i holy places have been completely destroyed, and burial places have been ransacked. The Baha'is have also been subjected to systematic persecution and blatant discrimination. They have been summarily dismissed from jobs, had their properties confiscated, and pensions and trade licenses revoked. Education has been denied their children.

This situation was recently dramatized for me by the execution of a gentleman, Mr. Nostrat'u'llah Sobhani. Mr. Sobhani is the father of a Colorado resident. He had been imprisoned for some time, and his family in Iran only learned of his death some time after the fact.

Baha'is are peace loving and wish only to be allowed to practice their faith without fear of arrest, torture, or harassment. They are enjoined to be law abiding and to be obedient to the government while refraining from partisan politics. That these people, of such high character and integrity, are so persecuted is yet another historical convolution of justice.

While I recognize that the situation in Iran is volatile and American influence limited, to say the least, I must, nonetheless, register my personal outrage. I urge you, if you have within your means an avenue for action of any consequence, to do whatever you can to put a stop to these crimes.

Sincerely,

  
Richard D. Lamm  
Governor

cc. Richard N. Dodge, Chairman  
Spritual Assembly of the Baha'is  
of Arapahoe County, Colorado

ID # 330192cu  
00071

**WHITE HOUSE  
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET**



- O - OUTGOING
- H - INTERNAL
- I - INCOMING  
Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 1 1

Name of Correspondent: D. Chew

MI Mail Report      User Codes: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

Subject: Continuation of Iran emergency

ROUTE TO:		ACTION	DISPOSITION			
Office/Agency	(Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>CULTURE</u>		<u>ORIGINATOR</u>	<u>85,10,30</u>		<u>C</u>	<u>85,10,30</u> <b>PX</b>
<u>Mat 18</u>		<u>R</u>	<u>85,10,30</u>		<u>C</u>	<u>85,10,30</u> <b>PX</b>
		<u>Referral Note: per 30 85 JAR memo to David Chew</u>				
			<u>1 1</u>			<u>1 1</u>
		<u>Referral Note:</u>				
			<u>1 1</u>			<u>1 1</u>
		<u>Referral Note:</u>				
			<u>1 1</u>			<u>1 1</u>
		<u>Referral Note:</u>				

- ACTION CODES:**
- A - Appropriate Action
  - C - Comment/Recommendation
  - D - Draft Response
  - F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure
  - I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
  - R - Direct Reply w/Copy
  - S - For Signature
  - X - Interim Reply
- DISPOSITION CODES:**
- A - Answered
  - B - Non-Special Referral
  - C - Completed
  - S - Suspended
- FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:**
- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
  - Code = "A"
  - Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.  
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).  
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.  
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

## RECORDS MANAGEMENT ONLY

### CLASSIFICATION SECTION

No. of Additional Correspondents: \_\_\_\_\_ Media: \_\_\_\_\_ Individual Codes: \_\_\_\_\_

Prime Subject Code: \_\_\_\_\_ Secondary Subject Codes: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

### PRESIDENTIAL REPLY

Code	Date	Comment	Form
C	_____	Time: _____	P- _____
DSP	_____	Time: _____	Media: _____

**SIGNATURE CODES:**

- CPn - Presidential Correspondence**
- n - 0 - Unknown
  - n - 1 - Ronald Wilson Reagan
  - n - 2 - Ronald Reagan
  - n - 3 - Ron
  - n - 4 - Dutch
  - n - 5 - Ron Reagan
  - n - 6 - Ronald
  - n - 7 - Ronnie

- CLn - First Lady's Correspondence**
- n - 0 - Unknown
  - n - 1 - Nancy Reagan
  - n - 2 - Nancy
  - n - 3 - Mrs. Ronald Reagan

- CBn - Presidential & First Lady's Correspondence**
- n - 1 - Ronald Reagan - Nancy Reagan
  - n - 2 - Ron - Nancy

**MEDIA CODES:**


- B - Box/package
- C - Copy
- D - Official document
- G - Message
- H - Handcarried
- L - Letter
- M - Mailgram
- O - Memo
- P - Photo
- R - Report
- S - Sealed
- T - Telegram
- V - Telephone
- X - Miscellaneous
- Y - Study



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 30, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR DAVID L. CHEW  
STAFF SECRETARY

FROM: JOHN G. ROBERTS   
ASSOCIATE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Continuation of Iran Emergency

Counsel's Office has reviewed the above-referenced proposed notice and letter to Congress, and finds no objection to them from a legal perspective. Solely in the interests of stylistic conformity with last year's notice, a comma should be added after "policy" in line three, and the comma after "normal" in line nine should be deleted. In addition, "Federal Register" in the last sentence should be underscored.

## WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 10/30/85 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: October 31st

SUBJECT: Continuation of Iran Emergency

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	LACY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
REGAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	McFARLANE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MILLER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	OGLESBY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BUCHANAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	RYAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CHAVEZ	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SPEAKES	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CHEW	<input type="checkbox"/> P	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> S	SPRINKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DANIELS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SVAHN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FIELDING	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	THOMAS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FRIEDERSDORF	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	TUTTLE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HENKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<u>Clerk</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HICKEY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HICKS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
KINGON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS: Please give your recommendations to my office by Thursday, October 31st. Thanks.

RESPONSE:

1985 OCT 31 11:10:14

David L. Chew  
Staff Secretary  
Ext. 2702



THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON

October 29, 1985

Dear Mr. President:

Under the National Emergencies Act, the authorities now being exercised pursuant to the November 14, 1979, declaration of national emergency with respect to Iran will lapse on November 14, 1985, unless, prior to that date, you publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the Congress a notice that those authorities are to continue in effect. If the Iran emergency were allowed to lapse, the Government would be limited to the existing measures regarding Iran. This could prevent you from taking steps necessary to implement the January 1981 agreements with Iran, from effectuating new settlements with Iran, or from protecting the interests of U.S. nationals with claims against Iran. It could also impair the Government's position in litigation involving Iran.

For these reasons, I recommend that you sign, transmit to the Congress, and publish in the Federal Register the necessary notice. Enclosed are a proposed notice of extension (Tab 1) and a letter transmitting the notice to the Congress (Tab 2).

Respectfully,

James A. Baker, III

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Enclosures

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)) provides for the automatic termination of a national emergency unless, prior to the anniversary date of its declaration, the President publishes in the Federal Register and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that the emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date. In accordance with this provision, I have sent the enclosed notice, stating that the Iran emergency is to continue in effect beyond November 14, 1985, to the Federal Register for publication. Similar notices were sent to the Congress and the Federal Register on November 12, 1980, November 12, 1981, November 8, 1982, November 4, 1983, and November 7, 1984.

The crisis between the United States and Iran that began in 1979 has not been fully resolved. Although the international tribunal established to adjudicate claims of U.S. nationals against Iran and of Iranian nationals against the United States continues to function, full normalization of commercial and diplomatic relations between the United States and Iran will require more time. In these circumstances, I have determined that it is necessary to maintain in force the broad authorities that may be needed in the process of implementing the January 1981 agreements with Iran and in the eventual normalization of relations with that country.

Enclosure

NOTICE

- - - - -

CONTINUATION OF IRAN EMERGENCY

On November 14, 1979, by Executive Order No. 12170, the President declared a national emergency to deal with the threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States constituted by the situation in Iran. Notices of the continuation of this national emergency were transmitted by the President to the Congress and the Federal Register on November 12, 1980, November 12, 1981, November 8, 1982, November 4, 1983, and November 7, 1984. Because our relations with Iran have not yet returned to normal and the process of implementing the January 19, 1981, agreements with Iran is still underway, the national emergency declared on November 14, 1979, must continue in effect beyond November 14, 1985. Therefore, in accordance with Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act, I am continuing the national emergency with respect to Iran. This notice shall be published in the Federal Register and transmitted to the Congress.

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
November \_\_\_\_, 1985

ID # 330266 CU

C0071

### WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET



- O - OUTGOING
- H - INTERNAL
- I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 1 1

Name of Correspondent: Dave Chew

MI Mail Report      User Codes: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

Subject: Semi-annual report to Congress on Iran Emergency

ROUTE TO:	ACTION	DISPOSITION				
Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD	
<u>CUHOLL</u>	<u>ORIGINATOR</u>	<u>85,11,06</u>		<u>C</u>	<u>85,11,06</u>	<u>JV</u>
<u>CUAT 18</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>85,11,06</u>		<u>S</u>	<u>85,11,06</u>	<u>JV</u>
	<u>Referral Note: JBR memo to David Chew</u>					
	<u>Referral Note:</u>					
	<u>Referral Note:</u>					
	<u>Referral Note:</u>					

**ACTION CODES:**

- A - Appropriate Action
- C - Comment/Recommendation
- D - Draft Response
- F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure
- I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
- R - Direct Reply w/Copy
- S - For Signature
- X - Interim Reply

**DISPOSITION CODES:**

- A - Answered
- B - Non-Special Referral
- C - Completed
- S - Suspended

**FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:**

Type of Response = Initials of Signer  
Code = "A"  
Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.  
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Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.  
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# RECORDS MANAGEMENT ONLY

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No. of Additional Correspondents: \_\_\_\_\_ Media: \_\_\_\_\_ Individual Codes: \_\_\_\_\_

Prime Subject Code: \_\_\_\_\_ Secondary Subject Codes: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

## PRESIDENTIAL REPLY

Code	Date	Comment	Form
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C	_____	Time: _____	P- _____
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DSP	_____	Time: _____	Media: _____
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**SIGNATURE CODES:**

- CPn** - Presidential Correspondence
- n - 0 - Unknown
- n - 1 - Ronald Wilson Reagan
- n - 2 - Ronald Reagan
- n - 3 - Ron
- n - 4 - Dutch
- n - 5 - Ron Reagan
- n - 6 - Ronald
- n - 7 - Ronnie

- CLn** - First Lady's Correspondence
- n - 0 - Unknown
- n - 1 - Nancy Reagan
- n - 2 - Nancy
- n - 3 - Mrs. Ronald Reagan

- CBn** - Presidential & First Lady's Correspondence
- n - 1 - Ronald Reagan - Nancy Reagan
- n - 2 - Ron - Nancy

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- C** - Copy
- D** - Official document
- G** - Message
- H** - Handcarried
- L** - Letter
- M** - Mailgram
- O** - Memo
- P** - Photo
- R** - Report
- S** - Sealed
- T** - Telegram
- V** - Telephone
- X** - Miscellaneous
- Y** - Study




THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 6, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR DAVID L. CHEW  
STAFF SECRETARY

FROM: JOHN G. ROBERTS   
ASSOCIATE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Semi-Annual Report to Congress  
on Iran Emergency

Counsel's Office has reviewed the above-referenced proposed report to Congress. In point 4 on page 2, it appears that the last word should be "fifteen" not "twelve." The previous report of April 22, 1985, stated that a total of ten small claimants had received awards on agreed terms. This report states that there have been five additional such cases, which would bring the total to fifteen, not twelve.

In the first line of the second paragraph of point 8 on page 4, "July 31" should be changed to "August 1." The Senate agreed to the conference report on what became Public Law 99-93 on July 31, but the House did not do so until August 1. (Alternatively, the reference to when Congress passed this statute can be deleted altogether. The legally significant date is the date the President signed the bill into law.)



## WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 11/05/85 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 11/07/85

SUBJECT: SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON IRAN EMERGENCY

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	OGLESBY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
REGAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	RILEY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MILLER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	RYAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BUCHANAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SPEAKES	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
CHAVEZ	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SPRINKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CHEW	<input type="checkbox"/> P	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SS	SVAHN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DANIELS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	THOMAS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FIELDING	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	TUTTLE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HENKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	CLERK	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
HICKS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
KINGON	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
LACY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
McFARLANE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

**REMARKS:**

Would you please comment on the attached and give them to me by Thursday, November 7. Thank you.

**RESPONSE:**

1985 NOV -6 11 6:41

David L. Chew  
Staff Secretary  
Ext. 2702



THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON

November 5, 1985

President 4133  
Nov 10 1985 10 5 41

Dear Mr. President:

Under Section 204(c) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, you are required to submit a report to the Congress concerning the Iran emergency every six months. A proposed report, which summarizes developments concerning the Iran emergency during the past six months, is enclosed at Tab A. Your last report to Congress, dated April 22, 1985, is enclosed for your reference at Tab B.

I recommend that you forward the proposed report to Congress by November 14, 1985, the end of the current six-month period.

Respectfully,

James A. Baker, III

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C. 20500

Enclosures

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

National Emergency With Respect to Iran

Message to Congress, November , 1985

To the Congress of the United States:

Pursuant to Section 204(c) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. Section 1703(c), I hereby report to the Congress with respect to developments since my last report of April 22, 1985, concerning the national emergency with respect to Iran that was declared in Executive Order No. 12170 of November 14, 1979.

1. The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, established at The Hague pursuant to the Claims Settlement Agreement of January 19, 1981 (the "Algiers Accords"), continues to make progress in arbitrating the claims before it. Since my last report, the Tribunal has rendered 25 more decisions, for a total of 194 final decisions. Of these, 146 have been awards in favor of American claimants; 101 were awards on agreed terms, authorizing and approving payment of settlements negotiated by the parties; and 45 were adjudicated decisions. As of October 15, 1985, total payments to successful American claimants from the Security Account stood at approximately \$368 million. In cases between the governments, the Tribunal has issued two decisions in favor of each government, dismissed one claim that had been filed by the United States, and dismissed four claims that had been filed by Iran. In addition, Iran has withdrawn fifteen of its government-to-government claims, while the United States has withdrawn only three.

2. My last report noted various changes in the composition of the Tribunal, including the designation of Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel as President of the Tribunal and Chairman of Chamber One. During the past six months, Swiss lawyer Robert Briner and French law professor Michel Virally have assumed their new positions as Chairmen of Chambers Two and Three, respectively. Shortly before Messrs. Briner and Virally assumed their new positions, Tribunal proceedings had been briefly disrupted because of travel difficulties allegedly encountered by Iranian respondents in connection with the Iran-Iraq war. With these alleged difficulties having abated, and the two new arbitrators having assumed their roles as Chairmen, the Tribunal has resumed normal operations.

The Tribunal continues to make progress in the arbitration of claims of U.S. nationals for \$250,000 or more. More than 36 percent of the claims for over \$250,000 have now been disposed of through adjudication, settlement, or voluntary withdrawal, leaving 330 such claims on the docket. The Tribunal issued long-awaited orders in claims involving dual United States-Iranian nationals, allowing these claimants to resume actively arbitrating their claims by demonstrating their dominant and effective U.S. nationality. The Chambers have also made significant awards to several American claimants, including a \$7.3 million contested award to Sylvania Technical Systems, Inc. The Sylvania decision also purports to set forth a uniform standard for awarding interest in Tribunal cases. In another important decision, the Tribunal decided that, at least in the context of that case, the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights between Iran and the United States governs the standard of compensation in claims for expropriation of property, and determined that the claimant in that case was entitled to recover the fair market value of the going concern that had been expropriated by Iran. Settlement discussions continue to proceed between numerous American claimants and Iranian respondents.

4. The Tribunal has made significant progress in the arbitration of the claims of U.S. nationals against Iran of less than \$250,000 each. As described in my last report, in addition to 18 test cases, the Tribunal has selected 100 other claims for active arbitration. As of October 15, 1985, the Department of State had submitted Supplemental Statements of Claim in 85 of these claims, containing more than 25,000 pages of text and evidence. Additional pleadings are being filed weekly. Although Iran repeatedly seeks extensions of time within which to file its responsive pleadings to these claims, the Tribunal has continued to press for their resolution. At the Tribunal, three senior legal officers and a law clerk work exclusively on these claims. The first three test case hearings have been set for December, and six additional cases have been set for hearing during the spring of 1986. The Department of State remains optimistic that the Tribunal will issue its first decision in a fully arbitrated small claim in early 1986. Finally, since my last report, another five small claimants have received awards on agreed terms, bringing the total to twelve.

5. The Department of State continues to coordinate the efforts of concerned governmental agencies in presenting U.S. claims against Iran as well as responses by the U.S. Government to claims brought against it by Iran. Since my last report, the Department has filed pleadings in six government-to-government claims based on contracts for the provision of goods and services. The Tribunal held one

hearing in a major contract dispute on whether it could hear approximately 1500 cases under the Iranian Foreign Military Sales Program closed before October 1, 1978.

In addition to work on the government-to-government claims, the Department of State, working together with the Department of the Treasury and the Department of Justice, filed five pleadings in disputes concerning the interpretation and/or performance of various provisions of the Algiers Accords. The Tribunal issued one significant decision in an interpretive dispute, ruling that -- subject to a limited exception, which Iran has stated does not apply to any of its claims -- the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction over claims brought by Iran against U.S. banks for allegedly unpaid deposits and for interest on transferred deposits. This, together with the Tribunal's earlier decision that it lacked jurisdiction over standby letter of credit claims asserted by Iran against U.S. banks, has resulted in the dismissal of more than 400 of Iran's claims against such banks.

Since my last report, Iran has initiated two new interpretive disputes. The first concerns the purported obligation of the U.S. Government to satisfy Tribunal awards issued in favor of Iran against private U.S. claimants. The second concerns the Tribunal's jurisdiction over indirect claims for losses incurred by corporations (and similar entities) that lack U.S. nationality, but which are controlled by U.S. nationals. The Department of State is now preparing responsive pleadings in both these proceedings.

6. The Algiers Accords also provide for direct negotiations between U.S. banks and Bank Markazi Iran concerning the payment from Dollar Account No. 2 (the interest-bearing escrow account established at the Bank of England in January 1981 with the deposit of \$1.418 billion of previously blocked Iranian funds) of nonsyndicated debt claims of U.S. banks against Iran. Since my last report, Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago reached a settlement with Iran, bringing to 30 the total number of bank settlements involving payments from Dollar Account No. 2. About 16 banks have yet to settle their claims. In addition, a number of those banks that have already reached settlements with Iran have reserved claims against Dollar Account No. 2.

As mentioned in my previous report, attorneys from the Department of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York have been negotiating an "Agreed Clarification" with Bank Markazi to allow for the payment from Dollar Account No. 2 of certain amounts still owing on Iran's syndicated debt. Agreement on the text of this "Agreed Clarification" was reached in June, and Treasury instructed the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, as fiscal agent of the United States, to

sign the document; however, the Bank Markazi representatives were not prepared to sign. They claimed the delay was due to the need to obtain additional formal clearances in Tehran and that there was no substantive problem with the agreement. The Department of the Treasury is hopeful that the necessary approval in Tehran will be forthcoming.

7. There have been no changes in the Iranian Assets Control Regulations since my last report.

8. Pursuant to a June 7, 1982 Directive License from the Department of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York had been deducting two percent from amounts received from the Security Account in satisfaction of awards rendered by the Tribunal in favor of U.S. claimants. The purpose of the deduction was to reimburse the U.S. Government for a portion of the expenses incurred in connection with the arbitration of claims of U.S. persons against Iran before the Tribunal and the maintenance of the Security Account from which such claims are paid. In ordering the deduction of this user fee, Treasury relied solely on the authority of the Independent Offices Appropriation Act (the "IOAA"). The amounts deducted, which as of August 16, 1985, totaled \$7.3 million, had been paid into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts. Last May, in a case brought by Sperry Corporation, the U.S. Claims Court issued a bench ruling holding that the two percent fee did not comply with the requirements of the IOAA and hence was invalid. No judgment has yet been issued, and, in light of the new legislation described below, it is unlikely that one will be issued.

*2/ House amend.* On July 31, 1985, Congress passed, and on August 16, 1985, the President signed, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987, Public Law 99-93, Title V of which deals with claims against Iran. Section 502 of this legislation directs the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to deduct one and one-half percent from the first \$5 million awarded on each claim paid from the Security Account, and one percent from any amount over \$5 million, and to deposit the amounts deducted into the Treasury to the credit of miscellaneous receipts. The constitutionality of this legislation has been challenged, however, in a continuation of the litigation by Sperry. By its terms, Section 502 is effective as of June 7, 1982. Consequently, the Department of the Treasury is in the process of refunding to those claimants that have received awards paid from the Security Account the difference between the two percent fee already deducted and the one and one-half/one percent fee authorized by Section 502 of Public Law 99-93. These refunds will total approximately \$2.6 million.

Title V of Public Law 99-93 also grants standby authority to the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission to determine the validity and amounts of any claims against Iran which are settled en bloc by the United States and Iran, and provides certain limited exceptions to the disclosure provisions of the Freedom of Information Act for Tribunal-related documents within the possession of the U.S. Government.

9. Financial and diplomatic aspects of the relationship with Iran continue to present an unusual challenge to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. In particular, the Iranian Assets Control Regulations, issued pursuant to Executive Order No. 12170, continue to play an important role in regulating that relationship and in enabling the United States properly to implement the Algiers Accords. I shall continue to exercise the powers at my disposal to deal with these problems and will continue to report periodically to the Congress on significant developments.

Ronald Reagan

The White House,

November , 1985

**National Emergency With Respect to  
Iran**

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*Message to the Congress. April 22, 1985*

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*To the Congress of the United States:*

Pursuant to Section 204(c) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. Section 1703(c), I hereby report to the Congress on developments since my last report of October 31, 1984, concerning the national emergency with respect to Iran that was declared in Executive Order No. 12170 of November 14, 1979.

1. The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, established at The Hague pursuant to the Claims Settlement Agreement of Janu-



ary 19, 1981 (the "Algiers Accords"), continues to make progress in arbitrating the claims before it. Since my last report, the Tribunal has rendered 18 more decisions for a total of 169 final decisions. Of these, 125 have been awards in favor of American claimants; 89 were awards on agreed terms, authorizing and approving payment of settlements negotiated by the parties; and 36 were adjudicated decisions. As of March 31, 1984, total payments to successful American claimants from the Security Account stood at over \$337 million. Of the remaining 44 decisions, 22 dismissed claims for lack of jurisdiction, 3 partially dismissed claims for lack of jurisdiction, 13 dismissed claims on the merits, one approved the withdrawal of a claim, four were awards in favor of the Government of Iran, and one was an award in favor of the United States Government.

2. In the past six months, there have been significant changes in the composition of the Tribunal. As I noted in my last report, Professor Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel of the Federal Republic of Germany was selected to replace President Gunnar Lagergren, who resigned effective October 1, 1984. On December 1, 1984, Professor Bockstiegel was designated President of the Tribunal, in addition to his duties as Chairman of Chamber One. On November 29, 1984, the Government of Iran appointed two new arbitrators to replace Judges Mahmoud M. Kashani and Shafei Shafeiei, whose qualifications had been challenged by the United States following their unprecedented attack on one of the third-party arbitrators, Judge Mangard, in September 1984. The two new Iranian arbitrators, Hamid Bahrami Ahmadi and Seyed Mohsen Mostafavi Tafreshi, assumed their duties on January 15, 1985. In addition, the Chairman of Chamber Two, Willem Riphagen, submitted his resignation for health reasons, effective April 1, 1985, and the Chairman of Chamber Three, Nils Mangard, has submitted his resignation for personal reasons, effective no later than July 1, 1985. Swiss lawyer Robert Briner and French law professor Michel Virally have recently accepted invitations from the U.S. and Iranian arbitrators to join the Tribunal in place of Chairmen Riphagen and Mangard.

3. In spite of the disruptions that I described in my last report, the Tribunal

made some progress in arbitrating the claims of U.S. nationals for \$250,000 or more. The Special Chamber, which was established to consider requests for withdrawals or terminations of claims and for awards on agreed terms, rendered 13 awards on agreed terms prior to its dissolution on January 15, 1985. With the arrival of the two new Iranian arbitrators, the Chambers have once again begun hearing and deciding cases. On March 1, the Tribunal awarded R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. an additional \$12 million in interest on its claim, the decision in which was described in my last report. In total, more than 35 percent of the claims for over \$250,000 have now been disposed of through adjudication, settlement, or voluntary withdrawal, leaving 344 such claims on the docket.

4. The Tribunal has continued with the arbitration of the claims of U.S. nationals against Iran of less than \$250,000 each. In addition to 18 test cases, the Tribunal has selected 100 other claims for active arbitration. In 62 of these claims, the Department of State has submitted Supplemental Statements of Claim, containing more than 16,000 pages of text and evidence. Additional pleadings are being filed weekly. Although Iran repeatedly seeks extensions of time within which to file its responsive pleadings to these claims, the Tribunal has continued to press for their resolution. At the Tribunal, three senior legal officers and a law clerk work exclusively on these claims. Finally, since my last report, another seven of these claimants have received awards on agreed terms, bringing the total to ten.

5. The Department of State continues to coordinate the efforts of concerned governmental agencies in presenting U.S. claims against Iran as well as responses by the U.S. Government to claims brought against it by Iran. Since my last report, the Department has filed pleadings in seven government-to-government claims based on contracts for the provision of goods and services. These claims include a claim on behalf of the Agency for International Development for over \$38 million based on outstanding developmental loans to the Government of Iran. In addition, the Department of State, working together with the Department of

the Treasury and the Department of Justice, filed responsive pleadings in two major interpretive disputes. One related to Iran's claim to over \$400 million remaining from funds transferred pursuant to the Algiers Accords for payment of Iran's syndicated debt. The other was in response to Iran's allegations that the United States breached its obligation under the Algiers Accords to terminate litigation against Iran. The Department of State also filed pleadings in four other interpretive disputes. The Tribunal held one hearing in an interpretive dispute on whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to arbitrate approximately 111 claims brought by Iran directly against U.S. banks which do not involve standby letters of credit. Finally, two of the Tribunal's chambers have confirmed that action will be taken on or about May 20 to strike or otherwise dispose of 248 claims brought by Iran against U.S. banks based on standby letters of credit.

6. The Algiers Accords also provided for direct negotiations between U.S. banks and Bank Markazi Iran concerning the payment of nonsyndicated debt claims of U.S. banks against Iran from Dollar Account No. 2 (the interest-bearing escrow account established at the Bank of England in January 1981 with the deposit of \$1.418 billion of previously blocked Iranian funds). As of April 10, 1985, three additional settlements had been reached since my last report between Iran and U.S. banks. The three settling banks, Irving Trust Company, Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, and Banker's Trust Company, received a total of \$81.91 million from Dollar Account No. 2 in payment of their claims against Iran. From this amount, \$73.595 million was subsequently paid by these banks to Iran in settlement of Iran's claims against them, primarily for interest on Iran's domestic deposits with these banks. (One of these banks paid Iran an additional \$8.45 million from other funds.) Thus, as of April 10, 1985, there have been 29 bank settlements resulting in payments to the settling banks of approximately \$1.5 billion from Dollar Account No. 2. From that amount, the banks have paid approximately \$693 million to Iran in settlement of Iran's claims against them. About 17 banks have yet to settle their claims. In addition, attorneys from the Department of the

Treasury and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York have been negotiating an "Agreed Clarification" with Bank Markazi to allow the payment from Dollar Account No. 2 of certain amounts still owing on Iran's syndicated debt.

7. There have been no changes in the Iranian Assets Control Regulations since my last report.

8. Although the attack on Judge Mangard in September seriously disrupted and delayed proceedings for three months, the Tribunal resumed full operation in January of this year and the two Iranian arbitrators who committed the attack were removed by the Government of Iran. Since that time, the Tribunal has actively pursued the arbitration of both private and government claims. Prehearing conferences and hearings that had been cancelled are being rescheduled. The Tribunal has made provision for the issuance of awards in cases heard prior to the removal of the two Iranian arbitrators and the resignations of President Lagergren and Chairmen Riphagen and Mangard. This resumption of Tribunal activities provides reason to expect that more progress will be made in the coming months.

9. Financial and diplomatic aspects of the relationship with Iran continue to present an unusual challenge to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. I shall continue to exercise the powers at my disposal to deal with these problems and will continue to report periodically to the Congress on significant developments.

**Ronald Reagan**

The White House,  
April 22, 1985.

WHITE HOUSE  
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

O - OUTGOING

H - INTERNAL

I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 85106110

Name of Correspondent: Bahman Z. Lotfi

MI Mail Report

User Codes: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

Subject: Jasmin Refugees in Pakistan

ROUTE TO:

ACTION

DISPOSITION

Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>PL CHAV</u>	ORIGINATOR	<u>8510726</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>C 8510726</u>
<u>Amb. Eugene Douglas Dept of State</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>8510730</u>		<u>A 8510711</u>
<u>PL CHAVE</u>	<u>H</u>	<u>8510723</u>	<u>LC</u>	<u>A 8510723</u>
		<u>1 1</u>		<u>1 1</u>
		<u>1 1</u>		<u>1 1</u>

ACTION CODES:

- A - Appropriate Action
- C - Comment/Recommendation
- D - Draft Response
- F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure

- I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
- R - Direct Reply w/Copy
- S - For Signature
- X - Interim Reply

DISPOSITION CODES:

- A - Answered
- B - Non-Special Referral
- C - Completed
- S - Suspended

FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
- Code = "A"
- Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments:

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.  
 Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).  
 Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.  
 Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

# RECORDS MANAGEMENT ONLY

## CLASSIFICATION SECTION

No. of Additional Correspondents: \_\_\_\_\_ Media: L Individual Codes: 4400 \_\_\_\_\_

Prime Subject Code: CO 071 Secondary Subject Codes: ND 016  
CO 119 \_\_\_\_\_

## PRESIDENTIAL REPLY

Code	Date	Comment	Form
C	_____	Time: _____	P- _____
DSP	_____	Time: _____	Media: _____

**SIGNATURE CODES:**

- CPn - Presidential Correspondence**
- n - 0 - Unknown
- n - 1 - Ronald Wilson Reagan
- n - 2 - Ronald Reagan
- n - 3 - Ron
- n - 4 - Dutch
- n - 5 - Ron Reagan
- n - 6 - Ronald
- n - 7 - Ronnie
  
- CLn - First Lady's Correspondence**
- n - 0 - Unknown
- n - 1 - Nancy Reagan
- n - 2 - Nancy
- n - 3 - Mrs. Ronald Reagan
  
- CBn - Presidential & First Lady's Correspondence**
- n - 1 - Ronald Reagan - Nancy Reagan
- n - 2 - Ron - Nancy

**MEDIA CODES:**

- B - Box/package
- C - Copy
- D - Official document
- G - Message
- H - Handcarried
- L - Letter
- M - Mailgram
- O - Memo
- P - Photo
- R - Report
- S - Sealed
- T - Telegram
- V - Telephone
- X - Miscellaneous
- Y - Study

UNCLASSIFIED  
CLASSIFICATION

S/S # 8522451

Date August 2, 1985

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
TRANSMITTAL FORM

FOR: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane  
National Security Council  
The White House

REFERENCE:

TO: President Reagan FROM: Bahman Lotfi

DATE: 6/10/85 SUBJECT: Iranian  
refugees in Pakistan

WHITE HOUSE REFERRAL DATED: 7/30/85 NSC# 334311

THE ATTACHED ITEM WAS SENT DIRECTLY  
TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION TAKEN:

A draft reply is attached

A draft reply will be forwarded

A translation is attached


An information copy of a direct reply is  
attached

We believe no response is necessary for the  
reason cited below

Other

REMARKS:

Mr. Lotfi sent the same letter to Secretary Shultz and RP's  
response is attached. Our reply was also sent to several  
members of Congress.

  
Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED

8522451

T H E   W H I T E   H O U S E   O F F I C E  
REFERRAL

JULY 30, 1985

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ATTN: AMBASSADOR EUGENE DOUGLAS

ACTION REQUESTED:  
APPROPRIATE ACTION

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 334311  
MEDIA: LETTER, DATED JUNE 10, 1985  
TO: PATRICK BUCHANAN  
FROM: MR. BAHMAN Z. LOTFI  
COMMITTEE FOR IRANIAN REFUGEES  
POST OFFICE BOX 27160  
WASHINGTON DC 20038  
SUBJECT: IRANIAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN  
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE  
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE  
(OR DRAFT) TO:  
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY  
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON  
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

*Received in 5/5-1  
7/29/85 - 5:20 p.m. ygo*

8522451

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 23, 1985


Dear Mr. Lotfi:

Thank you for your recent letter concerning your efforts on behalf of Iranian refugees in Pakistan. I appreciated hearing from you and being informed of your activities.

I must inform you that I have no direct jurisdiction over this matter. However, I have taken the liberty of getting in touch with Ambassador Eugene Douglas, Assistant Secretary of State for Refugee Affairs, on your behalf and have asked that your concerns be addressed by the appropriate officials at the State Department.

Again, thank you for expressing your concerns.

Sincerely,



LINDA CHAVEZ  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
and Director of Public Liaison

Mr. Bahman Z. Lotfi  
Committee for Iranian Refugees  
P. O. Box 27160  
Washington, D. C. 20038



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 11, 1985

Mr. Bahman Z. Lotfi  
Committee for Iranian Refugees  
P.O. Box 27160  
Washington, D.C. 20038

Dear Mr. Lotfi:

On behalf of Secretary Shultz I am responding to your letter of June 10 concerning the treatment of Iranians in Pakistan by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Owing to the very serious nature of the charges you make against UNHCR, I have taken more time than usual to check out the facts, resulting in a delayed response.

Your first charge is that UNHCR is guilty of discrimination against pro-Western refugees. Let me review with you the process by which applications for refugee status by Iranians are processed by UNHCR in Pakistan. UNHCR applies the 1951 Convention on Refugees and the UNHCR statute in handling each case and deciding which Iranian refugees are "of concern" to it. Two protection officers work independently on each Iranian case and review it together before final decision is made. In case of doubt, the UNHCR sub-office chief or head of UNHCR legal section makes the decision after careful review. Iranian refugees may appeal a decision to grant them status with the UNHCR. In order to appeal their case they need new elements that were not presented at the time of the original application.

It is the opinion of the officers at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad and of the Consul General in Karachi that the UNHCR officials processing Iranian refugees are well qualified professionals who seek to adhere strictly to the guidelines set down by their Geneva headquarters. Embassy personnel from other Western countries represented in Pakistan also rate the UNHCR processing operation highly.

Today, Pakistan is hosting close to three million refugees. The overwhelming majority are Afghan refugees. UNHCR's limited financial and personnel resources must be directed judiciously. UNHCR's Iranian caseload comprised 2,567 individual cases as of June 30, 1985. The majority (more than 60%) of these are members of religious minorities (Baha'is, Jews and Christians). Rather than an anti-Western bias, this majority of religious minorities in its Iranian caseload could lead those so disposed to conclude that UNHCR is pro-Western.



At the heart of this issue is the fact, that, no matter how abhorrent one may find the current regime in Iran, not everyone who leaves that country does so for reasons which can support a claim for refugee status on the basis of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution. Many of the young, male Iranians in Pakistan have left to avoid military conscription. They are not by that fact refugees under the UNHCR Convention.


Your second charge is that millions of U.S. tax dollars contributed to UNHCR are being wasted by being used to support individuals and organizations (Communists and Mojahedeen) whose goals are antithetical to Western values of freedom. This charge is patently false since the UNHCR/Pakistan 1985 budget for Iranians amounts to \$800,000, most of which is being spent for the religious minorities. The supplementary assistance line item is designed to provide, where necessary, a monthly subsistence, minimum food and shelter, major medical coverage, language training, primary education and legal assistance.

Your final complaint is that UNHCR refuses to provide statistical information. The reality is that UNHCR would need significantly increased funds and personnel to respond to all the private inquiries it receives. The U.S. has been in the forefront in efforts to avoid such increases. We are persuaded UNHCR would be positively disposed to respond to a request for information from us. We have, therefore, requested UNHCR to provide us with the information you requested on page four of your letter to Mr. Barnes. Upon receipt of UNHCR's response, it will be communicated to you.

In the meantime, let me assure you of our continuing vigilance over the use to which UNHCR and other international and private voluntary organizations put U.S. taxpayers' funds. We are also convinced that the interests of the refugees, their hosts and the international community at large are best served by the organization mandated by that community, namely UNHCR. Its task has become much more complex over the years as the numbers of refugees have increased exponentially and as the regional circumstances which have led to these refugee flows admit to fewer and fewer lasting solutions.

With every best wish,

Sincerely,



James N. Purcell, Jr.  
Director  
Bureau for Refugee Programs

584311

8522451

**COMMITTEE FOR IRANIAN  
REFUGEES**

P.O. Box 27160  
Washington, D.C. 20038  
Tel: (202) 682-4134

کمیته آوارگان ایرانی

June 10, 1985

Mr. Patrick Buchanan  
Assistant to the President  
White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Buchanan:

As an affiliate of Iran America Friendship Foundation - a non-profit, non-political organization - our Committee is extremely concerned about the United Nation's High Commissioner for Refugees' (UNHCR) activities in Pakistan.

Recently on behalf of the Iran America Friendship Foundation I made a fact-finding trip to Pakistan. The purpose of this trip was to evaluate the conditions of Iranian refugees in Pakistan, discuss the possibility of opening a U.S. refugee processing center for Iranian refugees and review the status of the services currently provided by UNHCR to these refugees.

While the existence of thousand of needy and desperate Iranian refugees in Pakistan was confirmed, the most disappointing and disheartening element of the trip was the attitude of UNHCR toward the Iranian refugees. The organization wastes millions of dollars of which one third is provided by U.S. tax money and discriminates against pro-western refugees as opposed to the communists and leftist oriented Modjahedeens. In part thanks to UNHCR's assistance, Pakistan has become a recruiting ground for Iranian communist party members as well as leftist Modjahedeens. Evidently, our tax dollars are being indirectly used to promote organizations that have been fighting against the very thing that America stands for - freedom.

Our request for budgetary and other statistical information has been rejected by UNHCR for no valid reason. A copy of my report to Mr. Thomas Barnes and his response is enclosed herewith

As U.S. tax payers we feel we have a right to know how, and for whom, our tax dollars are being spent.

During these years of tight budget restraints the discriminatory treatment of pro-western refugees must end, as we do not feel the UNHCR should spend our tax money freely without any

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restraints and in direct conflict with U.S. Government's overall political and humanitarian policies.

We will be honored to provide you with more detailed information concerning the UNHCR's activities in Pakistan and our group will be happy to assist your office in any manner that you feel necessary to prevent this unfortunate waste of American tax payers' dollars.

Sincerely

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Bahman Lotfi".

Bahman Z. Lotfi

Encl.

**NATIONS UNIES  
HAUT COMMISSARIAT  
POUR LES RÉFUGIÉS**



**UNITED NATIONS  
HIGH COMMISSIONER  
FOR REFUGEES**

SWAS/107

Télégrammes : HICOMREF

Télex : 27492 UNHCR CH

Téléphone : 31.02.61

Ref: 100.PAK.IRN

Palais des Nations

CH-1211 GENÈVE 10

18 April 1985

Dear Mr. Lotfi,

I refer to your letter of 3 April 1985, wherein you gave your impressions gathered during your visit to Pakistan. Perhaps your refugee informants did not brief you regarding the sit-in strikes, break-ins, attempted suicides at UNHCR premises, and threats of bodily harm to UNHCR personnel, the combination of which resulted in the closure of Karachi Sub-office for several periods during 1984. It was in the larger interest of refugees that UNHCR made certain security arrangements at the Office premises so as to maintain the continuity of assistance to Iranian refugees in Karachi.

As for the rejections referred to in paragraph 2 of your letter, you will no doubt appreciate that all Iranians in Pakistan are not necessarily refugees. In fact, some of them have been reported to be anti-refugee elements. UNHCR determines the refugee status of Iranians on a case-by-case basis, and consequently those applicants whose claims for refugee status are not related to refugee criteria contained in the international refugee instruments are not considered as refugees.

UNHCR works hard to resettle Iranian and other refugees, and is committed to durable solutions to refugee problems. In answer to your question about budgetary effects, resettlement, besides obviously benefiting the refugee, eventually lightens our budgetary load because we no longer pay supporting assistance to an individual in a country of temporary asylum. For resettlement, however, there must be takers. May I suggest that devotion on your side to influencing governments to accept more Iranian refugees for resettlement might be more productive than what I regard as unduly harsh criticism of this Organization?

I trust you will understand that we cannot request our Karachi Sub-office and our Mission in Islamabad to share with you office budgets and certain other statistical data. Kindly keep things in perspective. We have not requested similar information about the Iran America Friendship Foundation, nor would we presume to.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'T.J. Barnes', written over a printed name.

T.J. Barnes

Chief, South West Asia Section

Mr. Bahman Z. Lotfi  
Iran America Friendship Foundation  
1250 "I" Street, N.W.  
Suite 1100  
Washington, D.C. 20005

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IRAN  
AMERICA  
FRIENDSHIP  
FOUNDATION

بنیاد  
دوستی  
ایران و آمریکا

1250 "I" Street, N.W.  
Suite 1100  
Washington, D.C. 20005  
Tel: 202 682-4132

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April 3, 1985

Mr. Thomas Barnes  
Chief of S.W. Asia Section  
U.N. Palais Des Nation  
Ch. 1211 Geneva 10  
Switzerland

Dear Mr. Barnes,

It was a pleasure to meet you on February 25, 1985 in Geneva. You may recall, During that meeting we discussed many issues relating to the Iranian refugees around the world and in particular in Pakistan and Turkey. I stated that I am going to Pakistan on a fact finding tour and hope that my observation there will enable the Foundation to take a more active role in assisting the Iranian refugees.

While in Pakistan, I visited the UNHCR's offices in Karachi and Islamabad. In all frankness, I must say that even though UNHCR's own reports concerning its activities in Pakistan seemed encouraging, after talking with UNHCR's local representatives and many Iranian refugees in Pakistan, my conclusion about their activities in Pakistan is very discouraging. The following may briefly summarize some of the existing problems which in my opinion need immediate attention:

1. The attitude of the UNHCR's office in Karachi towards the Iranian refugees is extremely harsh and can only be described as unfortunate. I did not come across a single refugee who was satisfied with his treatment by UNHCR. As was clearly evident, for some reason UNHCR's senior staff treat Iranian refugees in the most disrespectful manner. With all due respect, it appeared to me that this staff in Karachi has, in fact, forgotten their main function, i.e., attending to the problems of the refugees. Rather, the Karachi Office seems to be more interested in elaborate offices and security system. This attitude has discouraged many displaced Iranians from even coming to UNHCR and requesting their assistance.

It is incredible that an office which is solely established for the purpose of attending to the problems of Iranian refugees should indiscriminately close its iron doors in the faces of refugees without even considering the urgency of their problems or needs. While I was told that appointments are given to the refugees within a few days, the majority of those refugees with whom I came in contact stated that they

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had never been given an appointment earlier than two weeks. I came across many cases of despair and illness but these respective refugees were not able to obtain an appointment with UNHCR to explain their problems or request UNHCR's assistance.

Following the example set by the Director of the Karachi Office, other senior staff members of the UNHCR have also adopted a degrading and unfortunate attitude toward Iranian refugees. Regrettably, in a most obvious way the Karachi Office seems to have lost sight of the very purpose for which it was commissioned. More specifically, Iranian refugees in Pakistan, and particularly in Karachi, have become the means for setting up administrative functions rather than the end for whom services should be provided. Frankly, I see no justification whatsoever for such confusion. There is no reason whatsoever, for this abusive, degrading and humiliating treatment of Iranian refugees. Granted these refugees can not be completely satisfied as UNHCR does not have the ways and means of satisfying the total needs of refugees, but a change of attitude by UNHCR's staff in Karachi will go a long way toward dispelling UNHCR's reputation of harshness against Iranian refugees.

2. Although my request for a review of the number of applicants and their rate of acceptance or rejection was refused by the Karachi Office, and only the statistics for Pakistan as a whole given, this refusal along with my discussions with refugees as well as those who were employed by UNHCR's Karachi Office in the past confirmed the fact that Karachi Office has the greatest number of rejections.

With few exceptions, one either has to be a Bahai, Jewish, Modjahed or a member of the Toudeh Communist party in order to be accepted as a refugee by the Karachi Office. This leaves out a majority of displaced Iranians. Furthermore, an overwhelming majority of those who are accepted as refugees for political reasons are members of the leftist Modjahedeen or Toudeh Communist party. Most of the funds provided by my Government as well as other Western democracies are being used to assist leftist groups, while those who do not desire to associate themselves with such groups are refused the benefit of such funds.

While I appreciate the fact that UNHCR by its mandate can not be involved in the political preferences of the refugees, I would not have raised the question if non-communist and non-Madjahedeen applicants were not summarily



rejected by UNHCR in Pakistan. In order to clarify this issue I would be grateful if the Karachi and Islamabad offices provide us with a complete breakdown of the data showing the religious and political affiliations of the refugees recognized by each office. Such statistics, obviously, will either dispel or confirm the overwhelmingly prevailing notion that the majority of refugees recognized by UNHCR for a political reason are either Modjahed or members of the Toudeh Communist party.

As an American citizen whose Government is always under budgetary constraints, it is difficult to understand why UNHCR's office in Karachi does not have any budgetary problems and is planning further expansion of its facilities. Unfortunately it is clear that Karachi Office's expansion from a three man force in 1983 to 17 today has not in any way benefited the refugees. During 1983, the expansion was evidently needed to render the required services to the Iranian refugees, but it seems this promise not only has not been fulfilled, it has had a negative effect as well. Rejection rate for the Karachi Office has increased considerably since 1983 and its staff's attitude toward the refugees has harshened for no justifiable reason. My request for a review of Karachi Office's budget was refused by the Karachi as well as the Islamabad office. Not being interested in the individual personnels' compensations and only wanting to review the total budget of the Karachi Office, I did not see any valid reason for such refusal. Therefore, could you kindly provide us this information including the general breakdown of the said budget.

3. I found the settlement efforts by the Karachi and Islamabad office at best minimal. I got the impression from my discussions with various refugees and highly respected local individuals that the UNHCR in Pakistan is not overwhelmingly interested in resettling these displaced people.

UNHCR in Pakistan is in a unique position to aggressively pursue the settlement possibilities with many governments, including Australian, Canadian, New Zeland and Governments of European countries.

Just to be certain could you kindly advise this office if settlement possibilities will have any effect on the UNHCR's budget.

The above sets forth some of my views concerning UNHCR's services in Pakistan. While trying to explain these issues to the UNHCR's Director in Karachi, I was told that the Karachi Office "is not interested in listening to sad music...."


I hope the above observations will shed some light on the existing refugee problems in Pakistan. I am duty bound to clearly state my findings without considering its possible effect on any one individual. My somewhat critical views are intended to be constructive and hope they are so interpreted. Therefore, I would be more than happy to discuss with you the details of the above stated issues and many other individual experiences which I came across during my stay in Pakistan if so desired.

In conclusion I will be grateful to you if you instruct the responsible individuals to forward to us the following items:

1. A complete breakdown of the displaced Iranians who have applied for refugee status in each of the UNHCR's offices in Pakistan,
2. Rate of acceptance and rejection by each office,
3. A breakdown of the refugees recognized for religious and political reasons,
4. Affiliative breakdown of the political refugees,
5. UNHCR's budget for Pakistan, including the administrative budget and a breakdown of this budget for each of the Karachi and Islamabad offices.

If you have any questions concerning the above, please do not hesitate to contact me at the above stated address or at my office at (202) 682 4161.

Sincerely,



Bahman Z. Lotfi

cc: Mr. Feldmann  
Mr. Amunategui  
Mr. Lavanchy  
Ms. Cappelli  
Mr. Johnsson



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IRAN  
AMERICA  
FRIENDSHIP  
FOUNDATION

بنیاد  
دوستی  
ایران و آمریکا

1250 "I" Street, N.W.  
Suite 1100  
Washington, D.C. 20005  
Tel: 202 682-4132

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Ambassador Eugene Douglas  
U.S. Coordinator for Refugee  
Affairs  
Room 7526  
Department of State  
Washington, D.C. 20520

June 15, 1984

Dear Mr. Ambassador,

On behalf of the Iran America Friendship Foundation, I would like to thank you for the opportunity of testifying at the June 11, 1984 Public Consultation Meeting held by you and your associates. As explained briefly during the meeting, the issues involving Iranian refugees are as follow:

1. The characteristics of the Iranian refugee;
2. The refugee processing procedure; and
3. The yearly refugee allocation.

1. IRANIAN REFUGEES:

As a result of the 1979 Iranian revolution and more recently the war between Iran and Iraq, thousands of Iranians have fled their country and become refugees worldwide. Unlike other refugees, the Iranians generally are an educated people. Prior to the 1979 revolution these people supported American policies in their country and a majority of them feel that it was this support that has made them now vulnerable to prosecution by the present regime. They are truly disheartened by America's indifference toward their problem. Many feel that America has a moral obligation to assist them in immigrating to America or other democratic countries around the world, so they can then begin again to become a productive member of the society.

Once Iranian refugees reach their host country, they become contributing members and not public charges. Today there are very few Iranians who collect Welfare, Medicare or any other public assistance. Culturally Iranians are very adaptable people who readily assimilate into a new society. Because most of them have college educations, they will immediately begin practicing

8

Ambassador Eugene Douglas  
June 15, 1984  
Page 2

their professions or study to pass the qualifying examinations. This does not mean that they are wealthy and do not need public assistance. On the contrary, a great majority of Iranians leaving Iran are economically underprivileged as they have left behind all worldly goods. However, they insist on being productive and contributing to the welfare of their new society - never a public burden. The fact that over 40% of all Iranians living in the United States reside in the state of California and none has become a charge to the taxpayers of that state is prima facie evidence of the productivity of Iranians.

There are over 4,000 Iranian medical doctors practicing in the United States along with thousands of engineers, economists, technicians, and other highly trained professionals. Iranians throughout the U.S. have established language schools, medical programs and other basic facilities in order to assist their needy countrymen. Iran America Friendship Foundation, at the present time, has two Farsi schools in the Washington, D.C. area enrolling 250 students and medical and dental programs throughout the country which refer needy Iranians to Iranian physicians and dentists to be attended without charge.

In summary, Iranian refugees are not a burden on the American society, on the contrary they become productive and contributing members shortly after their arrival.

## 2. REFUGEE PROCESSING PROCEDURE:

As Mr. Ambassador knows, most of the Iranian refugees arrive in Pakistan and Turkey. We understand that in an agreement signed between the U.S. and the Turkish Governments, the United States has undertaken not to process any Iranian refugees in Turkey. This agreement has caused and continues to cause a considerable amount of hardship for those Iranians who have managed to cross Iranian borders into Turkey.

With respect to Pakistan, although we do not know of any formal agreement between the Governments of Pakistan and the U.S., still the United States Government refuses to process any Iranian refugees in that country. Instead, allocations for Iranian refugees are being forwarded to other countries, e.g., Switzerland, Italy, France, Germany and Mexico where Iranians are not easily admitted. This procedure makes it extremely difficult for Iranian refugees to reach the U.S. processing centers, thus

5

Ambassador Eugene Douglas  
June 15, 1984  
Page 3

making the entire refugee allocation program for Iranians inefficient and inadequate.

In the interest of reducing this enormous hardship on Iranian refugees in Pakistan, we would like to strongly urge the establishment of an Iranian refugee processing center in Pakistan.


3. NUMBER OF REFUGEE ALLOCATIONS FOR IRANIANS:

We understand that U.S. Government has allocated 2500 refugees from Iran for 1984. Considering the enormous number of the Iranian refugees congregating around the world particularly in Pakistan and Turkey, this allocated number falls far below an accepted number. As stated earlier, we believe that the America has a moral commitment to assist those Iranians who supported America in the past and are now suffering as a result of this support. This commitment to assist refugees conforms to the very fundamentals upon which this nation is based. To grant refuge to fleeing Iranians will also comfort other American supporters around the world who may fear facing this same fate someday.

Based on the large numbers of Iranian refugees around the world and their commitment to America we request the 1985 allocation for Iranians be increased to a meaningful and realistic level.

Mr. Ambassador, thank you again for the opportunity to present my community's view. This office will be happy to answer any questions which you, your assistants or staff members may have concerning the Iranian refugee issue and any other matter for which we might be of assistance.

Sincerely,



Bahman Z. Lotfi  
Administrator  
Iran America Friendship Foundation