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Last Updated: 12/11/2023

91			ID #	143450
CORRESPON	WHITE HO	USE CKING WORKS	HEET	FE
 O.OUTGOING H. INTERNAL I. INCOMING Date Correspondence B. 05, 05 Received (YY/MM/DD) Name of Correspondent: Geve MI Mail Report Us Subject: Sector MI Mail Report Us Subject: Sector MAS NOT ANSW 	er Codes: (A)_ previou previou	ville (B) manic (B) s corr)ata . espe	from udence
ROUTE TO:	AC	TION		POSITION
Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Completion Date Code YY/MM/DD
Cg BAI Doc	Referral Note:	1310517 183105119		<u>C 83107129</u> <u>C 8310712</u> (see memo)
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DISPOSITION CODES:

I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary R - Direct Reply w/Copy S - For Signature X - Interim Reply

- A Answered B Non-Special Referral
- C Completed S Suspended

FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

- Type of Response = Initials of Signer Code = "A"
- Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments:

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.

ACTION CODES:

D - Draft Response

A - Appropriate Action C - Comment/Recommendation

F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure


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
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PRESIDENTIAL REPLY



SIGNATURE CODES:

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 - n 1 Ronald Wilson Reagan n - 2 - Ronald Reagan
 - n 3 Ron
 - n 4 Dutch
 - n 5 Ron Reagan

 - n 6 Ronald n 7 Ronnie
- CLn First Lady's Correspondence n 0 Unknown

 - n 1 Nancy Reagan
 - n 2 Nancy n - 3 - Mrs. Ronald Reagan

CBn - Presidential & First Lady's Correspondence

- n 1 Ronald Reagan Nancy Reagan n 2 Ron Nancy

MEDIA CODES:

B - Box/package C - Copy D - Official document G - Message H - Handcarried L - Letter M- Mailgram O - Memo P - Photo R - Report S - Sealed T - Telegram V - Telephone

X - Miscellaneous Y - Study

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 17-28-83 To: Jeanne Hyde From: Par Corker Please see attached memo re 1D 14/3450, hope this is okay.

TRANSMITTAL FORM CD+82A (10-67) PRESCRIBED BY DAO 214-2

USCOMM-DC 1232-P67 GPO: 1976 O - 216-459



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE The Under Secretary for Economic Affairs Washington, D.C. 20230

JUL 28 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretariat

FROM:

Adren Cooper (L'due Conficer

SUBJECT:

Correspondence with Mr. Gene V. Somerville

The letter from Mr. Somerville (attached) was answered by me a few days after receipt. I gave it priority attention because he said that he had previously written to the Department of Commerce and had not received a response (I do not know where the first letter was referred).

I told Mr. Somerville that the GNP accounts did not include detailed breakdowns on advertising revenue but I sent him the latest figures from the U.S. Statistical Abstract. I also said that the Bureau of the Census did not have later figures because its survey of services had been reduced because of budgetary considerations. I believe I also sent some excerpts from Business Conditions Digest that were relevant to this table of statistics.

I cannot find a copy of my reply. Two or three employees worked for me on a temporary basis during that period; I believe the letter was typed and handled by a young employee with only two or three months' experience. Since that time my office has been disrupted by replacement of carpeting, and again during painting operations.

I called Mr. Somerville on July 27, 1983. He said that he was an investment advisor and that he worked with statistics as a hobby. He thanked me for the letter.

Attachment

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

REFERRAL

MAY 19, 1983

335468

324 01

TO: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

ACTION REQUESTED: DIRECT REPLY, FURNISH INFO COPY

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 143450

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED MAY 3, 1983

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: MR. GENE V. SOMERVILLE 2617 EAST GELID COURT ANAHEIM CA 92680

SUBJECT: SEEKS VARIOUS ECONOMIC DATA FROM COMMERCE - CLAIMS PREVIOUS CORRESPONDENCE WAS NOT ANSWERED

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE (OR DRAFT) TO: AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

> SALLY KELLEY DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

143450

3 May 1983

5. Kellun

Mr. Ronald Reagan President of the U.S. The White House 1600 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W. Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Sir:

I have enclosed an approach to an analasis of Government Growth that may interest you....

Also, a copy of a request I submitted to the Commerce Dept, a long time ago, without a response.

I would like a breakdown of the G.N.P. as I have some other data I would like to put together. (Maybe it got lost in the mail)

Gene V. Somerville Political Poet Laureate 2617 E. Gelid Court, Anaheim, CA 92680 (714) 772-7978 *ま* 3 ら - ア 3 7 ²

					Government Growth
U.S. POPULATION	BUDGET	PER	CAPITA	<u>`C.P.I.</u>	Adj. for inflation 3
1950 151,325,798	\$ 39,485,000,000	\$	261.00	72.1	
1970 203,235,298	196,588,000,000		967.46	116.3	Budget Per Capita
1980 226,504,825	578,774,000,000	2,	555.29	247.8	21.5 % increase ANNUAL
50% Increase ÷ 30 = 1.7% Annual	1465 % increase ÷ 30 = 49% annual		% increase = 33% annual	344% increase ÷ 30 = 11.5 %	
GROSS NATIONAL PRO	TOUCT	FEDERAL BUI % of G.N.I		G.	N.P. PER CAPITA
1950 \$ 286,200,000	,000	13.8		/\$	1,891.61
1970 982,400,000	,000	20.0			4,834.65
1980 2,586,500,000	0,000	22.4			11,419.43
LABOR FORCE	UNEMPLO)YED	EMPLOYED /	PE	R CAPITA BUDGET (taxes)
1950 106,645,000	5,652,00	0 ,	100,993,000	\$	390.97
1970 140,182,000	6,869,00	00	133,313.000	1	,475.00
1980 166,789,000	12,509,00	00 -	154,280,000	3	,751.00
although the publicat	ne TRUE growth of our G ion of the C.P.I. has i increases in their pay	n itself caus	ISTER. The bla sed inflation.	me <u>cannot</u> be bed . The unions and	cause of inflation, 1 many businesses

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What ever happened to the MERIT SYSTEM, or would this force management to do their job of measuring performance???

It's about time we returned to the Free Enterprise System and competition not only in Industry but the Labor Market. . . .

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 14th Street & Constitution Avenue N.W. Washington D. C. 20230

Dear Sirs:

I would like for you to send me the latest detailed breakdown of the "Gross National Product" I imagine it includes the totals for Newspaper, Magazine and television advertising.

I am making a study which involves the available information in these numbers.

Thank you,

Sincerely:

2617 E. Gelid Ct. Anaheim, CA 92806

Gene V. Somerville

C/C President of the U.S.

- THE UNION COMMUNITY -

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Does Merit Scare It ???

If we scrapped the C.P.I. Could the Unions bear it? In other words - I say Can't they make it on merit?

THE GIANT

(Big Government-that is!)

As I gaze into the blue I finally realize it's true There is nothing we can do With our goverment that Grew and grew!

This monster with which we are encumbered It's like an Army and We're outnumbered.

No matter how hard that Reagan Tries -To whittle it down to size He is fighting a losing battle and we are just a bunch of cattle.

It's the body politic And it really makes me sick Politicians have but one goal my hearties!!!! At any price-"Preserve the Parties"

" Poetic Political Ponderings" Gene V. Somerville

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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

1 1 MAY 1983 Date: May 10, 1983

FROM: GENERAL COUNSEL

TO: Ken Cribb

For your information. Please give me any comments you may have by close of business, Thursday.

Thanks

Bruce Fein

Form A-88-C April 1979

F.C.C. - WASHINGTON, D.C.

PROMOTING THE PRESIDENT'S POLICIES THROUGH LEGAL ADVOCACY: AN ETHICAL IMPERATIVE OF THE GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY 148582

JL007

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The Watergate scandal a decade ago precipitated a widespread examination of the ethical norms of government attorneys. Dismay was expressed that so many government lawyers were implicated in some type of Watergate illegality or impropriety. Much celebrated discussion occurred over the causes of attorney wrongdoing, and several pieces of legislation emerged in the aftermath of Watergate, including the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. 1/

The Act imposes extensive financial disclosure requirements on high level government attorneys and other federal officials, 2/ creates an Office of Government Ethics, 3/ establishes broad disqualification requirements applicable to former officers and employees of the federal government, 3a/ and mandates a low ceiling on outside earned income. 4/ Relatedly, there has been acrimonious debate and litigation over whether ethical norms should require disqualifying an entire law firm from representing a client in litigation if one of the firm's members is personally disqualified because of prior involvement over the matter in dispute as a government attorney. A consensus seems to be crystallizing around a rule that would permit representation by the law firm if a so-called Chinese wall is constructed between the disqualified erstwhile government lawyer and the remainder of the law firm. 5/ Generally neglected from these omnibus discussions over the ethics of lawyers, however, has been an exploration of the duty a government attorney in the Executive Branch owes to his client, the incumbent President. I submit that ethical imperatives derived from our constitutional system of representative government and separation of powers obligate the government attorney to devote virtually unreservedly his legal talents and insights towards advancing the policies of the President through legal advocacy.

The Executive Branch employs thousands of attorneys, 6/ most of whom are insulated from removal after a change of Administration because of constitutional 7/ or statutory 8/ protections and because of practical limits on recruitment of new attorneys. I do not deplore the impressive array of rights afforded government attorneys against discharge, transfer, or demotion. But these rights create a corollary responsibility to provide unremitting assistance through legitimate legal argument to the incumbent Administration in furtherance of the policies championed by the President. This ethical canon echoes one applicable to the private attorney, which instructs a lawyer to advocate any construction of the law favorably to his client that is not frivolous. 9/ If the ethical obligation of the government attorney is not faithfully discharged, then the electoral system is mocked, the President's ability to implement his policies could be stymied, and unelected lawyers in the Executive Branch will be censurable for disdaining the will of the people.

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As President Franklin Roosevelt declared:

The essential democracy of our Nation and the safety of our people depends upon...lodging [power] with those whom the people can change or continue at stated intervals through an honest and free system of election. 11/

De Tocqueville observed over 150 years ago, that in America, virtually every political question is ultimately transformed into a legal one. 12/ That canonical utterance has withstood the test of time, and perhaps should be crowned as an eternal verity of American political science. Contemporary federal caseload statistics demonstrate prodigious increases in litigation over the past decade, 13/ partly attributable to widespread attorney fee awards 14/ and the discovery of innumerable new statutory 14a/ and constitutional rights, and the deseutude of doctrines of standing, 15/ mootness, 16/ ripeness 17/ and political questions. 18/. Equally significant is the fact that the statistics reveal an avalanche of litigation assailing government policy. 19/ A President must be successful in litigation defending his actions or initiatives if he is to have a significant role in shaping and implementing public policy.

A brief enumeration of the policies or programs of the Reagan Administration that have been or are being challenged in court is illustrative of the centrality of legal advocacy to the vindication of a President's agenda. Litigation has bedevilled Administration policy concerning tuition tax credits, <u>20</u>/ voluntary prayer in schools, <u>21</u>/ abortion, <u>22</u>/ mandatory busing, 22a/ color and gender-blind laws, 23/ federalism, 24/ the

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regulatory scope of statutes such as §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, <u>25</u>/ and Title IX of Higher Education Act Amendments, <u>26</u>/ the use of cost/benefit analysis to establish standards for employee exposure to toxic substances, <u>27</u>/ prosecution of draft registration violators <u>28</u>/, and curtailment of government aid to students failing to show compliance with draft registration rules, <u>29</u>/ Davis-Bacon Act prevailing wage standards, <u>29a</u>/ the obligation of parental notification when minors receive prescription contraceptives from family planning centers that receive federal funds, <u>30</u>/ oil and gas leasing on government property, <u>31</u>/ the award of attorney fees to plaintiffs unsuccessful in challenging government action, <u>32</u>/ the legislative veto, <u>33</u>/ and law enforcement safequards against illegal aliens <u>34</u>/ or frivolous claims of asylum. <u>35</u>/

At times, prevailing legal doctrines must be modified, distinguished, or even overruled to accommodate or facilitate many of a President's policy objectives. When Franklin Roosevelt acceded to the Presidency in March of 1933, the cornucopia of New Deal legislation and programs that he trumpeted could be effectuated only by a radical alteration of established constitutional jurisprudence lionizing freedom of contract, <u>36</u>/ property rights, <u>37</u>/ and State sovereignty. <u>37a</u>/ Despite formidable constitutional doubts, President Roosevelt orchestrated enactment of a host of laws resting on conceptions of Congressional power under the Commerce and Spending Clauses and the Tenth Amendment that had recently been repudiated by the Supreme Court. <u>38</u>/ Many of Roosevelt's major policy initiatives

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were initially denounced by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional. <u>39</u>/ On so-called "Black Money," May 27, 1935, the High Court unanimously invalidated the National Industrial Recovery Act, <u>40</u>/ and the Frazier-Lamke Act, the latter designed to aid farmers with mortgages in default, <u>41</u>/ and repudiated the President's asserted constitutional authority to remove members of independent agencies. <u>42</u>/

Roosevelt, the Attorney General, and government attorneys, however, did not renounce the New Deal policy goals despite these resounding judicial rebuffs. The Executive Branch collaborated in marshalling legal arguments distinguishing or urging modification or overruling of Supreme Court precedents in a quest to obtain a jurisprudence that would countenance New Deal programs. <u>43</u>/ As then Attorney General Robert Jackson noted, his duty was not to revere the Supreme Court, but to point out its failings or errors where appropriate. <u>44</u>/

Perhaps inspired by Theodore Roosevelt's boast that although he did not know much law, he knew how to put the fear of God into judges, Franklin Roosevelt unveiled his ill-received "Court Packing" plan in April of 1937. <u>45</u>/ Shorty thereafter, moved at least in part by the legal advocacy of government attorneys, the Supreme Court commenced the overruling of scores of cases that stood as obstacles to the effectuation of the New Deal. <u>46</u>/ In sum, President Roosevelt's New Deal would have been stillborn if government attorneys refused to advocate with skill and imagination a dramatic change in prevailing constitutional doctrines.

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President Lincoln also confronted anguishing legal obstacles to his policy regarding slavery and the citizenship rights of blacks. The odious <u>Dred Scott</u> decision of 1857 held that Congress could not outlaw slavery in the territories, and that blacks were disqualified from U.S. citizenship. Despite serious legal questions, Lincoln signed a bill in 1862 prohibiting slavery in the tertitories, <u>48</u>/ issued the Emancipation Proclamation, <u>49</u>/ and allowed blacks to obtain federal patents, visas, and to be masters of vessels engaged in the coasting trade, although pertinent statutes imposed a requirement of U.S. citizenship. 50/

The President and his subordinates, of course, cannot defy court decrees. Moreover, the President should not insist on undertaking policy initiatives where there is no plausible likelihood of surmounting judicial review within the reasonably foreseeable future. But such occasions seldom, if ever, arise. As the sage Justice Holmes observed, the law is not an unchanging brooding omnipresence in the sky. <u>51</u>/ History demonstrates that legal doctrines are continuously in flux, may change course abruptly, and are frequently riddled with ambiguity.

The Supreme Court has overruled over 230 of its own precedents; <u>52</u>/ in recent memory, at the urging of the federal government, the Court overruled <u>Plessy v. Ferguson</u>, <u>53</u>/ a decision endorsing the pernicious separate-but-equal doctrine tolerating racial discrimination, and discarded <u>54</u>/ the doctrine of Colegrove v. Green, <u>55</u>/ which instructed federal courts to

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abstain from deciding legislative apportionment suits on the ground that they raised nonjustiable political questions. 56/

In addition, numerous areas of the law today are plagued with incertitude because of infelicitous or opaque statutory language, 57/ and cascasdes of equivocal Supreme Court decisions addressing contentious issues such as affirmative action, 58/ gender discrimination, 59/ mandatory busing, 59a/ government aid to nonpublic schools, 60/ abortion, 61/ commerical speech, 62/the death penalty, 63/ Fourth Amendment strictures against unreasonable searches and seizures, 64/ regulation of toxic substances, 65/ and patents. 66/ Uncertainty, inconsistencies, and error in the case law are likely to become more pronounced in the future. The caseload burden of federal courts sharply curtails time for deliberation and clarity of exposition, 67/ and many contemporary federal judges perceive caseload processing as opposed to correct interpretation of statutes and the Constitution as the touchstone of judicial emminence and kudos. 68/

Contemporary features of the adjudicatory process and the legal topography underscores the important advocacy role of government attorney in the evolution of legal doctrines sympathetic to the policies of the President. A reasonably skilled government attorney can ordinarily assemble a reasonable legal case for sustaining Executive Branch endeavors. The attorney is ethically obligated to do so, unless he encounters the improbable situation where the best legal arguments are

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frivolous, that is, they have no likelihood of acceptance by the courts in the reasonably foreseeable future.

The President is, as a practical matter, elected by the people. He is thereby constitutionally endowed with authority to seek to advance his public policy preferences. The President's policies may find expression in proposed legislation, the issuance of rules or regulations, law enforcement strategies or priorities, or unilateral actions regarding foreign policy or national defense. The Constitution, of course, does not guarantee the President success in his policy initiatives. Congress may refuse to pass legislation or may nullify by statute a rule or regulation of the Executive Branch, and courts may hold that actions of the Executive Branch are without legal authority. The President is entitled, however, to the best legal advocacy of government attorneys devoted to shaping the evolution of legal doctrines that will sustain the President's programs and policy objectives. Otherwise, the President's constitutional powers will be blunted, and the will of the electorate thwarted.

Within the Executive Branch, the government attorney is emphatically a servant of the President. Neither the Constitution nor the electorate has entrusted the government attorney with an independence to determine what policies are enlightened or advance the cause of justice, and to dedicate his legal talents to furthering his personal public policy desires. The government attorney should comprehensively research legal issues, and apprise his superiors of the legal risks of

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proceeding with a particular policy gambit. If a decision is made to proceed notwithstanding the legal uncertainty, however, then the government attorney is ethically obligated to work unstintingly in fashioning legal arguments to uphold the policy. In some instances, this may require the construction of arguments for overturning judicial precedents, even those of recent vintage. Government attorneys did so with persistence and ultimate success during the Presidential tenure of Franklin Roosevelt.

The Supreme Court, it should be noted, has overruled major cases with lightening speed, as occurred regarding decisions addressing the constitutionality of legal tender laws, <u>69</u>/ the compulsory flag salute for public school pupils, <u>70</u>/ and taxes on religious pamphletting. <u>71</u>/ The Court has also overruled precedents of venerable age; it held in <u>Erie Railroad</u> v. <u>Tompkins 72</u>/ that the century-old decision in <u>Swift</u> v. <u>Tyson</u> <u>73</u>/ must be overruled because it unconstitutionally empowered federal courts to make general federal common law in disputes between citizens of different states.

Thus, the discovery by a government attorney of precedent that semingly would condemn a President policy does not ordain the conclusion that no responsible legal argument can be assembled to vindicate the policy. To the contrary, in most such situations, rational reasons can be adduced for modifying or reversing the adverse precedent, or distinguishing it, in order to effectuate the President's policy goal. The government attorney is ethically bound to develop when necessary plausible

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arguments for altering or overturning existing case law. This duty is comparable to the ethical norm governing private attorneys that endorses advocacy of any non-frivolous construction of law favorable to the client, including constructions dependent on modification or reversal of existing law, without regard to the attorney's professional opinion as to the likehood that the construction will ultimately prevail. <u>74</u>/ If a government attorney cannot ungrudgingly adhere to the ethical imperative requiring promotion of the President's policies through legal advocacy, then he might seriously consider voluntary resignation from the Executive Branch.

I wish to reiterate that this ethical imperative does not require unthinking or slavish fealty to a President's public policies. If a government attorney, after thorough and careful deliberation, concludes that no legal theory supporting an Executive Branch policy can be elucidated that has any possibility of acceptance by the courts in the reasonably foreseeable future, then there is no duty to defend the legality of the policy. This duty of Executive self-restraint is an import cornerstone of the Constitution's separation of powers.

The Constitution generally entrusts the ultimate determination of the legality of Executive Branch action to the Supreme Court. A Supreme Court decree overturning government action in a particular case would be virtually toothless as a check against Executive Branch abuses, however, if the Executive could flout the rationale of the decision and undertake action identical to that held unlawful, when no credible argument can be

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made that the High Court would reconsider its decision and uphold the action if an appropriate case were presented. Without such self-restraint, the Executive could in bad faith exploit the inevitable delays in the judicial process to continue wholesale implementation or enforcement of illegal policies or programs. The constitutionally envisioned role of the Supreme Court as a check against Executive power would thereby be reduced to a mere shadow. Executive self-restraint is as central to vindicating the intent of our constitutional architects as is judicial selfrestraint.

The ethical imperative of the goverment attorney traceable to our constitutional system of representative government is generally consonant with the ethical canons of the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility. Ethical Canon 7-14, for instance, exhorts the government attorney to refrain from instituting or continuing litigation that is "obviously unfair," to seek "justice," and to desist in civil or administrative proceedings from bringing about "unjust settlements or results." I believe that the concepts of fairness and justice that are intended to inform the government attorney in complying with this norm are those endorsed by his client, not the personal views of the attorney. Fairness and justice are elusive concepts. A government attorney's idea of fairness or justice may diverge substantially from that held by his superiors in the Executive Branch. Thus, if the personal views of the government attorney were controlling in the interpretation of EC 7-14, the attorney could hinder a broad spectrum of legitimate

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Executive Branch policies by refusing to devote his legal skills to support the policies because he believed that they were unfair or unjust. <u>75</u>/ I do not believe EC 7-14 was intended to so enfeeble the Executive Branch, or to place the personal views of a government attorney above those of the President.

In conclusion, the government attorney must both understand and adhere to the ethical imperative to avoid constitutional malfunctioning and to display a decent respect for the outcome of Presidential elections. The imperative stems from the constitutional right of the people to self-government, and to control the course of public policy through the exercise of the franchise. The understudied dimension of the government attorney's ethical duties to his client can only profit from greater scrutiny and colloquy. I encourage your participation in the dialoque.

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nativity scene is a minute portion of the city's overall Christmas celebration, accounting for only \$20 of the \$4,500 cost. The ACLU responded in effect that to spend even one penny would be unconstitutional: its attorney agreed, under questioning by the Supreme Court, that the logic of his position dictated that not even a single Christian Christmas tree ornament would be permissible.

When Pawtucket's attorney defended the essentially secular nature of the city's Christmas celebration as a "folk festival," he roused the ire of some religious leaders, who considered the offending expression to contain a vast theological impropriety. With defenders like that, they felt, who needs enemies? And strictly speaking, I suppose, the expression contains an anthropological impropriety as well. Pawtucket is hardly a "folk community," a term which conjures up images of a peasant village, ancient and isolated, nestled in some Bavarian or Thuringian valley. Yet, despite the unfortunate choice of words, the city's attorney had a point.

The differentiation of sacred and secular from one another was a relatively late development in human history. Only after that differentiation had arisen could a deliberate decision be made either to link or not to link the sacred and secular; prior to that point the two realms were so inextricably mixed that they were not two at all, but one. In our part of the world this differentiation has long since been accomplished, and during the last couple of centuries the decision has been made to keep the two realms separate from one another, especially in government and business. Yet there are residues of the earlier, predifferentiated state of affairs, Christmas—the popular or "folk" Christmas, that is, not the Christmas of the churches—being the most notable of these.

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The prevailing interpretation of the First Amendment's establishment clause presumes an already existing differentiation between sacred and secular, prohibiting state support for a differentiated sacred. It is less clear that it must prohibit support for a residual pre-differentiated event like Christmas. If the ancient popular Christmas had at some time spontaneously differentiated itself into two distinct festivals, one strictly sacred, the other strictly secular-a kind of winter carnival-there would be little question of the constitutional impropriety (not to mention the historical retrogression) involved in state support for the superimposition of religious elements onto the winter carnival. But this has not happened. Popular or "folk" Christmas remains what it has always been: a compound of religious, secular, even magical elements; a celebration of children, both our own children and the Christ Child who symbolizes their infinite worth; a remarkably durable and reassuring moment of primitivism in the darkest days of the year.

As I write, the Supreme Court has not yet announced its decision in *Donnelly* v. *Lynch*. Though I fear I'll expose myself to the charge of insensitivity to the menace of creeping sacralism in American life, let me confess: I hope Pawtucket wins this one.

Cabinet government, competent government

KEITH BURRIS

USICAL CHAIRS at the White House in the cabinet and in the higher circles of statecraft, has become, in the last twenty years, almost routine. But the recent Watt-Clark escapade deserves special note as well as historical perspective.

Our system does not build in "cabinet government," nor does it constitutionally define executive branch advisory and administrative power. Moreover, the growth of the executive branch has been cancerous in almost every sense of the word. So, it is fair to say we are still in the process of assimilating the age of bureaucracy and administration. Nonetheless, as recently as Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, the federal execu-

KEITH BURRIS teaches political science at Washington and Jefferson College in Pennsylvania. tive branch seemed to be under control (or essentially under control) in both budgets and management.

Both bureaucratic largess and budget began to slip under Dwight Eisenhower. Though "revisionists" are now saying Ike was secretly omnicompetent, the militarization of foreign policy and the loss of executive lines of accountability began in the fifties. In that decade, the Defense Department and the military industrial complex the president later warned us about began to balloon. Under Eisenhower, the CIA and the Department of State became adventurous. Under Eisenhower, the idea of extra-constitutional, non-treaty foreign policy arrangements ("doctrines" and "resolutions") began to take hold. Under Eisenhower, the National Security Council and the White House staff became major power sources. Eisenhower may have left the country in better shape than he found it, but he helped to unleash amorphous and unchained energy in the executive branch. Cabinet power and responsibility were further eroded under President Kennedy. Kennedy appointed a weak Secretary of State so, he said, he might act as his own. He appointed a non-political mathematician/businessman to head the Department of Defense. He made his campaign director (and brother) not Postmaster General and head of the Democratic party, but Attorney General and chief law enforcement officer of the land—a practice followed, with disastrous effect, by Richard M.Nixon. Kennedy shifted power decisively from the cabinet and what until Eisenhower had been the orderly and accountable growth of an entire branch of administrative government, to the White House staff and his own confidential apparatus. As Eugene McCarthy wrote, JFK personalized the presidency. Before it was imperialized, the office had to be personalized.

The history of LBJ and Nixon is well known but, except for the Ford interlude which included competent appointees like Carla Hills, William Coleman, and James Schlesinger, the trend toward weak and often unqualified or interchangeable cabinet officers has continued. President Carter fired the most independent and able of his team, reportedly because of tension between them and the White House (read campaign) staff. President Reagan has been through two Secretaries of State and three N.S.C. Advisors. Both presidents have gone the external special-government route: Carter continued the Nixon practice of appointing "tsars" or ministers of special and vague portfolio; Reagan likes commissioners and special emissaries. In foreign policy for the last seven years, we've had not only the State and Security Council changes, but four Middle East Envoys, one Central American "Envoy for Peace," the Kissinger panel, numerous advisory tours by Vice Presidents Mondale and Bush, Ambassador Kirkpatrick and company at the United Nations threatening withdrawal, preceded by Donald McHenry and Andrew Young.

Mr. Clark's jobs at State, N.S.C., and now Interior, illustrate merely the extremity of a clumsy notion of government we have gradually come to accept; any man the president wants for any job is pretty much acceptable unless he is a bigot or a crook. Experience, knowledge, and commitment to a given issue, program, or field are not taken seriously as qualifications for the top management positions in the government. One may argue that career or super-bureaucrats lend stability to the continually changing executive departments, but policy and direction are generated from above not below, and the point of keeping cabinet officers political is that in a democracy, bureaucratic power is to be held responsible.

M R. REAGAN deserves special blame for cronyism in appointments, rivaling only Warren G. Harding. And the man who ran on a platform of containing government ought to be abashed for his fox-guarding-the-henhouse mode of regulation; you do not limit government by discrediting it. But President Reagan shares the common presidential preference for weak and politically dependent men heading the departments and sycophants at The White Palace. Great presidents (Lincoln, F.D.R.) appoint strong persons as cabinet members,

sometimes even political enemies. Able presidents allow cabinet officers a degree of authority and autonomy, and grant them tenure enough to learn their jobs and accomplish something.

I do not know if Mr. George Bush is an able man or not; I do know he is experienced. He has been a congressman, Ambassador to the UN and to China, head of the Republican Party and the CIA—but none for more than two years. I would prefer that he had been in one job for ten years instead of five for two; we might then have a record to assess. Mr. Reagan's best appointment was of William Ruckelshaus to head the Environmental Protection Agency. Ruckelshaus knows the job because he held it previously, his record is good and he is a man of independent reputation.

The president's worst appointment: William Casey, his campaign chairman, as director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Senate, following the precedent of their rejection of Theodore Sorenson to head the C.I.A. under President Carter, should have sent Mr. Casey's name back on the grounds that the nomination was inappropriate. Mr.Casey would have made a fine Secretary of Commerce; he is not qualified for the C.I.A. post. Similarly, I am of the opinion that Andrew Young would have made a credible Secretary of H.U.D. or Health and Human Services, but I do not think he was qualified to head our delegation to the UN. I think Mr. John Connally was an able White House advisor for President Nixon, but he was not a very good Secretary of the Treasury. And so forth. . .

We need not amend the Constitution to allow for cabinet government. Nor ought we to tinker with the separation of powers by gutting presidential appointment power or overpoliticizing the appointment process. (We may have set some bounds here in the era of Andy Jackson.). But confirmation should be a process, and a process grounded in probity, not congressional good fellowship, partisan ardor, or the love of hot television light. The Senate may be the ultimate culprit. The Senate should assume less responsibility for the generation of legislation (much of it superfluous or poorly written), and more for the quality and qualifications of the cabinet.

In a presidential election year, the media should press prospective candidates for information on their possible cabinets. We are no longer talking about the president's five pals gathered around a kitchen table, but about selection of management for a vast labyrinth of procedures, funds, regulations, and guarantees—that Leviathan we know as modern government. We may allow ourselves to be ''unrealistic'' about the expansive quality of democratic administration, but we cannot afford to be careless about its tendency to be arrogant and unaccountable.

In keeping with its usual holiday practice, *Commonweal* will not publish an issue during the Christmas-New Year's season. The next issue will be dated January 13, 1984.

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16 December 1983: 685



THE WHITE HOUSE Library and Research Center and Law Library

TO: FROM: HELEN AMMEN Director

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RESPONSETO:

☐ John A. Svahn • Assistant to the President for Policy Development (x6515) Roger B. Porter Director Office of Policy Development (x6515)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 18, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD G. DARMAN

FROM: ROGER B. PORTER

SUBJECT: H.R. 6225 - Ratification of Reorganization Plans

The Office of Policy Development recommends approval of H.R. 6225.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 18, 1984

244826

MEMORANDUM FOR ROGER PORTER

FROM: JUDY JOHNSTON

SUBJECT: H.R. 6225 - Ratification of Reorganization Plans

H.R. 6225 ratifies all reorganization plans as a matter of law. Although the Administration testified that past reorganization plans have been constitutionally implemented, we have supported bill.

Ralph Bledsoe recommends approval.

Recommendation: That you sign the attached memorandum to Dick Darman recommending approval.

ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 6225 - RATIFICATION OF REORGANIZATION PLANS ACTION FYI ADMINISTRATION/ JOHNSTON JOHNSTON JOHNSTON DRUG POLICY TURNER OFFICE OF POLICY INFORMATION PROPERTY REVIEW BOARD OTHER OTHER Image:	•			DOCUMENT NO.	244826	55 .		
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John A. Svahn Assistant to the President for Policy Development (x6515) Roger B. Porter Director Office of Policy Development (x6515)

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 10-17-84 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 11:00 a.m. TOMORROW 10-18

SUBJECT: Bill H.R. 6225 - Ratification of Reorganization Plans

	ACTION FYI				
VICE PRESIDENT			MURPHY		P
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REMARKS:

May we have your comments by 11:00 a.m. TOMORROW, October 18, 1984. Thank you.

RESPONSE:



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

NGT 17 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Enrolled Bill H.R. 6225 - Ratification of Reorganization Plans Sponsors - Rep. Brooks (D) Texas and 5 others

Last Day for Action

October 23, 1984 - Tuesday

Purpose

To ratify all reorganization plans as a matter of law.

Agency Recommendations

Office of Management and Budget

Approval

Approval

Approval(Informally)

Department of Labor Department of Justice

Discussion

H.R. 6225 ratifies previously implemented reorganization plans and is in response to a recent court ruling questioning the validity of such reorganizations. In the past, Presidents have reorganized Executive agencies pursuant to statutes that permitted the Congress to disapprove a proposed reorganization through the use of a legislative veto. Such legislative vetos were recently found to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the case Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha.

As a result of the <u>Chadha</u> decision, a U.S. Court of Appeals recently held that the Reorganization Act of 1977 was unconstitutional because of its legislative veto provision, thereby raising questions about the validity of past reorganizations. By affirming all previously implemented reorganization plans under the 1977 Act and predecessor reorganization statutes, H.R. 6225 resolves any questions concerning the legality of such reorganizations and subsequent agency actions. Conclusion

In testifying on H.R. 6225 before the Congress, the Department of Justice stated that while it is the Government's position that past reorganization plans have been constitutionally implemented and remain in force, the Administration supported H.R. 6225 because it would resolve, without needless litigation, all questions concerning agency actions taken pursuant to reorganization plans.

H.R. 6225 passed both Houses by voice vote.

Assistant Director for Legislative Reference

Enclosures



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
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PRESIDENTIAL REPLY



THE WHITE HOUSE

MASHINGTON

October 18, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD G. DARMAN ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND DEPUTY TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF

FROM: SHERRIE M. COOKSEY

SUBJECT: Enrolled Bill H.R. 6225 --Ratification of Reorganization Plans

We have reviewed the above-referenced enrolled bill, which ratifies all previously implemented reorganization plans as a matter of law, and have no legal objections to the President signing it.

Document No. 244826SS

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WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 10-17-84 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 11:00 a.m. TOMORROW 10-18

SUBJECT: Bill H.R. 6225 - Ratification of Reorganization Plans

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REMARKS:

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RESPONSE:



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

OCT 17 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Enrolled Bill H.R. 6225 - Ratification of Reorganization Plans Sponsors - Rep. Brooks (D) Texas and 5 others

Last Day for Action

October 23, 1984 - Tuesday

Purpose

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Agency Recommendations

Office of Management and Budget

Department of Labor Department of Justice

Discussion

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Approval

Approval (Informally) Approval

Conclusion

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In testifying on H.R. 6225 before the Congress, the Department of Justice stated that while it is the Government's position that past reorganization plans have been constitutionally implemented and remain in force, the Administration supported H.R. 6225 because it would resolve, without needless litigation, all questions concerning agency actions taken pursuant to reorganization plans.

H.R. 6225 passed both Houses by voice vote.

Assistant Director for Legislative Reference

Enclosures

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International Decision

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Rinety-eighth Congress of the United States of America

AT THE SECOND SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Monday, the twenty-third day of January, one thousand nine hundred and eighty-four

An Act

To prevent disruption of the structure and functioning of the Government by ratifying all reorganization plans as a matter of law.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. The Congress hereby ratifies and affirms as law each reorganization plan that has, prior to the date of enactment of this Act, been implemented pursuant to the provisions of chapter 9 of title 5, United States Code, or any predecessor Federal reorganization statute.

SEC. 2. Any actions taken prior to the date of enactment of this Act pursuant to a reorganization plan that is ratified and affirmed by section 1 shall be considered to have been taken pursuant to a reorganization expressly approved by Act of Congress.

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Vice President of the United States and President of the Senate. October 19, 1984

Dear Mr. Brown:

I deeply appreciate your interest in the reform of the administrative structure of the Federal government. We have just received reports from a group I appointed to review the Federal government's management operations and organizational efficiency from a private sector perspective. This group, called the President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, is popularly referred to as the Grace Commission, after its Chairman, Peter Grace. The Grace Commission recommendations are now being reviewed and implemented wherever possible, and will, together with other management improvement efforts, bring about major changes for the better in how we manage the Federal government.

We are now actively engaged in a series of management improvement projects throughout the Federal government, many of which extend well beyond the recommendations of the Grace Commission. These projects are simed at reducing administrative overhead, streamlining operations, and assuring that waste, fraud and abuse are curbed.

We have also instituted a new process of annual management reviews in conjunction with the budget review process. These management reviews require agencies to set forth their plans for improved management and reduced costs. We are just now finishing the second year of these reviews and we are making major strides in this process as well. Your suggestion that I consider naming a new commission to inquire further into ways to improve efficiency is an interesting one. I shall certainly keep it in mind as I prepare for the future. Thank you so much for sharing your ideas with me.

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Sincerely, RONALB REAGAN A

Mr. Joseph S. Brown Apartment 14 2000 East 12th Avenue Denver, Colorado 80206

cc: Ken Cribb

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Lec: Ken, Cribb

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

Mr. Joseph S. Brown 2000 East 12th Avenue - No. 14 Denver, Colorado 80206

Dear Mr. Brown:

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I deeply appreciate " administrative s*** received repr government' from a r Pres

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

Date: 9/20/84%EP21 10: 9/1 To: OMB

I would like to respond to Mr. Brown with a letter from the President and I have the information he requests in his first paragraph. Please provide some language to respond to his suggestion re reorganizing the federal government.

Thanks for your help.

KATHERINE SHEPHERD

Presidential Correspondence Office Room 98, x7610

1917



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

18 September 1984

NOTE FOR ANNE HIGGINS

FROM: KENNETH CRIBB

SUBJECT: Attached Correspondence for the President

Would you please handle the attached letter to the President, which was delivered to me to present to the President?

Thanks very much for your assistance.

19111

Joseph S. Brown

2000 East 12th Avenue - No. 14 Denver, Colorado 80206

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14 SEP 1984

10 September 1984

Mr. Kenneth Crib Office of the President The White House Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. Crib:

At Freda Poundstone's suggestion, the enclosed for the President is sent to you.

If it results in no more than a brief note from the President confirming his Scottish ancestry, I would be most grateful.

Respectfully,

Joleph J. Brown

1917

Joseph S. Brown

2000 Easi 12th Avenue - No. 14 Denver, Colorado 80206 10 September 1984

The Honorable Ronald Wilson Reagan President of the United States The White House Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear President Reagan:

Some help with personal data, if you please. I am gathering resources for a book-<u>Scots and Their Contributions</u>. The yearbook of Current Biography for 1967, p. 388, recites that your mother was a Protestant, of English and Scottish background. Would you please give me your personal confirmation of Scottish descent. Reputable reference resources identify twenty-two Presidents, starting with Thomas Jefferson, out of the forty Presidents as being of Scottish or Scotch-Irish descent. This far beyond being remarkable. Scotland has given golf and soccer to the world, it was the American Scot, James Naismith, that invented basketball. I am trying to determine the possible Scottish ancestry of William G. Morgan, inventor of volleyball. If William G. Morgan could be so established this would represent a grand slam for world sports.

Your first administration represented correcting errors of the past and laying a foundation. Your second administration will be marked by building for the future. Taking these as themes, let me make a suggestion. Two groups were created by the Congress in 1947 and 1953 to recommend reforms in the administrative structure of the federal government. Heretofore the executive branch had never been systematically organized. These two commissions, called by Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, were the Hoover Commissions from the chairmanships of former president Hoover.

The Congress accepted 196 of the first Commission's recommendations and enacted some of them into law, e.g. the Reorganization Act of 1949 and establishment of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. The second Commision, during its two years, studied 60 of the 64 agencies accounting for about 95% of the costs of the executive branch of the government. There were 39 separate reports, entailing 314 recommendations, relating to reductions in the cost of operations, essentially through the elimination of non-essential functions and substitution of private enterprise for certain government services. The second Commission enjoyed a greater latitude of authority to investigate and recommend changes in matters of policy.

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The Citizens Committee for the Hoover Report, a private group, reported in 1958 that Congress and the executive branch adopted 72% of the reforms proposed by the first Commission, and 64% of those recommended by the second Commission.

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When you take your second oath of office we will be fifteen years away from the turn of the century. The suggestion is that you is that you consider calling for a new commission to review the federal government for, for examples, relation of state and federal government relationships; the necessity of certain government programs, vis-a-vis private sector capacity to assume and perform; the recruitment, trining, promotion, pay, etc. of federal employees, including the military; and national goals. I also suggest that the commission be empower to conduct studies with Canada and Mexico, jointly, for mutual relations the start of the next century.

Mr. Mondale's campaign will be characterized by caviling. I believe the American people will respond to a statesman gesture of leadership, represented by a call for structuring the government and neighbor country relationships in the best posture for the next century, and give you fullest confidence at the polls for building for the future.

It was my pleasure to by Deputy Director of the Colorado Reagan Bandwagon in 1980. In every campaign there are a thousand and one things one wishes they had done. We try not to think of the things we wish we had not done. Whatever my small and limited role, the 1980 Colorado record spoke for itself. The 1984 Colorado record will be even greater.

As the Scots say,

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All the best,

Respectfully,

Jeteph S. Brown

