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**Box:** 91306

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records  
 National Security Planning Group  
**File Folder:** NSPG0077 14 Nov 1983 Box 91306

**Archivist:** mjd  
**FOIA ID:** F98-018  
**Date:** 09/2/1999

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. agenda	NSPG meeting, 1p PART. 11/15/05 M1374 #1	11/14/8 3	P1/F1
2. memo	Charles Hill to John Poindexter re: Lebanon, 3p R 10/27/01 F98-018/1 #124	nd	<del>P1/F1</del>
3. memo	Philip Dur to Robert McFarlane re: NSPG meeting, 1p #56616 PART 4/27/06 F98-018/1 #125 R 7/14/10 M098/11	11/14/8 3	<del>P1/F1</del>
4. agenda	NSPG meeting, 1p PART 11 " #126	11/14/8 3	P1/F1
5. talking points	1p	nd	P1/F1
6. memo	text same as item 2, 3p R 10/27/01 F98-018/1 #128	nd	P1/F1
7. cable	140802Z NOV 83, 2p D 11/15/05 M1374 #2	11/14/8 3	P1/F1
8. cable	141240Z NOV 83, 1p R " " #3	11/14/8 3	P1/F1
9. message	Reagan to P.M. Thatcher (annotated), 2p D " " #4	nd	P1/F1
10. message	Reagan to Thatcher (edited), 2p D " " #5	nd	P1/F1
11. message	Reagan to Thatcher, 2p D " " #6	nd	P1/F1
12. message	Reagan to Thatcher (annotated), 2p D 4/27/06 F98-018/1 #134	nd	P1/F1
13. message	Reagan to Thatcher, 2p D " " #135	nd	P1/F1
14. cable	140811Z NOV 83, 2p D 11/15/05 M1374 #7	11/14/8 3	P1/F1
15. message	Reagan to P.M. Craxi, 2p D " " #8	nd	P1/F1
16. message	text same as item 15, 2p D 4/27/06 F98-018/1 #138	nd	P1/F1

### RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].  
 P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].  
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].

P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].  
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].  
 F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].  
 F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].  
 F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].  
 F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].  
 F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].  
 F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].  
 F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].



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**Archivist:** mjd  
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**Date:** 09/2/1999

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
17. message	Reagan to Craxi (annotated), 1p D 4/27/06 F98-018/1 #139	nd	P1/F1
18. message	Reagan to Craxi, 1p D " " #140	nd	P1/F1
19. message	Reagan to PM Kohl (annotated), 1p D 11/15/05 M1374 #9	nd	P1/F1
20. message	Reagan to Kohl, 1p D 4/27/06 F98-018/1 #142	nd	P1/F1
21. message	to Ambassador Bartholomew, 2p PART. 10/27/01 F98-018/1 #143 PAR	nd	P1/F1 #5663
<del>22. message</del>	<del>to Ambassador Lewis, 2p R 10/27/01 F98-018/1 #144</del>	<del>nd</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>23. message</del>	<del>to Charge Precht, 2p R " " #145</del>	<del>nd</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>23a. message</del>	<del>to AMB. VIETS R " " #146</del>	<del>nd</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>24. message</del>	<del>to Charge Suddarth, 1p R " " #147</del>	<del>nd</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>25. message</del>	<del>to Ambassador Paganelli, 2p R " " #148</del>	<del>nd</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>26. message</del>	<del>to Ambassador Hartman, 2p R " " #149</del>	<del>nd</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>27. message</del>	<del>to all diplomatic posts (annotated), 1p R " " #150</del>	<del>nd</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>28. message</del>	<del>to all diplomatic posts, 1p R " " #151</del>	<del>nd</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>29. message</del>	<del>to UN Secretary General (annotated), 1p R " " #152</del>	<del>nd</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>30. message</del>	<del>to UN Secretary General, 2p R " " #153</del>	<del>nd</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>31. message</del>	<del>to Japanese Foreign Minister, 2p R " " #154</del>	<del>nd</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>

### RESTRICTIONS

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) *NSM 8/36/99*

RECEIVED 08 FEB 84 12

TO POINDEXTER

FROM HILL, C

DOCDATE 00 NOV 84

KEYWORDS . LEBANON

NSPG

SUBJECT: STATE BACKGROUND PAPERS RE PREPARATION FOR LEBANON OPERATIONS RE NSPG  
MTG ON 14 NOV

-----  
ACTION: NOTED BY POINDEXTER DUE: STATUS C FILES IFM O

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8391369 NSCIFID NSPG0077 ( B / B )

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ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO


DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_ (C)





National Security Council  
The White House **CHRON FILE**

RECEIVED

System # II

Package # 91550

84 FEB 8 12:19

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary			
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>		<u>R</u>
Situation Room			
Executive Secretary			

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

**DISTRIBUTION**

cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other \_\_\_\_\_

**COMMENTS**

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

1. Congressional meeting
2. NSPG
3. Format for Pres. statement





MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL JOHN POINDEXTER  
THE WHITE HOUSE

**NOTED**

Subject: Preparations for Lebanon Operation

The following materials have been prepared for use in connection with the planned operation.

Prior to Execution

Messages to MNF contributors. In light of Prime Minister Thatcher's strongly stated view on the need for adequate consultations, we believe that she should be informed on Sunday, November 13 that the President is moving toward a decision to act against those who were responsible for the Beirut truck bombing. A proposed message is at Tab 1. This would be followed up with a message (Tab 2) informing Mrs. Thatcher shortly in advance about the President's decision to approve the operation.

Prime Minister Craxi should receive similar messages (Tab 3 and Tab 4) both because of Italian insistence that--as a major MNF contributor--they deserve meaningful consultation, and because we cannot preclude the possibility that the British and French will indicate, at some point, that they were "consulted."

We recommend that the messages to the British be transmitted through the Cabinet channel. Owing to the special precautions required by non-secure Italian communications, we would ask Ambassador Rabb to communicate directly with Prime Minister Craxi in Rome.

We recommend that a similar two-stage process be used with the French, through means available to you.

Message to the FRG. In light of the imminent Bundestag debate on INF, we recommend a Presidential message to Chancellor Kohl (Tab 5) informing him about the operation shortly before it is scheduled to begin.

Local Coordination. In order to preserve the security of the operation, the proposed messages to the MNF contributors indicate our preference that they not communicate with Beirut.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F98-018/1, #124

BY CAJ, NARA, DATE 10/22/01



We therefore must assume the responsibility for local notification. A message to Ambassador Bartholomew (Tab 6) authorizes him to inform the British, Italian, and French ambassadors in Beirut immediately before the operation begins. It will be essential to provide sufficient advance notice to the commanders of the other MNF contributors--as well as to the IDF--through military channels to permit them to take appropriate precautions. We leave it to you to work with DOD how that would be done.

Following Completion of the Operation

Since operational considerations may affect the precise timing of the operation, the following actions should not be taken until triggered by confirmation that the operation has been successfully completed.

Presidential Statement. We have suggested revisions in the proposed statement (Tab 7) designed to avoid criticism that we have failed to attack Iran and Syria despite the fact that we hold those governments responsible.

Informing Lebanon. The message to Ambassador Bartholomew (Tab 6) authorizes him to inform the GOL immediately after receiving confirmation that the operation has been successfully completed.

Informing Israel. Tab 8. To avoid accusations of coordinated US-Israeli military actions in Lebanon and/or against Syria, we suggest that Israel be informed through political channels only after the operation has been completed. (The IDF should be notified through military channels shortly before the operation begins so that they can take appropriate precautions.)

Informing moderate Arab states. Messages to Cairo, Amman, and Jidda are at Tabs 9-11. These messages also advise posts to take appropriate security precautions.

Informing Syria. Tab 12.

Informing the Soviet Union. Tab 13.

Informing all diplomatic posts. Tab 14. This message also contains a warning to increase post security as appropriate.

Informing the UN Secretary General. Tab 15.

Informing South Korea and Japan. In light of the President's just completed trip, we believe that messages from the Secretary to his counterparts would be appropriate. A message to Foreign Minister Abe is at Tab 16. We will be preparing a separate message to Seoul following consultations with the Secretary when he returns to Washington.

Relevant Travel Plans

President Gemayel plans to be in Damascus on Monday, November 21, returning to Beirut sometime Tuesday. Ambassador Rumsfeld plans to travel from Beirut to Rome on Monday, and to review his travel plans at that time. He tentatively plans to be in Cairo on Tuesday, in Israel on Wednesday, and in Damascus on Thursday. Depending on decisions in Washington, these plans may need to be modified.

Other Preparations

We understand that the White House is assuming responsibility for Congressional notifications and for public affairs.

*Charles Hill*

M. Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

- Tab 1 - First Message to Prime Minister Thatcher
- Tab 2 - Second Message to Prime Minister Thatcher
- Tab 3 - First Message to Prime Minister Craxi
- Tab 4 - Second Message to Prime Minister Craxi
- Tab 5 - Presidential Message to Chancellor Kohl
- Tab 6 - Message to Ambassador Bartholomew
- Tab 7 - Presidential Statement
- Tab 8 - Informing Israel
- Tab 9 - Informing Cairo
- Tab 10 - Informing Amman
- Tab 11 - Informing Jidda
- Tab 12 - Informing Syria
- Tab 13 - Informing the Soviet Union
- Tab 14 - Informing All Diplomatic Posts
- Tab 15 - Informing the UN Secretary General
- Tab 16 - Message to Foreign Minister Abe



~~TOP SECRET~~

SYSTEM II  
91369

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

**CHRON FILE**

November 14, 1983

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: PHILIP A. DUR *Phil*

SUBJECT: *Don # 100*  
NSPG, Monday, November 14, 1983

We have prepared an abbreviated agenda for this afternoon's meeting of the NSPG. As structured, the agenda should permit discussion of the most critical considerations and the uncertainties which surfaced during Saturday's meeting of the SSG.

There are a number of considerations bearing on this operation which should surface during the discussion, especially the risks to the forces undertaking the operation and what we may expect by way of counter-retaliation.

We are attaching several points for your consideration should they not be covered by either Director Casey or DOD.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the agenda for today's meeting and consider the points attached.

Approve  Disapprove

Attachments

- Tab A - Agenda
- Tab B - Points for Consideration

**DECLASSIFIED**

NLRR M098/11 # 56616

BY KML NARA DATE 7/15/10

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Declassify on: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSITIVE





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MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL JOHN POINDEXTER  
THE WHITE HOUSE

NOTE

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*Charles Hill*

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Executive Secretary

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- Tab 14 - Informing All Diplomatic Posts
- Tab 15 - Informing the UN Secretary General
- Tab 16 - Message to Foreign Minister Abe

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

2350 EST November 12

MEMO FOR BUD MCFARLANE  
FROM JOHN POINDEXTER

Due to Prime Minister Thatcher's concern about consultation, Larry Eagleburger and I recommend we send out the cable attached tomorrow (Sunday Washington time) after we have received a reply from General Saulnier.

Request clearance on attached cable.

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997  
By MSD NARA, Date 9/7/99

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~



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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NLS M1374 #3 WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

BY US NARA, DATE 11/15/05

PAGE 01  
SIT060

CABINET OFFICE 0001  
AN001068

DTG: 141240Z NOV 83 PSN: 027843  
TOR: 318/1252Z

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DISTRIBUTION: MCF JP KIMM SIT /007  
WHSR COMMENT: SENT TO AF-1/ADVISE ON DISSEM  
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OP IMMED  
DE WTE24 #0001 3181250  
O 141240Z NOV 83  
FM CABINET OFFICE

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ VIA CABO

DEAR RON,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 14 NOVEMBER ABOUT THE LEBANON.  
WE ARE CONSIDERING IT URGENTLY NOW AND I PLAN TO LET YOU HAVE MY  
VIEWS BY ABOUT 2.00 P.M. OUR TIME.

YOURS EVER,  
MARGARET.

# RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

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~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

PASS TO AMBASSADOR BARTHOLOMEW

1. IF WEATHER AND OTHER FACTORS PERMIT, AT 0001 ZULU NOVEMBER \_\_\_\_, US AIRCRAFT WILL CONDUCT A STRIKE AGAINST A HEADQUARTERS/TRAINING COMPLEX OF THE "HUSAYNI SUICIDE COMMANDOS" IN BAALBEK. PLANNING HAS BEEN COMPLETED WITH A VIEW TO AVOIDING COLLATERAL DAMAGE TO INNOCENT CIVILIANS OR ARMED CONFRONTATION WITH SYRIAN FORCES.

2. UPON RECEIVING AUTHORIZATION, YOU SHOULD INFORM YOUR COLLEAGUES FROM THE MNF CONTRIBUTORS ABOUT THE OPERATION IN ORDER TO PERMIT THEM TO TAKE APPROPRIATE PRECAUTIONS. YOU SHOULD NOT, REPEAT NOT, TAKE ANY ACTIONS ON THE BASIS OF THE INFORMATION IN PARA 1 UNTIL SO ADVISED.

3. AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE AFTER RECEIVING CONFIRMATION THAT THE OPERATION HAS BEEN SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED, YOU SHOULD SEEK AN APPOINTMENT WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL TO INFORM HIM OF OUR ACTION AND STRESS THAT THIS WAS A RESPONSE TO THE CRIMINAL AND

TOP SECRET

~~SENSITIVE~~

GTS  
 #18-018/1 #143  
 10/07/01


DECLASSIFIED IN PART upheld  
 NLRR M2008-098/n # 56630  
 BY anf NARA DATE 11/20/08



WANTON VIOLENCE AGAINST OUR MARINES. YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT IN HIS STATEMENT ANNOUNCING THE ACTION, THE PRESIDENT INTENDS TO IDENTIFY THE CULPRITS BY NAME, AND TO POINT TO IRANIAN AND SYRIAN COMPLICITY IN THE ATTACK. YOU SHOULD STRESS THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO LET THIS MATTER REST HERE. HOWEVER, IF THIS TYPE OF ATTACK IS REPEATED, WE HAVE WARNED SYRIA THAT WE WILL RESPOND TO ANY FURTHER ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST OUR PERSONNEL IN LEBANON.

4. AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THEREAFTER, YOU SHOULD ALSO SPEAK WITH

FOIA(b) ( / )



5. YOU SHOULD TAKE APPROPRIATE SECURITY PRECAUTIONS IN LIGHT OF THIS AIRSTRIKE.

## STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

In my address to the American people last week concerning events in Lebanon and Grenada, I spoke of my determination to spare no effort to identify those responsible for the October 23 atrocity against our Marines in Beirut. I promised that if the perpetrators could be identified, their act would not go unpunished.

After a careful and painstaking search, we determined the identity of the group responsible for the insidious act which took the lives of our Marines that Sunday morning. Although they sought anonymity, we now are confident that the culprits were *LEBANESE* *PERPETRATORS OF* the so-called "Husayni Suicide Commandos," a fanatical group with headquarters in the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon. There is good reason to believe that Iranian officials were aware of this group's plans, and that their movement to Beirut may have been facilitated by individuals with ties to Syria.

On the basis of the solid evidence developed, we have taken steps to discourage further attacks by these international criminals. About one hour ago, at \_\_\_\_\_ EST, United States aircraft attacked a headquarters and training complex in the Bekaa Valley used by the group. The strike was successful. All aircraft have been recovered safely.

This action was in response to the outrage that was committed against our people who came to Beirut in peace, to help advance the cause of peace in that troubled land. It



was, as well, a decisive action taken to deter a repetition of such terrorist acts. I can assure you that the operation was carefully designed to avoid damage to innocent civilians or armed confrontation with third parties. We are prepared to let the matter rest here, although I caution those responsible for supporting this form of terrorism that we will continue to respond decisively to similar acts in the future.

~~[The United States will work closely with other governments victimized by terrorism to preclude future crimes such as that perpetrated against our Marines. We call on all nations which subscribe to a moral code governing the conduct of relations between nations to join in a resolute and decided effort to curb this criminal conduct.]\*~~

\*We recommend deletion of this final paragraph.



~~TOP SECRET~~SENSITIVE

PASS TO AMBASSADOR LEWIS

1. IF WEATHER AND OTHER FACTORS PERMIT, AT APPROXIMATELY 0001 HOURS ZULU NOVEMBER \_\_\_\_, US AIRCRAFT WILL CONDUCT A STRIKE AGAINST A TARGET COMPLEX IN THE BEKAA VALLEY OF LEBANON BELONGING TO THE SO-CALLED "HUSAYNI SUICIDE COMMANDOS" OF THE ISLAMIC AMAL MOVEMENT. EVERY PRECAUTION HAS BEEN TAKEN TO AVOID COLLATERAL DAMAGE OR AN ARMED CONFRONTATION WITH SYRIAN FORCES.

2. UPON RECEIVING CONFIRMATION THAT THE OPERATION HAS BEEN SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED, YOU SHOULD CONVEY FOLLOWING POINTS TO PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR IMMEDIATELY.

-- AT APPROXIMATELY 0001 HOURS ZULU NOVEMBER \_\_\_\_ US AIRCRAFT CONDUCTED AN AIRSTRIKE AGAINST A TARGET COMPLEX BELONGING TO THE SO-CALLED "HUSAYNI SUICIDE COMMANDOS" OF THE ISLAMIC AMAL MOVEMENT IN THE BEKAA VALLEY OF LEBANON. WE NOW KNOW THIS GROUP WAS THE PERPETRATOR OF THE OCTOBER 23 ATTACK ON OUR MNF UNIT IN BEIRUT.

~~TOP SECRET~~SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F98-018/1 #144  
BY CJS, NARA, DATE 10/27/01

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

-2-

-- WE HAVE TAKEN EVERY PRECAUTION TO AVOID COLLATERAL DAMAGE  
OR AN ARMED CONFRONTATION WITH SYRIAN FORCES.

-- YOU, IN PARTICULAR, WILL APPRECIATE THE SENSITIVITY OF OUR  
OPERATION AND OUR NEED TO HAVE CLOSELY RESTRICTED PRIOR  
KNOWLEDGE OF IT.

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

~~TOP SECRET~~SENSITIVE

PASS TO CHARGE PRECHT

1. IF WEATHER AND OTHER FACTORS PERMIT, AT 0001 ZULU NOVEMBER \_\_\_\_, US AIRCRAFT WILL CONDUCT A STRIKE AGAINST A HEADQUARTERS/TRAINING COMPLEX OF THE "HUSAYNI SUICIDE COMMANDOS" IN BAALBEK. PLANNING HAS BEEN COMPLETED WITH A VIEW TO AVOIDING COLLATERAL DAMAGE TO INNOCENT CIVILIANS OR ARMED CONFRONTATION WITH SYRIAN FORCES.
  
2. AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE AFTER RECEIVING CONFIRMATION THAT THE OPERATION HAS BEEN SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED, YOU SHOULD ADVISE PRESIDENT MUBARAK OF OUR ACTION AND STRESS THAT THIS WAS A RESPONSE TO THE CRIMINAL AND WANTON VIOLENCE AGAINST OUR MARINES, INTENDED TO DETER FURTHER ATTACKS. YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT IN HIS STATEMENT ANNOUNCING THE ACTION, THE PRESIDENT PLANS TO IDENTIFY THE CULPRITS BY NAME AND TO POINT TO IRANIAN AND SYRIAN COMPLICITY IN THE ATTACK. YOU SHOULD STRESS THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO LET THIS MATTER REST HERE. HOWEVER, IF THIS TYPE OF ATTACK IS REPEATED, WE HAVE WARNED SYRIA THAT WE WILL RESPOND TO ANY FURTHER ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST OUR PERSONNEL IN LEBANON.
  
3. YOU SHOULD TAKE APPROPRIATE SECURITY PRECAUTIONS IN LIGHT OF THIS AIRSTRIKE.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F98-018, #145

SENSITIVEBY CAJ, NARA, DATE 10/27/01



~~TOP SECRET~~SENSITIVE

PASS TO AMBASSADOR VIETS

1. IF WEATHER AND OTHER FACTORS PERMIT, AT 0001 ZULU NOVEMBER \_\_\_\_, US AIRCRAFT WILL CONDUCT A STRIKE AGAINST A HEADQUARTERS/TRAINING COMPLEX OF THE "HUSAYNI SUICIDE COMMANDOS" IN BAALBEK. PLANNING HAS BEEN COMPLETED WITH A VIEW TO AVOIDING COLLATERAL DAMAGE TO INNOCENT CIVILIANS OR ARMED CONFRONTATION WITH SYRIAN FORCES.
  
2. AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER RECEIVING CONFIRMATION THAT THE OPERATION HAS BEEN SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED, YOU SHOULD ADVISE KING HUSSEIN OF OUR ACTION AND STRESS THAT THIS WAS A RESPONSE TO THE CRIMINAL AND WANTON VIOLENCE AGAINST OUR MARINES, INTENDED TO DETER FURTHER ATTACKS. YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT IN HIS STATEMENT ANNOUNCING THE ACTION, THE PRESIDENT PLANS TO IDENTIFY THE CULPRITS BY NAME AND TO POINT TO IRANIAN AND SYRIAN COMPLICITY IN THE ATTACK. YOU SHOULD STRESS THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO LET THIS MATTER REST HERE. HOWEVER, IF THIS TYPE OF ATTACK IS REPEATED, WE HAVE WARNED SYRIA THAT WE WILL RESPOND TO ANY FURTHER ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST OUR PERSONNEL IN LEBANON.
  
3. YOU SHOULD TAKE APPROPRIATE SECURITY PRECAUTIONS IN LIGHT OF THIS AIRSTRIKE.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F98-018/1 #146  
BY CS NARA, DATE 10/27/01

SENSITIVE



~~TOP SECRET~~SENSITIVE

PASS TO CHARGE SUDDARTH

1. IF WEATHER AND OTHER FACTORS PERMIT, AT 0001 ZULU NOVEMBER \_\_\_\_, US AIRCRAFT WILL CONDUCT A STRIKE AGAINST A HEADQUARTERS/TRAINING COMPLEX OF THE "HUSAYNI SUICIDE COMMANDOS" IN BAALBEK. PLANNING HAS BEEN COMPLETED WITH A VIEW TO AVOIDING COLLATERAL DAMAGE TO INNOCENT CIVILIANS OR ARMED CONFRONTATION WITH SYRIAN FORCES.

2. AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE AFTER RECEIVING CONFIRMATION THAT THE OPERATION HAS BEEN SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED, YOU SHOULD ADVISE FOREIGN MINISTER SAUD AND THE KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY OF OUR ACTION AND STRESS THAT THIS WAS A RESPONSE TO THE CRIMINAL AND WANTON VIOLENCE AGAINST OUR MARINES, INTENDED TO DETER FURTHER ATTACKS. YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT IN HIS STATEMENT ANNOUNCING THE ACTION, THE PRESIDENT PLANS TO IDENTIFY THE CULPRITS BY NAME AND TO POINT TO IRANIAN AND SYRIAN COMPLICITY IN THE ATTACK. YOU SHOULD STRESS THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO LET THIS MATTER REST HERE. HOWEVER, IF THIS TYPE OF ATTACK IS REPEATED, WE HAVE WARNED SYRIA THAT WE WILL RESPOND TO ANY FURTHER ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST OUR PERSONNEL IN LEBANON.

3. YOU SHOULD TAKE APPROPRIATE SECURITY PRECAUTIONS IN LIGHT OF THIS AIRSTRIKE.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F98-018/1 #147  
BY CA NARA, DATE 10/27/01 SENSITIVE

~~TOP SECRET~~

FOR ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS

1 ~~TOP SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AT \_\_\_\_\_ HOURS GMT NOVEMBER \_\_\_\_\_, U.S. AIRCRAFT ATTACKED A HEADQUARTERS/TRAINING CAMP COMPLEX IN THE BEKAA VALLEY OF LEBANON BELONGING TO THE GROUP WE NOW KNOW WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OCTOBER 23 ATTACK ON OUR MNF UNIT IN BEIRUT. THE AIRCRAFT ENCOUNTERED NO OPPOSITON AND ALL WERE RECOVERED SAFELY.

3. THE PURPOSE OF THIS ATTACK WAS TO RESPOND DECISIVELY AT THE SOURCE OF THE TERRORIST ATTACK ON OUR MARINES. THIS SURGICAL ACTION IS INTENDED TO PREEMPT FURTHER STRIKES BY THIS PARTICULAR GROUP, THE SO-CALLED "HUSAYNI SUICIDE COMMANDOS" OF THE DISSIDENT ISLAMIC AMAL MOVEMENT (NOT TO BE CONFUSED WITH THE AMAL ORGANIZATION UNDER THE LEBANESE LEADER NABIH BERRI). IT IS ALSO INTENDED TO DETER SIMILAR ACTIONS BY OTHER TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.

4. POSTS SHOULD SEEK APPOINTMENT WITH FOREIGN MINISTRIES AT FIRST OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN NATURE AND PURPOSE OF OUR ACTION. THE NATURE OF THE OPERATION, AND THE CARE TAKEN TO AVOID COLLATERAL DAMAGE TO INNOCENT CIVILIANS OR MILITARY CONFRONTATION WITH SYRIAN MILITARY UNITS SHOULD BE STRESSED. IT SHOULD ALSO BE EMPHASIZED THAT THE USG IS PREPARED TO LET THIS MATTER REST HERE. HOWEVER, WE HAVE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OR IRAN ENCOURAGED AND SUPPORTED THE ATTACK ON OUR MARINES, AND WE SUSPECT THAT CERTAIN PEOPLE WITH TIES TO SYRIA WERE INVOLVED. IN THE EVENT OF ANY FUTURE TERRORIST ACTS OF THIS NATURE THE U.S. WILL RESPOND APPROPRIATELY.

5. POSTS SHOULD TAKE INCREASED SECURITY MEASURES AS APPROPRIATE.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F98-018/1 #15P

~~TOP SECRET~~BY CAH NARA, DATE 10/27/01



~~TOP SECRET~~SENSITIVE

PASS TO AMBASSADOR PAGANELLI

~~TOP SECRET~~SENSITIVE

1. IF WEATHER AND OTHER FACTORS PERMIT, AT 0001 HOURS ZULU NOVEMBER \_\_\_\_, U.S. AIRCRAFT WILL CONDUCT A STRIKE AGAINST A TARGET COMPLEX BELONGING TO THE SO-CALLED "HUSAYNI SUICIDE COMMANDOS" OF THE ISLAMIC AMAL MOVEMENT IN THE BEKAA VALLEY OF LEBANON. EVERY PRECAUTION HAS BEEN TAKEN TO AVOID COLLATERAL DAMAGE OR AN ARMED CONFRONTATION WITH SYRIAN FORCES.

2. AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE AFTER RECEIVING CONFIRMATION THAT THE OPERATION HAS BEEN SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED, YOU SHOULD SEEK AN APPOINTMENT WITH FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM AND MAKE THE FOLLOWING DEMARCHE:

-- THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS UNDERTAKEN THESE ACTIONS AGAINST THE GROUP WHICH WE NOW KNOW WAS DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OCTOBER 23 ATTACK ON OUR MNF UNIT IN BEIRUT.

~~TOP SECRET~~SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F98-018/1 #148  
BY GJS NARA, DATE 10/27/01

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

-2-

- WE HAVE TAKEN GREAT CARE TO AVOID ARMED CONFRONTATIONS WITH SYRIAN MILITARY UNITS, AND THE STRIKE WAS UNDERTAKEN WITH A VIEW TO AVOIDING COLLATERAL DAMAGE.
  
- WE BELIEVE THERE WAS SYRIAN COMPLICITY, AT LEAST IN TERMS OF AWARENESS OF THE OCTOBER 23 ATTACK, BUT WE ARE PREPARED TO LET THIS MATTER REST HERE. WE WILL RESPOND APPROPRIATELY TO ANY FURTHER ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST OUR PERSONNEL IN LEBANON.
  
- 3. YOU SHOULD TAKE APPROPRIATE SECURITY PRECAUTIONS IN LIGHT OF THIS AIRSTRIKE.

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSITIVE



PASS TO AMBASSADOR HARTMAN

1. IF WEATHER AND OTHER FACTORS PERMIT, AT APPROXIMATELY 0001 HOURS ZULU NOVEMBER\_\_\_\_, U.S. AIRCRAFT WILL CONDUCT A STRIKE AGAINST A TARGET COMPLEX BELONGING TO THE SO-CALLED "HYSAYNI SUICIDE COMMANDOS" OF THE ISLAMIC AMAL MOVEMENT IN THE BEKAA VALLEY OF LEBANON. EVERY PRECAUTION HAS BEEN TAKEN TO AVOID COLLATERAL DAMAGE OR AN ARMED CONFRONTATION WITH SYRIAN FORCES. ~~(TS)~~

2. AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER RECEIVING CONFIRMATION THAT THE OPERATION HAS BEEN COMPLETED SUCCESSFULLY, YOU SHOULD SEEK AN APPOINTMENT WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO AND MAKE THE FOLLOWING DEMARCHE: ~~(U)~~

-- THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS UNDERTAKEN THESE ACTIONS IN LEBANON AGAINST THE GROUP WHICH WE ARE CONFIDENT WERE DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OCTOBER 23 ATTACK ON OUR MNF UNIT IN BEIRUT. ~~(U)~~

-- WE HAVE TAKEN GREAT CARE TO AVOID ARMED CONFRONTATIONS WITH SYRIAN MILITARY UNITS, AND THE STRIKE WAS UNDERTAKEN WITH A VIEW TO AVOIDING COLLATERAL DAMAGE. ~~(U)~~

-- WE ARE PREPARED TO LET THIS MATTER REST HERE. HOWEVER, WE WILL RESPOND APPROPRIATELY TO RENEWED VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM AGAINST OUR PEOPLE IN LEBANON. ~~(U)~~

-- WHILE WE HAVE CONSCIOUSLY REFRAINED FROM ATTACKS AGAINST ANY ELEMENTS NOT DIRECTLY AND IMMEDIATELY IMPLICATED IN THE OCTOBER 23 ATTACKS IN BEIRUT, WE CANNOT ENSURE THERE WILL BE SIMILAR RESTRAINT IN THE EVENT OF FUTURE ATTACKS AGAINST OUR PEOPLE IN LEBANON.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F98-018/1 #149  
BY CAJ, NARA, DATE 10/27/01

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

-- THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS DETERMINED TO PURSUE A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION TO THE LEBANESE PROBLEM, AND WE HAVE PLACED GREAT HOPE IN THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PROCESS BEGUN IN GENEVA LAST WEEK. (U)

(U)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

FOR ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS

1. ~~TOP SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AT \_\_\_\_\_ HOURS GMT NOVEMBER \_\_\_\_\_, U.S. AIRCRAFT ATTACKED A HEADQUARTERS/TRAINING CAMP. COMPLEX IN THE BEKAA VALLEY OF LEBANON BELONGING TO THE GROUP WE NOW KNOW WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OCTOBER 23 ATTACK ON OUR MNF UNIT IN BEIRUT. THE AIRCRAFT ENCOUNTERED NO OPPOSITON AND ALL WERE RECOVERED SAFELY.

3. THE PURPOSE OF THIS ATTACK WAS TO RESPOND DECISIVELY AT THE SOURCE OF THE TERRORIST ATTACK ON OUR MARINES. THIS SURGICAL ACTION IS INTENDED TO PREEMPT FURTHER STRIKES BY THIS PARTICULAR <sup>Lebanese terrorist</sup> GROUP ~~THE~~ <sup>known as the</sup> SO-CALLED "HUSAYNI SUICIDE COMMANDOS" OF THE DISSIDENT ISLAMIC AMAL MOVEMENT (NOT TO BE CONFUSED WITH THE AMAL ORGANIZATION UNDER THE LEBANESE LEADER NABIH BERRI). IT IS ALSO INTENDED TO DETER SIMILAR ACTIONS BY OTHER TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.

4. POSTS SHOULD SEEK APPOINTMENT WITH FOREIGN MINISTRIES AT FIRST OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN NATURE AND PURPOSE OF OUR ACTION. THE NATURE OF THE OPERATION, AND THE CARE TAKEN TO AVOID COLLATERAL DAMAGE TO INNOCENT CIVILIANS OR MILITARY CONFRONTATION WITH SYRIAN MILITARY UNITS SHOULD BE STRESSED. IT SHOULD ALSO BE EMPHASIZED THAT THE USG IS PREPARED TO LET THIS MATTER REST HERE. HOWEVER, WE HAVE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF <sup>IR</sup> IRAN ENCOURAGED AND SUPPORTED THE ATTACK ON OUR MARINES, AND WE SUSPECT THAT CERTAIN PEOPLE WITH TIES TO SYRIA WERE INVOLVED. IN THE EVENT OF ANY FUTURE TERRORIST ACTS OF THIS NATURE THE U.S. WILL RESPOND APPROPRIATELY.

5. POSTS SHOULD TAKE INCREASED SECURITY MEASURES AS APPROPRIATE.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F98-018/1 #150~~TOP SECRET~~BY CAS NARA, DATE 10/27/01

(58)



~~TOP SECRET~~

## Message for the UN Secretary General

NIACT IMMEDIATE USUN

FOR THE AMBASSADOR EYES ONLY

1. TOP SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AT APPROXIMATELY \_\_\_\_\_ HOURS GMT NOVEMBER \_\_\_\_\_, U.S.

AIRCRAFT ATTACKED A HEADQUARTERS/TRAINING CAMP COMPLEX IN THE BEKAA VALLEY OF LEBANON BELONGING TO THE GROUP WE KNOW WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OCTOBER 23 ATTACK ON OUR MNF UNIT. THE AIRCRAFT ENCOUNTERED NO OPPOSITION AND ALL WERE RECOVERED SAFELY.

3. YOU SHOULD INFORM THE SECRETARY GENERAL ABOUT THIS OPERATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE DRAWING ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- THE ATTACK AGAINST THE HEADQUARTERS/TRAINING CAMP IN THE BEKAA VALLEY OF THE <sup>Lebanese terrorist group known as the</sup> ~~SO-CALLED~~ "HUSAYNI SUICIDE COMMANDOS" OF THE DISSIDENT ISLAMIC AMAL MOVEMENT (NOT TO BE CONFUSED WITH THE AMAL ORGANIZATION UNDER THE LEBANESE LEADER NABIH BERRI), IS IN RESPONSE TO THE ATTACK ON OUR MARINES IN BEIRUT. IT IS INTENDED TO DETER SUCH ACTIONS BY SIMILAR TERRORIST GROUPS IN THE FUTURE.

-- THIS ACTION WAS TAKEN ONLY AFTER A PAINSTAKING EFFORT TO ENSURE THAT WE HAD CORRECTLY PINPOINTED THOSE IN LEBANON WHO WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE TRUCK BOMBING IN BEIRUT. GREAT CARE WAS TAKEN TO AVOID RISK TO INNOCENT CIVILIANS. WE ALSO MADE A SPECIAL EFFORT TO AVOID ARMED CONFRONTATION WITH SYRIAN MILITARY UNITS.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

F98-018/1 #152

BY

CH

NARA, DATE

10/27/01

~~TOP SECRET~~

(29)



~~TOP SECRET~~

## Message for the UN Secretary General

NIACT IMMEDIATE USUN

FOR THE AMBASSADOR EYES ONLY

1. ~~TOP SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AT APPROXIMATELY \_\_\_\_\_ HOURS GMT NOVEMBER \_\_\_\_\_, U.S.

AIRCRAFT ATTACKED A HEADQUARTERS/TRAINING CAMP COMPLEX IN THE BEKAA VALLEY OF LEBANON BELONGING TO THE GROUP WE KNOW WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OCTOBER 23 ATTACK ON OUR MNF UNIT. THE AIRCRAFT ENCOUNTERED NO OPPOSITION AND ALL WERE RECOVERED SAFELY.

3. YOU SHOULD INFORM THE SECRETARY GENERAL ABOUT THIS OPERATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE DRAWING ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- THE ATTACK AGAINST THE HEADQUARTERS/TRAINING CAMP IN THE BEKAA VALLEY OF THE SO-CALLED "HUSAYNI SUICIDE COMMANDOS" OF THE DISSIDENT ISLAMIC AMAL MOVEMENT (NOT TO BE CONFUSED WITH THE AMAL ORGANIZATION UNDER THE LEBANESE LEADER NABIH BERI I), IS IN RESPONSE TO THE ATTACK ON OUR MARINES IN BEIRUT. IT IS INTENDED TO DETER SUCH ACTIONS BY SIMILAR TERRORIST GROUPS IN THE FUTURE.

-- THIS ACTION WAS TAKEN ONLY AFTER A PAINSTAKING EFFORT TO ENSURE THAT WE HAD CORRECTLY PINPOINTED THOSE IN LEBANON WHO WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE TRUCK BOMBING IN BEIRUT. GREAT CARE WAS TAKEN TO AVOID RISK TO INNOCENT CIVILIANS. WE ALSO MADE A SPECIAL EFFORT TO AVOID ARMED CONFRONTATION WITH SYRIAN MILITARY UNITS.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FG8-018/1, #153BY GH NARA, DATE 10/27/01~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

-- ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS KNOWING SYRIAN AND IRANIAN INVOLVEMENT WITH THE TERRORISTS WHO WERE IMMEDIATELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BOMBING, WE HAVE CONSCIOUSLY REFRAINED FROM ATTACKS AGAINST ANY ELEMENTS OTHER THAN THOSE DIRECTLY AND IMMEDIATELY INVOLVED.

-- WE ARE PREPARED TO LET THIS MATTER REST HERE. BUT WE WILL CONTINUE TO RESPOND APPROPRIATELY TO ANY ATTACKS AGAINST US PERSONNEL IN LEBANON.

-- THE UNITED STATES REMAINS COMMITTED TO REDUCING THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE IN LEBANON AND TO THE SEARCH FOR A LASTING AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE LEBANESE CRISIS, FOUNDED UPON THE PRINCIPLES OF SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, AND THE PROMPT WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. WE CALL ON ALL THE PARTIES INVOLVED TO JOIN WITH US IN THIS EFFORT.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

## MESSAGE TO JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER

TO: TOKYO NIACT IMMEDIATE

FOR THE AMBASSADOR EYES ONLY

1. ~~TOP SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AT APPROXIMATELY \_\_\_\_\_ HOURS GMT NOVEMBER \_\_\_\_\_, U.S.

AIRCRAFT ATTACKED A HEADQUARTERS/TRAINING CAMP COMPLEX IN THE BEKAA VALLEY OF LEBANON BELONGING TO THE GROUP WE NOW KNOW WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OCTOBER 23 ATTACK ON OUR MNF UNIT. THE AIRCRAFT ENCOUNTERED NO OPPOSITION AND ALL WERE RECOVERED SAFELY.

3. THE MESSAGE BEGINNING IN PARA 4 FROM THE SECRETARY FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTER SHOULD BE DELIVERED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. COMPLIMENTARY OPENINGS/CLOSINGS SHOULD BE ADDED BY EMBASSY. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

4. BEGIN TEXT:

I WANTED TO INFORM YOU PERSONALLY ABOUT THE ACTIONS ORDERED BY THE PRESIDENT IN RESPONSE TO THE TERRORIST ATTACK IN BEIRUT IN WHICH MORE THAN 230 AMERICAN SERVICEMEN -- WHOSE SOLE MISSION WAS TO HELP RESTORE PEACE -- WERE MURDERED.

OUR ATTACK AGAINST THE CAMP AND HEADQUARTERS IN LEBANON OF THOSE WHO WERE DIRECTLY AND IMMEDIATELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE TERRORIST ATTACK AGAINST OUR PEOPLE IS DESIGNED TO DETER SUCH ACTS BY SIMILAR GROUPS IN THE FUTURE. OUR ACTION WAS CAREFULLY CIRCUMSCRIBED, AND WAS TAKEN ONLY AFTER A PAINSTAKING EFFORT HAD ASSURED US THAT WE HAD CORRECTLY IDENTIFIED THOSE WHO WERE RESPONSIBLE, AND HAD DESIGNED AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE WHICH WOULD MINIMIZE THE RISK OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS AND AVOID ACTIONS WHICH COULD LEAD TO ESCALATION.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F98-018/1 #154

BY CAJ NARA, DATE 10/27/01~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

NOTHING THAT HAS HAPPENED HAS DIMINISHED OUR EFFORTS TO HELP ACHIEVE PEACE IN A SECURE LEBANON FREE OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES, OR TO BRING LASTING STABILITY TO THAT TROUBLED, BUT STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT, REGION. I KNOW YOU SHARE MY CONVICTION, HOWEVER, THAT THE KIND OF DECISIVE ACTION ORDERED BY THE PRESIDENT OFFERS THE BEST HOPE OF CURBING INTERNATIONAL VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM. END TEXT.

5. ADDITIONAL MATERIAL BEING PROVIDED SEPTTEL FOR USE BY EMBASSY IN BRIEFING GOJ.

~~TOP SECRET~~