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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: NSPG MEETINGS

Withdrawer

RBW 11/4/2008

File Folder NSPG0075 23 OCT 1983

FOIA

M2008-098/11

Box Number 91306

5

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
56611	LIST	OF PARTICIPANTS [PARTIAL] PAR 10/18/2000 NLSF980018/1 #121 PAR UPHELD 9/24/10 M098/11	1	ND	B1 B3
60797	AGENDA	FOR NSPG MEETING R 4/27/2006 NLSF980018/1 #122	2	10/23/1983	B1
34066	MEMO	NORTH/MENGES TO MCFARLANE RE NSPG MEETING PAR 3/17/2008 F07-023 #34066 PAR UPHELD 9/24/2010 DOCUMENT PENDING RE 9/24/2010 CORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233	3	10/23/1983	B1 B3
60798	TIME CHART	RE GRENADA R 10/21/2002 NLSM01-017 #1	10	ND	B1
5. 56613	DRAFT NSDD	D 11/20/2008 M2008-098/11	2	ND	B1
6. 56614	CABLE	222056Z OCT 83 D 11/20/2008 M2008-098/11	3	10/22/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING

Date:
10/23/83

Situation Room
4:00pm

Subject:
Lebanon/Grenada

Participants:

The President
The Vice President
Admiral Daniel Murphy

State:

Secretary George P. Shultz
Dep Sec Kenneth W. Dam
Asst Sec Langhorne Motley
Mr. Richard Murphy
Under Sec Lawrence Eagleburger
Defense:

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger
Dr. Fred C. Ikle

CIA:

Dep Director John McMahon

Mr. Duanne Clarridge

OMB:

Dr. Alton Keel

JCS:

General John W. Vessey, Jr.
Admiral Arthur S. Moreau
General Paul Kelley

White House:

Mr. Edwin Meese, III
Mr. James A. Baker, III
Mr. Michael K. Deaver
Amb Robert C. McFarlane
Adm John M. Poindexter

NSC:

Mr. Geoffrey T.H. Kemp
Cmdr Philip Dur
Mjr Oliver North
Mr. Constantine Menges

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F98-01811 #121

By C/S, NARA, Date 10/18/00

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~~SENSITIVE~~ **CHRON FILE**

AGENDA

NSPG - LEBANON

Sunday, October 23, 1983
4:00 PM

I. INTELLIGENCE UPDATE: ISSUES BEARING ON DECISIONS
TO RETALIATE

- A. Review and assessment of evidence which..... John McMahon
implicates external elements in attacks
on U.S. and French MNF
- B. Review of intelligence collected..... John McMahon
before bombing incidents
- C. Information regarding location and..... John McMahon
vulnerability of factions implicated
in planning and execution of Beirut attacks
- D. Decisions regarding retaliation
 - 1. Pros and cons of undertaking counter-..... Secretary Shultz/
action Secretary Weinberger
 - 2. Need for additional intelligence Robert McFarlane
 - 3. Planning for retaliatory measures..... Robert McFarlane

II. DRAFT STATEMENT TO MEDIA TO BE ISSUED FOLLOWING.... George Shultz
MEETING

III. COMPOSITION OF MISSION TO BEIRUT..... Secretary
Weinberger

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NLS F98-018/1#122
BY LOT NARA, DATE 4/27/06

IV. MEASURES TO REDUCE VULNERABILITY AND EXPOSURE OF USMNF

- A. Need for prior consultations with other MNF..... Secretary Shultz
contributors
- B. Increased security cooperation with GOL and..... Secretary Weinberger/
and Lebanese factions capable of helping with GEN Vessey
security
- C. Options to reduce vulnerability Secretary Weinberger/
GEN Vessey

V. STATUS OF INTERAGENCY REVIEW OF U.S. POLICY..... Secretary Shultz
TOWARDS IRAN/IRAQ

- A. Expanded coordination with France

VI. PUBLIC AFFAIRS -- MONDAY EVENTS Jim Baker

VII. CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP MEETING..... Jim Baker

VIII. CONCLUSION..... Robert McFarlane

Draft Statement to be Issued after 4:00p.m.

The President met today for nearly three hours with his senior advisers to consider the United States response to the deliberate and heinous acts of terrorism today in Beirut against American and French forces. These acts are clearly designed to weaken our determination and to disrupt the efforts of the Government of Lebanon to regain control and sovereignty over the country. The President has communicated with our MNF partners and the Government of Lebanon. He has stressed that we remain determined to pursue our stated objectives in Lebanon which are to ensure that Lebanon can be restored as an independent and sovereign nation free of all foreign forces and free to reconstitute a national consensus. Those who perpetrated this crime will not succeed in their campaign of intimidation against the Lebanese. We and the Government of Lebanon remain committed to the process of national reconciliation and an accommodation of the legitimate interests of all the Lebanese people. This process has the highest priority. The world should understand that we will not be deterred from our pursuit of these goals by today's brutality.

The President, to prevent future acts of terrorism and reduce our vulnerability, has directed that an immediate review be undertaken of ways to provide better protection for the Marines contingents and other MNF in Lebanon, and to respond to this criminal act when the perpetrators are identified. Planning is still in progress and the President will consult closely with National Security Council, the Lebanese Government and our MNF Allies. Our actions will be resolute and consistent with stated policies and objectives.

WHITE HOUSE

The President met today with his senior advisors to consider the United States response to this morning's vicious attack on both the Marines and the French soldiers. One thing is clear: those who sponsor these outrages believe that they can intimidate the government of Lebanon, its people, and their friends in the international community. They are wrong. The United States will not be ~~discouraged~~ ^{INT. MEDIATED} from a course which is both just and consistent with our national interest of peace and stability in Lebanon and throughout the Middle East. We are confident that Lebanon's other friends will also stand beside the brave people of Lebanon and the government which is seeking to establish its sovereignty and independence free of external control.

We will spare no effort to reduce the vulnerability of our troops along with those of France, Italy, and Great Britain. But our support for the objectives they are there to serve is not weakened. Our commitment to the search for national unity and stability in Lebanon is not lessened. We have encouraged

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President Gemayel to persevere in his courageous decision to broaden the political base and composition of his government, and we will assure that he can do so without surrendering to those who reject political solutions and seek to impose their will by violent means.

Drafted: LWG:DLMack

10/23/83

Cleared: Ambassador Habib

NEA:RHPelletreau

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SYSTEM II

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MEMORANDUM

CHRON FILE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

RCM HAS SEEN

October 23, 1983

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ACTION


MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: OLIVER NORTH
CONSTANTINE MENGES *con*

SUBJECT: Grenada Input for NSPG

The State Department memo at Tab A forwards a time-phased implementation plan for operations to secure Grenada. This reflects the input from yesterday's SSG and today's briefings for Ambassador McNeil. At the 12:00 restricted IG, modifications were to accommodate all concerned.

At this point, Ambassador Frank McNeil and Marine Major General George Crist are enroute to Barbados to work with the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) on contingency planning. McNeil will tell their representatives that we are in Bridgetown to discuss their proposal. Crist will develop plans for their forces as though we had not yet made up our mind to go. McNeil will return here tomorrow evening (Monday) with Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica, who is the President of the OECS.



FOIA(b) (1)
FOIA(b) (5)

The JCS have completed military planning for the operation. The plan involves the use of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) assets which will be inserted by para-drop and/or helicopter between 0200 and 0300 in the morning. Marine amphibious and heloborne forces from the amphibious task force will be inserted immediately thereafter.

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NLS F07-023#34066
By LOJ, NARA, Date 3/17/08

The mission for the JSOC element is to secure the Governor General, prisons and air fields. The Marines will replace them on site prior to first-light. JSOC personnel will be clandestinely removed, hopefully before attention can be brought to their presence. As indicated on page 5 of the time-line at Tab A, plans are to have the first element of allied forces on the ground by first-light (approximately 1 1/2 - 2 hours after the Marines land).

The implementation plan also provides a step-by-step guide to the other political, diplomatic, legislative and public affairs matters which must be accomplished. You will note that there are several which call for direct Presidential involvement as follows:

Monday 5:00 p.m. -- President meets with Ambassador McNeil. - TENTATIVE - MAY NOT BRING BACK.

CABLES Late p.m. -- Presidential call to Prime Minister Thatcher to inform of our decision to take action.

3:00 PM *6:00 PM FINAL CHECK*

10:00 p.m. -- President consults with 4 Congressional leaders and offers full briefing at 8:00 a.m., Tuesday.

Tuesday 7:30 a.m. -- Presidential bilateral with Mrs. Charles.

8:00 a.m. -- President meets with Congressional leadership.

9:00 a.m. -- President and Mrs. Charles, joint public statement. President reassures American public; Mrs. Charles cites reason for OECS request, and expresses gratitude for U.S. action to support democracy and protect lives.

10:00 a.m. -- President briefs Cabinet

Late p.m. -- Presidential statement in press room after situation is pacified?

At the NSPG, we should also seek to point out that last night's events in Lebanon increase the need to take action. Not only has last night's tragic event eased our OPSEC problem, it has made the second two objectives of the NSDD (Tab B) more meaningful. We ought not to shirk from these in public statements after the operation has commenced.

State Department should also address the corollary issue of what we do now in Suriname. As the cable at Tab C indicates, there is a strong possibility that the assassination of Bishop and our subsequent response could totally change the picture in Paramaribo.

Regarding the issue of how long our forces will be on the ground, we should probably anticipate that it will take more than a week, but less than sixty days.

We should ensure that the following items are provided for clearance as soon as possible:

- Presidential address for Tuesday morning.
- War Powers Report.
- OAS resolution and UN language.
- Draft cables to NATO and other allies.
- Draft language for use with Soviets and Cubans in Moscow, Havana and here in Washington (we should not use the MOLINK for this communication).
- Legislative and public affairs guidance.

-- *Finding*

RECOMMENDATION

That you use the points above during this afternoon's NSPG.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab A - Time-line/Schedule
- Tab B - NSDD
- Tab C - Parimaribo 2413 Cable

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

CHRON FILE

GRENADA

NOT TO BE SEEN

- I. INTRODUCTION..... Robert McFarlane
- II. INTELLIGENCE UPDATE..... John McMahon
- III. DIPLOMATIC UPDATE..... Secretary Shultz
- IV. MILITARY UPDATE..... Secretary Weinberger/
GEN Vessey
- V. PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND CONGRESSIONAL STRATEGY.. James Baker
- VI. CONCLUSION..... Robert McFarlane

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MTH NARA, Date 8/30/96



A

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 22, 1983

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(WITH ~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT)

MEMORANDUM TO MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Grenada SSG

Please distribute attached time chart to appropriate members of the Grenada SSG for review on October 23.

CHM for
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By WJH NARA, Date 8/30/95

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DECL:OADR

~~SECRET~~

D MINUS TWO

POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC

0800

Special Emissaries briefed at State Department.

0930

Special Emissaries leave State for Andrews AFB.

1030

Depart Andrews AFB.

1655

Arrive Bridgetown.

1730 - 2200

1. Special Emissaries consult with Caribbean leaders in Bridgetown.
2. Discuss plans for formation of provisional government, timetable for conducting elections, integration of Grenada into CBI. Insure OECS call for OAS meeting. Schedule OECS planning group meeting for 1400 on D MINUS ONE.

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NLS M01-017 #1
BY LOI NARA, DATE 10/21/02

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D MINUS ONE

POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC

0900

Special Emissary Departs Bridgetown for Washington.

1000

Alert Ambassadors Kirkpatrick and Middendorf

1200

OECS call for meetings of OAS Perm Council to convene on Wednesday, a meeting of consultation of Foreign Minister to discuss situation on Grenada.

1400

Planning conference of OECS forces in Bridgetown

1500

Eagleburger calls in UK Ambassador and provides him signed letter from President to PM Thatcher stating our concern for safety of foreigners, concerns of Caribbean leader for threat from military regime on Grenada, formation of government, US interest to cooperate with provisional government and Caribbean leaders to restore democracy in Grenada. President will inform Ms. Thatcher when there is final decision. Cable text to London.

1540

Special Emissary arrives Andrews AFB.

1625

Special Emissary arrives State Department.

1700

Special Emissary reports to President.

2000

Special Emissary departs Andrews AFB for Bridgetown.

~~SECRET~~

D MINUS ONE (CONTINUED)

MILITARY

0900 - 2400

1. Preposition OECS troops
2. Planning continues
3. Forces Move as Necessary

2000 *1800*

1. Inform OECS of U.S. decision to assist
1. RN/USN naval coordination as appropriate

PUBLIC AFFAIRS/CONGRESSIONAL

1200

Spokesman
Spokesman announces that President has sent special envoy to meet with Caribbean leaders to consult about mutual concern over events in Grenada.

2000 - 2200

President consults with 4 Congressional leaders, offers to provide full briefing at 9 A.M.

*1800 - Tell OECS its go.
2nd cable to Thatcher*

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~~SECRET~~

D-DAY

06:00-8:00

MILITARY

1. US Forces land:
 - move to secure - Governor General, jails, radio station
 - protect Amcits, UK, Canadian nationals
2. Send aircraft to Barbados to move Caribbean force

POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC

1. Special Emissary in Rep Bridgetown calls Caribbean leaders and representatives in for emergency meeting.
2. US informs USSR (hotline?/in Moscow) of landing in Grenada and offers to assure welfare of Soviet personnel in St. George
3. Advise Cuba of US effort to ensure Amcit safety; warn against interference; advise that Cuban nationals may leave on neutral civilian ships
4. Inform UNSYG and UNSC President of operation with Caribbean forces to return order to Grenada and ensure Amcit safety; intention to discuss in OAS
5. Deliver messages to NATO, ANZUS, Japan, ROK, PRC(?), Latin American nations
6. Deliver specially tailored messages to Belize, Brazil, Venezuela, Mexico, OAS, Canada and France
7. Send message to all other posts
8. Secretary of State returns to Washington
9. State Mission leaves for Bridgetown
10. Brief selected ambassadors in Wahington (UK, Canada, France and other OECD, CARICOM). Call in head of OAS

PUBLIC AFFAIRS/CONGRESSIONAL

1. Pass to VOA/BBC information for broadcast to Grenada to calm populace
2. Follow-up meeting on media to schedule backgrounders, TV appearances, etc.

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D-DAY

8:00-10:00

MILITARY

1. Send first planning group of Caribbean forces, augmented by Barbados Defense Forces, to Grenada as soon as feasible
2. Begin assembling remainder of Caribbean forces in Bridgetown

POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC

1. Insure alternative democratic leadership is prepared to move to Grenada
2. Arrange for evacuation of Amcits and UKcits who desire to leave
1. Special Emissary meets with Caribbean leaders and representatives in Bridgetown to explain undertaking; request statements of support and participation; suggest call for OAS meeting; suggest approach to OAS members, Socialist International, Christian Democratic Union

PUBLIC AFFAIRS/CONGRESSIONAL

1. Codngressional leadership meeting
2. Presidential statement
3. Begin calling parents to inform them intention to to guarantee Amcit security
4. Request meeting with Congressional Committees and Black Caucus
5. Brief former Presidents, Secretaries of State (Kissinger), labor leaders, etc.

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10:00-12:00

MILITARY

1. US aircraft continue moving Caribbean forces
2. Caribbean forces assemble in Bridgetown
3. DOD/State team begin meeting on costing arrangements

POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC

1. Democratic leadership formally request OECS assistance in restoring order
2. Governor General issues call on OECS, HMG to assist in restoring peace
3. Augmentation group arrives in Bridgetown
4. Brief Cabinet
5. Caribbean nations continue to press for emergency meeting of OAS for Wednesday; begin lobbying OAS members
6. Caribbean nations approach Socialist International, Christian Democratic Union for support
7. U.S. consults with British and French on Caribbean nations request for assistance
8. AID/State establish assistance task force to determine Grenada recovery needs
9. Deliver messages to various governments (see D-1, 1800)

PUBLIC AFFAIRS/CONGRESSIONAL

1. Begin Congressional briefings of interested members, Black Caucus
2. State and Defense press spokesman Q's & A's
3. State backgrounder

D-DAY

12:00-14:00

MILITARY

1. Remainder of Caribbean forces arrive in Grenada

POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC

1. Provisional government arrives in St. George
2. State Mission arrives in Bridgetown

PUBLIC AFFAIRS/CONGRESSIONAL

1. Send report to Congress describing necessity, legal authority and estimated scope and duration of our intervention (War Powers, section 4(a)).

~~SECRET~~

D-DAY

14:00-16:00

POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC

1. Governor General announces formation of a provisional government consisting of Democratic leaders; pledges restoration of democracy via free elections within 90 days; dissolves PRA and requests continued U.S. and Caribbean force presence
2. Democratic leaders declare formation of a new government; promise to hold free elections within 90 days; endorse OAS proposal

PUBLIC AFFAIRS/CONGRESSIONAL

1. Inform press they will probably be allowed into Grenada on Wednesday if conditions are assured

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~~SECRET~~

D-DAY

16:00-18:00

DIPLOMATIC

1. Diplomatic relations re-established by Caribbean states
2. US upgrades diplomatic relations and announces plans to open Embassy.
3. Encourage selective governments to support new regime

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D PLUS ONE

MILITARY

1. US/Caribbean force moves to expand area under its control
2. Free all political prisoners.

POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC

1. Update all posts on situation
2. Special Emissary Augmentation group depart for Grenada; upon arrival decalares mission open
3. Coordinate diplomatic efforts with Caribbean partners, Barbados and Jamaica, in OAS meeting
4. Consolidate government procedures
5. Permanent council of OAS convenes a meeting of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs to consider this urgent problem and authorize collective members for the maintenance of international peace and security. (OAS charter, Article 59, 60).

PUBLIC AFFAIRS/CONGRESSIONAL

1. Possible Secretary of State press conference
2. Brief Congress on status of situation on Grenada

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