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Americans have just been treated to yet one more example of how this Administration resembles the Tower of Babel. Unfortunately the resulting fog and confusion this time serves to cloud the facts of the most critical issue facing the nation - our national security in a very dangerous world.

In what many military experts think is the best example of wishful thinking this year, President Carter assured a Tennessee audience this week that the United States has "clear naval and air superiority in the whole region" referring to the Persian Gulf. This claim goes hand in hand with V.P. Mondale's assertion last month that "Militarily... we're the strongest nation on earth."

Unfortunately someone has forgotten to tell Secretary of State Muskie about this significant military development. Muskie told a Notre Dame audience today that the U.S. must not pretend that it can capture military superiority. The VEEP said, "Such superiority may sound grand in speeches. But the Soviets will no more allow us to gain such a position than we will allow it to them. A search for superiority would simply create a massive, dangerous new arms race." Won't Muskie be surprised to know we have done the impossible!

Defense Secretary Brown on the other hand apparently did get this great news. The only problem in his case is that Defense Department studies fail to show this new American superiority, which like the "stealth" aircraft is apparently invisible.

In recent weeks Brown would have seen reports showing six out of ten Army divisions in the U.S. are not combat ready, half of the country's first-line warplanes cannot fly, and only 6 out of 13 U.S. aircraft carriers are combat ready. For good measure he would have learned today in the Washington Post that the navy has fewer nuclear submarines at sea than at any time since 1967.

What is a defense secretary to do when the figures don't match the Presidential Rhetoric? The answer is simple. Brown fudges them! A memo from Maj. General James H. Johnson, a senior operations officer on the Pentagon's top military staff disclosed that Brown has decided not to send to Congress a periodic report on the combat readiness of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines. Instead the report will be redone to stress what Brown calls "the positive factors of our readiness" rather than any shortcomings that might be politically untimely.

Let's review this for a moment:

1. Carter says we are superior.
2. Muskie says if Reagan tries to make us superior, he will spend the nation's wealth.
3. Brown says the figures don't show us superior - so let's change them.

These muddled views would be nothing more than another humorous example of the confusion which reigns supreme in the Carter Administration if it wasn't for one simple fact: they touch on the most critical issues facing this nation.

The Carter Administration knows how to read. They have seen the polls that show the American people want military superiority in order to preserve our margin of error and keep us out of war. What the Administration doesn't realize is that you can't get superiority by wishing for it or by "Jimmying" the figures to show false improvements.

President Carter recognized the unfortunate facts nearly a year ago when the election was still too far away to impact his rhetoric. After grandly announcing in his "State of the Union Address" that we would defend the Gulf against any threat, Carter told news editors, "I don't think it would be accurate for me to claim that at this time or in the future we expect to have enough military strength and enough military presence there to defend the region unilaterally." Sad but true.

Reagan & Bush

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NEWS RELEASE

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:

Friday, October 10, 1980

CONTACT: Lyn Nofziger or
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STATEMENT BY RICHARD V. ALLEN
CHIEF FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR TO GOVERNOR REAGAN

The American Broadcasting Company (ABC) news department and the Associated Press (AP) wire service have both reported that Secretary of Defense Harold Brown has ordered military staff officers to "emphasize the positive rather than the negative" in U.S. military assessments of unit readiness.

Secretary Brown also decided to withhold from Congress a periodic report on the readiness of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Marines.

These moves reportedly were disclosed in an internal memorandum from Major General James H. Johnson, Vice Director of the Joint Military Staff for Operations.

Secretary Brown's demands are consistent with the Carter Administration's decision to "jimmy" the numbers in the most recent Producer Price Index to hide the truth from the American people by making it appear that the economy is not as bad as it really is.

Before that, the Administration sought to divert attention from the worsening Carter defense record by leaking military secrets to the press about the development of the Stealth aircraft. Secretary Brown was directly involved in that sad episode, and for the very same purpose -- to make it appear that the administration's record is not as disastrous as it really is.

And now this latest secret memo demanding that only "Good News" be permitted to flow to the public regarding the state of our military preparedness. Besides the clear political implications of his directive, it also suggests an effort to try to lull the people into a sense of false security--at a time when the facts cry out for attention.

I cannot overemphasize the gravity of such a radical departure from standards of integrity and professionalism always upheld by the American military in reporting on readiness. Secretary Brown's demands for what amounts to "Good News" about our state of preparedness is nothing less than the injection of partisan political propaganda into what hitherto had been considered statements based on professional analysis. It is a dangerous attempt to delude Americans into thinking we can preserve world peace, when in reality, we may not be able to. I can think of few more irresponsible actions than ignoring genuine weaknesses in our margin of safety purely for the sake of winning a few votes.

Professional military men and women should not be ordered to accentuate the positive or the negative. They should be expected to do what they have always done--tell the truth to the Congress and to the American people. Yet, now, this administration apparently wants to hide the truth.

For the first time in American history there is apparently an attempt to enlist the American military on one side of a partisan political battle. I cannot think of any move more conducive to the continuing erosion of professional standards and morale at every level of our military forces.

What is perhaps even more disturbing is that a presidential appointee should order military staff officers to withhold from the Congress a report on military preparedness until a "positive" note is found.

Thus, we are faced with what amounts to a combination of an attempt to propagandize the people and to mislead the peoples' elected representatives.

Yesterday, Secretary Brown gave us a glimpse of what the administration believes is "positive" reporting in our state of preparedness. His speech was chilling in its implications for the future of balanced and reliable reporting on our state of readiness. In effect, Secretary Brown performed an instant re-write of recent history.

He said, among other things:

"...our intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and strategic bombers are fully combat ready."

But he has already admitted publicly that our land-based ICBM force cannot survive a nuclear attack. How the land-based ICBM's can be "combat ready" and vulnerable to a first strike at the same time was not explained by Secretary Brown, perhaps because that contradiction does not fit into the "Good News" concept.

Secretary Brown said we should include the strength of our NATO forces in any assessment of our overall strength. This is true. But at the same time we should realize that the forces of the Warsaw Pact nations are also

strong and growing stronger. Secretary Brown discusses this strength by saying that these forces are not "reliable."

American soldiers will take small comfort from Mr. Brown's undocumented reassurance of the reliability of forces which outnumber us, which are equipped and trained to fight and which do not confuse cheer-leading with true readiness.

No matter how many attempts to accentuate the positive are made, cold, hard, unhappy facts remain:

--Six out of ten Army divisions in the U.S. are not combat ready.

--Two of the three divisions committed to the Army's rapid deployment force are among those not combat ready.

--Only six of thirteen U.S. aircraft carriers are combat ready.

--Half of the country's first-line warplanes cannot fly.

--The Commander in Chief of SAC says the U.S. does not have the forces necessary to support the Administration's new targeting strategy, and he (Gen. Ellis) has told Congress that where we had a three-to-one advantage in relative forces measures in 1976, today "no U.S. edge exists in any of these same measures."

--During the past 13 years, the Soviet Union has increased its strategic forces by around 1,000 ICBMs, by more than 60 nuclear ballistic missile subs, and is in the process of completing over 300 Backfire supersonic bombers. The U.S. in that same period has added not one new ICBM launcher, not one missile sub, and not one strategic bomber.

--President Carter, on January 29, 1980, admitted: "I don't think it would be accurate for me to claim that at this time or in the future we expect to have enough military strength and enough military presence there (the Persian Gulf region) to defend the region unilaterally."

Secretary Brown explained this lack-of-readiness problem away by using the following example: "A tank," he said, "may be declared not 'operationally ready' if it needs certain maintenance. But, in many cases,

that same tank, in the same condition, would be usable—and would be used-- if we were suddenly at war."

In other words, in Mr. Brown's most startling admission, this administration's defense policy is explicitly based on using military equipment which is not properly maintained. This is a tragic policy. I would remind him that the earlier rescue attempt in Iran failed largely because our helicopters were not properly maintained, and eight U.S. servicemen lost their lives.

Our defensive capability has sunk so low under the Carter administration's neglect, that we now must resort to a patchquilt defense which would greatly increase the danger to the lives of American fighting personnel and substantially reduce our chances of success. Mr. Brown's rationalization that the Soviets have problems too is hardly reassuring. If our only chance for preserving the peace depends on possible weaknesses in the Soviet military establishment, then the threat to peace is great indeed.

Secretary Brown should realize he is head of the Department of Defense and not the Minister of Wishful Thinking.

DRAFT (WFG)

October 10, 1980

Statement

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What is perhaps even more disturbing is that a presidential appointee should order military staff officers to withhold from the Congress a report on military preparedness until a "positive" note is found.

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Yesterday, Secretary Brown gave us a glimpse of what the administration believes is "positive" reporting in our state of preparedness. His speech was chilling in its implications for the future of balanced and reliable reporting on our state of readiness. In effect, Secretary Brown performed an instant re-write of recent history.

He said that "many of the allegations of U.S. weakness in the area of readiness are misleading". This, of course, suggests that if "many" of these charges are misleading some are not—but Secretary Brown did not tell us which reports of lack of readiness are accurate.

Instead he said, among other things:

"...our intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and strategic bombers are fully combat ready."

But he has already admitted publicly that our land-based ICBM force cannot survive a nuclear attack. How the land-based ICBM's can be "combat ready" and vulnerable to a first strike at the same time was not explained by Secretary Brown, perhaps because that contradiction does not fit into the "happy news" concept.

Secretary Brown said we should include the strength of our NATO forces in any assessment of our overall strength. This is true. But at the same time we should realize that the forces of the Warsaw Pact nations are also strong. Secretary Brown discusses this strength by saying that these forces are not "reliable".

American soldiers will take small comfort from Mr. Brown's undocumented reassurance of the reliability of forces which outnumber us, which are equipped and trained to fight and which do not confuse cheer-leading with true readiness.

No matter how many attempts to accentuate the positive are made, cold, hard, unhappy facts remain:

--Six out of 10 Army divisions in the U.S. are not combat ready.

--Two of the three divisions committed to the Army's rapid deployment force are among those not combat ready.

--One out of 13 U.S. aircraft carriers are combat ready.

--Half of the country's first-line warplanes cannot fly.

--The Commander in Chief of SAC says the U.S. does not have the forces necessary to support the Administration's new targeting strategy, and he (Gen. Ellis) has told Congress that where we had a three-to-one advantage in relative forces measures in 1976, today "no U.S. edge exists in any of these same measures."

--During the past 13 years, the Soviet Union has increased its strategic forces by around 1,000 ICBMs, by more than 60 nuclear ballistic missile subs, and is in the process of completing some 300 Backfire supersonic bombers. The U.S. in that same period has added not one new ICBM launcher, not one additional missile sub, and not one strategic bomber.

--President Carter, on January 29, 1980, admitted: "I don't think it would be accurate for me to claim that at this time or in the future we expect to have enough military strength and enough military presence there (the Persian Gulf region) to defend the region unilaterally."

Secretary Brown should realize he is head of the Department of Defense and not the Minister for Wishful Thinking.

Two of the three divisions committed to the Army's rapid deployment force are among those not combat ready.

Facts:

- ④ --Six out of 10 Army divisions in the U. S. are not combat ready.
- ④ --~~16~~ out of 13 U. S. aircraft carriers are ~~not~~ combat ready
- Half of the country's first-line warplanes cannot fly.
- Secretary Brown has admitted publically that the force upon which our nuclear strategy depends -- our ICBM force-- cannot survive a nuclear attack ("...We must assume that the ICBM leg of our triad could be destroyed within a very short time as one result of a Soviet surprise attack.")
- The Commander in Chief of SAC says the U. S. does not have the forces necessary to support the Administration's new targeting strategy, and he (Gen. Ellis) has told Congress that where we had a three-to-one advantage in relative forces measures in 1976, today "no U. S. edge exists in any of these same measures."
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④ We are appaled by this attmet to re-write ~~history~~ before the facts to suit some preconceived notion of "positive" slanting. In effcte, this attmet o have "happy news" is in and of itslef a contributing factor to the contuning deterioration of militray standrds that has cahieved suh rapidty under the presnet amdndntion.

Blatn EMPHASIZE THE POSITIVE

PH-READINESS:500

DEFENSE SECRETARY BROWN: EMPHASIZE THE POSITIVE

BY FRED S. HOFFMAN

AP MILITARY WRITER

WASHINGTON (AP) - Defense Secretary Harold Brown, apparently sensitive to Republican allegations of U.S. military weakness, has ordered military staff officers to emphasize the positive rather than the negative in their assessments of unit readiness.

At the same time, Brown has decided to withhold from Congress a periodic report on the readiness of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps, presumably until the reporting stress can be changed to meet his new requirements.

Brown's moves were disclosed in an internal memorandum from Maj. Gen. James H. Johnson, vice director of the Joint Military Staff for Operations. A copy of the memorandum was obtained by the Associated Press.

In that brief memo to staff officers, Johnson said Brown "has expressed concern that our current readiness report formats only emphasize the negative aspects of our military readiness."

Johnson said that the defense secretary "has asked that we re-examine our readiness reporting system to develop a report format which places greater emphasis on the positive factors of our readiness."

The memo was dated Sept. 23, following a series of published reports which said that many Army divisions, Navy aircraft carriers and Air Force squadrons were not ready for combat. Those published reports were based on unit ratings made within the armed services.

In a speech in El Paso, Texas, Thursday, Brown called those published reports "extremely misleading" and said they were based on either misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the military "C-rating" system.

Brown insisted that "our forces are ready to go to war, if need be."

The defense secretary described the C-rating system as "a percentage planning and management tool designed to identify problem areas" and said that "we have made the standards tougher" over the past four years of the Carter administration.

One cornerstone of Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan's campaign strategy to beat President Carter is Reagan's contention that the Carter administration has permitted the United States to become militarily weak.

The theme of Brown's speech, in line with his new directive on readiness reporting, was to emphasize the positive. He recited a litany of improvements he said the Carter administration has made in the basic military force structure, modernization of equipment, the

ONE MUST LOOK NOT ONLY AT READINESS BUT AT TOTAL MILITARY CAPABILITY," BROWN SAID, CLAIMING THAT "CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS" HAS BEEN MADE IN ALL ASPECTS.

INTERVIEWED ABOUT THE CONTENTS OF HIS MEMORANDUM, GEN. JOHNSON SAID HE EXPECTS NO MAJOR CHANGES IN THE RATING SYSTEM.

HOWEVER, JOHNSON SAID, THE OBJECTIVE WILL BE TO SEE THAT "THE PLUSES GET EQUAL ATTENTION WITH THE MINUSES" IN READINESS REPORTS.

IN THE PAST, JOHNSON SAID, "IT WAS JUST THE MINUSES THAT WE FOCUSED ON."

AP-NY-10-10 0125EDT

VULNERABILITIES OF CARTER'S DEFENSE RECORD

- Cut \$38 billion in three years from President Ford's projected defense budget.
- Delayed the MX missile by at least three years.
- Shut down our Minuteman III ICBM production line.
- Cancelled the B-1 bomber.
- Slowed down the Trident submarine and the Trident II ballistic missile programs.
- Slowed down all three cruise missile programs (air-, ground-, and sea-launched cruise missiles).
- Deferred any decision on enhanced radiation weapons (neutron bomb).
- Cut naval ship-building programs in half.
- Vetoed a nuclear aircraft carrier.
- Allowed our armed forces to fall far below their recruitment goals and our military reserves to fall 20 percent below necessary war-time preparedness levels.
- Cancelled a fleet of Advanced Tanker Cargo Aircraft.
- Jeopardized alliance cohesion and credibility with his vacillating policy stands and his failure to meet commitments or to consult in a timely and meaningful manner.
- Promised to adhere to the terms of an unratified and inequitable strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT II).
- Asked for a 5.4% real increase in defense spending when he had turned it down four months previously in favor of a 3% increase.
- Called for an increase in military compensation (3/80), signed a bill calling for a modest increase in compensation, when he had lobbied against any increases two months previously (5/80).

SOURCE: The Carter Record, published by the RNC

Excerpts From Secretary Brown's Address

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 9 — Following are excerpts from an address today by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to the El Paso, Tex., Chamber of Commerce:

Many of the allegations of U.S. weakness in the area of readiness are misleading. They describe readiness in terms of some ideal standard, as if we were to be faced with the prospect of fighting pieces of paper. They tend to ignore the shortcomings of our potential adversaries, making it seem as if readiness posed no problem for them. Obscuring the differences between peacetime and wartime, many of these press reports misunderstand or misinterpret the "readiness" ratings, which are actually status reports.

Let me note first of all that our deployed strategic forces may have to be able to respond in minutes to a surprise nuclear attack. And even by this demanding standard, our intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and strategic bombers are fully combat ready.

As for our conventional forces, much has been made of the current readiness ratings of our armed forces — especially our divisions based in the United States. But let's look at the problems of our potential adversaries. Critics fail to point out that roughly two-thirds of all the divisions of the Soviet Army would be rated, by these same standards, as being in our lowest readiness category — C-4, "not combat ready." That does not mean that those divisions are useless; it merely means that it would take the Soviets some time to get them ready for war. Some of our divisions (but not two-thirds) would also take as much time to make ready for war. But that doesn't mean they are useless either. Those who think it does had better discount the bulk of the Soviet Army.

Other Factors Cited

There are other factors that, while not overestimating them, we should not ignore either. There is a tendency to compare Soviet and U.S. forces alone. But in practically all contingencies — and especially in Europe — there would be allies on both sides. The NATO allies are all voluntary members of the coalition. The European members of the alliance contribute 60 percent of NATO's tactical aircraft, 75 percent of its tanks and 80 percent of its manpower. In a war, they would be fighting to defend their own freedom against invaders from the East. But the Soviet Union's Warsaw Pact allies are captives of their coalition. They would be fighting not to defend their freedom, but to further the conquests of their oppressor. No one can say what their reliability might be under such circumstances.

There is also a tendency to compare NATO and Pact forces in terms of static measures, like number of tanks. But this kind of shorthand obscures other important differences between them.

To name only two, NATO designs its forces to repel, not to launch, a tank invasion. And its ground forces are designed and deployed to take advantage of the classic principle that the attacker needs at least a substantial numerical edge to overcome the natural advantages of prepared, but mobile, defense.

Recently it has been alleged that many of our Army divisions, Navy ships and Air Force squadrons are not ready for combat. These reports, which are based on references to the military "C-rating" system, are extremely misleading.

The C-rating system is best understood as a peacetime planning and management tool designed to identify problem areas, particularly resource deficiencies. It is a systematic way to tell unit commanders and their superiors that a certain number of our sailors are assigned to shore billets in peacetime.

These periodic shipyard overhauls and other scheduled maintenance are

what enables us to get 30 full years of use out of each carrier. A few of our carriers are being given a much more radical and time-consuming overhaul — under a service life extension program — so as to extend their useful life to 45 years — a considerable return on our investment.

There have also been a number of reports charging that less than 50 percent of our tactical jet fighters are fully "mission capable." The implication is that these aircraft would perform poorly during wartime.

The 50 percent figure is based on the peacetime mission-capable rates, which are a poor indicator of wartime capability. Combat deployment involves what must be done to a unit so that it has all of the personnel, equipment and training it should, before it actually enters combat.

During the past four years, the C-rating system has undergone a number of changes, and we have made the standards tougher. So, one cannot di-

rectly compare a rating today with one of some years ago — a point that some reports have not made clear.

A recent report alleging that, on the basis of the C-rating system, "only" six of the Navy's 13 aircraft carriers were combat ready is also misleading. The unstated implication was that more — even all — of the carriers should have a combat-ready C-rating. This, however, is an impossible standard, because no one has yet designed an aircraft carrier — or any other ship, for that matter — that never needs maintenance or a crew that never needs leave or additional training. It is no surprise — and should be no cause for alarm — that, at any given time, a certain number of our vessels undergo substantial changes to normal operations — for example, peacetime flying training ceases while aircraft repair and combat preparation receive top priority.

It should be recognized, as a general point, that in time of national crisis we will be able to — and we will — apply

resources to correct deficiencies and rapidly upgrade the readiness status.

We do have to make readiness improvements, and the C-rating system helps us to identify and alleviate the problems. For example, the Army recently announced that it is reallocating several thousand seasoned noncommissioned officers from over-strength units abroad to stateside units. The C-ratings will help tell us which units here have the greatest need for NCO's. That is what a management tool is supposed to do.

In part, the ratings have been misunderstood because, while they are a peacetime management device to identify problem areas, they are not exactly applicable in a wartime setting. A tank, for example, may be declared not "operationally ready" if it needs certain maintenance. But, in many cases, that same tank, in the same condition, would be usable — and would be used — if we were suddenly at war.

The major readiness problem we now have is a shortage of experienced military personnel. Much of this shortage is due to a history over most of the 1970's of inadequate pay for our men and women in uniform. This is not a new problem; we have not just recently run short of senior enlisted personnel. Today's Navy petty officer shortage — about 20,000 — is approximately the same size as it was in 1976. The number of Army NCO's in grades E-5 through E-9 has actually increased by 16,000 in the past four years, while the total number of soldiers in the Army has remained constant.

Too Many Are Leaving

But there is no doubt that too many of our senior enlisted men and women have been and even today are leaving the service. Pay is the most important factor. When the All Volunteer Force was introduced in the early 1970's, one of its premises was that military pay would be linked to non-Federal civilian pay, in order to make the military service financially competitive and thus more attractive as a career. Initially, military pay was raised to accomplish this. But, since 1974, military pay has fallen farther and farther behind civilian pay — in terms of real purchasing power. So, today's NCO's are making career decisions in the light of several years' experience of losing real purchasing power, especially compared with their counterparts in the civilian sector.

But here too we are making progress. Next year — with the President's Fair Benefits Package, including the Nunn-Warner Amendment with a variable housing allowance, and the 11.7 percent pay raise — the increase in military compensation will at least offset this year's rise in the consumer product index. And the gap between military pay and pay in the civil sector will narrow significantly for the first time since 1974. This long overdue correction should have a tangible and positive effect both on recruitment of high quality men and women and on retention of experienced personnel in critical skills.

Improvements in Recruiting

There are some other good signs on the personnel front. The Military Services now have more than 99.6 percent of their total authorized personnel. As of the end of August, we had recruited 8,000 more high school graduates this fiscal year than last. We have made significant improvements in the percentage of recruits who complete their first term of service.

Another less tangible, but still very important, factor in the attractiveness of the military as a career is a markedly changed attitude towards the military in this country. We went through a difficult period in attitudes toward the military and military preparedness during the late 1960's and most of the 1970's. But that is for the most part, I believe, behind us. It is my perception that the American people today not only recognize the economic hardships our military men and women face, but also they understand better the role of the military in our society and they appreciate and take pride in the contributions that men and women in uniform make to our country's strength and well-being. One other piece of evidence in this regard is the remarkable response of American young men to the new registration program.

I, for one, am deeply proud both of those who now wear a uniform and of those who have demonstrated their patriotic willingness to serve when and if our country needs them.

Our forces today are ready. To guide our readiness improvements, we have recently toughened the standards for our C-ratings. We have taken great strides over the past four years in logistics and maintenance, mobility, training and personnel. Tomorrow's readiness, I assure you, will be even better than today's.

Quotes from

John Collins, Senior Specialist in Defense, Library of Congress, *in his*
U. S.-SOVIET MILITARY BALANCE, 1980, *states*

~~P. 394~~

61 Our active status strategic reserves are too few to fight even a modest war in the Middle East without accepting risks that uncover crucial interests elsewhere. Even "best case" forces would probably prove insufficient against serious opposition by Soviet Armed Services, whose abilities to project offensive power beyond their frontiers have improved impressively in recent years.

p. 400

U. S. nuclear strategy disregards defense. The American people and production base are exposed completely to ballistic missile attack. Their ability to survive a full-scale nuclear assault by the Soviet Union is nearly nil.

p. 401

Our Armed Services possess reduced abilities to discourage attacks on the United States, defend the country effectively if deterrence should fail, and safeguard associates whose security is closely linked with our own.