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Bu 10/14

BA - BU. For R. Porter details meeting action

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF
POLICY DEVELOPMENT

1982 OCT 12 A 9:21

October 11, 1982

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FG002-38

MEMORANDUM FOR EDWIN L. HARPER

FROM: ROGER B. PORTER *RBP*

SUBJECT: Carter Excerpts in Time Magazine

I have the following reactions to the excerpts from Keeping Faith which you shared with me:

1. There is very little either new or striking that is likely to benefit future historians or that will change the current public view of Jimmy Carter.
2. There is much subtle self-justification which is typical for such memoirs. It reminds me of a conversation I once had with John McCloy who responded to my inquiry about why he had never written his memoirs with the remark that he had always found the memoirs written by his friends and colleagues not very useful history but major exercises in enhancing their own role in history. He added that he thought he was attending the same meetings they were but he had a very different sense of who was influencing whom when.
3. Carter seems unable to hide his hurt and bitterness. Clearly the strain between him and Edward Kennedy runs deep. Likewise, his relationship with Walter Mondale seems to have deteriorated. At one point he refers to him as "kind of a lonely voice."
4. Like most former Presidents, he feels his successor is "undoing" much of the progress made during his administration. Moreover, he tries to cultivate the media image of President Reagan as unconcerned about "the poor, students, and the afflicted" as well as of a President with little interest in "matters of supreme importance."

Carter claims that he is being treated by this Administration very differently than he treated his predecessors. He feels ignored by the Reagan White House while asserting that he briefed Nixon and Ford "often, possibly more than they actually wanted." I do not remember public reports about Carter consulting with Nixon and Ford much. It would be easy to check out from them how they felt they were treated. It might also be useful to look into what briefings or information, if any, are being provided to Carter. I see little merit in publicly increasing the contact between President Reagan and former

President Carter, but periodic briefings (not necessarily by the President) strike me as possibly useful in three senses:

1. President Reagan is likely the most secure person that we have had in the Presidency for a long time. He is neither mean, petty, or vindictive. The Carter claim that he is being ignored is not consistent with this view.

2. Establishing regular briefings can help establish a precedent that would be useful for President Reagan after he leaves office (hopefully after two full terms).

3. While President Carter suffered in my view from repeated lapses in his judgment, he acquired a good deal of knowledge, particularly about foreign leaders, that might prove useful if he would provide it in responding to such briefings.

We invest a great deal in our Presidents but seem to get very little return once they have left office.

I would enjoy discussing this issue with you as time permits.

OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT

STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 10/5/82 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 10/18/82

SUBJECT: "The Man from Plains Sums it Up"

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✓ PORTER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	TURNER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BARR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	D. LEONARD	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BOGGS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	OFFICE OF POLICY INFORMATION		
BRADLEY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	HOPKINS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
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FERRARA	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
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REMARKS:

Please comment on the attached.

Please return this tracking sheet with your response

Edwin L. Harper
 Assistant to the President
 for Policy Development
 (x6515)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date _____

TO:

R. Porter
D. Boggs
R. Carleson
W. Gunn
K. Hopkins
V. Montoya
M. Uhlmann

ACTION:

FYI:

- Comment
 For your handling
 Draft response

Due Date _____

REMARKS:

EDWIN L. HARPER

Oval Office Flashbacks

When Rosalynn was visiting the White House before moving in, some of our staff asked the chef and cooks if they thought that they could prepare the kind of meals that we enjoyed in the South, and a cook said, "Yes, Ma'am, we've been fixing that kind of food for the servants for a long time."

Our first movie in the White House was *All the President's Men*. I felt strange occupying the same living quarters and position of responsibility as Richard Nixon.

The President of India died, and I called Mama to ask her to represent me there. When she answered the phone I asked her what she was doing. She said she was sitting around the house looking for something to do, and I said, "How would you like to go to India?" She said, "I'd love to go some day." I said, "How about this afternoon?" She said, "Okay, I'll be ready."

Admiral Hyman Rickover said if I would stick to principle on things like water projects and human rights, I would come out all right. He further commented, however, that I may not win re-election in 1980.

Harold Brown reported that during a meeting with Huang n, head of the Washington liaison office of the People's Republic of China, Huang was particularly critical about our having changed strategic planning from a "2½ war" capability to a "1½ war" capability. When Harold pointed out that the other war plan had been designed for use against the People's Republic of China, the criticisms were attenuated.

I made some mistakes in dealing with Congress, and one that I still regret is weakening and compromising on legislation that first year dealing with some worthless dam projects. Signing this act was accurately interpreted as a sign of weakness on my part, and I regretted it as much as any budget decision I made as President.

On April 20, 1977, I addressed Congress on the energy crisis. At the beginning of my speech, I stated that, because of the nature of the subject, I did not expect applause. This was one time Congress lived up to my expectations.

I received a call from some of the Senate leaders, who were closeted with Senator S.I. Hayakawa. I knew he was listening when they asked me if I needed to meet occasionally with the California semanticist to get his advice on African affairs. I gulped, thought for a few seconds and replied, "Yes, I really do!" hoping God would forgive me.

Mother had recently been to Morocco. She said she smelled all the 21 types of perfume in the palace dressing room where she stayed. King Hassan offered to give her some perfume, and she said, "No." She laughed and said, "You damn foreigners are all alike." He laughed also and gave her a kiss. I doubt that the g's been called a "damn foreigner" before, and I don't know one else who could get away with it.

We could not solve the problem of deliberate leaks. After Watergate, it seemed that every subordinate functionary in government wanted to be Deep Throat.

Although I was surrounded by people eager to help me, my most vivid impression of the presidency remains the loneliness in which the most difficult decisions had to be made. I prayed a lot—more than ever before in my life.

The meeting with the economists was a waste of time. They all expounded their own conflicting theories and seemed unwilling or unable to consider other views or deal in a practical way with the economic problems I was having to face every day.

I had lunch with Fritz Mondale. He thought that my comment concerning "whipping Kennedy's ass" in the battle for the presidential nomination was ill-advised. His is kind of a lonely voice. Some of my staff members said it was the best thing for morale around the White House since the Willie Nelson concert.

With the approval of most congressional leaders, at the end of March 1980 I was able to sign and send to them a balanced budget for fiscal year 1982. We congratulated each other on this rare achievement.

Jerry Falwell of the Moral Majority lied in Alaska by claiming that he met with me in the Oval Office and that I told him I had to have homosexuals on my staff because there were homosexuals in the U.S. who needed representation in my inner circle. I have never had a private meeting with him. He has never been in the Oval Office. I have never had any such conversation.

I went to Grand Rapids, Mich., and found out later that I had called it "Cedar Rapids." When Gerald Ford went out castigating me for it, he shouted to the TV cameras that apparently I didn't even know that Michigan was one of the 48 states.

The demands for defense expenditures comprise a bottomless pit that we can never fill. One of the most serious problems we have is the inclination on the part of our military leaders to seek more money by constantly denigrating America's formidable military capability. This hurts our own country and our allies' confidence in us, and might lead the Soviet rulers to make a suicidal misjudgment based on the chorus of lamentations from the Pentagon and defense contractors that we are weak and impotent.

The Superfund Legislation set up a system of insurance premiums collected from the chemical industry to clean up toxic wastes. This new program may prove to be as far-reaching and important as any accomplishment of my Administration.

Although American medical skill is among the best in the world, we have an abominable system in this country for the delivery of health care, with gross inequities toward the poor—particularly the working poor—and profiteering by many hospitals and some medical doctors, who prey on the vulnerability of the ill.

After all the campaigning was over on the night before the election, I was not surprised or shaken when Jody gave me the bad news from Pollster Pat Caddell. It hurt me deeply, but I had already accommodated the disappointment that was to come officially the following day. Even so, we did not anticipate the magnitude of our defeat. To lose all but six states and to have our party rejected and the Republicans gain a majority in the Senate were additional embarrassments for me.

Veterans Affairs Administrator Max Cleland came to tell me goodbye. He brought me a plaque with a quote from Thomas Jefferson: "I have the consolation to reflect that during the period of my Administration not a drop of the blood of a single citizen was shed by the sword of war." This is something I shall always cherish.

The Man From Plains Sums It Up

With his book ready for publication, Jimmy Carter reviewed his presidency and its aftermath with TIME Assistant Managing Editor Ronald Kriss and Midwest Bureau Chief Christopher Ogden, who covered the Carter Administration as White House and State Department correspondent. The four-hour interview began in his wood-paneled home-town office just off the main street of Plains, Ga., and concluded on the sunny back patio of his modest brick ranch house a few blocks away. Afterward, Carter went right to work polishing up the inaugural lecture he was to present the next day as a professor at Emory University in Atlanta. Adjacent to his projected presidential library, Emory will operate the Carter Center for Public Policy, where, as he puts it, he hopes to "spend the rest of my working days." Excerpts:

the tragedy of Lebanon. I was shocked, disturbed and repulsed by attacks on the Palestinians in Lebanon. The bloodshed was grossly out of proportion to any threat to Israel on the northern border.

On a Middle East settlement. It should be compatible with the Camp David accords: Israel's withdrawal of her armed forces and military government from the West Bank and Gaza; some modifications of the 1967 borders to enhance Israel's security; specified Israeli military outposts with demilitarization of the West Bank; a legitimate homeland there for the Palestinians, one hopes with a link to Jordan, with all prerogatives of a nation except a military force and an independent foreign policy. The Palestinians deserve full autonomy and an end to human rights violations. I would not say they have a right to an independent state, but to a political entity that is an identifiable homeland. The only logical place for it is on the West Bank.

Jerusalem should be undivided, with unimpeded access to the holy places by all worshippers. But Jerusalem is not only part of Israel, it is part of the West Bank, and its ultimate status should be determined through negotiation. If Israel were to annex the West Bank, it would be, in effect, undoing the Camp David accords and rejecting Resolution 242 as a basis for peace. That would remove any vestige of legitimacy from the Israeli claim that they are searching for a peaceful resolu-

tion. This would probably terminate the Israeli-Egyptian Treaty, which is predicated on Israel's honoring the basic terms of the Camp David agreement.

On Menachem Begin. He is a man of almost unshakable beliefs. He finds it very difficult to change his mind. It was torture for him to agree to remove the settlers from the Sinai. He has a single-minded commitment to annex permanently all



the other occupied territories. He has a tendency to treat the Palestinians with scorn, to look down on them almost as subhumans and to rationalize his abusive attitude toward them by categorizing all Palestinians as terrorists.

I do not think Begin has any intention of ever removing the settlements from the West Bank, and that is a very serious mistake for Israel. There is no doubt Begin's purpose all the time was to cut a separate deal with Egypt. He disavowed that intention, but all his actions, all his words, indicated that. Begin was the most recalcitrant of all the Israelis at Camp David. I almost never had a pleasant surprise in my dealings with him.

On Anwar Sadat. I would not even try to deny that I was pro-Sadat. He was completely open, courageous, generous, farsighted. He was willing to ignore details to reach an ultimate goal of peace that was beneficial to him and to Egypt. Sometimes I felt he trusted me too much.

At one point, Sadat wanted to have all

the permanent members of the Security Council meet in Jerusalem with the Geneva Conference members. It was difficult to dissuade him. I could not see any way to get Mao Tse-tung, Jim Callaghan, Giscard d'Estaing, myself and Brezhnev all to come. It was already too much to get the Palestinians and Syrians to sit at the same table with the Israelis.

Sadat was completely committed to autonomy on the West Bank. I never thought he might just want the Sinai back. Not then; not now.

On Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak. On many occasions Sadat would send Mubarak as a direct emissary to see me. Sometimes Mubarak would deliver a handwritten message in an unsealed envelope; Sadat was trying to show me he trusted him. I have never detected any inclination in Mubarak to do anything contrary to what Sadat would have done had he survived. I think Mubarak has pledged his life and honor to continue the basic Sadat policies.

On Jordan's King Hussein. Hussein is personally courageous but an extremely timid man in political matters. That timidity derives almost inevitably from the inherent weakness of Jordan. As a nation, it is a contrivance, arbitrarily devised by a few strokes of the pen. Hussein is caught in a nutcracker, between Israel on one hand and Iraq and Syria on the other. He has little inherent national wealth, so he is dependent on the largesse of Saudi Arabia and others for weapons and economic security. He has a difficult situation governing a weak nation. But he is frustrating because he has not been courageous at times when political courage was needed.

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On the Saudis. The Saudis are a force for moderation and stability. They have a real commitment to the West and to the peace process, with certain provisos concerning Palestinian rights. I was frustrated that they did not have the confidence to say publicly, "Let us support Sadat and Camp David. We approve of Jordan and the Palestinians negotiating just to see if Israel is acting in good faith." That has not happened yet.

On the Soviet Union. The Soviets under Brezhnev will seize on every opportunity

to further the Communist cause. I was not misled about their ultimate intentions.

They are uncertain of themselves; do not have the calm self-assurance of the Chinese. They have to prove themselves over and over to be equals with our country. They are willing to make great sacrifices for military strength, which is perhaps their only strength.

I am fearful President Reagan is not sufficiently sensitive to the consequences of excessively isolating the Soviets. We need to give them hope that through negotiation and peaceful competition we can strive for accommodation. If that hope is removed, they might be induced to lash out and use their enormous military capability. It would be suicidal but it is a possibility. That is why it is so counterproductive for the President to imply that we are militarily inferior to the Soviet Union. We are not, but this claim tends to weaken the confidence of our own people, shakes the foundations of our alliances and might induce the Soviets to make a suicidal miscalculation.

On Ronald Reagan. I have seen our country suffer from the policies initiated by President Reagan in economics, in foreign policy, in some social programs. He has undone important accomplishments not only of me and other Democratic Presidents but of his Republican predecessors. Reagan and James Watt, his Interior Secretary, have tried to undo much of the progress made in environmental quality dating from Abraham Lincoln to Richard Nixon. It is grievously damaging. The budget deficits that Reagan will accumulate in four years, while claiming to be a fiscal conservative, exceed the total deficits of all the peacetime years of our history. Reaganomics was a fraud, but he is a persuasive speaker, and the American people bought it.

It is hard to think of any nation that has a closer relationship with us now than a year and a half ago, except for two or three countries ruled by right-wing regimes. Deteriorating relationships in Latin America, Asia, Europe and Africa all grieve me. But I have felt it was better for me not to be constantly criticizing Reagan, so that through experience he would modify his previous radical and erroneous positions. My reticence, I think, has been a factor in his ability to turn back to China, to espouse the Camp David accords, to honor the terms of SALT II and make other beneficial changes.

In some cases he seems to have little concern about the poor, students, the afflicted. He has oversupplied the military funding for the kinds of weapons have been requesting for 15 or 20 years and other Presidents have refused. Not only is it unnecessary, it is an improper allocation of priorities. The B-1 bomber is a waste of money. The densepack MX

missile system seems ridiculous to me. I am concerned too that the nonproliferation effort has fairly well been abandoned.

It hurt to lose to Ronald Reagan. But after the election, I tried to make the transition as smooth as possible. Later, from my experience in trying to brief him on matters of supreme importance, I was very disturbed at his lack of interest. The issues were the 15 or 20 most important subjects that I as President could possibly pass on to him. His only reaction of substance was to express admiration for the political circumstances in South Korea that let President Park close all the colleges and draft all the demonstrators. That was the only issue on which he came alive.

On relations with his successor. I made one courtesy call at the Oval Office, but my relationship with Reagan is nonexistent. I am not asking for an assignment,

“Ronald Reagan seems to have little concern about the poor, students, the afflicted. He has oversupplied the military with funding.”

but I think a former President can certainly be helpful. I called on Nixon and Ford regularly to help me. We briefed them often, possibly more than they actually wanted.

What Kissinger, Ford and Nixon did in the Middle East, I built upon. What they did in China, I built upon. What they did with the SALT negotiations, I built upon. I did not reject. Under Reagan, for the first time in recent history a nonpartisan international effort was set aside. That is still disturbing to me.

It is a mistake, a sign of weakness for an incumbent to blame problems on his predecessor. After a year or so, it may be rubbing the public the wrong way.

On the press. Reagan has been treated with kid gloves. He has been given the benefit of the doubt, not only during this first year and a half, but also during the campaign, when his detrimental policies were never analyzed by the press. Reagan's demeanor as an “aw shucks” grandfatherly type appeals to the country and

the press. Some of his characteristics, such as his not being familiar with details of issues, even arouse a sense of protection in the press. There was a kind of game by the press to see if there were questions I could not answer. Part of the reason for this challenge was the aura of morality that I had wrapped around myself, and my commitment not to lie. There was a natural inclination by the press to prove this guy is not as clean and moral as he claims.

On being an “outsider.” I was not part of the Wall Street business Establishment, the Washington political Establishment or the Hollywood entertainment Establishment. I was just not part of the Establishment in any way. I was a Southern peanut farmer populist type. That was fine with me.

But I saw Rosalynn having in the White House an extraordinarily comprehensive series of public events and entertainment. Yet the press sometimes criticized her. If we had Horowitz, Baryshnikov, Beverly Sills and also had Willie Nelson, Rosalynn was stigmatized as some sort of rube who did not really understand the glamour of Washington. That aggravated me worse than anything.

We were alien in some ways. There were ways I could have reached out. It was not an antagonistic attitude. It is just not part of my personality. I do not condemn the cocktail circuit. It is just not natural for me to be part of it.

On politics. I like politics, but it is not all good. The tedium of repetitive public appearances, dashing madly from one community to another, receiving lines, receptions, begging for contributions—none of those things are attractive or enjoyable to me.

Dealing with issues and making decisions, planning a campaign, the direct relation with voters—those elements of politics I enjoy.

On communicating. I am not a great speaker and am sometimes not at ease with large groups. I acknowledge those characteristics freely. They have been pointed out to me often enough to convince me. I can think on my feet. A poll of oldtime White House correspondents ranked me first in handling press conferences. It is hard to express effectively all sides of a complicated issue, and I tend to do that. It is much easier to take one simplistic side of an issue and express it clearly. Reagan does that very well. But there is no way in the long run to avoid the complexity of complex issues.

On Senator Edward Kennedy. No, I do not hate him. In many ways, he is a likeable person, but I do not think he is qualified to be President. Kennedy is a superb candidate for a nomination because peo-

ple are intrigued with his looks, wealth, speaking ability and family name. But when you probe and ask people if they put him in the White House, his support tends to evaporate. My guess and hope is that the same thing will happen in 1984. People ask: Can the man be trusted to make difficult decisions under pressure with an undergirding of integrity?

In 1980, Kennedy seemed to think if he announced as a candidate I would withdraw. Later he could not accept the inevitability of his defeat even after it was mathematically impossible for him to get a majority of the delegates. Those excessive political attacks by Kennedy after he lost contributed a great deal to my loss. What his motivations were I have never understood. If he is the nominee in 1984? Well, I have never voted Republican.

On Vice President Walter Mondale. Fritz disagreed on a few economic decisions I made, eliminating some social programs I thought were a waste of money. These decisions hurt Fritz, but I never doubted that he was competent, intelligent and loyal to me. There is no doubt in my mind that he is plenty tough enough to be President. He is not naturally as combative as I am, but that is not a sign of weakness.

On Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. Cy is a good man and was a fine Secretary. I might he made a mistake resigning in the Iran rescue mission failed. In my judgment, he should have said: "Mr. President, I might want to quit later. But I would like to stay two or three months to show my support for you and help tide you over this disappointment." He did not do that. But this has never driven a wedge between us.

I have had people tell me that Cy had been so affected by his involvement in the Viet Nam War and his aversion to violence that he may have been overly cautious about the hostage rescue mission. Vance was the strongest dove. But the second strongest dove was myself.

I wanted the Secretary of State second only to me to be the spokesman for foreign policy. Vance was quite reluctant to fill that role. Sometimes I would ask Cy specifically to make a public, sometimes controversial statement. Often, I would watch the evening news to see my Secretary of State, and instead I would see his spokesman, Hodding Carter, on the screen. A lot of it was because of his modesty. He wanted to do the hard work. He is one Cabinet member who worked harder than I did.

Dealing with Congress. When I was first elected, many congressional leaders, especially in the Senate, were convinced they should have been President instead. A substantial number of Democrats had never served

with a Democratic President. They looked on the incumbent President as an adversary. I had a rough row to hoe from the beginning. I also did not give the Congress any goodies to take home, nothing popular, where a Congressman could go home and say: "You ought to re-elect me because I voted for the Panama Canal Treaty or because I voted to increase oil prices by deregulation."

There is no doubt I gave Congress too heavy an agenda—twelve or 15 important issues the first year I was in. I would have been better off in the public's estimation as well as with Congress if I had narrowed those down to one or two. But it would not have been like me to postpone the other 13 because they were controversial. I was not the warm, backslapping political friend that some members of Congress would have preferred, but I tried to address issues on a professional basis, and they were decided on their merits.

On special-interest groups. There is no way for me to express adequately my concern about the detrimental impact of special interests in Washington. In many cases members of Congress can be induced to vote against the interests of the country—bought legitimately, with political threats on one hand and financial rewards on the other. The situation is getting worse. You have not only the financial payoffs with contributions and honorariums, but a tendency by Congress and the Administration to weaken ethics restraints. There are also those right-wing political-action committees that can spend hundreds of thousands to promote or defeat a candidate. Their scruples are sometimes nonexistent.

On the Moral Majority. I felt more bitter than I indicated in my book. I put them in the same category as Gerald L.K. Smith

and others who have thrived on disharmony, divisiveness and a narrow interpretation of what Christianity is. At times, they were vicious, and there is a growing aversion to their philosophy within the Christian community. It is still a major factor. But I had a calm assurance that my relationship with God was not affected adversely by Jerry Falwell's statements.

On Brother Billy. The issue of Billy and his work for the Libyans hurt me. Billy is exceptionally independent. He has a mind of his own. If I had told Billy, "Don't ever talk to the Libyans any more," he would have said, "Jimmy, you go straight to hell. I'll talk to whom I choose. You're not my boss." He would then have proved to me publicly, as Menachem Begin does so well in dealing with the President, that he cannot be told what to do. Billy said the extent of my defeat could not have all been attributable to him. I agree. At the most, it may have cost me one or two percentage points.

On the Democratic Party's future. An approach that would be successful for the Democrats would be a combination of fiscal responsibility and conservatism on one hand and an allocation of priorities to help people develop their own capabilities through education, employment and equal rights on the other. The Democrats could help themselves by unequivocally espousing environmental quality, peace, nuclear-arms control and human rights.

I do not think an ultraliberal on fiscal policy, a person who wants to reinstitute federal regulation of private industry or go back to an overemphasis on social giveaway programs, is going to win.

On other Democrats. In addition to Fritz Mondale, I like John Glenn very much. He is one Democrat along with Mondale who could carry our party to victory in 1984. Gary Hart and Reubin Askew also meet my criteria for potentially successful candidates. Any of these would have an excellent chance to win.

On history's verdict. I will be remembered as an incumbent President who was defeated for re-election. There will always be a thought in the minds of historians that the American people made an accurate judgment. I hope people will say that one of the reasons he was not re-elected is that he addressed difficult issues; that he did not yield to political expediency; that his basic principles were sound; and that he was effective in some of the major tasks he undertook—energy, arms control, Alaska lands, the Panama Canal, the Middle East, China relations. I hope history will deal kindly with me. But I am at peace with the knowledge I did the best I could. ■

NEXT WEEK

"I listened to every proposal, no matter how preposterous, including dropping an atomic bomb on Tehran," writes Jimmy Carter of his most frustrating experience as President: trying to free the American hostages from Iran. In the concluding TIME excerpt from *Keeping Faith*, Carter tells of the fallen Shah's fateful visit to the U.S., the seizure of the Americans on a day "I will never forget," the tragic failure of the rescue mission in the desert and the 444-day ordeal that ended in freedom for the hostages. Carter also tells of those achievements for which he expects historians to give him greater credit than did the U.S. voters who rejected him in 1980: his human rights policy; the treaty yielding control of the Panama Canal; and his efforts to end U.S. dependence on foreign oil.

J

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THE WASHINGTON POST

Friday, September 17, 1982

A10

Carter, in University Lecture, Offers Views on Haig, Reagan

Reuter

ATLANTA, Sept. 16.—Former president Jimmy Carter tonight described former secretary of state Alexander M. Haig Jr. as too unstable to serve in office, and called President Reagan cowardly for supporting the proposed balanced-budget amendment.

In the first of several lectures at Emory University, Carter said of Haig: "I don't think he was a stable enough man, really, to carry on the business of our foreign policy. I don't mean that he's unbalanced, but he was somewhat paranoid about claimed personal vendettas against him."

Carter called Reagan's support for the balanced-budget amendment "a cowardly act" because "if President Reagan wants a balanced budget, then he ought to

present the Congress with a balanced budget."

Carter also said he would find it difficult to support Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (Mass.) if he became the Democratic presidential nominee in 1984.

"I have never voted for a Republican in my life," Carter replied to a question. "It is my strong hope that I can vote the same way in 1984."

"It would be difficult for me to support Ted Kennedy at the present time," Carter said of the man who fought a bitter primary battle with him in 1980.

Carter predicted that his vice president, Walter F. Mondale, would be the nominee.

On another topic, Carter said Interior Secretary James G. Watt "is a disgrace to his office and to our country" because, in Carter's opinion, Watt has betrayed the public trust.

Preservation
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Clipping re former President Carter

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Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 1 1

Name of Correspondent: Terrence B. Adamson

MI Mail Report User Codes: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

Subject: Purchase of a set of Lenox China for Carter Library

ROUTE TO:

ACTION

DISPOSITION

Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>WHolland</u>	ORIGINATOR	<u>82 10 12</u>	<u>PH</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>82 12 06</u>
	Referral Note:				
<u>WATO3</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>82 10 13</u>	<u>PH</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>82 12 06</u>
	Referral Note:				
<u>WFIEL</u>	<u>S</u>	<u>82 12 06</u>	<u>TH</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>82 12 06</u>
	Referral Note:				
		<u>1 1</u>			<u>1 1</u>
	Referral Note:				
		<u>1 1</u>			<u>1 1</u>
	Referral Note:				

ACTION CODES:

- A - Appropriate Action
- C - Comment/Recommendation
- D - Draft Response
- F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure
- I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
- R - Direct Reply w/Copy
- S - For Signature
- X - Interim Reply

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- B - Non-Special Referral
- C - Completed
- S - Suspended

FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
- Code = "A"
- Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: _____

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
 Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOb).
 Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
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RECORDS MANAGEMENT ONLY

CLASSIFICATION SECTION

No. of Additional Correspondents: _____ Media: L Individual Codes: 4640 _____

Prime Subject Code: FG 002.38 Secondary Subject Codes: FE 008. FE 004.
GI
JL 007. _____

PRESIDENTIAL REPLY

Code	Date	Comment	Form
C	_____	Time: _____	P- _____
DSP	_____	Time: _____	Media: _____

SIGNATURE CODES:

- CPn - Presidential Correspondence**
- n - 0 - Unknown
- n - 1 - Ronald Wilson Reagan
- n - 2 - Ronald Reagan
- n - 3 - Ron
- n - 4 - Dutch
- n - 5 - Ron Reagan
- n - 6 - Ronald
- n - 7 - Ronnie

- CLn - First Lady's Correspondence**
- n - 0 - Unknown
- n - 1 - Nancy Reagan
- n - 2 - Nancy
- n - 3 - Mrs. Ronald Reagan

- CBn - Presidential & First Lady's Correspondence**
- n - 1 - Ronald Reagan - Nancy Reagan
- n - 2 - Ron - Nancy

MEDIA CODES:

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- H - Handcarried**
- L - Letter**
- M - Mailgram**
- O - Memo**
- P - Photo**
- R - Report**
- S - Sealed**
- T - Telegram**
- V - Telephone**
- X - Miscellaneous**
- Y - Study**

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 6, 1982

Dear Terry:

This is to thank you for your letter of October 7, 1982, in which you acknowledge former President Carter's willingness to accept Mr. Set Momjian's proposed offer to donate a set of Lenox China with the Presidential Seal to the Carter Library, if this was legally permissible.

Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 713, is the principal federal law governing use of the Seals of the President and Vice President. That section proscribes use of the Presidential Seal except in a manner consistent with regulations promulgated by the President. The regulations to which reference is made are embodied in Executive Orders 11649 and 11916. I enclose for your information copies of 18 U.S.C., Section 713, the notes to which include the Executive Orders mentioned. While permissible uses of the Seal are limited, use of the Seal on "Presidential" china would appear to be sanctioned by both law and tradition.

Under the circumstances of this proposed use for the Carter Library, I am also pleased to enclose a photograph of the Seal for the use you describe in your letter.

If you should have any further questions on this matter, please do not hesitate to contact me. I regret that inadvertent internal administrative lapses caused a delay in my response.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Orig. signed by FFF

Fred F. Fielding
Counsel to the President

Terrence B. Adamson, Esq.
Hansell, Post, Brandon & Dorsey
1915 I Street, NW
Fifth Floor
Washington, D.C. 20006

Enclosures

cc: Mr. Set Momjian
FFF:HPG:aw 12/6/82
cc: FFFielding/HPGoldfield/Subj./Chron

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 23, 1982

(Personal memo)
↓
LDP -
Your draft
did not really
do credit to
Terry -!
Nor was it
11/22 ↑

Dear Terry:

Thank you for
This is in response to your letter of October 7, 1982, in which you request, on behalf of former President Carter, ~~permission for Mr. Set Momjian to purchase a set of Lenox China with the Presidential Seal for donation to the Carter Library~~ *if this was legally possible.*

Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 713, is the principal federal law governing use of the Seals of the President and Vice President, as well as the Great Seal of the United States. ~~Section 713~~ *Section 713* proscribes use of the Presidential Seal except in a manner consistent with regulations promulgated by the President. The regulations to which reference is made are embodied in Executive Orders 11649 and 11916. I enclose for your information copies of 18 U.S.C., Section 713, the notes to which include the Executive Orders mentioned. ~~You will note that while permissible uses of the Seal are limited, use of the Seal on "Presidential" china would appear to be sanctioned by both law and tradition.~~ *I* am pleased to ^{also} enclose a photograph of the Seal for the use you describe in your letter.

inadvertent
If you should have any further questions on this matter, please do not hesitate to contact me. *I regret that* ~~with best wishes,~~ *lapses could a delay in my response.*

Sincerely,

Fred F. Fielding
Counsel to the President

Terrence B. Adamson, Esq.
Hansell, Post, Brandon & Dorsey
1915 I Street, NW
Fifth Floor
Washington, D.C. 20006

Enclosures

cc: Mr. Set Momjian

Thinking: When do you do with your friends?

Under the circumstances of this proposal use for the Carter Library

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date 11/23/82

MEMORANDUM

FOR: 104106 CU

FROM: H.P. Goldfield
Associate Counsel to the President

- For your information
- For your review and comment
- As we discussed
- For your files
- Please see me
- Return to me after your review

Comment

—
— Mr. Set Momjian
— 2101 Blair Mill Road
— Willow Grove, Pennsylvania 19090
—
—

LAW OFFICES
HANSELL, POST, BRANDON & DORSEY
A PARTNERSHIP INCLUDING PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS
1915 "I" STREET, N. W.
FIFTH FLOOR
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006
TELEPHONE (202) 342-0107
TELECOPIER (202) 659-6404
TELEX 54-2711

DOWNTOWN OFFICES
3300 FIRST ATLANTA TOWER
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30388-3101
TELEPHONE (404) 581-8000
TELECOPIER (404) 581-8219
TELEX 54-2711

TERRENCE B. ADAMSON
PARTNER

PERIMETER OFFICES
56 PERIMETER CENTER EAST, N. E.
FIFTH FLOOR
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30346-2283
TELEPHONE (404) 394-4400
TELECOPIER (404) 394-4637
TELEX 80-4455

October 7, 1982


104106 *cu*

Honorable Fred F. Fielding
Counsel to the President
Old Executive Office Building
Room 113
17th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Fred:

I am writing on behalf of former President Carter in response to the call of your Associate Counsel, H. P. Goldfield, concerning the request of Mr. Set Momjian to purchase a set of Lenox China with the Presidential Seal for donation to the Carter Library. Dan Lee, President Carter's Chief of Staff, asked me to let you know that Mr. Momjian is a long-time friend of the former President who offered to purchase this china for donation to the library, and that President Carter is delighted to accept the gift on behalf of the Library. Thank you for your and Mr. Goldfield's courtesies in this matter.

Warm regards.

Sincerely

Terrence B. Adamson

TBA:mk

cc: Honorable H. P. Goldfield
Associate Counsel to the President

Honorable Dan Lee
Chief of Staff to President Jimmy Carter

ID #

107131

FG 002-38

WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

O - OUTGOING

H - INTERNAL

I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD)

82/10/28

Name of Correspondent: Charles Z. Wick

MI Mail Report

User Codes: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

Subject: writes regarding his conversation with President Carter relative to a Nuclear freeze.

ROUTE TO:

ACTION

DISPOSITION

Office/Agency	(Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
✓ CA Full		ORIGINATOR	82/10/29	CS	C	82/10/29
NS CLAR		A	82/10/29		C	83/06/14
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			/ /			/ /

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Comments: NSC # 8207673

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No. of Additional Correspondents: 82 OCT 29 A11:47 Media: L Individual Codes: 1140

Prime Subject Code: EG 00238 Secondary Subject Codes: EG 298
ND 018

PRESIDENTIAL REPLY

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DSP		Time:	Media:

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- R - Report
- S - Sealed
- T - Telegram
- V - Telephone
- X - Miscellaneous
- Y - Study

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

6/13

CBE

✓

Please make
~~the~~ copy for
Folder marked

CARTER, Jimmy - Freeze

RECEIVED 02 NOV 82 13

TO PRESIDENT FROM WICK, C

DOCDATE 21 OCT 82

KEYWORDS: ARMS CONTROL

CARTER, JIMMY

SUBJECT: FWDS SUMMARY OF CONVERSATION W/ FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 05 NOV 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KRAEMER

MCGAFFIGAN

LORD

LINHARD

BOVERIE

PIPES

KIMMITT

SOMMER

COMMENTS

REF# 107131

LOG

NSCIFID

(H /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

 CJ 9/14 OBC per Kraemer

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

ad (C/M)



October 21, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The President

FROM:

Charles Z. Wick *mw*

SUBJECT:

Conversation with
President Carter

7673

107131

Summary

While putting together some suggested input to convey to your colleagues for your proposed November 18 speech, I called Jimmy Carter to verify a report that he had proposed a nuclear freeze to the Soviets in 1979. Mr. Carter confirmed the fact that he had proposed a freeze to Brezhnev in June of 1979 who apparently turned it down. This was followed by an increased rate of deployment of SS-20s. Brezhnev's current advocacy of a freeze, calculated to give the nuclear freeze proponents ammunition, might thus be discredited.

For your information this memorandum summarizes the key points of our conversation. I forward it in the hopes that it will prove useful in our efforts to formulate an effective public affairs initiative which will communicate the merits of the U.S. arms control position.

* * * * *

I asked former President Carter if press reports were true, that he had in 1979 proposed a nuclear freeze to the Soviets. President Carter replied that the reports were, in fact, correct.

In June 1979, President Carter went to Vienna to negotiate with Mr. Brezhnev. President Carter proposed:

(a) a nuclear freeze for both sides--in both production and deployment;

(b) immediate implementation of SALT II even prior to any ratification;

(c) a 5% reduction annually in the SALT II limits for the 5 years the treaty would be in effect; and

(d) an immediate implementation of a comprehensive test ban.

Brezhnev rejected all of these proposals.

'82 OCT 29 A11 :48

I asked President Carter if he thought it significant now, some 250 plus SS-20s later, that there is so much discussion about a nuclear freeze. He replied the concept of a nuclear freeze was significant then and it continues to be now. He said that while in Scandinavia last spring, as well as in France, he discussed his 1979 proposal to Brezhnev. His audiences were primarily businessmen and not very impressed with what had occurred in Vienna.

Following this European trip, President Carter continued to think the subject important enough to mention in his forthcoming book. He suggested I read through that chapter of his book. He added that he would be glad to help in any way he could.

I indicated to Mr. Carter that there was discussion now about the possibility of the President making a speech to bring people up-to-date on his November 1981, "Zero Option" speech. This would be, in effect, a report explaining why the average person should not be beguiled by the nuclear freeze or labels which could operate in a manner inimical to our interests.

It seemed to me that it would be rather dramatic to mention in your report that President Carter, himself, had proposed such a nuclear freeze in 1979. However at that time, it did not suit the Soviets. We could then underline that the arms superiority the Soviets enjoyed in 1979 was nowhere near what they have developed in the subsequent three years. This revelation could be very dramatic for the average person to consider.

Carter pointed out that President Reagan is perfectly at liberty to quote anything out of Carter's new book "because it is all quite accurate and the record would confirm it." He noted that the President does not need any approval or encouragement from him to quote from the book. As a matter of fact, Carter indicated he would welcome such quotation.

President Carter cautioned that he would not want the presumption to be made that because Brezhnev rejected U.S. proposals for a nuclear freeze in June of 1979, we have an excuse "for not being equally as forthcoming now with some modifications because of the SS-20s." He would still be in favor of a freeze of the intercontinental type missiles, in which he believes the U.S. does maintain a rough equivalency with the Soviet Union.

He continued by pointing out that in December of 1979, he proposed to the European Alliance that we should go ahead with the Pershing IIs and the ground-launch cruise missiles because the Soviets had proceeded with SS-20 deployment.*

HE BELIEVES THE U.S. OUGHT TO GO AHEAD AND DEPLOY THE INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE. I think his agreement with us here can be of great value and the use thereof should be considered.

I mentioned to President Carter that we are concerned about California and the other states that are proposing blanket nuclear freeze resolutions with no emphasis on the verifiability and safeguards that everybody who understands these things--whether or not they believe in the freeze--feel necessary and appropriate. I then asked him for his evaluation of the nuclear freeze movement.

Mr. Carter replied that, in this case as with almost every issue, the Reagan Administration is not going far enough to encourage mutual constraint on nuclear weapons, but that the total nuclear freeze advocates do not go far enough either. He felt that perhaps some common ground might be found. However, he pointed out that the simplistic approach on either side just does not cover the existing nuances and he would never agree to anything with the Soviets if we could not verify their commitment with our own independent means.

Mr. Carter stated that his own preference would be for the Administration to propose a freeze on further development or deployment of any intercontinental missiles. He felt that the United States could live with such an arrangement. He re-emphasized that the SALT II treaty should be completely honored pending a subsequent treaty. He also would be in favor of a comprehensive test ban.

* According to The International Institute for Strategic Studies and NATO sources, the Soviets initially deployed SS-20s in 1977 at the rate of approximately 50 a year. However in late 1979, following Brezhnev's rejection of Carter's nuclear freeze offer, the Soviets accelerated their deployment to the rate of approximately 75 a year.

I pointed out that our biggest problem now is the separation of the United States from its Western European allies. President Carter replied that there is general concern, particularly in Europe but in the United States to some degree as well, that the Reagan Administration is not sincere in advocating sharp reductions in nuclear weapons and that its proposal to the Soviet Union is so unacceptable that it is not a basis for negotiations. He regarded this as a general concern, but he agreed with James Reston's observation in the October 3, 1982, New York Times (see Attachment A): "If the President or Secretary Shultz or even the Secretary of Defense would come out and explain to the public what our proposals actually are and how they will also benefit the Soviet Union, it would certainly be enlightening." Carter said he himself would welcome an explanation, and he believes the public here and elsewhere is waiting for it.

I pointed out to President Carter that I know from my personal experience that Gene Rostow and all our negotiators are sincerely trying to accomplish something in arms control. He replied that he hoped it was true, but he was not convinced of it. He recalled that when he was President they had certainly not been of any help to him with what he regarded as a well-balanced SALT II treaty. Their condemnation of that treaty made them suspect in his view. He concluded that this was just a difference of perspective and something which we could not resolve.

In closing, I indicated that I was trying, in my job, to explain our position to the West European publics in particular and I thanked him for his help in trying to dissect the roots of the problems we face.

On a final note, I asked Mr. Carter if anyone in the Administration had talked to him about his views on these issues. He replied that no one had. Significantly, he frequently volunteered in the conversation to help us in any way he can. I thanked him for his time, and the conversation at that point drew to a close.

cc: Secretary of State
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

The Nuclear Blackout

By James Reston

WASHINGTON, Oct. 2 — After a two-month summer recess, the U.S.-Soviet talks on the control of nuclear weapons have begun again in Geneva. It would not be unreasonable to say that these may be the most important diplomatic negotiations of our time, or any other time, but the odd thing is that so few people know anything about them.

This is not because there is a conspiracy of silence. Nothing would be more damaging to the success of these talks than daily briefings by the ambassadors for reporters outside the door. There is a problem, however.

For while both sides have agreed to keep the details of their day-to-day discussions private, they have also agreed that the broad principles of their negotiations and the way the talks are going should be made public.

They have been faithful to this on the whole, but there has been very little analysis in the press or even in the universities about their different approaches to a question that involves the peace of the world and maybe even the future of the human race.

For example, the renewal of the nuclear talks in Geneva was ignored in most newspapers, and though Eugene Rostow, the director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, recently made a brilliant address to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council defining the conflicts at Geneva, his remarks were not even reported, let alone analyzed, in most of the serious publications of the country.

So the question here is not whether the U.S. or the Soviet approaches to the control of nuclear weapons are right, but why they are not discussed as carefully as President Reagan's economics, or even the strike conflict between pro football players and owners.

One reason is that the atomic issues are so technical and complicated that they are beyond the understanding or even the imagination of most people. The United States and the U.S.S.R. both now have approximately 7,500 ballistic missile warheads, enough to blow up the world several times over, and there is endless argument about the comparative advantages of land-based missiles or sea-based missiles, multiple warheads, "smart" cruise missiles and other mysteries.

The Reagan Administration is confronted by some influential people who want a nuclear agreement with the Soviets at almost any cost, and by others who wouldn't risk a deal with Moscow no matter what the Soviets promised.

*Preservation
copy*

Accordingly, the tendency here is to "leave it to the experts," most of whom nobody knows, and this is also true of the press and the universities, who are not concentrating on the control and spread of nuclear power and nuclear wastes, though this may be the most important question for the preservation of the civilization they presume to represent.

At least a few American newspapers have spent much thought and money on the education and training of reporters to cover the tangles of economics or the law, and to master the languages of the changing world they have to cover, but most of them have done very little to train people to watch and report on the growth, the possibilities and the dangers of atomic power. This may be the most important "beat" in the journalistic and scientific world today.

Similarly, at least some of our best universities have schools of Soviet studies and African studies — oddly very few on Middle Eastern or Latin American studies — but none, to my knowledge, on atomic studies. There are some classes — for example at Stanford University among other places — on "arms control." These have proved to be popular. But in general, the instruction is sadly inadequate to the requirements of the nuclear age.

The U.S. diplomats at Geneva are claiming that we are behind the Soviet Union in the development of many atomic missile systems. The Soviet diplomats are insisting that they are behind the U.S. in other nuclear weapons.

It reminds me of a similar argument during the last world war when the late Adlai Stevenson, then in the Navy Department, was talking to a Soviet diplomat about the delivery of supplies to Moscow. Stevenson protested that the Soviets were behind in defining what supplies they needed. The Russian complained that Washington was behind in delivering the goods. "I have not come here," the Russian diplomat said, "to discuss my behind but to discuss your behind."

Even so, complicated as this devilish subject is, and even admitting that the tangle of arguments about throwweights and multiple warheads are beyond the ken of most concerned people, it should not be impossible to do a little better in reporting and explaining why these two principal nuclear powers, who are committed to control their own nuclear arsenals and avoid the proliferation of nuclear weapons, are not able to agree on at least a reduction of the weapons that threaten the peace of the world.

If they cannot resolve this problem, they have an obligation to explain it, and expect the press and the universities to train the coming generation to keep it up front, so the people can understand what is at issue — which may very well be the lives of their children.

Preservation
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**United States
International
Communication
Agency**

Embassy of the United States of America
Via Boncompagni 2
00187 Rome

Telephone: 4674

Q342

FRP



FILE

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FG002-38

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PK

Rome, January 6, 1983

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I take the liberty to enclose at the request of
Mr. Libero Ranaudo the text of his reply to the
interview President Carter granted last year in
Turin.

Yours sincerely,

Daniel A. Spikes

Daniel A. Spikes
Assistant
Cultural Affairs Officer

Encl.: a/s

NSC # 8-300342

LIBERO RANAUDO

LIBERO
RANAUDO

ECONOMIC RECESSION DIALOGUE-DETENTE

I'm highly honoured to give
Mr. Ronald Reagan, the Honorable President of the USA
this my modest gift, without writing words,
but only trying to make facts useful
for all the peoples of our humanity.

PUBLISHED
BY AUTHOR

Italy - December 1982. Libero Ranaudo

LIBERO
RANAUDO

LIBERO RANAUDO

Editore - Publisher

C.C.I.A.A. 68884

via Tiberio, 1 - 86100 CAMPOBASSO (Italy)

OD. FISC. RND LBR 30815 8858R

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AN ANSWER TO CARTER IN FAVOUR OF REAGAN
ABOUT ECONOMIC RECESSION AND DIALOGUE -
DÉTENTE = by Libero Ranaudo

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SPECIAL AND UNIQUE EDITION

Campobasso (Italy) December, 1982.

Having been published in 1981 in Italy the work entitled " VALUE, RISK AND INVESTMENT", written into English and distributed also in the U.S.A. through a formal depositing at the "LIBRARY OF CONGRESS" in Washington , the undersigned Author of the mentioned book is compelled to reply to the ex-President of the U.S.A. Mr. Carter, who gave an interview to the Italian daily paper "LA STAMPA", since its contents come into collision with some economic principles demonstrated into the above-mentioned " economic treatise " : whence the legitimacy of the Author's duty of defending his own thought .

Into the article on the first page of the No.230 23rd October , 1982 titled "Reagan sbaglia tutto" (Reagan is going wrong every thing), Mr. CARTER, as US citizen: freely speaking to the Italian public opinion, expressed various statements, some of which are not included in the Author's competence, because they consist in a streacly national politics (the deficit of the US Budget or the judgements about some Italian politicals), whereas two topics of them fall within some cultural subject-matters already expounded into the above-mentioned work and more exactly: "the international economic recession due to the ReaganEconomics" and "Dialogue-Détente".

Mr Carter said that "ReaganEconomics originated the international recession into the whole Occident, whereas the harvest-abundance , together with the plenty of raw materials and above all of petroleum , would have kept rock-bottom prices in every case and would have reduced the inflation rate" , moreover ReaganEconomics "produced the highest (for US) unemployment from the end of the second world war" down to our times.

With regard to the " FIRST TOPIC ", one must reply these arguments can be classified as "gratuitous and demagogic", given that they are denied whether from the economic culture or from the incontrovertible facts during the whole 20th Century. The gratuitousness and demagogy are due to the absoluteness of the assertion wherewith the fall in prices would depend on the quantity od production of goods". This economic principle forms part in the economic classic culture of the past century and is referred to an ambit of a national market, but, even having relation to the law of "supply and demand", in this way people would ignore the results of the economic researchs about "economic cycles" still not solved fully from the world culture, as well as it would ignore the increasing " internationalization " in the economic relations .

In fact, the Carter's affirmation about the maintaining a rock-bottom prices might have an absolute validity on the cultural and practical level in the past century and into a national market only , whereas nowadays such an economic principle is very comparative, because people must con-

ECONOMIC RECESSION
DIALOGUE - DÉTENTE

[Handwritten notes in blue and red ink, including the name "Libero Ranaudo" and some illegible text.]

AN ANSWER TO CARTER IN FAVOUR OF REAGAN ABOUT
ECONOMIC RECESSION AND DIALOGUE-DÉTENTE - by L.Ranaudo

sider whether the upward and downward movements inserted into the " cycles Kondrat'ev/Juglar/Kitchin " or the making them indirectly conditional on the World Economy, whereby analysis and judgement have a " different " evaluation depending on the economic cycles and on their different v i e w p o i n t, they are referred to (even if relatively to the only USA, it is enough to remember that A.Hansen selected No.12 "minor cycles" in the U S economy into the period 1837-1937, whose evaluations are various nowadays). So much so that as time passed (and also today), the cause of the increase in prices was searching into two wide spheres : the former is "over production/underuse" (HINDMAN,LESCURE and their followers),the latter is "production/prices" also in reference to the monetary reduced space (CASSEL,KITCHIN,WOYTINSKY,KUZNETS,IMBERT,DUPREZ, to whom one must add both the SCHUMPETER's solution and the SIMIAND's and MARJOLINE's ones together with their followers: all ascertaining the ONLY "generality" of the inverse cor relation between price and production). On the other hand , it had been unanswerably ascertained that a long downward trend happened since 1770 down to 1900, whereas we all are living a long upward trend of increase in prices all over the world from today up to the beginning of the 20th Century (see: "Index of the wholesale prices" in the U.S.A.,in the United Kingdom and in France, treated and quoted on the W.FELLNER's "Trends and Cycles in Economic Activity" (1956) and on the M.NIVEAU's "Storia dei fatti economici contemporanei" (1972) -).

Moreover, through the work "Value,Risk and Investment" published and distributed in 1981 (see the pages from 360 to 370),it has been demonstrated that " the value of goods will grow in Future ", but, even not considering this last argument (legitimatizing the answer to Mr. CARTER), into NO NATION during the last decades there had been an achievement of rock-bottom prices,which are not remaining on the same level all over the world.

Having said that, one must recognize that the Reagan's Politics in the US Economy represents an " inversion " of the economic trend,thanks for a monetary revalorization as foundation of whichever future development . The CARTER's assertion is referred to the slackening of growth and unemployment, but one must consider that, on the contrary (viz: if it had been adopted the Carter's criterion), on one hand there would have been a probable employment and, on the other hand, there would have been the beginning of the end of all the West Economies, owing to an inevitable monetary inflation more double than the today's one. Really, the CARTER's thought in Economics can be related to the J.M.KEYNES's theories applied by the " quiet revolution " during the well-known ROOSEVELT's " New Deal", which, in that time, didn't generated a great monetary inflation since the USA' s Economy found successively its own outlet in the 2nd World War and nowadays it would generate an enormous acceleration of the inflationary process on the world level.

Finally, with regard to the US unemployment, it's enough to emphasize that the greater and greater Western European unemployment, together with

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the social-economic situation (comprehending the collectivistic economy , too) denies the CARTER's diagnosis, because, apart from the objective historic data selected by M.FELDSTEIN in the USA, one cannot help admitting the complexity of the today's US unemployment, having peculiarities due to various causes some of which consist in the behavior of categories of citizens rather than depending on the Government Politics,like the Italian journalist-writer A.RONCHEY has honestly recognized into his parallelism between the Roosevelt's and Reagan's historic situations (see "LA REPUBBLICA", No.25 of Nov.23,1982 pages 1 and 4). Therefore, in replying to the CARTER's arguments, one cannot leave out at any rate that the Reagan's political economics is saving the whole Occident's economy, even if the very Western Europe is suffering some effects negative of this temporary phase of the economic process tending to stop the monetary inflation in order to assure a solid development and durable employment some time in the future. And, in concluding, if Carter said "Reagan is doing wrong everything", the undersigned Author is compelled , always on the cultural level, to reply "... but he revalued the US Dollar besides the prestige of the USA,both conditions to solve the remaining problems truly" .

In reference to the "SECOND TOPIC" about "Dialogue-Détente", in the first place, one must emphasize a CARTER's contradiction and , in the second place, a compulsory specification of this proclaimed dialogue.

The "contradiction" is referred to two phrases. The former is : " According to my (Carter's) experience, to make room for instrumental interpretation from the USSR is dangerous. If rules were inflexible, then the USSR respect them, otherwise I get on well with Senator Jackson , who compares the Soviets with hotel-thieves: they try to open every door and, when a door is opened, they empty the whole room". The latter is : " It is more dangerous the President Reagan's line than the Western Europe one (...) It seems that the President (Reagan) aims to the isolation of the Soviets out of the international debate. (...) I've always adopted this rule with the USSR : to collaborate where it's possible, to resist where it's necessary. Dialogue and firmness are not only compatible but also in separable " .

It's evident the contradiction : "HOW is it possible to hold a dialogue and to collaborate with those who, before holding a dialogue and before collaborating, are already and prejudicially thought as thieves ?". Every common man -and still more all the women- knows very well that when a house-breaker pays a Lady of House a visit, in case she should hold a dialogue or collaborate with him, the thief empties easily the whole house and rapes the woman, too .

With regard to the "specification", instead, the true substance of speaking about " dialogue-détente" is very serious,but the considering "dialogue as cause of détente" and "détente as cause of Peace" is very dangerous. So that all who speak of "dialogue-détente" must explain " WHY " , during the past dialogue and the past détente,the USSR increas

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ed its own armaments enormously (unlike the Occidentals who diminished theirs) and also if the USSR's re-armament mean Peace.

Apart from the over-proved exposure quoted on the first part of "VALUE RISK AND INVESTMENT" into the "Criticism of Collectivism", suffice it to mention the recent judgement of the DEN-XIAO-PING's Communist China, which has openly and objectively recognized that "Détente has been a strategy only". Mr CARTER said "one must hold a dialogue, agreeing on the USSR where it is possible, but "dialogue" has been a speaking to nothing for Occident, whereas it has been the increasing military power for the USSR. The so-called "dialogue-détente" has created an invincible USSR: is Occident "invincible" ? In the negative answer, the world situation is dangerous, whereas, in the positive one, the USA and the USSR will create Peace. At all events, the historic results said clearly: "dialogue-détente" have had a unique aim: to talk of Peace increasing armaments. It's true that BREZHNEV didn't make the Third World War, but is also true he made guerrilla wars and the greatest military force of History: and what have the devotees of "détente" done and what could the UNITED NATIONS do ?

The Soviet Governants said that the "imperialistic Capitalism" wants war, whereas only "the invincible USSR" can guarantee Peace, but the historic and undeniable facts prove that Occident didn't make war, whereas the USSR are still making warfares and world revolution.

Anyway it be, the historic result of dialogue-détente has been that follows only :

1°) Long and Medium Range Missiles	: Nations of the WARSAW TREATY....No.	5,918
	" " " " " N.A.T.O.No.	1,744
2°) Nuclear Heads	: Nations of the WARSAW TREATY....No.	2,858
	" " " " " N.A.T.O.No.	2,289
3°) Nuclear Destructive Force	: the U.S.S.R. : MEGATONS	7,868
	the U.S.A. : " " "	3,505

(sources :

-inherent in the No.1 and No.2 : "L'ESPRESSO", Milan (Italy), No.19, May 18th, 1981 - page 44 ;

-inherent in the No 3 : " TIME " (European Edition), No.13, March 29, 1982 - page 19) .

In case the above-mentioned data be corresponding to reality, then THE FACTS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES, replying to the West public opinion and to the journalistic debate among D.CALLEO, C.TUGENDHAT and I.DAVIDSON (see the " FINANCIAL TIMES", No.28,742 of May 18, 1981 page 17) as well as to all the debates in the USA and all over the world.

In concluding the SECOND ANSWER to Mr.CARTER, the Author, always on the cultural level, replies: not words, but facts and not Détente but Peace, because the talking of Peace is not to create Peace. Whereby, one cannot but admitting that the Reagan's Politics is extremely positive rather

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than mistaken. In fact, the principal duty is not " to speak about Peace ", but only " to create Peace ", viz: to treat and to negotiate, but on conditions being equal, because Violence and Force manifest themselves always against the weakest and the less strong, but remain paralysed in front of those who can defend themselves efficiently. To hold a dialogue doing only for the benefit of an interlocutor is a suicide for another part. In order to avoid genocides and distructions and in front of those who talk of Peace on one hand, but increase armaments on the other hand, only one rule ought to be applied by every man and every Nation: one needs must foresee the "worst" and in the meantime one needs must negotiate the "better living together": and Peace will come into the World because what's needed is actions not hot air .

Therefore, the problem is to treat to the advantage and security of both parties: that's the very thing Reagan is acting. To prove these conclusions it's enough to remember two assertions of Reagan: the former is "The USA are maintining opened the door of dialogue and are ready to have more constructive relations with the USSR", in this meanwhile affirming the "balancing of armaments and the stopping of re-armament", moreover specifying "I'm (Reagan) sure I can treat" (sources: the Italian RAI-TV, GR-2 of 13rd, 14th, 15th November, 1982). In other words: "Treating, we all can create Peace", viz: facts, not words masking war power and military intervention. Reason whereby, it's consequently inexact to affirm "Reagan is going wrong every thing", because Reagan is taking the just road. The relative proof is that nowadays Occident and the Communist China are ready to treat "a pacific coexistence by means of better relations": it is the USSR that must reply .

This criticism of the CARTER's thought will find a sure comprehension, not only because the undersigned Author was highly honoured by a positive judgement about some assertions inherent in his books from the Ambassador Prof.R.GARDNER when CARTER President, but above all because Mr.Jimmy CARTER is a civil person and a Great Occidental, who will recognize "dialogue" is efficiently possible only where there is Liberty.

Having replied to Mr.CARTER, the Author must further explain that "The defence of Peace is one's own duty of every man and every woman everywhere", and, on this account, a more complete criticism of "dialogue-détente" is compulsory in order to perform every task, above all trying to help modestly and sincerely to solve this dangerous problem,

" Dialogue " is exclusively inherent in the problems on "theoretical level", but is not so on "practical level". In fact, "dialogue" is "a means" absolute and indispensable only in the ambit of Culture, of the scientific and artistic research, of Education, Thought, Religions and of whichever human manifestation re-entering into the "theoretic sphere". It's not so, neither can be so, into the "practical sphere": into Economy, Technology and Technical Applications, Handycrafts, Industry, Construction Application, Communications, Transports, Applied Politics, State Life, Sport, Artistic Works, Recreative Activities and into whichever manifestation re-entering

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into the "practical sphere", because in the practical sphere of every human activity one needs must only produce goods and achieve "concrete and completed facts", whose national and international relations originate only "comparison" and "competition", both which are due to a sole necessity: to accomplish and to treat, rather than "to speak".

But, in the historic evolution of Humanity, it happened that both the "theoretical sphere" and the "practical" one have been addressed to carry out a "future aim": in our century this aim is "Peace" and "Affluent Society" or "War" and "Imperialism". In consequence, "our historic problem" (viz: the trying to avoid that "two uses having opposite aims and countered each other" may flow in a solution of force owing to "defence" or "conquest" or "survival") cannot be solved from a dialogue paralyzing a part and making stronger and stronger the opponent, because in this case "dialogue" means only "TIME" to become still more invincible. Whereby a comparison prolonged by means of "dialogue", unavoidable, drives to "war" or to the "social-political-economic collapse" through the Counter-Revolution into the Communist World and through the "Communist World Revolution" into Occident.

We all have had the confirmation on the historic level, wherein the concept of "dialogue" had been extended and increased from the only international relations to the social-political life inside every system planning, and so arising to "principle", which, according to Occident, had meaning of "liberalization", whereas, according to every communist system, represented "counter-revolution". Whence the consequential repression in POLAND, which was scientifically foreseen from this Author's work nine months before the events (see: Note No.1 quoted on page 139 of the First Edition-Special and Numbered of "VALUE, RISK AND INVESTMENT" published in ITALY in February, 1981). The 1981-1982's historic repression in POLAND confirms the BUKOVSKY's criticism of Collectivism in his asserting no liberalization is possible into the "communist societies".

But, on the other hand, one must recognize an authentic deficiency of Occident, which doesn't want to touch the HISTORIC REALITY, that has HISTORICALLY confirmed the determinant and stable existence of TWO MAXIMUM SYSTEMS, both which cannot be modified all of sudden: the Liberalist/Capitalism and Social-Communist/Collectivism. In Occident people want to forget all this, but this is A REALITY, that manifested itself, is manifesting itself and will manifest itself in Future, as HISTORY so relentlessly remarks.

And just this reality has originated the armaments race and the danger of a nuclear war.

In this situation the so-called "dialogue", as it was thought and applied till today above all from the Western Europe, must be forsaken, specially in West Europe wherein "dialogue" has devotees exclusively in order to deny and to avoid whichever "ideological debate", thought as "obstacle to détente" and "laceration hindering reconciliation and collaboration", and so avoiding "every conflictuality" by means of

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whichever "compromise" (all arguments and strategies already "failed" by the historic events, since every "Pacifist" movement acted towards only one part, rather than between the opponents and into their spheres, as it was demonstrated in the First and Second World War).

By now, the "political" problem is already become "military" problem, wherefrom there is risen a problem of SURVIVAL OF SYSTEM and SURVIVAL OF HUMANITY, whose solutions cannot be got from "dialogue", but only from the "comparison between ideologies", which can really give "Peace" as "pacific coexistence".

It's this a historic and real perspective.

Historically, the final development of the comparison of the two greatest systems of our century has already been confirmed to have a double solution: the former, sooner or later, is the nuclear war with a possible self-destruction of Humanity and the latter is a pacific coexistence, like KRUSCEV recognized clearly and openly. And that's the very Kruscev's merit arising to a true greatness, which this Author, although he not be either marxist or capitalist, recognized honestly into his work entitled "Criticism of Marxism" (edition into English, published in 1977).

In this seat, even if sketchly, it's necessary for explaining greatness of Kruscev, independently on his various historical mistakes. We all know that the very KRUSCEV initiated the "atomic moratorium" in 1963, and so opening up the free route to the "armaments race", BREZHNEV went on the strengthening of. But, on the other hand, one must consider and must admit that the Cuba's trial of strength in 1962 was intensely and tragically lived both from N. KRUSCEV in the USSR and from J. KENNEDY in the USA. Whereby, people cannot deny that the Kruscev's successive leadership was but a making the best of those consequential effects in Occident, in application of the usual Soviet foreign strategy consisted of the famous principle "talking openly in a way and acting concealedly in another way" as History so clearly teaches: STALIN with the Treaty von Ribbentrop/Molotov towards HITLER, KRUSCEV towards KENNEDY and MAO-TSE-TUNG, BREZHNEV towards NIXON, FORD and CARTER.

But, beyond the starting of the armaments race and of the achievement a military super-power, Kruscev has done something stronger and more powerful than the "atomic super-bomb" of No.100 Megatons, tested on the island NEW ZEMLIA: the introduction into the "marx-leninist dialectics" of the possibility of a "pacific co-existence". This is an incalculable fact, because, even if on the theoretical level only and even if already instrumentalized successively, this hypothesis is AN IDEA: and "THOUGHT" is the unique human thing which cannot be stopped by NONODY and from NOTHING till Humanity will exist.

Therefore, the "pacific co-existence" is a "theoretic problem" that, sooner or latter, the "Marx-Leninist USSR" must face seriously and really.

And in the today's reality, the perspective of a "comparison among the ideologies" is possible and necessary and is proved on theoretical and on practical level.

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On the theoretical level, one must do some historic acknowledgments.

The first is that the "ideological debate" is not useful for demonstrating that Tom is right and Dick is wrong, but to find a solution to the "most important necessities" of Humanity.

If on one hand there are two blocs armed each against other, on the other hand there is an "objective situation", that, with the passing of time, can become a cause decisive and overhanging the same problem of rearmament and disarmament. Within these last 15 years of the 20th Century Humanity must face the solution of this "objective situation", consisted of three undeniable historic facts: the "world overpopulation", "The Energy Crisis" and the "underdevelopment -underfeeding", which, globally and contemporaneously, had not been foreseen by NONE in the PAST.

And this solution can't be done from "dialogue" by the chit-chats of a "generic international cooperation" and of "a righter distribution of resources", because the solution of these great problems can't ignore the differences among systems, as well as "all the interests already existent". At any rate, one can't do like ostrich ignoring the undeniable historic reality of the two maximum systems: the liberist-capitalism and the social-communist/collectivism. The less people cannot act like child or Idealists, asking to the USSR and the USA "don't do arms, any more! and give that money to all the poor populations".

Even if, in February, 1981, the very undersigned Author treated also this historic fact in his work "VALUE RISK AND INVESTMENT", all that was only done in order to state the problem, but its solution can't be formulated in such a children's manner, because such a solution is impossible.

Moreover, even were it possible and even if both the USSR and the USA should will to give gratis the identical monetary resources in favour of all the poor populations, well, in that case, not only one doesn't solve any problem, but the super-powers should create some "historic conditions" still more dangerous than the today's ones. In fact, all these endless problems have not their solution in the "finding the monetary resources to be employed", but in the "HOW, TO WHOM and FOR WHICH AIMS to employ these monetary resources" necessary for facing and solving the "overpopulation", "the energy crisis" and "underdevelopment-underfeeding".

From here, there is the necessity of an "ideological debate", only where from we can create PEACE and FUTURE, because within hardly 15 YEARS there will be 8 MILLIARDS OF MOUTHS WHO MUST EAT: and we all mustn't hold a "dialogue" or "talking hot air" or "destroying by war", but only TO CREATE and TO PRODUCE.

The second acknowledgment on the historic level is "the practical function", because "the ideological debate" is a comparison respecting each other, trying to find the manner and the way of a "pacific coexistence among different systems". Reason whereby, the "ideological debate" becomes an ideal and real comparison for the pacific living together, viz: "ideological debate" as "scientific competition applied to Economy and to the greatest necessities of Humanity. All this since Economics IS NO

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IDEOLOGY, but A SCIENCE that is applied to the economic life, in front of which it's compelled to do one's accounts whichever "IDEOLOGY", whichever "DIALOGUE" and whichever "SPEAKING".

The third acknowledgment on the historic level is the necessity of starting on doing something, instead of going on talking, because agreement is possible: different and opposite systems, having contrasting finalities, can have only one interest in common: THE SURVIVAL THROUGH THE LIVING TOGETHER.

On the other hand, the treating is not hampered from the "ideological debate", or rather it's made favorite of debate, since the solution avoiding the armed collision and putting into effect survival and security gushes just from the Ideological Debate rather than a solution of force. It's the ideological debate that must be used, since in this way, people make confrontation using ideas instead of using cannon for a war: and Peace will surely rise at this crack of dawn of the FUTURE of HUMANITY.

From this concrete possibility there rises the concrete perspective of finding an "interest in common" going beyond all the systems: but all this will never be possible through "dialogue", but only through the ideological debate, wherefrom, instead of getting a solution of force gushed, it will rise the theoretical and practical solution that shall start A WONDERFUL FUTURE solving all the most important necessities of Humanity by means of Progress and Evolution on all the levels for all the individuals, women and men, above and beyond all the barriers created from Nationalisms, from Politics, from Ideologies, from Racialism and from Religions.

On the practical level, one must admit the Historic Reality established that, between two antithetical and countered systems, the sole existence of the former can be a menace to the existence of the latter. And it is this situation, rather than the ideological differences and the armaments race, the determinant cause of the "NUCLEAR DANGER": THE RECIPROCAL FRIGHT. But it's possible to create Peace avoiding risks and controlling situations. In fact, the thinking that the armaments be able to be straightway destroyed is to think an impossible thing, but, even were it possible, it should be extremely dangerous, also and above all in the social and economic field. The unique possible thing is a control for a reciprocal security, developing contemporaneously the trade relations having reciprocal security and reciprocal equality of the economic and monetary effects, in the meantime increasing all the international relations and activities in the fine Arts and in the applied ones, as well as in all the scientific fields: and, after, all the other problems can be resolved really.

And only after a negotiations and an agreement between the two maximum super-powers and, after, between the two military blocs by widening to the other Nations too, it will have a real and constructive meaning a wick-

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ever "dialogue" and whichever "discussion", recovering and encouraging positively the current " MADRID CONFERENCE " and all the initiatives already taken from the UNITED NATIONS. All this is necessary, because as matter of fact the whole World is become a battlefield on all the levels between the two maximum ideological systems : BUT THE REMAINDER OF THE WORLD CANNOT REMAIN TO SEE .

To the theoretical and practical possibilities, one must add an argument STILL MORE IMPORTANT : the necessity of survival through the pacific coexistence . In fact, in the USA, in the USSR, in the Communist China and in the India, as well as in all the Nations all over the world, THERE ARE SO MANY BABIES, WHO SHALL BE THE WOMEN AND THE MEN OF TUMORROW .

And, in front of this historic fact, every individual has the sacrosant duty of creating A FUTURE WHEREIN THERE SHALL EXIST NO ANNA FRANK , ANY MORE !

To the ascertainment of the proofs on the theoretical and practical level and of the necessity of the survival by means of co-existence, one must emphasize the fact that cannot avoid a socio-economic process of fusion between "individualism and socialism " (in their amplest meaning), in the reciprocal acknowledgment of the positive elements existent into both systems. And, therefore, like the lichens' and mosses' one, it cannot, culturally, avoid an "intellectualistic-mental symbiosis" among Individuals and Collectivities, with the consequence of developing every separate Identity, on account of the ineluctable evolution, wherefrom it's, historically, emerged that the " cosmic destiny " of HUMANITY is only one : to utilize continents and oceans and after to go too far in the interstellar space .

These are no imaginations or rethoric words, because this is the Reality and the History that the terrestrial peoples have already begun to write by the "international cooperation on the spacial and scientific levels" : and, along this road, all the Nations of all the continents and without political distinction, will unite under the aegis of the UNITED NATIONS, thanks for the two maximum systems nowadays existent and for the aim of the reciprocal living together in the respect of the remainder of the World .

In order to prove all this compulsory development inserted into the Answer to CARTER (this Author has replied about the "dialogue-détente" and the "economic recession" to), the undersigned Italian citizen, asserting his own International and National Rights and applying the HELSINKI's AGREEMENT, is highly honoured to have already sent, in a diplomatic way through his Lawyers, a formal request to the Honourable Mr. REAGAN, Mr. ANDROPOV and Mr DEN-XIAO-PING in order to achieve "a scientific discussion among Free-Citizens Scientists Artists of Occident together with the remainder of the world ones and the Esponents qualified politically of the U.S.A. of the USSR

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AND OF THE People's Republic of China , in order to ascertain the possibility of finding a reciprocal security on cultural, economic and social level , being all this the presupposition of whichever Treaty of Peace .

Moreover , all the above-mentioned words will be a reality within few months, thanks for an imminent Bill to be submitted to the competent Legislative Organs in order that both the ITALY'S PARLIAMENT and the UNITED NATIONS may lay the foundation of a PEACE for a world without end .
December, 1982 .

Libero Ranaudo

(Page No.11)

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JV

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 11, 1983

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Dear Mr. Alagia:

Thank you for your letter of February 24, 1983 regarding the possibility of obtaining photographs taken at the White House with President Carter. Unfortunately, all of the material from the Carter Administration has been sent to Atlanta, Georgia. I would suggest that you contact Douglas B. Huron, Stein & Huron, 1619 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009. He should have information on whether or not you can obtain the photographs you desire.

Sincerely,

Orig. signed by FFF

Fred F. Fielding
Counsel to the President

*
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D. PAUL ALAGIA, JR., P.S.C.
PARTNER

February 24, 1983

The White House
Washington, D.C.

Attention: Mr. Fred Fielding

Dear Sir:

My wife and I were invited to The White House on May 14, 1980, at the invitation of President Carter for a reception. We had our picture taken with the President. Is it possible that we can get a copy of the pictures taken at that time? They were never forwarded to us. Robert Strauss was Chairman of the Democratic National Party at that time and he is a good friend of mine. I would appreciate it if you would check to see if those pictures are still available.

Sincerely yours,

D. Paul Alagia, Jr.

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