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**WHORM Subject File Code:** FG002-38  
(Federal Government Organizations: Former Presidents:  
Carter, James Earl, Jr.)

**Case file Number(s):** Begin-089999

**Box Number:** 5

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WHITE HOUSE  
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

O - OUTGOING

H - INTERNAL

I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 8/10/10

Name of Correspondent: Marion (Mike) Manning

MI Mail Report User Codes: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

Subject: Views concerning the previous administration's programs. Supports the President.

ROUTE TO:

ACTION

DISPOSITION

Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>CAPEAC</u>	ORIGINATOR	<u>CH 8/10/13</u>		<u>CH 8/07/20</u>	<u>8/05/02</u>
<u>OMB</u>	<u>D</u> CH	<u>8/10/05</u>		<u>C</u>	<u>8/10/08</u> CH
<u>OMB</u>	<u>R</u> CH	<u>8/10/11</u>		<u>A</u>	<u>8/07/10</u> CH
		<u>I I</u>			<u>I I</u>
		<u>I I</u>			<u>I I</u>

ACTION CODES:  
A - Appropriate Action  
C - Comments  
D - Draft Response  
F - Fact Sheet

I - Info Copy/No Action Necessary  
R - Direct Reply w/Copy  
S - For Signature  
X - Interim Reply

DISPOSITION CODES:  
A - Answered  
B - Non-Special Referral  
C - Completed  
S - Suspended

FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:  
Type of Response = Initials of Signer  
Code = "A"  
Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: PLEASE RESPOND DIRECTLY FROM OMB.

FAP/DC

JUL 10 1981

Honorable Marion Menning  
State Senator  
State Capitol -- Rm. 28  
St. Paul, Minnesota 55155

Dear Mr. Menning:

Thank you for your letter to the President regarding the low-income energy assistance program.

We recognize the role States play in administering the low income energy assistance program, and we fully support you and your State's efforts to target energy assistance only to the truly needy.

In an effort to reduce the Federal regulation burden and increase the flexibility of States to decide eligibility requirements (including assets limitations) for programs such as energy assistance, the Administration has proposed an Energy and Emergency Assistance Block Grant. Under this proposal States and localities would be able to determine their own needs and to decide who gets energy assistance and how much they get.

Thank you for sharing your views with us. I hope you will continue to advise us of your thoughts on the policies of the Administration in the months and years ahead. As part of its action on Reconciliation legislation, the Congress is considering proposals to revise the low-income energy program and establish a block grant. We believe the Congress will take this opportunity to act on the Administration's initiative and to reform the kinds of abuses you have noted.

Sincerely,

/s/ Donald W. Moran

Donald W. Moran  
Associate Director for Human  
Resources, Veterans and Labor

cc: John A. Svahn  
Commissioner/SSA

cc: Official file -- IM Branch

Mr. Schleede DO Records

Mr. Moran WH Liaison Office RM. - 33 ✓

Mr. Kleinberg (2)

office chron

HIM/JWong: plb -- 7/6/81

Revised DKleinberg: 5/29/81

Return in order for OMB to send out  
instead of the White House -- 6/19

Control No. 7308 -- AD/728 & AD/974

Diskette: #3 Menning

7308

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

MAY 6 10:14

REFERRAL

MAY 5, 1981  
UNIT

TO: OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

ACTION REQUESTED:

DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF JUDY F. PEACHEE

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 018180

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED APRIL 3, 1981

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: THE HONORABLE MARION (MIKE) MENNING  
STATE SENATOR  
MINNESOTA STATE SENATE  
STATE CAPITOL  
ROOM 28  
ST. PAUL MN 55155

SUBJECT: VIEWS CONCERNING THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION  
PROGRAMS; SUPPORTS THE PRESIDENT

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL — IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN  
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE  
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN BASIC CORRESPONDENCE, CONTROL SHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE  
(OR DRAFT) TO:  
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 33, THE WHITE HOUSE

BY DIRECTION OF THE PRESIDENT:  
LESLIE SORG  
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON  
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

JW

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

REFERRAL

JUNE 17, 1981

TO: OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

ACTION REQUESTED:

DIRECT REPLY, FURNISH INFO COPY

REMARKS: PLEASE RESPOND DIRECTLY FROM AGENCY

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 018180

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED APRIL 3, 1981

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: THE HONORABLE MARION (MIKE) MENNINI  
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MINNESOTA STATE SENATE  
STATE CAPITOL  
ROOM 28  
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AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 33, THE WHITE HOUSE

BY DIRECTION OF THE PRESIDENT:  
LESLIE SORE  
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON  
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

JW  
6/17/81

MARION (MIKE) MENNING

Senator 26th District  
R.R. 1, Box 300D  
Edgerton, Minnesota 56128  
and  
Room 28 State Capitol  
St. Paul, Minnesota 55155  
Phone: (612) 296-4171

Senate

State of Minnesota

April 3, 1981

Mr. Herbert R. Doggette, Jr.  
Acting Commissioner  
Office of the Commissioner of Social Security  
Baltimore, Maryland 21235

Dear Mr. Doggette:

Thank you for your letter of March 18. However, I am again sending you a copy of the letter I sent to the President on February 19, 1981. I am sick and tired of the bureaucracy saying they appreciate my comments when they will not give me the assurance that what I say is true and that I will see some results. You have to realize that what I say is correct, and that it is absolutely poor and rotten government to continue the practices of the Carter administration.

Please do something, or must I run for the United States Senate in order to get at people like you?

Sincerely,

Marion (Mike) Menning  
State Senator

MM/mh  
enclosure




THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21235

Refer To:  
SEP11

MAR 18 1981



MAR 18 1981

Honorable Marion (Mike) Menning  
Minnesota Senate  
St. Paul, Minnesota 55115

Dear Mr. Menning:

Thank you for your letter to President Reagan concerning possible abuse in the Low Income Energy Assistance Program (LIEAP).

Let me assure you that the new Administration is sincerely concerned with the many problems of waste and abuse in various public assistance programs. The Administration is looking for ways to cut costs and, at the same time, to protect the rights of the genuinely needy. We appreciate your sharing your comments with us and we will consider them as we develop recommendations to address this vitally important issue.

Sincerely,

Herbert R. Doggette, Jr.  
Acting Commissioner

*Handwritten note:*  
I want to know.

MARION (MIKE) MENNING

Senator 26th District  
R. R. 1, Box 300D  
Edgerton, Minnesota 55128  
and  
Room 28 State Capitol  
St. Paul, Minnesota 55155  
(612) 296-4171

Senate

State of Minnesota

February 19, 1981

The Honorable Ronald Reagan  
President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear President Reagan:

Congratulations. You are really trying. I have a suggestion on further cuts.

In implementing the fuel assistance program, the Carter Administration refused to include an asset limitation on the applicant's eligibility to receive funds. In the State of Minnesota, there are many individuals worth \$50,000 to a half million dollars who are collecting money for fuel oil assistance during the winter season. I might add that there are even some farmers collecting assistance under this program who have land holdings worth a million dollars. As a taxpayer, I am sick and tired of having my tax dollars go to people with this much money.

In Minnesota we have been working on our state program to implement an asset limitation on eligibility for fuel oil assistance. I do believe the program should be continued in some cases. It is necessary to help those people who truly need it.

If you need further information on this suggestion, please give me a call.

Keep up the good work, Mr. President.

Sincerely,

Marion (Mike) Menning  
State Senator

MM/mh



3P  
MARION (MIKE) MENNING

Senator 26th District  
R.R. 1, Box 300D  
Edgerton, Minnesota 56128  
and  
Room 28 State Capitol  
St. Paul, Minnesota 55155  
Phone: (612) 296-4171

**Senate**  
**State of Minnesota**

018180

April 3, 1981

The Honorable Ronald Reagan  
President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear President Reagan:

I am enclosing a copy of a letter I have written to Acting  
Commissioner Doggette, Jr. Please stop these types of  
bureaucrats from wrecking our nation.

You have a tough job. You have my support and my prayers  
in running this country.

I praise the Lord that you were not more seriously hurt  
several days ago.

Sincerely,



Marion (Mike) Menning  
State Senator

MM/mh  
enclosure

FB002-38

**WHITE HOUSE  
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET**

O - OUTGOING

H - INTERNAL

INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 81 06 124

Name of Correspondent: William J. Hughes

MI Mail Report

User Codes: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

Subject: Encloses a letter from William F. Gillen requesting that the President turn down former President Carter's request for permission to stop at military exchanges and commissaries.

**ROUTE TO:**

**ACTION**

**DISPOSITION**

Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>LA Inc</u>	<sup>CH</sup> ORIGINATOR	<u>81106125</u>	<u>NAN</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>81,09,02</u> <sup>CH</sup>
	Referral Note:	<u>  /  /</u>			<u>  /  /</u>
	Referral Note:	<u>  /  /</u>			<u>  /  /</u>
	Referral Note:	<u>  /  /</u>			<u>  /  /</u>
	Referral Note:	<u>  /  /</u>			<u>  /  /</u>

**ACTION CODES:**

- A - Appropriate Action
- C - Comment/Recommendation
- D - Draft Response
- F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure

- I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
- R - Direct Reply w/Copy
- S - For Signature
- X - Interim Reply

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- B - Non-Special Referral
- C - Completed
- S - Suspended

**FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:**

- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
- Code = "A"
- Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.  
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).  
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.  
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

# RECORDS MANAGEMENT ONLY

## CLASSIFICATION SECTION

No. of Additional Correspondents: \_\_\_\_\_ Media: L Individual Codes: 1230 \_\_\_\_\_

Prime Subject Code: EG 002-38 Secondary Subject Codes: ND 009 \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

## PRESIDENTIAL REPLY

Code	Date	Comment	Form
C	_____	Time: _____	P- _____
DSP	_____	Time: _____	Media: _____

**SIGNATURE CODES:**

- CPn - Presidential Correspondence**
- n - 0 - Unknown
- n - 1 - Ronald Wilson Reagan
- n - 2 - Ronald Reagan
- n - 3 - Ron
- n - 4 - Dutch
- n - 5 - Ron Reagan
- n - 6 - Ronald
- n - 7 - Ronnie
  
- CLn - First Lady's Correspondence**
- n - 1 - Nancy Reagan
- n - 2 - Nancy
- n - 3 - Mrs. Ronald Reagan
  
- CBn - Presidential & First Lady's Correspondence**
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- n - 2 - Ron - Nancy

**MEDIA CODES:**

- B - Box/package
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- G - Message
- H - Handcarried
- L - Letter
- M - Mailgram
- O - Memo
- P - Photo
- R - Report
- S - Sealed
- T - Telegram
- V - Telephone
- X - Miscellaneous
- Y - Study

JUN 15 1981

029763

Mr. William F. Gillen  
21 East 58th Street  
Brant Beach, N. J. 08008

June 11, 1981

Congressman William J. Hughes  
436 Cannon Building  
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Congressman Hughes:

I request that you contact President Reagan and ask him to turn down Mr. Carter's request for permission to shop at military exchanges and commissaries.

Mr. Carter, after being educated at the Naval Academy, spent seven (7) years on active duty and then elected to go to "greener pastures". He now receives a pension as a former president of \$69,500 plus his pension from the State of Georgia, plus private income, which places him in the vicinity of more than \$200,000 per year. This is far more than three times the pay of the highest ranking military commanders on our country now on active duty.

In Los Angeles in May 1977, he said, "It's not unreasonable for the taxpayers to demand that the military at least pay enough for goods they buy to cover operating expenses."

Granting Mr. Carter his request is an insult to every individual who retired from our military services after completing at least twenty (20) years of military service to their country.

Respectfully yours,



William F. Gillen  
LCDR USNR (Ret.)

WFG:mac

~~WILLIAM J. HUGHES~~  
~~20 DISTRICT, NEW JERSEY~~

COMMITTEES:  
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY  
COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT  
MARINE AND FISHERIES  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON AGING

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
Washington, D.C. 20515

WASHINGTON OFFICE:  
436 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515  
(202) 225-6572

DISTRICT OFFICES:  
2920 ATLANTIC AVENUE  
ATLANTIC CITY, NEW JERSEY 08401  
(609) 345-4844

427 LANDIS AVENUE  
VINELAND, NEW JERSEY 08360  
(609) 696-3269

151 NORTH BROADWAY  
P.O. BOX 248  
PENNSVILLE, NEW JERSEY 08070  
(609) 678-3333

June 22, 1981

President Ronald Reagan  
The White House  
Washington, DC 20500

029763

Dear Mr. President:


I am forwarding to you a copy of a letter sent to me from a constituent regarding benefits to former President Carter.

I would appreciate your attention to and comments upon this correspondence.

I thank you for your prompt reply.

With kind personal regards.

Sincerely,

  
William J. Hughes  
Member of Congress

WJH:j1

# WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

O - OUTGOING

H - INTERNAL

I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 8/10/13

Name of Correspondent: Patrick J. Leahy

MI Mail Report User Codes: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

Subject: Requests assistance in obtaining four photos of President Carter.

ROUTE TO:	ACTION	DISPOSITION
Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response Code Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>LA Free</u>	<u>ORIGINATOR</u> <u>8/10/13</u>	<u>NAN</u> <u>C 8/10/14</u>
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

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**FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:**

- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
- Code = "A"
- Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: Senator Leahy's office has been advised per phone conversation that requested photos are not available at White House.

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.  
 Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOP).  
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 Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

# RECORDS MANAGEMENT ONLY

## CLASSIFICATION SECTION

No. of Additional Correspondents: \_\_\_\_\_ Media:   L   Individual Codes:   1210   \_\_\_\_\_

Prime Subject Code:   EG 002-38   Secondary Subject Codes: \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

## PRESIDENTIAL REPLY

Code	Date	Comment	Form
C	_____	Time: _____	P. _____
DSP	_____	Time: _____	Media: _____

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  - n - 6 - Ronald
  - n - 7 - Ronnie
  
- CLn - First Lady's Correspondence
  - n - 1 - Nancy Reagan
  - n - 2 - Nancy
  - n - 3 - Mrs. Ronald Reagan
  
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- S - Sealed
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- V - Telephone
- X - Miscellaneous
- Y - Study

United States Senate  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 9, 1981

Mr. Max L. Friedersdorf  
Special Assistant to the President  
for Legislative Affairs  
The White House  
Washington, DC 20500

042731

Dear Mr. Friedersdorf *map*

I am writing to follow up on phone calls from Mike Calhoun of my staff requesting assistance in obtaining four photographs of President Carter.


I am assembling a photo montage for my Burlington, Vermont office and already have, through you and your staff's help, the necessary photographs of President and Mrs. Reagan.

I would appreciate your additional help in securing the following photographs.

- A.) One, 16 x 20 medium range shot of the 1976 Presidential swearing in ceremony taken at the Capitol.
- B.) One, 16 x 20 shot of President and Mrs. Carter walking down Pennsylvania Avenue.
- C.) Two, 8 x 10 color prints taken on January 19, 1981, of my son Kevin, with President Carter in the Oval Office.

Calls to the former President's offices in Atlanta have failed to turn up any of these photos and they have suggested they be obtained through the White House Press Office. I would be grateful for any help you can offer in this regard.

Sincerely,



PATRICK J. LEAHY  
United States Senator

PJL/jbc



FC002-38

**WHITE HOUSE  
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET**

O - OUTGOING

H - INTERNAL

I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 8/11/06

Name of Correspondent: William J. Hughes

MI Mail Report

User Codes: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

Subject: writes again enclosing a letter from William F. Sullivan asking the President to turn down Mr. Carter's request for permission to shop at military exchanges and Commissaries.

**ROUTE TO:**

**ACTION**

**DISPOSITION**

Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>LA Frie</u>	<u>ORIGINATOR</u>	<u>8/11/06</u>	<u>MF</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>8/11/06</u>
<u>SP STEV</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>8/11/06</u>		<u>C</u>	<u>8/11/06</u>
<u>DOD</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>8/11/08</u>		<u>A</u>	<u>8/11/08</u>
<u>LA Frie</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>8/12/04</u>		<u>C</u>	<u>8/12/04</u>
		<u>FYI</u>			
		<u>1 1</u>			<u>1 1</u>

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**W62867**

# RECORDS MANAGEMENT ONLY

## CLASSIFICATION SECTION

No. of Additional Correspondents: \_\_\_\_\_ Media: L Individual Codes: 1230 \_\_\_\_\_

Prime Subject Code: EG 00238 Secondary Subject Codes: ND 009 \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

## PRESIDENTIAL REPLY

<u>Code</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Comment</u>	<u>Form</u>
<u>C</u>	_____	<u>Time:</u> _____	<u>P-</u> _____
<u>DSP</u>	_____	<u>Time:</u> _____	<u>Media:</u> _____

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- n - 6 - Ronald
- n - 7 - Ronnie

#### CLn - First Lady's Correspondence

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- n - 2 - Nancy
- n - 3 - Mrs. Ronald Reagan

#### CBn - Presidential & First Lady's Correspondence

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- X - Miscellaneous
- Y - Study



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

December 2, 1981

Honorable William J. Hughes  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Hughes:

This is in reply to your letter of November 2, 1981 to President Reagan. Subsequent to his November 16 response to you, Max L. Friedersdorf, Assistant to the President, forwarded your letter to this Department.

Your letter was accompanied by a copy of your June 22, 1981 letter to the President, forwarding the inquiry of your constituent LCDR William F. Gillen, USNR (Ret.). LCDR Gillen objected to any extension of post exchange and commissary shopping privileges to former President Carter. According to our records, your letter was not received in this Department. However, we did respond to two other letters sent by LCDR Gillen. A copy of each is enclosed for your information. Those letters summarize this Department's policy on the shopping privileges.

I trust these letters will be helpful in preparing your response to LCDR Gillen.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "William H. Taft, IV".

William H. Taft, IV

Enclosures

WILLIAM J. HUGHES  
2D DISTRICT, NEW JERSEY

COMMITTEES:  
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY  
COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT  
MARINE AND FISHERIES  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON AGING

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
Washington, D.C. 20515

WASHINGTON OFFICE:  
436 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515  
(202) 225-6572

DISTRICT OFFICES:  
2307 NEW ROAD  
NORTHFIELD, NEW JERSEY 08225  
(609) 645-7957

151 NORTH BROADWAY  
P.O. Box 248  
PENNSVILLE, NEW JERSEY 08070  
(609) 678-3333

November 2, 1981

048640

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C. 20500


Dear Mr. President:

In the event my correspondence of  
June 22 never reached your office, I have  
enclosed another copy, for your use and  
information.

I would appreciate your reviewing  
Mr. Gillen's remarks, and furnishing me with  
the benefit of your thoughts and observations  
so that I may respond to my constituent.

With kind personal regards.

Sincerely,



William J. Hughes  
Member of Congress

WJH:em  
Enclosure

November 16, 1981

Dear Bill:

I would like to thank you for your November 2 letter to the President enclosing a copy of correspondence from William F. Gillen regarding whether former President Carter will be granted permission to shop at military exchanges and commissaries.

You may be assured that I have directed your constituent's views to the appropriate officials within the Administration for further consideration. I hope that you will not hesitate to contact me whenever I can be of further assistance to you.

Again, thank you for your interest in writing on behalf of your constituent.

With cordial regard, I am

Sincerely,

Max L. Friedersdorf  
Assistant to the President

The Honorable William J. Hughes  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

MLF:CMF:ASR:asr

cc: w/copy of inc, Joni Stevens (Military Aide's Office) -  
for DIRECT reply, with copy to MLFriedersdorf.

June 22, 1971

President Ronald Reagan  
The White House  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I am forwarding to you a copy of a letter written to me from a constituent regarding benefits to former President Carter.

I would appreciate your attention to and comments upon this correspondence.

I thank you for your prompt reply.

With kind personal regards.

Sincerely,

William J. Hughes  
Member of Congress

WJH jl

Mr. William F. Gillen  
21 East 58th Street  
Brant Beach, N. J. 08008

June 11, 1981

Congressman William J. Hughes  
436 Cannon Building  
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Congressman Hughes:


I request that you contact President Reagan and ask him to turn down Mr. Carter's request for permission to shop at military exchanges and commissaries.

Mr. Carter, after being educated at the Naval Academy, spent seven (7) years on active duty and then elected to go to "greener pastures". He now receives a pension as a former president of \$69,500 plus his pension from the State of Georgia, plus private income, which places him in the vicinity of more than \$200,000 per year. This is far more than three times the pay of the highest ranking military commanders of our country now on active duty.

In Los Angeles in May 1977, he said, "It's not unreasonable for the taxpayers to demand that the military at least pay enough for goods they buy to cover operating expenses."

Granting Mr. Carter his request is an insult to every individual who retired from our military services after completing at least twenty (20) years of military service to their country.

Respectfully yours,



William F. Gillen  
LCDR USNR (Ret.)

WFG:mac

053312

5200


LD 7

FG 002-38

PR 005

Lee, Dan

WHITE HOUSE MAIL ROOM  
RECEIPT FOR INSURED MAIL



Date 12/17/81 No. 300480

Time of Receipt 10:00AM Clerk's Init. J6

Declared Value 50 Fee Paid .85

Postage 2.45

Special Handling .75

Special Delivery \_\_\_\_\_

Restricted Delivery Fee \_\_\_\_\_

Return Receipt Fee:  
At Time of Mailing \_\_\_\_\_

After Time of Mailing \_\_\_\_\_

Sender Joe CAZZERI

Addressee DAN LEE OFFICE  
JF TIMMY CARTER

75 SPRING ST.

ATLANTA, GA 30303

FRAMES PHOTO G200



WHITE HOUSE  
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

FG002-38

O - OUTGOING

H - INTERNAL

I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 1/1

Name of Correspondent: USDC for the No. Dist. of Georgia

MI Mail Report

User Codes: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

Subject: Civil Action File No. C82-192A  
Curtis L. Wrenn v. Jimmy Carter

ROUTE TO:

ACTION

DISPOSITION

Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>CW Holland</u>	<u>ORIGINATOR</u>	<u>82,02,16</u>			<u>C82,02,18</u>
	Referral Note:				
<u>CW AT 14</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>82,02,16</u>			<u>C82,02,18</u>
	Referral Note:	<u>Attachments sent to DOJ</u>			
		<u>1/1</u>			<u>1/1</u>
	Referral Note:				
		<u>1/1</u>			<u>1/1</u>
	Referral Note:				
		<u>1/1</u>			<u>1/1</u>
	Referral Note:				

ACTION CODES:

- A - Appropriate Action
- C - Comment/Recommendation
- D - Draft Response
- F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure

- I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
- R - Direct Reply w/Copy
- S - For Signature
- X - Interim Reply

DISPOSITION CODES:

- A - Answered
- B - Non-Special Referral
- C - Completed
- S - Suspended

FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
- Code = "A"
- Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.  
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).  
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.  
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

# RECORDS MANAGEMENT ONLY

## CLASSIFICATION SECTION

No. of Additional Correspondents: \_\_\_\_\_ Media: X Individual Codes: L 130 \_\_\_\_\_

Prime Subject Code: FG 002-38 Secondary Subject Codes: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

## PRESIDENTIAL REPLY

Code	Date	Comment	Form
C	_____	Time: _____	P- _____
DSP	_____	Time: _____	Media: _____

### SIGNATURE CODES:

- CPn - Presidential Correspondence
  - n - 0 - Unknown
  - n - 1 - Ronald Wilson Reagan
  - n - 2 - Ronald Reagan
  - n - 3 - Ron
  - n - 4 - Dutch
  - n - 5 - Ron Reagan
  - n - 6 - Ronald
  - n - 7 - Ronnie
- CLn - First Lady's Correspondence
  - n - 1 - Nancy Reagan
  - n - 2 - Nancy
  - n - 3 - Mrs. Ronald Reagan
- CBn - Presidential & First Lady's Correspondence
  - n - 1 - Ronald Reagan - Nancy Reagan
  - n - 2 - Ron - Nancy

### MEDIA CODES:

- B - Box/package
- C - Copy
- D - Official document
- G - Message
- H - Handcarried
- L - Letter
- M - Mailgram
- O - Memo
- P - Photo
- R - Report
- S - Sealed
- T - Telegram
- V - Telephone
- X - Miscellaneous
- Y - Study



U.S. Department of Justice

Civil Division

060724  
-  
FG06238

Office of the Assistant Attorney General

Washington, D.C. 20530

Mr. Fred Fielding  
Counsel to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

APR 11 1982

Dear Mr. Fielding:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter regarding Curtis L. Wrenn v. Jimmy Carter, President of the United States, et al., Civil Action No. C82-192A (N.D. Ga.). The plaintiff in this case has improperly named former President Jimmy Carter in this Title VII discrimination case and we intend to advise the Court that the former President is not a proper defendant. The case has been delegated to the United States Attorney's office in Atlanta and has been assigned a supervising attorney in this office, Jose Sandoval 633-3416.

Sincerely,

*Richard K. Willard*  
J. PAUL McGRATH  
Assistant Attorney General

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*ll - do we  
have a file  
on this case -  
If so, please  
keep*

Date

*4.23.82*

Suspense Date

*the carbon  
on file*

MEMORANDUM FOR:

*David*

FROM:

DIANNA G. HOLLAND

*for  
to send  
original  
to central  
files*

ACTION

\_\_\_\_\_

Approved

\_\_\_\_\_

Please handle/review

*x*  
\_\_\_\_\_

For your information - *then*  
*to central files*  
For your recommendation

\_\_\_\_\_

For the files

\_\_\_\_\_

Please see me

\_\_\_\_\_

Please prepare response for  
\_\_\_\_\_ signature

\_\_\_\_\_

As we discussed

\_\_\_\_\_

Return to me for filing

\_\_\_\_\_

COMMENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 18, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR J. PAUL MCGRATH

FROM: FRED F. FIELDING *Orig. signed by FFF*

SUBJECT: Wrenn v. President Jimmy Carter, et al.,  
U.S. District Court for the Northern  
District of Georgia, Atlanta Division,  
Civil Action No. C82-192A

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Attached for handling by your office is the Summons and pro se Complaint for Monetary and Injunctive Relief in the above-referenced lawsuit which was received by the White House via certified mail on February 11, 1982.

This action seeks monetary, injunctive and other equitable relief arising from the alleged wrongful denial of employment of plaintiff by Defendant Emory University and the alleged wrongful refusal by the Federal Defendants to investigate a charge of racial discrimination based on the denial of employment.

Unless you request otherwise, it does not appear necessary that this office participate further in the defense of this action. However, should any further questions arise, please have the attorneys assigned this matter contact David Waller at 456-2674.

Thank you for your cooperation and assistance in the defense of this matter.

16

*Handwritten initials in green ink*

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF  
WASHINGTON POLICY DEVELOPMENT

3/16

1982 MAR 16 P 8:41

079470PD

FG002-38

FG00601

To: Ed Harper

Useful analysis of different approaches to  
policy development, illustrated by  
Carter's ill-fated urban policy effort.

*Handwritten signature in blue ink*  
John McClaughry

1982 MAR 16 P 8:41

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 18, 1982

E

Quick review of attached.

Detailed analysis of Carter's Urban Policy effort.

- a. Seven models for policy formulation
  1. legislative clearance model
  2. Departmental-White House Staff(or OMB) model
  3. WH Staff Model
  4. Outside Task Force Model
  5. Cabinet Government-Interagency Task Force Model
  6. WH Lead-Interagency Task Force Model
  7. Congressional Initiative Model
- b. Description of Carter's Urban Policy Process  
A disaster from beginning to end.
- c. Evaluation criteria
  1. Did the process actually produce a decision?
    - a) Was the decision internally consistent?
    - b) Did it meet budget constraints and indicate priorities?
    - c) Politically viable?
    - d) Decision rendered within whatever time constraints were relevant?
  2. Did process permit reasonable debate of up side and down sides?
  3. Alternatives considered? Up side etc.
  4. Did interested parties participate?
  5. Adequately informed--data, analysis etc. provided?
  6. Encourage creativity, innovation and new ideas?
  7. Reality testing?
  8. Were there understood decision rules?
  9. Decision consistent with the will of the President? Allow revision by the President?

Conclusions:

Structure makes a difference. Pure Cabinet Government model is the weakest & WH Staff-Dept. model the strongest defined by above criteria.

E

## THE PRESIDENCY AND POLICY FORMULATION: PRESIDENT CARTER AND THE URBAN POLICY

by

HAROLD L. WOLMAN

Senior Research Associate in Public Finance  
Urban Institute

and

ASTRID E. MERGET

Associate Professor of Public Administration  
George Washington University

### Introduction

Presidents adopt different mechanisms and devices to formulate their Administration's domestic policy. As a substantial volume of political science literature suggests, each President adopts a decision-making system appropriate to his own background, experience, and style. However, as these studies far too rarely note, some methods may work better than others. Indeed the relative effectiveness of those methods may vary according to the nature and substance of the decision and the circumstances surrounding the decision as well as with the style and personal preferences of the President. In short, the process a President selects for formulating broad scale domestic policy may critically determine the policy outcome. This article reviews the various mechanisms for Administration policy-making, describes and analyzes the process of formulating an urban policy in the Carter Administration, and examines this process in the light of evaluative criteria we set forth.

#### I. Models for Presidential Policy Formulation

Political scientists and historians have identified a variety of different methods through which Presidents have formulated their domestic policy. Most Administrations, while using several of these models, have nonetheless preferred one dominant approach. The models include:

*Legislative Clearance Model.* Legislative proposals are initiated by a single department or agency with legislative review and clearance provided by the Office of

Management and Budget (formerly the Bureau of the Budget) to assure that the proposal is "in accord with the program of the President." This model, initiated in Calvin Coolidge's Administration and greatly expanded by Roosevelt and Truman, is still the normal means of handling routine legislative proposals, which, in number, constitute the bulk of an Administration's legislative activity.

*Departmental-White House Staff (or OMB) Model.* Under this model a department initiates policy while working closely with OMB-BOB (as in the Truman, Eisenhower years, and Kennedy years) or with the White House staff (as increasingly in the Johnson and Nixon years) in the development of a policy proposal. In this model OMB (BOB) or the White House Staff plays a much more active role in policy development rather than the more passive role played in the conventional model of legislative clearance.

*White House Staff Model.* Here the White House Staff initiates and directs policy formulation activity and works with Departmental officials (sometimes selected by White House rather than the Department), who provide technical advice and assistance. The Kennedy and Johnson Administrations both used this model. The Nixon Administration relied extensively on this approach when the White House Domestic Policy staff played a predominant role in initiating new policy.<sup>1</sup>

*Outside Task Force Model.* Particularly during the Johnson years, policy initia-



tion resulted from proposals formulated by the White House staff on the basis of the deliberations and discussions of outside task forces. These task forces, put together by the White House, were intended to reflect the major interests in American society concerned with the issue under consideration. They worked closely with White House and Bureau of the Budget staff, frequently with relatively little participation by affected departments. President Johnson viewed the outside task force as a device for inspiring more creativity and innovation in the process of policy formulation than reliance on the bureaucracy would provide.<sup>2</sup>

*Cabinet Government-Interagency Task Force.* The Carter Administration has emphasized policy formulation through interagency task forces set up by the White House and chaired by a single lead agency. The White House plays a passive role, engaged, if at all, only as a mediator.

*White House Lead-Interagency Task Force.* This model also involves policy-making through an interagency task force, perhaps chaired by a lead agency as in the Interagency Task Force-Cabinet Government model, but with the White House playing a stronger and more direct role in shaping policy. The primary difference in the two models is the activism or passivity of the White House role.

*Congressional Initiative.* In this model a particular Congressional committee, subcommittee, or Congressman initiates legislation; the Administration responds, either routinely through departmental analysis or through review by the White House.

These seven models vary in formal structure and process, particularly with respect to (1) the initiator of the policy formulation process, (2) the relative degree of involvement of the White House and the departments, and (3) the hierarchical nature of decision-making process. From Kennedy through Nixon presidents increasingly relied on the White House for initiation of important proposals. The White House staff played a progressively more active and determinative role in the process relative to the Departments.

The Carter Administration came into

office with a philosophy of policy formulation somewhat at odds with these recent trends. Reacting against the dominance that the White House staff commanded during the Nixon and Ford Administration, President Carter declared his intention to institute "Cabinet Government." According to Jack Watson, the Secretary to the Cabinet, the four central aspects of cabinet government include:

- Cabinet officers should be free to appoint subordinates of their own choice.
- Cabinet officers should be able to set their own priorities for their department.
- Cabinet officers should be able to administer their bureaucracies free of White House interference.
- Cabinet officers should be delegated significant policy-making authority.<sup>3</sup>

#### *Carter and the Urban Policy*

Jimmy Carter's campaign statements, his electoral constituency, and his initial appointments all suggested that confronting the problems of America's cities would be one of his Administration's priorities. At the U.S. Conference of Mayors meeting in Milwaukee in June 1976, shortly after his nomination was assured, Governor Carter told the mayors that if elected they would have "a friend, an ally and a partner in the White House." Carter then added "I believe that working together, we can turn the tide, stop the decay and set in motion a process of growth that by the end of this century can give us cities worthy of the greatest nation on earth."

As President, Carter turned quickly to address urban problems. With his preference for Cabinet Government as the preferred model of formulating domestic policy, he constituted an interagency task force to tackle urban policy. On March 21, 1977 the President issued a memorandum to HUD Secretary Patricia Roberts Harris requesting that she exercise her authority to convene the major domestic agencies as an Urban and Regional Policy Group (URPG). By implication, the burden was on the participating agencies to

conceptualize and elaborate a national urban policy for the Carter Administration.

The task force proceeded slowly. In July, 1977, Vernon Jordan, Executive Director of the National Urban League, publicly upbraided the President for his inattention to the problems of cities and their minority residents. Speaking at the National Urban League with President Carter in attendance, Jordan said, "the sad fact is that what this Administration has not done . . . far exceeds its list of accomplishments." His remarks, as a highly respected spokesman from a core of the President's electoral constituency, galvanized the Administration into action and constituted a turning point in the urban policy process. The URPG was quickly transformed from a rather passive group for long range policy development into a mechanism for the formulation of the "urban policy" component of the President's domestic program for the coming year.

As the framing of a national urban policy proceeded, the structure of the policy process began to depart from Carter's original model of cabinet government, which characterized the period prior to Jordan's critique; ultimately it evolved through three other models—the White House Lead-Interagency Task Force Model, the Departmental-White House Staff Model, and the White House Staff-Departmental Model. The evolution of the process can be analyzed with respect to the following structural characteristics:

*Mandate and Timetable.* There were at least four distinct changes in the mandate before the URPG. No one of them proceeded with an explicit imperative from the President himself.

Mandate 1) In the pre-Jordan period, the URPG only inferred a mandate from the President's initial memorandum to Secretary Harris establishing the URPG. In the memo the President noted, that "During my campaign, I pledged an urban and regional policy based on mutual trust, mutual respect, and mutual commitment between states and local government on the one hand and the federal government on the other . . . the first step toward achieving the goal must be coordina-

tion among federal departments and agencies." The memo stated that, "The purpose of the group will be to conduct a comprehensive review of all federal programs which impact on urban and regional areas; to seek perspectives of state and local officials concerning the role of the Federal Government in urban and regional development; and to submit appropriate administrative and legislative recommendations." The memo was silent, however, on what the nature of those recommendations should be.

The lack of substantive guidance from the President was highlighted at the first meeting. After a freewheeling discussion among departmental representatives, Secretary of Commerce Juanita Kreps asked the director of the Domestic Policy Staff, Stuart Eizenstat, what the President thought the most pressing urban problems were. Eizenstat responded that the President had never directly answered that question, but during the campaign he had frequently commented on the loss in tax base many cities were experiencing.

The only attempt at further specificity was offered by Jack Watson. At one early meeting of the URPG he urged the participants to prepare a memorandum for the President by mid-summer which would characterize existing federal policy and also propose some broad philosophy or set of principles to guide the Carter Administration in designing its own urban policy.

Watson's recommendation was notable in two respects. First, it was conveyed merely as a clarification of the original memo. It was presented as a suggestion, not a mandate; phrases such as the "President wants" or the "President expects" or any other such invocation of presidential authority or imperative were not asserted. Second, despite the ambiguities in the first memo there was no further substantive guidance.

Mandate 2) After the Carter-Jordan incident, the mandate changed drastically, shifting from a philosophical consideration of policy principles to a challenge to frame a coherent urban policy, consisting of specific proposals.

The timetable also changed. The pro-

nouncement of the main themes of the President's urban policy was targeted for the State of the Union Message in January, with the important details to be specified in a special message to Congress scheduled for March 15. Hastening to respond to Jordan's critique, as many of the new programs as possible were to be captured in the Fiscal Year 1979 budget. The members of the URPG, once passive discussants of policy principles, now turned actively to programs and funding levels. The timetable called for URPG budget submissions to OMB by late September and for presenting an overall draft report to the White House by early November. When the agencies failed to meet the September deadline for budget submission the date was extended to mid October, then late October. Eventually, the budget target was dropped altogether.

Work then focused on meeting the November target for the draft report. While direct presidential guidance was not forthcoming, Eizenstat and Bert Carp, his deputy, took a more active interest in the URPG deliberations. They urged the URPG to produce a document with federal policy targeted toward large cities in distress.

A draft document, reflecting the URPG deliberation and recommendations, was completed by late October. Entitled "Cities and People in Distress" and prepared primarily by Marshall Kaplan, a HUD consultant, the draft set forth five primary problem areas affecting cities (unemployment, fiscal condition, physical environment, institutional capacity, and equal opportunity); numerous policy proposals were directed at these problem areas. The document was embellished with a long list of proposals which the member agencies or URPG had suggested. The 111-page document, promptly leaked to the press in early November, sparked criticism for its exclusive focus on distressed central cities and for its contention that all federal programs should be "titled toward strengthening Urban America."

Within the White House and OMB the document was accorded suspicion. A quick calculation of the accumulated costs signalled a phenomenal increase in

the budget. The proposed programs would cost an estimated \$10-20 billion annually, instead of the \$5-7 billion the Domestic Policy Staff had set as its estimate. The publication of the document ended the effort to tie urban policy directly to the FY 1979 budget; instead the Administration decided to ask for a supplemental appropriation for any programs it later decided to fund in FY 1979.

Mandate 3) Once again the mandate changed. With a Presidential pronouncement about urban policy set for the President's State of the Union Message in January, 1978, budget and programmatic details were set aside in search of a statement about general principles and guidelines, enlivened with a few major illustrations of new policy initiatives. The timetable now called for a memo to the President in mid December for use in the State of the Union Message.

Work now commenced on writing a decision memo for the President conveying to him the gist of the document "Cities and People in Distress," but revised to remove its exclusive emphasis on large cities, and its long list of programs. The decision memo was to reflect only the philosophical underpinnings of an urban policy and the broad outlines of programs and proposals consistent with those underpinnings. The memo, addressed to the President jointly from Eizenstat and HUD Secretary Harris, was first drafted by HUD but several drafts ensued from extended negotiations between HUD and Domestic Policy Staff. (After November the URPG did not meet and for all practical purposes, ceased to function.) As a result of this prolonged effort, the memo was not formally signed by Harris and Eizenstat until January 9 and apparently was not read by the President until *after* his State of the Union Address.

Instead, OMB briefed the President and in early January presented to him a listing of various urban programs considered in the URPG discussions along with their budgetary implications. The President rejected them and retreated from including a major urban policy statement in the State of the Union Message. The message, in fact, contained only casual refer-

ence to urban issues; Carter indicated that a supplementary budget request would be submitted for any new initiative to be announced in a special urban message in March.

Mandate 4) The White House then directed the entire process toward the drafting of the March special message. The mandate for this message was made somewhat less ambiguous as a result of the President's response in late January to the Eizenstat-Harris memo. The note Carter sent the two signators indicated that the urban policy should have four emphases: (1) no new money, (2) neighborhoods, (3) a strong state role and (4) a strong private sector role.

Between January and March, work concentrated on a new decision memo to serve as the basis for the President's urban message. The President finally received this memo, after protracted negotiation between HUD and the Domestic Policy Staff, on March 23. The President's urban message was delivered on March 27.

*Membership, Participation and Structure.* In the pre-Jordan days, the URPG typified Watson's notion of Cabinet Government. HUD served as a convener for the interagency task force whose members consisted of seven departments or agencies whose mission directly touched the concerns of urban areas. In addition to HUD, the members included the Departments of Commerce, Treasury, Transportation, Health, Education and Welfare, and Labor, and (belatedly) the Environmental Protection Agency. "Non-urban" agencies with a potential stake in the outcome—the Departments of Agriculture, Justice (LEAA, Immigration Service), and GSA—were not members, nor were they included as observers. Nor, were other ongoing policy processes—the Economic Development Reorganization Task Force, the Tax Policy Process, Welfare Reform, and Energy—synchronized with the urban policy process; occasionally representatives were sent as observers.

In March 1977, the first meeting of the URPG took place in the Roosevelt room of the White House with Secretary Harris chairing the discussion among the princi-

pals—for the most part, the Secretaries of the several departments or their designated Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary—and several key White House staff sat in, most notably Stuart Eizenstat of the Domestic Policy Staff, and Jack Watson, the President's Advisor on Intergovernmental Relations.

Thereafter, the URPG meetings involved departmental deputies. Secretary Harris designated Donna E. Shalala, Assistant Secretary for Policy Development and Research, as chair, but then assigned one of the Secretary's own special assistants, Lyn Curtis, to be Executive Director. After the first principals' meeting in the White House, junior members of the White House Domestic Policy Staff and the Vice-President's office attended, as did a Deputy Director from OMB. On occasion, Watson appeared to make a few brief remarks.

The agenda was loosely set. In the earliest meetings, there were no formal rules of procedure, no hierarchy and no assignments. Meetings were little more than wide-ranging discussions.

The membership and structure changed notably after the Jordan encounter. The most publicized change occurred when Harris replaced Shalala with Robert Embry, Assistant Secretary for Community Planning and Development. Embry, who presided over HUD's Community Development Block Grant Program, came to the Department from Baltimore with a reputation as a man capable of reviving a declining city. He had been seriously considered by President-elect Carter for the secretaryship of HUD, and, perhaps more than any other HUD official, was known to have strong ties to the White House. The second change was one of venue. Meetings, previously held in a HUD conference room, were now scheduled weekly in the Old Executive Office Building. Perhaps the most important change was the regular attendance of Eizenstat assuming a co-chair responsibility with Embry.

A more hierarchical arrangement materialized. Embry asserted a more vigorous role in outlining and distributing agendas for the frequent meetings, in guiding discussions, in instructing or at

least imploring agencies to prepare supportive documentation for their proposals and in attempting to bring closure to the discussion. Under Embry, the URPG took on a formal organization with a set of operating procedures and assignments. But the URPG faltered when faced with deadlines for the FY 1979 budget and then the State of the Union Message.

After the preparation of the "Cities and People in Distress" document the URPG as a formal organization ceased to exist. It neither met nor deliberated. The January 9th decision memo from Eisenstat and Harris resulted from negotiations between HUD and the White House Domestic Policy Staff. The same actors were the only participants in the development of the President's March message.

*Staff Resources.* At no time did the interagency task force have independent staff resources. Before Embry assumed the co-chair, there was virtually no staff support for the URPG, even within HUD. Although Secretary Harris assigned Curtis as Executive Director on a full-time basis, he had but a handful of interns plus a secretary or two. While Shalala presided over some 200 staff in her capacity as Assistant Secretary for Policy Development and Research, none spent their time on urban policy matters directly. The curious division of responsibility within HUD between Shalala and Curtis made the former reluctant to use her ample staff resources in a way which would seem competitive with Curtis, the Secretary's designee. The other URPG agencies lent no support. Deputies and their staffs spent relatively few hours at URPG meetings, in reading and commenting on the successive drafts of discussion papers, and in preparing their own agency proposals.

When Embry assumed control, policy and staff functions within HUD merged. Embry recruited Yvonne Perry, a professor at Howard University, to assume a post as Deputy Assistant Secretary, with primary responsibility for staffing him at URPG. Perry freed up several civil servants to work with her, and she enlisted the assistance of a few academics on leave in HUD. Embry also made available funds for her to hire consultants, includ-

ing Kaplan, the primary author of the first draft of "Cities and People in Distress."

In the post-URPG phase, the White House for the first time designated a staff person, Ralph Schlosstein, on loan from the Treasury Department, to work on urban policy. HUD continued to rely on Embry and his staff, with Kaplan assuming a larger role.

*Operating Procedures and Decision-Making Rules.* In the pre-Jordan period, early meetings resembled seminars with each agency articulating its own point of view on urban problems and urban policy. These discussions were provoked by a lengthy thought paper prepared by Curtis, reviewing and evaluating the policy thrusts of the Great Society and the New Federalism; it broadly charted the course of urban decline, and it asserted the need for a "coherent" federal urban policy. When the paper circulated for comment, each agency typically reacted defensively to the characterization of its own urban activities; most submitted a reinterpretation of how its departmental urban-related policies and programs worked. The paper exchange usually produced yet another draft in the series of the paper; each version became diluted in its once-pithy critique of existing urban policy.

When Embry assumed the Co-chair, operating procedures became clearer. Task forces were set up to carve out substantive areas of policy concern. Each task force was chaired and convened by a lead agency. For example, Treasury served as the lead for public finance; Commerce for economic development; and HUD for neighborhoods. The frequency of task force meetings, the nature of their deliberations, their proclivity for action and their internal cohesion varied across the proliferating task forces. In most cases the internal process within the task forces mirrored the URPG; they were unable to move effectively toward a decision.

The task forces periodically reported to the URPG as part of the weekly URPG agenda set by Embry. Their formal presentations were usually orderly, but the discussions among URPG members

tended to wander. Lacking a clear decision-rule, it was difficult for the chair to bring the discussions to a decision.

The lack of an explicit decision rule prompted the emergence of logrolling as the implicit though operative decision rule. The task forces and departments flooded the URPG with proposals for new programs or increased expenditures. The primary motive driving each agency was to protect its own turf and if possible to increase its budget for existing (or slightly revised) programs or to aggrandize for a lead role on a new initiative such as Urbank. At the stage when the process was dovetailed with the budget cycle, the URPG agencies inventoried their existing programs in search of an urban link; the unspoken assumption was that justification for additional funding would be more compelling if existing or proposed programs could be defended as contributions to the urban policy. HUD, for example, attempted to portray its housing proposals as part of the urban policy, although these proposals had been formulated prior to the existence of the URPG.

The participating agencies appeared to assume that the President's political need for a policy would free up added resources despite his general commitment to controlling federal spending. The dominance of logrolling as a decision-making rule is evidenced in the fact that, disregarding the President's intentions, the URPG recommendations never contained a proposal to eliminate an existing program or to reduce any programmatic expenditure. Indeed there was never any serious discussion at the weekly meetings of the URPG of such possibilities.

HUD, as convener and lead agency, could not superimpose its will on co-equal Cabinet departments. Nor could it effectively set priorities or broker among competing claims. No agency, including HUD, opposed an other agency's proposals so long as they did not adversely affect its own interests on the assumption that other agencies would respond similarly. The result was a draft document like "Cities and People in Distress," which enumerated, without any effort to impose

priorities, the wish lists of the participating agencies.

After the public release of "Cities and People in Distress," the task of setting priorities, sifting through alternative proposals, and defining a coherent policy moved away from the URPG. The process for producing the Eizenstat-Harris decision memo resembled a department—White House staff model for policy formulation. HUD prepared draft documents which were presented to the Domestic Policy Staff, and, on the basis of a series of meetings and negotiations between HUD personnel (Embry, Kaplan and staff) and Eizenstat and his staff, an acceptable memo was ultimately prepared for Presidential review.

In his subsequent meeting with Harris and Eizenstat to discuss the decision memo, the President made clear his strong interest in issuing an urban policy statement. From that point, the influence of the White House Domestic Policy staff expanded while HUD's diminished. The final stage resembled the White House staff-departmental model. HUD furnished substantial staff work, but subject to the direction of the Domestic Policy staff. The decision-making rule was clearly a hierarchical one—the will of the White House, as expressed through the Domestic Policy staff. The final decision memo was primarily the work of Schlosstein.

On March 23rd, the President was presented with a decision package—a 168-page list of proposals with boxes alongside each option for checking agreement, disagreement, or further consideration. In reviewing the document the President rejected four major proposals—the Urban Development Bank, the Labor Intensive Public Works Program, the Targeted Employment Tax Credit, and the Differential Investment Tax Credit—which his advisors considered critical. The next day Harris and Eizenstat personally and privately met with the President to persuade him to change his mind. They were successful in arguing that the exclusion of these proposals would be politically disastrous; it would vitiate the very reason for why the process had evolved as it

did: the need to respond to Vernon Jordan and his urban black constituency. In the end, the President's March 27th message reflected the recommendations presented in the decision memo which was a paired down version of what URPG had earlier proposed. In the end what prevailed was the President's expressed concern about controlling the budget and scope of federal interventions, plus the realization that Congress would be reluctant to pass legislation aimed solely at the largest, most distressed cities.

*Leadership Style and Behavioral Norms.* So long as the URPG functioned, the primary behavioral norm was turf protection and, in some instances, turf expansion. In the pre-Jordan days, when the White House exhibited little interest or involvement, HUD and its designated chair, Shalala, acted primarily as a convener rather than a leader or broker. When Embry assumed the chair, his style was more forceful—reflecting both a personality difference and the more urgent mandate from the White House. With the new mandate the White House staff abandoned its role as a passive, disinterested observer; and Eizenstat and his staff adopted a more active role. Nonetheless, Embry conducted the URPG meetings calling upon, and often deferring to, Eizenstat or his deputy Carp for comment as appropriate. Thus, Embry, a HUD Assistant Secretary, found himself in an awkward position, just as Shalala had. On the one hand, he was restricted by the behavioral constraints implicitly imposed in chairing a meeting of a group of peers. On the other hand, Eizenstat—a hierarchical superior—was frequently present; seldom as a strong participant, he was an inhibiting factor on Embry's performance. Embry too was unable to force out of the URPG a set of priorities.

Between November and up until March, the process became more covert; it moved from a bilateral negotiation between HUD and the White House with the White House playing an increasingly active role to an hierarchical arrangement with the White House directing HUD. The President's personal involvement remained largely absent until the very end,

when he was put in a reactive mode vis-a-vis the advice of Eizenstat and Harris.

*Relations with Environment.* Both the structure and the style of the URPG precluded a coalition across the URPG agencies in support of an urban policy: turf protection dominated. Further, no attempt was made to enlist the interest or support of other agencies even when it was obvious that their policies exerted profound impact on the condition of urban areas. Although recent research findings had documented the effect on cities of such decisions as locating federal installations, especially military bases, and letting federal contracts, no formal communications transpired between the URPG and GSA or the Defense Department despite their recognition accorded in "Cities and People in Distress." Ironically, the final message carried a recommendation for an urban impact statement which would pertain to all federal agencies.

Efforts to elicit reaction from external groups potentially affected by the policy were sporadic. The meetings of the URPG were not secretive, and the press carried reasonably accurate summaries. Especially after the Jordan encounter, major newspaper began running stories on the issue and proposals before the URPG. Indirectly and informally, congressmen and their staff's may have learned what was going on, but there was no formal attempt to brief them or to test out proposals. The only groups formally contacted were the constellation of interest groups representing urban interests such as the National League of Cities. In the early fall, Harris and Eizenstat met with these groups to discuss somewhat generally the emerging contours of the urban policy. Informal communications continued after the publicized meetings so that the major state and local public interest groups knew what was happening from week-to-week with the URPG.

### III. An Evaluation of the Urban Policy Process

We now turn to an evaluation of the urban policy process. Such an evaluation requires a set of general criteria by which we can evaluate decision processes and the

TABLE 1

*Changes in the Process of Formulating a National Urban Policy*

Phase	Time Period	Model	Critical Turning Point
Pre-Jordan: Discussing a policy philosophy for urban areas.	March-July 1977	Cabinet Government	Jordan-Carter Confrontation
Post-Jordan			
(1) Linking the URPG policy proposals to FY 1979 budget.	August- November 1977	White House Lead Interagency Task Force.	Release of "Cities" and People in Distress"
(2) Targeting the State of the Union Message.	November 1977- January 1978	Departmental—White House staff	The "Eizenstat memo to Carter"
(3) Planning for a special message on National Urban Policy	February-March 1978	White House staff— Departmental	

contributions of each of the various models described in Part I. (As noted earlier it is quite likely that some of these models function better than others.) Since existing literature appears to be rather scanty in this regard, we posit a set of criteria which might be used for evaluating any decision process and apply them to the urban policy process discussed above. The urban policy process passed through four of the models listed; as a result we must be careful to distinguish among them in the evaluation. Unless otherwise noted we refer to the Cabinet Government model when a specific model rather than the entire process is referred to.

**Evaluation Criterion 1. Did the process actually produce a decision?** Ultimately the President did issue an urban policy message. In that sense a decision was reached; the process resulted in useable output. However, it is important to recall the models used at various stages in the process. The Cabinet Government model in its pure form did not produce a decision and appeared incapable of producing a decision. Only after the White House, in response to the Jordan indictment, moved responsibility within HUD from Shalala to Embry and provided for a form of co-chair with Domestic Policy Staff Director, Eizenstat, did a document reflecting URPG decisions result. And that document, "Cities and People in Distress," was prepared primarily by a HUD consul-

tant who attempted to organize the rambling URPG discussions and issue papers. Only after the process moved into the final Departmental—White House and White House-Departmental models did a decision on policy actually occur. Apparently it proved difficult for an interagency task force chaired by one of the departments to generate decisions without a strong White House role in the process. HUD, in a position of negotiating among peers, had insufficient leverage to move several recalcitrant and defensive departments to agreement.

Did the output ultimately generated by the process meet the following **subcriteria**: **First, was it internally coherent?** Certainly not, in the rather grandiose terms originally envisioned; the result was not a coherent and comprehensive urban policy. Perhaps no process could have produced such an ambiguous and undefinable result. The URPG, resorting to logrolling, made a coherent and comprehensive urban policy less rather than more likely. Even operating under subsequent models where the likelihood should have been greater, the objective was not attained—perhaps because clear leadership on the substance was never forthcoming. The result, except for the packaging, resembled what the traditional urban policy-making mechanism would have yielded: disaggregated and discrete collection programs.

**Second, did the decision meet budget**



constraints and indicate priorities? The first output "Cities and People in Distress," a product primarily of the two interagency task force models, did not. A model characterized largely by negotiation among peers and dependent upon logrolling could not adhere to budget constraints or set priorities. The final urban policy message, an eventual product of the Departmental—White House and White House staff-Departmental models, did adhere to budget constraints (through imposition of White House control), but gave no indication of the relative priority or importance of various parts of the Urban Policy.

Third, was the decision politically viable? Again, if we look at the first product—"Cities and People in Distress"—the answer was clearly no. The policy implications of that document were that all programs of the United States government and the entire federal budget ought to be redirected toward assuring the well-being of urban areas. The report was widely criticized in Congress, in the press, and by rural and suburban interest groups for its "biased" approach. The final document eliminated this urban imperialism approach, but the proposals did not seem to be politically viable at least if Congressional passage is viewed as a criterion of viability. It is, of course, hard to determine the extent to which the political difficulties the Urban Policy has faced are related to the nature of the process which produced it and the extent to which those difficulties are related to other factors such as long term problems between the White House and Congress.

Finally, was the decision rendered within whatever time constraints were relevant? Following the Jordan encounter, the process was supposed to dovetail with the State of the Union Message, the FY 1979 budget preparation process, and a mid-March special message. The Cabinet Government model proved incapable of producing a useable product by those dates. The President's Urban Policy message, largely a product of the Departmental-White House and White House Lead-Departmental models, was finally

delivered on March 27 after several more interim dates had been missed.

*Evaluation Criterion 2. Did the process permit opportunity for reasonable debate and discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the proposal or proposals discussed?*

The process did well on this criterion. If wide ranged debate and discussion on the consequences of the proposals did not occur in the task forces or weekly meetings of the URPG, it was not the fault of the process; the opportunity did exist.

*Evaluation Criterion 3. Did the process permit opportunity for reasonable consideration and discussion of alternative proposals and their advantages and disadvantages?*

The performance of the process with respect to this criterion is somewhat more difficult to judge. While diverse programs were considered and, through logrolling, ultimately included, alternative approaches or programs to this broad range of programs were not generally considered. HEW Secretary Califano did, at one point, write a memorandum to the President suggesting an income strategy as an alternative approach to a territory-based policy, but the URPG never accorded this serious consideration. Inherently the process did not prevent such consideration from occurring. Instead discussion focused on narrow policy choices as proposed by individual agencies.

*Evaluation Criterion 4. Did the process permit all the relevant points of view to be heard and considered? Were all those with a real interest in the decision actually participants?*

We have seen that the process excluded non-urban viewpoints with an interest in the decision. To some extent this exclusion did not flow directly from the Cabinet Government model; other agencies could have been included. However, the fact that the Cabinet Government model does call for a lead agency may contribute to exclusion. In the urban policy process the appointed lead agency, HUD, clearly conceptualized the problems through the framework of central city concerns, and this perspective may well have contributed

to the exclusion of non-urban interests from adequate participation. The last two models utilized, involving interaction between the White House staff and HUD, were, of course, even more exclusive.

*Evaluation Criterion 5. Was the process adequately informed by factual data, analysis, and existing knowledge?*

The process does not receive good marks on this criterion. Departmentally-based staff generally acted as advocates rather than as analysts. HUD as a lead agency, was unable to perform a strong analytic role for several reasons: (1) the HUD staff assigned was small and its time greatly pre-empted by the logistic needs of the process; (2) the range of issues under consideration was far beyond those for which the HUD staff had expertise; and (3) HUD, as lead agency, was viewed with suspicion by other agencies in the process. Independent critical analysis by HUD staff would have been immediately dismissed as biased or as special pleading and would have jeopardized HUD's ongoing relations with other agencies. As a consequence HUD staff primarily performed a clearinghouse function rather than an analytical one. The interagency meetings themselves generally excluded staff from the various departments, including HUD, from any form of participation. Discussion was confined to policy level officials—Assistant Secretaries and Deputy Assistant Secretaries—who frequently were not conversant with relevant research or the long-standing experiences of their own departments.

*Evaluation Criterion 6. Did the process encourage creativity, innovation, and the consideration of new ideas?*

Cabinet government appears to promote defensive behavior: each agency strives to protect its existing programs from incursions by the lead agency or any other while attempting to make incremental gains. The lack of staff or outside participants meant that policies under consideration had to originate from the various participating agencies. Agencies were more likely to see the process as an opportunity for pursuing previously existing proposals, perhaps in a mildly repackaged form, rather than as an op-

portunity for developing new ideas or advancing crosscutting approaches.

*Evaluation Criterion 7. Did the process permit and encourage reality testing through critiques by relevant individuals or groups outside the decision process or through inclusion of a broad diversity of real world perspectives within the process?*

By excluding non-urban interests from participation, the process restricted reality testing to the ultimate detriment of the policy. Excluding Congress from a consultative or reactive role prevented an accurate assessment of Congressional sentiment; eventually there was a harsh Congressional reaction to the urban policy proposed. However, the public interest groups representing cities, counties, and states were involved both through a series of special meetings and informal consultation; they offered a dimension of reality testing from their particular perspective.

An interagency process, by its very nature, cannot be a closed process. Through interviews and leaks the press reported with reasonable accuracy on developments throughout the process. Indeed, the "open administration" format adopted by the Carter Administration as a reaction to the excessive secrecy of Presidents Nixon and Johnson encouraged rather than discouraged press attention. Reactions from Congress, interest groups, and non-participating agencies were thus frequently in response to these press reports and did provide a form of reality testing. The very openness of the process contributed to policy difficulties. Reports depicted the URPG as chaotic and indecisive and the process as disorderly and irrational; policy deliberations were reported in mid-stream. The press reports of "Cities and People in Distress" were a case in point. These reports tabulated the potential budgetary costs of the list of desirable programs presented and thus both (1) tarnished the process as being unable to produce anything but a wish list of desirable programs presented and (2) established unrealistic public expectation with respect to urban policy budgetary targets.

*Evaluation Criterion 8. Did the process*

permit decisions to be arrived at through orderly, understood, and accepted decision rules?

The Cabinet Government model failed miserably on this criterion. A task force composed of peer agencies lead by one of the peers could hardly be expected to invoke hierarchical decision rules. Nor was voting an acceptable process. Consensus was the only possible decision-rule and logrolling the most obvious means of arriving at consensus.

However, even consensus through logrolling requires some means of verifying the existence of a consensus and legitimating the specific results arrived at. HUD, as lead agency in the Cabinet Government model, was not able to force such a consensus in the rather rambling and chaotic URPG meetings. The effort to produce a consensus first occurred in the drafting and circulation of Curtis' policy paper. However, written reaction to a policy paper is an extraordinarily difficult way to arrive at a consensus through logrolling; it discourages negotiations among the agencies. Each agency tended to comment in terms of its maximum position.

As the process evolved into the White House Lead-Interagency Task Force model, the decision process of building consensus through logrolling became more orderly. The White House interest in forging decisions encouraged adherence to an agenda and promoted a consensus through logrolling at the URPG meetings. The difficult task of identifying and verifying a consensus was undertaken by URPG Chairman Embry, mostly in private consultation with White House Domestic Policy Director Eizenstat or his deputy, Carp.

As the process evolved into the Departmental-White House staff models, the decision-rule adopted was the one characteristic of such a model: negotiation between HUD and the White House staff within a modified hierarchical context. The White House staff held the upper hand in the negotiating process because it represented, at least implicitly, the will of the President while HUD was somewhat restricted by the necessity of representing in the negotiations (or at least being perceived as re-

presenting) the decisions arrived at through the logrolling process within the URPG.

The final decision, in a formal sense, was made hierarchically. The content of the President's decision memo was determined primarily by the White House Domestic Policy staff, with HUD personnel acting partly as a lobbying force, partly as a negotiating partner, and partly as staff for the process. The President reviewed and approved or disapproved the results of interaction between HUD and the White House Staff. In the final presidential decision the hierarchical decision rule was followed in form only. When the President disapproved four of the major recommendations in the decision memo, Eizenstat had to persuade the President to change his mind in order to preserve the political viability of agreements reached through the earlier negotiation process.

*Evaluation Criterion 9. Did the process result in a decision which was consistent with the will of the President? Did it permit the President to revise the decision so that it was consistent with his will?*

The process failed badly on this criterion. The President, at the final stage, expressed his will and was, in effect, overruled. The President, for all practical purposes, did not participate in or make his policy preferences strongly felt at any stage of the urban policy process.

It is worth considering the extent to which this result flowed from the dynamics of the process as opposed to the personal choice of the President which conceivably might have been different. The President, with the few exceptions noted previously, gave almost no substantive guidance to the URPG, nor at any stage in the process did he enunciate what policies he preferred.

The President's staff participating in the process may or may not have had substantive discussions with the President concerning his policy preferences. If so, his staff did not convey the results of those discussions, except in the most general terms, to the URPG. Strikingly absent from the comments or reactions of White House staff participants was the phrase "the President wants" or "we

have discussed this with the President and he said . . .”

There remains a broader question: can Cabinet Government serve the President's will, even if it is known? Interagency task forces rely on consensus among a variety of peer departments or agencies; they depend on logrolling to reach a decision. In the case of the urban policy, the President's desire for a comprehensive and consistent urban policy with limited budgetary impact was not a probable result of the process chosen to produce it.

We now turn to a more speculative venture, attempting to evaluate each of our seven models in light of our criteria. As is suggested below, no one model possesses all the desirable attributes of policymaking. In addition, it is reasonable to expect that the utility of a model will vary with circumstances. Nonetheless, we present the following as an initial set of speculative hypotheses concerning the effectiveness of each of the seven models of policy formulation.

*Traditional Legislative Clearance Model.* The great strengths of this model inhere in its capacity to produce decisions (Criterion 1), which are adequately informed (Criterion 5) and which ensue from an orderly, predictable set of decisionmaking procedures (Criterion 8). With most policy the result of this traditional approach, decisions are forged out through bargaining and compromise to reflect the mission and constituent interests of a department and its Congressional Committees. Further, the process is enriched by the store of experience and information which departments and their Congressional committees accumulate over time. The process conforms to the long-established timetables and cycle for formulating legislation and framing the annual budget. The model in narrowing the scope of deliberation proves weak in promoting the lively consideration of a broad range of alternatives and points of view (Criteria 2-4), in fostering change and in admitting of new ideas (Criteria 6-7). With the policy debate constrained, conflict is minimized and agreement is more readily secured.

*Departmental-White House Staff Mod-*

*el.* The distinctive feature of this model is the more direct accommodation of the President's view on policy issues (Criterion 9). As such, the model takes on a somewhat more hierarchical character as well as clear method for reaching a decision (Criterion 8). The approach also benefits from the base of information built up by agencies and OMB over time. The chief deficiency of this approach is the narrow scope of alternatives and points of view aired in the deliberation (Criteria 2-4 and 6-7). With a department as the initiator, forced to lobby the White House, the likelihood of reaching a decision is not certain (Criterion 1).

*White House Staff-Departmental Model.* With the White House playing a more active, assertive and directive role, this model assumes a more hierarchical mode of policy-making. Not surprisingly, the approach proves more capable of reaching a decision on an issue (Criterion 1) through a reasonably clear orderly procedure (Criterion 8), in which the President's views are articulated and decisively influential (Criterion 9). On all other dimensions, the model ranks moderately because of the constrained scope of deliberation (Criteria 2-4, 6-7). Although a department can bring to bear on the process a base of knowledge and information, decisions are more apt to reflect White House preferences than analytically derived choices (Criterion 5).

*Outside Task Force Model.* Since this model expands the scope of policy deliberations drawing in a wider range of participants often from outside the government, it promotes debate on diverse alternatives and points of view (Criteria 2-4). Further, it enlists a vast array of information reaching beyond the government to academic and research communities (Criterion 5) and, as such, admits of novel ideas (Criterion 6). As a model only occasionally employed, typically convened by the President to tackle broad policy issues outside the normal policy-making procedures, the approach lacks predictability and order; it seldom follows the legislative calendar or budget cycle. Its decision rules and procedures are developed ad hoc (Criterion 8). As this model diverges from an

hierarchical approach to policy-making, the chances of not producing a decision are increased (Criterion 1).

*Cabinet Government-Interagency Task Forces.* This model proves exceptional on only one of the criteria for evaluation: it encourages debate among the agency participants (Criterion 2). The model is exceedingly weak in its capacity to generate a decision (Criterion 1), follow known and predictable decision rules (Criterion 8) and accommodate a presidential perspective (Criterion 9). The approach is also notable in its nonhierarchical mode of decisionmaking; even a lead agency cannot exercise decisive leadership among equals. Composed of government agencies, it does promote some diversity of policy concerns and interests (Criteria 2-4). However, as the deliberations are bound by traditional agency concerns, the process does not invite bold, new approaches (Criterion 6). As agencies are inclined to act protectively of their own missions or perhaps aggressively vis-a-vis each other, conflict is heightened. In the absence of decisive leadership, the chances of producing a decision are greatly impeded.

*White House Lead-Interagency Task Force.* The active role of the White House moves this interagency model more toward decisive action (Criterion 1). Through his staff, the President can assert his views and leadership (Criterion 9). While the presence of various agencies permits some debate over alternatives (Criteria 2-3), generally the scope is circumscribed (Criteria 4-7).

*Congressional Initiative.* Reflecting a traditional mode of policy formulation, this model proves very effective in arriving at a decision (Criterion 1) through an orderly set of procedures (Criterion 8). Since the President is placed in a reactive mode, his opinion on a proposal is clearly

elicited (Criterion 9). The weaknesses of this approach are abundant in constraining debate, in limiting information and in discouraging novelty as well as reality-testing (Criteria 2-7).

#### VIII. Conclusion: Does Structure Make a Difference?

Structure which shapes the process of policy formulation is not the exclusive determinant of policy outcomes. But it is crucial variable all too often dwarfed in analysis by attention to other factors. Political influences and pressures transmitted through agencies, Congress and the President; the President's own personal philosophy about government and policy responses to social problems; the nature of the social problem itself, its urgency and susceptibility to solution; the prevailing mood of the political culture; the informal and conventional processes of decision-making—these and other factors go a long way to determine the substantive outcome. But how that outcome is ultimately achieved, if at all, can turn on the structure of the process.

Structure defines what issues are admitted into the deliberative process; who is included or excluded from an authoritative role in policy-making; what the scope of solutions will be; what the rules are for reaching a decision. As such, structure helps define the extent, content and mode of political conflict and how that conflict gets legitimately resolved. At the point in framing a national urban policy when decisive action on policy was called for by pressures exerted from the political environment, it was no surprise to see the pure model of Cabinet Government abandoned and supplanted by alternative approaches which were more likely to produce decisions that the President could announce and present to Congress for action.