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U.S. Initiative to Iran



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is President Reagan's address to the nation, Washington, D.C., November 13, 1986.

I know you've been reading, seeing, and hearing a lot of stories the past several days attributed to Danish sailors, unnamed observers at Italian ports and Spanish harbors, and especially unnamed government officials of my Administration. Well, now you are going to hear the facts from a White House source, and you know my name.

I wanted this time to talk with you about an extremely sensitive and profoundly important matter of foreign policy. For 18 months now we have had underway a secret diplomatic initiative to Iran. That initiative was undertaken for the simplest and best of reasons—to renew a relationship with the nation of Iran, to bring an honorable end to the bloody 6-year war between Iran and Iraq, to eliminate state-sponsored terrorism and subversion, and to effect the safe return of all hostages.

Without Iran's cooperation, we cannot bring an end to the Persian Gulf war; without Iran's concurrence, there can be no enduring peace in the Middle East.

For 10 days now, the American and world press have been full of reports and rumors about this initiative and these objectives. Now, my fellow Americans, there is an old saying that nothing spreads so quickly as a rumor. So I thought it was time to speak with you directly—to tell you firsthand about our

dealings with Iran. As Will Rogers once said, "Rumor travels faster, but it don't stay put as long as truth." So let's get to the facts.

The charge has been made that the United States has shipped weapons to Iran as ransom payment for the release of American hostages in Lebanon—that the United States undercut its allies and secretly violated American policy against trafficking with terrorists.

Those charges are utterly false. The United States has not made concessions to those who hold our people captive in Lebanon. And we will not. The United States has not swapped boatloads or plane-loads of American weapons for the return of American hostages. And we will not.

Other reports have surfaced alleging U.S. involvement: reports of a sealift to Iran using Danish ships to carry American arms; of vessels in Spanish ports being employed in secret U.S. arms shipments; of Italian ports being used; of the United States sending spare parts and weapons for combat aircraft. All these reports are quite exciting, but as far as we are concerned, not one of them is true.

Sending a Signal to Tehran

During the course of our secret discussions, I authorized the transfer of small amounts of defensive weapons and spare parts for defensive systems to Iran. My purpose was to convince Tehran that our negotiators were acting with my authority, to send a signal that the United States was prepared to replace the animosity between us with a new relationship. These modest deliveries, taken together, could easily fit into a single cargo plane. They could not, taken together, affect the outcome of the

6-year war between Iran and Iraq—nor could they affect in any way the military balance between the two countries.

Those with whom we were in contact took considerable risks and needed a signal of our serious intent if they were to carry on and broaden the dialogue.

At the same time we undertook this initiative, we made clear that Iran must oppose all forms of international terrorism as a condition of progress in our relationship. The most significant step which Iran could take, we indicated, would be to use its influence in Lebanon to secure the release of all hostages held there.

Some progress has already been made. Since U.S. Government contact began with Iran, there's been no evidence of Iranian Government complicity in acts of terrorism against the United States. Hostages have come home, and we welcome the efforts that the Government of Iran has taken in the past and is currently undertaking.

Iran's Strategic Importance

But why, you might ask, is any relationship with Iran important to the United States? Iran encompasses some of the most critical geography in the world. It lies between the Soviet Union and access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. Geography explains why the Soviet Union has sent an army into Afghanistan to dominate that country and, if they could, Iran and Pakistan.

Iran's geography gives it a critical position from which adversaries could interfere with oil flows from the Arab states that border the Persian Gulf. Apart from geography, Iran's oil deposits are important to the long-term health of the world economy. For these reasons, it is in our national interest to watch for changes within Iran that might offer hope for an improved relationship. Until last year, there was little to justify that hope.

Indeed, we have bitter and enduring disagreements that persist today. At the heart of our quarrel has been Iran's past sponsorship of international terrorism. Iranian policy has been devoted to expelling all Western influence from the Middle East. We cannot abide that because our interests in the Middle East are vital. At the same time, we seek no territory or special position in Iran. The Iranian revolution is a fact of history, but between American and Iranian basic national interests there need be no permanent conflict.

Since 1983, various countries have made overtures to stimulate direct contact between the United States and Iran. European, Near Eastern, and Far Eastern countries have attempted to serve as intermediaries. Despite a U.S. willingness to proceed, none of these overtures bore fruit. With this history in mind, we were receptive last year when we were alerted to the possibility of establishing a direct dialogue with Iranian officials.

Now, let me repeat. America's longstanding goals in the region have been to help preserve Iran's independence from Soviet domination; to bring an honorable end to the bloody Iran-Iraq war; to halt the export of subversion and terrorism in the region. A major impediment to those goals has been an absence of dialogue, a cutoff in communication between us.

The Search for a Better Relationship

It's because of Iran's strategic importance and its influence in the Islamic world that we chose to probe for a better relationship between our countries.

Our discussions continued into the spring of this year. Based upon the progress we felt we had made, we sought to raise the diplomatic level of contacts. A meeting was arranged in Tehran. I then asked my former national security adviser, Robert McFarlane, to undertake a secret mission and gave him explicit instructions. I asked him to go to Iran to open a dialogue, making stark and clear our basic objectives and disagreements.

The 4 days of talks were conducted in a civil fashion; and American personnel were not mistreated. Since then, the dialogue has continued, and step-by-step progress continues to be made.

Let me repeat: our interests are clearly served by opening a dialogue with Iran and thereby helping to end the Iran-Iraq war. That war has dragged on for more than 6 years, with no prospect of a negotiated settlement. The slaughter on both sides has been enormous; and the adverse economic and political consequences for that vital region of the world have been growing. We sought to establish communication with both sides in that senseless struggle, so that we could assist in bringing about a cease-fire and, eventually, a settlement. We have sought to be even-handed by working with both sides and with other interested nations to prevent a widening of the war.

This sensitive undertaking has entailed a great risk for those involved. There is no question but that we could never have begun or continued this dialogue had the initiative been disclosed earlier. Due to the publicity of the past week, the entire initiative is very much at risk today.

There is ample precedent in our history for this kind of secret diplomacy. In 1971, then-President Nixon sent his national security adviser on a secret mission to China. In that case, as today, there was a basic requirement for discretion and for a sensitivity to the situation in the nation we were attempting to engage.

Since the welcome return of former hostage David Jacobsen, there have been unprecedented speculation and countless reports that have not only been wrong but have been potentially dangerous to the hostages and destructive of the opportunity before us. The efforts of courageous people like Terry Waite [lay assistant to the Archbishop of Canterbury] have been jeopardized. So extensive have been the false rumors and erroneous reports that the risks of remaining silent now exceed the risks of speaking out. And that's why I decided to address you tonight.

It's been widely reported, for example, that the Congress, as well as top executive branch officials, were circumvented. Although the efforts we undertook were highly sensitive and involvement of government officials was limited to those with a strict need to know, all appropriate Cabinet officers were fully consulted. The actions I authorized were and continue to be in full compliance with Federal law. And the relevant committees of Congress are being and will be fully informed.

Another charge is that we have tilted toward Iran in the gulf war. This, too, is unfounded. We have consistently condemned the violence on both sides. We have consistently sought a negotiated settlement that preserves the territorial integrity of both nations. The overtures we've made to the Government of Iran have not been a shift to supporting one side over the other. Rather, it has been a diplomatic initiative to gain some degree of access and influence within Iran—as well as Iraq—and to bring about an honorable end to that bloody conflict. It is in the interests of all parties in the gulf region to end that war as soon as possible.

To summarize, our government has a firm policy not to capitulate to terrorist demands. That "no concessions" policy remains in force—in spite of the wildly speculative and false stories about arms for hostages and alleged ransom payments. We did not—repeat—did not trade weapons or anything else for hostages; nor will we. Those who think that we have "gone soft" on terrorism should take up the question with Col. Qadhafi.

We have not, nor will we, capitulate to terrorists. We will, however, get on with advancing the vital interests of our great nation—in spite of terrorists and radicals who seek to sabotage our efforts and immobilize the United States. Our goals have been and remain:

- To restore a relationship with Iran;
- To bring an honorable end to the war in the gulf;
- To bring a halt to state-supported terror in the Middle East; and
- Finally, to effect the safe return of all hostages from Lebanon.

As President, I've always operated on the belief that, given the facts, the American people will make the right decision. I believe that to be true now.

I cannot guarantee the outcome. But, as in the past, I ask for your support because I believe you share the hope for peace in the Middle East, for freedom for all hostages, and for a world free of terrorism. Certainly, there are risks in this pursuit, but there are greater risks if we do not persevere.

It will take patience and understanding; it will take continued resistance to those who commit terrorist acts; and it will take cooperation with all who seek to rid the world of this scourge. ■

PERSIAN GULF

The Washington Post

23 OCTOBER 1987

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Charles Krauthammer

Forget About Proportionality

At a White House briefing a few hours after the American attack on Iranian oil platforms in the Persian Gulf, presidential spokesman Marlin Fitzwater was asked: "The Iranians are already suggesting that there will be retaliation. . . . Why should we think that this won't go on response for response?" Answered Fitzwater: "I would emphasize the restrained nature of this action, the precision with which we tried to identify a target which was proportional to their attack." And "we gave . . . advanced notice so that they could escape and thereby save lives."

So there we have it: restraint, precision, advance notice and, above all, proportionality. Combat so gentlemanly it cannot fail to impress the ayatollah. No reason for him to strike back. After all, we seek no wider war, as LBJ used to say.

The idea of proportionality, that restraint begets restraint, continues to mesmerize American policy makers. One would think they had learned something from Vietnam, the laboratory, the graveyard, of the idea of proportional warfare. Our policy of gradual escalation—"graduated pressure"—did not deter. It simply ensured ever rising levels of stalemate, the level being decided by the other side.

And if not in Vietnam, proportionality should have met its ruin in Beirut, where the United States adopted rules of engagement of absurd proportionality. A Marine who found himself under sniper attack was permitted to return fire (1) only after identifying exactly who was firing, (2) only if he used the same caliber weapon ("Let's see now. Is that guy trying to kill me with an AK-47? May I go up to an M-16, sergeant?"), and (3) only so long as the sniper kept it up. As soon as the sniper decided he had had enough, the Marine had to quit too. After

being ordered to concede to the adversary control over the location, intensity and duration of combat, U.S. forces in Lebanon settled down to await their destruction.

On the other hand, the virtues of disproportion—the application of force so sudden, overwhelming and irresistible as to demoralize and disarm the enemy and thus stop the violence—have been amply demonstrated in such diverse places as Czechoslovakia (1968), Poland (1981) and Grenada.

The most recent demonstration was Libya. In retaliation for a Libyan terrorist attack that killed but one American, the United States last year launched a massive raid on Gadhafi which so devastated and demoralized him that neither he nor international terrorism has been quite the same since. Indeed, Libya has slid so far that this summer it was routed in its border war with hapless Chad. Not all this was due to the raid. But the raid contributed much by concentrating Libyan minds on the disproportion between what Libya could inflict and what it could be made to endure.

A demonstration of the real power imbalance between a loudmouth and a superpower is enough to put a country like Libya in its place. Conversely, once a superpower voluntarily accepts the constraints of proportionality, it forfeits that excess of power which makes it a superpower and which enables it to deter lesser powers.

Fitzwater got it exactly wrong. Proportionality is the enemy of deterrence. The way to ensure that tit-for-tat warfare will continue in the Gulf is precisely for the United States to restrict itself to responses that are, in the administration's proud and reiterated characterization of the oil platform attacks, "restrained, proportional and measured." (Indeed, Iran has


already commented on the deterrent effect of the American action: yesterday it attacked the main Kuwaiti oil terminal with another Silk-worm missile.) It is *only* under a regime of proportionality that Iran can carry on tit for tat against the U.S. Navy.

Iran does the one thing the United States warned it against—firing directly at a U.S.-flagged vessel (blinding the American captain)—and it is reproved with the most marginal attack carried out in the most genteel way: no Iranian soil, no Iranian soldier, no Iranian interest is disturbed. And just to be sure, the secretary of defense promises that there will be no more. Chapter closed.

The point of retaliation is not to make Iran bleed, but to make it stop. And you do that not with an exercise of destroyer target practice against abandoned oil platforms, but by striking a target of real strategic significance to the Iranian war effort, a target such as Kharg Island, from which Iran exports 90 percent of its oil.

Restraint, proportionate and measured. The message such a response sends is not that the United States will not tolerate any attack by Iran, but that the United States will not tolerate any engagement with Iran.

The point of administration restraint is a desire not to provoke. But that misses the point. The ayatollah has made it clear that what he finds provocative about the Great Satan is not its retaliation but its existence. The only way for the United States to stop provoking Iran is to leave the Gulf. And since Congress is not going to support any running gun battle in the Gulf, no matter how low the intensity, a couple more tit for tats and the ayatollah will have won again.



ASIA . . . CONTINUED

surgents. Support for Kim Il Sung has diminished, and trade with South Korea has blossomed (volume over \$1 billion last year). Malaysia and Indonesia, with large (distrusted) Chinese minorities, and memories of Chinese-supported Communist rebellions are still quite wary of the PRC, though Thailand has cooperated with the Chinese over Kampuchea. Nonetheless, the Soviets possess little to pressure the PRC within the region, excepting Indochina. The *Taiwan Card* does not appear feasible, as the fervently anti-Communist Kuomintang shows no desire to develop ties with any Communist power.

Soviet economic ties to the region are minimally greater than their political ties. Trade with the non-Community Southeast Asian countries is not at a level to assist in expanding Soviet influence. The Soviet Union accounts for no more than 1.3 percent of the trade volume of any ASEAN country, and the Soviet trade balance with ASEAN has been highly negative. (The major commercial item has been Soviet import of Malaysian rubber.) By contrast, the United States accounts for 15-20 percent of ASEAN's trade volume. Obstacles to further development of trade ties include the Soviet preference for barter arrangements, the inconsistency of its trade dealings and its refusal to provide advantageous terms for Third World goods. The Soviets' major economic interest in the region is to expand trade with Japan, in particular to gain access to high technology and Japanese cooperation in developing Siberia.

The most important area of economic cooperation with non-Communist Southeast Asia has been in shipping; Thailand and Singapore repair Soviet vessels. The Soviets probably wish to use such agreements to provide for permanent berthing privileges, though Singapore, conscious of its strategic location, and Thailand have both refused any arrangement of this sort. The USSR also maintains a branch of its national bank (MNB) in Singapore, which has the important functions of collecting economic intelligence and gaining access to the Asian dollar markets. The Singaporeans carefully monitor its activity.

The Soviet presence in Southeast Asia is virtually exclusively military. The lack of other ties means minimal political influence or leverage. Even the Communist parties in the non-Communist Far East tend to be more closely aligned with the PRC, or at least follow a Maoist ideology.

Under Gorbachev, the USSR has shown an interest in expanding political and economic ties with non-Communist Southeast Asia, at least in part to reduce the incentive for security ties with the United States, the PRC and/or Japan, and in the hopes of devaluing cohesiveness Western foreign policy coordination. Potential Japanese participation in SDI is particularly alarming to the Soviets.

Opportunities for Increased Soviet Influence

The current Soviet position in Southeast Asia should by no means lull the West into writing off the area. A continued military presence, and further cooperation with regional allies is necessary to meet the expanding Soviet military presence. Ties with the PRC must be cultivated to broaden political and economic cooperation, and prevent any incentive for realignment with the USSR. A U.S. pullback could lead to a decisive shift in the balance of power.

Politically and economically, there is significant, if not abundant potential for Soviet gains. The situation in Indochina is the leading element of instability in the area, providing potential for the expansion of Soviet military power. Other factors listed below are critical insofar as they threaten U.S./Western influence in the region; however, they do not provide great opportunity for positive Soviet

gains. Major elements of potential advantage to the USSR include:

1. **Broadening of the conflict in Indochina:** Spillover of the fighting into Thailand could threaten that country's stability, in much the same way that Cambodia (now Kampuchea) was swept away when the war in Vietnam crossed its border.

2. **Reduced tensions in the Communist world:** Although a rapprochement with the PRC is unlikely in the near term, resolution of the Kampuchean conflict could greatly reduce intra-Communist tensions. Ideally for the Soviets, the prov-Soviet regime would remain, ASEAN and the PRC would accept a *fait accompli*, and more normal relations could be pursued. The end to the fighting in Kampuchea would remove a leading sore spot on Soviet-PRC relations.

3. **Problems in the PRC's relations with the West:** In the near term, the USSR would like to see an end to economic cooperation with the West and technology transfer. Trade and investment deals have often not gone smoothly, and factions within the ruling party remain highly distrustful of the West/Capitalist world. The political right in the United States, whose influence is not minimal, retains a fondness for Taiwan, and issues such as arms sales could sour U.S.-PRC relations.

4. **Political instability:** As economic and educational standards continue to advance, Southeast Asians are tiring of authoritarian governments. Capitalism remains popular, however, and government instability does not necessarily translate into pro-Communism or anti-Americanism. Continuing instability, or an anti-Americanism backlash, could threaten U.S. bases. South Korea is unlikely to emerge with a pro-Communist government because major opposition figures are broadly pro-American. However, if the United States is too closely associated with a repressive government, its influence could decline.

5. **Economic instability:** Despite the general prosperity of the area, several economies depend on raw materials whose markets are volatile: Indonesia and Brunei on oil and Malaysia on tin and rubber. The Philippines has the shakiest of the non-Communist economies, though the United States or capitalism does not tend to be blamed for this as much as official corruption or the Marcos dictatorship. It is not clear what positive gains the Soviets could achieve from such economic instability, other than some anti-American backlash and resultant political instability, which is more likely to loosen the security system or ties with the United States than to provide a pro-Soviet regime.

6. **Economic/trade tensions:** The most immediate source of tension between Southeast Asia and the United States is trade. The protectionist trend in the United States is largely directed at Southeast Asia, and U.S. insensitivity to the issue could arouse nationalistic feelings. If the trade issue looms larger than the Soviet threat, security cooperation could be hindered. Though this would serve Soviet objectives, the Soviets are not likely to achieve positive gains. In fact, cooperation among the Asian nations might increase.

The basic caveat to U.S. policy makers is that despite the unidimension, Soviet presence in Southeast Asia, the area should not be viewed exclusively in military terms. The United States has much to lose in other aspects of its relationships with the nations of the area. In particular, trade issues should be dealt with, taking into account Asian sensitivities. The strength of the United States relationship with the non-Communist Far East is in its multidimensionality, and to focus solely on the tunnel vision of the global struggle with the USSR would ultimately cost the U.S. the good will that those other relationships have developed.

David S. Broder

Democrats Can't Afford To Be Smug

The biggest mistake that Democrats can make is to believe that the 1986 election confirmed them as the majority party in the country. The biggest mistake the Republicans can make is to resume thinking of themselves as the minority.

If the election proved anything, it is that despite the increased flashes of vigor both parties have shown, voters are willing to trust neither very far. The eight additional Senate seats the Democrats won from the Republicans were exactly matched by the eight governorships the Republicans took from them. The House totals for both parties budged barely an inch, making the election for all intents and purposes a standoff.

Nonetheless, interviews and discussions this past week clearly suggest that the outcome is going to be misinterpreted on both sides. Already a smug establishmentarian tone is being heard among the Democrats and a sour insurgency mood is infecting the Republicans. I'll come back to the Republicans in the next column, but for now will concentrate on the Democrats.

The reason for the exuberance, reflected in Democratic National Chairman Paul G. Kirk Jr.'s boast that "the Democrats are back," is that in the most visible arena of national politics, Capitol Hill, Democratic hegemony has been restored. With a new Senate majority and strengthened control of the House, with both chambers seemingly secure enough to withstand all but the heaviest adverse tides in 1988, with President Reagan headed into his last two years and with no intimidating Republican successor on the scene, the Democrats are talking as if all was now right in their world.

It isn't. Winning back the Senate did give the Democrats a vital shot in the arm. They were so trapped in self-doubt after the 1984 reverse-landslide that another loss might have sunk them. Instead, they got a tremendous boost in their morale. They added 11 new senators—mostly young and bright—and more than two dozen new House members, among them four blacks, two women and one American Indian.

All this is to the good, but none of it begins to solve the two major problems that have plagued the Democrats in national elections and kept the White House in Republican hands for 14 of the last 18 years. One is the perverse geography of their political base: the inability of their presidential candidates to win in the growth states of the South and the West. This tendency has produced what consultant Horace Busby has called the "Re-

governorships in Florida and Texas and held California—the triple pillars of their Sun Belt strategy. They also added governorships in Alabama, Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma and South Carolina, while losing only Tennessee in that broad belt of states.

True, Democrats gained several southern Senate seats. But no one can doubt that, so far as the strength and potential of the Republican Party in Florida is concerned, for example, the loss of Paula Hawkins in the Senate is more than offset by the election of Bob Martinez as governor.

The other big Democratic problem has been in managing its coalition. The Democrats have trouble aligning their major constituency and interest groups with each other for national campaigns. And that problem, too, rather than being solved by the 1986 election, may have been increased.

Organized labor, the most sophisticated of those interest groups, quickly claimed a major role in the Senate victory. AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland announced that he will begin steps next month looking to the possibility of another pre-primary presidential endorsement. Never mind that some Democrats believe labor's blessing proved to be a kiss of death to Walter Mondale in 1984. The unions whose help was an almost unalloyed blessing to the Democrats in 1986 will embrace them again in 1988, no matter what the consequences.

Even more pointedly, Jesse Jackson asserted, accurately, that black votes—cast in 8-1 or 9-1 majorities in almost every state—gave the Democrats back their Senate majority. The black vote was essential in North Carolina, Georgia, Alabama and Louisiana, where Republicans won among white voters, and very helpful in California and Colorado as well.

In a presidential year, that vote may produce negative side-effects it did not have in this year's reduced electorate. Robert G. Beckel, the manager of Mondale's campaign, put the point plainly:

"This year, many of the young white males in the South didn't vote, and that was a blessing for us. But they will be back in 1988, and we still have to fashion an economic argument for the South that says to the blacks and the poor, 'We hear you and we're going to help you,' and at the same time says to those young whites who are working their way up, 'We're not going to block you; we're not going to hold you down in order to help someone else.'"

Beckel has firsthand experience

DRAN

The Iranian Connection (Cont'd.)

Charles Krauthammer

Somebody Should Resign


A few weeks after British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington resigned over the Argentine takeover of the Falklands, a Reagan aide passed around a piece of paper at a senior staff meeting. Referring to Carrington, whom Alexander Haig, at a private staff meeting, had once called a "duplicitous bastard," the note read: "Duplicitous Bastard Resigns on Principle: A Model."

In America, we cannot get even our sweetest bumbler to resign. We have no model, no tradition of principled resignation. Now, because of the Iranian affair, there is talk of leave-taking. But, as usual, we just cannot get it right. The wrong man is thinking of resigning.

The wrong man is Secretary of State George Shultz. Spear-carrier of the administration's anti-terrorist policy, Shultz is embarrassed. He has beaten up on the Europeans for making separate peace with terrorist states. He has assured the Arab League that the United States was not supporting Iran in its war with Iraq. All the while, the National Security Council has been engaged with Iran in an arms-for-hostages exchange.

The right man for resigning is NSC chief John Poindexter. Poindexter now admits that he made "a miscalculation" on whom he could trust in Iran. (The mullahs have a way of driving Americans to understatement. President Carter called the Desert One fiasco an "incomplete success.") If

"The president has been flying a seat-of-the-pants foreign policy for some time now. (Reykjavik comes to mind.) It has now crash-landed."



someone does resign, it shouldn't be the man who pushed the right policy, but the man who pushed the wrong one.

How wrong? Let me count the ways. Even if you cave in and decide to buy hostages, how can you possibly consent to buy them retail, one at a time? When the Israelis made the worst hostage trade in history, 1,150 terrorists for 3 soldiers, at least they got all three of their boys.

The administration cover story is that the real policy was not buying hostages, but buying friends. The United States was not paying ransom. It was pursuing a larger strategic objective: making alliances with Iranian doves as an opening to a

post-Khomeini future. Goodness. Has there ever been an appeasement policy that was not predicated on the notion of hawks and doves among our enemies? We must offer wheat and credits and perhaps pieces of Africa or Central America in order to strengthen Soviet—or Sandinista or Angolan, fill in the blanks—doves. Heard that one? Whenever conservatives hear it, their instinctive, and correct, response is ridicule.

Now we hear that there is a power struggle taking place among Ayatollah Khomeini's successors, and we have to help the doves. There is a problem with this theory. True, there are several factions vying for power. But there is not a shred of evidence that any one is any less Islamic-fanatic or anti-Western than the other. Nor, even if such a faction exists, that we know which one it is. Nor, even if we know, that we know how to help it. One would imagine that in Khomeini-land, a connection to the Great Satan is hardly a means to political advancement.

The president has been flying a seat-of-the-pants foreign policy for some time now. (Reykjavik comes to mind.) It has now crash-landed. Reagan likes to pilot listening to his gut, not watching his radar. His gut—sympathy for hostage families—told him to risk for the hostages. He did. He risked America's antiterrorist policy. He risked American credibility with the Gulf states and Arab moderates. He risked his own principle, enunciated during his first week in office, that criminals, even if state-sponsored, will not dictate American foreign policy. He risked and he lost.

Reagan's legendary luck ran out: Where were his advisers in the White House whose job it was to tell him that he can't live on luck alone? Whose job it is to watch the radar? Miscalculation is not a hanging offense, but it is a resigning one.

An antiterrorism policy is extraordinarily difficult to sustain because, like any policy of *not* doing (no negotiation, no concessions), it is inherently fragile: one significant slip and the policy evaporates. Right now, the U.S. policy is about to evaporate.

It cannot easily be salvaged. But a principled resignation is the first step on the road back. It would demonstrate that the policy of trading arms, and the American national interest, for hostages is repudiated. That policy, not the choice of loose-lipped Iranians as partners, is the miscalculation. Carrington miscalculated Argentine intentions and resigned. Will the American miscalculator please stand up and step down?

Daniel Schorr

A Whiff of Watergate?

Hell hath no fury like a Congress scorned. The Democratic-controlled Congress, scenting abuse of power in Nicaragua and Iran, is going into its war dance, and the wagons of executive privilege are being drawn around the Reagan White House.

If you think you smell a whiff of Watergate in the air, it's because the odor is there. There is no evidence of illegality in congressional mandates evaded and executive orders flouted. But once again, the issue is raised of a willful president, scornful of the plodding ways of democratic government, pursuing his perceived national security objectives by extralegal means.

In the present case, President Reagan had a pocket clandestine directorate created inside the staff of the National Security Council. This was not the NSC operated as a collegial body of Cabinet officers and intelligence professionals, coordinating policy and advising the president. It was simply a roosting place; under a blanket of executive privilege, for compartmented special projects.

From this vantage point, Robert McFarlane's protégé, Marine Maj. (later lieutenant colonel) Oliver North, a Vietnam veteran in unconventional warfare, rode herd on the CIA's mining of Nicaragua's harbors. When Congress imposed a cease-fire on hostile official activity against the Sandinista regime, North simply created a network of military friends from Vietnam days to do the job of supplying the contras.

America's anticommunist ventures have left a pool of unrequited right-wingers available for such work. The Nixon "plumbers" did their re-

positions against giving aid to terrorists and against taking sides in the Iran-Iraq war. It appears that the principal concern was to withhold details from the State and Defense departments, which might press such arguments.

Secret missions have a way of taking on a life of their own, involving a concentration on keeping the secret at the expense of examining the rationale for what is being kept secret. So well were the secrets kept from most of the executive branch, not to mention Congress, that Israeli diplomatic and intelligence officials, partners in the enterprise, knew more about what the U.S. government was doing than all but a few in that government.

When McFarlane left the White House last December, North officially took over the "Iranian connection," but when North flew to Tehran, he took along McFarlane—another "volunteer" from the private sector.

Now congressional committees are preparing to ask for NSC files and telephone logs, seeking to establish how pocket government works and how it subcontracts to the "private sector." The White House indicates it will invoke executive privilege. To paraphrase Ronald Reagan in other connections, here we go again.

The writer is senior news analyst for National Public Radio.

Royal Evans and Robert Novak

Like 'a Shadow CIA'

THE VICE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY

FOR RELEASE

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REMARKS AS DELIVERED BY
VICE PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE'S
PUBLIC POLICY LUNCHEON
WASHINGTON, D.C.
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1986

Mr. President, at the outset of these remarks, let me just pay my respects to you and thank you for all you do for this wonderful institution, AEI, an institution for which I have so much respect. I'm delighted to see you. Bob Melott, too.

And, of course, I was invited sometime ago by Paul McCracken to come here, and I hope that you'll all be interested in the topic that Paul asked me to address: "Special Drawing Rights, the Snake and its Effect on Disintermediation."

I am delighted to be at this AEI forum. You couldn't have scheduled a better time to discuss public policy. A great many citizens currently are troubled about recent revelations, and I'm grateful for this chance to address some of those concerns of the American people.

There's been much criticism and confusion in recent weeks over the Administration's, our, policies regarding Iran. I understand the skepticism of the American people. The result, as you all know, according to these opinion surveys, is that the Administration's credibility has been hurt. This is especially painful to the President and to me as well. After all, we're in the White House because of the trust that the American people placed in us.

We must restore that trust and so today I'd like to discuss some of the basic concerns that the American people rightfully have about our policy toward Iran -- questions of why we tried to open channels, open channels with a regime that all of us Americans despise; questions of how we can have a policy of not sending arms to Iran and then seemingly do just the opposite; and questions about the operation of the National Security Council staff.

Let me start with a basic concern. Why did we open a dialogue with Iran?

Here was a country that deeply humiliated the United States by kidnapping our diplomats, burning our flag. We still have vivid memories of blindfolded Americans being paraded around our own Embassy in there in Tehran. There is in the hearts of the American people an understandable animosity -- a hatred really -- to Khomeini's Iran. I feel that way myself, to be very honest with you, and so does the President who has been vilified time and time again by Iran's radical leaders; we're told that most Iranians feel the same way about us, the country that they call the Great Satan.

So why have anything to do with them? I'm sorry I didn't bring a map, but if you look at a map, Iran is all that stands between the Soviets and the Gulf oil states. It's all that stands between the Soviets and a warm water port. Either a disintegrating Iran or an overly powerful Iran could threaten the stability of the entire Middle East, and especially those moderate Arab states -- our friends whose stability and independence are absolutely vital to the national security of the United States. We may not like the current Iranian regime, and I've said we don't, but it would be irresponsible to ignore its geopolitical and strategic importance.

That doesn't mean we should simply appease any Iranian regime. It does mean, however, that we can't ignore this looming transition that will soon take place in Iran. Khomeini will pass from the scene. A successor regime will take power, and we must be positioned to serve America's interests, and indeed the interests of the entire free world.

Apart from the strategic reasons, humanitarian concern about American hostages in Lebanon provided another reason to open a channel to Iran. The Iranians themselves are not holding our hostages, but we believe they have influence over those who do hold some of our hostages.

But let me add something very important. In spite of our bitter feelings toward Iran's leadership, we would've tried to begin a dialogue with Iran whether we had hostages in Lebanon or not. In fact, for three years prior to the first hostage kidnappings, this Administration attempted to find reliable -- hopefully moderate -- Iranian channels through which to conduct a responsible dialogue.

And more recently we've been receiving intelligence that pragmatic elements within Iran were beginning to appreciate certain sobering realities. To the east in Afghanistan, we estimate 115,000 Soviet troops are committing atrocities on

Iran's Islamic brothers. To the north, 26 Soviet divisions, right there on Iran's border for whatever opportunities might arise.

To the west, Iran is engaged in a war of unbelievably horrible human dimensions, war with Iraq -- 12-year old kids, 14-year old kids, pressed into service, and then ground up in combat. And at home, Iran is teetering on the economic brink right there in its own front yard, 40 percent unemployment rate. Many Iranian leaders understand that their own survival, and certainly the rebuilding of their economy, may depend on normalizing ties with their neighbors and with the Western world.

So, we for our reasons and certain elements in Iran for their reasons -- in spite of this mutual hatred -- began a tentative, probing dialogue -- which brings us to another question.

How can the United States Government have a policy against countries sending arms to Iran and then turn around and itself send arms? I know the American people simply do not understand this.

When we started talking to the Iranians, both sides were deeply suspicious of each other. And remain so, I might say. Those Iranians who were taking enormous personal risks by just talking to us felt that they needed a signal that their risks were worth it. We were told the signal they required, and we gave them that signal by selling a limited amount of arms -- about one-tenth of one percent of the arms that have supplied by other countries.

Likewise, we needed proof of Iranian seriousness. We required signs of a cessation of Iranian use of terrorism and help in gaining the release of our hostages in Lebanon. And we did see certain positive signs, we have seen them. They opposed, for example, the Pan American hijacking in Karachi and immediately after, they denied landing rights. They interceded with the TWA hijackers in Beirut. And, of course, three hostages once held in Lebanon by the Islamic Jihad are today with their families here in the United States of America.

And I, perhaps President Ford will agree with this, but when you are President, any American held captive against his will anywhere in the world is like your own son or daughter. I know that's the way our President feels about it. But you must remain true to your principles. And I can tell you the President is absolutely convinced that he did not swap arms for hostages.

Still the question remains of how the Administration could violate its own policy of not selling arms to Iran. Simple human

hope explains it perhaps better than anything else. The President hoped that we could open a channel that would serve the interests of the United States and of our allies in a variety of ways. Call it leadership; given 20-20 hindsight, call it a mistaken tactic if you want to; it was risky, but potentially of long-term value.

The shaping of the Iranian policy involved difficult choices. As complex as the public debate on the issue would be, the matter was further clouded by the way in which the President's goals were executed, specifically allegations about certain activities of the National Security Council staff.

Clearly mistakes were made.

Our policy of conducting a dialogue with Iran, which was legitimate and arguable, has become entangled with the separate matter of this NSC investigation.

A week ago Monday afternoon the President learned of possible improprieties. A week ago Monday. On Tuesday, he disclosed the problem to the public and instructed the Attorney General to go forward with a full investigation. On Wednesday, he created a bipartisan commission, outstanding individuals, to review the role of the NSC staff and make recommendations for the future. And just yesterday, he moved to appoint, have the court appoint an independent counsel to ensure a full accounting for any possible wrongdoing.

The President pledged full cooperation with the United States Congress, urging it to consolidate and expedite its inquiries. Yesterday he also named Frank Carlucci, a seasoned professional with broad experience, so well known to many people here, to serve as his national security advisor. Now this is fast action in anybody's book.

These are actions I fully support and which I believe the American people will judge commendable.

The President has moved swiftly, strongly, but let me add this. I'm convinced that he will take whatever additional steps may be necessary to get things back on track and get our foreign policy moving forward.

As the elected representatives of all the people, the President and the Vice President, he and I have a duty to preserve the public trust and uphold the laws of this country. We take that duty very, very seriously.

I'd like to say something about my role in all of this. I was aware of our Iran initiative and I support the President's

decision. I was not aware of and I oppose any diversion of funds, any ransom payments, or any circumvention of the will of the Congress, the law of the United States of America. As the various investigations proceed, I have this to say -- let the chips fall where they may. We want the truth. The President wants it. I want it. And the American people have a fundamental right to it.

And if the truth hurts, so be it. We've got to take our lumps and move ahead.

Politics do not matter; personalities do not matter; those who haven't served the President well don't matter. What matters is the United States of America.

And we musn't allow our foreign policy to become paralyzed by distraction.

There can be no denying that our credibility has been damaged by this entire episode and its aftermath.

We have a critical role to play internationally and I intend to help the President tackle the challenges that lie before us in the last two years of this Administration: Putting U.S.-Soviet relations on a new footing; pursuing a breakthrough in arms reduction; building on the potential that I saw so clearly just this past summer for making new strides for peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors; working to end apartheid and creating a more hopeful future for all Africans; solidifying the remarkable changes taking place in Asia; combatting international terrorism in close conjunction with our allies; and, of course, fostering the development of democracy in Central America.

And let me add, the freedom of the people of Central America should not, must not, be held hostage to actions unrelated to them. This nation's support of those who are fighting for democracy in Nicaragua should stand on its own merits, not hang upon events related to Iran. The Marxist-Leninist regime in Managua must not benefit from the errors of some people in Washington, D.C.

Our Administration has a duty to follow a foreign policy that reflects the values of its citizens. This sounds simple; and yet it is often, as so many of you here know, a very complex matter. It's not easy translating general values into specific foreign policy programs. And this is why there's always so much internal debate over our nation's role in world affairs -- from Iran to arms reduction.

The Reagan Administration has two years left in which to pursue our particular vision of how America's foreign policy should fit America's values. There's one thing, however, on which critics and supporters would agree -- U.S. foreign policy must move forward. The U.S. has obligations as leaders of the free world. It has opportunities and responsibilities unmatched by any other country to bring stability to the world. †

And we must move forward with the trust of the American people. To the extent that that trust has been damaged it must be repaired, and only the truth can repair that. Our government rules not by force or intimidation, but by earning the confidence and respect of the American people.

Our duty must be to uphold that confidence and restore that respect.

Sometimes true bipartisanship is called for and, in my view, now is such a time. And I have been very pleased that Republicans and Democrats alike have pledged to help get the facts out and move on.

A storm is now raging, but when the full truth is known -- and it will be; and when the American people come to understand that this strong and honest President moves swiftly to correct what might have been wrong, then a forgiving American people -- in spite of their misgivings about Iran and weapons and diverted funds -- will say, "Our President told the truth. He took action. Let's go forward together."

† † †

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


March 4, 1987

Dear Mr. Ansari,

Mr. Kojelis asked me to thank you for the very interesting material on the terrible situation in Iran. As far as U.S. policy is concerned, I think that you can safely view the recent arms transfers as a foreign policy aberration that will not be repeated.

Please do keep in contact with our office.

Sincerely,



Max Green
Associate Director
Office of Public Liaison

Nazenin Ansari
Young Constitutional
Monarchists of Iran
P.O. Box 9403
Washington, D.C. 20016

ZAHW

February 27, 1987

Dear Mr. Kojelis:

I hope the enclosed material will be of interest to you. Please do contact me if you have any questions, or need further information.

Sincerely yours,

Nazem Ansari

YOUNG CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHISTS OF IRAN

P.O. BOX 9403, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20016

(202) 362-7088

February 16, 1987

Dear Sir:

Khomeini's tyrannical regime has been rewarded with fresh ammunition. The arms sales to Iran have vindicated the Islamic Republic's policy of terror by signalling the surrender to its extortion. Unless further acts of terrorism are to be encouraged, it is necessary to reconsider the policies of selling arms in exchange for hostages and of reestablishing relations with Iran under the autocratic system of the Islamic Republic.


In order to assist this policy reassessment, we are sending you three background papers discussing the Islamic Republic's lack of legitimacy, the logistics of the Islamic Republic's support for terrorism, and the reestablishment of relations with Iran.

We hope that these background materials will prove to be helpful. We are convinced that it is wrong to deal with the Khomeini regime and that the policy of providing arms in exchange for hostages will only encourage further Khomeini-inspired terrorism. Thus, we urge you to support the following policies:

1. Reinstate the arms embargo against Iran and Iraq;
2. Adopt a comprehensive policy against the Khomeini regime and its support for international terrorism;
3. Distinguish between the totalitarianism system of Khomeini's Islamic Republic and freedom fighters struggling against totalitarianism, such as the Contras in Marxist Nicaragua and the partisans in Soviet occupied Afghanistan;
4. Recognize that the only moderates in Iran are those who will not tolerate more Khomeini-type terror and seek the democratic rights and freedoms guaranteed by Iran's Constitution of 1906.

Thanking you in advance for your support, we remain

Sincerely yours,


Sassan Mehrabanzad
Representative

Why the Islamic Republic has lost
its Legitimacy in Iran.

Young Constitutional Monarchists of Iran

February 1987

The Islamic Republic of Iran is a theocratic state governed by a religious oligarchy. It is a clique of conniving zealots who, in the name of religion, have challenged democratic values by rejecting the philosophical, moral, and political rationales on which democracy is based.. It is a mullahcracy which views Western civilization as ethically corrupt, morally spiritless, and as a means to weaken the masses and steal their resources.

The Islamic state's record on political, social, religious, and civil repression in Iran and its handling of the Iranian economy, which has been marred by corruption, demonstrate its illegitimate pursuit of self-interest and affirm the loss of its mandate with the Iranian nation.

In Iran of today, the regime of the mullahs derives its power not from the people but from Islamic revolutionary organizations. By institutionalizing physical oppression and moral coercion, the regime has established control over every aspect of human life.

First, there are the paramilitary, mob-oriented forces referred to as the "Hezbollah" (Party of God) mobs run by the Komitehs and the Revolutionary Guards. Then there are the Mostazafan (Disinherited) Foundation, the Foundation of the Martyred, and the Mobilization Foundation. They wield enormous material and human power because they are allowed to confiscate property and wealth at will, as well as to dislocate or relocate anyone as they deem necessary.

Women were the first victims of the retrogressive policies of the Islamic Republic, which made them legally, politically, and economically invisible. A few months after the revolution, the Family Protection Act was declared anti-Islamic and was consequently dismantled. The minimum age of marriage for girls was reduced to 13. Polygamy was allowed and women lost their automatic right to ask for divorce on the grounds of their husbands remarriage. To make matters worse,

thousands were removed from the work place through psychological and physical pressure.

Today women have been forced to hide behind the veil (hejab). As one member of the Parliament stated in 1980:

"the hejab is not a religious issue,...but a political, social, and economic issue ."

"Anti-vice squads" spray women with acid or cut their faces with razors for wearing makeup, showing too much hair, or even wearing veils with gold and silver streaks. The regime has equated resistance to veiling with a U.S. conspiracy to destroy the Islamic Republic.

Minorities, too, have fallen prey to various means of repression and discrimination. In particular the Jewish populace of Iran and the members of the Bahai sect have been systematically persecuted. The regime continues to ignore the 1981 United Nations Declaration calling for the elimination of all forms of discrimination based upon religion and belief.

Doctors have been executed for treating political dissidents. Between July 14 and August 6, 1986, the government arrested 450 members of the independent Iranian Medical Association. The members were striking to protest the dissolution of the elected Board of Directors, and the naming of a political appointee as its president by a government decree.

The eligibility of students to apply to Iranian universities has depended on their religious and political qualifications. In order to be accepted into any postsecondary institution, as well as to any place of employment, students must pass a rigorous exam in Shi'a Islamic law and doctrine administered by the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education. The staff of universities have been purged for the lack of religious and political qualifications. These qualifications are determined and reviewed by the Cultural Revolutionary Headquarters and the Higher Council for Revolutionary Education. Members of the Cultural Revolutionary Headquarters include President Ali Khamenei, Chief Justice Ayatollah Musavi Ardabili, and Majlis speaker Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani.

"We are not afraid of economic sanctions or military intervention. What we are afraid of is Western universities."

Fine arts are no longer taught because so much of Iranian art and literature is Persian and secular rather than Islamic

in flavor. Iranian performers have been suffering from a systematic campaign of imprisonment, torture, and execution.

Newspapers and magazines have been shut down, and their owners and editors have been imprisoned for not being politically qualified. Last month the control of the two daily newspapers with the largest circulations, Keyhan and Etela'at, was transferred to the personal office of Ayatollah Khomeini which is run by his son, Ahmad Khomeini.

Clothes bearing latin letters or bright colors have been labeled decadent, and their sellers and wearers have been punished by up to 74 lashes with a leather whip in public. In addition to absurd spectacles directed against women, there are repeated identity checks, arbitrary arrests, and public executions.

In 1984 Amnesty International "learned of cases which prisoners were executed after being sentenced to relative short terms of imprisonment, when both the prisoner and the family had been given to believe that the release was imminent...many were imprisoned for the non-violence exercise of their conscientiously-held beliefs." Amnesty also "learned of cases in which relatives were imprisoned as hostages when a political suspect could not be found."

In 1986 Amnesty documented 470 executions in Iran, although it believed that the true total was much higher. This number translates to 42 percent of all known executions in the world last year.

In the absence of any coherent policy, the economy has deteriorated continuously. The high inflation rate, stagnant income, and the high unemployment rate have caused a large decline in living standards. The unemployment rate would be higher were it not for several million men mobilized in the armed forces, Revolutionary Guards and other security forces.

Not only are there shortages of water and electricity (now up to 10 hours daily), but there are also shortages of medicine and food. People have to stand in line for up to 5 hours to buy bread which is now made of a mixture of sawdust and flour. Moreover, in a country which has the third largest reserves of oil in the world, people must stand in line for hours to buy gas at \$20 per gallon. The regime has announced that very soon people will have to fast everyday, continuously.

To make matters worse, Iranians must deal with bribing corrupt mullahs and government officials in the City Halls, the Courts, the Customs Bureau, and the Commerce Ministry, who

accept dollars for services rendered, including the distribution of ration cards. Black markets, which are operated by the hierarchical elite accept dollars only. As Helen Kafi of the French magazine L'Express (translated in World Press Review of October 1986) noted:

"There are clubs which provide-- many services: alcohol, drugs, girls, subversive literature-- anything that is forbidden can be delivered to you at home. More important, the club has a list of confidential phone numbers that can help open doors at the highest levels. The numbers are those of leading dignitaries in the regime like Ahmad Khomeini, and Sadegh Tabatabai, the son-in-law of Ayatollah Khomeini [arrested in West Germany for smuggling opium and heroin], citizens above ideological suspicion who club members say are highly corrupt. Through their intervention one can obtain a passport and exit visa, the lease on a shop, even the liberation of a prisoner. All of this is expensive and payable in currency through a foreign bank. The cost of freeing a prisoner; for-example, is \$30,000 to \$40,000."

It is evident that the mullahcratic Islamic Republic has undermined the political, social, cultural, and religious values of Iran and Iranians as a nation. The regime has buried its own raison d'etre under the bodies of more than a million war casualties and torture victims. The holocaust it has caused is testimony to its inability to envision, much less to construct, a better future for the Iranian people.

As the regime has become more vulnerable, a national Iranian Constitutional Resistance movement has gained momentum. Despite their tough approach, the authorities have been unable to dismantle the clandestine groups that organize the secret activities of millions of Iranians. Contrary to the militant activities of the leftist forces in Iran, such as the People's Mojahedin Organization, the activities of the Constitutional Resistance movement have been nonviolent and peaceful.

On August 5, 1983, according to William O. Beeman's article in the Baltimore Sun of August 17, 1983:

"thousands took to the streets in an eerie silent march the likes of which has not been seen since 1979."

The march against Khomeini and the Islamic Republic, and for the return of Constitutional Monarchy, was called by Dr. Ali Amini, a former Prime Minister of the late Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

Once again, on April 26, 1985, the British Broadcasting Corporation reported that thousands demonstrated in total silence. Many were wearing hats to demonstrate that the Khomeini regime had cheated people with its promises. Similar demonstrations took place in Shiraz, Hamedan, Borujerd, Tabriz, the Holy City of Mashad, and Esfahan.

Another demonstration was called on May 17, 1985 by Dr. Shahpour Bakhtiar, the last Prime Minister of the late Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi who now heads the National Iranian Resistance Movement. According to Reuter of May 18, 1985:

"The protest, which residents said included road blocks, was the biggest against the government and the war with Iraq for two years."

On September 5, 1986 one of the new arms of the Constitutional Resistance Movement, the Flag of Freedom, organized an 11-minute television broadcast by Shah Reza Pahlavi II in Iran. Reza Shah II stated that the collapse of the regime is a only a matter of time. For 11 minutes the government was unable to stop the program which was seen in its entirety. Clashes between the people and the Revolutionary Guards, of whom many surrendered, took place in south of Tehran. In other cities, such as Gonbad, people took to the streets congratulating one another and offering sweets and cakes to passersby.

On January 23, 1987, the Flag of Freedom and the National Iranian Resistance Movement distributed pictures of Reza Shah II and Dr. Bakhtiar at the Friday Prayer in Tehran. They had been placed in four large balloons hovering over the prayer location. By shooting at the balloons, the Revolutionary Guards released the pictures over the crowds.

Today, the mullahs face the problem of how not to bring back the Army from the front, lest they spread more discontent upon their return. They are well aware that their survival can only be ensured by the continuity of the Iran-Iraq war and the expansion of their revolution abroad.

The Islamic Republic is in a precarious and an unstable state. Although every effort is being made to survive (even when that it implies, as Ayatollah Khomeini has stated, to make a deal with Devil himself), the ruling clerical clique recognizes that its days are numbered and its collapse is inevitable. Its legitimacy has been lost, and its mandate with the Iranian nation has been broken.

To conclude, American short-term tactical objectives

should not undermine its long-term strategic interests. Reestablishment of relations with a repressive system that is on the verge of annihilation is both wrong and illogical. Such an unwise move will on the one hand portray the United States as the guarantor of tyranny and repression in Iran, and on the other hand, damage its prestige as the protector of freedom and democracy around the world. The United States should align itself with the Iranian nation in its pursuit of peace, liberty, and happiness. It is only then that the leader of the Free World can achieve its goals for security and stability in the Middle East, and freedom and democracy around the world.

The Logistics of the Islamic Republic's
Support for Terrorism

Young Constitutional Monarchists of Iran

February 1987

The strategic implications of Iran's location next to the Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf, and its vast human and natural resources are critical to the formulation of American foreign policy and the achievement of its goals in the Middle East. As John C. Campbell, Middle East expert, has summarized, these goals are:

"first, security, denial of the area to Soviet control, maintenance of the independence of the Middle East nations, and prevention of situations which could lead to nuclear war; second, oil supply, the continued availability of Middle East oil to the rest of the world in adequate continuity and on bearable terms; and third, relative stability, or more accurately, the containment of instability which could jeopardize attainment of the first two aims."

Since the emergence of the Islamic Republic in Iran, its clerical leaders have claimed that their goal of exporting the Islamic revolution has been based on a "neither East nor West" policy. This paper will examine some of the mechanisms for the export of the Islamic revolution in order to demonstrate that this policy signifies a tilt towards the East and the Soviet Union.

One of the primary goals of the Islamic revolution and the Islamic Republic is to root out "American imperialism" from the Middle East and beyond. This goal was reiterated by Prime Minister Mir Hussein Moussavi in late December 1986:

"No matter what the price, we have to destroy the United States."

To destroy the "Great Satan" (the United States), its "stooges" first have to be eliminated. These are the leaders

of the conservative Persian Gulf states, and the leaders of African countries friendly to the West. The clerics in Iran view them as corrupt and eager to sacrifice the natural resources of their countries in order to strengthen "the enemy of freedom, the arrogant America."

The Islamic Republic has, thus, created special instruments for the export of the revolution. The most important of these are the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, the Council for the Export of the Revolution, and the Committee to Restore the Rights of Black Americans. The former two have been instrumental in the Islamic Republic's pursuit of establishing an Islamic Republic of Iraq through the war; as a nucleus for a string of Islamic governments throughout the Persian Gulf region. As speaker of the Parliament, Hashemi-Rafsanjani stated,

"...We are for the export of the revolution...We have launched an Islamic movement and Islam must prevail in the region... We will never conquer a country through the use of our army..."

1. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) was formally established under a decree issued by Ayatollah Khomeini on May 5, 1979. It was created to protect the foundation of the revolution by assisting the ruling clerics in the administration of the fundamentalist Islamic morals and codes; and by replacing the Western style Iranian army that could not be trusted by the mullahs.

Today the Revolutionary Guards have been organized into battalion sized units. Many that have been trained in North Korea and People's Republic of China are now operating the IRGC naval and air elements. Their weapons have been supplied mainly by China and Eastern bloc countries, including Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria.

The Corps operates at times independently, and at other times with the regular army in the war against Iraq. In addition, it mobilizes the population for the war. For-example, one of its divisions, the "Women's Mobilization Division", has been recruiting half million Iranian women. It is headed by Zohreh Rahnavard, a.k.a. Zeynab Borujerdy, the wife of Prime Minister Mir Hussein Moussavi. Ms. Rahnavard co-commands the division of Ms. Dawi Bur, who received her field training in Lebanon and then studied to be a trainer in the "Martyr's Camp", in northeast of Tehran.

The Revolutionary Guards also provide training and support for terrorists and terrorist organizations, such as the Islamic Jihad network, both inside Iran and in foreign countries such as Lebanon and Libya. They operate at least eight identifiable terrorist training camps in Iran. Several are reserved for foreign recruits from Moslem students and workers throughout the Middle East, Asia, Western Europe, and the United States. These recruits get their training on airline hijackings, using various planes, and air buses. It has been estimated that 400 have already completed this training. In addition there are several segregated camps in Tehran, Qom, Isfahan, and Beheshtieh in which 30 groups of female terrorists are taking training.

Following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, a contingent of the Revolutionary Guards was dispatched to the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon. They established their headquarters and propoganda offices in Baalbek and began giving "Koranic lessons" to the local Lebanese. At various times their numbers have been estimated between 600 to 2,000.

In Lebanon, the activities of the Corps-- which contains a special "liberation brigade" to participate in operations outside of Iran-- has been controlled by a secret committee. This is the "War Against Satan Committee" which oversees operations from its Tehran headquarters. The most important operations are conducted, planned and handled by the committee which then directs the Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon to carry out its orders using local Shiite militants including the Islamic Jihad. Most intelligence observers credit the majority of terrorist acts in the Middle East, including the bombings of the U.S. Embassy and the Marine Headquarters in Beirut, to this secret organization.

In Libya a cadre of the Revolutionary Guards instructs recruits from several African countries. The Africans have been trained in various terrorist techniques including assasination, bombing, and other skills.

2. Council for the Islamic Revolution

Another mechanism used by the Islamic Republic to export its Islamic crusade has been the Council for the Islamic Revolution (the Council), set up in 1981. Its members include clerics and regular advisors from Syrian and Libyan intelligence agencies. According to Robin Wright of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Council reportedly received more than \$1 billion annually from government allocations and "contributors from foreign

countries".

The Council recruits Arab cadres from surrounding Arab countries. It has trained thousands of "enteharis" (volunteers) for suicide attacks on those perceived to be the enemies of the Islamic Republic. With the help of Libya, Syria, and North Korea it has set up several camps, including two in Tehran and Qom, for training terrorists.

The Council consists of a series of committees and subcommittees which represent the interests of specific regional groups and pool resources to mount individual cell operations. Some of the liberation movements under the umbrella of the Council are:

a. Hezbollah (Party of God)

The term Hezbollah is more generic than specific. Hezbollah knows no territorial limits or temporal power. "Only one party--of Allah; only one leader--Ruhollah [Khomeini]". It was first established in Iran as the arm of the Islamic Republican Party to carry out violent repression in Iran.

The Hezbollah became visible in Lebanon in 1979, and is one of the arms of the Islamic Jihad network. Its leader is Sheik Mohammad Hassan Fadlallah. Of its 8000 members mainly in southern and eastern Lebanon and West Beirut, between 600-800 are Revolutionary Guards who were dispatched from Tehran in 1982 after the Israeli invasion.

Iranian sources have identified Mohammad Ali Hamadei, the Lebanese Shi'ite suspect in the 1985 hijacking of TWA airliner as one of Fadlallah's bodyguards during several of his trips to Tehran, including the one in late December, 1986 to attend the conference of the anti-Iraqi opposition forces. They have also identified Abdel Hadi Hamadei, his brother, as being the Chief Security Officer of the Hezbollah in Lebanon.

b. Islamic Da'awa

The Al Dawa operates under the guidance of the Council's Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. The Assembly is an umbrella organization which has control over two dozen Islamic fundamentalist and terrorist groups throughout the Middle East.

The Al Dawa has been implicated in several hijackings,

kidnappings, assassination attempts and suicide bombings against American targets. On December 3, 1984, two Al Dawa members were among the four men who hijacked a Kuwaiti passenger plane, forced it to land in Tehran and murdered two United States Agency for International Development officials. In addition, half of the 17 Shiite Moslem prisoners convicted in a series of bombings, including the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait, on December 12, 1983, are Al Dawa members. Their release, incidentally, has been demanded in many terrorist incidents. One of the demands of the Islamic Republic during recent negotiations with the United States was the release of these terrorists. In the past, Al Dawa terrorists have coordinated activities with Shiite elements in Baalbek using the nom de guerre of Islamic Jihad.

c. Islamic Amal

Similar to the Al Dawa, the Islamic Amal also operates under the command of the Council's Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. It is radically pro-Khomeini, and is a split-off from the mainstream Shi'ite group, Amal, which is headed by Nabih Berri. The division occurred in 1981 after a visit to Tehran by Hussein Moussavi, its present leader, where the Islamic Republic officials, including Speaker of the Parliament Hashemi Rafsanjani, insisted that Amal take a more militant posture vis a vis Western interests in the Middle East.

Like the other groups mentioned above, the Islamic Amal is another arm of the Islamic Jihad network. The group played a direct support role in the Beirut bombings of the U.S. Embassy and Multi-National Peacekeeping forces in 1983. One leader of the Islamic Amal has boasted that he can assemble within one week "500 loyal activists ready to throw themselves into suicide operations."

d. Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain

The group has been allowed by the Islamic Republic of Iran to broadcast a daily four-hour program beamed to Bahrain from the state-run Tehran radio. "Take to the streets and resist with your chests the bullets of the soldiers of the ruling regime in Bahrain. Learn from the lessons of the revolution in Iran." In early December 1981, the Front organized a plot to overthrow the government of Bahrain. The members were trained in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and had received on-the-scene assistance from the Islamic Republic's Embassy in Manama, Bahrain. The plot was

uncovered by the government and members were arrested.

e. Takfir wa Hijra (Repudiation and Renunciation), Al Jihad al-Jadid (New Holy War)

The two organizations took part in the assassination of President Anwar Sadat on October 6, 1981. There have been unconfirmed reports that Islamic Republic financing played a role, as a way to get revenge of Sadat for warmly welcoming the ailing Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Today, the two groups are committed to the overthrow of the Mubarak government in Cairo.

f. The Islamic Revolutionary Organization in the Arabian Peninsula.

The group is comprised of dissident Saudi elements seeking to overthrow the ruling Saudi family. Although there is no evidence that this group participated in the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca on November 20, 1979, however analysts believe that Islamic Republic funds and support played a key role in the takeover.

g. The Moro National Liberation Front of Phillipines (MNLF)

The organization maintains representatives in the Council. The goal of the MNLF and its armed units, the Bangsa Moro Army, is Islamic autonomy in the Phillipines.

h. The Party of Islam

The group is committed to the creation of an Islamic Republic in Malaysia. A number of Malay fundamentalists have been trained in terrorist camps in the Islamic Republic of Iran. In October 1983, a plot by the Party of Islam to overthrow the government was uncovered in Malaysia. Same year, a number of Malaysian pilgrims were expelled from Saudi Arabia for exhibiting placards bearing the photograph of Ayatollah Khomeini.

In a 1982 Tehran seminar, "liberation mullahs" resolved to step up their campaign against Sunni Gulf states as well as against Western powers. On April 18, 1983, the U.S. Embassy in Beirut was bombed. On October 23, 1983, the U.S. Marine Command Center at Beirut International Airport was bombed. On

the same day the Command Post of the French contingent of the Multi-National Peacekeeping Force was attacked. On December 21, 1983 the French Headquarters in Beirut was bombed.

On December 12, 1983 there were coordinated bombings in six key foreign and Kuwaiti installations including the French Embassy, the Shubai Petroleum Plant which is the main oil refinery and water desalination plant, and the U.S. Embassy. According to Daniel Pipes, the Director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, one of the suicide bombers' fingertips, found in the wreckage, belonged to a man who had entered Kuwait on an Iranian passport. He had undertaken the bombing after receiving orders from a courier from Iran. As a result, the Kuwaiti authorities uncovered a whole network of Iranian sponsored terrorist groups.

In the fall of the same year, supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini attempted to assassinate the entire leadership of the Gulf Cooperation Council gathered in Doha, Qatar by the use of explosives and ground-to-air SAM-7 rockets. The plot had been financed through a leading fundamentalist mullah with close ties to the Islamic Republic.

After a series of personnel shifts in the Council from September to November 1986, Ayatollah Montazeri strengthened his control over its affairs. His son Saeed Montazeri is now in charge of the Liberation Movements, along with his son-in-law Seyyed Hadi Hashemi, in addition to one of the leaders of Al Dawa, Mohammed Baqer Sadr, and Minister of Information (Intelligence), Mohammadi-Rayshahri.

3. The Committee to Restore the Rights of Black Americans

The Islamic Republic has, since its inception, established committees to support the separatist movements of various minorities. One such committee is the Committee to Restore the Right of American Indians. Another is the Committee to Restore the Rights of Black Americans created in August, 1985 after a meeting between President Ali Khamenei and Libyan leader, Muammar Qaddafi.

The Committee to Restore the Rights of Black Americans is a part of the Islamic Republic Foreign Ministry. It is headed by David Bellfield, a.k.a. Daoud Salaheddin, a black Muslim wanted by the FBI for the assassination of Akbar Tabatabai in Washington D.C. in 1981. Tabatabai headed the Iran Freedom Foundation, an organization which opposed the Islamic Republic and Ayatollah Khomeini.

President Khamenei stated in the opening meeting of the

members of the committee, on August 3, 1985,

"...the group has been formed to restore the rights of black Americans, and not with the purpose of making sensational propoganda or spreading Islam...and should be developed into a combat mechanism fighting against America."

The headquarters of the Committee which centralizes the command and the control apparatus of its operations is in Iran. Its activities are coordinated with other revolutionary bodies that were created "to protect" the rights of blacks in America, Europe and Africa where "American capitalists are exploiting blacks for their cheap labor."

"America is conspiring against our Islamic revolution which is not confined to Iran. We will therefore utilize all legitimate weapons at our disposal to fight the enemy of freedom, the arrogant America. The forty million blacks in America represent one such weapon."

Other "anti-imperialist" weapons are to be found in Africa; even when they are also anti-Islamic. Accordingly close relations have been established with African Marxist countries with anti-American policies, such as Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Angola, and Mozambique.

It is apparent that the "Neither East Nor West" policy of the Islamic Republic has tilted towards the East. Its goals and objectives have worked to the advantage of the Soviet Union in its campaign against Western interests. Both countries view the United States as seeking to seize the natural resources of the "oppressed masses"; and portray the countries friendly to the United States as willing accomplices in the "neo-colonialist exploitation".

After Ayatollah Khomeini's departure from Iran in 1963, thousands of his followers were trained in terrorist camps operated by the PLO in Lebanon, Syria, and South Yemen. Much of the funding for this training was provided by the Soviet Union which reportedly underwrote the expense of each trainee. Many of these trained supporters now hold important offices in the Islamic Republic. According to Nathan Adams's statement before the Senate Joint Foreign Relations and Judiciary Committee Hearings on Terrorism in May 1985,:

"Sheikh-ol-Eslam, Deputy Foreign Minister, is one. Mostafa Mir Salim, and advisor to the Islamic Republic's President Hojatoeslam Ali Khamenei is another. A former student at Patrice Lumumba University, he also attended

terrorist training camps in South Yemen. He is connected today to at least one terrorist training facility in Iran. Yet, incongruously, he was the Islamic Republic's chief negotiator with the hijackers of the Kuwaiti Airbus last December [1984]. Moussavi Khoeniah, another graduate from Patrice Lumumba--and the University of Leipsig in East Germany--also was a terrorist camp trainee. For the past several years he has headed the Islamic Republic's Haj pilgrimage to Mecca [Saudi Arabia]. And the Saudi's have twice expelled him for inciting disturbances, leading pro-Khomeini demonstrations... Khoeniah is today considered one of the most powerful figures in Iran... Other terrorist-trained figures in the government include Minister for Heavy Industry, Behzad Nabavi, and [former] Oil Minister Mohammed Gharazi."

Since 1980 the Soviet Union has supplied the Islamic Republic with ammunition, small arms, communication equipment, heavy artillery, multiple rocket launchers, tanks, and surface-to-surface missiles. In addition, it has allowed North Korean military supplies to be flown to Iran over Soviet territory. According to Jane's Defense Weekly:

"By mid-1985 there was already a sufficient number of Soviet trained Iranian officers and experts to conduct a large-scale offensive using Soviet-made weapons."

More importantly:

"The Soviet Union has been given access to all western military technology in Iran, with U.S.-built F-14 Tomcats and F-4 Phantoms being flown to the USSR for tests and former CIA monitoring stations in northern Iran being made available to Soviet technicians."

In January 1985, the Foreign Ministers of the Islamic Republic, Syria, and Libya agreed on the escalation of terror against U.S. and Western interests. In the same year, the Iranian Prime Minister Mir Hussein Moussavi traveled to Cuba to discuss cooperation between the countries in anti-American activities. Moreover, today the Islamic Republic terrorists are training alongside Palestinians in Nicaragua.

Moscow has viewed the anti-American position in Iran, since the 1979 Islamic revolution, as one of the positive achievements for the Soviet Union. Not only has the Islamic Republic continuously attempted to destabilize the Gulf states, but its contribution to the fissures in the Arab world has made any common position by these states to contain

instability next to impossible.

In Africa, the seeds of instability and agitation have been planted. The Islamic Republic recognizes the strategic importance of the region to the Free World. A strengthened Islamic Republic will only direct its forces against these interests by actively supporting hostile elements in the region.

In the final analysis, U.S. normalization of relations with the Islamic Republic in Iran will have several threatening implications for the achievement of U.S. foreign policy goals in the Middle East. First, it will undermine the American anti-terrorist policy. This will allow more agitation and subversion in the area, thereby threatening the moderate states of the area and the availability of their oil to the rest of the world. Thus, American credibility and reliability in the Middle East as an ally of the conservative Persian Gulf regimes will be damaged, and its prestige as the protector of peace and stability in the region will be destroyed. More importantly a strengthened Islamic Republic will also challenge the American security and durability around the globe as a superpower in the long run; and consequently pave the road for more Soviet influence and control.

The Reestablishment of Relations with Iran

Young Constitutional Monarchists of Iran
February, 1987

The recently publicized contacts and arms deals between the United States government and certain elements of the Khomeini regime have been justified as legitimate steps toward the normalization of diplomatic relations between the United States and Iran. In particular, the geopolitical importance of Iran, the bolstering of a moderate faction within the Khomeini regime and support of pro-Western elements in the Iranian Armed Forces have been cited as reasons for the attempted "rapprochement" with Iran. The purpose of this analysis is to examine the results of this policy in view of the stated policy objectives.

1. Geopolitics and the Khomeini Regime

The geopolitical importance of Iran is undisputed and good relations with Iran are both strategically and economically desirable. Nonetheless, it is necessary to differentiate between Iran as such and Iran under the Khomeini regime in this context. Under the Khomeini regime, Iran has become a destabilizing factor in the Middle East. Given Iran's unwaivering insistence on exporting the Islamic revolution through the use of terrorism, if necessary, it is not surprising that the other nations in the region have been in constant fear of Khomeini subversion or expansionism.

From its inception, the Khomeini regime has held the discontented majority in Iran at bay with anti-foreign terrorism, the success of which is portrayed as revolutionary victory. Through the systematic support of terrorist groups throughout the Middle East, Iran under the Khomeini regime has become an international logistical center for terrorism. As the champion of terrorism, the Khomeini clique has repeatedly celebrated terrorist acts against Americans as part of its victorious campaign to eliminate American influence (and Americans) in the region. For example, "victory" speeches were heard after the taking of 52 American hostages for 444 days, after the bombing of the Beirut Marine barracks killing 230 U.S. Marines, and after the recent extraction of military equipment from the United States in return for "exertion of influence" over

pro-Khomeini terrorist groups holding American hostages in Lebanon.¹

As a result, one may conclude that Iran's geopolitical value has been overshadowed during Khomeini's reign by the destabilizing effect which the Islamic Republic's terrorist policies have had on the region. In addition to domestic instability incited in many Arab nations, the Khomeini regime also provoked the Iran-Iraq war through its subversion in Iraq. This war has lasted longer than World War II and the Khomeini regime has refused a negotiated settlement. The result of the war has been a severe strain on the oil economies in the Gulf and on international shipping. Moreover, the Gulf states are threatened by the potential of an Iranian victory in the war because given the Khomeini regime's policy of exporting its revolution at any cost, these states are assured that the violation of their sovereignty will only be a matter of time.

In conclusion, it is apparent that Iran under the Khomeini regime will continue to threaten the stability of the region in its quest for exporting its revolution. The systematic use of terrorism by the Khomeini regime will continue as long as its support for terrorism remains unpunished and continues to produce results in the form of bargaining power and resultant concessions. The fact that the kidnapping of Americans in Lebanon has continued even after the arms shipments by the United States² illustrates the futility of the expectations of change: dealing with elements of the Khomeini regime will only strengthen this tyranny but is unlikely to change its ways.

¹The "Islamic Jihad" and "Hezbollah" are often referred to as pro-Khomeini Lebanese terrorist groups; it would be more accurate to describe them as Khomeini's terrorist groups operating in Lebanon. The terms "Islamic Jihad" and "Hezbollah" are phrases which have been coined by the Khomeini regime as part of the revolutionary rhetoric: "Islamic Jihad" (Islamic holy war) has been the justification for the Khomeini regime's inhuman excesses in Iran and abroad, and "Hezbollah" (the party of God) is the name which was adopted in the early days of the revolution by fanatical mobs which distinguish themselves by harassing women, minorities and political opponents with brown shirt tactics.

²It is clear that the Khomeini regime is also responsible for the recently renewed hostage taking in Beirut.

Thus, in the context of Iran's geopolitical value, the only discernible effects of recent U.S. arms deals with the Khomeini regime have been to bolster the Khomeini regime's chances for continued survival and to increase the Khomeini regime's chances for military success against Iraq. Both effects tend to increase, rather than decrease, instability in the region. Strengthening the Khomeini regime will only lead to further war, terrorism and regional instability and, thus, support Soviet objectives.

2. The Myth of a "Moderate Faction"

As a justification for the recent shipment of arms to Iran, it has also been stated that negotiations have been conducted with a "moderate faction" in the Khomeini government which would be more favorably disposed toward the United States and which would gain domestic political clout through its successful procurement of arms from the United States. This "moderate faction"³ has not been directly identified by the administration, but the names of Rafsanjani, Hashemi, Tabatabai and Ghorbanifar have been associated with this faction. These individuals comprise three shady arms dealers and one radical political leader.⁴

³Many commentators have correctly pointed out the absurdity of recent references to "moderates" in Khomeini's inner circle. The Khomeini regime has slaughtered the Iranian people since its inception in a manner only equalled by Pol Pot. The Khomeini regime's domestic track record is evidenced by a long list of victims: over 20,000 officially executed; over 500,000 killed in the Iran-Iraq war; over 1,000,000 disabled; over 2,500,000 displaced and homeless.

With respect to the rest of the world, the Khomeini regime has consistently made use of hostage taking and terrorist bombings as its prime foreign policy tools. The fact that it is the policy of the Khomeini regime to create, support and utilize terrorist groups in the Middle East is well documented; 52 American hostages in Tehran, 230 Marines killed in the Beirut, the TWA hijacking, the ruthless murder of Leon Klinghoffer, Robert Stethem Jr., and William Buckley, and the hostages currently held in Lebanon are only a few examples.

⁴Mr. Cyrus Hashemi (a relative of Mr. Rafsanjani) was an arms dealer who was accused of embezzlement by the Khomeini regime and recently died in London; Mr. Sadegh Tabatabai (Khomeini's son in law) is an arms dealer with Israeli contacts who was arrested and expelled from West

(Footnote Continued)

The factional differences within the Khomeini regime have often been vaguely alluded to without substantiation or elaboration. In view of almost universal emotions of hatred and disgust toward the Khomeini regime, (all of) its members, and everything it stands for, it is unlikely that any faction within the Khomeini clique can be perceived as "moderate" by Iranians (or by anyone else). The ideological differences that may exist within the Khomeini regime concern only the means and vehemence with which Khomeini's visions, of reshaping Iran into a theocratic society by recreating the conditions of 6th century Islam, are pursued; the views of the different factions do not differ with respect to Iran's foreign policy.⁵

Notwithstanding apparent power struggles and differing views, all members of Khomeini's clique share certain fundamental beliefs and attitudes which shape Khomeini's foreign policy; those who do not share these views have not been able to remain in Khomeini's government and, thus, cannot be part of the "moderate faction" referred to. These central beliefs focus on the legitimacy of terrorism as a tool to pursue and spread the "Islamic Revolution" which is characterized by religious fundamentalist extremism. For example, the "moderate"⁶ speaker of Khomeini's Parliament Rafsanjani described the recent hostage taking by Lebanese terrorists as "the pursuit of justice."

(Footnote Continued)

Germany for attempted smuggling of three pounds of opium; Mr. Manuchehr Ghorbanifar is an arms dealer whose integrity was questioned after he failed CIA polygraph tests and who has been accused of being a double agent (for Israel and Iran) and of involvement in drug deals; Mr. Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani is the speaker of Khomeini's parliament and has been categorized as a radical by noted American Iranologist James Alban Bill.

⁵In fact, the factionalism which was carried out through mutual criticism in the two major daily newspapers of the Islamic Republic (the two factions each controlled one paper) has recently subsided. The editorial control of the two dailies, which had served as fora for this factionalism, was recently unified under the auspices of Khomeini's son Ahmad. Thus, if there ever were different factions within the Khomeini clique, they have now formed a coalition.

⁶Mr. Rafsanjani has been described as a "moderate" by the administration and as a "radical" by Iranologist James A. Bill.

Finally, in terms of attempting to gain an American foothold in Khomeini's Iran, it should be noted that Khomeini's "moderate" officials have uniformly stated that Iran will "deal with the devil" to achieve its purposes. Along with this statement the officials, whether "moderate" or not, have portrayed American overtures as the final humiliation of America and the final symbol of Iranian victory over U.S. imperialism. To the Iranian public, the American efforts at reestablishing relations with Iran have been described as "the dog coming back with its tail tucked in after having been kicked out." This faction appears to be a poor choice for encouraging pro-American views among Iranians.

In conclusion, it does not appear that recent contacts by the United States with certain elements of the Khomeini regime have been successful in providing support for moderates in Iran in order to enhance the possibility of a normalization of relations. Those who have been described as moderates within the Islamic Republic have uniformly ridiculed the effort and reconfirmed their uncompromising anti-American stance. It is a mistake to believe that factions within the Khomeini clique are any different with respect to the continued use of terrorism; the regime's track record speaks for itself. The only moderates on the Iranian political scene are those groups which have been driven into exile or underground because of their opposition to the extremism of Khomeini and his cohorts.

3. The Iranian Army

A final reason cited for the sale of arms by the United States to the Khomeini regime is the indication of support to pro-Western elements in the armed forces which will help to bring about a more pro-American stance in the long run. It is true that those elements in the Iranian Army, which have survived the Khomeini regime's summary executions of military officers and personnel before the war, are favorably disposed toward the West and a sane Iranian foreign policy.

However, it should be noted that the Khomeini regime has created another army, the Revolutionary Guards, for precisely that reason. Thus, it is the Revolutionary Guards, and not the Army, which controls military activity on the front.⁷ As a result, the weapons recently sold to

⁷ Revolutionary Guards have been placed in key positions
(Footnote Continued)

the Khomeini regime are likely to reach the extremist Revolutionary Guards, who blindly support Khomeini's most radical policies, while leaving the Army to its role as an orphan.

In conclusion, it is unlikely that arms sales to the Khomeini regime will ever benefit Iran's politically moderate armed forces. It is more likely that these arms will further strengthen the the Islamic Republic's radical Revolutionary Guards to the detriment of the Army.

4. Conclusion

The normalization of relations with Iran is a valid objective based not only on Iran's geopolitical importance and the threat from the Soviet Union, but also based on decades of genuine friendship and cooperation between the Iran and the United States. In order to improve relations with Iran in the long run the United States must bank on the widespread feeling of friendship toward the United States that still exists among Iranians. This has been attempted by selling arms to a "moderate faction" within the Khomeini regime which would presumably gain strength through these transactions.

However, it appears that none of the stated objectives of this Iran policy have been achieved through these arms sales. First, as long as the Islamic Republic (whether under the leadership of Khomeini or under his successors) governs Iran, Iran will be a destabilizing factor in the region and will support terrorism, thus, opposing U.S.

(Footnote Continued)

throughout the military command structure so that Army units are not able to operate without the approval and cooperation of the Revolutionary Guards. The fact that the Khomeini regime is (understandably) fearful of any gains in popularity or power by the Army is reflected by the rate of rotation. Successful Army officers are transferred to another theater as soon as they demonstrate competence or popularity. Iran's most significant military success (pushing Iraq out of Iranian territory in 1982) was achieved when the Army was given freedom to operate independently from the Revolutionary Guards for the first time. During the night after this triumphant victory for the Army, the airplane carrying the Iranian chiefs of staff including the Commander of the Army, General Fallahi, mysteriously disappeared over Iranian airspace. Ever since, the Army has been subjected to increasing control by the clergy and the Revolutionary Guards.

objectives. Since all factions within the Khomeini regime believe in the pursuit of this type of foreign policy, it is not a question of which faction will come to power; the problem is the system of government and not the individuals who administer it.

In addition to the absence of a "moderate faction" within the Khomeini regime, it must be noted that the vast majority of Iranians opposes the Khomeini regime including its "moderate" faction while it is terrorized into silence. Iranians will not tolerate the continuation of Khomeini-type terror under a successor government, regardless of which faction will come to power.

The only effect which arms sales to the Khomeini regime have had on the moderates in Iran has been to create a sense of discouragement. The Khomeini regime has been undermined politically and economically to an extent which has made the regime's overthrow only a matter of time. With the promulgation of the Reagan doctrine promising support to all freedom fighters opposing totalitarian regimes, Iranians had been looking to the United States with more hope than ever; these hopes of support for the pursuit of freedom and dignity have now been dashed.

In order to achieve the objective of better relations with Iran, it is clear that dealing with a regime, which is irrevocably and ideologically opposed to everything the United States stands for, is not tactically prudent. Moreover, dealing with a regime that systematically supports the murder and harassment of innocent civilians by supporting terrorism around the world and that systematically slaughters its own people is not only imprudent but immoral. In order to achieve better relations with Iran in the long run, the United States must align itself with the Iranian people, that is, with the forces of constructive change which seek to overthrow Khomeini and the Islamic Republic, rather than to support the most despicable tyranny Iran has ever suffered from.

Letters

Circus of mullahcracy must end in Iran

The controversy surrounding U.S. dealings with the Islamic Republic concerns Iran. Yet politicians and journalists just flex their muscles to show their wisdom and strength or to settle their own scores with friends and foes.

We Iranians are afraid that the facts of the matter will be buried under the avalanche of all the allegations. We are afraid that the terrible circus of mullahcracy which has brought misery, death, and terror to millions will continue with greater fervor and force.

The Reagan administration inherited the cataclysmic Iranian holocaust from those who had fallen victim to the false propaganda of the Khomeini clique and the Communists. Some of those who helped the ascendancy of the Ayatollah Khomeini are still finding merit in his actions. Either they are ideologi-

cally motivated or they hope that Khomeini succeeds so they can rectify their own errors.

The United States must break with past policies. It must take a fresh look and find out what really went wrong in Iran, a country which was friendly to the West and America and was a balancing force for the stability of the region and the survival of Israel.

Looking for moderates in the Khomeini regime reminds me of those who tried to find good deeds in Hitler's regime. There are no moderates or liberals in Iran, only a bunch of cutthroats who showed their real faces during the hostage crisis. When they found terrorism was so costly to do directly, they began doing it by proxy. Among other things, the U.S. Embassy and the Marine barracks were bombed in Leba-

non, Robert Stethem Jr. was executed in Lebanon, and at least 15 Americans and Europeans were taken hostage in the Middle East.

How much proof is needed for one to see the true faces of these people? What Winston Churchill did with Rudolph Hess was right, and history proved it.

The United States must talk to Iranians who are after bringing about a lawful regime that would fit in the family of civilized nations. The United States must recognize the millions who seek their democratic rights and freedoms guaranteed to them by the constitution of 1906 and who seek the overthrow of Khomeini's mullahcracy in Iran. It is then that the real fight against international terrorism will be won.

NAZENIN ANSARI
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The Washington Post

A14 MONDAY, DECEMBER 8, 1986

No 'Moderate' Elements in Iran

The U.S. administration has tried to establish contacts with Iranian "moderate" elements who will govern the country in the future. In view of Iran's geopolitical and economic importance, this objective is valid, as Judith Kipper states in "We Still Need an Opening to Iran" [op-ed, Dec. 2]. However, it is a mistake to believe that moderates exist within the Khomeini regime.

All members of the Khomeini clique share fundamental beliefs without which they would not survive internal politics. These beliefs focus on the legitimacy of terrorism as a tool to spread the "Islamic Revolution." For example, the "moderate" speaker of the Ayatollah Khomeini's parliament described the recent hostage taking by Lebanese terrorists as "justice."

The Khomeini regime's track record for international terrorism is illustrious. The holding of 52 hostages in Tehran, the killing of 230 Marines in Beirut, the execution of Robert Stethem Jr. in Tehran, the abduction of Americans in Lebanon and the torture and the death of William Buckley are but a few milestones to remind us of the ayatollah's

intentions. It is evident that the systematic use of terrorism by the regime continued even after the ayatollah's "moderates" received arms shipments.

The Iranian people, too, have suffered tremendously under the ayatollah's bloody reign, which is equaled only by Pol Pot's in Cambodia. Resistance to this tyrannical rule has reached unforeseen proportions and is undermining the regime's viability.

The only moderate factions in Iran are those groups that have been driven into exile or underground. To pursue its goal of establishing contacts with moderates who will govern Iran in the future, the administration should align itself with forces of constructive change. These are the vast majority of Iranians who will not tolerate more Khomeini-type terror and who seek the democratic rights and freedoms that are guaranteed by Iran's constitution of 1906.

HASSAN GILANI

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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

China and Iran: 'Not Analogous'

Robert C. McFarlane's decision-making exercise ["McFarlane on Why," op-ed, Nov. 13] draws a parallel between circumstances surrounding U.S. rapprochement with the Republic of China and those involving U.S. negotiations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. A closer scrutiny of Iran's ideological and political stance, however, invalidates any such comparison.

To begin with, Iran and its radical fundamentalist nature challenge what America is, not only what America does. Iran seeks to destroy the basic principles and values that America was built upon, for those values stand against its goal of creat-

ing the "true Islamic Republic on earth." Accordingly, since its emergence, Iran has declared war upon the United States. In the words of the Ayatollah Khomeini ("Islam and Revolution," 1981), "Iran is a country at war with America." To attain its version of religious absolutism on earth, the regime of the ayatollahs legitimized, institutionalized and sponsored terrorism.

Today the regime Mr. McFarlane wants to establish relations with is, in his own words, in the midst of "a political turmoil." It is unstable internally and externally. Not only is there severe resistance from the general

population, but there is even factional fighting among the mullahs. There is no guarantee who will emerge as the victor. But one thing is certain: moderation is an anomaly in Iran and its state of jurisprudence.

During the past seven years radical fundamentalism has proved to be a more profound enemy of the United States than Marxism. What China achieved through good faith, Iran should not through extortion. The two cases are not analogous.

NAZENIN ANSARI

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Washington

TERRORISM PAYS

Khomeini's tyrannical regime has been rewarded with fresh ammunition. Western governments have vindicated the Islamic Republic's policy of terror by surrendering to its extortion. In effect, they have sold the rope with which they will be hung.

Through shady figures such as Sadegh Tabatabai, arrested in West Germany for dealing opium, Rajaie Khorassani, arrested in New York for shoplifting, and Manuchehr Ghorbanifar, the West has tried to buy favors with the fanatic regime of the Ayatollahs. What has been the consequence?

Domestically, the Khomeini regime has slaughtered the Iranian people through institutionalized torture and murder and through the continuation of the Iran-Iraq war. Externally, the Islamic Republic has been responsible for subversion against moderate regimes in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. In Lebanon, Hezbollah militants have been trained by Iranian Revolutionary Guards and have bombed U.S. embassy and Marine compounds, killed at least 232 Americans and taken 15 Europeans and Americans hostage. In the western hemisphere, the Ayatollahs have established their headquarters in Nicaragua.

Terrorism pays. It should not, for terrorism is evil, and non-resistance to evil will secure the rule of evil men.

If the free world believes in the value of human life, freedom and dignity, NOW is the time to put an end to this campaign of violence and deception.

We urge the leaders of the free world to:

1. Reinstate the arms embargo against the Islamic Republic and Iraq ;
2. Adopt a comprehensive policy against the Khomeini regime and its support for international terrorism;
3. Distinguish between the totalitarian system of Khomeini's Islamic Republic and freedom fighters struggling against totalitarianism, such as the Contras in Marxist Nicaragua and the partisans in Soviet occupied Afghanistan; and
4. Recognize that the only moderates in Iran are those who will not tolerate more Khomeini-type terror and seek the democratic rights and freedoms guaranteed by Iran's Constitution of 1906; We are the freedom fighters who will govern Iran in the future.

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Iran-Iraq war and the West

By Anthony Cordesman

THE ATTACK on the USS *Stark*, and the failure of the West's leadership to agree on a policy towards the Iran-Iraq war at the June summit meeting in Venice, have highlighted the need for a clearer understanding of the West's strategic interests in the Gulf.

The leading nations in the West need to reach an agreement on how they want the Iran-Iraq war to end, and on the best way of reaching peace or ceasefire.

They also need to take a more realistic view of burden sharing and to agree on the relative role of the USA and Europe in defending the Gulf.

In broad terms, the West's strategic interests in the Gulf are clear. Today's oil glut is certain to fade with time. World demand for energy continues to increase, and 15 years of Western effort to reduce its long-term dependence on oil imports have had only limited success.

The Gulf now has a larger percentage of the world's proven oil reserves than it did before the oil embargo in 1973. More than half the world's reserves are located in the region: 24.6% in Saudi Arabia, 13.3% in Kuwait, 6.9% in Iran, 6.4% in Iraq, 4.6% in the UAE, 0.5% in Qatar, 0.5% in Oman, and 0.2% in Bahrain.

The current world surplus of oil export capacity is temporary. Unless the West is willing to restructure its entire pattern of economic development, it will slowly increase its dependence on Gulf oil exports until at least the year 2000, and this dependence will accelerate with time as other exporting nations decline in total reserve capacity, increase their domestic demand, and are forced to cut exports or total production.

Economic ties

This means that the West not only needs a secure access to Gulf oil, but the kind of

economic ties to the Gulf states that will ensure they import enough goods and services from the West to 'recycle' the money the West spends on oil imports.

As time goes by, the West will also increasingly compete for Gulf oil with Third World and Eastern Bloc states. The Soviet Bloc already imports oil, although the USSR has 9% of the world's reserves, and is producing over 12 million barrels of crude oil a day and consuming only about 8.8 million.

The USA may only get about 850 000 barrels a day of oil from the Gulf today, but this is largely because other nations can get ample supplies of oil from the Gulf and it is cheaper to ship oil to the USA from Nigeria, Indonesia, Canada, Mexico and Venezuela.

The USA now has only 3.9% of the world's oil reserves and this fraction is dropping steadily. As world oil demand increases relative to supply, the USA will see its oil prices rise and will probably have to turn back to the Gulf for its oil.

The challenge the Iran-Iraq war poses to the West goes far beyond the short term threat to today's tanker traffic. The West must think in decades. It must find a lasting way to contain hostile regional radicalism, and the growth of Soviet influence.

This is why Iran's successes at Faw, and in the fighting around Basra, are so dangerous. They may lead to a broader Iranian victory over Iraq that would give the Khomeini regime control over Iraq's oil resources, brings Iran to the border of Kuwait, and gives a hostile Iran direct control over some 14% of the world's oil reserves.

This situation could then rapidly grow far worse. If the West should then falter in its willingness to protect Kuwaiti shipping through the Gulf, the southern Gulf states

would have little choice other than dependence on Soviet military support or accepting Iranian domination of the region.

Kuwait would be a particularly attractive target. Much of its population is already Shi'ite and many residents speak Persian. Kuwait's military capabilities are symbolic at best, and if Iran conquered southern Iraq, Kuwait would then offer Iran a target with another 13% of the world's oil reserves.

This creates the very real risk that Iran could obtain direct control over some 25% of the world's oil reserves — or roughly four times the combined total reserves of Europe, Japan and the USA.

Theoretical political arguments about 'burden sharing' are relatively unimportant in the face of the current military realities. In practice, the USA is the only Western nation that has enough forces, and enough strategic air and sea lift, to play a decisive military role in the Gulf.

The presence of the UK's Armilla force in the Gulf is an important symbol of Western unity, and the UK plays a vital role as an arms supplier and military advisor to Kuwait, Oman, the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

Similarly, the French Indian Ocean squadron, and particularly the French mine clearing force, could play a useful role in the Gulf, and France is now a key supplier of arms and military advice to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE.

Only the USA, however, can project full-scale carrier task forces with the aircraft numbers, range and performance capability to win quick air superiority over Iran.

Only US naval forces are large enough to secure the right of passage through the Gulf. Only US air and land forces have the strength and power projection capability to help compensate for Kuwait's military weakness and reassure the southern Gulf states.

For all the talk of NATO, Western, or UN task forces, the USA must provide virtually

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**DEFENSE
WEEK**

17 AUGUST 1987 Pg. 3

Soviets Forced To Change Tactics

Afghan Rebels Master Stinger

Stinger anti-aircraft missiles have been in the hands of Afghanistan rebels less than a year, but already the weapon has knocked out scores of Soviet aircraft and forced changes in the occupying forces' air tactics, according to war-watchers in the U.S.

The Soviets had been liberally deploying helicopter gunships and low-flying attack jets to raid rebel bases hidden in the country's mountainous terrain. But resistance fighters have become so accurate in firing the shoulder-held Stinger that the Soviets now use helicopters sparingly in combat, sources said. The Stinger, which has a range of up to five miles, also has forced Soviet bombers to back off and drop their armaments from higher altitudes, the sources said.

"The Stingers have put them (the Soviets) more on the defensive than they ever had been before," said Marin Strmecki, a national security analyst who maintains rebel contacts and has spent time with resistance forces in Afghanistan. "They have virtually ceased to use helicopters in combat. They're just too vulnerable," said Strmecki, a research associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

The Mujahideen, after receiving the first shipment of U.S.-made Stingers in late 1986, were knocking out one to two Soviet aircraft daily, according to Strmecki. Other observers have reported a Stinger success rate of 60 to 70 percent (*Defense Week*, June 1, 1987). The U.S. reportedly plans to ship 600 Stingers to Afghanistan by year's end.

The Soviets have employed two defensive tactics to defeat the Stinger, an infrared-guided weapon that homes in on heat emitted from the target. Strmecki said attack

BY ROWAN SCARBOROUGH

aircraft are now dispensing clusters of parachute flares to head off the missile. "I'm told it's partially successful," he said. The Soviets are also flying bombers at out-of-range altitudes to distract Mujahideen ground fighters, then ordering in low-flying planes for the actual attack.

The high Stinger success rate means the ill-equipped rebels are not having as much difficulty as first

Afghanistan.

But a high-ranking U.S. official did go on the record in discussing the Stinger during a close-door appearance last February before the House appropriations defense subcommittee. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Larry Welch commented on the missile's success when questioned by Rep. Charles Wilson (D-Texas), a vocal backer of the Mujahideen. The subcommittee this month released an edited version of the Welch-Wilson colloquy.


Wilson, who had just returned from a four-day tour with the Mujahideen, told Welch that Soviet aircraft were having to drop bombs from an "extremely high altitude."

Welch responded, "They are having to use stand-off weapons. It has drastically reduced their effectiveness."

Wilson also reported that the Stingers "have absolutely driven the Russian Air Force out of the skies..." Welch disagreed, saying the Soviets were still deploying helicopters. But he added, "Let me say that they are losing a lot of helicopters, I agree with you. They are losing a lot of helicopters, and in fact the Soviets are now beginning to introduce some more

effective countermeasures against those Stingers."

On the question of whether U.S. attack helicopters would be as vulnerable as Soviet choppers, Welch contended they would not be. He said Army helicopters, under the Air/Land Battle plan, would penetrate enemy territory only for a specific attack, then withdraw. The aircraft would carry enough flares to last for the mission's duration, he said. "The concept the Soviets are trying to use, I believe, is a lousy concept and doesn't work," he said.



Army testers show how Stingers are used. Afghan rebels find Stingers easy to use.

expected in firing the weapon. "They are very motivated," Strmecki said. "The Stinger is not terribly exotic. If you are trained well, it's not very complex." He said the rebels assign their best educated fighters to fire the Stinger.

Although the Reagan administration's decision to send Stingers to Afghanistan has been widely reported, both the Pentagon and State Department have declined to confirm the arms transfer. Administration spokesmen also refused to discuss the use of the missile in

AN-IRAQ...CONTINUED

all of the combat forces involved. The USSR is only real alternative, and even its power projection capabilities are somewhat limited.

Unfortunately, the attack on the USS *Stark* has sparked a debate within the USA over the US military role in the Gulf that may paralyse the Reagan Administration's freedom of action.

The US Congress and the American public are far from convinced that the USA should defend what they see as Europe and Japan's oil.

There is very little understanding of the fact that the world oil market is unified and that any reduction of the flow of oil from the Gulf would immediately lead Europe and Japan to compete for US sources of oil.

There is little American understanding of how limited European military power projection capabilities now are, and little real attention is paid to the longer term strategic risks inherent in an Iranian victory or even a partial Soviet replacement of the USA as the *de facto* military guarantor of the southern Gulf states.

This is why Europe and Japan need to provide the Reagan Administration with as much outside political, military, and financial co-operation and support as possible. At the same time, Europe needs to take other actions on its own. Most European states have failed to pay sufficient attention to the risks the war poses or the role that Europe can play in the Gulf.

Many European countries — including the UK, France, Portugal, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland — have made major sales to Iran of arms, military spares parts and munitions without sufficient concern regarding the risk of an Iranian victory.

Similarly, many European nations are selling arms to the southern Gulf states with little regard as to whether the net result will create an effective national or Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) deterrent to Iranian military attacks or threats.

Given this background, the West's strategic interests in the region are clear. Europe, Japan, and the USA need to work together in each of the following areas:

● Every diplomatic effort needs to be made to help persuade Iran to end the war, and this is one area where the West can work together with the USSR. The best solution to the risks posed by the Iran-Iraq war is a peace or ceasefire that preserves a secular Iraq with strong trading ties to the West while simultaneously preserving a strong nationalistic Iranian regime — even if it is a regime which is not friendly to the West.

The risk that continued conflict will bring down a secular Iraq, or eventually create an Iran so divided that some faction will turn to the USSR, is so great that the West must make every effort to end the fighting.

● The Iran-Iraq War is a land war, and Iraq must assume military responsibility for its own defence. Neither the USA or any combination of Western states can provide the military forces to save Iraq from defeat. The West should, however, continue to sell Iraq arms and provide military and civil credit.

● At the same time, the West should take every possible political step to end the flow of arms to Iran as long as Iran continues its offensives. The West should not tilt in Iraq's favour to give it any kind of victory over Iran, but it should take every possible step to deny Iran victory over Iraq. This not only means a total halt to any US covert arms sales, but to all European arms sales.

● The West should support the USA in ensuring the safety of shipping in the Gulf, even if this means a limited military confrontation with Iran.

The real strategic goal behind US actions goes far beyond protecting 11 Kuwaiti tankers. It is to deny Iran the ability to pressurise the southern Gulf states to end their aid to Iraq, to ensure that Kuwait can continue to be a key trans-shipment point for Iraq, to reassure Kuwait that the West will increase its military support in the event of an Iranian victory at Basra, and to ensure that the USSR does not replace the West as the major military guarantor.

● At the same time, the West needs to show the greatest possible restraint in taking any military action against Iran. It may be militarily tempting to conduct pre-emptive attacks on Iran before it deploys new systems

like the Silkworm missiles, or to try to use high levels of escalation and reprisal to try to shock an opponent like Iran into halting military action.

The West, however, will have to live with Iran long after the 'tanker war' is over. It must avoid any action which will make a peace settlement or ceasefire even harder to achieve and which could permanently alienate the Iranian people because the West acted too harshly and without clearly justifiable cause.

● The West should quietly improve the quality of its arms sales and advisory efforts in the southern Gulf. It needs to pay far more attention to creating a viable deterrent against air and naval attacks and low-level guerrilla war. The UK, France and the USA need to pay far more attention to the overall impact of their individual arms sales efforts, and to ensure that the Gulf states get military capability.

Fortunately, the military balance between Iraq and Iran is now so close that it probably will not take dramatic new actions for the West to secure its interests. The West can prevent an Iraqi defeat by reinforcing policies it already has, and this should eventually lead Iran to a peace or ceasefire.

The West must then continue to strengthen the southern Gulf of GCC states so that they gradually create a viable self-defence against the limited military threat that either Iraq or Iran may pose in the future.

The West does not need new out-of-area forces or permanent military bases in the region, and it does not need a new pillar in the form of some dominant regional military power.

What the West needs is a mix of regional states in the Gulf which are strong enough to act in their own best interests and which can cope with the occasional radicalism and political convulsions in any one state that are the inevitable price of change.

Anthony Cordesman's book *The Iran-Iraq War and Western Security 1964-87* is being published by Jane's in association with the Royal United Services Institute on 17 August.

Saudi Fire, Tunisian Bombs, Egyptian Shooting: Is There an Iranian Hand?

By Editor Michael Collins Dunn

ANYONE WHO HAS followed Iran's overseas operations will hardly be surprised to find Iranian fingerprints here and there in the Muslim world in the wake of the Meccan tragedy and the US buildup in the Gulf; in fact, Iran's riposte to the West is likeliest to come covertly, not in the Strait of Hormuz. In three pro-Western Muslim states, there have been recent events which could bear the mark of Iranian operations.

The explosion and fire in the Saudi gas liquefaction plant at al-Ju'ayma recently certainly looked suspicious, and despite Saudi denials many will assume it was sabotage. One point was seemingly overlooked in press reporting on the fire: it came the night after one of the landmark days in the Shi'ite Muslim calendar, the feast of Ghadir Khumm, which not only marks the Prophet Muhammad's (supposed) choice of Imam 'Ali as his successor, but which is also associated with the Prophet's last *bajj*. From the point of view of Shi'ite symbolism, it was an extremely appropriate time to strike at Saudi Arabia for what happened during the *bajj*, and to underscore the Sunni-Shi'ite division. Since the Sunni world does not celebrate Ghadir Khumm, even the Saudis may not have noticed the coincidence of date.

A few months ago Tunisia broke diplomatic relations with Iran for supporting extremist anti-Government plots, and Egypt expelled the last remnant of the Iranian interests section soon after a former Egyptian In-

terior Minister was shot and wounded. Since then, more incidents have occurred in both countries, and there have been major new attacks since the Meccan deaths, raising the question of whether these, too, are Iranian operations. (To be sure, both countries have vigorous "fundamentalist" movements, but these have not had a tradition of using violence.)

In the Tunisian case, explosions occurred in four tourist resorts in Sousse and Monastir on August 2. Not only does this strike at Tunisia's tourist trade (European women in scanty swimsuits scandalize fundamentalists), but Monastir is President Habib Bourguiba's hometown and power base. The Government seems to be blaming the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI), which was also linked earlier to Iran, but the MTI is usually seen as more of a mainstream Muslim Brotherhood type of fundamentalist movement and may be being tarred with a more radical brush for Tunisian Government purposes. (In Beirut, "Islamic *Jibad*", a known Iranian front, claimed responsibility.) In any event, Tunisia, as the most Westernized and secularized Arab state, may prove to be an area of growing Iranian involvement.

In Egypt, the Government has been concerned by an uncharacteristic wave of political violence over the past year, which has included not only attacks on US and Israeli diplomats but on a prominent Egyptian editor and the woun-

ding of former Interior Minister Hasan Abu Basha. In the Abu Basha case, there were strong hints of a connection between those charged and the expulsion of the last Iranian diplomats from Cairo. A group said to be related to the *Jibad* movement which killed Anwar Sadat was arrested and said to have been financed by Iran.

On August 13, another former Interior Minister, Nabawi Isma'il, was attacked at his residence in the Muhandisin suburb. He was unhurt but two persons were injured. A connection with Iran is not, however, as clear; one report said that the "Free Officers" claimed responsibility, a name which usually points to pro-Libyan, not pro-Iranian sentiments. Furthermore, Nabawi Isma'il was closely linked to former President Anwar Sadat and some of the less savory figures around him, and is not particularly popular in Egypt today. Like Abu Basha as well, his having served in the Interior post (which handles internal security) in the more repressive Sadat era made him many enemies.

But, in Egypt as in Tunisia and Saudi Arabia, a reflex of the confrontation in the Gulf may be greater internal trouble inspired and applauded — and perhaps organized — by Iran. Past experience has shown that Iran is generally not eager to take on the West in conventional military confrontations, and that the likeliest response to the challenge in the Gulf will come elsewhere. ★

HOTSPOTS

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Iran's co-operation with the USSR

By Yossef Bodansky

EARLY LAST MONTH, the Soviet Union called for the withdrawal of all foreign navies from the Persian Gulf.

Soviet warships were to be exempt from this withdrawal because of the proximity of the Gulf to the USSR. Nevertheless, it was subsequently implied that the USSR would consider withdrawing its ships if US, UK and French ships were to leave.

White House Chief of Staff Howard Baker said the USA would seriously consider the proposal.

Until recently, the Soviet Union did not seriously consider a Western military presence in the Gulf as a threat to its own objectives in this political and strategic area of importance.

Since July 1984, Soviet-Kuwaiti strategic co-operation intensified. For example, key Soviet weapon systems, including MiG-29 aircraft, were shipped to Iraq via Kuwait.

The USSR was certain its secrets would not be betrayed by Kuwait. Indeed, a US official was reportedly expelled for trying to photograph the aircraft.

The Soviets believe their relationship with Kuwait so safe that when, after Kuwait leased three Soviet tankers and requested naval protection, they were unconcerned when the USA offered to reflag and escort Kuwaiti tankers.

Mutual withdrawal

The USSR does appear to be serious about a mutual withdrawal from the Gulf, possibly due to the sudden escalation of the naval activities of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and their taking over of the Bandar Abbas naval base (JDW 1 August).

Prime Minister Mir-Hossein Mussavi's presence in the Straits of Hormuz during the ZULFIQAR exercise and subsequent IRGC build-up (JDW 1 August) is extremely significant in view of his overall position on Iran's Gulf policy.

Mussavi is one of the staunchest supporters of Soviet-Iranian collaboration and of Iran's role in the Soviet-led global struggle for national liberation. He believes the Islamic revolution would enable Iran to play a more active role in "the liberating of mankind".

In pursuit of these objectives, Mussavi has visited southern African and central American countries, offering economic and military assistance to local regimes and to terrorist organisations operating out of those countries.

Military developments in the Gulf appear to indicate the further implementation of a far-reaching Soviet-Iranian military agreement.

The first half of 1985 saw an escalation of the Iran-Iraq war and the mounting success of IRGC-led Iranian forces, to which the Soviet Union directly and indirectly contributed training and equipment.

Iran interpreted the military build-up of the



▲ Nikolai Ryzhkov
Chairman of the USSR
Council of Ministers



▲ Iranian Prime
Minister, Mir-Hossein
Mussavi

Gulf Co-operation Council and the Iraqi acquisition of sophisticated aircraft and anti-shiping weapons as a potential threat to their hegemony in the Gulf.

The Iranian leadership considered this development to be critical to the fate of Iran.

Reportedly, the Ayatollah Khomeini, justified any means for overcoming this threat.

Despite public leaning toward, and supplying arms to Iraq, a high-level delegation of 12 senior Soviet officials, including military personnel, visited Tehran to negotiate the rearming of Iran to the point of regional supremacy.

The Soviet delegation is said to have been invited by the powerful Speaker of the Majlis (Parliament), Hojatoleslam Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, whose prime interest is the pursuit of Iranian supremacy and hegemony in the Gulf.

Hashemi-Rafsanjani pursues a traditionalist Iranian/Persian policy, and insists on the expansion of Iran's security umbrella throughout the Gulf.

Multiple-stage

In early 1985, the Soviet Union offered a multiple-stage programme, optimised to answer Iran's objectives and fears.

The first stage of this plan would be a complete re-equipping of the Iranian Navy, in exchange for a Soviet control over, or use of, 50% of all Iranian naval facilities in the Gulf.

The Soviets would then continue with a complete re-equipping of the depleted Iranian Air Force with modern aircraft, possibly MiG-29.

The third stage of the agreement calls for the complete rearming and expansion of the ground forces, and establishing military industries in Iran.

At the time it was thought many Iranian leaders were in favour of the offer, especially as it did not involve any Iranian payment, short of a supply of oil and gas at fixed prices. By mid-1986, some negotiations for the implementation of the agreement were in progress.

Soon afterwards, circumstantial evidence

emerged that Iran had either committed itself to the Soviet offer, or was at least leaning strongly in this direction.

Iran signed, apparently as part of this deal, an agreement with the USSR on the building of a factory to manufacture Kalashnikov AK-47 assault rifles and ammunition in Iran.

A Czech company, OMNIPOL, would construct the factory and supply machinery and technology.

Despite Iran's commitment to retaining hegemony in the Gulf, some of its leaders became apprehensive of the inevitable slide into Soviet domination that such an agreement might have.

Subsequent deals between Iran and the USA resulted in major delays in the Iranian-Soviet agreements.

The Persian-nationalist faction of Iran's leadership, led by Hashemi-Rafsanjani, sought to balance Soviet influence with improved relations with the USA.

The faction approached Khomeini on this subject, who approved negotiations with the USA.

However, once negotiations with the USA collapsed following their exposure by Prime Minister Mussavi and his supporters, there was no longer any obstacle to the Soviet-Iranian agreement.

Co-ordination

On 4 July, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Javad Larijani met Soviet Ambassador Boldyrev to discuss the situation in the Gulf.

Larijani confirmed Iran's support of Soviet initiatives while condemning US naval presence.

Boldyrev and Larijani also discussed the "expansion of mutual relations" between their two countries.

On 8 July, Iranian Ambassador to the Soviet Union Hayrani-Nobari delivered a message from Mussavi to the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Nikolai Ryzhkov.

The message dealt with the improvement of Soviet-Iranian relations and stated that Iran was planning to take some important decisions in the near future.

Hayrani-Nobari was told: "The USSR welcomes the stances of the Islamic Republic in the Persian Gulf and believes in the necessity of joint co-operation and effort in this respect."

On 15 July, Boldyrev met the Iranian Deputy Energy Minister for International Affairs, Mohammed Reza Adeli, to discuss further technical co-operation on oil and water issues.

They agreed on an extended programme of visits by Iranian and Soviet experts in key industries and installations to the two countries. The following day, Javad Larijani left for Moscow for high-level discussions with Yuliy Vorontsov on the subject of "bilateral relations and mutual political and economic co-operation between the two countries".

Insight

(The Washington Times)

31 AUGUST 1987 Pg. 34

Discord Still Bars the Denouement

SUMMARY: Another Central American nation's strife is back in the spotlight. Reports that right-wing Salvadoran terrorists had attacked anti-Duarte activists in California led to local and FBI investigations. Congress is considering asylum for Salvadorans. And to the south, the Duarte government and Marxist rebels are flirting with negotiation.

Reports from war-torn El Salvador were beginning to sound like reports from war-torn anywhere: Guerrillas sabotaged a key bridge; government troops ambushed a key rebel outpost; neutral villagers were left isolated and without supplies; so many people were killed, and so many people were injured.

The details tended to get lost in the wake of an enormous outpouring of news from Central America, most of which focused on the anticommunist rebels in Nicaragua. The Marxist insurgency in El Salvador has not enjoyed such limelight. The average American is far less versed in the intricacies of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front's struggle against the government of President Jose Napoleon Duarte than in the details of Adolfo Calero Portocarrera vs. President Daniel Ortega Saavedra.

In July, however, there emerged a pattern of events that seemed to define the good guys and the bad guys in the El Salvador conflict; and the incidents took place in the United States, where the news media and law enforcement agencies could get smack in the middle of things.

The story from Los Angeles was that notorious right-wing Salvadoran death squads had come there to terrorize anti-government (and pro-communist) activists, mostly members of the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador.

Victor Rios, regional coordinator for the CISPES branch in Los Angeles, says the whole thing started with him. "Some time ago, somebody driving a van outside my house smashed my car again and again, then left. Two or three weeks later, I re-

ceived a note at my house saying something like, 'You communist pig, your car was first; you're going to be next.'"

The incident involving Rios did not gain much attention, but it was followed by a widely publicized assault July 7. A Salvadoran woman named Yanira Corea was allegedly kidnapped, beaten, tortured and sexually abused by two men with Salvadoran accents. According to reports, Corea was questioned by her captors about the political activities of other Salvadorans.

The harassment reports snowballed. Los Angeles police said by Aug. 3 that terror within the Salvadoran community had reached a "fever pitch," with thousands of people fearing for their lives. There were at least three reported kidnappings, plus written and telephoned death threats.

The matter was complicated by the fact that many Salvadorans living in Los Angeles are illegal aliens and would not report threats for fear of being deported.

The FBI announced that it had opened an investigation into the possibility of terrorist activity against the 300,000 or so Salvadorans in Los Angeles. Tom Bradley, the city's mayor, proposed a \$10,000 reward for information that would help convict those responsible for the incidents.

The clear implication from CISPES and the alleged victims was that the Duarte government had something to do with the attacks. "I don't know if they are connected to the [Salvadoran] army or the death squad," says Rios. "It may be people from the far right trying to bring psychological warfare.

"No doubt about it, it was caused by my affiliation with CISPES."

But Los Angeles police investigators began to suspect a source a little closer to home, such as a personal vendetta, a power move by a rival political faction or an attempt at extortion. One police official reported the investigation had been complicated by inconsistencies in the evidence.

Ernesto Rivas-Gallont, Salvadoran ambassador to the United States, shrugs off the attack reports as the work of malicious individuals: "I never gave those reports any credence. They were outright fabrications. When the L.A. freeway shootings began, I was waiting to hear that El Salvador death squads had taken responsibility."

When told of the ambassador's comments, Rios responds calmly. "I don't think the ambassador could explain to Yanira that she fabricated her own rape and torture," he says. "My concern is that you are talking about a high official of government, who may be encouraging people" to continue this activity. The attacks, he adds, are "a clear indication of the [Reagan] administration's policy failure in El Salvador."

The alleged failure is the inability to rid El Salvador of the so-called government death squads, which would supposedly murder anyone deemed a threat to the regime.

But according to Louise Rees, senior analyst with Mid-Atlantic Research Associates Inc., the death squads have been eradicated. "The basic problem was with the Treasury Police," she says. "They were unprofessional and committed ad hoc killings against criminals and political oppo-

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Zbigniew Brzezinski

What the U.S. Should Have Told Iran

To be a great power, you have to act like one.

The enormously powerful American task force navigating the narrow passages of the Hormuz Strait provides a sad spectacle of the decline of U.S. power. The presence of so much concentrated military hardware is an unwitting monument to the lack of international credibility in American resolve. If American power were truly feared, not a single American warship would have been necessary. An American flag would have sufficed.

This is another way of saying that the U.S. capacity for effective deterrence has badly eroded. Increasingly, the prevailing assumption is that the United States would not dare to use its power—whether at the conventional or strategic level. As that credibility declines, the display of American power to convince anyone of U.S. seriousness will have to grow in inverse proportions. In effect, the costs of conveying U.S. concern are inflating—and the risk that a potential U.S. opponent might badly miscalculate is correspondingly increasing.

This condition has both global and regional implications. It could affect the stability of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship, and today it particularly handicaps the legitimate U.S. effort to preserve third-party freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf in the context of the Iraq-Iran war. That effort, on the level of both military tactics and the domestic debate, illustrates why American military might increasingly lacks deterrent effect. Indeed, things have reached the point that the very effort to deploy so much power into the Persian Gulf communicates to the Iranians the impression of American unwillingness to use it.

Deterrent power is designed to convey a strategic message. Thus, it is appropriate to ask: What did the Iranians see and hear when the United States decided to reflag Kuwaiti tankers? What they saw and heard, after all, was the point of departure for their conclusions regarding our policy and our resolve.

From the vantage point of Tehran, the United States was seen to deploy considerable naval power to escort ships in a highly confined geographical area, where such power is militarily very vulnerable and has rela-

tively little utility. Instead of intimidating the Iranians, this conveyed an American reluctance to become engaged. It signaled an American hope that the sheer concentration of military firepower would be sufficient to deter hostile action. At the same time, the domestic U.S. debate was conveying discord, indecision and even fear. The official U.S. policy was hotly contested in congressional speeches and in editorials. Congress experimented with various attempts at mandating foreign policy through legislative action—but to no avail, except to signal division and indecision. Speeches conveyed anxiety, concern over "risks" and especially preoccupation over the possibility of new U.S. casualties.

Particularly damaging to U.S. credibility were the almost endless congressional speculations about how Iran might strike. Their bottom line was to reinforce the image of a cowardly giant, pretentiously flexing its muscles but only too ready to run for cover at the slightest indication of trouble. This was exacerbated by the growing inclination of Congress to micro-manage U.S. foreign and military policy. The mere attempt to do so by 535 would-be secretaries of state and defense contributed to a cacophony of voices that together signaled panic rather than resolve.

Iranian decision-makers (and their religious fanaticism does not preclude clever calculation) were justified in drawing two conclusions: first, American military dispositions conveyed not only a reluctance to become involved in a fight but also a hope to intimidate the Iranians by sheer presence; second, American debate, especially the congressional voices, conveyed the inclination to cut and run as soon as any American blood was shed. In these circumstances, the propitious course of action for the Iranians was to inflict some wound on the Americans and to wait for the internal spasms of self-pity, fear and breastbeating to cause an American pull-out.

A great power that is respected—in other words, a great power whose resolve to protect its interests is unquestioned—would have acted somewhat differently. Without

much fanfare, it would have concentrated adequate military power to inflict serious damage on the potential opponent and would have quietly conveyed to that opponent its intentions. In this particular case, Washington should have informed Tehran, perhaps through a responsible third party: 1) U.S.-flag ships will continue to use the Gulf; 2) the United States will respond with military means against Iranian assets if any U.S.-flag ship is harmed; 3) the United States will react similarly if any U.S. facilities are subject to Iranian-sponsored terrorist action; and 4) the United States has the capacity to destroy not only important Iranian military assets but also vital economic facilities and to impose a total naval blockade of all Iranian maritime trade. In brief, the United States can render Iran helpless in its war with Iraq. Following such a message, the United States pointedly could have sent in an unescorted freighter or tanker, even informing Tehran of its schedule.

But to enjoy the immunity that accrues to the status of a great power one must first be willing to act like a great power. It is especially important to do so when truly major geostrategic interests are involved. The Persian Gulf region is vital to the West. The West as a whole will suffer, and the U.S. global position will be endangered, if any one of the following three scenarios should occur: 1) moderate Arab regimes in the region are destabilized by fundamentalist and Iran-backed internal upheavals; 2) Iran defeats Iraq and becomes the dominant regional power; and 3) the Soviet Union becomes the principal regional arbiter, as frightened Arab regimes, appalled by U.S. timidity, in desperation turn to Moscow for protection.

The Iranian threat to Saudi Arabia in the wake of the bloodshed in Mecca could bring matters to a head. As our decision-makers ponder how to react to a possible attack by Iran, they might well bear in mind an irreversible lesson of history: by failing to act like a great power, one invites being treated as if one were not a great power.

The writer was national security adviser to President Carter.

A Deadlier Gulf War?

Iraq and Iran push ahead with nuclear arms plans

BY JUDITH PERERA

Fuelled by the Gulf war, a deadly nuclear arms race is gathering momentum. Iraq will soon start building a military nuclear research center; Iran has reshaped its nuclear program along lines which make military research possible. A significant part of nuclear development in both countries has gone underground to escape the prying eyes of international inspectors.

Iraq's ruling Revolutionary Command Council recently finished plans for the nuclear research facility and work will start at a site near Irbil under Mount Karochooq, safe from air attack, according to sources close to the government.

In Iran, there are signs that the post-Shah reassessment of nuclear policy which began in 1979 is complete. Though Iran's new nuclear program is undoubtedly modest, its military potential is far greater, because unlike earlier installations, these new facilities could escape inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Both Iran and Iraq, whose nuclear programs are more than 20 years old, signed and ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. But as with other Third World signatories, compliance has given way to resentment at the ban on the transfer of "sensitive" technologies like uranium enrichment and fuel processing — seen as a way of keeping Third World clients dependent on industrial nations.

For Iraq, Israel's bombing of the nuclear research center at Tuwaitha near Baghdad in 1981 and the destruction of a newly installed French-built Osiris research reactor were the incentive to plan an alternative research facility.

The Israeli attack was just one of many attempts to sabotage Iraq's nuclear program. These included bomb attacks on European suppliers, including the blasting of the Osiris while under construction in France, and an earlier, abortive aerial attack on Tuwaitha by Iran.

The Tuwaitha nuclear facilities were developed to be used for civilian purposes. Since Iraq signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1972 it has abided by the

treaty's provisions, according to International Atomic Energy Agency officials. Under terms of the treaty if Iraq used the Tuwaitha facilities for military purposes, it would have had to withdraw from the treaty, precipitating an immediate end to the supplies of reactor fuel from Europe, the United States and the Soviet Union.

When U.S. physicist Richard Wilson of Harvard University visited Tuwaitha after the Israeli bombing, he wrote a letter to The New York Times confirming that Iraq was not misusing the facility. The bombing would be counter-productive, he warned, and would deter other states from signing the nonproliferation treaty. "Why sign the treaty and give up some of your sovereignty when you will be bombed anyway?" he asked. He later suggested in Nature magazine that Iraq's option would be to "build a separate secret facility in another place." It seems that Baghdad has reached the same conclusion.

Before the Gulf war, Iraq had the economic power to get most of what it wanted for Tuwaitha. It used its oil and oil revenues skillfully to obtain sophisticated nuclear facilities from France and Italy and uranium from Portugal, Brazil and Niger. The sabotage attempts were annoying, but did not pose insurmountable problems.

Economic restraints and cuts in oil production imposed by the war with Iran, however, changed the equation; Israel's attack in 1981 was a serious setback to the nuclear program. Iraq found it impossible to obtain western help to rebuild Tuwaitha and has had to return to Moscow, its original nuclear supplier.

Tuwaitha, which is now surrounded by surface-to-air missiles and protective earthworks, already houses an old Soviet research reactor installed in 1968. But once the oil money began to flow Iraq preferred western suppliers, who imposed fewer conditions on the nuclear equipment they sold.

Military experts believe that Iraq has the scientists and technicians it needs to build the new Karochooq facility without involving western suppliers or the Soviet Union. But it may get help from

new nuclear states, like Pakistan, which are not party to the nonproliferation treaty.

Iraq also has long-standing nuclear links with India, Brazil and China and has already received technical help and fuel from the three countries.

Iranian Program

Like Iraq, Iran is seeking help from other Third World states for its nuclear program, as a deal with an Argentine consortium to complete the Bushehr reactor indicates. The Bushehr reactor is one of two units started by the West German Kraftwerk Union (KWU) in the mid-1970s as part of the Shah's \$30-billion program for 20 reactors and supporting facilities by the end of the century.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini cancelled the program so that nuclear development could be weaned from dependence on the West.

The consortium that has offered to finish the plant is led by the Argentine company Enace, owned 75 percent by the Argentine Nuclear Energy Commission and 25 percent by KWU. The Spanish Empresarios Agrupados also is involved.

Argentina, which is not party to the nonproliferation treaty, is keen to export its nuclear technology to ease the financial problems of its own program. It is one of the few Third World countries to have built its own reactors, reprocessing and enrichment facilities and could provide Iran with these sensitive technologies, giving it the capability to produce material suitable for making nuclear weapons.

When Khomeini came to power, he canceled two plants started at Ahwaz by France's Framatome, but too much had already been invested

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HOTSPOTS

**ARMED
FORCES**

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— Armies of the — Gulf War

Anthony R. Tucker examines the composition of the armed forces of Iran and Iraq

The Kurdish guerrilla war

IN 1958, the Kurds, who live mainly in northeastern Iraq and consider themselves separate from the Arab Iraqis, pressed for independence after aiding Brigadier Qasin to take power in Iraq. The Democratic Party for Kurdistan (DPK) was formed, but Qasin did little to aid Kurdish aspirations and, as a result, political tension mounted. Matters came to a head in June 1961, when violence broke out at Ramyah, a small Kurdish town in northern Iraq. The *Pesh Merga* (military wing of the DPK) emerged as a result and a drawn out guerrilla war started.

Fighting continued into the 1970s with the aid of Iranian Kurds and secret aid from the Iranian Government. The Shah saw this as a way to divert Iraqi interests from aspirations they might have towards territory in southern Iran.

Kurdish resistance began to mount and in August 1974 President Saddam Hussein decided to launch an Iraqi offensive into the Kurdistan region east of Mosul. Key Kurdish towns were selected for capture and an armoured column of 300 tanks seized Raniya, Qala Diza and Rawanduz. However, Kurdish resistance was strong, aided by artillery support from across the Iranian border, and Iraqi army casualties were extremely high. By the end of the

IRAQ and Iran are by far the strongest of the states bordering the Persian Gulf.

Their military growth has been very recent. The basis of the present conflict lies in the Kurdish question, and the struggle for domination of the Shatt-al-Arab Waterway.

year the *Pesh Merga* had not been defeated.

On 6 March 1975, the Iraqi and Iranian Governments signed a treaty, agreeing on non-interference in each other's internal affairs. The Shah ceased all military supplies to the Kurds and control of the Shatt-al-Arab Waterway was given to Iran by Hussein. After reaching agreement with Iran, the Iraqis launched an all-out attack to crush the Kurds. The *Pesh Merga* were beaten into submission and a ceasefire was called on 13 March. Kurdish unity was broken and by April 1979 220,000 Kurds had been deported from their homelands to southern Iraq.

The March 1975 treaty achieved its aim, but Hussein signed away more than he bargained for — Iraq's only coastal outlet was now under Iranian control. Hussein's opportunity to regain control of the Shatt-al-Arab Waterway was presented by Iranian political unrest.

With civil unrest reaching uncontrollable proportions in Iran, the Shah 'retired' to

Above:
Iranian gunners on Majnoon Island engage Iraqi artillery with a 130mm howitzer in January 1984. AP

Morocco on 16 January 1979. The collapse of the Iranian Government followed his departure. Under the spiritual leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, the Islamic Republic of Iran was formed on 2 April 1979.

The Gulf War



Hussein not only planned to regain control of the Shatt-al-Arab Waterway, but also the oil-rich Khuzistan province in southern Iran. The Iraqi offensive was to be three-pronged and, on 11 September 1980, the first assault was launched in the north, towards the Iranian town of Qasr-e-Shirin. The Iraq-Iran War had begun.

The armies

The Iraqi Army gained considerable experience during the Kurdish conflict, but it was facing an army equipped with the latest and best Western weapons. From 1958 to 1963 Iraq received a large quantity of Russian military equipment. Iraq's Army consisted of four armoured divisions, two mechanised infantry divisions, four infantry divisions, one armoured brigade, one Republican Guard mechanised brigade, two infantry brigades and one special forces brigade.

The Iranian Army was slightly weaker, with a pre-revolution strength of approximately three armoured divisions, four

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GULF WAR...CONTINUED

infantry divisions, two infantry brigades, one airborne brigade and one special forces brigade. Before the fall of the Shah, the Iranian Army was organised into two corps, each consisting of HQ and staff units, two armoured divisions, one mechanised infantry division, an artillery brigade, signals, transport, logistics and repair battalions, plus anti-tank, military police and air corps companies. Each armoured division consisted of two armoured brigades, each comprising two armoured battalions, one mechanised infantry battalion, one artillery battalion and one engineer company. Iraqi armoured divisional organisation was similar. Supplementary to these corps the Iranians also had two mechanised infantry divisions, one tank division, an airborne division, Army Air Corps Brigade and a long-range patrol brigade. Large numbers of Revolutionary Guards were raised from civilian militia.

The navies

The navies have so far played a negligible part in the war. Iraq, for obvious reasons, has a very small navy, consisting of about 5,000 personnel, and about 44 patrol boats. On the other hand, Iran has a larger navy, consisting of 20,000 personnel, equipped with 11 destroyers, frigates and corvettes, plus about 40 fast attack missile patrol craft and patrol boats. However, Iran's Navy is now thought to be largely inoperable because of the lack of spare parts.

Combat performance

It was believed that the Iranian Army was in decline — many of its senior officers having been purged during the Revolution. Also, all American and British military technicians had been withdrawn, and it was felt the Iranians did not have the expertise to service their sophisticated equipment. Victory for the Iraqis, therefore, seemed assured.

In the initial offensive of 1980, the Iraqis used only three divisions: a mechanised infantry division on the northern front at Qasr-e-Shirin; a mountain division (infantry) on the central front at Mehran, Ilam and Dezful; and an armoured division, probably the Saladin Armoured Division, on the southern front at Ahwaz, Khorramshahr and Abadan, in total some 40,000 men. The attack in the north at Qasr-e-Shirin was followed by the invasion of the centre, towards Dezful and Ahwaz. In the south, Iraqi forces crossed the Shatt-al-Arab Waterway thrusting towards Khorramshahr and Abadan. The Iraqi Air Force then bombed principal Iranian towns, to hinder mobilisation of the militia. Resistance was much stiffer than expected, but by 18 October 1980 Khorramshahr had been captured and Abadan set ablaze. The Iraqi Special Forces Brigade, including units of Hussein's Presidential Palace Guard, were used in the fierce fighting for Khorramshahr.

However, in the north, an Iranian counter-attack on 2 October 1980 seized Mehran, blocking any northern Iraqi advance southwards. On 10 October, the Iranians launched another counter-attack around Ahwaz.

As a result of the counter-attacks, and after successfully capturing Dezful, the Iraqis found themselves halted before Ahwaz. It soon became apparent that the Iraqi offensive was slowing down as the Iranians rushed more men to the various fronts.

By 1981, both sides were firmly dug in. The Iraqi spring offensive never materialised, and it was not until April 1982 that the next move was made. The Iranians launched a counter-offensive in the south, recapturing Khorramshahr. The Iraqi bridgehead was untenable and they were forced to retire. Surprisingly, the war did not develop as expected, there were no large scale armour engagements. Both sides used their aircraft purely for limited ground attack purposes.

The first material losses of the war were inflicted at Khosrowabad in September 1980, when the Iraqis launched a pre-emptive air strike and the Iranians lost five patrol boats. In retaliation the Iranians launched an air attack sinking four Iraqi missile patrol boats, probably at Khawr AbdAllah.

Most fighter losses resulted from anti-aircraft (AA) fire and surface-to-air mis-

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International Shipping and the Iran-Iraq War



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is a statement by Richard W. Murphy, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, delivered separately before both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C., May 19, 1987.

I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you today to discuss the Administration's policy toward the continuing war between Iran and Iraq and toward problems related to international shipping in the gulf.

Our meeting takes place against the background of the attack by Iraqi aircraft on the U.S.S. *Stark* Sunday, with tragic loss of life. We extend our deepest condolences to the families of those brave American sailors who died or were injured in the attack. We greatly appreciate the assistance provided by Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in the rescue and evacuation operation.

Yesterday morning, the President expressed his concern and anger over Sunday's tragedy in the Persian Gulf and noted that we had protested the unprovoked attack in the strongest terms to the Government of Iraq. Yesterday afternoon, the President of Iraq apologized for the unintended attack and made clear Iraq had no hostile intentions whatsoever toward the United States. He expressed his deepest regrets and profound condolences. We have agreed to an immediate joint investigation of the incident to avoid any future mistakes.

This tragic accident brings home starkly the increasing danger of the Iran-Iraq war and the urgency of bringing the conflict to an end. The United States is actively engaged in seeking this goal.

This Administration, like its predecessors, regards the gulf as an area of major interest to the United States and is committed to maintaining the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. Consistent with our national heritage, it attaches great importance to the principle of freedom of navigation. The Administration is also firmly committed as a matter of national policy to support the individual and collective self-defense of the Arab gulf states. These longstanding U.S. undertakings flow from the strategic, economic, and political importance of the region to us.

U.S. Policies Toward the Gulf War

Over the past 3 months, the President has reaffirmed the direction of our long-term policy. Given the increasing dangers in the war, with its accompanying violence in the gulf, we have taken a series of specific decisions designed to ensure our strategic position in the gulf and reassert the fundamental U.S. stabilizing role. Frankly, in the light of the Iran-*Contra* revelations, we had found that the leaders of the gulf states were questioning the coherence and seriousness of U.S. policy in the gulf along with our reliability and staying

power. We wanted to be sure the countries with which we have friendly relations—Iraq and GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] states—as well as the Soviet Union and Iran understood the firmness of our commitments. On January 23 and again on February 25, President Reagan issued statements reiterating our commitment to the flow of oil through the strait and U.S. support for the self-defense effort of the gulf states. He also endorsed Operation *Staunch*, our effort to reduce the flow of weapons from others to Iran.

While neutral toward the Iran-Iraq war, the U.S. Government views the continuation of this conflict, as well as its potential expansion, as a direct threat to our interests. We are working intensively for the earliest possible end to the conflict, with the territorial integrity and independence of both sides intact. As the President asserted in his February 25 statement on the war, we believe that "the time to act on this dangerous and destructive war is now." He urged an intensified international effort to seek an end to the war, and we have taken a lead in UN Security Council (UNSC) consultations to achieve this aim. As we announced May 7, the United States is "ready in principle to support the application of appropriate enforcement measures against either party which refuses to cooperate with formal UNSC efforts to end the war."

While there remains much work to be done in New York, I believe that an international consensus is growing that this war has gone on too long—the

suffering of the Iraqi and Iranian peoples has been too great—and the threat to international interests is so direct that more active measures are required. As you know, Iraq has long shown its willingness to end the fighting; Iran remains recalcitrant.

Operation Staunch has been pursued in recent months with new vigor. I believe its effectiveness has not been seriously impaired, as many expected, by the Iran revelations.

Shipping Problems in the Persian Gulf

In addition to the inherent tragedy and suffering in Iraq and Iran, as the fighting drags on, with mounting casualties and drains on the economies of these two nations, so grows the threat of the war spilling over to nearby friendly states in the gulf. The fresh threats to international shipping are one example of such spillover effect.

In the past 18 months, attacks on neutral shipping passing through the Strait of Hormuz have increased in intensity. A total of nearly 100 vessels were hit by Iran and Iraq in 1986; in the first 3 months of this year, some 30 ships were attacked, including a Soviet merchant ship. Since the first of May, Iran has attacked 5 ships of nonbelligerent countries, virtually all in commerce with Kuwait. Attacks now occur at night as well as day, by sea as well as air, by small boats armed with light weapons as well as by helicopters launched from Iranian warships. While Iran has yet to sink a ship, most of those attacked have suffered damage, some seriously, and innocent lives have been lost.

The May 17 attack on the U.S.S. *Stark* was the first attack on a U.S. warship in the war. This tragic accident gives emphasis to our caution to both belligerents that the war in the gulf could lead to mistakes and miscalculations; it must be ended.

We have increased the state of alert of U.S. Navy ships in the gulf and warned belligerent states (i.e., Iran and Iraq) that our ships will fire if one of their aircraft should approach in a manner indicating possible hostile intent—as did the Iraqi F-1 which attacked the U.S.S. *Stark*.

The recent Chinese delivery to and testing by Iran of Chinese Silkworm antiship missiles at the Strait of Hormuz present a potentially serious threat to U.S. and other shipping. With their 85-kilometer range and 1,100-pound warhead, these missiles can span the strait at its narrowest point and represent, for the first time, a realistic

Iranian capability to sink large oil tankers. Whatever Iran's motivation for procuring such threatening missiles, their presence gives Iran the ability both to intimidate the gulf states and gulf shippers and to cause a real or *de facto* closure of the strait. The Chinese decision to sell such weaponry to Iran is most unwelcome and disturbing. We have made clear to both Iran and China the seriousness with which we consider the Silkworm threat. Other concerned governments have done the same. It is our hope that a sustained international diplomatic campaign will convince Iran not to use the Silkworms.

For the past year, Iran has been using a combination of military action, attacks on gulf shipping, and terrorism, as well as shrewd diplomacy, to intimidate the gulf states not involved in the war. It has tried to impress upon gulf states the hopelessness of their looking to the United States for help and to divide the gulf states one from the other.

Since last summer, Kuwait has been a particular target of Iranian threats. While not a belligerent, Kuwait's size and location make it highly vulnerable to intimidation. The Iranian regime has inspired terrorist and sabotage incidents within Kuwait, fired missiles on Kuwaiti territory on the eve of the January Islamic summit, and attacked over 24 vessels serving Kuwaiti ports since last September. The most recent example of the active intimidation efforts was the explosion at the TWA office in Kuwait city, May 11, which killed one employee. Over the last 3 years, Iranian-influenced groups have attempted a series of bombings and attacks, including on the ruler of Kuwait himself, in an attempt to liberate terrorists being held in Kuwait who were convicted of bombing the U.S. and French Embassies.

Several months ago, Kuwait and other GCC states expressed to us their concern about the continuing attacks by Iran on tankers. Kuwait asked for our assistance, fearing potential damage to its economic lifeline. Consistent with longstanding U.S. commitment to the flow of oil through the gulf and the importance we attach to the freedom of navigation in international waters, as well as our determination to assist our friends in the gulf, the President decided that the United States would help in the protection of Kuwaiti tankers. In the context of these developments, Kuwait asked to register a number of ships in its tanker fleet under U.S. flag. We informed Kuwait that if the vessels in question met ownership and other technical requirements under U.S. laws and regulations, they could be registered

under the U.S. flag. This is in accordance with our established position on qualifications for U.S. flag registration of commercial vessels in general. We also informed the Kuwaitis that by virtue of the fact that these vessels would fly the American flag, they would receive the U.S. Navy protection given any U.S. flag vessel transiting the gulf. The U.S. Navy has always had the mission to provide appropriate protection for U.S. commercial shipping worldwide within the limits of available resources and consistent with international law.

Kuwait welcomed our response, and we have together proceeded with the registry process. The Coast Guard has begun inspection of the vessels in order to determine their conformity with U.S. safety and other technical standards.

We view the reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers in the United States as an unusual measure to meet an extraordinary situation. It would not, however, set a precedent for the normal conduct of commercial shipping or affect the broad interests of the U.S. maritime industry. U.S. flagging procedures minimally require that only the captain of each vessel be a U.S. citizen. Because these vessels will not be calling at U.S. ports, there is no requirement that they carry U.S. seamen or other U.S. crewmembers. These new U.S. flag vessels will be sailing in areas where other U.S. flag vessels have generally not frequented since the war began.

To date, Iran has been careful to avoid confrontations with U.S. flag vessels when U.S. Navy vessels have been in the vicinity. U.S. Military Sealift Command and other commercial U.S. flag vessels have transited the gulf each month under U.S. Navy escort without incident. We believe that our naval presence will continue to have this deterrent effect. Iran lacks the sophisticated aircraft and weaponry used by Iraq in the mistaken attack on the U.S.S. *Stark*. Moreover, we will make sure in advance that Iran knows which ships have been reflagged and are under U.S. protection.

Our response to Kuwait demonstrates our resolve to protect our interests and those of our friends in the region, and it has been warmly welcomed by those governments with which we have had traditionally close ties. Our goal is to deter, not provoke; we believe this is understood by the parties in the region—including Iran. We will pursue our program steadily and with determination.

In providing this protection, our actions will be fully consistent with the applicable rules of international law, which clearly recognize the right of a neutral state to escort and protect ships

flying its flag which are not carrying contraband. In this case, this includes the fact that U.S. ships will not be carrying oil from Iraq. Neither party to the conflict will have any basis for taking hostile action against U.S. naval ships or the vessels they will protect.

Our judgment is that, in light of all the surrounding circumstances, the protection accorded by U.S. naval vessels to these U.S. flag tankers transiting international waters or straits does not constitute introduction of our armed forces into a situation where "imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated." The War Powers Resolution, accordingly, is not implicated by our actions. On the contrary, our actions are such as to make it clear that any prospect of hostilities is neither imminent nor clearly indicated. I repeat that our intention is to deter, not provoke, further military action. We will, however, keep the situation under careful review—particularly in light of the May 17 attack on the U.S.S. *Stark*—and keep Congress closely informed.

Kuwait has also discussed with other maritime powers commercial charter arrangements in the interest of deterring further Iranian attacks on its vessels. We understand that Kuwait broached this issue with all permanent members of the UN Security Council and has entered into an agreement with the Soviet Union to charter three long-haul, Soviet flag vessels to transport some of its oil out of the gulf.

A constant of U.S. policy for decades has been U.S. determination to prevent enhanced Soviet influence and presence in the gulf. We do not want the Soviet Union to obtain a strategic position from which it could threaten vital free-world interests in the region. We believe our arrangement with Kuwait will limit

Soviet advances in the region; they would have welcomed the opportunity to replace us and used this position to try to expand further their role in the gulf. We understand that their commercial charter arrangement for long-haul charters out of the gulf does not necessitate an increase in the Soviet naval presence or establishment of facilities in the gulf. This we would not welcome and have made our position clear.

I want to be frank to acknowledge, however, that the disturbing trend in the war—its spread in geographic terms and its increasing impact on third parties like Kuwait—creates the circumstances in which the Soviets may find more opportunities to insert themselves. The U.S.S.R. plays a fundamentally different role in the gulf and is viewed by Iran as directly threatening to Tehran. Aside from the long northern border, Soviets occupy Afghanistan to Iran's east and are Iraq's primary source of arms. The unescorted Soviet ship recently attacked had, in the past, carried arms to Iraq. The Soviets sent warships into the gulf for the first time last fall after Iran boarded and searched a Soviet arms-carrying vessel. Iran should ponder this development as it maintains its intransigent war policy. We certainly believe the Soviet actions in the gulf and their attempts to enhance their presence there further emphasize the need to bring this war to an end.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Administration is following a clear and consistent set of policies in support of our national interests in the gulf. Our policies are carefully conceived—and they focus on steps needed to end the war. They are

calm and steady in purpose, not provocative in intent; they should help deter Iranian miscalculations and actions that would require a strong response. By supporting the defensive efforts of the moderate gulf states, including the sale of appropriate defensive arms, we help to enable them to defend the interests we share in the gulf and to reduce the prospects for closer ties with the Soviet Union as well as any inclination to accommodate Iranian hegemony.

We want the Congress to be fully aware of what we are doing. That is why we provided, in March and April, a number of briefings on our gulf policy and what we intend to do to help Kuwait, including briefings to the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee. That is why the President has, on several occasions, issued public statements explaining our policy. We have a coherent and effective policy in the gulf region. We seek your support and that of the U.S. public for our efforts. We believe it is important for the United States to work more actively to end the Iran-Iraq war, to be prepared to defend the principle of the free flow of oil and meet our long-standing commitment to assist the gulf Arab states in their self-defense, and to continue to work to constrain Soviet designs. We will advise Congress on the evolution of our discussions with Kuwait and the continuing security situation. ■

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Buchanan, Sparking Conservatives With Rhetoric On Iran Arms Crisis, Weighs Run for Presidency

By JANE MAYER and ELLEN HUME
Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
WASHINGTON—Twenty-four hours after delivering a blistering and unauthorized public attack on both the press and liberal members of Congress, White House Communications Director Patrick J. Buchanan sat back in his West Wing office, smiled heartily and confessed, "I enjoyed it."

While most other White House officials have been taking cover since the Iran-Contra affair broke, Mr. Buchanan, a longtime devotee of political combat, has taken to the ramparts. His controversial remarks have piqued less-combative White House officials, and prompted White House spokesman Larry Speakes to put out disclaimers suggesting the communications director has been speaking only for himself.

But his pugnacious rhetoric has energized the conservative movement, which has been deeply dispirited by the Iranian disclosures. Moreover, it now seems to have presented a possible new direction for Mr. Buchanan: his own bid for the Republican presidential nomination.

"I'm intrigued by the idea, and I think you have to make a decision by March 1 at the latest," Mr. Buchanan said in an interview. Often frustrated by the constraints on his ability to speak freely from the White House, and worried about perceived disarray within the conservative movement, Mr. Buchanan says he is serious, even though he has never before sought or held an elective office.



Patrick J. Buchanan

In the next two weeks, Mr. Buchanan plans to grapple with what he sees as two major stumbling blocks. The first is funding. Facing potential opponents with multi-million-dollar war chests, Mr. Buchanan's chief hope so far is an offer of financial help from the Congressional Club, North Carolina Sen. Jesse Helms's mass-mailing political machine. "I am finding a lot of conservatives are excited about Pat Buchanan running for president—I think this is the only way to unite the conservative movement," says Carter Wrenn, director of the Congressional Club. He says he hopes its members can raise \$9 million for Mr. Buchanan.

Splitting Conservative Support

Mr. Buchanan's second major concern is that his candidacy would inevitably fracture conservative support, ultimately scuttling chances for a conservative to win the nomination, and that leads many political strategists to conclude it's unlikely he'd run. As one conservative strategist sees the problem, "Pat could never win—but he could cause a lot of mischief."

Mr. Buchanan worries aloud about the impact that his potential candidacy might have on New York Rep. Jack Kemp and television evangelist Pat Robertson, both of whom he calls "friends." But those close to Mr. Buchanan, like his sister and former U.S. Treasurer Angela "Bay" Buchanan Jackson, who is urging him to run, say that "Jack Kemp has had his chance and he hasn't taken off."

John Buckley, a spokesman for the Kemp campaign, dismisses the threat of a Buchanan bid. "I'm not overly concerned about it," he says. "Running for president takes a lot of spadework, and it's late for somebody to start thinking about it."

But Mr. Buchanan sounds sorely tempted. Musing on the opportunity, he says: "For the first time in my life, the movement is all over the lot. It doesn't

know where it is, or who it's going with. Out there, people are looking, but they don't like what they see."

Presidential reveries aside, it's clear that the Iran-Contra affair has given new lease, and apparently new license, to the White House communications director. "You can tell Pat's having fun for the first time, and it's good to see," says former White House speechwriter and Buchanan friend Peggy Noonan.

Mr. Buchanan's latest blitz, delivered to a pro-Reagan rally here Monday, was an all-out assault on both congressional liberals and the media, whom Mr. Buchanan accused of prolonging and exploiting the Iran-Contra controversy for their own political gain. The speech, which cast the growing scandal as a partisan fist fight, followed an explosive Dec. 8 Washington Post Op-Ed piece in which he accused Republicans who questioned the White House of lacking "elemental loyalty" to the president.

Lightning Rod for Criticism

Asked whether he was supposed to clear these public remarks with White House authorities, Mr. Buchanan says, "Yes." Asked if he did so, he says, smiling, "No." Those close to Mr. Buchanan reason that White House authorities would never have consented to some of the more-controversial statements he has made. But with Chief of Staff Donald Regan weakened and preoccupied by the current controversy, less control is now being exercised over such matters.

And even though aides to Mr. Regan have been sniping fiercely at Mr. Buchanan in the press, suggesting he has "out-Agnewed Agnew," they are unsure

how to regain the political initiative. And even as they flail, some admit Mr. Buchanan has served a useful purpose by acting as a lightning rod to deflect criticism.

The tactical dispute between Mr. Buchanan's combative style and the Regan camp's more-conciliatory style strikes at the heart of a White House quandary over how to proceed through the next year. Conservatives fear that if the White House doesn't aggressively seize the initiative in the remaining days before the Jan. 27 State of the Union message, their gains and their future may be jeopardized by the Democratic Congress.

"I think this is a real crisis," says Stuart Butler, director of domestic policy studies for the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank. "Either the White House can take the direction of preoccupying itself with damage control, or it can go on the offensive and capture the debate.

Right now, Pat Buchanan seems to be the only one taking an aggressive tone."

But Mr. Buchanan swears—as he has before—that he's about to lower his profile. He says about his Monday speech, "I probably should have toned it down some," and he says about his plans, "It would be a mistake to think that I'm going to be out there a lot in the next couple of months."

One reason, he says, is that the battle over shaping the State of the Union message, which will provide a crucial blueprint of where the Reagan administration is going, has to be fought quietly and internally. "It's real inside baseball, and I've got a job here as a staff member," he says. But then, before he can catch himself, he's spoiling for another good fight. "What if we came out in the speech with a date certain for deploying SDI?," he says.