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FOREIGN POLICY

Reagan

"In the case of foreign policy, I am equally unimpressed with all this talk about our problems being too complex, too intricate, to allow timely decision and action. The fetish of complexity, the trick of making hard decisions harder to make; the art, finally of rationalizing the non-decision, have made a ruin of American foreign policy."

Reagan Speech
May 21, 1968

Reagan has chosen to ignore the progress that both Democratic and Republican administrations have made toward a secure peace.

His 1976 attacks on President Ford were at least as harsh as those he makes on President Carter in 1980. Throughout, he provides simple answers to the delicate complexities of foreign affairs -- answers which reflect his lack of understanding of the consequences of his remarks.

I. Military Involvement

Reagan frequently rejects a tempered response to international problems, preferring instead to flex America's military might at the slightest provocation. Over the last 12 years, Reagan has suggested or implied that American military forces be sent to Angola, Cuba, Cyprus, Ecuador, Lebanon, the Middle East, North Korea, Pakistan, Portugal, Rhodesia, Vietnam (after our troops had been sent home) and has hinted at retaking the Panama Canal.

Angola

In response to Soviet involvement in the Angolan civil war Reagan said the U.S. should have told the Russians:

"Out. We'll let them (Angola) do the fighting or you're going to have to deal with us."

New York Times
January 6, 1976

Cuba

In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Reagan said:

"One option might well be that we surround the island of Cuba and stop all traffic in and out."

New York Times
January 29, 1980

Cyprus

Reagan has said that, in a manner similiar to Eisenhower's deployment of troops to Lebanon, as President he would have favored sending a "token (U.S.) military force" to Cyprus during the 1975 crisis on the island.

New York Times
June 4, 1976

Ecuador

In response to the Ecuadorians' seizure of U.S. tuna boats in 1975, Reagan suggested:

"(T)he U.S. government next winter should send along a destroyer with the tuna boats to cruise, say 13 miles off the shore of Ecuador in an updated version of Teddy Roosevelt's dictum to 'talk softly, but carry a big stick.'"

San Diego Union
Marcy 7, 1975

Lebanon

"In the same vein as Eisenhower's deployment of troops to Lebanon, Reagan has said that, as President, he would have sent troops to Lebanon during the 1976 civil war."

New York Times
June 4, 1976

Middle East

Responding to a question on whether the U.S. should establish a military presence in the Sinai to counter the Soviets, Reagan said:

"I think this might be a very, very good time for the United States to show a presence in the Middle East. I don't think it would be provocative and I don't think it looks like anyone bullying..."

Boston Globe
January 13, 1980

North Korea

In response to the North Korean seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo, Reagan said:

"I cannot for the life of me understand why someone in the United States government, particularly the President, has not said, 'That ship had better come out of that harbor

in 24 hours or we are coming in after it.'"

Los Angeles Times
January 25, 1968

To demonstrate United States resolve and willingness to stand by defense treaties, Reagan said we should let it be known that, "B-52's should make a moonscape out of North Korea if South Korea is attacked."

Los Angeles Times
June 1, 1975

Pakistan

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Reagan advocated sending advisers into Pakistan.

"I think the most logical thing is that they (the advisers) would go to the country we have a treaty with, Pakistan, and that training could be provided there, with U.S. and Pakistan where we have a legitimate reason and right to be."

St. Louis Globe-Democrat
January 11, 1980

Reagan also proposed sending "a squadron of planes" to Pakistan to counter the Soviets' move in Afghanistan.

Washington Star
January 31, 1980

Portugal

To prevent a Communist takeover of Portugal in 1975, Reagan said the United States should have acted "in any way to prevent of discourage" the Communists, adding "It was clearly in our interest to do so." But he refused to be more specific.

Los Angeles Times
June 1, 1975

Rhodesia

To ensure an orderly transition in Rhodesia between a minority-white to a black-majority rule, Reagan said:

"Whether it will be enough to have simply a show of strength, a promise that we would (supply) troops or whether you'd have to go in with occupation forces or not I don't know."

New York Times
June 4, 1976

North Vietnam

The Los Angeles Times reported that in a speech to the National Headliners Club Reagan stated that the United States should have met North Vietnam's final thrust in South Vietnam with B-52 bombers.

Los Angeles Times
June 1, 1975

Panama Canal

Reagan has long been a principal opponent of the Panama Canal Treaty, and has promised that:

"If there is any possibility of keeping the Panama Canal, believe me I would do it..."

Atlanta Constitution
January 18, 1980

United Nations

In the past, Reagan has found excuses to question United States' participation in the United Nations. The first occasion arose in 1971 when the issue of admitting China to the United Nations was being discussed.

"I was also disgusted and very frankly I think that it confirms the moral bankruptcy of that international organization...I don't know whether to withdraw totally from the adjuncts of the United Nations. You know the service organizations surrounding it are doing good work."

Press Conference
October 26, 1971

In 1975 when the United Nations condemned Zionism as racism, Reagan suggested, that if the U.N. continues its present conduct, the United States should serve notice "we're going to go home and sit a while."

Los Angeles Times
November 17, 1975

Reagan has also attacked various organs of the United Nations including UNESCO. In 1977 when the head of UNESCO, Sean MacBride, attacked the capitalist system, Reagan gave his reply.

"...UNESCO -- the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization...May actually be a base for communist espionage."

Jefferson City Missouri
Post
December 15, 1977

Foreign Aid

Reagan has attacked the foreign aid program.

"We've bought dress suits for Greek undertakers, extra wives for Kenya Government officials."

New York Times
January 23, 1965

Vietnam

Reagan has consistently defended the Vietnam war. In a recent speech before the Veteran's of Foreign Wars Convention, Reagan once again asserted the war was a "noble cause."

August 18, 1980

Reagan has also claimed that "The Vietnam war was not an action of moral poverty; it was a collective action of moral courage..."

Layfayette Journal
and Courier
April 23, 1980

Reagan feels that despite the best efforts of our soldiers to win the war, they were hamstrung by the politicians and some segments of the public.

"There is a lesson...in Vietnam. If we are forced to fight, we must have the means and the determination to prevail, or we will not have what it takes to secure the peace...we will never again ask young men to fight and possibly die in a war our government is afraid to win."

Speech to Veterans
of Foreign Wars
August 18, 1980

In a 1967 Newsweek article, Reagan called upon President Johnson to escalate the Vietnam War using nuclear threats

"...no one would cheerfully want to use atomic weapons...But...the last person in the world who should know we wouldn't use them is the enemy. He should go to bed every night being afraid that we might."

Los Angeles Times
July 3, 1967

Richard J. Whalen, one of Reagan's advisors, shares his outlook. He believes the United States should have bombed the dikes of North Vietnam, then "with 90% of the country under water" negotiated a peace.

Los Angeles Times
June 26, 1980

Bush

"Certainly there are going to be situations where an American President might have to contemplate the use of force. One of Carter's great problems is that nobody thinks under any circumstances that he would use force. It's the post-Vietnam syndrome. But, going back to Reagan, I do not favor blockading Cuba because I think that's irrelevant. You'd lose all support of moderates in this hemisphere on that."

National Journal
March 15, 1980

Bush

"I don't favor permanent bases (in the Middle East). That's where I differ with some of the other Republican candidates. And the reason I don't is not that I don't want to--don't recognize that you need at some point to project power or show force, but I see a permanent base in the Middle East as an invitation to the Soviets to do the one thing that the Sudanese and the Egyptians kept them from doing: getting a foothold in the Middle East again.

Bill Moyers' Journal
WNET/Thirteen
March 6, 1980

Bush

"I am convinced that Carter has been an abnormally weak and vacillating president in foreign affairs."

"He sees the world as he wishes it were, not as it is."

"We don't seem to be realistic enough, tough enough, strong enough. We have projected a failure to keep commitments, a weakness and vacillation."

Madison WI, State
Journal
November 8, 1979

Bush

"I don't believe in bullying one's allies. Or pushing some guy around because he's smaller. I believe in leading him and I know that at times, you have to say, 'This is how it's going to be.'"

Concord, NH,
Monitor & Patriot
October 12, 1979

Bush

Asked recently where he would draw the line and commit American troops, Bush said,

"Look, I'm not going to answer a hypothetical question about where you draw the line and put troops. That's one way to get into foreign policy trouble, and it's a sure way to get into political trouble."

Wall Street Journal
February 26, 1980
file #1-19-1 (R)

Bush

"I don't think you need an overall change in diplomacy, but I do think we need to be able to protect conventional force power selectively. I don't favor stationing of U.S. forces in the Middle East which, in my view, would draw Soviets back into the Middle East. But I don't think it's a question of redesigning something in the sense of a new machinery to deal with foreign policy, I think it's a projection of commitment and will."

New York Times
January 5, 1980

Bush

"Mine is a moderate approach. We don't need radical solutions. We need to figure out what works and what doesn't work. We need to find a balance."

Philadelphia, PA
Inquirer
October 22, 1979
file # 2-3-7

Carter

"There are two obvious preconditions for an effective American foreign policy: a strong national economy and a strong national defense.

"That's why I placed the highest priority on the development of a national energy policy which our country has never had. That's why we must win the struggle against inflation, and I've been very pleased lately at the trend in interest rates and the good news we had this morning on the Producer Price Index (Applause). The Congress and I are moving resolutely toward this goal. In fact, every single American is involved. This common effort to deal with the worldwide economic challenge does require some sacrifice and I am determined that the sacrifice will be fairly shared. The response of our democracy to economic challenges will determine whether we will be able to manage the challenge of other global responsibilities in the 1980s and beyond. If we cannot meet these international economic problems successfully, then our ability to meet military and political and diplomatic challenges will be doubtful indeed. Although it will not be easy, the innate advantages of our nation's natural bounty which God has given us and the common commitment of a free people who compromise American society give us the assurance of success.

"We must also be militarily strong. The fact is that for 15 years the Soviet Union has been expanding its military capabilities far out of proportion to its needs for defense -- a 4 or 5 percent real growth above the inflation rate compounded annually for 15 years has caused us some concern. For much of this same period, our spending for defense had been going down. If these adverse trends had continued, we would have found ourselves facing a severe military imbalance, an imbalance all the more threatening because of mounting global turbulence. That's why I have launched a broad modernization of our strategic and conventional forces and worked to strengthen our alliances: We and our allies have pledged ourselves to sustained real annual increases in our defense spending.

"Our task is to build together a truly cooperative global community, to compose a kind of global mosaic which embraces the wealth and diversity of the Earth's people, cultures and religions. This will not be an easy task. The philosophical basis of such a community must be respect for human rights as well as respect for the independence of nations.

"In promoting that prospect for a future of peace, we will stay on the steady course to which we have been committed now for the last three and a half years.

"We pursue five major objectives:

"First, to enhance not only economic but also political solidarity among the industrialized democracies.

"Second, to establish a genuinely cooperative relationship with the nations of the Third World.

"Third, to persevere in our efforts for peace in the Middle East and other troubled areas of the world.

"Fourth, to defend our strategic interests, especially those which are now threatened in Southwest Asia.

"And fifth, to advance arms control, especially through agreed strategic arms limitations with the Soviet Union, and to maintain along with this a firm and a balanced relationship with the Soviets.

"Our first objective, solidarity with our Allies, is the touchstone of our foreign policy. Without such solidarity, the world economy and international politics may well degenerate into disorder.

"This is why we have led the North Atlantic Alliance in its program to upgrade its conventional forces. And last winter, in an historic decision, NATO agreed to strengthen its nuclear missiles in Europe in order to respond to a very disturbing Soviet missile buildup there.

"Next month, the seven leading industrial democracies will hold a summit meeting in Venice. I look forward to being there with the other six leaders of our most important Allies. It's our collective intention not only to make the summit another milestone for global economic cooperation, but also to advance our political and our strategic solidarity."

World Affairs Council
Philadelphia
May 1980

Administration Record in Foreign Policy

We have a strong and good record: peace in the Middle East -- the most crucial area -- which provides us with a basis for dealing with an outrageous situation in Afghanistan. Nothing puts us in a better position for dealing with this problem than the Camp David Accords. Beyond that, we are improving America's strength and resolve -- in the post-Vietnam era -- both at home and abroad; relations with our key Allies have rarely been better; we have made decisive progress in peacemaking; both in the Middle East and (with the British) in southern Africa; and we have demonstrated to the world -- following Vietnam -- that we are a country that stands for its values, and are the major country others look up to.

Afghanistan is the product of fundamental Soviet miscalculation about the reaction of the entire world. It has revealed the Soviets for what they are -- not the partisans of independence and non-alignment and the whole world has brought them to account.

-- Soviet aggression in Afghanistan is the result of a disastrous failure of Soviet policy. That is the way it is perceived by virtually every nation in the world, and I am sure that is how it will come to be seen in the Kremlin in time.

I have drawn the line in the region and the response of other countries has been very gratifying, including those who are prepared to provide necessary facilities.

-- In defense, I reversed a decade's decline in real defense spending, and we are now making steady increases in the face of 15 years of major Soviet defense increases. We created the NATO Long-Term Defense Program, a major achievement; and we now also agree to deploy long-range tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

-- External factors -- the growth of Soviet power and arrogance, spreading turmoil in parts of the developing world -- have complicated this task, but we have been putting together the essential building blocks for the future. Specifically: 5% real growth in defense spending; NATO Long-Term Defense Program; negotiating SALT II normalization with China; Camp David; southern Africa peace-making; Panama Canal Treaties; Multilateral Trade Agreement; Seven-nation Summits; Common Fund.

-- There is much left to be done. Most important is realizing as a nation the critical importance to us of the Persian Gulf/southwest Asia area, and the need to convince the Soviet Union of its mistake in believing that we are too preoccupied with our domestic problems to resist the further expansion of its powers abroad.

I have heard and read recently a lot about a strong America. We are strong, and I intend to see that we stay that way. But words are cheap.

It does no good to talk about a strong America and oppose a strong defense.

You can't attack inflation with brave words while you vote for larger deficits.

Anyone can be in favor of a "firm response," so long as the response is not controversial, and we certainly will never end our addiction to OPEC oil by promising the American people cheap, plentiful energy in the years ahead.

SALT

Reagan's Early Position -- Objections

Reagan opposed the SALT II Treaty as it was negotiated by both the Ford and Carter administrations. His objections, even before the details of the Treaty were known, were on the grounds that it would allow the Soviets to achieve nuclear parity.

"We should be far more aware of our bargaining strength than we seem to be. The Soviet Union seems most anxious to enter a SALT II agreement. They have reason to be worried about a defense weapons system in which we hold a huge technological lead, a bright spot for us called the cruise missile...The best way to have an equitable SALT II agreement is to negotiate from a firmly established position. We should not be so eager for an agreement that we make unnecessary concessions, for to grant such concessions is to whet the Soviet appetite for more."

New York Times
February 11, 1976

Reagan then changed his objections. He no longer objected to Soviet parity but rather he claimed the Soviets would become superior to the United States.

"President Carter and his supporters in the Congress ...are negotiating a SALT II treaty that could very well make this nation NUMBER TWO behind the Soviet Union in defense and offense capability."

Ronald Reagan Letter
February, 1979

Reagan did not change this latter objection and used it as a standard campaign line.

"SALT II is not strategic arms limitation. It is strategic arms buildup, with the Soviets adding a minimum of 3,000 nuclear warheads to their inventory..."

New York Times
September 16, 1979

Reagan's Current Position -- Proposals

In late 1979, Reagan began to add his own SALT proposals to his criticism of SALT II. Where at first he had objected to the Soviets achieving nuclear parity, in 1979 he began to advocate a new policy.

"...(an) arms limitation agreement that legitimately reduces nuclear armaments to the point that neither country represents a threat to the other."

San Jose Mercury
September 16, 1979

By early 1980, Reagan was joining his standard criticism of SALT II with his proposal of first achieving military superiority, and then negotiating a nuclear arms reduction treaty.

"We also should have learned the lesson that we cannot negotiate arms control agreements that will slow down the Soviet military buildup, as long as we let the Soviets move ahead of us in every category of armaments. Once we clearly demonstrate to the Soviet leadership that we are determined to compete, arms control negotiations will again have a chance. On such a basis, I would be prepared to negotiate vigorously for verifiable reductions in armaments, since only on such a basis could reductions be equitable."

Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations
March 17, 1980

Bush

"And my conviction is this--amend the Treaty; send it back, and I think this administration is wrong when they're saying (sic) there's a new arms race. Why? Because the Soviet Union is already in an arms race. They're spending 40 percent more than we are."

CBS Face the Nation
page 6
October 7, 1979

Bush

"And it's the intent of the Soviets that concerns me; and I believe that those who, in the Senate, who want to see it amended are on the right track. And I want a SALT Treaty. I prepared the national intelligence estimates for this country; I don't like what I see in this arms race. Frankly, my presidency would be aimed as much as possible at the reduction--SALT III. Not easy to do, but strength of commitment, I think, could get us there."

CBS Face the Nation
Page 7
October 7, 1979

Bush

"Can we catch the Soviets if they try to cheat? The answer is ominous for the United States. The fact is that under this treaty we are virtually unable to monitor whether the Soviets comply with its terms....When it comes to verification of SALT II, Jimmy Carter will ask us to trust the Soviets as he once asked us to trust him. But I say ...that a treaty that cannot be verified tomorrow shouldn't be ratified today,"

Wall Street Journal
July 6, 1979

Bush

"What we need is an actual reduction, not limitation in nuclear weapons."

Birmingham, AL, News
October 3, 1979

Bush

"I oppose the SALT agreement as put forward. I would amend the treaty. After a period of time, I believe the Soviets would indeed negotiate."

Vancouver, WA, Columbian
July 18, 1979

Bush

"It is not a good treaty as drafted. Our ability to verify Soviet compliance is severely diminished by the loss of (observation) stations in Iran.

"There are things the Soviets can do to make the treaty verifiable. Why aren't they willing to do them? I want to see that tested."

Columbus, OH, Citizen
Journal
October 17, 1979

Bush

"Somehow every negotiation should push the Soviets for far more meaningful reductions....I'd be prepared as president to go a long way toward real reductions and real verifiable limits....A SALT III treaty is really a lot more important and meaningful than SALT II. So don't get caught in a bad deal now. Push harder for better SALT II terms."

Bush

"We should have SALT III, a meaningful, verifiable reduction in nuclear arms. You don't get there through a bad SALT II treaty, however."

Illinois interviews and
speeches
Champaign, Illinois
News-Gazette
February 3, 1980

Bush

"I don't like the SALT Treaty. I don't think it's a good agreement. I think the Senate should amend it or reject it. I think the Soviets would renegotiate....(the treaty) locks in inequality and can't be verified."

Carroll, IA, Daily Times-
Herald
July 2, 1979

Bush

"The Soviet economy is less than half as strong as ours, and yet they're spending 40 percent more on military matters. I don't think rejecting the treaties would mean an arms race. Their economy is already over-burdened."

Claremont, NH, Eagle-Times
August 10, 1979

Carter

"...we remain deeply committed to the process of mutual and verifiable arms control, particularly to the effort to prevent the spread and further development of nuclear weapons. Our decision to defer, but not abandon our efforts to secure ratification of the SALT II Treaty reflects our firm conviction that the United States has a profound national security interest in the constraints on Soviet nuclear forces which only that treaty can provide."

State of the Union Address
January 1980

Mondale

"In recent days, three major questions have been raised about the SALT treaty. In each, I believe the evidence is clearly on the side of ratification.

"The first question: Does SALT undermine our national security? Those who believe it does point to the weapons the Soviets are permitted under the treaty, like the so-called heavy SS-18 missile, or the Backfire bomber. Because we do not possess our own heavy missile, and because the Soviets can keep their Backfires, it is claimed that the treaty jeopardizes our national security.

"But that argument does not stand up to common sense. It is totally misleading to single out one or two aspects of Soviet strategic forces and claim that this treaty gives them superiority. What counts and what must be kept in mind is the total picture. And what is it?

"First, of all, we don't have any heavy missiles because we don't need them, and the Defense Department has always said they don't want them. We have what they call a triad of weapons, some on land, some in water, some in air. The Soviets put 70% of their forces on the increasingly vulnerable fixed land-based ICBM systems. We have put 3/4 of our strategic weapons, and I think wisely so, in our essentially invulnerable and greatly superior submarines and bombers.

"Nor are we standing still. On the land, the President has ordered full-scale development of the new MX that will make our ICBMs mobile. The MX, though smaller in size than the SS-18, is absolutely equal to the biggest Soviet missile in military capability, and will be much more survivable because it is mobile.

"Developing the MX, coupled with the increasing strength of the rest of our forces, meets the threat of a possible Soviet first-strike advantage in the 1980s. And the MX is explicitly available to us under the treaty. And that's not the end of it.

"In the water we have 4 times as many warheads as the Soviets do on our far less vulnerable and far superior submarines. This fall we will begin fitting our Poseidon submarines with the longer ranged Trident I missiles. By the middle of '81, the U.S.S. Ohio, the first Trident, will be deployed.

"These new systems assure that our submarine based missiles will continue to be invulnerable. And that's not all.

"In the air, we are fitting our B-52s with cruise missiles that are five to ten years ahead of the Soviet weapons. Our B-52 forces eclipse the Soviet air defenses. We are working with our NATO allies toward modernizing our theater nuclear weapons. We have a flying armada of strategic FB-111s, of F-111s in Europe, of aircraft on our carriers -- all of which can strike Soviet territory and none of which is counted under the treaty.

"...And we are explicitly reserved the right to build an aircraft comparable to the Backfire if we want it.

"When our total nuclear capacity is measured against the Soviets' strategic equivalence between us is indisputable. Nothing in the SALT treaty undermines that effort. Nothing in the treaty forecloses any option we want. But without SALT, everything will be far more costly.

"Without SALT, the characteristics and size of the forces we face will be far less certain.

"An that is why, and I want to underscore this, that is why the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- every one of them the head of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marines -- unanimously support this treaty. That is why the current SAC commander, the Strategic Air Command commander, supports this treaty. That is why the Secretary of Defense, a California product, by the way, an expert in strategic arms and one of the most gifted Americans ever to hold that post, supports it.

"And that is why all of our Western allies, every one of them, support this treaty, and have given their strong and unqualified endorsement.

"The second major argument brought against the treaty is that it is based on hard-nosed reality and suspicion. The diplomatic language of those negotiations is not so polite to ignore that we must rely on our own means to verify what the other side is doing.

"And the treaty is built on seven years' experience with Soviet behavior in SALT I. In that agreement, a standing body was established to deal with issues that might arise relating to compliance under the earlier treaty. Not a single charge of violation was made by either side. And every issue regarding ambiguous activity that we or the Soviets brought to that body was satisfactorily resolved.

"Can SALT be adequately verified? I serve on all the highly classified, super-secret agencies that deal with this matter, And I say it can, and I have no doubt about it.

"That is the testimony of the leader of every aspect of the American intelligence community. There are people who are not tied into political party. They are long-time professionals who conduct the most sophisticated super-secret work that is carried on anywhere in our government.

"To the person, they have testified that this treaty is verifiable. That's the position of the Secretary of Defense, and it's the position of every member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"What is critical in verification is that we be able to identify any violations before they can affect the strategic balance. What is important is not that we know everything about Soviet forces, but that we know about those things that matter to our security.

"We have monitored Soviet strategic forces for 30 years, and with unbelievable accuracy. And we will continue to do so with or without a SALT agreement.

"We have a multi-billion dollar intelligence network. We have photographic satellites, radar stations, and other highly sophisticated devices. And SALT, and this is very important, expressly forbids the use of any measure by the Soviet Union or by us to deliberately obstruct verification of the provisions of this agreement.

"This treaty is not built on trust, it is built on our own technology, and our proven ability to monitor backed up by the terms of the treaty.

"The third major argument about SALT has been made from both ends of the political spectrum. It is said that the treaty does not limit the arms race or does not limit it enough or even that it legalizes an arms build up.

"But the claim this treaty fails to cap the arms race collapses in the face of a few simple facts.

"Today the Soviets have 2500 strategic missile launchers and bombers. Under the terms of the treaty, they must dismantle 250 of them. But without the treaty, we estimate that they could have had up to 3,000 such launchers and bombers by 1985, 1/3 more than the total permitted under this agreement.

"Under the limit of the 2500 launchers and bombers, there are additional sub-limits that are very important to us. Without SALT II, by 1985 we expect that the Soviets could have as many as 1800 multiple warheaded, or MIRVed, missile launchers. With SALT, they are limited to 1200. Without SALT by 1985 we expect that the Soviets could have up to 1400 MIRV'ed ICBM launchers. With SALT, they're limited to 820. Under SALT, the number of warheads they're permitted under their largest missile, the 18, is ten warheads. They are capable of putting 20 or 30 warheads on that system. The difference is some 6,000 fewer warheads with the treaty than without it. Without SALT, the Soviets could continue developing newer and more deadly land-based missiles. In the past they have done so, having 3 or 4 new systems underway at the same time. But with SALT, they are restricted to only one new system.

World Affairs Council
Los Angeles, CA
July 1979

April 16, 1980

SALT II PROSPECTS

Q: Is the SALT II Treaty dead? If not, when do you plan to ask the Senate to resume consideration of it?

A: -- Early in January, at our request, the Senate leadership deferred further consideration of SALT II for the time being. But the Treaty remains on the Senate calendar; we remain firmly convinced that the Treaty is in the national interest of the United States; and we are committed to its ratification.

* * *

-- We did not negotiate this treaty to make friends with the Soviet Union. We negotiated because, as adversaries with awesome military power, it is in our security interest to have reliable, verifiable limits on the strategic arms race. In a period of heightened tensions, it is all the more important to have reliable constraints on the competition in strategic weapons.

-- The United States intends to abide by its obligations under international law to take no action inconsistent with SALT II, provided that the Soviet Union reciprocates. The evidence we have is that the Soviets have to date taken no actions inconsistent with the Treaty.

SALT II COMPLIANCE

Q: What did you mean when you said that the US would comply with the provisions of SALT II within the bounds of reciprocal action by the Soviets and consultations with the Congress? Does this obviate the need for actual ratification? And are the Soviets in fact complying?

A: -- Under international law the United States and the Soviet Union are obligated to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the SALT II Treaty while its ratification is pending.

* * *

-- In addition, the United States has no plans to take actions which would be inconsistent with any of the terms of the SALT II Treaty, so long as the Soviets act with similar restraint.

-- We will continue to monitor Soviet activities closely. The evidence we have to date is that the Soviets have taken on actions inconsistent with the Treaty.

-- Our currently-planned strategic programs are consistent with the Treaty. They will enable us to maintain effective deterrence and essential equivalence. We will, of course, continue to assess our strategic posture in the light of our overall security interests, taking into account the military need for additional steps, Soviet actions, and the terms of the SALT II Treaty.

-- This policy we have adopted in no way eliminates the need for ratification of the SALT II Treaty. SALT II must be ratified if the significant constraints it imposes on Soviet nuclear weaponry are to have full, long-term effect.

Q: Since the Backfire bomber can reach targets in the continental US, why shouldn't it be included in SALT?

A: -- The Soviet Union is currently deploying Backfires in both their long-range air force and in naval aviation units. The Backfire bomber has been in production for several years, and current production averages two and a half aircraft a month. We continue to believe that the primary purpose of the Backfire is to perform peripheral attack and naval missions. Undoubtedly, this aircraft has some intercontinental capability in that it can surely reach the United States from home bases on a one-way, high-altitude, subsonic, unrefueled flight; with refueling and Arctic staging it can probably, with certain high-altitude cruise flight profiles, execute a two-way mission to much of the United States.

-- The ability to strike the territory of the other side is not the criterion for determining whether an aircraft is a "heavy bomber" and, thus, subject to the limitations in the SALT II agreement. For example, the US has 67 FB-111's which are part of our strategic bomber force and dedicated to attack on the Soviet Union. We also have over 500 aircraft deployed in the European and Pacific theaters which have the capability to strike Soviet territory. The Soviet Union at one time tried to get these latter aircraft included in SALT on the grounds that they could strike the Soviet Union. With the firm support of our Allies, we adamantly resisted that position on the grounds that these aircraft, whatever their theoretical capability, are deployed for theater missions and, thus, not subject to SALT limitations. The Soviets have used this same argument with respect to the Backfire.

-- Nevertheless, the Soviets have agreed to furnish specific assurances concerning the Backfire. The US regards the obligations undertaken by these assurances as integral to the Treaty. These assurances, which include a freeze on the current Backfire production rate, are consistent with the US objective of constraining the strategic potential of the Backfire force, while continuing to exclude our own European and Pacific-based theater aircraft from SALT. Those assurances also help to restrict the Backfire to a theater role. In particular, limiting the numbers available means that Soviet diversion of Backfire from its theater and naval missions to a strategic role would substantially reduce Soviet strength in these areas while adding only marginally to overall Soviet strategic capability.

Q: It is claimed that SALT II will be adequately verifiable; but how will the US make sure that the Soviets aren't cheating? Doesn't the loss of intelligence collection sites in Iran undermine our ability to verify the SALT II agreement?

A: -- The US relies for verification on "national technical means" which is a general term covering a variety of technical collection methods for monitoring Soviet military activities. As the President has publicly confirmed, these national technical means include photographic satellites. There are other collection methods as well. For example, we are able to monitor Soviet telemetry -- that is, the technical data transmitted by radio signals from the Soviet missiles during tests -- from outside Soviet territory. A further example of national technical means are the ships and aircraft which we also use to monitor Soviet missile tests. The sides have also acknowledged that large radars, such as the COBRA DANE radar at Shemya Island in the Aleutians, can be used as a form of national technical means (NTM).

-- This is not a complete list of the technical devices that constitute our NTM. Still less is it a complete list of US intelligence resources. Many of our intelligence resources are very sensitive. Public acknowledgement of their existence, much less of their technical capabilities and details of how they work or what information they produce, would make it far easier for the Soviets to negate them. Therefore, what we can say publicly about the details of our intelligence facilities is very limited. Members of the Senate who will have to vote on the Treaty will, of course, have full access to all the details.

-- However, there is no secret that our NTM enable us to learn a great deal about Soviet military systems, including the strategic nuclear forces that are limited in SALT. We are able to monitor many aspects of the development, testing, production, deployment, training, and operation of Soviet strategic forces, despite the closed nature of Soviet society and Soviet concern with secrecy. A good measure of the capabilities of our system of intelligence collection is the detailed information we publish on Soviet forces: For example, the Secretary of Defense's Report for FY 80 lists the numbers of Soviet bombers, missiles, and gives estimates of the numbers of weapons carried on Soviet forces. We know that the Soviets have a "fifth generation" of ICBMs under development, and we know a good deal about their characteristics -- this before a single missile has been flight-tested. That this is by no means the full extent of our knowledge of Soviet systems is clear from the mass of unofficial -- but often all-too-accurate -- leaks of detailed information on Soviet programs.

-- From these sources, then, we are able to assemble a detailed picture of Soviet forces, both overall and in terms of the characteristics of particular systems. No one source is essential; instead we rely on information from a variety of sources -- for example, what we learn from photography can be checked against information from radar or telemetry monitoring. This means both that loss of a particular source, though it can be important and require replacement, does not "blind" our ability to monitor what the Soviets are doing. Moreover, the use of multiple sources complicates any effort to disguise or conceal a violation. The Soviets know we have a big intelligence operation and know a certain amount about how it works, from our official statements, from leaks, from spies, and from their own NTM. But we know they do not know the full capabilities of our systems -- or, equally important, how we use the information we collect. The result is that efforts to conceal would have to be planned to cope with a number of US collection systems, some of them entirely unknown. (The need to maintain this uncertainty is a major justification for continued secrecy about our intelligence systems and methods.)

-- As for the loss of the intelligence collection sites in Iran, we are proceeding in an orderly fashion to reestablish that capability. As Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown pointed out in his April 5 speech in New York, the issue is not whether the capability will be reestablished but rather how, where, and how quickly. There are a number of alternatives available to us for recovering the capability. Some can be implemented more quickly than others. Some involve consultations with other countries, some do not.

-- Intelligence of the kind obtained from the Iranian sites provides information on Soviet strategic systems, including some of the aspects of the strategic systems which are limited by SALT. For this reason, we will be moving with all deliberate speed to reestablish the capability. However, as noted above, we have a large number of other technical intelligence collection sources which collect intelligence on Soviet strategic systems. As a consequence it is not imperative that the Iranian capability be immediately reestablished to ensure that the emerging SALT agreement is adequately verifiable, i.e., that any Soviet cheating that could pose a military risk be detected in time for the US to respond and offset the threat. As long as the capability is reestablished on a timely basis -- as we plan to do -- there will be no impact on SALT verification. We estimate that regaining enough capability to monitor adequately these tests for SALT purposes will take about a year.

-- The principal information at issue is the nature and characteristics of new or modified Soviet ICBMs. Each such Soviet program will require about 20 flight tests over a period of years. We would be able to monitor testing and detect violations well before the testing programs were complete. On this basis, we are confident that we will be able to verify adequately a SALT agreement from the moment it is signed.

The Defense Debate, Such As It Is

What pretends to be the defense debate of the campaign amounts to a claim by Ronald Reagan that he would restore nuclear "superiority" over the Soviet Union and Jimmy Carter's retort that he will preserve a strategic strength that is "second to none." The Republican candidate decries delay of the MX missile and other weapons; the President says he is acquiring the MX and more at the proper pace. Only John Anderson challenges the MX directly.

Mr. Reagan wants to create the impression of a dangerous new "missile gap" while Mr. Carter has bought the MX mostly to defend himself politically. These are the worst motives for so fateful a decision.

The failure to debate the merits and flaws of the MX is bad enough; even worse is the Carter Administration's effort to preempt discussion by boasting about some new nuclear targeting strategy. Dutifully, Defense Secretary Brown says that American warheads are now being targeted to allow the nation to fight and win a "limited" nuclear war — which he personally doubts could be either limited or won. This is hardly instructive to the electorate.

The fascination with the MX and with new targeting strategies arises from a concern that the Soviet Union's big and accurate new missiles give it a theoretical capability to destroy most American land-based missiles in a surprise attack. Some Soviet military writings do suggest that there are Soviet generals who believe such a first strike could win a war. The theory is that a surprise strike would leave Moscow with such overwhelming nuclear strength as to make America sue for peace rather than risk further devastation of cities in both nations.

President Carter's first, proper response to this theoretical danger was a decision to make some American land-based missiles mobile. They would be immune to surprise attack and remain available for retaliatory strikes. But when it came time to choose a

mobile missile, Mr. Carter picked the MX, to gain the support of the Joint Chiefs for SALT II. The MX was the biggest and best of the foreseeable weapons. It would therefore make the Soviet land-based missiles appear as vulnerable as the American ones.

Such symmetry, however, would actually be less safe and only accelerate the arms race. For while a Soviet first-strike capacity theoretically threatens one-fourth of America's nuclear forces, an American first-strike weapon would threaten three-fourths of present Soviet forces. And with both sides possessing first-strike temptations, their behavior in a crisis could be less certainly restrained than now.

In fact, the Soviet first-strike challenge could be offset in much less dangerous ways. Instead of the MX, America could deploy a smaller missile, like Minuteman or Trident, in a mobile form. That would remove the danger of surprise attack without threatening one against the Soviet Union.

The argument for a very large and potent mobile weapon is simply not persuasive. The United States already has the ability to fight any kind of nuclear war, including any that could be realistically described as "limited." With 10,000 warheads, America could destroy two-thirds of Russia's land-based missiles and every other important military target and still have enough left to destroy every large Soviet city, most of Soviet industry and 75 million people.

With so many warheads, American missiles have to be periodically retargeted to emphasize one or another priority. The danger lies not in aiming at more military targets than cities but in looking to the MX to advance any serious "limited war" strategy. For the MX would not only survive surprise attack and add to America's capacity to initiate such an attack. It would threaten Soviet weapons in a way that will force the Russians to build their own powerful mobile system, thus diminishing the prospects of arms control.

The major party candidates notwithstanding, these are issues worth debating.

BACKGROUND PAPER
ON

NY TIMES EDITORIAL: THE DEFENSE DEBATE, SUCH AS IT IS

Does M-X constitute a first-strike weapon?

Deploying the M-X will not give us a disarming first-strike capability against the Soviet Union, because the Soviets would still have sizeable and powerful strategic forces remaining after an M-X strike. (Similarly, a Soviet capability to destroy our MINUTEMAN force won't give them a disarming first-strike capability against the U.S.)

It is true that silo-based ICBMs will be vulnerable to strategic response of the other side--U.S. silos in the early 80's and then the Soviets' later. To a considerable extent, Soviet ICBMs would be vulnerable to a first-strike in the 80's, even without M-X, because of recent improvements to MINUTEMAN III.

Compelling evidence that M-X is not in fact or by design a first-strike weapon exists in the open press:

e A very significant portion of the \$33.8 billion price tag is consumed by a basing design whose first task is to make M-X survivable, a notion incompatible with a true first-strike weapon.

• We are planning to deploy only 200 missiles--a number far too small to constitute a first-strike weapon. We could have chosen to deploy more; we did not because, in part, to avoid the erroneous perception we were bent on acquiring a first-strike weapon system.

Deployment of M-X will simply accelerate the arms race.

Fundamental to our development of strategic forces is the policy of strategic deterrence: to build our defenses to a level sufficient to deter any rational foreign government from attacking us.

The M-X concept provides the force survivability essential to deterrence without threatening the Soviet deterrent posture. This is accomplished by choosing a large number of shelters (4600) to provide survivability, while limiting the number of missiles (200) to a level insufficient to place the entire Soviet ICBM force at risk. Our M-X decision is consistent with both a serious commitment to arms control, and an equally serious commitment to maintain unambiguous deterrence.

How can we possibly need a large missile in light of the existence of 10,000 warheads?

The very first question we addressed in considering M-X was why is it necessary at all? Why do we need modernization or improvement of our strategic nuclear forces? Today we have 9,000 nuclear warheads in our strategic forces. The 9,000 warhead force is sufficient only if it is available when needed. The relevant issue is not how many warheads we have in our force, it's how many we can count on surviving a surprise attack--how many the Soviets have to take into account as surviving after a surprise attack. We want that number to be large, and we want there to be no uncertainty in the mind of the Soviets that these surviving forces will be large and powerful. So the issue is not the size of the force; the issue is the survivability of the force.

In the past the survivability of our ICBMs, our MINUTEMAN force, was achieved by putting the missiles in vertical silos and surrounding them with concrete and reinforcing steel. Given this hardening and the poor accuracy of Soviet ICBMs, MINUTEMAN could ride out an attack and still be available to provide a counter-strike, therefore deterring a Soviet attack from taking place. This was true until the Soviet Union began tests of a new guidance system on their largest missile, the SS-18.

In December 1977, the Soviets began testing the new guidance system for the SS-18. We followed those tests very carefully, analyzed the data that our intelligence sources collected, and by the summer of 1978 concluded that they had developed a guidance system that allowed the SS-18 to detonate close enough to MINUTEMAN silos to destroy them. From that point on, it was clear that the MINUTEMAN system could not provide the deterrence in the future which it had provided in the past. More generally, we concluded that silos were inadequate, and that any fixed basing was inadequate as a way of protecting our strategic forces.

Why not use a smaller missile, like MINUTEMAN or TRIDENT?

Extensive analyses showed that the total costs of acquiring and operating a survivable, mobile, land-based ICBM system were minimized by use of a large missile. We did look seriously at a possible compromise missile, common or essentially common to SLBM and ICBM. That study indicated we would have to give up too much ICBM capability to realize cost savings. In the final analysis, with SALT II looming very large, we decided to develop the largest missile allowed by that treaty, thus seizing that opportunity rather than foreclosing it by development of a smaller ICBM. Simultaneously, we know that decision would minimize costs of the M-X system.

Non't deployment of M-X be destabilizing in a crisis?

We believe the contrary to be true, largely because we think the Soviets know that M-X does not constitute a disarming first-strike weapon. But there are other reasons for believing that M-X will have a stabilizing effect, reasons derived from anticipating what the likely Soviet responses might be to M-X deployment. By making Soviet silo-based missiles more vulnerable, M-X will deter any Soviet efforts to increase the threat to M-X by expanding their silo-based missile forces.

Finally, to the extent that the capabilities of the M-X worry the Soviets, they can use the time until it is deployed to put increased emphasis on systems that will be more survivable than fixed land-based ICBMs (such as the mobile system suggested in the editorial), or to cooperate with us in negotiating arms control agreements that make silo-based missiles survivable for both sides, or that make deep reductions in nuclear weapons. We would welcome any of these likely responses as stabilizing.

IRAN

Reagan

Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Sept. 9, Reuter -

Republican Presidential candidate Ronald Reagan said today the way to deal with the hostage situation in Iran was to give the Iranian government an ultimatum.

Speaking at a street corner rally here, Mr. Reagan said the U.S. Government should send a private message saying: "We want our people back and we want them back today or the results will be very unpleasant."

Mr. Reagan, who is on a campaign swing through the country's industrial states, did not specify what reprisals he had in mind if the Iranian government did not comply.

He said the Carter Administration "Is responsible for the situation that brought about the taking of the hostages in the first place."

* * *

Mr. Reagan said the United States should have stood by the late Shah before he was forced from power by the revolution led by religious leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

After the Shah was overthrown, the Carter Administration should have evacuated the U.S. Embassy in Teheran or strengthened its guard, he added.

Instead, he charged, Mr. Carter ordered that weapons be taken away from the U.S. Marines guarding the Embassy.

President Carter told a press conference after the embassy was seized that it would have been futile for the Marine Guards to have tried to resist.

Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Street Corner Rally
September 9, 1980

Reagan

In reference to the fall of the Shah of Iran, Reagan vaguely asserted the revolution somehow could have been averted.

"I believe there was a time this revolt (against the Shah's government) could have been halted. I can't tell you exactly how. But I think it could have been done."

San Francisco Chronicle
November 15, 1979

Bush

"Do you know that only recently did Jimmy Carter talk about 53 hostages instead of 50? Three of them are held by the government. They could turn those people loose, take them out to the Tehran Airport and send them home today. And in addition to that, you have these terrorists that they call students, and so I just think that nothing's risk free. You're dealing with people that have total disrespect for international law. And I would say nothing is risk free. And that's a tough decision for the President. But he'll have my support if he goes -- tightens up."

NBC Meet the Press
April 20, 1980

Bush

"But I know enough about it (the Iranian situation) to know that somewhere between sending in the Marines and sitting there doing nothing, as United States of America, is a need. And that's what I'm talking about paramilitary."

NBC Meet the Press
April 20, 1980

Bush

"I've been a severe critic of Carter's weak foreign policy, but this is no time for bipartisan criticism. Potential candidates must act responsibly.

"If you study the hostage situation psychology, the longer they stay alive, the better their chances for freedom.

"When this is all over with and the hostages are free, I will have a clearer perspective and will make a statement at that time. Until then, I support the President."

"We ought to have standby plans, of course, but I assume the President has such plans."

Elgin, IL, Daily Courier
News, December 2, 1979

Bush

"Obviously the United States should act, and act in a definitive way to let tyrants around the world know they can't brutalize American citizens (as in Iran)."

Keene, NH, Sentinel
November 26, 1979

Bush

"You'll hear plenty about it when this crisis (in Iran) is over. You're not dealing with rationality here. I would put the lives of the hostages ahead of your understanding, at this moment, the intricacies of my foreign policy.

"Sometimes you have to resist the temptation to unload and act more responsibly... I'm not the President of the United States. I would forgo political advantage, even if it means you won't vote for me."

UPI release
November 26, 1979

Bush

"By God, if they (American hostages in Iran) get harmed I want to see some action. I don't want us to act like a third class power."

Boston, MA, Globe
November 27, 1979

Carter

"One very immediate and pressing objective that is uppermost on our minds and those of the American people is the release of our hostages in Iran.

"We have no basic quarrel with the nation, the revolution or the people of Iran. The threat to them comes not from American policy but from Soviet actions in the region. We are prepared to work with the government of Iran to develop a new and mutually beneficial relationship.

"But that will not be possible so long as Iran continues to hold Americans hostage, in defiance of the world community and civilized behavior. They must be released unharmed. We have thus far pursued a measured program of peaceful diplomatic and economic steps in an attempt to resolve this issue without resorting to other remedies available to us under international law. This reflects the deep respect of our Nation for the rule of law and for the safety of our people being held, and our belief that a great power bears a responsibility to use its strength in a measured and judicious manner. But our patience is not unlimited and our concern for the well-being of our fellow citizens grows each day."

State of Union Message
January, 1980

September 10, 1980

IRAN

Q: What are you doing about the hostages?

A: There have been a number of recent developments relating to the hostages:

-- Secretary Muskie sent a letter to the new Prime Minister; the Prime Minister commented on the letter in a long speech on September 9.

-- 185 U.S. Representatives sent a letter to the new Iranian Majlis, and they have prepared a response.

-- Most important, Iran seems to be in the final stages of installing an official government for the first time since the=revolution.

-- All of these events have an effect on the internal situation in Iran and on the hostages. It is too early to say whether that effect will be positive.

The new leadership in Iran should be increasingly aware that their policy of holding hostages in defiance of international law and elementary human rights is hurting their country and bringing dishonor on their own revolution. We have no desire to hurt Iran or its people, but we will persevere with our economic sanctions and other efforts until they reach that very simple conclusion.

We are exploring every avenue which may lead to a resolution of this crisis. We will be watching the activities of the new Majlis very carefully as they address this issue. There need be no obstacles to the quick termination of this problem.

Q: Former Ambassador Sullivan has recently leveled a series of charges against your Administration for its handling of Iran policy at the time of the fall of the Shah. Sullivan suggests that Dr. Brzezinski was, in effect, running an independent embassy in Tehran and that conflicting policy views in Washington resulted in the United States having no policy at all at a crucial moment. He says his own views were disregarded and that Dr. Brzezinski favored a coup attempt even after the Iranian military had effectively collapsed. These are very serious charges about your management of U.S. foreign policy in a critical region. How do you respond?

A: There are two things which surprise me about Ambassador Sullivan's recent article:

-- First, I am surprised that a professional diplomat would publish an account of such an important series of events without a careful check of his facts. The article includes a number of serious misstatements and misrepresentation of fact. I do not agree with his account of events and I do not agree with the conclusions he draws from it.

-- Second, and perhaps more surprising, is his decision to publish these highly personal and inflammatory impressions at a time when we are engaged in very sensitive efforts to attempt to free his colleagues who are being held prisoner in Iran. More than anyone else, I would have expected him to understand the danger of unpredictable reactions in Tehran. I do not understand what motivated him to publish these personal reminiscences at this time; I do know that his decision to do so is not helpful in our efforts to free his former colleagues and associates in Tehran.

I believe any further comment would only compound the problem. There will be time for a full discussion of these issues after the hostages are free, but not now.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

NOVEMBER 14, 1979.

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

The President has today acted to block all official Iranian assets in the United States, including deposits in United States banks and their foreign branches and subsidiaries. This order is in response to reports that the Government of Iran is about to withdraw its funds. The purpose of this order is to insure that claims on Iran by the United States and its citizens are provided for in an orderly manner.

The order does not affect accounts of persons other than the Government of Iran, the Central Bank of Iran and other controlled entities. The precise amounts involved cannot be ascertained at this time, but there is no reason for disturbance in the foreign exchange or other markets.

The President is taking this action pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which grants the President authority "to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States."

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PRESS CONFERENCE NO. 53

OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

9:00 P.M. EST
NOVEMBER 28, 1979
WEDNESDAY

The East Room
The White House
Washington, D.C.

THE PRESIDENT: For the last 24 days our nation's concern has been focused on our fellow Americans being held hostage in Iran. We have welcomed some of them home to their families and their friends. But we will not rest nor deviate from our efforts until all have been freed from their imprisonment and their abuse. We hold the Government of Iran fully responsible for the well-being and the safe return of every single person.

I want the American people to understand the situation as much, as possible, but there may be some questions tonight which I cannot answer fully because of my concern for the well-being of the hostages.

First of all, I would like to say that I am proud of this great nation, and I want to thank all Americans for their prayers, their courage, their persistence, their strong support and patience. During these past days our national will, our courage, and our maturity have all been severely tested and history will show that the people of the United States have met every test.

In the days to come our determination may be even more sorely tried but we will continue to defend the security, the honor, and the freedom of Americans everywhere. This nation will never yield to blackmail.

For all Americans our constant concern is the well-being and the safety of our fellow citizens who are being held illegally and irresponsibly hostage in Iran. The actions of Iran have shocked the civilized world.

For a government to applaud mob violence and terrorism, for a government actually to support and in effect participate in the taking and the holding of hostages is unprecedented in human history. This violates not only the most fundamental precepts of international law, but the common ethical and religious heritage of humanity. There is no recognized religious faith on earth which condones kidnapping. There is no recognized religious faith on earth which condones blackmail. There is certainly no religious faith on earth which condones the sustained abuse of innocent people.

We are deeply concerned about the inhuman and degrading conditions imposed on the hostages. From every corner of the world

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OVER

nations and people have voiced their strong revulsion and condemnation of Iran, and have joined us in calling for the release of the hostages.

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Last night a statement of support was released and was issued by the President of the United Nations General Assembly, the Security Council, on behalf of all of its members. We expect a further Security Council meeting on Saturday night, at which more firm and official action may be taken to help in obtaining the release of the American hostages.

Any claims raised by government officials of Iran will ring hollow while they keep innocent people bound, and abused, and threatened. We hope that this exercise of diplomacy and international law will bring a peaceful solution, because a peaceful solution is preferable to the other remedies available to the United States.

At the same time, we pursue such a solution with grim determination. The government of Iran must recognize the gravity of the situation which it has itself created, and the grave consequences which will result if harm comes to any of the hostages.

I want the American people to know, and I want the world to know, that we will persist in our efforts, through every means available, until every single American has been freed. We must also recognize now, as we never have before, that it is our entire nation which is vulnerable, because of our overwhelming and excessive dependence on oil from foreign countries. We have got to accept the fact that this dependence is a direct, physical threat to our national security. And we must join together to fight for our nation's energy freedom.

We know the ways to win this war: more American energy, and the more efficient use of what we have. The United States Congress is now struggling with this extremely important decision. The way to victory is long and difficult, but we have the will, and we have the human and the natural resources of our great nation. However hard it might be to see into the future, one thing tonight is clear: we stand together.

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We stand as a nation unified, a people determined to protect the life and the honor of every American. And we are determined to make America an energy secure nation once again. It is unthinkable that we will allow ourselves to be dominated by any form of over-dependence at home, or any brand of terrorism abroad. We are determined that the freest nation on earth shall protect and enhance its freedom.

I will be glad to answer questions.

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QUESTION: Mr. President, the Ayatollah Khomeini said the other day, and I am using his words, that he doesn't believe you have the guts to use military force. He puts no credibility in our military deterrent. I am wondering how do we get out of this mess in Iran and still retain credibility with our allies and with our adversaries overseas?

THE PRESIDENT: We have the full support of our allies, and in this particular instance we have no adversaries overseas. There is no civilized country on earth which has not condemned the seizure and holding of hostages by Iran. It would not be advisable for me to explore publicly all of the options open to our country. As I said earlier, I am determined to do the best I can through diplomatic means and through peaceful means to insure the safety of our hostages and their release. Other actions which I might decide to take would come in the future after those peaceful means have been exhausted.

But I believe that the growing condemnation of the world community on Iran will have a beneficial effect.

QUESTION: Mr. President, why did you reverse your policy and permit the Shah to come into this country when, one, medical treatment was available elsewhere, two, you had been warned by our Charge that the Americans might be endangered in Tehran and three, the Bazargan government was so shaky that it was questionable whether he could deliver on the promise to protect our embassy, and last of all, in view of the consequences do you regret the decision?

THE PRESIDENT: No, the decision that I made personally and without pressure from anyone to carry out the principles of our country, to provide for the means of giving the Shah necessary medical assistance to save his life, was proper. At the same time we notified the government of Iran. We were assured by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister that our embassy would be protected, and it was protected for several days, in spite of threats from outside.

Then peremptorily, after Khomeini made an aggravating speech to the crowds in the street and withdrew protection from the embassy, it was attacked successfully. The embassy was protected by our people for the length of time possible without help from the host government. No embassy on earth is a fortress that can withstand constant attacks by a mob unless a host government comes to the rescue of the people within the embassy.

But I took the right decision. I have no regrets about

MORE

it nor apologies to make because it did help to save a man's life and it was compatible with the principles of our country.

QUESTION: Mr. President, we appear to be in a rather dangerous period of international tension and volatility, especially in the Islamic world, and it comes at a time when we are about to embark on our quadrennial election campaign, with all that that will bring. Have you given any thought to whether following examples of other national emergencies it may be wise to try to mute the political fall-out of this by trying to bring opponents in and outside of your party into some kind of emergency coalition for this purpose?

THE PRESIDENT: We have attempted to keep the political leaders in our nation informed, both publicly and through other channels. We have given frequent briefings, for instance, on the Hill, both to the members of the Senate and to the House. We have encouraged all of those who have become announced candidates for president to restrain their comments which might be misconstrued overseas and to have a maximum degree of harmony among those who might be spokesmen for our country.

I myself, in order to stay close to the scene here where constantly changing events could be handled by me as President, have eliminated the major portion of political oriented activities.

I don't think the identity of the Islamic world is a factor. We have the deepest respect and reverence for Islam and for all those who share the Moslem faith. I might say that so far as I know, all of the Islamic nations have joined us in condemning the activities and the actions of the government of Iran. So I don't think religious divisions are a factor here at all.

But I will have to continue to restrict my own political activities and call on those who might be opposing me in the future for president to support my position as President and to provide unity for our country and for our nation in the eyes of those who might be looking for some sign of weakness or division in order to perpetuate their abuse of our hostages.

MORE

QUESTION: What can the U. S. do now, what can it do to prevent future incidents of the nature of Iran? How can you satisfy the public demand to end such embarrassment?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, this is an unprecedented and unique occurrence. Down through history, we have had times when some of our people were captured by terrorists or who were abused, and they have obviously been instances of international kidnapping which occurred for the discomfort of a people or a Government.

So far as I know, this is the first time that such an activity has been encouraged by and supported by the Government itself. And, I don't anticipate this kind of thing recurring.

We have taken steps already in view of the disturbances in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf regions to guard our people more closely, to provide them with a higher degree of security, and to make arrangements with the host Government to provide assistance if it is needed in the fastest possible way.

Many other nations have reduced severely the number of people overseas. I think that one of the points that should be made is that a year ago, we had 70,000 Americans in Iran. Seventy thousand. There were literally thousands of people who were killed in the Iranian Revolution, from all nations.

We were able to extract Americans from Iran safely. It was a superb demonstration of cooperation and good conduct on the part of the State Department and other American officials. So, there will be disturbances in the future, but I think we are well protected as we possibly can be without withdrawing into a shell from protecting American interests in nations overseas.

My own experience, so far, has been that the leaders of Nations have recommitted themselves to provide security for Embassies of all countries. I think we have learned a lesson from this instance. But, because it is so unique, in the high degree of irresponsibility, of the Iranian Government leaders, I don't believe that we will see another reoccurrence of it any time soon.

QUESTION: Mr. President, Former Secretary Kissinger has criticized your administration in handling the situation in Iran. He has suggested and that it came about because, partly because of the perceived weakness in American policy and that you have further damaged America's image as a result.

How do you respond?

THE PRESIDENT: I would rather not respond. There is no reason for me to get into a public debate at this time with former Secretary Kissinger about who is, or who is not responsible for the events that took place in Iran. Obviously, what has occurred cannot have been predicted.

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And, for 30 years, our country has had a relationship with a fairly stable Government there. The changes took place very rapidly. So far as I know, no one on this earth predicted them.

And, I think it is not becoming at this moment, and not conducive to better American understanding to get involved in answering allegations that I or someone else may have been culpable and may have caused a further aggravation of a very difficult situation.

QUESTION: Mr. President, what role did the former Secretary play in your decision to permit the shah to enter the country?

THE PRESIDENT: None. I did not hear at all from the former Secretary Kissinger, nor did he contact Secretary Vance at any time during the days when we were deciding that the shah should come in the United States for medical care to save his life. In previous weeks and months, since the shah was deposed, Secretary Kissinger and many others let it be known that they thought that we should provide a haven for the shah. But Secretary Kissinger played no role in my decision to permit the shah to come in for medical treatment.

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QUESTION: Speaking of the Shah, if he is well enough to travel, would you like him to leave the country?

THE PRESIDENT: That is a decision to be made by the Shah, and by his medical advisors. When he decided to come to our country, with my permission, I was informed then, and I have been informed since, that as soon as his medical treatment was successfully completed, that his intention was to leave. I have not encouraged him to leave; he was free to come here for medical treatment, and he will leave on his own volition.

QUESTION: Yes, I would like to follow up Mr. Schorr's question. The consequences of the crisis in Iran is drifting the United States into almost a cold war with the Islamic countries. Watching TV news for 25 days, Americans soon will believe the whole Moslem world is hating them. Moreover, they are not told that the Shiites are very minor minority among the population of the Islamic world, because the majority is Sunni. Don't you think you get any help from any Islamic countries, and what will your policy be toward Islamic countries under these circumstances?

THE PRESIDENT: The premise of your question is completely wrong. We are not approaching any sort of cold war with the Islamic countries. So far as I know, every Islamic country has condemned Iran for its capture of our hostages, and has been very supportive.

This includes Moslem nations which, in the past, have not been close friends of ours: Iraq, Libya, and others. So I don't see this as a confrontation at all between our nation and the Islamic world. It is certainly not part of the Islamic faith to condone, as I said earlier, blackmail or the persecution or harm of innocent people; or kidnapping or terrorism.

So I think that we have a very good relationship with the people and the governments of the Islamic world, and I don't think it has deteriorated in this instance. In some ways we have been drawn closer to these people, because they see what has occurred in Iran as something of a disgrace for their own religious faith, and they don't see this as typical of what Moslems believe.

I might add also, that this is not typical of the Shiite faith either. It is the misguided actions of a few people in Iran who are burning with hatred and a desire for revenge, completely contrary to the teachings of the Moslem faith.

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QUESTION: Mr. President, there is a feeling of hostility throughout the country towards Iran, because of the hostages. Senator Long said that the taking of our embassy in Iran, in his words, is an act of war. There are rumors, since denied, that our Navy has been called up for service. I ask you, as our Commander in Chief: is war possible, is war thinkable?

THE PRESIDENT: It would be a mistake for the people of our country to have aroused within them hatred toward anyone; not against the people of Iran, and certainly not against Iranians who may be in our country as our guests. We certainly do not want to be guilty of the same violation of human decency and basic human principles that have proven so embarrassing to many of the Iranian citizens themselves.

We obviously prefer to see our hostages protected and released completely through peaceful means. That is my deepest commitment, and that will be my goal. The United States has other options available to it which will be considered, depending upon the circumstances. But I think it would not be well-advised for me to speak of those specifically tonight.

QUESTION: Mr. President, we have had 55,000 Iranian students in this country. We have been very good to them, very hospitable. Even the new Finance Minister of Saudi Arabia was a student who once demonstrated in Washington against law and order. Shouldn't we be very careful in letting any of these students come in here? Shouldn't we screen them in the future, and make them agree that they will not demonstrate?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, it is very difficult for an Iranian citizen or a student to get a visa at the American embassy in Iran at this time. (Laughter.) And I think the influx of Iranians to our country now would be minimal.

I am determined to enforce the law in regard to Iranian students. Some of them have violated the law; they are now being screened, they are being assessed in their commitment and the legality of their presence here. We have already finished this procedure with more than 22,000. About 17,000 have proven to be here completely legally, and are indeed full-time students. Among the other 5,000, about several hundred have already departed. Others are now having to prove that, contrary to the earliest evidence, they do indeed have a right to be in our country. If they are here illegally, they will be expelled. There is one exception to that rule: if a citizen of Iran can prove that if he or she returned to Iran that they would be executed or abused because of their political beliefs, they can seek asylum here. And if that asylum in our judgment is justified, we will provide it for them. But this procedure is going forward in accordance with American law, in accordance with American fairness, in accordance with the full principles of the United States Constitution.

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QUESTION: Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, sir?

QUESTION: Can this crisis go on indefinitely or ought the Ayatollah Khomeini to understand that at some point the American people may demand and other nations may expect that you move forward to resolve it by whatever means you find necessary?

THE PRESIDENT: It would not be possible or even advisable for me to set a deadline about when or if I would take certain action in the future. This is an ever-present consideration on my mind. I am carrying out all of the duties that normally fall on a President's shoulder, which are adequate, but I never forget one moment that I am awake about the hostages whose lives and whose safety depend on me, and I am pursuing every possible avenue to have the hostages released.

Any excessive threats or any excessive belief among the Iranians that they will be severely damaged by military action as long as these negotiations are proceeding and as long as legalities can be followed, might cause the death of the hostages which we are committed to avoid. So that is one of the questions that I cannot answer, to set down a certain deadline beyond which we would take extra action that might result in the harm or the death of the hostages.

We are proceeding, I guarantee you, in every possible way, every possible moment, to get the hostages freed and at the same time protect the honor and the integrity and the basic principles of our country. That is all I can do. But I am doing it to the best of my ability and I believe we will be successful.

QUESTION: Mr. President, many Americans view the Iranian situation as one in a succession of events that proves that this country's power is declining. How can you assure Americans tonight that our power is not declining abroad and how are you reassessing priorities for the eighties in terms of foreign policy?

THE PRESIDENT: The United States has neither the ability nor the will to dominate the world, to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations, to impose our will on other people whom we desire to be free, to make their own decisions. This is not part of the commitment of the United States.

Our country is the strongest on earth. We are the strongest militarily, politically, economically, and I think we are the strongest morally and ethically. Our country has made great strides, even since I have been in office. I have tried to correct some of the defects that did exist. We have strengthened the military alliances of our country, for instance. NATO now has a new spirit, a new confidence, a new cohesion, improving its military capabilities, much more able to withstand any threat from the east, from the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact, than it was before.

We have espoused again the principles that unite Americans and make us admired throughout the world, raising the banner of human rights. We are going to keep it high. We have opened up avenues of communication, understanding, trade with people that formerly were our enemies or excluded us -- several nations in Africa, the vast people and the vast country of the People's Republic of China

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In doing so we have not alienated any of our previous friends. I think our country is strong within itself. There is not an embarrassment now about our government which did exist in a few instances in years gone by. So I don't see at all that our country has become weak. We are strong and we are getting stronger, not weaker.

But if anybody thinks that we can dominate other people with our strength, military or political strength or economic strength, they are wrong. That is not the purpose of our country.

Our inner strength, our confidence in ourselves, I think, is completely adequate. I believe that the unity that the American people have shown in this instance, their patience, is not at all a sign of weakness. It is a sign of sure strength.

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QUESTION: Mr. President, serious charges have been placed against the shah concerning the repression of his own people and the misappropriation of his nation's funds. Is there an appropriate vehicle to investigate those charges and do you foresee a time when you would direct your administration to assist in that investigation?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know of any international forum within which charges have ever been brought against a deposed leader who has left his country. There have been instances of changing governments down through the centuries in history and I don't know of any instance where such a leader who left his country after his government fell has been tried in an international court or in an international forum. This is a matter that can be pursued. It should be pursued under international law, and if there is a claim against the shah's financial holdings there is nothing to prevent other parties from going into the courts in accordance with a law of a nation or internationally and seeking a redress of grievances which they claim.

But as I said earlier, I don't think there is any forum that will listen to the Iranians make any sort of claim, justified or not, as long as they hold against their will and abuse the hostages in complete contravention to every international law and every precept or every commitment or principle of humankind.

MR. JACKSON (AP): Thank you, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much.

END

(AT 9:30 P.M. EST)

DECEMBER 5, 1979

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT
BY
THE VICE PRESIDENT

The Briefing Room

(12:01 P.M. EST)

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Over the past several weeks we have been hearing a drumfire of propaganda out of Tehran, some of it from people calling themselves students, some of it from the government-controlled radio and television in Iran, and some of it from various officials or people in authority. The message is very clear. It says over and over that the world and the American people should ignore the hostages, forget about the innocent people bound hand and foot, overlook the continued outrage to law and standards of human behavior. We are told to forget all that and focus on the hatred of one man.

We are not going to forget and the American people are not going to get their priorities confused. How are our hostages being treated? The facts are there for all to see, and the simple fact is that 50 human beings are being held in inhuman conditions, contrary to all civilized standards, in order to prove a political point. They are not permitted regular visitors. They are isolated and not allowed to speak except to their captors. As far as we know, the hostages have not been allowed to receive mail or messages. There has never been a systematic accounting of the numbers and welfare of the hostages.

The so-called "students" have not permitted any outside observers even to see these people for 10 days. They are refusing to let international organizations such as the Red Cross into the compound. They refuse visits by religious organizations. They refuse representatives of neutral states. Even prisoners of war are guaranteed certain standards of human treatment. But these standards are being dragged in the dirt every day by a group of kidnapers with the acquiescence of the government.

We are hearing daily propaganda about the alleged crimes of our people in Tehran, most of whom volunteered to serve their country at a difficult and dangerous time. We are not and will not respond to that propaganda. I would note that one of those being held as a so-called "spy" in Tehran is in fact a private American citizen who simply happened to be visiting the Embassy on business at the time of the attack on November 4. It was many days before we even learned, indirectly, that he was being held. That man, like the rest, has now been held for 31 days, tied up, denied contact with his family, denied exercise, denied access even to the comfort of religion.

We hear a great deal about the crimes of the shah, but that is not the issue. The issue which disturbs the American people is that 50 of our fellow citizens are being abused in violation of international

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(OVER)

law. These are our brothers and sisters.

Yesterday the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution which called as the first most important priority, as it should, for the release of the American hostages. That is the issue. It is the only issue, and we are not going to forget they must be set free.

END

(AT 12:05 P.M. EST)

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Ever since Iranian terrorists imprisoned American embassy personnel in Tehran early in November, these 50 men and women -- their safety, their health and their future -- have been our central concern. We have made every effort to obtain their release on honorable, peaceful and humanitarian terms, but the Iranians have refused to release them or to improve the conditions under which they are being held captive.

The events of the last few days have revealed a new and significant dimension of this matter. The militants controlling the embassy have stated they are willing to turn the hostages over to the Government of Iran, but the Government has refused to take custody of them. This lays bare the full responsibility of the Ayatollah Khomeini and the Revolutionary Council for the continued illegal and outrageous holding of the innocent hostages. The Iranian Government itself can no longer escape responsibility by hiding behind the militants at the embassy.

It must be made clear that the failure to release the hostages will involve increasingly heavy costs to Iran and its interests. I have today ordered the following steps:

- (1) The United States is breaking diplomatic relations with Iran. The Secretary of State has informed the Government of Iran that its embassy and consulates in the United States are to be closed immediately. The Iranian diplomatic and consular personnel have been declared persona non grata and must leave the country by midnight tomorrow.
- (2) The Secretary of the Treasury will immediately put into effect official sanctions prohibiting exports from the U.S. to Iran in accordance with the sanctions approved by ten members of the United Nations Security Council on January 13, in the resolution which was vetoed by the Soviet Union. Although shipment of food and medicine were not included in the U.N. Security Council vote, it is expected that exports of even these items to Iran will be minimal or non-existent.
- (3) The Secretary of the Treasury will make a formal inventory of the assets of the Iranian Government which were frozen by my previous order, and of the outstanding claims of American citizens and corporations against the Government of Iran. This accounting will aid in designing a claims program against Iran for the hostages, their families and other U.S. claimants. We are preparing legislation to facilitate processing and paying these claims.
- (4) The Secretary of State and the Attorney General will invalidate all visas issued to Iranian citizens for future entry into the United States effective today. We will not reissue visas or

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issue new visas except for compelling and proven humanitarian reasons or where the national interest requires. This directive will be interpreted very strictly.

The United States has acted with exceptional patience and restraint in this crisis. We have supported Secretary General Waldheim's activities under the U.N. Security Council mandate to work for a peaceful solution. We will continue to consult with our allies and other friendly governments on the steps we are taking and on additional measures which may be required.

I am committed to resolving this crisis. I am committed to the safe return of the hostages and the preservation of our national honor. The hostages and their families and all of us in America have lived with the reality and the anguish of their captivity for five months.

The steps I have ordered today are those that are necessary now. Other action may be necessary if these steps do not produce the prompt release of the hostages.

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OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
ON
HOSTAGE RESCUE ATTEMPT

The Oval Office

(7:00 A.M. EST)

THE PRESIDENT: Late yesterday, I cancelled a carefully planned operation which was underway in Iran to position our rescue team for later withdrawal of American hostages who have been held captive there since November 4th.

Equipment failure in the rescue helicopters made it necessary to end the mission. As our team was withdrawing, after my order to do so, two of our American aircraft collided on the ground following a refueling operation in a remote desert location in Iran. Other information about this rescue mission will be made available to the American people when it is appropriate to do so.

There was no fighting; there was no combat. But to my deep regret, eight of the crewmen of the two aircraft which collided were killed, and several other Americans were hurt in the accident.

Our people were immediately airlifted from Iran. Those who were injured have gotten medical treatment and all of them are expected to recover.

No knowledge of this operation by any Iranian officials or authorities was evident to us until several hours after all Americans were withdrawn from Iran.

Our rescue team knew, and I knew, that the operation was certain to be difficult and it was certain to be dangerous. We were all convinced that if and when the rescue operation had been commenced that it had an excellent chance of success. They were all volunteers; they were all highly trained. I met with their leaders before they went on this operation. They knew then what hopes of mine and of all Americans they carried with them.

To the families of those who died and who were wounded, I want to express the admiration I feel for the courage of their loved ones and the sorrow that I feel personally for their sacrifice.

The mission on which they were embarked was a humanitarian mission. It was not directed against Iran; it was not directed against the people of Iran. It was not undertaken with any feeling of hostility toward Iran or its people. It has caused no Iranian casualties.

Planning for this rescue effort began shortly after our embassy was seized. But, for a number of reasons, I waited until now to put those rescue plans into effect. To be feasible, this complex operation had to be the product of intensive planning and intensive training and repeated rehearsal.

However, a resolution of this crisis through negotiations and with voluntary action on the part of the Iranian officials was obviously then, has been and will be preferable.

This rescue attempt had to await my judgment that the Iranian authorities could not or would not resolve this crisis on their own initiative. With the steady unraveling of authority in Iran and the mounting dangers that were posed to the safety of the hostages themselves and the growing realization that their early release was highly unlikely, I made a decision to commence the rescue operations plans.

This attempt became a necessity and a duty. The readiness of our team to undertake the rescue made it completely practicable. Accordingly, I made the decision to set our long developed plans into operation. I ordered this rescue mission prepared in order to safeguard American lives, to protect America's national interest and to reduce the tensions in the world that have been caused among many nations as this crisis has continued. It was my decision to attempt the rescue operation. It was my decision to cancel it when problems developed in the placement of our rescue team for a future rescue operation. The responsibility is fully my own.

In the aftermath of the attempt, we continue to hold the government of Iran responsible for the safety and for the early release of the American hostages who have been held so long.

The United States remains determined to bring about their safe release at the earliest date possible. As President, I know that our entire nation feels the deep gratitude I feel for the brave men who were prepared to rescue their fellow Americans from captivity. And, as President, I also know that the nation shares not only my disappointment that the rescue effort could not be mounted because of mechanical difficulties, but also my determination to persevere and to bring all of our hostages home to freedom.

We have been disappointed before. We will not give up in our efforts. Throughout this extraordinarily difficult period, we have pursued and will continue to pursue every possible avenue to secure the release of the hostages. In these efforts, the support of the American people and of our friends throughout the world has been a most crucial element. That support of other nations is even more important now. We will seek to continue, along with other nations and with the officials of Iran, a prompt resolution of the crisis without any loss of life and through peaceful and diplomatic means.

Thank you very much.

END

(7:07 A.M. EST)

MIDDLE EAST

Reagan

-It is questionable whether under Reagan the Camp David accords would have happened, or whether they would have much of a future.

"...I would not like to see...the United States try to impose a settlement on the Middle East problems. I think we should stand ready to help wherever we can be of help, and whenever, in both the factions there, in arriving at a peaceful settlement -- but we should not, as the great power, go in and attempt to dictate or impose the settlements."

Clifford Evans Interview
RKO General Broadcasting
April 10, 1980

In a related incident, Reagan denied that he had promised Egyptian Ambassador Ashraf Ghorbal that, if elected, he would seek a "comprehensive peace settlement" as Ambassador Ghorbal claimed. (Washington Star, June 18, 1980)

Bush

"The Palestinian question is best resolved by progress in that area without the U.S. dictating or indicating what it needs to be. The U.S. should keep close relations with Jordan. It is in our interests to do so. We should improve relations with the moderate Arab countries, while keeping a commitment to Israel, because my perception is that the Arab countries in the Gulf area are much more concerned about our lack of commitment and our lack of credibility in foreign policy overall...They are much more concerned about that than the Begin-Sadat accords, which they don't support. To be honest with you, I was as skeptical as the devil as to whether Carter could get anything out of the Begin-Sadat thing in the first place. I saw that happen, so I'm not about to say this thing has totally broken down. The U.S. has a role as a catalyst..."

New York, NY, Village Voice
December 17, 1979

Bush

"I believe in keeping our commitments with Israel. I would argue with Carter about pulling back from those commitments.

"We can't be in the position of trading off the security of an ally in the hopes of economic advantage during our energy crisis.

"We don't need troops in the Middle East but we need to inject naval power and we need to restore the Naval budget which Carter cut."

Elgin, IL, Daily Courier News
December 2, 1979

Bush

"We must not appear to trade off a commitment to an ally for economic gain, or, in this instance the price of oil. The appearance of that transcends Middle East politics and gets into my whole argument with Carter foreign policy; that we don't keep commitments. We are pulling back. We are vacillating."

ABC Issues and Answers
October 21, 1979

Reagan Bush Committee

901 South Highland Street, Arlington, Virginia 22204 (703) 685-2400

NEWS RELEASE

EMBARGOED UNTIL:

Delivery on:
September 3, 1980
8:00 p.m. EDT

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or
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ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE RONALD REAGAN
B'NAI B'RITH FORUM
WASHINGTON, D.C.
SEPTEMBER 3, 1980

I know it will come as no surprise to you that I have chosen to speak to you tonight about the State of Israel, its importance to our own nation and world peace.

But in a sense when I speak of Israel, I speak as well of other concerns of B'nai B'rith and of the entire Jewish community in the United States. Israel is not only a nation--it is a symbol. During my campaign I have spoken of the values of family, work, neighborhood, peace and freedom. I made a commitment to it that those values would be at the heart of policy-making in a Reagan Administration. Israel symbolizes those values. What is Israel if not the creation of families, working together to build a place to live and work and prosper in peace and freedom?

In defending Israel's right to exist, we defend the very values upon which our nation is built.

The long agony of Jews in the Soviet Union is, of course, never far from our minds and hearts. All these suffering people ask is that their families get the chance to work where they

choose, in freedom and peace. They will not be forgotten by a Reagan Administration.

- But, I must tell you this:

No policy, no matter how heartfelt, no matter how deeply rooted in the humanitarian vision we share, can succeed if the United States of America continues its descent into economic impotence and despair.

Neither the survival of Israel nor the ability of the United States to bring pressure to bear on the situation of dissidents against tyranny can become realistic policy choices if our American economy continues to deteriorate under the Carter policies of high unemployment, taxes and inflation.

The rhetoric of compassion and concern becomes just that, mere words, if not supported by the vision--and reality--of economic growth. The present Administration does not seem to realize this. It seems to believe that if the right kind of words are chosen and repeated often enough, all will be well. Can those who share our humanitarian concerns ignore the connection between economic policy, national strength and the ability to do the work of friendship and justice and peace in our own nation and world?

The theme of this convention, "A Covenant with Tomorrow," speaks directly to the question of American interests and the well-being of Israel. There is no covenant with the future which is not firmly rooted in our covenant with the past. Since the

rebirth of the State of Israel, there has been an iron-clad bond between that democracy and this one.

That bond is a moral imperative. But the history of relations between states demonstrates that while morality is most frequently given as a motive for actions, the true and abiding motive is self-interest. Well, the touchstone of our relationship with Israel is that a secure, strong Israel is in America's self-interest. Israel is a major strategic asset to America.

Israel is not a client, but a very reliable friend, which is not something that can always be said of the United States today under the Carter Administration.

While we have since 1948 clung to the argument of a moral imperative to explain our commitment to Israel, no Administration has ever deluded itself that Israel was not of permanent strategic importance to America. Until, that is, the Carter Administration which has violated this covenant with the past. Can we now have confidence it will honor a covenant with tomorrow?

The interests of all the world are served by peace and stability in the Middle East. To weaken Israel is to destabilize the Middle East and risk the peace of the world, for the road to world peace runs through the Middle East.

How do we travel that road?

We cannot positively influence events at the perimeters of our power if power--including economic power--at the center is diminished.

The conduct of this nation's foreign policy in the last four years has been marked by inconsistency and incompetence.

We must have a principled, consistent foreign policy which our people can support, our friends understand, and our adversaries respect. Our policies must be based upon close consultation with our allies.

We require the defensive capability necessary to ensure the credibility of our foreign policy, and the security of our allies and ourselves. There can be no security for one without the other.

Today, under Jimmy Carter, our defensive capability has been so seriously eroded as to constitute not a deterrent but a temptation.

This is not a campaign issue, it is a matter of grave national concern; indeed so grave that the President considers it a liability to his personal political fortunes. He has tried to give the appearance of responding to it. But the half-hearted measures he proposes are clearly inadequate to the task.

We must restore the vital margin of safety which this Administration has allowed to erode, maintaining a defense capability our adversaries will view as credible and that our allies can rely upon.

As an ally of the United States, Israel must have the means to remain strong and secure. Over the years, the United States has provided economic and defense assistance, and a Reagan Administration will maintain this traditional commitment.

In 1976, Candidate Jimmy Carter came before this convention and said: "I have called for closer ties with our traditional allies, and stronger ties with the State of Israel. I have stressed " he said, "the necessity for a strong defense--tough and muscular, and adequate to maintain freedom under any conceivable circumstances."

One wonders, did the candidate listen to his own call? Today we have fewer real allies and, among those, we speak with diminished authority. Our relations with Israel are marked by doubt and distrust. Israel today is in grave danger, and so is freedom itself.

In 1976, Jimmy Carter declared that he would seek what he called a "comprehensive settlement" in the Middle East. What this might mean for Israel and how this might be achieved were questions neither asked nor answered.

The comprehensive agreement which Mr. Carter sought required, first, a reconvening of the Geneva Conference. Israel was amenable to this step. Her adversaries agreed conditionally. But, the conditions were that the Palestine Liberation Organization be represented and that Israel effectively agree in advance of negotiation to withdraw to the pre-1967 borders, which were in fact armistice lines resulting from the first effort to destroy the State of Israel. Israel rightly refused these conditions and was promptly accused of intransigence. Can we believe that Mr. Carter is not still in favor of dealing with the P.L.O. and desirous of forcing the terms of a settlement?

Mr. Carter invited the Soviet Union to join him in his effort to force Israel to accept the mockery of negotiations in Geneva. Before that, it had required a major effort to keep the Soviets out of the Middle East peace process. In October, 1977, Mr. Carter invited them back in free of charge, and they graciously accepted. The Carter Administration presented as a major achievement the conclusion of a joint Soviet-American accord which would have given the Russians a stranglehold on negotiations, as well as a convenient calling card for inserting themselves more deeply into the Middle East.

This seriously disturbed President Sadat. The President of Egypt did not share Mr. Carter's appreciation of the Soviets, and he came to the conclusion which other world leaders, including Mr. Brezhnev, have now reached: Mr. Carter is incapable of distinguishing between his own short-term political interests, and the nation's long-term foreign policy interests. Mr. Carter professed not to understand what all the fuss was about.

The result was that the United States Government, for the first time in the history of the rebirth of Israel, found itself on the outside looking in. President Sadat made his courageous trip to Jerusalem at the invitation of Prime Minister Begin, and a bilateral peace process began. Without, let me re-emphasize, the participation of Mr. Carter. The quick foreign policy success that Carter had hoped to achieve turned instead into another major foreign policy blunder.

What we do or fail to do in the Middle East is of vital importance not only to the peoples of the region, but also to the security of our country, our Atlantic and Pacific allies, Africa, China, and the Asian subcontinent.

Because of the weak and confused leadership of Jimmy Carter, we are approaching a flashpoint in this tragic process, with Soviet power now deployed in a manner which directly threatens Iran, the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea; with Soviet forces and proxy forces building up again in the region; with Soviet fleets and air bases emplaced along the sea lanes on which we and our Allies and the entire free world depend.

In spite of this I am confident that if we act with vigor, vision and practical good sense, we can peacefully blunt this Soviet thrust. We can rely upon responsible Arab leaders in time to learn what Anwar Sadat learned, which is that no people can long endure the cost of Soviet patronage.

How we deal with Israel and her neighbors in this period will determine whether we rebuild the peace process or whether we continue to drift. But let it be clear that the cornerstone of our effort and of our interest is a secure Israel, and our mutual objective is peace.

While we can help the nations of that area move toward peace we should not try to force a settlement upon them.

Our diplomacy must be sensitive to the legitimate concerns all in the area. Before a negotiated peace can ever hope to

command the loyalty of the whole region, it must be acceptable Israelis and Arabs alike.

Most important, we must rebuild our lost reputation for trustworthiness. We must again become a nation that can be relied upon to live up to its commitments.

In 1976, Candidate Jimmy Carter said: "I am concerned with the way in which our country, as well as the Soviet Union, Britain and France have poured arms into certain Arab countries--five or six times more than Israel receives."

But it was Mr. Carter who agreed to sell sixty F-15 fighters to Saudi Arabia. To get the Congress to go along, he assured these aircraft would not have certain offensive capabilities. Now, the Secretary of Defense tells us he cannot say whether that commitment to Congress will be honored.

It was Mr. Carter who agreed to sell one hundred main battle tanks to Jordan.

It was Mr. Carter who agreed to provide U.S. licensed turbine engines for Iraqi warships.

Meanwhile, Israel is being increasingly isolated by international terrorism and by U.N. resolutions designed to undermine Israel's position in the world while Carter stands by and watches.

I was appalled to see the Carter Administration abstain from voting on, rather than veto, the Resolution passed by the United Nations Security Council two weeks ago, totally disregarding the Democratic Platform promises of 1976 and 1980. As I stated then, that Resolution not only undermines progress toward peace by

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putting the United Nations on record against Israel and on one side of the sensitive issue of the status of Jerusalem; it also presumes to order other nations--including our Dutch ally--to move their embassies from Jerusalem.

I believe this sorry episode sheds some light on an earlier action by Jimmy Carter concerning another U.N. resolution, voted on in March this year. On March 1st, the Carter Administration failed to veto a mischievous U.N. resolution condemning Israel's presence in Jerusalem, calling it an "occupation." That was the position of the Carter Administration on Saturday. Two days later, on a Monday, reacting to the public outcry, Jimmy Carter put the blame for this outrage on his Secretary of State and reversed the position of the Administration.

The man who asks "trust me," zigzags and flip-flops in ever more rapid gyrations, trying to court favor with everyone: Israel, the P.L.O., the voting bloc in the United Nations and the voters at home. On March 1st, it took the Carter Administration three days to switch positions. On August 20th, it took only three minutes. Secretary of State Muskie condemned the U.N. Resolution on Jerusalem in a long speech that was for the voters in this country. Minutes later, he abstained instead of vetoing the U.N. Resolution. That was for the P.L.O. and their friends.

This is the Carter record on the Middle East. Arab leaders are persuaded that we don't say what we mean. Israel is persuaded that we don't mean what we say. How do we build productive relations with either side on such a basis?

Before we can act with authority abroad, we have to demonstrate our ability to make domestic policy without asking permission of other governments.

Mr. Carter sent an emissary to Saudi Arabia to ask for permission to store petroleum here in our own country--a strategic reserve vital to our national security and long demanded by Congress. The Saudis, predictably, said no. Mr. Carter halted the stockpiling.

Can we have relations with our friends in the Arab world if those relations are built on contempt for us?

Clear away the debris of the past four years, and the following issues remain to test the good faith of the Arab nation and of Israel, and to challenge our national will and diplomatic skill in helping them to shape a peace.

There is the unresolved question of territorial rights resulting from the 1967 war.

There is the status of Jerusalem which is part of the first question.

There is the matter of refugees.

There is the matter of the P.L.O., which I consider distinct from the matter of the refugees.

The question of territory, putting aside Jerusalem for the moment, must still be decided in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. We will tolerate no effort to supersede those Resolutions. We must weigh the future utility of the Camp David accords against that position.

There are basic ambiguities in the documents Camp David produced, both in the links between the Israeli-Egyptian peace, and in the provisions for an autonomous regime in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. These ambiguities have now brought negotiations to a dangerous impasse.

Let us remember that an autonomous Palestinian Arab regime for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was an Israeli proposal--a major concession on Israel's part in the interest of progress toward peace.

Negotiations between Israel and Jordan could result in long and creative steps toward resolving these problems. Israel and Jordan are the two Palestinian states envisioned and authorized by the United Nations. Jordan is now recognized as sovereign in some 80 percent of the old territory of Palestine. Israel and Jordan are the parties primarily authorized to settle the future of the unallocated territories, in accordance with the principles of the Mandate and the provisions of Resolutions 242 and 338.

Thus, the autonomy plan called for in the Camp David Agreements must be interpreted in accordance with the two Security Council Resolutions, which remain the decisive and authoritative rules governing the situation. The Camp David Agreements cannot and should not lead to fundamental changes in the security position, or to the withdrawals of Israeli troops, until Jordan and other neighbors make peace.

Jerusalem has been a source of man's spiritual inspiration since King David founded it. Its centrality to Jewish life is known to all.

Now it exists as a shared trust. The holy places of all faiths are protected and open to all. More than this, each is under the care and control of representatives of the respective faiths. Unlike the days prior to 1967, Jerusalem is now and will continue to be one city, undivided, with continuing free access for all. That is why I disagree with the cynical actions of the Carter Administration in pledging to preserve the status of Jerusalem in its party platform and its undercutting Israel and Jerusalem by abstaining on a key U.N. vote. I believe the problem of Jerusalem can be solved by men of good will as part of a permanent settlement. The immediate problem is to make it easier for men of good will to come to the peace table.

President Carter refuses to brand the P.L.O. as a terrorist organization.

I have no hesitation in doing so.

We live in a world in which any band of thugs clever enough to get the word "liberation" into its name can thereupon murder school children and have its deeds considered glamorous and glorious. Terrorists are not guerrillas, or commandos, or freedom-fighters or anything else. They are terrorists and they should be identified as such. If others wish to deal with them, establish diplomatic relations with them, let it be on their heads. And let them be willing to pay the price of appeasement.

The P.L.O. is said to represent the Palestinian refugees. It represents no one but the leaders who established it as a means of organizing aggression against Israel. The P.L.O. is kept under tight control in every state in the area except Lebanon, which it has effectively destroyed. As for those it purports to represent when any Palestinian breathes a word about peace to Israel, he is an immediate target for assassination. The P.L.O. has murdered more Palestinians than it has Israelis.

This nation made an agreement with Israel in 1975 concerning its relations with the P.L.O.

This Administration has violated that agreement.

We are concerned not only with whether the P.L.O. renounces its charter calling for the destruction of Israel, we are equally concerned with whether it is truly representative of the Palestinian people. If we can be satisfied on both counts, then we will not be dealing with the P.L.O. as we know it, but a quite different organization, one truly representative of those Arab Palestinians dedicated to peace and not to the establishment of a Soviet satellite in the heart of the Middle East.

Finally, the question of Arab Palestinian refugees.

My analysis of this tragic situation begins with the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, May 14, 1948. Let me read the relevant paragraph:

"We appeal--in the very midst of the onslaught launched against us now for months--to the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel to preserve peace and to participate with us in the

upbuilding of the State on the basis of full and equal citizenship and due representation in all its provisional and permanent institutions."

Tragically, this appeal was rejected. People left their land and their homes confident Israel would be destroyed in a matter of days and they could return. Israel was not destroyed and the refugee problem is with us today.

One solution to this refugee problem could be assimilation in Jordan, designated by the U.N. as the Arab Palestinian state.

In the final analysis, this or some other solution must be found as part of a peace settlement. The Psalms speak to our concerns, for they encompass all that we strive for. They are a vision of our ideals, of the goal to which we strive with constancy, dedication and faith. They embrace our hopes for a just, lasting peace in the Middle East and our hopes that the works of justice and mercy be done at home:

...May our garner be full,
affording every kind of store;...
May there be no breach in the walls,
no exile, no outcry in our streets.
Happy the people for whom things are thus;

It is given to us to see that this vision is never lost, its message never forgotten, that the work of peace and justice and freedom goes on, inspired by our values, guided by our faith and made permanent by our commitment.

Harris joined the Community Services Administration in 1977 as Special Assistant to the Director and assumed his current position in August 1977.

Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission

Nomination of Dennis Dale Clark To Be a Member. September 4, 1980

The President today announced that he will nominate Dennis Dale Clark, of Greenbelt, Md., to be a member of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission. He would replace Jerome R. Waldie, who has resigned, and he will be nominated for an additional term expiring in 1986. Clark has been General Counsel of this Commission since 1979.

He was born December 31, 1944, in Detroit, Mich. He received a B.A. from Ohio Wesleyan University in 1967 and a J.D. from University of Michigan Law School in 1970.

From 1970 to 1976, Clark was an associate attorney with the Washington firm of Bredhoff, Cushman, Gottesman & Cohen. From 1976 to 1977, he was associate attorney with the Washington firm of Lichtman, Abeles, Anker & Nagle. From 1977 to 1979, he was Deputy Associate Solicitor with the Fair Labor Standards Division of the U.S. Department of Labor.

B'nai B'rith International

Remarks at the Closing Banquet of the Biennial Convention. September 4, 1980

President Spitzer, President Day, Ambassador Euron, Senator Carl Levin, Secre-

tary Klutznick, Secretary Goldschmidt, members and friends of B'nai B'rith International, ladies and gentlemen:

My wife made me promise that at the beginning of my speech I would recognize the presence of Mr. Shalom Doron, Doron who's the chairman of the board of the B'nai B'rith Women Children's Home in Israel, one of the finest places that I have ever known about, where Rosalynn was privileged to visit when we were in Jerusalem last year.

This is a home, as you women certainly know, for children who are severely emotionally disturbed. They have a remarkable 70-percent recovery rate among those children. They give no drugs, and as Mr. Doron says, the therapy is love. My wife is one of the experts on mental health, says it's one of the most successful programs and schools that she has ever seen in her life, and you're to be congratulated for it.

I come before you at a special time in our Nation's history, a dynamic period of controlled turmoil known as election time. [Laughter] It's a time when good friends can find themselves in total disagreement. It's a time when parents are very likely to find themselves at odds with their own sons and daughters. It's a time when liberals ask the candidates if they'll do enough and conservatives ask the candidates not to do too much. It's a time when mere discussions become sharp debates and when debates turn into heated arguments. I understand it's a lot like hiring a new rabbi for the synagogue. [Laughter]

Speaking of elections, I'm told that Jack Spitzer was a shoo-in for reelection as your president this year. I find that a good omen as I appear before you. [Laughter]

Well, I'm delighted to be back with you again. I remember distinctly the excitement of my attendance at your banquet in 1976. And I'm delighted to be here, because, well, I think you know

why. The B'nai B'rith and the Democratic Party have stood together for progressive causes for almost 50 years—from social security to strong trade unions, from civil rights at home to human rights abroad. We've made progress because we've worked together, and we've worked together because we've had shared goals, shared ideals, shared commitments.

People sometimes say that the old Democratic coalition no longer exists. But I say that all those who care about economic justice and personal dignity and civil liberties and pluralism have a living record of achievement that keeps that coalition alive. If anyone doubts that it's alive today, let them look tonight at the people and the ideals and the achievements of B'nai B'rith International. The whole world looks to you with admiration and with appreciation.

Like you, I believe both in progress and also in the preservation of tradition. Progress is the very essence of the American dream, the conviction that each generation through hard work can give its children a better life than we ourselves enjoy. But we do not want reckless change. We value political traditions, we value our cultural diversity, and we treasure them as guideposts for the future.

This will be a decade of change, perhaps even more rapid change, perhaps even more disturbing change than we experienced in the 1970's. But it's also a decade of challenge; it's a decade of hope. Our country is on the right road to the right future, and we will stay the course. The election is not about the past. I've called it a choice between two futures, and I believe that Americans want a future of justice for our society, strength and security for our Nation. And I believe that Americans want a future of peace for the entire world. We're on the right road in building a just society.

We're not a perfect nation but we're making good progress.

B'nai B'rith has always recognized the universality of that effort for justice and for basic civil or human rights. That's why you seek ratification of the equal rights amendment, and so do I. Our Nation is more than 200 years old, and it's time for the rights of all Americans, women and men, to be guaranteed in the Constitution of the United States.

You want to preserve the separation of church and state, a policy that's served us so well for 200 years, and so do I. And you want a competent and an independent judiciary, and so do I. I want America to stay on the road that we've set for ourself in the past and which we insist upon following in the future. We're on the right road to the right future in bringing peace to the Middle East, and we'll stay the course, no matter how difficult it might be, in our commitment to justice and peace and to the security and the well-being of Israel.

I hope that when the history books are written about my own administration, that one of the paragraphs there will be that President Jimmy Carter, representing the United States, helped the leaders and the people of Israel and Egypt to find a permanent peace. This is most important for us. Ever since President Truman recognized Israel's independence the very day it was proclaimed in Israel, our two nations have had a special relationship based on a common heritage and a common commitment to ethical and Democratic values. It's in the strategic and the moral interest of the United States of America to have peace in the Mideast and a secure and a peaceful Israel. It's in our interest as well as those of the people of Israel.

We've not been completely successful yet, but our course in the Middle East has

brought the first real peace that that region has known in the 32 years of Israel's existence. There is no turning back. The brave vision of Prime Minister Begin and President Anwar Sadat has been vindicated. The proof is in the almost unbelievable present circumstance, for Ambassadors are exchanged between nations, in meetings between the leaders of those nations in Cairo, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and also in Alexandria, in airline flights between the two countries on a routine basis, and even the fact that now Israeli visitors or tourists can buy the Jerusalem Post at newsstands in Cairo.

Normalization has begun. It can and it must proceed further. When I went to Jerusalem and to Cairo and to Alexandria, the excitement of the hundreds of thousands of people on the streets were the most vivid testimony to me of the hunger in the hearts and minds of the people of those two great nations for a lasting peace and for justice.

The United States of America is a full partner with Israel and Egypt in the task of extending that peace—extending a genuine peace between Israel and all her neighbors. And I'm also convinced that the people of Jordan and Syria and Lebanon and the other nations in the Middle East who are Arab want peace as deeply as do the people of Israel and of Egypt. Some leaders have not yet been convinced, but I'm convinced that the people there want peace.

Together we're engaged in the only negotiation that has ever addressed both Israel's security and the political status of the West Bank and Gaza at the same time on the same agenda. And I'd like to remind you that this was an agenda set by the leaders of the two nations—Israel and Egypt—even before we began the three-way talks that led to Camp David accords and the peace treaty itself. Prime

Minister Begin has assured me that he wants this from the bottom of his heart.

The road will not be easy. I cannot assure you that our country will always agree with every position taken by the Government of Israel. But whatever differences arise, they will never affect our commitment to a secure Israel. There will be no so-called reassessment of support for Israel in a Carter administration.

As Ambassador Evron pointed out to you, when he spoke recently, we have never threatened to slow down or cut off aid to Israel, and I can assure you that we never will. I know from experience and from long and extended negotiations and discussion with the leaders of those two countries that without security for Israel there can be no peace. President Sadat understands this just as clearly, as do I, or as Prime Minister Begin understands it. That's why we moved so quickly in the first few months of my own Presidency to enact a strong antiboycott law.

Such a law, as you know, has been blocked under the Republicans by the Secretaries of State and Treasury. They were afraid it would hurt our relationships, diplomatic and trade relationships with the Arab world. I thought about this. But I decided to go ahead despite these risks, because I knew it was the right thing to do. Now foreigners no longer tell American business leaders where they can do business and with whom. And Secretary Phil Klutznick, the Secretary of Commerce, is making sure that we're going to keep it that way.

The United States Government and myself personally are committed to United Nations Resolution 242, and we will oppose any attempt to change it. The United States Government and I personally oppose an independent Palestinian state, and unless and until they recognize Israel's right to exist and accept Resolution

242 as a basis for peace, we will neither recognize nor negotiate with the PLO. As I have repeatedly stated, it is long past time for an end to terrorism.

Also I know, and have known since my early childhood, the importance of Jerusalem in Jewish history. From the time King David first united the nation of Israel and proclaimed the ancient city of Jerusalem its capital, the Jewish people have drawn inspiration from Jerusalem. I sensed that special feeling myself last year when I stood as President of the United States before the Knesset in Jerusalem. I was there searching for peace in the city of peace. My prayers were answered in the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

We're still pursuing with Israel and Egypt the larger peace that all of us seek. In such a peace, Jerusalem should remain forever undivided, with free access to the holy places, and we will make certain that the future of Jerusalem can only be determined through agreement with the full concurrence of Israel.

It's important for me to point out to you—because we share an intense interest in this subject—that President Sadat understands perfectly that my positions have been, are now, and will be those that I have just described to you.

I believe in keeping Israel strong, and I'm proud that in the 32 years of Israel's existence, one half the total economic and military aid has been delivered to that great democracy during the brief time that I have been President of the United States. I don't look on this as being kind to Israel, nor as a handout; I look upon it as President of our country as an investment in the security of America.

Ultimately, as all of you know, there is no other path to peace in the Middle East except through negotiation, and those negotiations are difficult, tedious, some-

times contentious. Sometimes there is a delay in progress that causes us all to be frustrated, sometimes almost discouraged. No one who cherishes the goal of peace can allow that course to founder. This is the policy that I will always follow. There will not be one policy for election year and another policy after the election. Exactly the same policy that led to the Camp David accords and to the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt and an uninterrupted supply of military and economic aid to Israel will continue as long as I am President of the United States.

I shared a common problem with Prime Minister Begin and with President Sadat. As was the case with them, my personal involvement in the Camp David process carried high political risks. No politician likes to have a highly publicized effort for a great achievement and fail. There was certainly no guarantee of success. The differences seemed almost insurmountable. Neither was there any guarantee of success in Jerusalem or Cairo when I went there to remove the obstacles to a peace treaty. I have been personally involved in the peace process because in conscience there is really no choice for me. We simply must continue to move away from war and stalemate to peace and to progress for the people of Israel and for the people of Egypt.

Our efforts were successful in 1978. Our efforts were successful in 1979. If we stay the course, they will be successful in the future. This is a time not for despair, but for a renewed commitment.

This week my personal representative to the peace negotiations, Ambassador Sol Linowitz, has been in the Middle East again, meeting with Prime Minister Begin and then with President Sadat. Once again we've found a way to move towards peace. The talks will resume. And again I will personally join in the search for peace,

if necessary in a summit meeting, which Prime Minister Begin and I discussed on the phone when he called me this morning. He called to express his personal gratitude at the success of the Linowitz mission to the Middle East, and also to express his gratitude at the renewed prospects for progress. As you know, President Sadat has already publicly agreed with this idea of a summit meeting if necessary to ensure success.

We are on the right road in working for peace and in helping to keep Israel secure, and we'll stay on that road in close partnership with our Israeli friends as long as I'm President.

The Mideast peace effort cannot be isolated as an international affair. Closely related to it—and I hope that you will mark my words—we are on the right road also in moving toward energy security in the future. We had to fight for 3 years, as Senator Carl Levin knows, who helped me with this effort, to enact a comprehensive energy program. It's only just begun to work, because the legislation has only just recently been passed. But the benefits are already clear. We're now importing 24 percent less foreign oil than we were when I became President. The first year, 1977, that I was in office, we averaged importing about 8½ million barrels of oil every day. This year we expect that average to have dropped to about 6½ million barrels per day, which means that's a 2 million barrel less purchase of foreign oil every day, because we've moved on energy. But this progress is not a sure thing for the future. The success of this effort depends on the outcome of the election this year.

The new Republican leaders sneer at energy conservation. They say we should do away with the 55-mile speed limit. They say we should do away with the synthetic fuel program. They say we should abolish the windfall profits tax, a

tax on the unearned profits of the big oil companies. And they would like to let the big oil companies keep the money, money that we will use to spur solar energy, coal use, gasohol and to help the poor and the aged pay for the higher cost of fuel to heat their homes.

As an alternative, all they offer is the wan hope that if we just give the oil companies enough money, they'll solve the energy problem for us and maybe help to shape our foreign policy at the same time. We must be very careful about this. The new Republican leaders do not seem to recognize the cost of foreign oil dependence—not just the financial cost, not just the cost in joblessness and inflation, but the foreign policy cost and the national security costs as well. To abandon conservation, to abandon our energy program could be to take the destiny of our Nation out of our own hands and put it in the hands of OPEC. We must not permit that. You should consider very carefully who might be Secretary of Energy or Secretary of State in a different administration next year.

We're on the right road also in rebuilding the cities of America. We've built a tough-minded working partnership between American mayors and the Federal Government and also private industry. You can see and feel the result in cities all over America—a renewed sense of pride and accomplishment and confidence.

When I campaigned for President in 1976 and went into almost any city in this country and talked to the local officials there in the counties and the city governments, there was a sense of discouragement, alienation, and despair. We've not yet been completely successful, but we have started rebuilding the spirit of accomplishment and confidence in our cities. We still have a long way to go and

this program—so successful so far—is not a sure thing for the future. It depends on the outcome of this election.

A gigantic, election-year tax cut promised—Reagan-Kemp-Roth—would deprive us of over a trillion dollars between now and 1987—the financial tools to finish this job, not only in the cities but to meet the social needs of America. The scheme would deal our cities a great blow and would set them back a generation. We simply cannot permit this to happen.

Now our country is ready to build on these kinds of foundations. The economic renewal plan that I announced last week will help us do just that. We will retool American industry and make it more competitive and more innovative and more productive. The results will be more jobs and more stable prices for all the people of our country.

The alternative presented by the new Republican leaders would reignite inflation just as we're beginning to get it under control. The Republican nominee for Vice President once estimated that the scheme that he now advocates, Reagan-Kemp-Roth, would mean an inflation rate of more than 30 percent. This is one free lunch that America simply cannot afford.

We're also on the right road to the right future in meeting challenges from abroad. Before I took office, our military strength slid steadily downward for 8 straight years. We have reversed that trend, to ensure that we'll continue to have the modern conventional forces and the modern strategic forces needed to deter war, to keep our Nation at peace through strength.

We are now moving decisively to increase our security—and also that of our friends—in NATO and in the critical Indian Ocean, and in the Persian Gulf area we are building American strength. The

brutal Soviet invasion of Afghanistan shows how important these efforts are. We're determined to respect the independence of the nations of that area, and we are determined to meet any threats to our vital interests.

At the same time, we will stand by our commitments to control nuclear arms. As long as I'm President, the United States will not initiate a pointless and a dangerous nuclear arms race. We'll continue to work for the control of nuclear weapons. Mutual and balanced nuclear arms control is not some sentimental act of charity. It's not a favor we're doing for some other nation. It's essential to our own national security.

And we're on the right road to promoting human rights. I'll not be swayed from that course. We'll stand firm for human rights at the Review Conference on European Security and Cooperation in Madrid this fall to make sure that the Helsinki agreements are carried out. We'll be fighting for human rights as we did in Belgrade under Secretary Goldberg at the last session.

Because of our strong efforts and the focus of world attention, more than 50,000 Soviet Jews moved last year to freedom in Israel and to the United States. As you know this was the greatest number in history. They found freedom to worship, freedom to rejoice in the cultural and religious traditions of centuries. But in July, last month, less than 2,500 were permitted to emigrate—an annual rate of 30,000—and the rate of new approvals was even lower. This makes our cause more urgent, our resolve more certain, and we will continue to communicate that resolve very clearly to the Soviet leaders.

In closing, let me say that, as President of our country, I try to represent its people. The American people believe in

peace, for ourselves and for our allies whom we love. The American people believe that in order to have peace we must be strong, strong militarily, and we're second to no nation in the world in military strength; that we must be strong politically; that our influence must be extended to others in a benevolent and acceptable way; strong morally, that we do not ever yield from a commitment to the unchanging principles and goals and ideals on which our Nation was founded—a nation committed to freedom and to pride in the future and to the worth of an individual human being, a nation committed to the principle that every person can worship as he or she chooses, and that in diversity, in the plurality of our economy and our social structure, lies not weakness, but strength.

I represent a nation that believes in truth, and sometimes the truth hurts. Sometimes it's a temptation for a political leader in a democracy like ours or like Israel's to mislead the people, because most people want to hear good things. But Americans and Israelis are not afraid to face the facts, and that's part of the strength of our society.

And I represent a people who believe in democracy and openness in letting government differences be exposed, in letting the people of our nations be involved in the debates. We're not afraid of those differences and those debates. We're not afraid to strip away the bark and let people understand the reasons why decisions are made.

Part of our strength as a country is that a President or a Prime Minister—we're not alone. When we speak, we speak for the people, not in spite of the people. And I also represent a country that believes in the future. A country that's not afraid. A country that realizes that we have never made progress the easy way. A country

that knows that we can't find simple solutions to difficult questions and that we cannot waver in our commitment. And that the country must be united. It must be bound together with confidence in our own strength, recognizing the blessings that God's given us, thankful for them and willing to use them for the benefit not only of ourselves but of others.

We would never have been successful in Camp David had it not been for our attention to the future. The last few hours we were there were hours of despair, because we felt that we had failed. As we prepared to leave Camp David Prime Minister Begin sent over a stack of photographs of me and him and President Sadat and asked me if I would simply sign my name. He wanted to give them to his grandchildren. And I had my secretary go and find out from some of the other members of the Israeli delegation the personal names of every one of his grandchildren. And I took a little extra time, and I wrote each name on the photograph and signed it myself. And instead of sending it back to Prime Minister Begin by messenger, I carried it over myself.

We were both discouraged men, because we had reached what seemed to be an impasse. And we stood there on the porch of one of those little cabins at Camp David, and he began to go through the photographs—they were all just alike but had different names—and he told me about each one of his grandchildren and which one he loved the most and which one was closest to him and which one got in trouble, which one was the best student. And I told him about my grandchildren, too. And we began to think about the future and the fact that what we did at Camp David was not just to be looked upon as a political achievement that might bring accolades or congratulations to us. It was not just an investment in peace for

our own generation; it was an investment in the future.

We share a lot, Prime Minister Begin and I. The people of the democratic world share a lot—a common faith in our own country and its principles and a faith in the worth of other human beings all over the world, even those quite different from us. We believe that there's the same yearning in the hearts of people in every land for freedom, for self-realization, a better life for their children, and a future of peace and security and hope. That's what I want for our country and for the countries that are so important to us, like Israel.

Thank you very much.

NOTE: The President spoke at 9:53 p.m. in the Sheraton Ballroom at the Sheraton-Washington Hotel. In his opening remarks, he referred to Jack J. Spitzer, president of B'nai B'rith International, Grace Day, president of B'nai B'rith Women, and Israeli Ambassador to the United States Ephraim Evron.

Confederated Tribes of the Siletz Indians of Oregon

Statement on Signing S. 2055 Into Law.
September 5, 1980

I am pleased to sign into law S. 2055, an act to establish a reservation for the Confederated Tribes of the Siletz Indians of Oregon.

Early in my administration I signed into law the Siletz Indian Restoration Act of 1977, restoring Federal acknowledgment of the Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Oregon and making them eligible for the special programs and services provided by the United States for Indians. Section 7 of that act provided for the establishment of a reservation for the tribe and required the administration to submit to the Congress

within 2 years a plan for the establishment of the reservation.

S. 2055 reflects this administration's plan and strikes a balance among the interests of the tribe and those of the local community, the State of Oregon, and the Federal Government. Most of the lands to be conveyed to the tribe under the act are timberlands. They also include an important area which would permit the tribe to centralize its facilities and activities in a place to which the tribe has strong historical, cultural, and emotional ties.

All parties involved—officials of the administration, of the tribe, and of the State and local governments of Oregon are to be commended for their fine spirit of cooperation. I want to specially commend Congressman Les AuCoin and Senator Mark Hatfield for their leadership in this endeavor.

It is with pleasure that I sign S. 2055.

NOTE: As enacted, S. 2055 is Public Law 96-340, approved September 5.

United States Attorney
Herman Sillas, Jr.

White House Statement. September 5, 1980

There have been a number of press reports about the Department of Justice's recommendations to the President concerning Mr. Herman Sillas, the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of California. The President's Counsel, Lloyd N. Cutler, has reviewed these recommendations and, together with the Department of Justice, has afforded Mr. Sillas and his counsel a full opportunity to examine the record and submit their comments.

Camp David

Q: How can you expect progress in the Camp David negotiations if you are holding out the prospect of a summit? Also, our European allies, as well as most Arab nations, believe the Camp David talks are going nowhere. What makes you believe that there is something left to achieve from them?

A: For more than 30 years, there were efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Except for some limited disengagement agreements, none of them worked. Then came Camp David, which led to the first actual peace in the area -- the treaty between Egypt and Israel, which is being implemented. The other half of Camp David -- on full autonomy for the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza -- is the first time that both Israel's security and the rights of the Palestinian people have been at the top of the agenda, together. This approach also fulfills another essential condition -- that the toughest, most unanswerable questions, like the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, are put off until after a transition period of five years. This can permit the parties to have a time of living and working together, in order to find room for accommodation.

It is clear to us that any other approach to peace would also have to deal with these central problems, and follow this general approach. And no other approach has been suggested that can do that.

I am convinced -- as are Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat -- that Camp David can succeed, in the interest of all our countries and, when we are finished, in the interest

of the Palestinian people, as well. The road is not easy; the issues are complex and difficult, and reflect more than a generation of conflict. As the talks resume, however, they will focus on the difficult issues that remain, building on all the ground work that has been done in the past 16 months. With good will on all sides -- which does exist -- the answers can be found.

During Sol Linowitz' visit to the Middle East, the parties agreed to restart the talks, and to consider the timing and venue for a summit. The two efforts complement one another: the talks will develop the issues toward resolution and a summit could be useful in pushing the whole process forward. Given the decades that have elapsed since the search for peace began, we should not be concerned about a few weeks between the reconvening of the talks and a summit meeting.

Pressure on Israel

Q: With all the potential leverage we have on Israel, why don't you use some of it to get Israel to make some compromises?

A: It is important to bear in mind two factors:

-- there can be no peace in the Middle East unless Israel is secure. We are committed to its security, and we provide it with great quantities of assistance and modern arms to that end. Seeking to weaken Israel through "pressure," therefore, could fly in the face of our concern for Israel's security, and would undermine Israeli political confidence in the peace process;

-- the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict must be a political process, reached through political decision. Thus any agreement in the autonomy talks, to have any value, must have the approval of the prime minister, cabinet, Knesset, and people of Israel. Therefore, there is only one way to reach success: to work through each issue patiently and persistently, until there can be agreement that makes sense to both Israel and to Egypt. I am confident that that is possible, and will do all that I can to help.

We must also understand that the decisions and choices Israel is facing in the autonomy talks are among the most difficult in its entire history. It can only make those choices against a background of confidence in its security and its future. We are committed to helping provide that essential confidence. Israel needs our understanding at this difficult time. It will have it.

AFGHANISTAN

Reagan

The Reagan Response to Afghanistan

Opposing the President's actions, Reagan proposed his own plan to counter the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Soon after the invasion Reagan advocated sending advisers, and stationing war planes in Pakistan. He also suggested that the United States send weapons to Afghanistan.

"(W)e ought to be funneling weapons through there that can be delivered to those freedom fighters in Afghanistan to fight for their own freedom. That would include those shoulder-launched, heat-seeking missiles that could knock down helicopter gun ships that the Soviets are using against them."

Washington Post
January 10, 1980

But that was not enough. Reagan also proposed that the United States blockade Cuba in retaliation for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

"One option might well be that we surround the island of Cuba and stop all traffic in and out."

New York Times
January 29, 1980

Even though Reagan advocated military options to counter the Soviet invasion, he opposed draft registration.

"Indeed, draft registration may actually decrease our military preparedness, by making people think we have solved our defense problem..."

Quoted by Senator Hatfield
Congressional Record
June 4, 1980

Although Reagan decries vacillation in United States foreign policy, and calls for a greater show of military force, his statements during the Afghanistan crisis call into question whether Reagan has the understanding and steadfastness required to initiate an effective U.S. response. Of the three steps the President initiated to counter the Soviets, Reagan opposed both the grain embargo and draft registration, and he vacillated on the Olympic boycott.

AFGHANISTAN

Bush

"The idea of blockading Cuba, which Ronald Reagan has proposed, risks nuclear war and would require the entire Atlantic fleet. It wasn't Cuba that invaded Afghanistan, it was Russia. The way to peace is to keep this country strong, not through reckless foreign policy."

Milford, CT
Washington Star
March 22, 1980

Bush

"Ronald Reagan has proposed a blockade of Cuba to stop Russia aggression halfway around the world. I would not. I don't believe that is right. I don't know where all the ships would come from to do it. I don't quite see the relevance. I am not soft on Castro. I believe Castro is trying to export revolution...but there has to be some adherence to international law.

"I can see some vague relationship, inasmuch as Russia is training Cubans to be their surrogates in Africa, but I don't see why when the Soviets are aggressors in Afghanistan we declare war on China. That's not my conception of how one uses power or how one makes foreign policy decisions."

Manchester, NH
Washington Post
February 10, 1980

Bush

"I think you're going to see a peace offensive by the Soviet Union. I think they underestimated world opinion. I don't think they want war today. I think you're going to see a pullback, maybe this summer."

Chicago Council on Foreign Relations
New York Times
March 24, 1980

Bush

"So, getting them (Soviets) out (of Afghanistan), I think, will be part of a Soviet peace effort, an idea to show that they really aren't the brutal aggressors that they are and I think that's what's going to do it. It's going to be more world opinion than it is bristling weapons lined up against the. But, the ideas that they've stabilized things is not quite accurate. They've stabilized it militarily, but they haven't stabilized the heartbeat of the Afghans, and don't forget it, and we haven't heard the last of it. You do not brutally aggress and crush a people and have a permanent stability.

That's not what's happened."

Bill Moyers' Journal
WNET/Thirteen
March 6, 1980

Bush

"But the Soviets also will have an energy shortfall in the mid-1980's and so the Afghanistan invasion can also be seen as a drive toward warm-water ports and Middle East oil fields."

Interviews with J.F.terHorst
Detroit, MI, News

Carter

"The Soviet attack on Afghanistan and the ruthless extermination of its government have highlighted in the starkest terms the darker side of their policies - going well beyond competition and the legitimate pursuit of national interest, and violating all norms of international law and practice.

This attempt to subjugate an independent, non-aligned Islamic people is a callous violation of international law and the United Nations Charter, two fundamentals of international order. Hence, it is also a dangerous threat to world peace. For the first time since World War II, the Soviets have sent combat forces into an area that was not previously under their control, into a non-aligned and sovereign state.

On January 4 I therefore announced a number of measures, including the reduction of grain sales and the curtailment of trade and technology transfer, designed to demonstrate our firm opposition to Soviet actions in Afghanistan and to underscore our belief that in the face of this blatant transgression of international law, it was impossible to conduct business-as usual. I have also been in consultation with our allies and with countries in the region regarding additional multilateral measures that might be taken to register our disapproval and bolster security in Southwest Asia. I have been heartened by the support expressed for our position, and by the fact that such support has been tangible, as well as moral.

State of the Union Address
January, 1980

Mondale

"America has moved decisively. To show the Soviet Union that it cannot invade another nation and still conduct business as usual with the United States, our country has embargoed 17 million tons of grain; tightened controls on high technology trade; limited Soviet fishing in our waters; raised our defense budget to upgrade all aspects of our forces; strengthened our naval presence in the Indian Ocean; intensified development of our Rapid Deployment Forces; and offered to help other sovereign states in the region to maintain their security.

In the UN General Assembly, the United States joined more than a hundred other nations in an unprecedented majority -- calling for the immediate, unconditional, and total withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. But the President, the Congress, and the American people understand that a world which travels to the Moscow Games devalues its condemnation and offers its complicity to Soviet propaganda.

Address to U.S. Olympic Committee
April, 1980