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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Withdrawer

DLB 3/21/2005

File Folder NATO STRATEGY

FOIA

F00-089

Box Number 9

TERRY TERRIFF

5

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
5811	MEMO	GEORGE SHULTZ TO REAGAN, RE: YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MINISTERIAL, MAY 30-31 R 12/12/2006 F00-089	2	5/23/1984	B1
5812	PAPER	NATO EAST-WEST STUDY R 12/12/2006 F00-089	2	ND	B1
5813	PAPER	NATO STUDIES OF EAST-WEST ECONOMIC TRENDS R 12/12/2006 F00-089	1	ND	B1
5814	PAPER	EUROPEAN SECURITY COOPERATION - WEU R 12/12/2006 F00-089	2	ND	B1
5815	PAPER	CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE ISSUES R 12/12/2006 F00-089	2	ND	B1
5816	PAPER	RESULTS OF MAY DPC MINISTERIAL	1	ND	B1
5817	PAPER	OUT-OF-AREA SECURITY R 12/12/2006 F00-089	2	ND	B1
5818	PAPER	NATO INFRASTRUCTURE	1	ND	B1
5819	PAPER	GREECE, TURKEY AND NATO	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
5820	PAPER	SPAIN AND NATO R 12/12/2006 F00-089	1	ND	B1
5821	PAPER	POLAND PAR 12/29/2010 F2000-089/1	2	ND	B1
5822	PAPER	ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPING MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE R 12/12/2006 F00-089	1	ND	B1
5823		NUMBER NOT USED			

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL


Oct 27, 1982

TO: PHIL DUR ✓
BOB HELM
BOB LINHARD
AL MYER
RAY POLLOCK

NATO
STRATEGY

FYI --

Attached is a thought-provoking piece which challenges (1) the current focus on extended attack of second and third echelon Soviet forces and (2) affordability and effectiveness of advanced precision-guided munitions. Although oriented toward conventional weapons, there might also be implications for nuclear weapons.


Dick Boverie

Atch.



(703) 527-2151

JEFFREY COOPER ASSOCIATES, INC.
Suite 910 1611 North Kent Street Arlington, VA 22209

October 22, 1982

Major General Richard T. Boverie
National Security Council
Room 386, OEOP
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Dick:


Talking with Dov Zakheim last week, he suggested you'd be interested. The enclosed paper was drafted as an antidote to the current prevailing optimism on conventional deep attack of the second echelon; I think you'll find it interesting and certainly provocative even if you don't agree with it. Although we don't talk about it in the paper, many of the current concepts for deep nuclear attack share similar problems.

We are very concerned that the community is focusing far too much on what it would like to do because it is technically elegant, rather than on simpler, and possibly more effective missions it already has the technology in hand to do.

I discussed these ideas with Dov and Bill Hoehn who were very much in tune; I'd be most interested in your reactions.

I'd like to get together some time to discuss these ideas and some other issues. Please do give me a call.

With warmest regards,


Jeffrey R. Cooper
President

Enclosures

TOWARDS AN ALTERNATE CONCEPT
OF CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE

Issue

Does the current focus on extended attack of second and third echelon Soviet forces address the right problem for NATO's defense and do advanced precision-guided conventional munitions offer an affordable and effective solution?

Background

The objective of raising the "nuclear threshold" by enhancing the effectiveness of conventional forces and creating a credible, stalwart conventional defense is one shared by most Western defense and political analysts. Particularly in Europe, where anti-nuclear sentiment is rising and political support for an active NATO nuclear defense is almost non-existent, a credible conventional defense concept could serve as the focal point for a supportable force modernization program. Reasonable and knowledgeable analysts differ, however, over the feasibility of a non-nuclear defense, over concepts of operations and over the associated systems necessary to implement a stalwart and credible non-nuclear defense.

The problem for NATO's conventional defense is how to defeat well forward a Soviet attack possessed of numerical superiority and the additional potential advantages of surprise. Typical U.S. analyses of the Corps battle focus on the need to kill X number of tanks and Y number of other vehicles in order to halt the attack. In the United States over the last decade, assessments of Soviet doctrine, tactics and hardware have led many analysts to conclude that Soviet follow-on echelons are a critical element to the Soviet conventional threat to Europe; consequently, they have sought ways not only of destroying Soviet armor but also of conducting deep attack against second and third echelon Soviet elements in order to prevent their introduction into the main battle area. Developments in advanced sensor and munitions technology have led many analysts

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to seize upon precision-guided munitions as the key to effective attack of Soviet units both in the main battle area and deep in the enemy rear, providing the means to combat the enormous Soviet tank inventory (the most pressing need), and to neutralize follow-on echelons as necessary to either restore deterrence or seize the initiative.

While the concepts of the integrated battlefield, the extended battlefield, and the integrated, extended battlefield now embodied in the latest Army doctrine¹ are, in the abstract, attractive solutions to NATO's defense problem, several fundamental questions need to be raised about the correctness of the threat definition and the practicality and affordability of the responses posited.

First, recent reevaluations of Soviet doctrine, tactics and equipment² raise disturbing questions concerning the character and priorities of the threat that the Soviets present to Europe in the 1980's. Soviet planners are increasingly concerned about the need for a swift and decisive campaign against Europe, one which can be concluded before NATO can resort to use of TNF, and also possibly before their own second or third echelon forces can be brought into battle. The emerging Soviet doctrine focuses on extremely early breakthroughs of NATO's forward defenses by the application of overwhelming force along selected axes of advance, and within those axes, key breakthrough sectors. Breakthroughs are to be exploited by specially designated, equipped and trained units; these Operational Maneuver Groups (OMG) will penetrate deep into NATO territory to disrupt its defenses and destroy the capability for NATO's conventional and nuclear responses. In this concept, a very high tempo of operations is required; the OMGs are expected to be behind NATO's defenses within 24 hours of the offensive's start. The result, it is hoped by the Soviets, is a decisive victory within three or four days. Striking second and subsequent echelons, deep in Warsaw Pact territory, seemed a credible NATO alternative to an adequate forward defense, so long as those

¹ See FM 105, U.S. Army Concepts of Operations, and Air/Land Battle 2000.

² See Daniel Goure' Report of ESECS Workshop #1, and Christopher Donnelly, International Defense Review, No. 9, 1982, for example.

forces were viewed as critical to the success of Soviet offensive operations. If Soviet plans are less dependent on these follow-on units, however, NATO's evolving plans and posture for deep attack may provide a less effective and credible deterrent than realized.

The second question that needs to be raised is: Even if the second echelons were to be critical, have we chosen the right elements on which to focus, the right place and the right time to attack them, and the right amount of effort to be expended on deep attack? The concepts place great stress on attriting Soviet armor very early and very deep in Pact rear areas. Standoff attack of mobile armor is technically difficult by itself and deep attack raises both additional C³I cost, and penetrativity problems. Moreover, attack too early may not be the most effective time to deliver a coup de main. Finally, the costs of deep attack may take too many resources from the main battle area which we know will be a, if not the, critical point.

Third, the concepts of operations and many of the system "solutions" proposed for dealing with the first and second echelons and with the air battle are primarily technological fixes dependent on advanced sensors, munitions and delivery vehicles. They mirror earlier U.S. fascination with tactical nuclear weapons as a way of dealing with massed threats; indeed, the effectiveness of new conventional weapons is often illustrated through the use of comparisons with low yield tactical nuclear weapons for the same mission. Reliance on technological fixes enables NATO to avoid the expense of building and maintaining a quantitatively equivalent force, or the difficulty of developing alternate strategic or operational concepts to address Soviet force preponderance and mobile offensive tactics. While these concepts responded to deep-seated U.S. preferences, they are likely to have a number of drawbacks: they will probably be far more expensive than currently projected; judging from past experience, they will probably work less well in the field; and due to C³I, EW and other problems, they may prove to be impractical solutions to the nature of the threat; finally, they may detract resources from alternate, more effective concepts.

We believe that these current concepts may be fatally flawed, partially due to overselling of the effectiveness and low cost of precision-guided munitions, partially due

to an excessive concern with killing Soviet tank hordes, tank by tank, and partially due to their questionable justification in terms of deep attack against second echelon Soviet forces.

The Problem

The problem is not how to deal most effectively with Soviet armor or the second echelon of Soviet forces. The problem is how to wage a successful defense of Western Europe, preferably a successful defense not employing nuclear weapons. To be successful in fashioning an effective stalwart defense, it is critical that we correctly understand and characterize the threat that we face.

Soviet doctrine predicates success on effective employment of momentum, mass and maneuver; it will utilize these elements of operational art not to destroy enemy units per se, but to destroy the cohesiveness of NATO's defense and its ability to wage a successful defense.

Momentum, mass and maneuver are closely related elements in Soviet concepts of operational art. Momentum is the ability to proceed inexorably with planned actions according to predetermined norms and standards despite enemy resistance and unforeseen events; it is the ability to retain the initiative. Momentum in the Soviet military sense is the product of mass and maneuver; it is analogous to, and probably derivative of, the physics concept of momentum -- the product of mass and linear velocity. Mass refers to concentration of assets, both forces and firepower, at critical points so that favorable force ratios can be achieved. Mass implies more than just the collection of sufficient discrete assets at the right point, but the moulding of them into a cohesive and directed whole. Maneuver is the ability to place the mass at the right point and at the right time; it refers not only to linear mobility towards objectives, but the lateral mobility necessary to exploit opportunities as they are presented and thus maintain the high tempo of operations.

U.S. doctrine as it is now evolving places its greatest emphasis on reducing the mass through attrition by firepower of its armored components both at short and long-

ranges; it pays significantly less attention to reducing the effective mass by disrupting its momentum, confounding its timing and destroying its cohesion. In attempting to attrit the mass by firepower, either at short or long-range, systems must be able to acquire and track a large number of targets, fix moving and dispersal forces and service them without being saturated or exhausted. U.S. commanders also face the problem of choosing where to place their emphasis: at short or long-range. We may well be planning to do the wrong job elegantly rather than the right job imperfectly, but perhaps sufficiently.

The Alternative Choices

Several alternate concepts seem worthy of exploration. First, to attempt to destroy the momentum of the attack by affecting both the component elements: by diffusing the mass and disrupting maneuver. Second, to focus firepower and target acquisition, the scarce allied resources, on Soviet elements after they have been committed but before they are engaged. Third, to seek to keep second and third echelons from contributing to the effective mass by delaying their timely engagement.

good

NATO strategy may be concentrating overly on attriting Soviet armor. The real problem is much larger: a combined-arms capability operating with the elements of momentum -- mass and movement. Rather than addressing the technically difficult and potentially unproductive mission of attriting Soviet armor, particularly in the second and third echelons, NATO should look to disrupting the cohesion of the Soviet combined-arms capability, as it is committed to battle whether in the first echelon or subsequently. Alternatively, operating against his need to maneuver, one could look to canalize both the direction and timing of Soviet attack and second echelon units.

First, we need to rethink the basic resource allocation between first and second echelon capable forces. Our focus on the second echelon problem may be misplaced. Recent evidence and examination of Soviet doctrine, tactics and equipment suggest that the pace, timing and tempo of a Soviet attack may not require second echelon forces for initial exploitation.

Second, if, on the other hand, we attack after he has committed his reinforcing elements, the force application can be assured of reducing the effective mass as well as potentially disrupting the tempo of his operation. If we attack second echelon element too early, we allow the enemy to regroup and reform his echelons. While we may reduce the number of axes he can reinforce by deep attrition, he does retain the choice to remass his attrited forces and again recommit them without necessarily suffering significant delay to his timelines.

Third, however, disrupting the momentum of the offensive and the cohesion of Soviet forces may have greater benefits than simply killing tanks and vehicles. The expenditure of vast resources in the effort to attrit Soviet armor, particularly on a tank-by-tank basis, may not be an effective approach to defying the overall threat. Attacking individual tanks or tank companies is a complex and costly task. The further beyond the FEBA engagement is attempted, the greater the costs. Moreover, the requirements for high probability kill against armored units places a great strain on system performance parameters. Killing tanks may not be critical, except at the FEBA. If they fail to show up, regardless of how they are delayed, the effect is the same.

Fourth, focusing strikes closer to the FEBA is an easier problem for target acquisition and tracking. As a cost-effectiveness problem, there are several reasons to question the concept of deep strike against mobile forces. We have far less acquisition and tracking capability far behind the FEBA than closer. That capability is technically more complex and far more costly, and it locates targets less precisely; to some degree, both cost and inaccuracy scale with distance.

Fifth, strikes closer to the FEBA may be more effective and timely. Deep delivery is more difficult and more costly than strikes closer to the FEBA. Moreover, if MLRS is a good example, it will require four times as much ordinance at 30 km as at 10 km for equal effect. As flight time lengthens, both time late of target data and guidance system inaccuracies (not including terminal homing) increase. Costs for more accurate guidance and for additional propellant also increase for greater range. Penetrativity becomes more difficult as more enemy airspace is traversed.

Sixth, area denial weapons may be more effective than precision-guided munitions in halting Soviet momentum and destroying maneuver capability. The choice of one-on-one precision-guided weapons will impose stringent requirements for effective and inexpensive sensors and munitions, a technically challenging and demanding job. It is not clear that this path is our most effective option.

The critical first step in meeting the Soviet threat is to use better what is currently available; we need to think better about how to do with what we have than with what we would like to have. Proposed responses to NATO's conventional force inadequacies all-too often rest on planned deployment of new capabilities, with unproven technologies and promised low costs: for example, deep strikes against Soviet armor which require entirely new intelligence, tracking, and target acquisition systems; new weapons delivery capabilities; new sensors and terminal homing guidance; and new armor piercing weapons or submunitions. All too often these promised programs fail to work, fail to be productive at reasonable cost, or have serious operational problems even though the technology itself works. (Recent examples are GLCP, Roland II, and Maverick-IIR.) Rather than place excessive reliance on the promise of future technologies, and on the successful integration of a series of new technologies, a more cost effective option may be more extensive exploitation of capabilities, know-how, and systems currently available and in use. NATO should look to ways of exploiting the synergistic qualities of existing capabilities coupled together in an innovative fashion (e.g., area munitions dispensers deployed from heavy bombers). Several examples are suggested below.

Use of Area Denial Munitions

Direct fire weapons do offer individually greater kill probabilities; at the same time, they are limited in their ability to service sufficient targets. In a target rich environment precision-guided direct fire will have a high individual probability of kill, and they will be highly effective individual systems. Unfortunately, they will also be rate saturated in their target handling capability and may not be able to service sufficiently the number of targets presented before they are overrun or out of range.

Large volumes of area munitions, while of low individual kill probabilities can serve to channel and significantly delay Soviet forces. Also, while area munitions may have a relatively low lethality against heavily armored units, they are relatively effective against light armor and soft-skinned vehicles. Area munitions can be used to separate the tanks from supporting infantry, engineers, artillery forward observers, and even artillery. Without support from the other combat arms, Soviet tank forces are increasingly vulnerable to the effects of NATO anti-tank systems deployed along the FEBA. And it is at the FEBA that NATO deploys excellent tank killing weapons in relatively large numbers. In addition, the deployment of area munitions behind advancing Soviet armored forces, while not directly blunting the offensive, will serve to slow it down and complicate its workings. If Soviet rear services forces cannot occupy the battlefield, then POL and ammo may be denied to forward units, and repairable equipment will lie unused.

The choice of "one-on-one" precision-guided munitions, in most cases, imposes a relatively low speed and high to moderate target area approach in order to give the target seeker a sufficient "look" opportunity and the individual munitions a chance to disperse and home on target. Such low speed reentry coupled with the relatively high signature (RCS) of many PGM carriers suggests that these systems will be more vulnerable to Soviet air defenses than some other delivery mode choices.

Another potentially serious problem with PGM's is that they operate less well against high clutter backgrounds such as urban and built up areas. Since recent Soviet doctrine recognizes the changing military topography of West Germany, attacks through built-up areas could be a serious problem.

In general, we have our best capabilities for target acquisition and timely strike close to the FEBA. Out to approximately 30-50 km beyond the FEBA, we have a higher density of effective acquisition and strike assets than for deeper strike. Moreover, it is at the point of engagement that Soviet forces will be most heavily concentrated and thus will provide the best target for either direct or area munitions.

We have far better capabilities for deep strike against fixed rather than mobile targets both in terms of numbers, costs, and accuracy. Our deep strikes, therefore, should concentrate on those fixed targets which are important to the enemy's momentum, mass and maneuver; these are primarily transportation and logistics nodes. We know how to do this job far better and more cheaply than attempting deep attack of mobile forces.

Countering C³

The Soviet operational requirement for momentum places increasing weight on command, control, and communications capabilities. Continuous C³ is particularly critical to the deployment of forces in initial operations and the management of the OMG and supporting arms during the exploitation phase of a breakthrough. Communications are also critical to the cohesiveness of Soviet forces and the maintenance of momentum; without adequate communications, momentum will suffer.

In view of this, disruption of Soviet C³ and interference with the command process should be a priority NATO objective. Currently NATO devotes far too few resources to this mission relative to those expended on more problematic and less potentially fruitful endeavors, such as attriting Soviet armor. Disruption of C³ may place entire formations out of action or so complicate attack planning and execution as to defeat Soviet strategy. While perhaps a less tangible military instrument, at least in terms of visible battlefield kills, radio-electronic warfare may be the most effective means of "killing" Soviet forces.

Conclusion

In summary, we have chosen to attempt to do the most difficult job -- killing armor -- at the most difficult place -- deep in the enemy rear, and it is likely to require a disproportionate share of resources to even attempt it. We are suggesting that we attempt to do a less difficult task in the rear area -- hitting fixed points at which critical transportation and logistics nodes are located and disrupting enemy C³ by a combination of hard-kill and EW -- and that we utilize the resources so freed to deliver large volumes

of area munitions at the place where our target acquisition assets operate best -- near the FEBA. While these areas munitions have individually low-kill probabilities, in sufficient densities they will significantly impede heavy armor by destroying tracks, be relatively effective against light armor, and be very effective against thin-skinned vehicles and personnel. By stripping Soviet armor of their combined arms elements, we will allow the direct fire PGM's and tank guns to concentrate their effectiveness on the most difficult to kill targets at the places where their effectiveness is highest.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

NATO Strategy

CONFIDENTIAL

May 23, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

From:

George P. Shultz *GPS*

Subject:

Your Participation in the North Atlantic Council Ministerial, May 30-31

I. SETTING

This will be the first meeting in the United States of the NATO foreign ministers since 1969. The setting is symbolic -- this year is the 35th anniversary of the signature in Washington of the North Atlantic Treaty which created NATO. The high point of the Ministerial will be your dinner at the White House May 30, followed by the meeting in the Cabinet Room and the Rose Garden appearance May 31.

At the dinner, you will present the Medal of Freedom to NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns, who retires in June after almost 13 years service. This will also be an occasion to pay tribute to NATO's success in keeping the peace and withstanding Soviet pressures, and to urge continued Allied solidarity in the search for a more constructive relationship with the East.

The Cabinet Room meeting on May 31 will provide an opportunity to extend your remarks of the night before and to listen to Allied views. The subsequent session in the Rose Garden will highlight the importance we attach to the Alliance, on the eve of your departure for Europe.

II. ISSUES

The central focus of the Ministerial will be on East-West relations. Other topics will include arms control and global security issues, especially the Persian Gulf.

The Soviet decision to boycott the Olympics and the renewed persecution of the Sakharovs have deflated Allied hopes for early progress on East-West relations and arms control. At the same time, these events have increased Allied anxiety over the potential consequences of a prolonged stalemate, which they now see as lasting until at least next year. The Allies will thus want the Ministerial to take as forthcoming a tone as possible on East-West relations. In preparation for the meeting, NATO

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BY KDI NARA DATE 12/2/06

has prepared a major study of East-West relations. Ministers are expected to release a public statement on East-West relations, which will balance a readiness for dialogue with the need for Western strength, unity, and realism.

There are no arms control decisions before the Ministerial. NATO is in a strong position on INF, despite the problem in the Netherlands. Although the Allies are pessimistic about prospects of bringing the Soviets back to the table, there is little pressure to change our position. Our recent proposals in MBFR and on chemical weapons and the concrete measures we have on the table in the CDE have given us the initiative. The one area of arms control where we face some difficulty is outer space. The Allies have been skeptical about our position on anti-satellite weapons (ASATs). You should stress the seriousness of our ongoing review of possible ASAT arms control options. With regard to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), you should note that there is no reason for it to be a contentious issue in the Alliance, since decisions on deployment are a long way away, and that we will continue to consult closely with the Allies.

If the present escalation continues, the Iran-Iraq war will be a significant focal point of debate at the Ministerial. We will want to avoid panic in the oil markets, promote efforts to reduce our vulnerability to any interruption of energy supplies, and at the same time encourage greater allied understanding and cooperation on the problem of Gulf security. In addition, we will be discussing other regional problems where the US and Europe share common interests, although our viewpoints occasionally diverge. In particular we should hope to achieve greater understanding of our policies in Central America and the importance of that region to US security.



United States Department of State 4215

Washington, D.C. 20520

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May 23, 1984

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(WITH ~~SECRET/SENSITIVE ATTACHMENT~~)

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By dlb NARA, Date 3/21/05

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Background Papers for the President's Use in the
North Atlantic Council Ministerial, May 29-31,
1984

Attached are background papers prepared for the President's use
in the upcoming North Atlantic Council.

for MCFarlane
for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

As stated.

~~SECRET~~

(WITH ~~SECRET/SENSITIVE ATTACHMENT~~)

DECL: OADR

BRIEFING PAPER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~NATO East-West Study

At the last ministerial, NATO foreign ministers commissioned a major Alliance review of East-West relations. The December communique announced: "Ministers instructed the Permanent Council to undertake a thorough appraisal of East-West relations with a view to achieving a more constructive dialogue and to report to the ministerial meeting in spring 1984." It has since been agreed that the major conclusions of the classified study will be made public in some form during the May ministerial.

Dynamics and Handling of the Study

First proposed by Belgian Foreign Minister Tindemans, the study is a response to European concern over East-West political tensions. The Germans and certain other Europeans have sought to move it in the direction of an apologia for the policy of detente during the 1970s. They have attempted to freight the study with hortatory rhetoric about dialogue while giving less emphasis to the requirements of deterrence. They are anxious to use the study as the basis for a hopeful message to their publics and the Soviets at the May ministerial.

We view the study as an opportunity to strengthen Allied solidarity on East-West relations around a core of strength and realism, as proposed by the President on January 16. We have succeeded in balancing European emphasis on the need for conciliation of the East with emphasis on the need to hold the Soviets accountable for East-West tensions and to improve our defenses. We have also inserted in the study a greater emphasis on the importance to the West of Soviet activities globally, and the need to provide support, including security assistance, to threatened states in the Third World.

The Germans led the move to present a version of the study's conclusions to the public at the upcoming ministerial. NATO is now considering a public statement. We will seek to ensure that the public presentation reflects the Presidential emphasis on strength and realism which we have worked into the study itself.

Substance of the Study

The study is divided into four parts: 1) Introduction: Developments in East-West Relations; 2) Current Situation and Trends in East-West Relations; 3) Considerations for the Approach of Members of the Alliance to East-West Relations; and 4) Conclusions.

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BY h01 NARA, DATE 12/12/06

The study makes the following major points about Soviet behavior:

-- The deterioration in East-West relations is due to Soviet actions, in Europe and globally.

-- Detente during the seventies was associated with a degree of beneficial Soviet restraint in Europe. But the Soviet Union never shared the popular Western concept of detente, viewing it as simply another means of advancing its interests.

-- The Soviet build-up of nuclear and conventional forces goes far beyond the legitimate requirements of self-defense; the Soviets seek to use these forces for political intimidation.

-- The Soviets are responsible for the suspension of nuclear arms-control talks.

-- Soviet adventurism in the Third World is contrary to the norms of international behavior and a threat to the West.

-- Dramatic medium-term changes in Soviet policy are unlikely.

The study draws the following conclusions about Allied policy:

-- The twin pillars of Allied policy identified in the Harmel Report of 1967 -- the maintenance of a credible Western deterrent and the pursuit of constructive East-West dialogue -- remain valid.

-- However, the Allies must improve their military deterrent.

-- Moreover, the Allies must take a global view of their security.

-- Allies must remain patient and united in insisting on the need for greater Soviet restraint and respect for Western interests.

-- Allies should continue their efforts to engage the Soviets on the full range of our agenda.

-- Allies should strive peacefully to overcome the East-West division of Europe, particularly of Germany.

The study thus incorporates language which satisfies both the realists, led by the U.S., and the conciliators, led by Germany. On balance, we believe that the final product meets our objectives.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

5813

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATO Studies of East-West Economic Issues

As part of the post-La Sapiniere program, NATO's Economic Committee is now studying important aspects of East-West economic relations. In early 1983, the Committee began an extensive review of the security implications of East-West economic relations. The Committee's initial study was used by the NATO-country foreign ministers as the basis for their discussion of the topic during their meeting in Paris in June 1983. In the Paris communique, the ministers stressed that Alliance members should exercise caution in the transfer of technology, dependency relationships, and other economic dealings that could contribute to the military capabilities of the Soviet Union. It was emphasized that while mutually beneficial trade based on commercially sound terms contributes to constructive relations, the Allies must remain vigilant to avoid further use by the USSR of some trade relations to enhance its military strength. The same language was used in the December 1983 Brussels communique and will likely be included in the Washington communique.

The Economic Committee is now carrying out detailed analyses of those aspects of East-West economic relations identified in the 1983 study as having significant security implications for the Alliance (trade, energy, credits). Topics examined by the Committee during the past year include the financial situation of the Soviet Union and East European countries, Soviet economic relations with LDC's, Warsaw Pact military expenditures, and Soviet and East European agricultural and energy policies. During the coming year, the Economic Committee will update several of these studies and will carry out an in-depth analysis of key Soviet industrial sectors that contribute significantly to Soviet military capabilities. This study will include an examination of the role of Western technology in the development of the key Soviet industrial sectors. We anticipate that the findings of the study will indicate the need for effective controls on the transfer of Western high technologies to the Soviet Union.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

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EUROPEAN SECURITY COOPERATION - WEU

European interest in security cooperation within a European framework has revived in recent months. The French and the Germans are in the forefront of an initiative to revitalize the West European Union (WEU). The WEU, comprising the original EC-6 plus the UK, was established thirty years ago as part of a compromise which admitted the FRG to NATO while limiting its remilitarization. The Brussels Treaty which established the WEU specified that it would cooperate with NATO, and NATO has overshadowed the WEU since the beginning.

European Motives and Plans

The individual Allies approach the WEU issue from different perspectives and with different objectives. The French are the principal advocates of the initiative and see it as a means to curb what they consider a trend toward neutralism in the FRG and other European Allies. They also may see the WEU as a mechanism for organizing European armaments cooperation around a French pole. The Germans hope that the initiative will help to accelerate the slow pace of European unification. The UK is undecided on the initiative and wishes to ensure that no damage to the transatlantic relationship results. The initiative is also a response to the long-term growth in European concern over the strength and durability of the U.S. commitment to the security of Europe.

WEU members have told us that their initiative is intended to strengthen the European pillar of NATO, not to weaken the Alliance. Within this framework, member nations seem uncertain what their specific priorities might be. The WEU is preparing a series of options papers for a meeting of WEU foreign ministers now likely to take place on June 12. The British, who are the most skeptical major Ally in the WEU, expect little result from the meeting. A gathering of WEU defense ministers -- perhaps accompanied by foreign ministers -- has been tentatively scheduled for the thirtieth anniversary of the organization next October.

U.S. Policy

The traditional U.S. attitude has been support for European security cooperation which strengthens the Alliance and opposition to efforts which weaken or appear to weaken it as the principal and essential framework for Western security. As currently discussed, the WEU initiative will not undercut

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NATO and has only a modest prospect of generating practical achievements. We must of course continue to study the substance of any concrete WEU proposals. We would of course oppose anything like the French/Belgian idea of giving the WEU's Arms Control Agency an analytical, consultative role in international arms-control negotiations. We are asking that our Allies keep us informed of WEU developments in a timely fashion.

Our primary concern is over appearances rather than substance. As we have told our Allies, we must avoid any impression that Europeans are losing confidence in the U.S. commitment to their security or are preparing a security alternative to NATO. The best antidote to any perception of U.S.-European security differences is demonstrable unity at the NAC ministerial and the London Summit.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

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Conventional Defense Issues

Defense Spending and Burdensharing: Since 1977 the allies have had as a public commitment the goal of a 3% real increase in defense spending per year. In 1981 the allies increased their real defense spending by 2.8%, declining to 2.3% in 1982, and -- once all the figures are in -- we predict about 1.9% in 1983. Faced with continuing economic stagnation and cuts in almost all other government expenditures, the allies have done reasonably well to maintain any real increase in defense spending, but we believe that they can and should do more.

NATO Strategy and Conventional Defense: Traditionally, the U.S. has been dissatisfied with NATO's conventional deterrent, a concern which has grown as the Soviet nuclear potential has increased. Two legs of NATO's triad of forces, the US nuclear deterrent and INF, are in the process of being modernized. Thus, in 1984 we have been emphasizing the need to ensure that the conventional leg of the triad is strengthened to reduce NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons and underpin NATO's strategy of flexible response. There is a renewed interest in many quarters in Europe in strengthening conventional defense, partly as a reaction to the nuclear fears of recent years. At the same time, there are both doctrinal and financial obstacles which must be overcome if we are to achieve a significant improvement in Allied conventional defense efforts. Many in Europe have always feared that a substantial increase in conventional forces would downgrade nuclear deterrence and risk making Europe "safe for conventional war". Others have raised objections to some military tactics which might be employed by strengthened NATO conventional forces. In particular, the concept of deep interdiction of second echelon Soviet forces which both the US and NATO are considering has been criticized for introducing an allegedly offensive character to NATO plans. More mundanely, others simply reject the increased cost of a viable conventional defense.

Armaments Cooperation, the WEU and Emerging Technology: The Europeans have been traditionally dissatisfied with their share of the NATO armaments market. The current upwelling of European criticism was sparked in 1982 by such US protectionist legislation as that requiring only US origin specialty metals in equipment purchased by DOD. Since then, the "inequity" of the trans-Atlantic arms trade with our European allies -- running at an average of 6 to 1 in our favor -- has received

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extensive European publicity and political attention. Many Europeans have contended that US efforts to improve NATO defenses through introduction of high technology are really a device to continue US domination of the defense market within the Alliance.

Partly as a reaction to this feeling, and partly for broader political purposes, the French and the Germans are in the forefront of an initiative to revitalize the seven-nation West European Union (WEU), established 30 years ago. Earlier efforts to improve intra-European arms cooperation, including the Independent European Program Group (IEPG), have not produced significant results. In addition to improving the viability of European defense industries, the Germans hope that the initiative will help to keep alive the process of European unification while the French see it as a means to curb perceived trends toward neutralism in Germany. The Italians have been strongly supportive. The UK, the most skeptical major ally in the WEU, does not expect any significant results from the meeting of WEU Foreign Ministers scheduled for June 12.

For our part, we agree that any effort to increase European defense spending could be greatly influenced by the level of European participation in the production of new weapons. We have invited our allies to join with us in exploring emerging technologies (ET) to increase the effectiveness of NATO's conventional forces. ET is now a part of the NATO defense planning process. We and the Allies have agreed to give special emphasis to eleven ET projects, and we are examining additional projects and technologies with near-term potential for joint development. In the Congress, we are working to eliminate protectionist legislation.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

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Out-of-Area Security

The support of our NATO allies for US policy to deter, and if necessary, to defend vital Western interest world-wide has been an administration objective from the beginning. We do not seek to extend the geographical boundaries of NATO, which in any case would be politically impossible. What we do seek is tangible evidence of allied support in three areas. Primarily we want our allies to facilitate (overflight, landing, logistic support) US out-of-area deployments, compensate (additional reserve units, air and sea lift capabilities) for those US forces thus diverted from European defense, and participate (militarily, politically and economically) in areas of special importance to the West.

The Allies continue to respond with caution. They suspect, inter alia, that at the heart of the US initiative is a desire for readjustments in Alliance defense responsibilities; there are also economic constraints. Given their current difficulties in meeting NATO defense spending goals, the Allies see few possibilities for major additional contributions to compensate, within the treaty area, for US forces diverted elsewhere. Politically, some fear that formalized understandings on out-of-area cooperation would be seen by their publics as an open-ended endorsement of US policies or of threat perceptions with which they might disagree. Militarily, many allies worry that US contingency planning for SWA creates the possibility of trapping US forces far from Europe during a NATO crisis.

Because of these European attitudes, we have put considerable emphasis on the US commitment to deter any threat to the strategically vital area of Southwest Asia. It is in SWA that the allies can provide the most important contribution and where European interests (e.g. oil, Suez transit, Soviet presence near the Gulf) are most clearly drawn. At the same time, we have worked hard to coordinate policy with France, Britain and Italy on Lebanon. While we do seek allied political and economic support for US policy in Central America, we have attempted to avoid any inference that we want a European security contribution to that region. In any case, such a contribution would be of relatively little real importance militarily and would prove politically divisive. Similarly, we have sought European support for our diplomatic initiatives in Southern Africa.

We have also been careful to keep separate the NATO and the bilateral aspects of our diplomatic effort. Because direct Soviet military action to seize the Gulf would require a

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massive US response (e.g. 7 US divisions, 3 carrier battle groups, 30 squadrons), our ability to reinforce NATO simultaneously would be severely restricted. However, we have told our allies that regardless of any SWA contingency the US commitment remains to provide 10 divisions within ten days of the outbreak of a NATO war. What would be affected are the follow-on US reinforcements. Thus the issue of planning to compensate for this potential diversion of US forces is clearly a NATO planning problem. On the other hand, facilitating US deployments and participating with US forces outside the NATO Treaty Area are issues for bilateral agreements.

We have also emphasized that a Soviet invasion of the Gulf is the least likely scenario but, nonetheless, one which must be deterred. We acknowledge that the main threats to vital Western interest in SWA are internal subversion and intra-regional conflict. Thus, allied economic and military assistance programs as well as even a modest military presence in the region can be vitally important in demonstrating to friend and foe a common Western commitment.

Within NATO, we have obtained clear public expressions of support for US policy to extend deterrence to SWA. These statements -- primarily in Ministerial and Summit communiques -- acknowledge the need to compensate for US out-of-area deployments and the importance of tangible support from individual allies. NATO military authorities have already drawn up specific compensatory measures which we are working to incorporate in the defense plans each ally submits to the Alliance for the 1985-90 NATO planning period.

Bilaterally, we have obtained excellent cooperation with a number of allies in the Sinai and in Lebanon, in addition to the military presence which the British and French continue to maintain in the SWA region. Both military and political contingency discussions are taking place with increasing urgency with regard to the Iran-Iraq conflict. The contact group for southern Africa as well as bilateral contacts with Portugal have proved useful. Lastly, European support for our Central American efforts has increased. Several countries sent observers to the recent elections in El Salvador and many have come to adopt a more balanced approach to Nicaragua. In this context an important development is the French decision not to enter in new sales agreements with the Sandinistas.

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5819	PAPER GREECE, TURKEY AND NATO	1	ND	B1

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SPAIN AND NATO

Positive Trends Continue

Prime Minister Gonzalez is still feeling his way on how to manage a successful referendum on NATO without risking Socialist party unity, communist gains, or his own credibility. While personally convinced that the risks of withdrawal are unacceptably high, he has still not felt ready publicly to endorse NATO membership. Nevertheless, he has so far been able to silence party critics and taken steps to prevent the Socialist congress (scheduled for December) from tying his hands on the issue. He has also hinted that the GOS will adopt a pro-NATO stand prior to the referendum, now expected during the first half of 1985.

The public has thus been conditioned to think in terms of continued Spanish membership and the trend-line of opinion on NATO has reversed itself (albeit modestly). This suggests that anti-NATO attitudes may be susceptible to change once a firm decision by the leadership is made. Finally, Gonzalez is counting on EC accession, an economic upturn, and continued progress against terrorism to strengthen his political hand by the end of the year.

But Major Hurdles Remain

The bottom line remains that there is very little pro-NATO sentiment in Spain. Communist disarray has somewhat reduced pressures from the left, but Socialist popularity has dropped and this could increase their reluctance to take on an unpopular fight on NATO. EC entry is not yet tied down. Economic recovery is not clearly visible. And Gonzalez could come under heavy pressure to sweeten a referendum by explicitly disavowing full integration.

And The Integration Issue Is Key

Increasingly, the Spanish are focusing on how, not whether, Spain should participate in the Alliance. Gonzalez has told us he envisions a NATO role that stops short of, but does not foreclose full military integration. The Spanish want to discuss integration issues with us in the next few months, with a view to taking an internal GOS decision prior to the December party congress. Our objective will be to make clear that Spanish participation in NATO cannot simply be political, that Spain must make a military contribution, and that full integration should not be foreclosed. With our encouragement, EC-member allies are taking the lead, in part because the EC accession issue gives them special leverage.

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
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POLAND

Government/ Party

General Jaruzelski appears to be firmly in control. Any challenge to his authority would most likely come from hardliners who favor closer relations with Moscow and a tougher line on dissent.



Church/ State

The issue of religious symbols in public places has been quiet since the compromise in Mietno/Garwolin. Compromise cannot bridge the gulf that separates the fundamental positions of Church and State on this issue but neither side wants to provoke a confrontation.

The Polish parliament passed legislation approving the establishment of autonomous foundations such as the Church wants to administer its plan to channel private and public aid from the West to private agriculture in Poland. Specific statutes for the Church foundations remain to be set out before the Church foundation can be set up. Approval of the statutes is expected in the early summer.

The Opposition/ Political Prisoners

Underground publications continue to proliferate. Underground Solidarity (main organization: the TKK) remains active and claims that one million Poles still pay dues to the union organization. As participation in demonstrations on "anniversaries" in Poland diminishes, the TKK no longer stakes its prestige on calls for demonstrations. The TKK has, however, called for a boycott of local elections scheduled for June 17. The government has said that participation level of over 50% would be satisfactory.

The number of political prisoners has risen over the past four months from 217 in December to 427 at the end of March according to official figures. In addition, according to the government spokesmen, 686 people were detained after May 1 and May 3 demonstrations. Most of these will probably be fined and released although a few have been sentenced to jail.

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Members of the Polish Primate's Committee for Aid recently visited two prisons in Poland and met all political prisoners. Their preliminary reports indicate poor to terrible conditions. Church-State negotiations on the fate of the Solidarity Seven and KOR Four has become public knowledge. To date no deal has been struck, but according to the most recent press reports, efforts continue. Apparently, some of the prisoners are willing to accept government conditions while others insist on unconditional release or a trial.

Economy

The Polish economy has shown some growth but systemic problems remain. The Jaruzelski government is nominally committed to reform but has been either unwilling or unable to implement meaningful reform measures. The Poles have accepted the German compromise for dealing with the Polish debt to official creditors, endorsed by the U.S., at the Paris Club but have not yet paid the percentage of the 1981 arrearages stipulated in the agreement. The Paris Club next meets on Poland on May 21.

Polish-American Bilateral Relations

Bilateral relations remain poor. The Poles published a "White Book" on bilateral relations 1981-83 which rehashes familiar charges against the U.S.G. Our step-by-step approach towards the government in Poland remains in place. We await positive developments in Poland that would prompt us take appropriate measures in response.

ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPING MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE

Turkey, Greece, and Portugal are considered by NATO to be developing members of the Alliance. The U.S. provides the lion's share of aid to these countries; together with Spain, they currently receive more than 20% of all US security assistance. The FRG is the next largest aid contributor. Other allies provide less significant assistance, which NATO attempts to coordinate through an Ad Hoc Group set up for this purpose.

Turkey: In the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement of 1980, the US pledged its "best efforts" to help Turkey meet its modernization goals and maintain aging equipment in its inventory. The NATO Defense Planning Committee estimates some 40% of Turkey's force goals for 1983-1988 can be met only with outside help. In FY 83 we provided \$687.7 million in assistance. In FY 84 we substantially increased this figure to \$856.1 million: \$130 million in MAP grants, \$585 million in FMS credits, \$138 million in ESF, and \$3.1 million in IMET. For FY 85, the Administration has requested \$934 million for Turkey on greatly improved terms: \$230 million MAP, \$250 million in low-interest direct FMS loans, and \$275 million in normal, market-rate FMS guaranteed loans, \$175 million in ESF, and \$4 million in IMET.

Portugal: As much as 75% of Portugal's current force goals may require outside assistance to be met. Following a sharp drop in security assistance in FY 82, we have sought to increase our aid to Portugal. In FY 83, we provided \$112 million in assistance. The figure for FY 84 is \$148.4 million: \$60 million in MAP, \$45 million in FMS, \$40 million in ESF and \$3.4 million in IMET. For FY 85, the Administration has requested \$208 million for Portugal (\$70 million MAP, \$55 million FMS, \$80 million in ESF, and \$3 million in IMET). Assistance by other allies centers on a program by Portugal to build three frigates. The status of this program currently is uncertain due to Portuguese reluctance to start construction without firm commitments from NATO participants to fully fund this program.

Greece: In both FY 82 and 83, we provided Greece with \$280 million in FMS credits. Our allocation in FY 84 is \$500 million in FMS credits, and we expect Congress to approve our recommendation to maintain this level in FY 85.

Spain: Although not considered a developing country, Spain receives US bilateral assistance to help it modernize its military forces. In line with our "best efforts" commitment under last year's bilateral agreement, we are providing Spain in FY 84 with \$400 million FMS credits, \$12 million in ESF, and some \$2.4 million in IMET. Similar amounts have been requested for FY 85.

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TERRORISM

The Europeans have demonstrated an effective capability to deal with domestic terrorism, and such terrorism dropped considerably in 1983 in both The Federal Republic of Germany and Italy. Nevertheless, Europe had the highest incidence of international terrorism of any area of the world. We look to Europe for a high level of cooperation on combatting terrorism worldwide. The intelligence abilities of the Western European services can play an important role in enhancing our ability to secure early warning and other information about terrorist groups and individuals.

An additional consideration is the extent to which there is a Soviet link to terrorism occurring in Western Europe. Most West European terrorism is conducted in opposition to US and/or NATO interests. While we have not developed much in the way of hard evidence of a Soviet link, it appears likely that there is more to explain the large scale of domestic and international terrorism in Western Europe than mere freedom of movement in Europe for Middle East and other groups.

Western Europe also served as the locale for the activities of international terrorist groups--especially those connected to the Middle East. Summaries of events in several countries follow:

In Federal Republic of Germany, terrorist activity declined in 1983. INF deployment began on schedule, with little violence and no apparent terrorist involvement. Most attacks were committed by the Revolutionary Cells. The Red Army Faction showed no sign of resurgence. Right-wing terrorists suffered setbacks, with members of the Kexel-Hepp group (responsible for attacks on the US military community in 1982) arrested and the banning of the Action Front of National Socialists (neo-Nazi) by the FRG.

In Italy, terrorist activity was drastically reduced in 1983. Italian counterterrorist successes resulted in numerous arrests of Red Brigades and other terrorists. There were no major attacks against US interests, although violent confrontations between police and anti-INF protestors occurred. By year's end, it appeared that some groups might be reorganizing.

In Greece, 1983 was characterized by bombings and assassinations against a variety of targets. A number of incidents involved US interests--the most notable being the assassination of Naval Captain George Tsantes by the November 17 group.

France was the site of numerous terrorist attacks by a variety of international terrorist groups. Armenians continued to attack Turkish targets. The US pavilion at the Marseilles International Trade Fair was destroyed. Carlos claimed responsibility for the bombing of a high-speed train and a railway station. Basque and Corsican violence escalated, with more than 550 bombings in Corsica alone.

In Spain, 1983 saw attacks primarily against Spanish Government targets by Basque terrorists. A number of small-scale bombing attacks against US firms in the Basque country (to protest US policy in Latin America) occurred.

Irish terrorism continued sporadically in 1983. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) suffered a severe setback with the conviction of 140 of its members. However, 19 hard-core PIRA members escaped from Maze prison, contributing to the group's resurgence by year's end. The Irish Government outlawed the Irish National Liberation Army (a Marxist offshoot of the IRA). Armenian terrorism continued to focus on Turkish targets throughout Western Europe. The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) conducted attacks in Istanbul, France and Portugal. By year's end, a splinter group of ASALA, the ASALA Revolutionary Movement, emerged. The other major Armenian group, the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide, was also active in Western Europe. However, after July, Armenian terrorism was absent--perhaps explained by a series of arrests. In early 1984, three members of the Justice Commandos were convicted in the assassinations of Turkish diplomats in Los Angeles and Belgrade. Seven ASALA members (three in Los Angeles and four in Paris) were convicted of extortion and murder, respectively.