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TERRY TERRIFF

1

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
5794	MEMO	DICK BOVERIE TO AL MYER, BOB HELM, PHIL DUR, R: FRG MOD <i>R 4/5/2012 F2000-089/1</i>	1	11/19/1982	B1
5795	MEMO	DON FORTIER TO WILLIAM CLARK, RE: YOUR MEETING WITH FRG DEFENSE MINISTER MANFRED WOERNER, NOVEMBER 9 AT 3:15 PM <i>R 4/5/2012 F2000-089/1</i>	2	11/8/1982	B1
5796	SUMMARY	BIO <i>D 7/5/2006 F00-089</i>	1	10/13/1982	B1 B3
5797	MEMO	PHIL DUR TO GENERAL BOVERIE, RE; NATO <i>R 4/5/2012 F2000-089/1</i>	1	11/9/1982	B1
5798	MEMO	DICK BOVERIE TO BOB LINHARD/OLLIE NORTH, RE: SITE SECURITY	1	11/16/1982	B1
5799	CABLE	#012050Z DEC 82	4	12/1/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 22, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR PHIL DUR ✓
BOB HELM
RICHARD LEVINE
AL MYER
OLLIE NORTH

NATO file

FROM: DICK BOVERIE *Dick*
SUBJECT: Defense Issues

The issues in the attached recent articles are representative of the numerous defense issues related to NATO and other alliances which the defense group should be squarely on top of. I find it unconscionable that the defense group in the White House has essentially no role in, or even direct knowledge of, such matters. In these areas, we just read the newspapers and watch the train go by. When I return from TDY, we should get together and figure out a way to get on top of all of this. No more dallying -- time is up.

This should not be confused with political issues, which are handled very nicely by the NSC staff regional offices.

Attachments

- Tab I Washington Post article, Oct 22, 1982, p. A21, "How to Get Less from the Allies," by Robert W. Komer.
- Tab II Baltimore Sun article, Oct 21, 1982, p. 9, "Senators set for battle over size of America's European force," by Charles Corddry.
- Tab III Pittsburgh Press article, Oct 15, 1982, p. B2, "Soviets Aim for Allied Weapons," by Lance Gay
- Tab IV Los Angeles Times Editorial, Oct 18, 1982, "Defense Without Nuclear Arms."

P.S. I have talked to Jon Howe about whether it might be useful to reinvigorate the IG on NATO conventional forces. Jon responded positively; we'll probably see some action soon.



Robert W. Komer

How to Get Less From the Allies

When Congress complains about inadequate allied sharing of the burdens of the common defense, it often turns out that Congress is part of the problem. Let me cite two classic examples of how not to get more burden-sharing from our allies.

After three years of hard negotiating, Germany generously agreed that it would assign 93,000 German reservists to wartime support by the host nation of U.S.

"Those in Congress who beef about inadequate burden-sharing usually don't know the facts."

forces in Europe—a major breakthrough as far as sharing the burden is concerned. Bonn would pay and train these soldiers and it would requisition for them in an emergency such civilian equipment as is available in Germany. The United States would pay for equipment not available from these German resources.

All in all, the Germans would pay roughly half the total five-year cost and the United States the other half. The Defense Department estimates that to provide the same capability with U.S. reserve or active forces would cost from 10 to 40 times as much. If this isn't equitable burden-sharing, I don't know what is.

But the Senate Appropriations Com-

mittee, in its wisdom, has cut out the \$39 million requested for the first U.S. contribution, in part ostensibly because the specifics weren't firmed up but in reality because of the complaint that our allies are not contributing enough to NATO.

How's that for tortured reasoning? When the Defense Department does finally negotiate an agreement by which our most important NATO ally provides

more to NATO, and for the first time in NATO history offers soldiers to support U.S. forces, Congress throws it out the window.

Moreover, Germany is one country that even Sen. Ted Stevens, chairman of the defense Appropriations subcommittee, admits is pulling its own weight in NATO. Since Germany drafts its soldiers, it gets more men for the deutschmark than we do for the dollar. It also provides free of charge enormous real estate and facilities for our forces. In wartime, it would even provide the battlefields.

Unfortunately, those in Congress who beef about inadequate burden-sharing usually don't know the facts. If they want

to target a country that doesn't pull its own weight by any measure, why not pick on Japan instead of Germany? Japan is the quintessential example of a country that selfishly under-contributes to the common defense. Its nine-tenths of 1 percent of GNP for defense is less than that of even Denmark or Canada.


Yet the Defense Department in its wisdom has just proposed to deploy a new wing of F16 fighter bombers to northern Japan. We will send some 3,500 more men as well.

No doubt there are sound military reasons for doing so, but I cannot think of anything less likely to encourage Japan to spend more on its own defense. Indeed when I was in the Pentagon, I argued long and hard for a reduction in the U.S. commitment precisely to put the bee on Tokyo to do more.

Why not a Japanese F16 wing? Sen. Stevens should certainly look into this matter. At the least, he should ask the Japanese to fund the entire multi-billion dollar equipment as well as stationing costs of U.S. forces deployed forward for their own defense.

The writer was undersecretary of defense for policy in the Carter administration.

WASHINGTON POST, OCT 22, 1982 (P. A21)



11

Senators set for battle over size of America's European force

By Charles W. Corddry
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—A new Senate confrontation over the size of America's military force in Europe seemingly was assured yesterday when Senator Sam Nunn (D, Ga.) announced he would try to overturn a troop-cut measure and get strength frozen at present levels.

The fight, projected for the December post-election congressional session, could be the hottest on the troop issue in more than a decade—barring some now unexpected compromise with Senator Ted Stevens, the assistant majority leader, who is the prime mover for cuts.

The Reagan administration has said through Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger that troop reductions would be "disastrous." It thus seems likely to be at least partially allied with the Georgia Democrat against Mr. Stevens, an Alaska Republican who received full Republican backing in the Senate defense appropriations subcommittee.

With the outcome now far from clear, the troop-cut fight turns on such issues as high U.S. defense spending at a time of big federal deficits, the adequacy of European contributions to Western security and pique over European support for the trans-Siberian gas pipeline.

Mr. Nunn, who is a leading Senate authority on Western defense, said in a speech yesterday that U.S. troop strength must not be calculated "on the basis of anger and fiscal frustration."

The senator contended that unilateral American cuts now would undermine chances of negotiating East-West limitations on conventional military forces, and reduction of nuclear arms in Central Europe as well.

To that extent, he fully backed the Reagan administration. But he also proposed a freeze on current U.S. troop strength in Europe until the allies join in a plan for viable conventional (non-nuclear) defense. This would use available new weapons technologies and military tactics for defeating attack with deep strikes against the attacker's reinforcing units.

Mr. Nunn has allies in the conventional-defense pursuit, including Manfred Woerner, the new West German defense minister, and Gen. Bernard W. Rogers, the American who commands NATO forces in Europe.

The administration plans to increase the number of U.S. troops in Europe by several thousand in fiscal 1983 and so is unlikely to throw full

SENATORS . . . Pg. 4

WASHINGTON POST 21 October 1982 Pg. 28

Moroccan King Here to Pursue Reagan's Bid for Mideast Peace

By John M. Goshko
and Richard M. Weintraub
Washington Post Staff Writers

A high-level Arab delegation headed by Morocco's King Hassan II arrived here yesterday for discussions with President Reagan on Friday about his peace initiative for the region.

Today Secretary of State George P. Shultz will meet with Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir for the third time in a week to review the problems impeding an agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli and other foreign forces from Lebanon.

The two sets of meetings involve what U.S. officials call "the separate but parallel tracks" that the administration is pursuing in hope of resolving what it regards as the two most urgent problems affecting the region: settlement of the Lebanon crisis and, beyond that, ending the Arab-Israeli conflict.

But despite the flurry of diplomatic activity—which also included a meeting Tuesday between Reagan and Lebanon's new president, Amin Gemayal—the prognosis among U.S. officials and other diplomatic observers is that many weeks, and probably months, will be required before there are any signs of even a tentative breakthrough on either problem.

Administration sources now concede that Shultz, who had hoped to capitalize on the momentum of Reagan's Sept. 1 speech outlining his initiative by going to the Middle East this fall, now believes there is no point in attempting such a journey until next year.

As State Department spokesman John Hughes said yesterday in response to questions about the purposes of the Arab delegation's visit, "It's one more step in a continuing process. It may seem lengthy and drawn out. But it's a complex process and it's going to take time."

In addition to Hassan, the Arab delegation is expected to include representatives of Syria, Saudi Ara-

bia, Jordan, Tunisia and Algeria.

Its aim is to explain to Reagan the stance the Arab League adopted last month in Fez, Morocco, calling for Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories and establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

On its face, the Fez declaration is a rejection of Reagan's initiative, which advocates eventual autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza "in association with Jordan."

However, U.S. officials have tended to regard the Fez declaration as an opening position for protracted diplomacy that eventually might move the Arab states closer to the U.S. position; and the administration is encouraged by one provision in the Fez statement implying an eventual Arab recognition of Israel's right to exist.

Shamir had been visiting Costa Rica and stopped in the United States for 24 hours en route home. Reliable sources said Shultz offered last week to have Reagan's special Lebanon negotiator, Morris Draper, meet Shamir in New York to brief the Israeli minister on Gemayal's visit, but it later was decided to have Shultz and Shamir talk directly.

The meetings with Shamir and Gemayal made clear that there is a gulf between Israel's proposals for a security zone in southern Lebanon that would leave the region effectively under Israeli control and Gemayal's preference for giving the job of policing such a zone to an expanded multinational force that probably would have to include U.S. troops.

Draper will return to the area over the weekend to make a new try at cutting through the differences, but there is growing pessimism in official U.S. circles about the chances of getting an agreement that will see foreign forces withdrawn from Lebanon by year's end.

PITTSBURGH PRESS 15 OCTOBER 1982 (20) Pg. B2

Soviets Aim For Allied Weapons

By LANCE GAY
Scripps-Howard Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — For the first time in more than 20 years, the Soviet Union has revised its military tactics in Europe and created a division-sized armored force to burst through the front line of battle and capture Allied nuclear weapons.

Gen. Bernard Rogers, supreme allied commander of NATO forces in Europe, told reporters the new Soviet strategy was tested for the first time last year during Warsaw Pact exercises on the Polish border.

"Although it is new in this age, I think it reverts to the mobile forces the Soviets had in World War II," Rogers said. "Its purpose is to get into our rear and attack our command and control centers and logistics. But its most important function is to get to our nuclear-capable units."

The 12,000 men assigned to the new Soviet division were drawn from existing forces in East Germany. They are equipped with 350 tanks, 140 artillery pieces and about 100 attack helicopters.

Rogers expects to see three or four more of the highly mobile divisions created as soon as the new strategy is implemented.

The change in tactics takes advantage of the central strategic weakness of NATO war plans, which call for committing all available forces in Europe to a front-line defense.

Normal military strategy calls for keeping one-third of the forces in reserve, but the NATO plan counts on quickly moving forces from America to Europe to back up front-line units.

The new Soviet divisions would attempt to break through the front lines and speed toward American units that are equipped to handle nuclear weapons.

WASH POST 20 OCT Pg. 6

U.S. Overstated Its Savings, GAO Audit Report Contends

Associated Press

The Reagan administration may have overstated budgetary savings by \$5.8 billion because of questionable reporting procedures, congressional auditors said yesterday.

The General Accounting Office told a congressional panel that \$5.8 billion in savings reported by a presidential council reflected management commitments that might or might not result in savings.

The GAO recommended that the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency make a separate report showing what commitments were carried out and ended up saving money.

STEALTH...Continued

plant in Evendale, Ohio.

Thus, to its extreme discomfort, the East Hartford-based Pratt & Whitney Group of the nation's second-largest defense contractor, United Technologies Corp., has been relegated to the role of a spectator while its arch-rival, General Electric, suits up for the starting lineup in both major bomber projects.

The plan to produce a Stealth version of the B-1 — an apparent move to provide some price competition for Northrop — involves a third California firm, the Lockheed Corp. of Burbank. Lockheed, a loser to Northrop in the contest to do the initial Stealth design work, has teamed up with Rockwell International, builder of the B-1.

Amid Air Force claims that it has nothing to do with the project, Rockwell and Lockheed are putting their heads together to develop a Stealth version of the B-1.

Their new radar-evading B-1, ostensibly, would be a long-range interceptor — not a long-range bomber like the present B-1.

But the Lockheed-Rockwell plan is drawing skeptical reaction. The reason: the B-1 isn't your everyday, garden variety interceptor. An interceptor is an aircraft that is designed to shoot down attacking enemy bombers, missiles and fighters.

In today's modern air warfare, an interceptor is a supersonic, highly maneuverable fighter. The Navy's F-14 Tomcat and the Air Force F-15 Eagle, both less than a third the size of the B-1, are the two top U.S. interceptors in the skies today.

Some military critics are openly scoffing at the idea that the Air Force would actually buy an aircraft that weighs 477,000 pounds to be used as an interceptor.

"I've never heard of a plane this big being used as an interceptor," a House Appropriations Committee staff member told Defense Week, a leading defense industry publication.

The Pentagon also smells something obvious. The usually well-informed industry publication reported that Defense Department officials are fretting over the Rockwell-Lockheed B-1 project because they also envision the proposed aircraft as a potential competitor to the Stealth bomber.

Despite Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger's credo that competition keeps down costs, many Air Force types fear that a B-1 Stealth bomber would accomplish the opposite. Developing two Stealth bombers could double development costs, enrage Congress and endanger both projects, an industry ex-

pert said.

Lockheed's famous "Skunkworks," the research unit that has developed many U.S. secret weapons, including the high-flying U-2 spy plane, has been working on Stealth technology for years. The aerospace grapevine has buzzed with reports that Lockheed has already developed a prototype of a Stealth fighter. It is reportedly about the size of the Navy's F-18 fighter and has some of the design configuration of the space shuttle.

Stealth technology — the ability to hide an aircraft's radar signature — is actually a combination of many design and engineering innovations. The basic idea is to deny flat surfaces, reflecting materials and heat to probing radar signals.

Rounded surfaces, smaller tails, special plastic coatings, thermal paints and other techniques are being designed into Stealth aircraft to absorb or diffuse the radar beams.

With no surfaces or materials to bounce from, the enemy radar picks up no images. The operator's scope remains blissfully clear of any threats. In theory, opposing interceptors and ground-to-air missile sites are not alerted and the Stealth bombers can streak unmolested toward their targets.

The new Rockwell-Lockheed venture will be privately funded under a memorandum of understanding between the two firms, say various published reports. Lockheed will employ its Stealth knowledge to design new wing edges for the Rockwell-built aircraft. The team will also design new engine inlets, doors and radar domes for the B-1. The initial work, however, is expected to be simply a paper airplane — a concept rather than an actual design.

General Electric is not involved in the Rockwell-Lockheed effort. But since the big engine firm is already a contractor on the official B-1 and Stealth projects, it is expected to be more than a casual observer of the Rockwell-Lockheed Stealth effort.

Modern jet engines present an especially critical problem for Stealth aircraft. Powerful heat blasts from the jet's exhaust, coupled with the engine's revolving fan blades, reportedly account for more than 70 percent of an aircraft's radar image.

With its feet firmly planted in both the B-1 and Stealth projects, General Electric appears to be in a can't-lose situation. No matter who wins a possible Stealth bomber competition, the aircraft will have General Electric engines, unless Pratt & Whitney manages to join the Rockwell-Lockheed alliance.

IV

EDITORIALS

LOS ANGELES TIMES 18 October 1982 (20)

Defense Without Nuclear Arms

Gen. Bernard W. Rogers, supreme commander of Allied forces in Europe, is hardly a member of the ban-the-bomb crowd. But he is convinced that, given the advances being made in conventional, non-nuclear weapons, Western Europe could be successfully defended without recourse to the atomic arsenal. Furthermore, he and a number of other military leaders and defense experts have begun to say so.

The emergence of a public dialogue on the subject is extremely encouraging. Elimination of the present heavy reliance on tactical nuclear weapons for European defense would probably do more than all the arms control talks held until now to reduce the danger of ultimate nuclear catastrophe.

As things stand, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies have an advantage in numbers of troops, tanks, aircraft and other conventional weapons.

They also are better prepared to sustain their forces in combat with personnel replacements, ready reserve units, stockpiled ammunition and equipment, and the like.

As Rogers puts it, "we measure our ability to sustain combat in Europe in days, whereas we can estimate the Warsaw Pact's sustainability in weeks or months. . . . We would have to go to theater nuclear weapons fairly rapidly because we don't have the conventional strength to hold them."

Allied military men were uncomfortable over this prospect long before the present anti-nuclear movement in Europe ever began—partly because of the danger of escalation to a nuclear holocaust, and partly because they consider over-reliance on nuclear weapons unwise anyway.

Their unease has increased as the result of a new Soviet doctrine—already tested in maneuvers—under which any invasion would feature a lightning thrust to overwhelm Allied strong points and win the war before Allied leaders could make the grim political decision to go nuclear.

Considering the unwillingness of the European and American people to spend what was thought

necessary to support a purely non-nuclear defense, however, the generals were unable until recently to see any alternative.

In the view of Rogers and a number of other experts, the picture is changing because of improvements already under way in the NATO forces, more adequate stocks of ammunition and, most important, improvements in non-nuclear weapons technology.

The United States has developed and tested a number of non-nuclear devices capable of destroying runways, mauling widely dispersed tank forces and penetrating tough shelters protecting Soviet nerve centers.

Not all the bugs have been worked out. But James Digby, a Rand Corp. expert on the subject, says, "the problems are of a sort that can be solved"

If an effective non-nuclear defense existed on the NATO side, it would not only reduce the danger that a war, once started, would go nuclear. It would also reduce the possibility of a Soviet invasion occurring in the first place because Kremlin planners would be unable to dream up scenarios in which Soviet forces overran Europe while Western political leaders wrestled with the terrible decision to use nuclear weapons.

Rogers argues that the switch to reliance on a non-nuclear defense, while costing billions of dollars, would be less expensive than many people think. If the Allied nations were willing to increase military spending by 4% a year instead of the 3% that is currently the goal, he says, a credible conventional defense could be in place by the end of the 1980s.

According to his figures, that works out to about \$23 a year for each man, woman and child in the NATO countries.

With the world economy in a near-depression, winning approval for even a relatively modest increase wouldn't be easy. But if reducing the dangers of nuclear war is as important as most of us believe, the option is one that deserves high-priority study in Washington and Allied capitals.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5794

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL


Nov 9, 1982

TO: AL MYER
BOB HELM
PHIL DUR ✓

NATO

Attached is a memo prepared by the regional policy office for the meeting today between the new FRG MOD and Judge Clark. (I will attend the meeting.) Given our current situation, I had suggested that the regional office take the lead in preparing the paper for today's meeting. However, the memo was not coordinated with us, even though defense and arms control are our business. Note references to INF, nuclear freeze, General Rogers' pronouncements on NATO doctrine, etc.

As we crank up our efforts to get on top of NATO defense issues, I hope that our office is able to take the lead for visits by MODs, whose responsibilities are defense matters, not foreign policy. (The regional offices would appear to be appropriate for visits by Foreign Ministers.) The key to taking the lead is to be, in fact, acknowledged, respected, involved leaders in this area.


Dick Boverie

cc: Sven Kraemer
Bob Linhard

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NLRR F00-089/1 #5794
BY RW NARA DATE 4/5/12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

November 8, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: DON FORTIER

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with FRG Defense Minister
Manfred Woerner, November 9 at 3:15 p.m.

Background: Manfred Woerner is superbly equipped, by background, temperament, and philosophical disposition to take the helm of the German Defense Ministry. He is someone with whom we should be able to work well. Woerner is widely known within the US defense community; believes strongly in the need for improved NATO defense; and is sympathetic with the bulk of the Reagan Administration's defense policy. Your meeting with him should be quite positive in tone. Woerner met yesterday with the Vice President and various Senators and Congressmen. He will also be meeting with Secretaries Weinberger and Shultz. (Bio at Tab A) (C)

Points Woerner May Raise: Woerner may seek your views on 1) the nuclear freeze movement in the US; 2) prospects for the Reagan defense budget; and 3) ways to ensure the Kohl visit is a success. He will want to gauge how strenuously the President will oppose troop withdrawal amendments in Congress. He may also raise the issue of General Rodgers pronouncements on NATO doctrine (though this has presumably been laid to rest) and the question of INF equipment going into the UK ahead of the time it arrives in the FRG.

Points and Questions Worth Covering

-- Appreciate political efforts you have made to increase defense spending at a time of domestic retrenchment. Still, new FRG levels are less than 1% in real terms and fall well short of current 3% goals. We hope FRG defense spending will be augmented in days ahead. Only if we are seen to be moving ahead together can we deprive our respective legislatures with an excuse for backsliding.

-- We are interested to hear from you regarding your recent defense consultations with the French. Should we expect deep cuts in French conventional forces as they seek to find funding for nuclear improvements? Will you be able to moderate this?

-- What last minute surprises might we expect from the Soviets - in either negotiating proposals or rhetoric - in their effort to derail INF deployment. Are there specific actions we can take to publicly reinforce the seriousness with which we take INF and START talks?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NLRR F00-D89/1 #5795

BY RW NARA DATE 4/5/12

-- We hope to continue to increase support for Turkey - vital to NATO and the Persian Gulf. US Congress, however, is becoming harder to convince. They ask: Why should we do more than our allies. Could we pursue - perhaps in connection with the Chancellor's visit - a new understanding on ways to jointly increase support for Turkey? This also gives us something new and concrete to point to during debates on troop reduction from Europe. (C)

Tab A Bio of Woerner

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NATO (10/22/1982-11/16/1982)

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
5796	SUMMARY BIO	1	10/13/1982	B1

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NATO

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

9 Nov 1982

TO: AL MYER
BOB HELM
PHIL DUR ✓
SVEN KRAEMER
BOB LINHARD

FYI.

Dick
Dick Boverie

Atch

Buckslip to William P. Clark w/DOD
Press Release attached.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

2:05
November 9, 1982

TO: WILLIAM P. CLARK

Attached is the DoD press release on the just-completed meeting between Secretary Weinberger and FRG MOD Woerner. I recommend that you scan it before your 3:00 meeting with Woerner.


Dick Boverie

cc: Don Fortier
Dennis Blair

Press Statement

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Minister of Defense Manfred Woerner had an excellent discussion covering a wide range of defense issues and strategic questions in great depth.

- Among the topics discussed was the requirement to improve the conventional strength of the Alliance, as agreed to at the NATO Summit in Bonn. Secretary Weinberger and Minister Woerner agreed that their governments were determined to move ahead on this initiative.
- Secretary Weinberger expressed his appreciation to MOD Woerner for the German contribution to wartime host nation support and, in particular, for the German determination fully to implement this commitment.
- Secretary Weinberger and MOD Woerner also discussed the funding for NATO infrastructure. Secretary Weinberger was gratified that, in spite of current economic difficulties, MOD Woerner confirmed that the Federal Republic was taking a significant step forward on infrastructure funding.
- The Ministers reaffirmed the "dual track" decision of the Alliance for the deployment of Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces. They reconfirmed that their

governments continue to attach equal importance to each
rack, and that they are determined to proceed with
the agreed deployment if the proposed arms control
solution, to eliminate these missiles entirely,
should not be accepted by the Soviet Union.

- The two Ministers had most fruitful discussions
and were fully in agreement on the broad issues of
alliance strategy.

NATO

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 9, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL BOVERIE

FROM: PHIL DUR
SUBJECT: NATO

TAX
Duck B.

I'll first want to make sure that we have the capability, standing, and involvement

I think that your comments on the preparations for the Woerner visit were to the point. My own sense is that we should have as a minimum cleared-off on what Don Fortier wrote. To this end, could we send a memo to all the regional guys announcing our readiness to take the lead where regional defense issues are concerned?

From our visit with DoD last week and based upon a conversation with the NATO AO's in PM, it is apparent that the priorities on the NATO conventional forces agenda, such as it is, are largely political. The PM Action Officer is confused about what we would like to see on the agenda since State and DoD appear to be in agreement about things like:

- What to do with the advanced technology and air-land battle studies
- What is to be done next about the MRP

White House?

maybe not as clear as it once was, given results of Woerner/Wainberg discussion this a.m.

agree

agree

My own sense of it is that there is a pervasive reluctance in DoD to examine military issues in the alliance on their own merits. The exception to this is the J-3 in OJCS. I believe that the next round of Appropriations hearings is going to force us into some rather hard-nosed examinations of NATO defense issues where the military logic for what we are doing -- and not doing -- is scrutinized by the likes of Sam Nunn and his staff. (Jeff Record's piece is another indication that the debate on this is heating up).

or is it PM-ESP co-chaired??

We should anticipate those questions and issues and get some inter-agency accord on what our answers and positions will be. On issues such as troop ceilings, HNS, MRP and conventional force doctrine the IG (PM-chaired) may be a good place to start, but we may end up with some or all of these in an agenda for the SIG/DP.

My visit to OSD confirmed my suspicion that NATO conventional defense planning and programming is one area where we need to put the "M" back into "PM". I would like to help in that effort!

cc: Al Myer
Bob Helm

DECLASSIFIED

Right on!!

~~SECRET~~
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NLRRF00-08917# 5797
BY RW NARA DATE 4/5/12

Thanks, Phil. If we keep pushing, we'll do it.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Nov 9

Phil -

- Ref your Nov 9 memo to Gen Boverie on NATO.
- Though I may from time to time cross over and touch upon the responsibilities of others, I truly try to avoid it... and in any case, coordinate with the other party beforehand.
- That is why your memo on NATO took me for a loop. Unless you know something that I don't know, NATO military affairs falls outside your area of responsibilities.
 - Your memo indicates that you have been talking NATO with STATE P-M AOs. - About what and why?
 - I discussed the NATO IG agenda with Olaf Grobol and Roy Wallace last Friday. When did you talk to P-M and what directions did you lead them?
- I think we have a problem and need to discuss it!

AC MYER

cc: Gen Boverie

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5798	MEMO DICK BOVERIE TO BOB LINHARD/OLLIE NORTH, RE: SITE SECURITY	1	11/16/1982	B1

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
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

December 16, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL BOVERIE

SUBJECT: NATO - Out of Area Impact
Study

After a careful review of the draft message and discussion with Dennis Blair, I telephoned our concurrence to Ken Montavon's office.



Very respectfully,
Phil

Fine. Thx.

B

12/16

NATO

1015
16 Dec 82

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

AL MYER

PHIL DUR

Picked up this OSD
draft at NATO IG
yesterday.

Phil: Would you
please review (AI is on
leave). Contact Col
Kent Montavon (OSD/ISP)
with any comments -- even
if simply to say "O.K." (Want
OSD and others to think of us
as players + keep us in loop.)
Dick B.

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