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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

3/2/2017

**File Folder** UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (4/24/81-1/13/83)

**FOIA**

F03-002/5

**Box Number** 48

SKINNER

1125

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
191247	CABLE	STATE-105179	3	4/24/1981	B1

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

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UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (4/24/81-1/13/83)

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DATE 05/03/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: FILE  
EOB: EURE, NEA  
WHSR COMMENT:

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-48-22-2-9

BY KDB NARA DATES 5/29/03

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUGMBI #1313 1191103  
O 291145Z APR 81  
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2184

~~SECRET~~ ABU DHABI 1313

NODIS  
E.O. 12065: RDS-1/4/29/01 (WOLLE, WM. D.) DR-M

TAGS: PINR XF UR MPOL  
SUBJECT: REQUESTS FOR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION ON SOVIET  
ACTIVITIES IN SOUTH YEMEN  
REF: STATE 105179

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. AMBASSADOR TOLD FOREIGN MINISTER RASHID ABDULLAH APRIL 29 THAT IN RESPONSE TO HIS SPECIFIC REQUEST, STATE AND DOD ARE PREPARED TO SEND TWO-MAN TEAM TO PROVIDE REQUESTED BRIEFING ON SITUATION IN PDRY, SOVIET ROLE THERE, AND THREAT POSED BY SOVIET AND CUBAN PRESENCE IN ETHIOPIA.
3. MINISTER EXPRESSED GRATITUDE AND, ON LEARNING THAT TEAM WOULD BE PREPARED TO LEAVE WASHINGTON ON OR ABOUT MAY 15, ASKED THAT UAE BRIEFING BE DELAYED UNTIL PERIOD OF JUNE 5-10. HE EXPLAINED THAT LAST HALF OF MAY AND VERY BEGINNING OF JUNE WOULD BE COMPLETELY TAKEN UP BY SUMMIT MEETING HERE OF ARAB GULF COUNCIL STATES, AND PREPARATIONS FOR IT. HE NOTED THAT HE EXPECTS TO MAKE ANOTHER VISIT TO ADEN SOON AFTER JUNE 10, AND THEREFORE ABOVE MENTIONED PERIOD WOULD BE IDEAL.

ABU DHABI 1313

DTG: 291145Z APR 81 PSN: 043492  
TOR: 119/1319Z

\*\*\*\*\*~~SECRET~~\*\*\*\*\*

DATE 05/03/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. AMBASSADOR MENTIONED THAT WE ARE ALSO ATTEMPTING  
TO ARRANGE FOR TWO BRIEFERS TO VISIT KUWAIT AND  
POSSIBLY A FEW OTHER PENINSULA CAPITALS.  
WOLLE

ABU DHABI 1313

DTG:291145Z APR 81 PSN: 043492  
TOR: 119/1319Z

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SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

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NLRR 748-48-22-3-8

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

BY ICOB NARA DATE 6/5/83

MESSAGE:

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RUQMYA RUMJGM RUEHEG RUEHDM RUMJDK RUQMOD RUQMBE

RUQMAM RUEHAD RUQMNS RUQMZN RUEHAM RUFHRS RUQMBI

RUEHJI RUEHJM RUMJHT RUQMKW

DE RUEHC #8815 1591736

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TO ALL NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS FLASH

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 148815

GENEVA FOR HABIB AND DRAPER, BRUSSELS FOR EC

F.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: SOPN, MILI, MOPS, MNUC, IZ, IS, US

SUBJECT: U.S. STATEMENT ON ISRAELI STRIKE ON IRAQI  
NUCLEAR RESEARCH FACILITY

1. THE FOLLOWING IS ADDITIONAL U.S. STATEMENT ON ISRAELI STRIKE JUNE 7 ON IRAQI NUCLEAR RESEARCH FACILITY IN TUWAITHA MADE AT DEPARTMENTAL BRIEFING 1:00 P.M., JUNE 8.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CONDEMNS THE REPORTED ISRAELI AIR STRIKE ON THE IRAQ NUCLEAR FACILITY, THE UNPRECEDENTED CHARACTER OF WHICH CANNOT BUT SERIOUSLY ADD TO THE ALREADY TENSE SITUATION IN THE AREA. AVAILABLE EVIDENCE SUGGESTS U.S.-PROVIDED EQUIPMENT WAS EMPLOYED IN POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF THE APPLICABLE AGREEMENT UNDER WHICH IT WAS SOLD TO ISRAEL, AND A REPORT TO THIS EFFECT IS BEING PREPARED FOR SUBMISSION TO THE U.S. CONGRESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RELEVANT U.S. STATUTE. END TEXT.

CLARK

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#8815

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SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

**DECLASSIFIED**

MESSAGE:

**NLRR 748-48-22-47**  
**BY COB NARA DATE 6/5/13**

HCE940  
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OO RUEHC  
DE RUQMBI #1873 1680754  
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O 170732Z JUN 81  
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2425  
INFO RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 324  
BT  
SECRET ABU DHABI 1873

~~EXDIS~~

E.O. 12065: GDS 6/17/87 (THERDS, P.N.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR UNSC TC

SUBJECT: UAE POSITION ON UNSC RESOLUTIONS ON ISRAELI RAID

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. CHAIRMAN PRESIDENTIAL COURT SHAIKH SURDOOR PASSED A MESSAGE TO CHARGE THROUGH A MEMBER OF HIS PERSONAL STAFF THAT APPROVES OF FRANCO-BRITISH RESOLUTION CONDEMNING ISRAELI RAID AND WOULD LOBBY OTHER ARABS IF THEY HAVE REASONABLE ASSURANCES THAT U.S. WILL NOT VETO. SURDOOR IS OUT OF TOWN AND ANY RESPONSE WILL NEED TO BE PASSED BACK THROUGH SAME STAFF MEMBER.
3. BELIEVE SURDOOR'S INITIATIVE FOLLOWS A CONVERSATION WITH CHARGE LAST WEEK IN WHICH POINT WAS MADE THAT U.S. WOULD NECESSARILY VETO SANCTIONS.
4. WOULD APPRECIATE GUIDANCE, WITH ABSENCE OF BOTH PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER (SEE SEPTTEL) SHAIKH SURDOOR IS IN CHARGE OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UAE AND CAN PRODUCE AS OFFERED ABOVE.

THERDS

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2772  
INFO RUTABA/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 052  
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 692  
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 219  
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 1553  
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 2952  
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 1806  
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2395  
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 2684  
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 2436  
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NLRR 748-48-72-5-6

BY EDB NARA DATE 5/29/13

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 ABU DHABI 2677  
EXDIS  
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 8/26/93 (THEROS, P.N.) DR-M  
TAGS: PEPR TC LY US  
SUBJECT: QADDAFI VISIT; EXPLANATIONS BY SHAIKH SURDOR  
REF: ABU DHABI 2662 (NOTAL)

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: CHAIRMAN, PRESIDENTIAL COURT SAW CHARGE EVENING AUGUST 25 AND GAVE HIM ACCOUNT OF SHORT QADDAFI VISIT. UAE PRESIDENT SHAIKH ZAYID LECTURED QADDAFI ON HIS POLICIES, ASKING HIM "JUST WHO DO YOU THINK YOU ARE" AND DEMANDING QADDAFI STOP ATTEMPTS TO SUBVERT SAUDI ARABIA AND STOP FINANCING RADICAL PALESTINIANS. ZAYID ALSO ASKED IF QADDAFI WANTED COMMIT SUICIDE BY ATTACKING U.S. NAVY. QADDAFI RESPONDED THAT HE HAS ALREADY STOPPED SUPPORTING RADICALS AND NOW BACKS ARAFAT. AS FOR LIBYAN-U.S. RELATIONS QADDAFI INSISTS HE IS FRIGHTENED OF U.S. WHICH SEEKS TO KILL HIM BUT MUST DEFEND SOVEREIGNTY OF LIBYA AND MADE CONVINCING CASE FOR GULF OF SIRTE JURISDICTION. QADDAFI CLAIMED HE DOES NOT KNOW WHAT U.S. WANTS. SURDOR SAID UAE WANTS TO REBUILD BRIDGES BETWEEN U.S. AND LIBYA BECAUSE DEFUSING QADDAFI DEFUSES THE THREAT AGAINST SAUDI ARABIA. CHARGE RECOUNTED RECENT LIBYAN ACTIVITY SUCH AS TERROR SQUADS, SUBVERSION OF NEIGHBORS (TUNIS AND SUDAN), STOCKPILING OF SOVIET WEAPONS. SURDOR INTERRUPTED, CONCEDED FIRST

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EOB: KEMP  
WHSR COMMENTS:

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POINTS AND THEN LECTURED CHARGE ON U.S. FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND IMPORTANCE ARAB STATES ATTACH TO WEAPONS SALES AS A POLITICAL INDICATOR. QADDAFI ALSO WAS ASKED TO EXPLAIN TRIPARTITE TREATY WITH PDRY AND ETHIOPIA. ON SUBJECT OF ARAB GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL SECGEN CONDEMNATION OF "U.S. PIRACY", SURDOOR AWARE OF OTHER AGCC COUNTRIES DISOWNING BISHARA AND SAID "KUWAITIS ARE VERY FRIGHTENED PEOPLE." END SUMMARY.

3. SHAIKH SURDOOR BIN MUHAMMAD AL-NAHAYYAN, CHAIRMAN PRESIDENTIAL COURT, RECEIVED CHARGE EVENING AUGUST 25, AND SAID HE WAS INSTRUCTED BY UAE PRESIDENT SHAIKH ZAYID TO GIVE U.S. ACCOUNT OF QADDAFI'S VISIT.

4. ZAYID ATTACKS QADDAFI:  
SURDOOR OPENED BY SAYING THAT QADDAFI ACCOMPLISHED ONLY ONE THING DURING HIS VISIT; HE HAS CONVINCED UAE THAT HE, PERSONALLY, IS ANTI-COMMUNIST BUT UAE STILL HAS LOTS OF PROBLEMS WITH HIM. IMMEDIATELY AFTER ARRIVING QADDAFI WAS TAKEN TO AL-AIN (A TWO-HOUR DRIVE) AND FIRST TALKS WERE HELD IN THE CAR. SHAIKH ZAYID WAS DRIVING, QADDAFI SAT UP FRONT AND SURDOOR IN THE BACK SEAT. SURDOOR SAID ZAYID JUMPED ON QADDAFI LIKE ARABIC EQUIVALENT OF DUTCH UNCLE. SPECIFICALLY, ZAYID ASKED QADDAFI JUST WHO DID QADDAFI THINK HE WAS? DID QADDAFI EXPECT TO RULE ARAB WORLD, MEDITERRANEAN, OR JUST NORTH AFRICA? DOES HE HAVE SUICIDAL TENDENCIES IN ATTACKING THE AMERICANS? DOES HE NOT UNDERSTAND THAT HE IS THE RULER OF A COUNTRY WITH VERY FEW PEOPLE, MOST OF THEM ILLITERATE AND IGNORANT? WHAT DOES HE MEAN BY ATTACKING SAUDI ARABIA? WHY IS QADDAFI ATTEMPTING TO SPLIT THE PLO AND SUPPORTING THE RADICALS? WHAT DOES HE MEAN BY ENGAGING IN ALLIANCES WITH COMMUNIST STATES LIKE ETHIOPIA AND YEMEN?

5. QADDAFI DEFENSE AGAINST COMMUNISM CHARGE:  
QADDAFI, SURDOOR SAID, RESPONDED IN A VERY REASONED MANNER. HE FIRST PUT UP A RATHER IMPASSIONED DEFENSE AGAINST ANY CHARGES THAT HE IS COMMUNIST OR PRO-COMMUNIST. QADDAFI SAID THAT IN HIS VISITS TO MOSCOW HE HAS REPEATEDLY GONE OUT OF HIS WAY TO RUB INTO SOVIETS FACT THAT HE IS A BELIEVING MUSLIM. HE ONCE STOOD UP BREZHNEV BY REFUSING TO PAY A VISIT TO LENIN'S TOMB BECAUSE IT WAS SCHEDULED AT PRAYER TIME. HE REQUIRES THAT SOVIETS INCLUDE MOSQUES AT ALL APPROPRIATE TIMES DURING HIS VISIT. DURING HIS VISIT EARLIER THIS WEEK IN ADDIS ABABA QADDAFI LECTURED ETHIOPIAN AND ADFNI LEADERS ON PERMITTING COMMUNISTS TO HOLD POSITIONS OF IMPORTANCE IN THEIR COUNTRIES AND INSISTED THAT THEIR REVOLUTIONS TO HAVE HOPE OF SUCCESS MUST BE ISLAMIC AND NOT COMMUNIST. (WHAT MENGISTU THOUGHT OF THIS MUST HAVE BEEN INTERESTING -- POST COMMENT.) QADDAFI WENT ON INTO PASSIONATE (AND CONVINCING) ATTACK ON ATHEIST COMMUNISTS THROUGHOUT ARAB WORLD AND SAID THAT AMONG REASONS FOR FAILURE OF UNITY WITH SYRIA

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IS FACT SYRIAN GOVERNMENT INCLUDES COMMUNISTS. ZAYID AND SURDOOR WERE BOTH IMPRESSED BY QADDAFI'S SINCERITY.  
 6. QADDAFI FRIGHTENED OF U.S.:  
 QADDAFI SAID THAT HE REALIZES THE DANGER OF A CONFRONTATION WITH U.S. U.S. CAN DESTROY LIBYA IN FIVE MINUTES AND HE HAS NO ILLUSIONS SOVIETS WILL SAVE HIM. HOWEVER, U.S. HAS PUSHED HIM INTO A CORNER. THE U.S. HAS SENT ASSASSINATION SQUADS AFTER HIM, IT HAS ATTEMPTED TO SUBVERT HIM, IT IS THREATENING HIM WITH EGYPTIAN INVASION, IT DELIBERATELY VIOLATES LIBYAN SOVEREIGNTY IN THE GULF OF SIRTE. QADDAFI CITED A CHAIN OF EVENTS BEGINNING WITH THE NEWSWEEK ARTICLE AND CONCLUDING WITH THE AIR CLASH OVER THE MEDITERRANEAN. QADDAFI SAID THAT HE HAS NEVER BEEN ABLE TO FIND OUT WHAT THE U.S. WANTS HIM TO DO. HE IS NOT SUICIDAL AND WISHES ONLY TO FIND A MODUS VIVENDI WITH WASHINGTON. IF HE COULD START A DIALOGUE TOMORROW WITH THE AMERICANS HE WOULD.

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INFO RUTABA/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 053  
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 693  
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 220  
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 1554  
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 2953  
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 1807  
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2396  
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 2685  
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 2437

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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 2 ABU DHABI 2677  
EXDIS

7. QADDAFI SEEKS UAE ASSISTANCE IN TALKING TO U.S.:  
SURDOOR SAID THAT QADDAFI THEN ASKED SHAIKH ZAYID TO  
ASK AMERICANS "WHAT THEY WANT" AND HE WOULD RESPOND.  
SURDOOR SAID HE IS NOW ASKING JUST THAT QUESTION AND  
HOPEd WE COULD PROVIDE AN ANSWER. CHARGE MENTIONED LIBYAN  
TERRORIST SQUADS IN U.S. AND EUROPE, SUBVERSION OF  
NEIGHBORS, EXPORT OF REVOLUTION, SUPPORT OF RADICAL  
TERRORIST GROUPS, AGGRESSION AGAINST NEIGHBORS, HELPING  
SOVIETS SPREAD THEIR INFLUENCE, AND VAST STOCKPILING OF  
SOVIET ARMS. SURDOOR SAID WE SEEM TO BE FRIGHTENED OF  
EACH OTHER AND THEN WENT AND SAID THAT HE WAS SERIOUS  
IN SAYING U.S. AND LIBYA SHOULD RESTART A DIALOGUE. IF  
UAE COULD HELP, THEY WOULD BE OVERJOYED TO DO SO AND WOULD  
IN ANY EVENT APPRECIATE ANY ADVICE WE COULD OFFER.

8. QADDAFI SUPPORT FOR RADICAL PALESTINIANS:  
QADDAFI SAID THAT HE HAD SUPPORTED RADICAL PALESTINIANS  
BECAUSE HE HAD SYMPATHY FOR THOSE WHO WERE SO MUCH LIKE  
HIM; DEDICATED PEOPLE WHO BELIEVED IN A CAUSE THAT OTHERS,  
THE MAJORITIES, ONLY HONORED BY THEIR WORDS AND NOT BY  
THEIR ACTIONS. HE AGREED, HOWEVER, WITH SHAIKH ZAYID  
THAT THIS SUPPORT ONLY WEAKENED THE PALESTINIANS AND  
HAD, IN FACT, ALREADY DECIDED TO CHANNEL ALL HIS SUPPORT  
TO ARAFAT.

9. QADDAFI AND SAUDIS STILL AT ODDS:

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WHSR COMMENTS:

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QADDAFI SIDESTEPED ALL ZAYID'S ATTEMPTS TO ADDRESS HIS PROPAGANDA WAR AND SUBVERSION AGAINST SAUDI ARABIA. THIS WAS SINGLE MOST FRUSTRATING ELEMENT OF VISIT FOR UAE LEADERS. THEY HAVE CONCLUDED THAT QADDAFI FINDS SUBVERTING SAUDI ARABIA, AMERICA'S MOST IMPORTANT ARAB ALLY, AS THE ONLY-EFFECTIVE WEAPON HE POSSESSES TO STRIKE AT AMERICAN INTERESTS AND CANNOT BE STOPPED FROM DOING THIS UNTIL HIS OVERALL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. IMPROVES. THIS LED SURDOR TO SAY THAT THE IMPORTANCE OF A U.S.-LIBYAN DIALOGUE CANNOT BE OVERSTRESSED; DEFUSING QADDAFI WOULD DEFUSE HIS CAMPAIGN OF SUBVERSION AGAINST SAUDI ARABIA.

10. LIBYAN-ETHIOPIAN-PDRY TREATY:

QADDAFI SAID HE SIGNED RECENT ALLIANCE WITH ETHIOPIA AND SOUTH YEMEN PRECISELY IN ORDER TO STOP THE SPREAD OF COMMUNISM. HE WANTS TO GIVE THESE REGIMES EKOTHER SHOULDER ON WHICH TO LEAN AND REDUCE THEIR DEPENDENCE ON SOVIETS. INSTEAD OF ATTACKING PDRY, UAE SHOULD SUPPORT IT; SPECIFICALLY BY HELPING TO FINANCE ITS SCHOOL SYSTEM, SENDING TEACHERS OF ARABIC AND OF THE QURAN. QADDAFI SAID THE CURRENT LEADERS OF THESE COUNTRIES ARE NON-IDEOLOGICAL OPPORTUNISTS DETERMINED ON REMAINING IN POWER AND WILL TAKE SUPPORT WHERE THEY CAN. HE IS FRIGHTENED, HOWEVER, BY COMMUNIST SUBVERSION OF THE YOUTH AND SAID THAT EDUCATION MUST BE RESCUED FROM COMMUNIST CONTROL AND RESTORED TO ISLAMIC FORMATS.

11. LIBYAN CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY ON GULF OF SIRTE:

QADDAFI PRODUCED MAPS AND A DETAILED LEGAL ANALYSIS OVER LIBYAN CLAIMS TO SOVEREIGNTY FOR GULF OF SIRTE. SURDOR SAID THAT THIS WAS A CONVINCING PRESENTATION AND ON THE FACE OF IT WE APPEAR TO HAVE VIOLATED LIBYAN TERRITORIAL OR INTERNAL WATERS. CHARGE RESPONDED WITH WHAT HE HOPES WAS LEARNED DISSERTATION ON DRAWING OF BASE LINES ACROSS THE MOUTHS OF BAYS AND SAID THAT BAYS WHOSE BASE-LINES ARE LONGER THAN THE DEPTH OF THE BAY (LIKE THE GULF OF SIRTE) CANNOT BE CLASSIFIED AS INTERNAL OR TERRITORIAL WATERS. ACTION REQUESTED: WOULD APPRECIATE ANY DOCUMENTARY SUPPORTS YOU CAN PROVIDE TO COUNTER LIBYAN ASSERTIONS. U.S. PRESS STATEMENTS HAVE BEEN TOO VAGUE TO BE OF ANY USE IN THIS CONTEXT. IF "L" COULD PROVIDE BRIEF SUMMARY WITH CITATIONS WOULD APPRECIATE.

12. BISHARA STATEMENT ON U.S. "PIRACY":

SURDOR ASKED WITH A GRIN IF OMANIS HAVE ALREADY INFORMED US THAT BISHARA'S STATEMENT "ON BEHALF OF AGCC" WHICH ACCUSED U.S. OF "MEDIEVAL PIRACY" DID NOT REFLECT VIEWS OF OMANI GOVERNMENT. CHARGE SAID THAT HE HAD NOT HEARD ANYTHING SPECIFIC WITH REGARD TO OMAN BUT UNDERSTOOD OTHER GULF GOVERNMENTS WERE UNCOMFORTABLE WITH BISHARA'S ACCUSATION AND THAT WE PRESUMED ABSENCE OF ANY OFFICIAL STATEMENT IN ABU DHABI INDICATED UAE DID NOT SHARE

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BISHARA'S VIEWS. SURDOR BEGAN TO LAUGH AND SAID THAT KUWAITIS ARE VERY FRIGHTENED PEOPLE. THEY HAVE ALWAYS BEEN HOSTAGE TO IRAQIS AND "STUPIDLY" PERMITTED PALESTINIANS TO RULE THEIR COUNTRY. THEY SAY THINGS OUT OF FRIGHT THAT THEY DO NOT BELIEVE.

13. IMPORTANCE OF ARMS SALES:  
WHEN CHARGE MENTIONED LIBYAN STOCKPILING OF SOVIET ARMS SURDOR REACTED ANIMATEDLY. HE DELIVERED LECTURE ON FAILURE OF UNITED STATES POLICY TO RECOGNIZE IMPORTANCE OF ARMS SALES. TO BEGIN WITH, U.S. LECTURING ON DOMESTIC PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH PURCHASES OF SOPHISTICATED ARMS IS, AT MINIMUM, PATRONIZING AND ALWAYS POORLY INFORMED. GOVERNMENTS ARE THEIR OWN BEST JUDGES OF THEIR DOMESTIC SITUATION AND IF THEY CANNOT MAKE CORRECT JUDGMENTS THEY WILL FALL FROM POWER ANYWAY. U.S. FAILS TO UNDERSTAND THAT OIL-RICH COUNTRIES NEED US ONLY FOR EXTERNAL DEFENSE. REFUSAL TO SELL ARMS WHEN NEIGHBORS ARM (OFTEN BUT NOT ALWAYS WITH AMERICAN ARMS) PASSES A CLEAR POLITICAL MESSAGE: I.E. THE U.S. PUTS A LOW PRIORITY ON THE SECURITY OR CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF THE PURCHASING STATE. THE U.S. MILITARY CANNOT DEFEND A COUNTRY LIKE THE UAE WITHOUT A VIABLE MILITARY FORCE THAT CAN HOLD THE GATES UNTIL U.S. FORCES ARRIVE. THIS FORCE MUST BE ARMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE THREAT IT IS LIKELY TO FACE NOT ACCORDING TO U.S. CONCEPTS OF SOPHISTICATION OR DOMESTIC CONCERNS. IF U.S. BELIEVES UAE CANNOT ABSORB A PARTICULARLY SOPHISTICATED WEAPON THEY SHOULD COME UP WITH A SUBSTITUTE THAT HAS THE SAME CAPABILITY OR, BETTER YET, HELP THE UAE TO TRAIN ITS PEOPLE TO ABSORB IT. U.S. SHOULD NOT OFFER FANCY -- BUT INFERIOR -- TOYS (I.E. FX) BECAUSE IT BELIEVES THAT THE UAE LEADERSHIP WANTS AIRPLANES FOR SHOW. THE SUBJECT OF SOPHISTICATED AIRPLANES IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY TOUCHY AROUND HERE.

14. COMMENT: QADDAFI GOT VERY LITTLE FOR HIS TRIP. HE DID NOT EVEN GET A SINGLE PUBLIC OR PRIVATE WORD FOR SUPPORT. UAE DESIRE TO BUILD BRIDGES BETWEEN U.S. AND LIBYAN REFLECTS TRADITIONAL UAE POLICY OF CONCILIATION THROUGH DIALOGUE; A REDOUIN HANGOVER. UAE DESIRE TO REPRESENT LIBYAN INTERESTS IN U.S., WE BELIEVE, REPRESENTS A CALCULATED DECISION THAT BEST WAY TO DEAL WITH AND, POSSIBLY, DEFANG ONE OF THE MOST DANGEROUS ARAB LEADERS IS TO LOCK HIM INTO A FORMAL RELATIONSHIP. THIS WILL, THEY BELIEVE, REDUCE QADDAFI'S FREEDOM OF ACTION IN DEALING WITH UAE AND PUT THEM INTO THE LOOP ON QADDAFI'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. THIS RELATIONSHIP IS IN THEIR EYES CRUCIAL TO QADDAFI'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ARAB GULF STATES. BELIEVE THE UAE CAN BE HELPFUL AND INSOFAR AS POSSIBLE RECOMMEND THAT UAE LEADERSHIP BE KEPT INFORMED OF OUR STATE OF RELATIONSHIP WITH LIBYA. AS A STARTER, BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL THAT WE RESPOND TO SURDOR'S REQUEST FOR "WHAT

024005  
CSN:HCE 0521

3

238/13:31Z

260725Z AUG 81

\*\*\*\*\*CONFIDENTIAL\*\*\*\*\*

1A

\*\*\*\*\*CONFIDENTIAL\*\*\*\*\*

DO WE WANT FROM LIBYA" WITH AT LEAST A BILL OF PARTICULARS AND A CHRONOLOGY OF WHERE WE AND THE LIBYANS PARTED COMPANY. IF WE HAVE ANY DEMANDS ON WHAT THE LIBYANS CAN DO TO IMPROVE RELATIONSHIPS WE COULD DO WORSE THAN PASSING THEM BACK THROUGH THE UAE.

THEROS

BT

#2677

NNNN

024005

CSN:HCE 0521

4

4

238/13:31Z

260725Z AUG 81

\*\*\*\*\*CONFIDENTIAL\*\*\*\*\*



SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE308  
STU8479  
PP RUEHC  
DE RUQMBI #2925 2600740  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
P 170659Z SEP 81  
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2898  
BT  
~~S E C R E T~~ ABU DHABI 2925

EXDIS

FROM CHARGE

E.O. 12065: NA

TAGS: MILI MASS TC

SUBJECT: AWACS: UAE PERIPHERAL BUY

REF: 80 STATE 277576

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOREIGN MINISTER TOLD ME THAT SHAIKH KHALIFA IS ABOUT TO ASK US TO SELL TO THE UAE THE COMPUTER UNIT THAT WILL PERMIT DIRECT RECEIPT OF AWACS GENERATED DATA (REFTEL). THIS UNIT WILL BE COORDINATED WITH SAUDI AWACS. IT WAS UNCLEAR IF SAUDIS SUGGESTED OR ONLY APPROVED THE DEAL.

THERDS

BT

#2925

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-48-22-6-5

BY LOS NARA DATE 6/5/13

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 92

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/10/81/1314

SITUATION: MID  
SUBJECT CATAGORY: EAST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE531  
 STU2553  
 DD RUEHC  
 DF RUOMRI #3370 2981149  
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
 O 251056Z OCT 81  
 FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI  
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3078  
 BT  
 S E C R E T ABU DHABI 3370  
 NDDIS  
 DEPT PLEASE PASS AS APPROPRIATE  
 E.O. 12065: RDS-1 10/25/01 (THEROS, P.N.) DR-M  
 ZTAGS: PEPR EG IS XF EEC  
 SUBJECT: ALLEGED ARAB PRESSURE ON POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTORS  
 TO SINAI MULTINATIONAL FORCE  
 REF: STATE 284926  
 1. ~~S~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.  
 2. QUICK CHECK OF EEC COLLEAGUES W/ ABU DHABI SHOWS  
 NO EVIDENCE UAE GOVERNMENT HAS BROUGHT UP SUBJECT OF  
 EEC PARTICIPATION IN SINAI MULTINATIONAL FORCE. LOCAL  
 PRESS HAS MADE ONLY MINIMAL REFERENCE TO EUROPEAN  
 TROOP CONTRIBUTIONS.  
 3. ITALIAN AMBASSADOR STATES THAT NOT ONLY HAS HE NOT  
 HAD ANY ADVERSE REACTION BUT THAT UAE GOVERNMENT HAS  
 BEEN UNUSUALLY CORDIAL TO HIM DURING A ROUND OF MEETINGS  
 HE HAS HELD DURING VISIT OF ITALIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN  
 MINISTER. DUTCH CHARGE HAS RECEIVED A SIMILAR INQUIRY  
 FROM THE HAGUE AND HAS REPLIED TO EFFECT THAT UAE  
 GOVERNMENT SEEMS TO BE IGNORING THE ISSUE. UK AMBASSADOR  
 HAS HEARD NOTHING BUT HE EXPECTS SOME SORT OF NEGATIVE  
 REACTION WHEN HE DELIVERS DEMARCHE EXPLAINING BRITISH  
 DECISION. (HE HAS ALREADY RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS BUT  
 HAS NOT YET BEEN TOLD TO DELIVER THEM.) FRENCH AMBASSADOR  
 IS UNAVAILABLE.  
 THEROS  
 BT  
 #3370  
 NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR ~~740-48-22-74~~

BY COB NARA DATE 6/5/13

SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~

17

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 ABU DHABI 3726  
SIT048 DATE 11/23/81

DTG: 221042Z NOV 81 PSN: 021252  
TOR: 326/1221Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: COL VP SIT  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT:

**DECLASSIFIED**

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NLRR 48-48-22-8-3

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

BY GTB NARA DATE 6/5/13

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUQMBI #3726 3261056  
O 221042Z NOV 81 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3226

~~SECRET~~ ABU DHABI 3726  
NODIS

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY VELIOTES FROM CHARGE  
E.O. 12065: RDS 11/22/01 (THEROS, P.N.) OR-M  
TAGS: PEPR PBOR US JO IS  
SUBJECT: U. S. POLICY ON JERUSALEM  
REFS: (A) STATE 309456  
(B) AMMAN 8495

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. NEWS REPORTING ON PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON JERUSALEM HAS BEEN INFLAMMATORY AND OUR CLARIFICATION HAS BEEN LOST IN THE NOISE. ALL INDICATIONS ARE THAT UAE GOVERNMENT DEPLY OFFENDED BUT OWING TO ABSENCE VIRTUALLY EVERY KEY LEADER HAS NOT FORMULATED RESPONSE.

3. REQUEST THAT OUR CLARIFICATIONS AND ANY ADDITIONAL COMMENTS WE WISH TO MAKE BE PUT IN THE FORM OF A PERSONAL LETTER TO SHAIKH ZAYID FROM EITHER THE PRESIDENT OR THE SECRETARY. MY OWN EFFORTS, BASED AS THEY MUST BE UPON WHAT IS IN THE NEWSPAPERS, LACK CREDIBILITY TO BE DAMAGE-LIMITING. THIS LETTER, TO SERVE OUR PURPOSES, MUST GET HERE IN TIME TO BE FORWARDED TO ZAYID, BEFORE HE GOES TO THE SUMMIT AT FEZ.  
THEROS

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 3788  
SIT149 DATE 11/30/81

DTG: 250617Z NOV 81 PSN: 025007  
TOR: 329/1213Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

ROUTINE  
DE RUQMBI \*3788 3290928  
R 250617Z NOV 81  
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3252

~~SECRET~~ ABU DHABI 3788

NODIS

FROM: CHARGE

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS AS APPROPRIATE TO BAGHDAD, AMMAN AND JIDDA  
E. O. 12065: RDS-4 (11/25/01 (THEROS, P. N.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR PBOR US IS TC

SUBJ: UAE REACTION TO JERUSALEM STATEMENT

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DISCUSSED CONTRATEMPUS OVER JERUSALEM STATEMENT WITH COURT CHAMBERLAIN, SHAIKH SUROOR BIN MUHAMMAD. SUROOR SAID THAT IN ABSENCE OF OTHER KEY LEADERSHIP OF UAE, HE WAS EXPRESSING ONLY HIS PERSONAL OPINION ON THE SUBJECT, (THIS IS SOMEWHAT AKIN TO NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SPEAKING "PRIVATELY"). SUROOR SAID THAT STATEMENT ON JERUSALEM MAY PROVE TO BE MOST NEGATIVE EVENT FOR THE WEST IN THE LAST DECADE OF THE PALESTINE PROBLEM. HE RETURNED FROM AGCC SUMMIT, RIYADH, WITH IMPRESSION THAT SAUDIS WERE SMOLDERING OVER THE JERUSALEM STATEMENT. TO BEGIN WITH, THEIR SENSE OF RELIGIOUS ATTACHMENT TO JERUSALEM GOES FAR DEEPER THAN WHAT HE SURMISES WE BELIEVE. SECONDLY, THEY HAVE INTERPRETED THIS AS AN ATTEMPT TO SABOTAGE THE FAHD PEACE PLAN. WHEN I INTERRUPTED TO PROTEST, SUROOR SAID THAT THEY MAY NOT HAVE BEEN OUR INTENTIONS, BUT IT HAS CERTAINLY BEEN THE RESULT. IT HAS PERMITTED THE RADICALS IN THE PLO TO OVERRIDE ARAFAT. TEN DAYS AGO

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ARAFAT TOLD SHAIKH ZAYID PERSONALLY, THAT THE PLO HAD ACCEPTED THE FAHD PLAN, AND WOULD SEEK ONLY COSMETIC CHANGES AT THE SUMMIT. YESTERDAY, THE PLO REPRESENTATIVE TOLD THEM THAT HE WAS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO SAY THAT THE JERUSALEM STATEMENT MAKES THE PLAN INVALID. KING HUSSAIN'S POSITION AS THE ARAB RULER MOST INTIMATELY CONNECTED WITH JERUSALEM HAS BEEN COMPLETELY UNDERCUT, AND IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO TAKE A POSITIVE ATTITUDE AT THE SUMMIT. LIBYA, OF COURSE, WAS ALWAYS OPPOSED TO THE PLAN, BUT SYRIA, ALTHOUGH OPPOSED, WAS FINDING IT DIFFICULT TO RESIST SAUDI PRESSURE. THEY NOW HAVE A WAY OUT. AS FOR IRAQ, HE UNDERSTANDS OFFICIALLY FROM THE IRAQIS, THAT THE IMPLIED RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL IN THE FAHD PLAN, FOLLOWED AS IT WAS BY THE STATEMENT ON JERUSALEM, MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN TO REFUSE TO ATTEND THE SUMMIT. THE ALGERIANS WILL ATTEND THE SUMMIT, BUT

~~SECRET~~

18

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NLRR 748-48-22-92

BY KDB NARA DATE 5/29/13

~~SECRET~~

19

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 ABU DHABI 3788

DTG: 250617Z NOV 81 PSN: 025007

ON RECORD, ARE OPPOSED TO THE FAHD PLAN. SUROOR CLAIMS THE SAUDIS ARE IN CONSIDERABLE DISARRAY OVER THE SUMMIT. AT BEST, THE SUMMIT WILL DO NOTHING; A HUMILIATION FOR SAUDI ARABIA. AT WORSE, IT WILL TURN INTO A FORUM FOR ANTI-AMERICAN RHETORIC. SOME MEMBERS OF THE SAUDI ROYAL FAMILY, SPECIFICALLY, PRINCE ABDULLAH, ARE ARGUING THAT SAUDI ARABIA SHOULD DO SOMETHING DRAMATIC TO PROVIDE A COUNTERPOINT TO THE STATEMENT ON JERUSALEM. THEY HAVE PRESSED FOR A DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGE WITH THE SOVIET UNION AS THE MOST APPROPRIATE TACTIC. SUROOR CLOSED WITH AN APPEAL THAT THE PRESIDENT MAKE SOME SORT OF PUBLIC STATEMENT BALANCING, OR EXPLAINING, HIS STATEMENT ON JERUSALEM.

3. I, OF COURSE, RAN DOWN THE POINTS IN STATE 321007. SUROOR REPLIED THAT THESE POINTS WERE ALL VERY WELL AND BASICALLY UNOBJECTIONABLE, BUT THEY ARE COMING THROUGH THE WRONG CHANNELS.  
THEROS

ABU DHABI 3788

DTG: 250617Z NOV 81 PSN: 025007

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 ABU DHABI 4059  
SIT120 DATE 12/22/81

DTG: 160845Z DEC 81 PSN: 053192  
TOR: 350/1843Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RVA NAN COL JP VP SIT EOB  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

ROUTINE  
DE RUQMBI #4059 3500859  
R 160845Z DEC 81  
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3377

~~SECRET~~ ABU DHABI 4059  
EXDIS  
FOR PELLETTREAU FROM THEROS  
E. O. 12065: GDS 12/16/87 (THEROS P. N.) OR-M  
TAGS: EPET PEPR TC LY  
SUBJECT: UAE PLEDGES SUPPORT TO LIBYA  
REF: ABU DHABI 4039

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-48-22-10-0

BY KAJIB NARA DATE 6/5/13

1. (U) 1. EMIRATES NEWS AGENCY HAS PUBLISHED STATEMENT BY UAE FOREIGN MINISTRY STRESSING EMIRATES' COMPLETE SUPPORT AND SOLIDARITY WITH LIBYA IN CONFRONTING DANGEROUS ESCALATION IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. STATEMENT SAYS THAT UAE WAS READY TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL HELP FOR LIBYA AND COOPERATE WITH IT IN THE FIELD OF PETROLEUM TO COMPENSATE FOR ANY SHORTAGE THAT MAY RESULT FROM THE WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN EXPERTS.

2. (S) COMMENT: BELIEVE THAT THIS UNEXPECTEDLY STRONG SHOW OF SUPPORT FOR LIBYA IS A DIRECT RESULT OF OUR FAILURE TO RESPOND TO THE LEADERSHIP'S REQUEST FOR SOME FEEDBACK ON OUR POLICY TOWARD LIBYA. EVERY UAE OFFICIAL OF ANY STATURE THAT I HAVE SEEN IS THE LAST TWO DAYS HAS REPEATED THE REQUEST IN OUR PREVIOUS MESSAGE FOR SOME EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT THERE IS A LIBYAN ASSASSINATION TEAM IN THE U.S. I THINK SHAIKH ZAYID FEELS PERSONALLY OFFENDED BY THE LACK OF A RESPONSE.  
THEROS

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 2568  
SIT493 DATE 12/30/81

DTG: 171329Z DEC 81 PSN: 054614  
TOR: 351/1725Z

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DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001  
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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: NAN COL JP VP SIT EOB  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #2568 3510347  
O 171329Z DEC 81 ZFF6  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 1756

INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 8122  
AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 7400  
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 3040  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 8081  
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 4663  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 4304  
AMEMBASSY LONDON 7762  
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 332568  
NODIS

E. O. 12065: RDS 1, 4 12/16/01 (CONSTABLE, PETER) NEA

TAGS: PEPR, TC, LI, US

SUBJECT: UAE OFFER TO MEDIATE BETWEEN U. S. AND LIBYA

REF: ABU DHABI 3985 (NOTAL)

1. ENTIRE TEXT IS SECRET.

2. YOU SHOULD EXPRESS TO SHEIKH ZAYID AND SHEIKH SUROR  
OUR GRATITUDE FOR THEIR OFFER TO BE HELPFUL IN IMPROVING  
U. S. -LIBYAN RELATIONS AND OUR FULL APPRECIATION OF THE  
CONSTRUCTIVE UAE ATTITUDE PROMPTING THIS OFFER. AT THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SAME TIME, YOU SHOULD CONVEY TO THEM OUR DEEP SKEPTICISM  
THAT EVEN THE MOST SKILLFUL MEDIATION, BY THE UAE OR ANY  
OTHER INTERLOCUTOR, COULD RESULT IN THE CHANGE OF DIRECTION  
OF LIBYAN BEHAVIOR WHICH IS A PRECONDITION FOR NORMALIZA-  
TION.

3. YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO ZAYID AND SUROR THAT ON  
SEVERAL PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, WE HAVE RECEIVED DIRECT OR  
THIRD-PARTY MESSAGES FROM QADHAFI PROFESSING A DESIRE TO  
IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH US. INVARIABLY THESE P; OFESSIONS

HAVE BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY SOME HOSTILE ACT OR PLAN  
DIRECTED AGAINST US OR OUR INTERESTS. IN JUNE, FOR  
EXAMPLE, WE RECEIVED QADHAFI FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISER  
SHAHATI WHO BORE SUCH A MESSAGE. AT THE SAME TIME,

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NLRR 748-48-22-11-9

BY KOR NARA DATE 5/29/17

~~SECRET~~



22

~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 2568

DTG: 171329Z DEC 81 PSN: 054614

THE LIBYAN AUTHORITIES WERE SEIZING AND OCCUPYING THE REMAINDER OF OUR DIPLOMATIC PROPERTIES IN TRIPOLI, INCLUDING THE AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE. MORE RECENTLY, MESSAGES HAVE BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY LIBYAN TARGETTING OF U. S. OFFICIALS AND INSTITUTIONS ABROAD AND IN THE U. S. THERE HAS BEEN SOME UNAUTHORIZED SPECULATION IN THE PRESS ON DETAILS OF THIS LIBYAN TERRORIST PLANNING. WHILE WE CANNOT COMMENT IN DETAIL ON THESE PLANS, WE HAVE NO DOUBT THAT QADHAFI HAS LAUNCHED EFFORTS FOR VIOLENT ATTACKS AGAINST AMERICAN OFFICIALS AND INSTALLATIONS, INCLUDING ONE PLAN FOR WHICH WE HAVE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE.

4. YOU MAY TELL SUROP THAT THE LIBYAN AUTHORITIES WERE AWARE IN ADVANCE OF OUR INTENTION TO INVALIDATE U. S. PASSPORTS FOR TRAVEL TO LIBYA AND THE REASONS FOR IT. THEY ARE ALSO AWARE THAT WE ARE FULLY PREPARED TO SEEK WAYS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND LIBYA SHOULD THERE BE CLEAR EVIDENCE OF A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN LIBYAN BEHAVIOR. WE ARE NOT INTERESTED IN LIBYAN DENIALS BUT ONLY A REAL CESSATION OF LIBYAN LAWLESS BEHAVIOR, INCLUDING HOSTILE ACTS AGAINST U. S. INTERESTS, WHICH IS WHAT WE HAVE SOUGHT ALL ALONG FROM QADHAFI.

5. YOU MAY TELL SUROP AGAIN THAT WE GREATLY APPRECIATE

SECSTATE WASHDC 2568  
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DTG: 171329Z DEC 81 PSN: 054614

THE UAE'S OFFER TO ACT AS THE LIBYANS' PROTECTING POWER, ALSO INFORM HIM THAT WE ARE REVIEWING THE PROTECTING POWER ARRANGEMENTS AND THAT YOU WILL BE IN CONTACT WITH THE UAEG ON THIS WHEN WE HAVE COMPLETED THE REVIEW. PAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 2568

DTG: 171329Z DEC 81 PSN: 054614

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

23

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 4198  
SIT521 DATE 12/30/81

DTG: 280930Z DEC 81 PSN: 010287  
TOR: 362/1258Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: NAN JP VP SIT EOB  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

PRIORITY  
DE RUQMBI #4198 3620932  
P R 280930Z DEC 81  
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3427  
USMISSION NEW YORK PRIORITY 345

INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1318  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 873  
AMEMBASSY DOHA 1702  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 3105  
AMEMBASSY MANAMA 2854  
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 2577  
USLO RIYADH 486  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 385  
BT

~~SECRET~~ ABU DHABI 4198  
LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 12/28/07 (THEROS, P.N.) OR-M

TAGS: PURG TC

SUBJECT: SAUDI TACTICS FOR THE UN SANCTIONS VOTE, JANUARY 5.

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. UAE COURT CHAMBERLAIN TOLD CHARGE THAT SAUDI ARABIA HAD OUTLINED TO SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASSAD ITS PLAN FOR SECURING A U.S. VOTE IN FAVOR OF SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL OR, FAILING THAT, AN AMERICAN ABSTENTION ON THE UN SANCTIONS VOTE JANUARY 5. THE SAUDIS BELIEVE THAT THE SANCTIONS, PER SE, NEED NOT BE EFFECTIVE (THEY ALSO KNOW THE U.S. WOULD NOT VOTE FOR EFFECTIVE MEASURES) BECAUSE ANY U.S. VOTE AT THE UN WHICH GOES AGAINST THE WISH OF

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WILL ENGENDER A VIOLENT REACTION FROM PRIME MINISTER BEGIN. THE SAUDIS INSIST THAT SYRIA EXERCISE ITS INFLUENCE WITH RADICAL ARABS, MOST NOTABLY LIBYA, IN PREVENTING THEM FROM UNDERMINING THE SAUDIS AT THE UN. SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASSAD APPARENTLY ACCEPTS THE SAUDI APPROACH. COURT CHAMBERLAIN DID NOT GO INTO DETAILS OF SYRIAN/UAE CONVERSATIONS BUT DID IMPLY THEY WERE COOL. END SUMMARY.

3. CHARGE MET WITH THE UAE COURT CHAMBERLAIN SHAIKH SUROOR BIN MUHAMMAD AL NAHAYYAN ON DECEMBER 27. SYRIAN PRESIDENT HAFEZ AL ASSAD HAD DEPARTED THE UAE THE PREVIOUS DAY. SHAIKH SUROOR CAREFULLY AVOIDED DISCUSSION OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE DECEMBER 25 TALKS BETWEEN ASSAD AND UAE PRESIDENT SHAIKH ZAYID. SUROOR WAS WILLING, HOWEVER, TO RELAY PRESIDENT ASSAD'S ACCOUNT OF HIS DISCUSSIONS

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**NLRR 748-48 22-12-8**  
**BY 16013 NARA DATES 29/17**

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 ABU DHABI 4198

DTG: 280930Z DEC 81 PSN: 010287

WITH SAUDI OFFICIALS. ACCORDING TO SUROOR, ASSAD'S VERSION JIVES WITH REPORTS UAE HAD RECEIVED EARLIER FROM THE SAUDIS THEMSELVES. IN ESSENCE, THE SAUDI PLAN IS TO COORDINATE THE APPROACH OF THE MODERATE ARAB NATIONS TOWARD CONVINCING THE U. S. TO VOTE FOR INCONSEQUENTIAL SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL OR, AT A MINIMUM, SECURE A U. S. ABSTENTION DURING THE UN SANCTIONS VOTE, JANUARY 5. THE SAUDIS WILL TAKE THE LEAD IN NEGOTIATING AN ACCEPTABLE SANCTIONS MEASURE WITH THE U. S. THE SYRIANS REALIZE THAT THE U. S. WOULD NOT VOTE FOR EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS, BUT ARE BOWING TO A VIRTUAL ULTIMATUM FROM THE SAUDIS TO COOPERATE ON THIS APPROACH. THE SYRIAN ROLE WOULD BE TO QUELL DISSENT FROM THE RADICAL ARABS, ESPECIALLY LIBYA.

4. SUROOR STATED THAT THE SAUDIS BELIEVE ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER BEGIN IS CLINICALLY INSANE AND WILL REACT VIOLENTLY TO ANY U. S. VOTE IN FAVOR OF SANCTIONS OR EVEN TO AN AMERICAN ABSTENTION. BEGIN'S REACTION WOULD THEN DEEPEN THE RIFT BETWEEN THE U. S. AND ISRAEL. THE UAE, ACCORDING TO SUROOR, AGREES WITH THE SAUDI TACTIC.

5. IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT SHAIKH SUROOR, IN THE COURSE OF THIS CONVERSATION, EXPRESSED SOME PERSONAL ANTI-PATHY TOWARD THE SYRIANS. HE SAID, INTER ALIA, THAT THE ALAWI ARE NEITHER CHRISTIANS NOR MUSLIMS, BUT PAGANS WHO WORSHIP WOMEN'S GENITALIA. ALTHOUGH, HE SAID, THE SYRIANS ARE SWORN ENEMIES OF MUSLIMS, THE UAE MUST SUPPORT THEM BECAUSE THEY ARE FELLOW ARABS. IN CONTRAST TO

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SUROOR'S GENERAL CRITICISM OF SYRIANS, HE ALSO STATED THAT PRESIDENT ASSAD HIMSELF IS A WARM AND GRACIOUS PERSON.

6. LOCAL PRESS COVERAGE OF THE ASSAD VISIT WAS CURSORY AND COMPRISED OF THE USUAL HACKNEYED PHRASES, E. G., "... TALKS HELD ON THE CURRENT SITUATION... ARAB SOLIDARITY... PROMOTION OF BILATERAL RELATIONS." ASSAD WAS ACCORDED ONLY THE MINIMAL HONORS UPON HIS ARRIVAL IN ABU DHABI. OTHER AMBASSADORS WERE NOT CALLED OUT TO RECEIVE HIM. THE STATE DINNER WAS SMALL, AND THE UAE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL TOLD CHARGE THAT HE CONSIDERED ASSAD'S VISIT, "UNOFFICIAL, UNSCHEDULED, AND UNINVITED."

7. COMMENT: THE UAE CAN BE COUNTED ON TO ADHERE CLOSELY TO THE SAUDI APPROACH ON THIS ISSUE. UAE COOLNESS TOWARDS SYRIA PROBABLY STEMS FROM TWO FACTORS: (A) THE SYRIAN ROLE IN SCUTTILING THE FEZ TALKS AND THUS EMBARRASSING SAUDI ARABIA AND THE ARAB GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL, AND (B) DAMASCUS' SUPPORT FOR TEHRAN; A DOUBLE SIN IN BACKING THE PERSIANS AGAINST ARAB IRAQ AND, CLOSER TO HOME, AIDING AND ABETTING A COUNTRY WHICH DIRECTLY THREATENS THE UAE. END COMMENT.  
THEROS

ABU DHABI 4198

DTG: 280930Z DEC 81 PSN: 010287

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 1243  
SIT628 DATE 04/15/82

DTG: 071120Z APR 82 PSN: 029168  
TOR: 097/1928Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP MR SIT EOB  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUQMBI #1243 0971137  
O 071120Z APR 82  
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3936

~~SECRET~~ ABU DHABI 1243

NOUIS

FROM CHARGE

E. O. 12065: RDS-1 4/7/2002 (THEROS, P. N.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR XF

SUBJECT: UAE MEDIATION IN IRAN-IRAQ WAR

REF: (A) ABU DHABI 1211 (B) STATE 090660

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. HAVE OBTAINED FURTHER FEEDBACK FROM SHAIKH SUROOR ON IRANIAN REQUEST FOR UAE TO MEDIATE IN WAR. MINSTATE RASHID ABDULLA NOW IN BAGHDAD AND WILL RETURN TO KUWAIT AFTER GETTING SADDAM HUSSEIN'S RESPONSE TO BRIEF PRESIDENT SHAIKH ZAYID AND KUWAITI LEADERSHIP. UAE NOW INTENDS TO TRY TO CONVERT THIS INTO AGCC MEDIATION EFFORT IF IRANIANS WILL BUY IT. PROBLEM IS THAT IRANIANS QUITE SPECIFICALLY REGARD SAUDI ARABIA (AND THE U.S.) AS A MOTIVATING FORCE BEHIND IRAQI DECISION TO GO TO WAR. YH ZAYID AND KUWAIT AMIR SABAH WILL CONSULT WITH BAHRAINI AND QATARI LEADERSHIP AND THEN WILL MAQP APPROACH TO SAUDIS.

4. I AM NOW TOLD THAT DESPITE CONVERSATION THAT LED TO REF (A) THAT IRANIANS DID HAVE GENERAL OUTLINE OF PEACE PROPOSALS. THESE INCLUDE:

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

- A. COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQI FORCES,
- B. REPARATIONS TO IRAN-- BUT THESE COULD COME FROM ANYONE -- NOT NECESSARILY FROM IRAQ AND,
- C. SUBMISSION OF TERRITORIAL DISPUTES TO ARBITRATION AND/OR INTERNATIONAL COURTS.

5. BRIEFED SUROOR ON REF (B). HE SUGGESTED VERY LOW U.S. PROFILE UNTIL THEY SEE HOW THIS MEDIATION EFFORT DEVELOPS. ANY U.S. REACTION OR EVEN A LEAK COULD BE FATAL BECAUSE IRANIANS ARE ABSOLUTELY PARANOID ABOUT U.S. UAE GOVERNMENT WILL KEEP US INFORMED OF MEDIATION DEVELOPMENTS.

6. AFTER WRITING ABOVE, DIPLOMATIC CORPS WAS SUMMONED TO AIRPORT TO RECEIVE SHAIKH ZAYID ON HIS RETURN FROM KUWAIT. NOTHING CONCRETE, BUT TWO MINOR POINTS:

**DECLASSIFIED**

**NLRR 748-48-22-13-7**

**BY LAB NARA DATES 5/29/17**

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PAGE 02 OF 02 ABU DHABI 1243

DTG: 071120Z APR 82 PSN: 029168

SHAIKH ZAYID WAS UNCOMMONLY CHATTY WITH THOSE WHO RECEIVED HIM AND IRAQI AMBASSADOR WAS MAKING THE ROUNDS TRYING TO FIND OUT WHAT IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAD DONE IN UAE. NOTED THAT RASHID ABDULLA APPARENTLY DID NOT RETURN WITH SAHIKH ZAYID AND SUSPECT HE MAY BE GOING TO SAUDI ARABIA. IT WAS APPARENT THAT UAE IS DETERMINED TO KEEP THIS A SECRET AND HAS NOT INFORMED IRAQI AMBASSADOR WHILE FEEDING MISINFORMATION INTO THE PRESS ON RASHID ABDULLA'S VISIT TO BAGHDAD.

7. SUGGEST DEPARTMENT RAISE REFERENCE (A) TO NODIS BECAUSE OF INTENSE UAE CONCERN THAT THERE BE NO LEAKS. THEROS

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 ABU DHABI 2192 DTG: 211040Z JUN 82 PSN: 029686  
SIT716 DATE 06/24/82 TOR: 173/1205Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS KEMP EOB  
EOB:  
WNSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST/TO KEMP FOR ACTION

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUQMBI #2192 1721044  
O 211040Z JUN 82  
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4367

~~SECRET~~ ABU DHABI 2192  
LADIS

FOR SECSTATE FOR AMB PELLETREU  
FROM CHARGE

E.O. 12065: GDS 6/21/88 (THEROS, P N) OR-M  
TAGS: PPDR, PEPR, LE, TC, US  
SUBJ: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT OF UAE FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. EMIRI DIWAN CALLED ME IN, TO HAND ME THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM UAE PRESIDENT SHAIKH ZAYID BIN SULTAN AL-NAHAYYAN ADDRESSED PERSONALLY TO PRESIDENT REAGAN. THE FULL TEXT FOLLOWS OF THE TRANSLATION PREPARED BY DIWAN. (ARABIC TEXT WHICH DIFFERS IN NON-SUBSTANTIVE MANNER WILL BE SENT BY POUCH.)  
QUOTE:

PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN  
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
AT THIS TRAGIC MOMENT WHEN THOUSANDS OF LEBANESE AND PALESTINIAN VICTIMS, INCLUDING INNOCENT WOMEN AND CHILDREN ARE BEING DECIMATED, I ADDRESS YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES TO APPEAL TO YOU STRONGLY TO WORK TOWARDS STOPPING ISRAEL FROM CONTINUING TO MAKE A MOCKERY OF ALL HUMANITARIAN VALUES UPHELD BY THE DIVINE RELIGIONS OF THE WORLD, AS WELL AS BY THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AND OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOMS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE ENTIRE WORLD LOOKS TO YOU NOW WITH THE VAST LEVERAGE POWER AVAILABLE TO YOU IN THIS DOMAIN TO WORK TOWARDS PUTTING AN END TO THIS INHUMAN CARNAGE OF THE LEBANESE AND PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. THE ARAB WORLD WHICH HAS BEEN KEEN TO DEVELOP RELATIONS OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION WITH THE WEST CANNOT STAND INACTIVE WATCHING ISRAEL, THE ALLY OF THE WEST, UTILIZING ITS ADVANCED WEAPONS TO SOW DESTRUCTION AND DEVASTATION AND TO IMPOSE A POLICY OF BLACKMAIL AND TERROR IN LEBANON AND TO BRING ABOUT THE GENOCIDE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.  
MR. PRESIDENT - IN THE NAME OF PEACE AND JUSTICE, I APPEAL TO YOU TO PERSONALLY INTERVENE BY EXERTING PRESSURE ON ISRAEL TO CEASE ITS AGGRESSION AND TO WITHDRAW TOTALLY AND UNCONDITIONALLY FROM LEBANON. I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE WHOLE WORLD

COMMUNITY, ESPECIALLY THE ARAB AND ISLAMIC NATIONS, CHARGES YOU WITH A GRAVE RESPONSIBILITY TO ADOPT A FIRM POLICY THAT ENSURES RESTRAINING THE PERPETRATORS OF INJUSTICE AND AGGRESSION AND BRINGS SUCCOR TO THE VICTIMS OF THIS INJUSTICE SO AS TO REALIZE JUSTICE.

IF IT IS FOUND THAT THE WEST APPLIES DOUBLE STANDARDS OF JUSTICE AND DISCRIMINATION IN ITS DEALINGS BETWEEN NATIONS, THEN THE ARAB AND ISLAMIC WORLD WILL EXPERIENCE GREAT RESENTMENT AND BITTERNESS THAT WILL HAVE NEGATIVE EFFECTS ON THE TOTALITY OF ITS RELATIONS WITH THE WEST FOR THE PRESENT AND FUTURE.

ZAYID BIN SULTAN AL-NAHAYYAN  
PRESIDENT OF THE UAE.

END QUOTE

3. THE UAE HAS NOT RELEASED TEXT NOR ANNOUNCED FACT OF MESSAGE, BUT HAS BRIEFED THE LEBANESE AMBASSADOR ON ITS SUBSTANCE. DIWAN ADVISED THAT SIMILAR BUT NOT IDENTICAL MESSAGES HAVE BEEN SENT TO THATCHER, MITTERAND, AND KREISKY.

4. COMMENT: UNDERSTAND THAT THIS LETTER HAS BEEN IN THE WORKS FOR MORE THAN A WEEK AND HAS BEEN CONSTANTLY REVISED AS UAE LEADERSHIP ATTEMPTED TO FIND FORMULATION THAT WILL: (A) GET U.S.G.'S ATTENTION; (B) MAKE THE POINT THAT THE NEED TO MAINTAIN A CEASE-FIRE IS PARAMOUNT WHILE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

NOT NEGLECTING THE REQUIREMENT FOR AN EARLY ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL; AND (C) THAT UAE PUBLIC OPINION MAKES IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR THE UAE GOVERNMENT TO MAINTAIN A GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. THE MESSAGE IS VINTAGE ZAYID, ESPECIALLY ITS EMPHASIS ON HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS, AND REFLECTS THE PRESIDENT'S INTENSE PREOCCUPATION WITH THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. IT IS ALSO SIGNIFICANT THAT THIS LETTER HAS NOT BEEN PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED; IT SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED AS MERE POSTURING. END COMMENT.  
THEROS

ABU DHABI 2192

DTG: 211040Z JUN 82 PSN: 029686

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PAGE 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 2317  
SIT498 RECALLED

DTG: 070735Z JUL 82 PSN: 050201  
TOR: 188/1213Z

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PRIORITY /ROUTINE  
STU1520  
DE RUQMBI #2317/01 1880752  
P R 070735Z JUL 82  
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4434

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-48-22-15-5

BY 620 NARA DATE 4/8/13

INFO AMEMBASSY DOHA 1967  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 3396  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 2287  
AMEMBASSY LONDON 2541  
AMEMBASSY MANAMA 3155  
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 2862  
USLO RIYADH 714  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 381

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 2317

EXDIS

DEPT. PASS COMIDEASTFOR, USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECPLAD,  
DIA WASHDC, COMRDJTF MACDILL AFB FLA//JT-2C//,  
SECDEF WASHDC/USDP/ISA

LONDON FOR HOPPER

E. O. 12065: RDS-3 7/7/2002 (THEROS, P.N) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR PINS US TC XF

SUBJECT: DEVELOPING NEGATIVE PERCEPTION OF U. S. AND CONSEQUENCES  
FOR THE FUTURE

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: WHATEVER MAY BE THE FINAL DENOUNCEMENT OF THE  
LEBANESE TRAGEDY, CERTAIN TRENDS IN UAE PERCEPTION OF THE  
U. S. HAVE ALREADY SOLIDIFIED AND WILL BE A NEAGTIVE FACTDR  
IN THE FUTURE. THE UAE GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY COME TO TWO  
CONCLUSIONS: A) THE UNITED STATES IS OBLIVIOUS TO THE UAE'S  
INTERESTS AND/OR ITS SURVIVAL, AND B) UAE PUBLIC OPINION  
WILL NO LONGER TOLERATE CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH THE U. S. IN  
PUBLIC ALTHOUGH IT RECOGNIZES OVERALL UAE DEPENDENCE ON  
U. S. MILITARY GUARANTEES TO SAUDI ARABIA. CONSEQUENTLY,  
UAE GOVERNMENT IS ALREADY ACTING TO ELIMINATE VISIBLE  
SIGNS OF U. S. -UAE RELATIONSHIP SUCH AS SHIP VISITS,  
PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL MILITARY COMPETITION, AND,  
IN GENERAL, AVOIDING THE SORT OF EVENTS THAT GET IN THE  
PRESS. NOTHING SUBSTANTIVE HAS CHANGED BECAUSE THE UAE  
IS QUITE DEFINITELY WAITING FOR AN INDICATION ON WHAT  
RIYADH INTENDS TO DO. IN SHORT, THE UAE LEADERSHIP NO  
LONGER BELIEVES THE U. S. HAS ANY INTEREST IN PROTECTING  
THEM AND MAY HAVE ALREADY WRITTEN THEM OFF. END SUMMARY.

3. IT HAS BECOME CLEAR THAT THE U. S. ROLE IN THE CURRENT  
LEBANESE CRISIS HAS BEEN A SHOCK TO THE UAE ESTABLISHMENT.  
ALTHOUGH U. S. SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL HAD LONG BEEN A NEGATIVE  
FACTOR IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, THE LEADERSHIP HAD  
CONSISTENTLY BALANCED AGAINST IT OTHER BENEFITS FROM THE  
RELATIONSHIP, ESPECIALLY THE CERTAINTY THAT U. S. POWER  
WAS BEHIND ANY SAUDI GUARANTEES TO THE GULF STATES. THIS  
CONFIDENCE BEGAN TO ERODE WITH CONSTANT USG'S URGING  
OF GULF STATES TO "COME TO TERMS WITH IRAN." OTHER  
NEGATIVE TOOMENTS WERE SARON'S REPEATED STATEMENTS THAT  
THE U. S. APPROVED OF ISRAEL'S ARMS SUPPLIES TO IRAN,  
STATEMENTS THAT WERE NEVER DIRECTLY DENIED BY ANY SENIOR  
U. S. OFFICIAL, THE USG PURCHASE OF IRANIAN CRUDE, AND A  
GENERAL FEELING OF UNEASE THAT THE USG CONSISTENTLY REFUSED

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TO SUPPORT THE POSITIONS OF ITS TWO CLOSEST FIRENDS IN THE EASTERN ARAB WORLD: JORDAN AND SAUDI ARABIA.

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4. THIS HELPED SET THE STAGE FOR THE SHOCK OF LEBANON. SHAIKH ZAIYD HAD TOLD VIRTUALLY EVERY IMPORTANT U. S. VISITOR THAT HE WAS UNDER PRESSURE FROM "MY OWN PEOPLE" (I. E. --NOT EXPATRIATE ARABS) TO BREAK WITH THE U. S. OVER PALESTINE. AN EARLY HOPE THAT THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS MIGHT INDEED LEAD TO A SOLUTION HAD LONG SINCE FOUNDERED ON THE VIOLENT REPRESSION OF PALESTINIANS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA (MORE SO THAN SETTLEMENTS IN UAE EYES) AND U. S. CREDIIBILITY WAS FURTHER ERODED BY U. S FAILURE TO EXPRESS REGRETS AT PALESTINIAN DEATHS ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA COMMEASURATE WITH OUR OFFICIAL GRIEF AT (FAR FEWER) ISRAELI DEATHS. THE POINT NEEDS TO BE MADE HERE THAT THIS IS A COUNTRY WITHOUT A MILITARY TRADITION AND WITH ESSENTIALLY THE MERCHANT'S ABHORRENCE OF BLOODSHED. IT HAS BEEN THE HUMAN CASUALTIES THAT HAVE CONSISTENTLY AROUSED UAE SYMPATHIES. SUPPORT FOR PLO POLITICAL GOALS, ALTHOUGH REAL, HAS BEEN MUCH MORE LUKEWARM AND THE UAE WOULD HAVE FOUND ACCEPTABLE ANY SORT OF POLITICAL SOLUTION THAT COULD HAVE BEEN SOLD TO A REASONABLE NUMBER OF PALESTINIANS. AS FURTHER EVIDENCE, THE UAE BREAK WITH EGYPT WAS FAR MORE SYMBOLIC THAN SUBSTANTIVE WITH FINANCIAL AND COMMERCIAL TIES INTACT AND SUBSTANTIAL EGYPTIQN PRESENCE IN COURTS AND SECURITY FORCES.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 2317  
SIT499 RECALLED

DTG: 070735Z JUL 82 PSN: 050208  
TOR: 188/1218Z

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PRIORITY /ROUTINE  
STU1559  
DE RUQMBI #2317/02 1880816  
P R 070735Z JUL 82  
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4435

INFO AMEMBASSY DOHA 1968  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 3397  
AMEMBASSBY KUWAIT 2288  
AMEMBASSY LONDON 2542  
AMEMBASSY MANAMA 3156  
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 2863  
USLO RIYADH 715  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 382

SECRET SECTION 02 OF 03 ABU DHABI 2317

EXDIS  
DEPT. PASS COMIDEASTFOR, USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECPLAD,  
DIA WASHDC, COMRDJTF MACDILL AFB FLA//JT-2C//,  
SECDEF WASHDC/USDP/ISA  
LONDON FOR HOPPER

5. AS A CONSEQUENCE, TEN THOUSAND DEAD LEBANESE AND PALESTINIANS (AND WHAT IS PERCEIVED AS U. S. LACK OF CONCERN) HAS HORRIFIED THE LOCAL POPULATION AND IT IS A NIGHTLY SUBJECT OF CONVERSATION AT THE RULER'S MAJLIS. FURTHERMORE, THERE IS THE PROBLEM REPORTED EARLIER: THE UAE HAD BOUGHT A PLO GUARANTEE TO CONTROL RADICAL PALESTINIANS IN RETURN FOR FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL SUPPORT FROM ABU DHABI. IF THE PLO IS DESTROYED THEIR GUARANTEE AGAINST TERRORISM DISAPPEARS AND LOCAL SECURITY FORCES CANNOT COPE UNASSISTED. FINALLY, KHOMEINI AND COMPANY IN TEHRAN HAVE MADE ENORMOUS CAPITAL OUT OF THE DISPATCH OF EVEN TOKEN NUMBERS OF TROOPS TO LEBANON, AND ARE CALLING INTO QUESTION THE LEGITIMACY OF SHAIKLY GOVERNMENT THAT DOES NOT DO ITS PART FOR THE PALESTINIANS. IN FACT, IRAN HAS ALREADY DELIVERED SEVERAL MESSAGES CALLING ON THE UAE TO DISTANCE ITSELF FROM AMERICA.

6. THE PROBLEM IS THAT THE UAE HAS FEW OPTIONS. UNLIKE RIYADH, ABU DHABI HAS NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH WASHINGTON THAT GIVES IT A VOICE AND ACCESS. IN ANY EVENT, THEY ARE BEING TOLD BY THE SAUDIS THAT THEIR EFFORTS HAVE MADE NO IMPRESSION IN WASHINGTON. (FYI: SAUDI AMBASSADOR TO UAE, AL-FAWZAN, TOLD ME PRIVATELY AFTER HIS RETURN FROM CONSULTATIONS IN RIYADH, THAT WAS THE GIST OF HIS MESSAGE TO THE UAE. HE ADDED THAT PRINCE MISHA'L (NFI)) HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE ROYAL HOUSE NO LONGER BELIEVED PEACE WAS POSSIBLE WITH OSRAEL--AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE--AND THAT SAUDI THREATS TO WASHINGTON REFLECT NOT ONLY AN ATTEMPT TO PRESSURE THE U. S. BUT "AN INDICATION OF THE FUTURE" SINCE " THEY ARE CERTAIN TO FAIL." END FYI.) ITS MILITARY FORCES ARE SO SMALL AND INEFFECTIVE THAT EVEN A TOKEN CONTRIBUTION IT OUT-OF-THE-QUESTION. MONEY, WHICH THEY HAVE IN ABUNDANCE, IS USELESS IN THIS SITUATION.

7. THERE REMAINS ONE OPTION OPEN TO THEM NOW: TO TAKE IRANIAN ADVICE AND AT LEAST PUBLICLY DISTANCE THEMSELVES FROM THE USG. SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF THE FIGHTING IN LEBANON, I HAVE NOT BEEN PERMITTED TO SEE CROWN PRINCE SHAIKH KHALIFA AND THE EXCHANGE OF LETTERS FROM SHAIKH ZAYID TO PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS BEEN HANDLED THROUGH THE COURT CHAMBERLAIN, SHAIKH SUROOR. I HAVE BEEN POLITELY (AND APOLOGETICALLY) CUT OUT OF ONE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 070735Z JUL 82 PSN: 050208

RAMADAN SOCIAL EVENT INVOLVING SHAIKH ZAYID IN WHICH I WOULD HAVE BEEN OTHERWISE INCLUDED. THE ARMED FORCES HAVE (AGAIN APOLOGETICALLY) TURNED DOWN AN INVITATION TO ATTEND A PARACHUTE COMPETITION AT U.S. ARMY EUROPE TO WHICH THEY HAVE SENT TEAMS EVERY YEAR AND FOR WHICH THEY WERE TRAINING THIS YEAR. FINALLY, IT HAS BEEN MADE CLEAR THAT THE UAE WOULD RATHER NOT RECEIVE ANY REQUESTS FOR SHIP VISITS IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

8. THESE ARE, OF COURSE, ALL COSMETIC MEASURES TAKEN TO ENSURE A PUBLIC POSTURE DISTANCING THEMSELVES FROM THE USG. WITH THE EXFEPTION OF SHIP VISITS THEY INVOLVE NOTHING MORE THAN SOCIAL INCONVENIENCE FOR ME THAT WE CAN LIVE WITH. (ODDLY ENOUGH, MINDEFENCE SHAIKH MUHAMMAD BIN RASHI IN DUBAI DID RECEIVE OUR OUTGOING PRINCIPAL OFFICER AND HIS REPLACEMENT WITH CORRESPINDING NEWS PHOTOS BUT THIS APPEARS TO BE MORE A REFLECTIION OF HIS PERSONAL AFFECTION FOR TOM DOWLING. IN THE SAME SENSE, SHAIKH SUROOR, THE COURT CHAMBERLAIN, REMAINS ACCESSIBLE, AGAIN, FOR PERSONAL REASONS.) HOWEVER, I AM MORE AND MORE OF THE OPINION THAT OTHER OPTIONS ARE BEING CONSIDERED. THESE MIGHT INCLUDE STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF THE BOYCOTT, REDUCTION IN LEVEL OF RELATIONS (THOUGH DEFINITELY NOT A BREAK), TERMINATION OF THE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP AND SO ON. I MUST EMPHASIZE THAT THESE THOUGHTS ON SPECIFICS ARE PURELY SPECULATIVE. THE UAE IS CLEARLY WAITING TO SEE WHAT THE SAUDIS WILL DO AND FOLLOW SUIT IN PARALLEL. THEY ARE ALSO INCREASINGLY FRUSTRATED BY LACK OF ANY INDICATION FROM RIYADH ON WHAT IS GOING ON.

9. THE TRAGEDY IS THAT MANY OF THESE TRENDS ARE IRREVERSIBLE UNLESS A MIRACLE OCCURS IN LEBANON BECAUSE OF PALESTINE AND LEBANON. THE UAE LEADERSHIP FEEL THREATENED INTERNALLY BY THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. EXTERNALLY, THEY FEAR A U.S. POLICY THAT THEY SEE LEADING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ISRAELI HEGAMONY OVER THE NORTHERN ARAB STATES AND AN IRANIAN HEGEMONY OVER THE GULF. THIS IS, OF COURSE, PART OF THE MIDDLE EASTERN CONSPIRACY THEORY OF HISTORY BUT THERE ARE ENOUGH FACTS ON THE GROUND TO CORROBORATE THE FANTASY. THE RPOBLEM WITH THIS HEGEMONY IS THAT NOTH OF THE U.S. "CLIENTS" HAVE POLICIES INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE CONTINUED EXISTANCE OF MODERATE REGIMES: THE BEGIN/SHARON LEADERSHIP IS INCAPABLE OF ACTING WITHOUT BRUTALITY AND THE IRANIANS INTEND TO ESTABLISH A THEOCRATIC REGIME WHOSE FIRST VICTIMS WILL BE THE SHAIKHS.

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 ABU DHABI 2317 DTG: 070735Z JUL 82 PSN: 050209  
SIT500 RECALLED TOR: 188/1219Z

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DISTRIBUTION: RCAL /001  
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PRIORITY /ROUTINE  
UTS2470  
DE RUGMBI #2317/03 1880841  
P R 070735Z JUL 82  
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI  
  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4436

INFO AMEMBASSY DOHA 1969  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 3398  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 2289  
AMEMBASSY LONDON 2543  
AMEMBASSY MANAMA 3157  
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 2864  
USLO RIYADH 716  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 383

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 ABU DHABI 2317

EXDIS  
DEPT. PASS COMIDEASTFOR, USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECPLAD,  
DIA WASHDC, COMRDJTF MACDILL AFB FLA//JT-2C//,  
SECDEF WASHDC/USDP/ISA  
LONDON FOR HOPPER

10. THERE IS ONE SCHOOL OF THOUGHT, ACTIVELY ENCOURAGED BY KUWAIT, TO OPEN UP TO THE SOVIETS. FORTUNATELY, THE SOVEITS HAVE PROVEN THEMSELVES A WEAK REED IN LEBANON AND IN FACT APPEAR TO THE UAE TO BE AS BUSILY TRYING TO CULTIVATE REVOLUTION IN IRAN AS THEY THINK WE ARE. THE EUROPEANS PRESENT NO ALTERNATIVE; THEY ARE LEADERLESS AND VACILLATING IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONTEXT. EGYPT IS TOO WEAK TO IMPROVE THE LOT OF THE PALESTINIANS AND, IN ANY EVENT, ZAYID BELIEVES CAMP DAVID HAS FAILED. THE SAUDIS HAVE LOST THEIR LEVERAGE IN WASHINGTON. SURRENDER TO THE IRANIANS WOULD BE SUICIDAL. PROBABLY THE ONLY COURSE LEFT OPEN IS ONE OF OPPORTUNISM, ADJUSTING TO OUTSIDE THREATS AS BEST THEY CAN.

11. THE MOST LIKELY CONSEQUENCES ARE APR TO BE ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL ACTIONS AGAINST THE U. S. INTERESTS WHICH ARE SUBSTANTIAL AND WHICH THE UE CAN EASILY UNDERTAKE. IT IS EQUALLY LIKELY THAT SUCH ACTIVITIES COULD BE INITIATED BY THE MERCHANTS CONTROLLING THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AS BY THE GOVERNMENT. A BREAK IN RELATIONS IS HIGHLY UBNLKELY UNLESS RIYADH DID SO FIRIST. (EVEN IF IT CAME, IT WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY ESTABLISHMENT OF FULLY STAFFED INTERESTS SECTION.) ALEMOST CERTAINLY, A BLOODY SEQUEL TO THE LEBANESE TRAGEDY WOULD MEAN THE END OF OUR MILITARY SALES POSSIBILITIES HERE: UNLIKE SAUDI ARABIA, THE UAE IS NOT SO FAR ALONG WITH U. S. THAT IT COULD NOT BREAK IT OFF WITHOUT DISLOCATION. COMIDEASTFOR SHIP VISITS WOULDLBECOME A THING OF THE PAST.

12. WHAT CAN WE DO? THE SITUATION IN LEBANON IS BEYOND OUR KEN AND ITS RESOLUTION CANNOT BE TAILORED TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE UAE ALONE. HOWEVER, THERE IS THE IRANIAN THREAT AND PERHAPS REASSURANCES THERE MIGHT HELP.  
THEROS  
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 ABU DHABI 4384  
SIT825 DATE 10/14/82

DTG: 100910Z OCT 82 PSN: 011158  
TOR: 283/1029Z

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DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001  
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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS KEMP  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

ROUTINE  
DE RUQMBI =4384 2831012  
R 100910Z OCT 82  
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4953

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ABU DHABI 4384  
DEPT. PASS THE WHITE HOUSE  
E. O. 12356: N/A  
TAGS: PDIP, TC, US  
SUBJECT: THANK YOU MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM  
ZHAIKH ZAYID

REF: STATE 266076  
THE MINISTRY OF FOREGIN AFFAIRS HAS REQUESTED THE EMBASSY  
TO CONVEY THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN:  
BEGIN TEXT YOUR EXCELLENCY:  
THE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES JOIN  
ME IN EXTENDING TO YOUR EXCELLENCY SINCERE THANKS FOR YOUR  
KIND GREETINGS AND CONGRATULATIONS EXTENDED ON THE OCCASION  
OF THE HOLY EID AL-ADHA STOP WISHING YOUR EXCELLENCY EVERY  
HAPPINESS COMMA ABUNDANT PROSPERITY AND CONTINUED PROGRESS  
TO THE FRIENDLY PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA STOP  
I ALSO HOPE THAT THE FREINDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO  
COUNTRIES WILL CONTINUE TO GROW FOR THE MUTUAL BENEFITS OF  
OUR TWO PEOPLES STOP WITH MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION AND  
ESTEEM STOP  
ZAYID BIN SULTAN AL NAHAYYAN  
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES  
END TEXT.  
LUMSDEN

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

**DECLASSIFIED**

**NLRR 7/18-48-22-16-4**  
**BY CLD NARA DATE 6/5/13**

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 ABU DHABI 4699  
SIT137 DATE 11/04/82

DTG: 041143Z NOV 82 PSN: 048143  
TOR: 308/1441Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

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EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUQMBI #4699 3081153  
O 041143Z NOV 82  
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

TO SECSTATE WASH DC 5084

INFO AMEMBASSY DOHA 2117  
AMEMBASSY DIDDA 3549  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 2463  
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 3012  
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 1247  
USLO RIYADH 837  
BT

~~SECRET~~ ABU DHABI 4699

~~EXDIS~~

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: MARR, MASS, PEPR, BA, MU, TC, ZP  
SUBJ: GCC DEFENSE PLANNING - FIXED WING INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT  
REF: (A) MANAMA 2206 (B) MUSCAT 4346 (C) ABU DHABI 4135

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I HAVE JUST READ AMBASSADOR SUTHERLAND'S INTERESTING AND REVEALING REPORT OF HIS NOVEMBER 1 CONVERSATION WITH BDF CINC SHAIKH HAMAD. ITS DESCRIPTION OF CURRENT STATE OF GCC DEFENSE DELIBERATIONS (REF A, PARA 6) CONSTRAINS ME TO MAKE THE BRIEF BUT IMPORTANT CAVEAT IN PARA 3 BELOW WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE RAMIFICATIONS OF ANY FUTURE "APPLICATION OF GCC FUNDS TO PARTICULAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS FOR THE TWO DONEE STATES."

3. REFS (B) AND (C) REPORT STATE OF PLAY RE US FIXED-WIND INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT SALES IN OMAN AND U. A. E. RESPECTIVELY. I CAN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

UNDERSTAND WHY SUPPORT FOR F-16'S TO OMAN MAY BE STRONGER IN WASHINGTON THAN THAT FOR F-16'S TO U. A. E. HOWEVER, GIVEN INTERNAL GCC DYNAMICS LIKELY TO STEM FROM SITUATION AMBASSADOR SUTHERLAND HAS REPORTED, A USG POLICY DECISION NOW TO AUTHORIZE F-16'S FOR SOME GCC MEMBERS AND NOT FOR OTHERS, IS LIKELY TO EXERT A CONTENTIOUS AND DEVISIVE INFLUENCE IN AN ORGANIZATION WHERE IT IS VERY MUCH IN OUR INTEREST TO SPONSOR HARMONY. THIS NEGATIVE EFFECT WOULD COMPOUND IF THE NON-AUTHORIZED STATE PRINCIPALLY INTERESTED IN THE AIRCRAFT WERE A "DONOR" AND THE AUTHORIZED STATE PRINCIPALLY INTERESTED IN IT WERE A "DONEE." IN ABU DHABI OUR STOCK AS A RELIABLE DEFENSE SUPPLIER AND STRATEGIC COOPERATOR WOULD SURELY PLUMMET ONCE AGAIN, EVEN THOUGH AN ALTERNATE SYSTEM (MIRAGE 2000) IS AVAILABLE AND A PURCHASE DECISION RE THAT SYSTEM MAY BE IMMINENT.  
LUMSDEN

**DECLASSIFIED**

**NLRR 748-48-22-17-3**

**BY CRB NARA DATE 6/5/12**

~~SECRET~~



35

~~SECRET~~

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 ABU DHABI 0130 0124 DTG: 130835Z JAN 83 PSN: 075249  
SIT299 DATE 02/26/83 TOR: 013/1128Z

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WHSR COMMENT: NODISKLISTKLISTT WETTERING FOR ACTION

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

NLRR 748-48-22-18-2  
BY LCOD NARA DATES 29/13

ROUTINE  
DE RUQMBI #0130/1 0130856  
R 130835Z JAN 83  
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5409

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 ABU DHABI 0130

~~NOPTS~~

EO 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: MARR, MASS, TC  
SUBJ: FORMATION OF A REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS FOR CENTRAL  
COMMAND (CENTCOM)  
REF: 82 STATE 357099

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. I AM SURE THAT, BY NOW, OTHER AMBASSADORS HAVE COMMENTED IN  
DETAIL ON REFTEL. I APOLOGIZE FOR MY TARDINESS IN SUBMITTING  
THESE REMARKS, BUT WILL SCAPEGOAT THE JUST-COMPLETED MOVE OF MY  
OFFICE TO OUR NEW CHANCERY AND THE NECESSARY COMPLETE DISASSEMBLY  
AND REASSEMBLY OF OUR COMMUNICATIONS UNIT.

3. THE REFLECTIONS WHICH FOLLOW ARE KEYED TO NUMBERED ITEMS  
ONE AND TWO IN REFTEL, PARA 2, AND ARE SUBMITTED FROM THE  
VANTAGE POINT OF THE UAE AS A COUNTRY NOT RPT NOT CURRENTLY  
UNDER CONSIDERATION AS A PREFERRED LOCATION FOR CENTCOM HQ.

4. POLITICAL ADVANTAGES ASSOCIATED WITH CREATING THIS  
HEADQUARTERS IN THE REGION COULD RPT COULD BE CONSIDERABLE,  
BUT I WOULD EXPECT MY HOSTS' INITIAL REACTION TO BE ONE  
OF SIMPLY CONTINUING THE AMBIVALENCE THEY HAVE HERETO-  
FORE DEMONSTRATED TOWARDS U.S. SOUTHWEST ASIAN POLICY.  
THIS CAN BE SEEN IN THE DIFFERENT MANNER IN WHICH THEY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TREAT RDF ON ONE HAND AND OMAN ACCESS AGREEMENTS ON THE  
OTHER. FORMER IS AN OBJECT OF OFFICIAL PUBLIC FOCUS AND  
IS CASTIGATED AS UNWARRANTED SUPERPOWER INTERVENTION INTO  
GULF AFFAIRS WHICH -- AS EVERY GCC COMMUNIQUE FAITHFULLY  
POINTS OUT -- GULF STATES "CAN HANDLE THEMSELVES". CON-  
VERSELY, INITIAL OBJECTIONS TO LATTER HAVE NOW DWINDLED  
AND OMAN'S COOPERATION WITH US HAS FOUND QUIET ACCEPTANCE  
AS NECESSARY ARRANGEMENT (FORTUNATELY IN A NEIGHBORING  
STATE) REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN ULTIMATE OFFSET SHOULD SOVIET  
OR SOVIET SURROGATE FORCES EVER SUCCEED IN MAKING CURRENT  
AREA TENSIONS BOIL OVER AND BECOME UNMANAGEABLE THREATS  
TO UAE'S VERY EXISTENCE. OVER LONGER TERM, I SEE NO  
INSURMOUNTABLE BARRIER TO OUR BOTH ESTABLISHING CENTCOM  
HQ IN IMMEDIATE REGION AND TURNING THIS FACT TO OUR  
DIPLOMATIC ADVANTAGE. THIS PROGNOSIS PRESUPPOSES, FIRST THAT,  
WE WILL ESCAPE MAJOR DISASTERS SUCH AS SHAH'S COLLAPSE

DURING CENTCOM'S INFANCY AND SECOND, THAT WE WILL COME TO  
GRIPS WITH DISADVANTAGES CITED IN PARAS 5 AND 6 BELOW.  
UNDER FAVORABLE CONDITIONS, HOWEVER, CENTCOM HQ ESTABLISHMENT --  
UNDER APPROPRIATE PHASING (REFTEL, PARA 3) --  
COULD BOLSTER QUANTITY AND QUALITY OF CURRENTLY QUIET  
ACCEPTABLE, AND PERHAPS SOME DAY EVEN PERMIT AN OPEN  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BY UAEG THAT U.S. SOUTHWEST ASIA  
STRATEGY IS NOT SO BAD AFTER ALL. THIS POSITIVE  
DEVELOPMENT WOULD BE FURTHER ENHANCED WERE WE EVER ABLE  
TO ESTABLISH CENTCOM HQ IN SAUDI ARABIA. ALTHOUGH UAE  
DOES NOT RPT NOT ALWAYS AGREE WITH SAUDIS ON GULF  
QUESTIONS, MY HOSTS KNOW POWER WHEN THEY SEE IT, AND  
SUCH AN EVENT WOULD BE ACCEPTED HERE AS A FORCE MAJEURE  
EVENT REHABILITATING THE U.S. AS A POWER WILLING AND  
ABLE TO PROTECT MODERATE STATES IN THE AREA UNDER  
GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE TERMS. UNDER THESE CONDITIONS ALSO,  
CHANCES FOR GROWTH OF FURTHER STRATEGIC COOPERATION WITH  
UAE ITSELF (BASED UPON PRIOR ESTABLISHMENT OF A CREDIBLE  
DEFENSE SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP AS SINE QUA NON) WOULD BE  
GREATLY IMPROVED. OF COURSE, THESE POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES  
ARE STILL CONFRONTED BY FORMIDABLE DISADVANTAGES, WHICH  
I WOULD LIKE TO TREAT TOGETHER WITH "DOMESTIC AND REGIONAL  
IMPLICATIONS" IN THE FOLLOWING TWO PARAGRAPHS.

5. IN GAUGING DOMESTIC AND REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF  
ESTABLISHING CENTCOM HQ HEREABOUTS, WE MUST ACCEPT THAT  
THIS WILL BE VIEWED AS AN EVENT OF HISTORICAL PROPORTIONS,  
AND THAT IT WILL BE ENDLESSLY DEBATED, AND REACTED TO,

ABU DHABI 0130 0124 DTG: 130835Z JAN 83 PSN: 075249  
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ACROSS THE ENTIRE POLITICAL SPECTRUM OF THIS REGION.  
THEREFORE, WE IMMEDIATELY RUN INTO THE PROBLEM  
OUR HOSTS HAVE IN BALANCING THE NEED FOR OUR PROTECTION  
AGAINST THE POLITICAL EXPOSURE RISKED IN ACCEPTING  
IT. THE UAE, AS OTHER MODERATE STATES IN THE ARABIAN  
PENINSULA, IS STAUNCHLY ANTI-COMMUNIST BY VIRTUE OF  
PROFOUND RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND STRONG COMMERCIAL TRADITIONS.  
ALONG WITH THOSE OF ITS NEIGHBORS, HOWEVER, ITS PRIORITY  
ORDERING OF ETERNAL THREATS FOCUSES ON THE MATRIX OF  
GROWING AREA TENSIONS IT FACES. POTENTIAL SOVIET  
ACTIVITIES CERTAINLY AFFECT ITS CALCULATIONS, BUT,  
LOGICALLY OR NOT, THE NEED FOR A DIRECT COUNTER TO THE  
RED ARMY IS GENERALLY ACKNOWLEDGED NOT RPT NOT TO BE  
EITHER THE MOST IMMEDIATE OR EVEN (BY SOME) THE MOST  
DANGEROUS SITUATION FACED. WE SHOULD NOT FORGET THAT THIS  
PART OF THE WORLD DID NOT SHARE WITH US, AND OUR  
EUROPEAN AND EAST ASIAN ALLIES, COLD WAR DRAMAS SUCH  
AS THOSE AT CHECKPOINT CHARLIE AND THE PANMUNJOM BRIDGE.  
SOUTHWEST ASIA'S CONCERNS, RATHER, FOCUS ON THE ANATHEMA  
OF COLONIALISM AND THE IMPERATIVE OF BEING INDEPENDENT  
OF LARGE INDUSTRIAL POWERS.

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~~SECRET~~



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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01      ABU DHABI 0130    0124    DTG:130835Z JAN 83 PSN: 075252  
SIT298      DATE 02/26/83            TOR: 013/1130Z

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DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001  
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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB SITB KEMP EOB  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: NODISKLISTKLISTT WETTERING FOR ACTION

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

ROUTINE  
DE RUQMBI #0130/2 0130915  
R 130835Z JAN 83  
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5410

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 ABU DHABI 0130  
NODIS

QUALIFIED THAN I TO MAKE JUDGEMENTS ON MILITARY DOCTRINE QUESTIONS APPROPRIATE TO THIS ENORMOUS UNDERTAKING. IT IS A FACT, HOWEVER, THAT THE DIFFERENCES NOTED ABOVE IN THREAT PERCEPTIONS BETWEEN OUR "ALLIES" IN EUROPE AND EAST ASIA ON ONE HAND, AND OUR "FRIENDS" IN SOUTHWEST ASIA ON THE OTHER ARE LIKELY INDEFINITELY TO FRUSTRATE OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES IN THIS REGION ANYWHERE NEAR THE TYPE OF THING WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MAINTAIN, FOR EXAMPLE, AT RAMSTEIN OR SUBIC. NEVERTHELESS, WHILE WE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO COME UP WITH NEW WAYS TO SUPPORT ACTUAL OPERATIONS, THERE IS NO REASON FROM UAE VANTAGE POINT THAT CENTCOM ELEMENT COULD NOT BE INTRODUCED IN THE REGION SOON. WE ALSO SHOULD BE ABLE TO HAVE UAE ACQUIESCENCE AS WE MOVE FORWARD WITH DISCUSSIONS ON ADDITIONAL PRE-POSITIONING WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS INDICATING RECEPTIVENESS. ON THE WAY, WE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO CONCEIVE AND EXECUTE POLICIES THAT WILL CONTINUE REBUILDING OUR DAMAGE CREDIBILITY VIS-A-VIS VIRULENT REGIONAL PROBLEMS. THEY WILL NEED TO CONVINCE FRIENDLY AREA GOVERNMENTS, WANTING TO BE SO CONVINCED, THAT THE U.S. HAS THE WILL AND ABILITY TO STRUCTURE A FORCE WHICH CAN COUNTER SOVIET MOVES IN SOUTHWEST ASIA IN A MANNER THAT WILL NOT SUBJECT THEM TO REGIONAL POLITICAL DESTABILIZATION THROUGH ITS VERY PRESENCE. A PROPERLY CONCEIVED PHASE-IN OF AN INITIALLY SMALL (E.G. REFTEL, PARA 3, SUB-PARA 2) CENTCOM HQ COULD BE A GOOD FIRST STEP IN THIS DIRECTION. LUMSDEN

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END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

6. IT IS INEVITABLE THAT MANY UAE LEADERS WILL WORRY THAT IN OUR EAGERNESS TO ESTABLISH CENTCOM, CONFRONT THE SOVIET CHALLENGE, CORRECT A DETERIORATING GLOBAL BALANCE, AND SECURE THE OIL FIELDS, WE MAY PROCEED IN DISREGARD OF PERNICIOUS REGIONAL SIDE EFFECTS ON THE MODERATE (BUT TIMID) STATES WE ASK EITHER TO JOIN DIRECTLY WITH US, OR TO SUPPORT, HIGH-PROFILE MILITARY COOPERATION PROJECTS IN THE REGION, SUCH AS ESTABLISHMENT OF A MAJOR U.S. COMMAND HEAD-QUARTERS. THEY FEAR WE WILL INHERENTLY RESIST MAKING CONCESSIONS TO THESE "SIDE PROBLEMS", WHICH WE WILL CONSIDER SECONDARY TO OUR MAIN GLOBAL OBJECTIVE. THE REGIONAL CURRENTS WHICH BOTHER THEM MOST, AND TO WHICH THEY THINK US LIKELY TO PAY INSUFFICIENT HEED AS WE MOVE FORWARD WITH LARGER MILITARY STAKES IN MIND, ARE: (A) THE CONFLICTING NATIONAL PHILOSOPHIES OF THE AREA (IRAQ/IRAN; OMAN/PDRY; PDRY/YAR; IRAQ/SYRIA; SYRIA/JORDAN; ETC.) THROUGH WHICH RADICAL REGIONAL POWERS HECTOR AND SUBVERT SMALL MODERATE STATES BEARING THE STIGMA OF COOPERATION WITH "IMPERIALISTS"; (B) A RESURGENT WAVE OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM, WHICH IS NOT RPT NOT AS PRONOUNCED IN UAE AS ELSEWHERE IN REGION, BUT WHICH IS CLEARLY NOT A FORCE TO BE PROVOKED THROUGH THE APPEARANCE OF HUNDREDS OF U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL; AND (C) THE PERVASIVELY NEGATIVE PERCEPTION OF U.S. BIAS IN FAVOR OF AN AGGRESSIVE AND

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

EXPANSIVE ISRAEL. IRONICALLY, ONE ELEMENT OF GREAT REGIONAL CONCERN WHERE SHARP U.S. MILITARY POLICY FOCUS IS ACKNOWLEDGED HEREABOUTS IS ALSO NEGATIVE, VIZ: WE ARE VIEWED AS PREPARED TO SEIZE OIL FIELDS IN BASIS OF IRANIAN CONTINGENCIES INDEPENDENT OF SOVIET OR SOVIET SURROGATE INVOLVEMENTS.

7. THUS, WHILE THE TASK IS CERTAINLY DOABLE, WE FACE SOME HURDLES IN ESTABLISHING CENTCOM HQ IN GULF AREA, AND SUBSEQUENTLY PROVIDING NECESSARY SUPPORT FOR IN-FORCE DEPLOYMENT OF ADEQUATE U.S. UNITS TO ACCOMPLISH OUR OBJECTIVES HERE. THOSE OF US IN STATE AND DOD WHO HAVE BEEN WORKING ON THIS PROBLEM OVER PAST SEVERAL YEARS REALIZE FULL-WELL THAT SOLDIERS AND DIPLOMATS BOTH ARE GOING TO HAVE TO BE FLEXIBLE AND INNOVATIVE IF WE ARE TO PULL THIS OFF. I WILL LEAVE THOSE MUCH BETTER

~~SECRET~~