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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 3/29/2016

File Folder CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMISSION - KISSINGER
BIPARTISAN COMMISSION (8/10/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 27

SKINNER

482

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
174316	MEMO	OLIVER NORTH, A. SAPIA-BOSCH, ET AL. TO W. CLARK RE NSC BRIEFING FOR COMMISSION ON CENTRAL AMERICA	2	8/10/1983	B1
174317	TALKING POINTS	RE NSC BRIEFING FOR COMMISSION ON CENTRAL AMERICA	2	ND	B1
174318	FORM	REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS FOR 8/11/83	2	8/10/1983	B6

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8390979 B

RECEIVED 10 AUG 83 16

TO CLARK

FROM NORTH

DOCDATE 10 AUG 83

SAPIA-BOSCH

FONTAINE

KEYWORDS: CENTRAL AMERICA COMM AP

SUBJECT: TALKERS FOR PRES AUG 11 MTG W/ BIPARTISAN COMMIS ON CENTRAL AMERICA

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO DUE: STATUS C FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8390971 8390980 NSCIFID (K / C)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
Pres	IP 8/10	For information		VP, JB, EM, MD
-	8/12	Noted by Pres		
@	8/12	Noted by Clark		SB, ON, FO

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 10, 1983

RR

SENSITIVE

MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL BIPARTISAN COMMISSION
ON CENTRAL AMERICA

DATE: August 11, 1983

LOCATION: Cabinet Room

TIME: 1:00-1:30 p.m.

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

WPC

I. PURPOSE. On July 25, 1983 you met with Dr. Kissinger regarding the commission and its mandate. This meeting with the full commission will provide an opportunity to stress the importance of their task and your hopes that they will facilitate a bipartisan consensus on our policy toward the region. Our principal objective in the meeting is to focus their attention and that of the media on our quest for peaceful solutions to the problems of Central America.

Timing of the meeting will be helpful given the content and venue of your speeches in Tampa and El Paso. It will also serve as a positive precursor for your meeting this weekend with President De la Madrid.

II. BACKGROUND. On July 19, 1983 you signed an executive order chartering the commission. The executive order and commission charter have since been amended to indicate that their report to you should be delivered by February 1, 1984. Privately, Dr. Kissinger has provided assurance that the report will be available during the first week of January.

On Wednesday, August 10, the commission members were sworn in at the State Department. They have also been provided with an intelligence briefing by the CIA (Wednesday) and a Defense Department assessment (Thursday morning). Immediately prior to their meeting with you, they will have been briefed by the NSC staff on our policy toward the region. Your talking points (Tab A) are designed to set the tone for the rest of the commission's work.

Though the commission members will be sworn in, security clearances have not been completed. Accordingly, all presentations received by the commission and their meeting with you will be unclassified.

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Declassify on: OADR

III. PARTICIPANTS.

- The President
- The Vice President
- Secretary Shultz
- Amb. Jeane Kirkpatrick, President's Rep to Commission
- Langhorn Motley, Asst Sec State (Latin America)
- Dr. Henry Kissinger, Chairman
- Nicholas F. Brady, Managing Director, Dillon Reed & Co., Inc.
- Henry G. Cisneros, Mayor, San Antonio, Texas
- William P. Clements, Jr., Former Governor of Texas
- Dr. Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro, Professor, Yale University
- Wilson S. Johnson, Pres., Nat'l Fed of Independent Business
- Lane Kirkland, President, AFL-CIO
- Dr. Richard M. Scammon, Political Scientist
- Dr. John Silber, President, Boston University
- Potter Stewart, Assoc Justice, Supreme Court (retired)
- Ambassador Robert S. Strauss, Attorney at Law
- William B. Walsh, President Project Hope
- Senator Charles Mathias, Senior Counselor
- Senator Pete Domenici, Senior Counselor
- Senator Lloyd Bentsen, Senior Counselor
- Senator Scoop Jackson, Senior Counselor
- Congressman Jim Wright, Senior Counselor
- Congressman Mike Barnes, Senior Counselor
- Congressman Jack Kemp, Senior Counselor
- Congressman Bill Broomfield, Senior Counselor
- Winston Lord, Senior Counselor
- William Rogers, Senior Counselor
- Ambassador Harry W. Shlaudeman, Commission Exec. Dir.
- Oliver L. North, NSC
- Alfonso Sapia-Bosch, NSC
- Roger W. Fontaine, NSC

Messrs. Meese, Baker, Deaver to attend at their discretion.

IV. PRESS PLAN.

- Cabinet Room - Pool Photo opportunity
- Departure - Brief remarks by Dr. Kissinger at West Wing Entrance

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS.

- 11:30 a.m.-12:45 p.m. - Commission briefing w/lunch, Rm 208
- 12:45-1:00 p.m. - Commission escorted to Cabinet Room
- 1:00-1:10 p.m. - Pool Photo opportunity
- 1:10-1:30 p.m. - Meeting, talking points attached

Attachment
Tab A- Talking Points

Prepared by:
Oliver L. North, NSC

cc The Vice President
Mr. Edwin Meese
Mr. James Baker
Mr. Michael K. Deaver

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SENSITIVE

TALKING POINTS
MEETING WITH NATIONAL BIPARTISAN COMMISSION
ON CENTRAL AMERICA

- We are very glad to have you aboard. We have a most important task ahead of us. You are in the rare and enviable position in Washington of having the support of both the Congress and the Executive Branch.
- I have welcomed the initiative of Senators Jackson and Mathias and Congressmen Barnes and Kemp who got together and proposed a bipartisan commission to look at the long term problems and solutions of security, poverty, and democratic development in Central America.
- It is important that in the days ahead you focus your efforts on these issues in Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica--and how they are affected by Nicaragua, Cuba, and the Soviet Bloc.
- We all recognize that to do something constructive about these problems, we need a broad consensus and continuity so that the agreed upon policies can be carried forward well into the future. This is your most important task.
- The idea of a "Marshall Plan" has been mentioned as the kind of effort that is needed to improve the social and economic conditions in the region. We all recognize the positive symbolism, but note these important additional factors:
 - The social and political structure in Europe after the war was much more amenable to rapid economic development than the structure in Central America.
 - In Europe, we had won a war and established peace. In Central America, we have continuing systemic violence by those who want to prevent democratic development and economic recovery.
 - While this warfare continues, the prospects for social and economic improvement are starkly limited.

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- Your role, not as diplomatic negotiators, but as facilitators of a long term solution is key to developing support for what must be done.
 - It is also important that while you work, we must continue our efforts to improve the security situation and to strengthen conditions for peace.
 - Our ongoing efforts in this regard will continue through my Ambassador-at-Large, our support for the Contadora process, and by strengthening those democratic states in the region which are threatened by their neighbors. In our quest for peace, we cannot sacrifice the freedom that these people so desperately crave.
 - I am confident that with your help we can explain to the Congress and the American people that a greater effort is needed. Because of the importance of your work to the forthcoming legislative agenda, we must have your report as early as possible.
 - Last week's Congressional approval of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) is a major and an imaginative step forward to provide long term economic growth for the region.
 - I also sense we are moving toward a better awareness of the serious dangers to our national interests posed by continuing Soviet and Cuban interference.
 - Finally, I believe we all share a common vision for the people of Central America:
 - We want to see them escape the poverty and oppression of their past.
 - We want to see them move toward societies where democratic rights are protected and a decent standard of living is assured.
 - With your help these goals can be realized.

National Security Council
The White House

773

II

System #

Package#

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83 AUG 10 P 2: 39

SEQUENCE TO

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DISPOSITION

Executive Secretary	1	mm	
John Poindexter	2 P	J	A
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary	3		D
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other JUDGE

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: Immediately
(Date/Time)

Done to Deaman right away -- I have called to say we changed to unclassified format and are running a bit late.

Cy in folder

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

August 9, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH
ALFONSO SAPIA-BOSCH
ROGER W. FONTAINE

SUBJECT: Meeting of the National Bipartisan Commission with
the President

The President is scheduled to meet in the Cabinet Room with the National Bipartisan Commission on Thursday, August 11, 1983 from 1:00 to 1:30 p.m. At Tab I is a briefing paper with attached talking points for use by the President during the meeting.

Our principal objective for this meeting is to focus the attention of the commission and the media on the issues. The President should use this occasion to stress the commission's role in providing recommendations for a peaceful solution to the problems of the region. Press activities are designed to further this aim. The President's talking points are general in nature and emphasize the importance he attaches to their work.

On Wednesday, the commission will have been sworn in and had a briefing by the State Department. On Thursday morning prior to their meeting with the President, the commission will have had a briefing from Dr. Fred Ikle (9:00 a.m.) and a policy briefing by the NSC staff (11:30 a.m.-12:45 p.m.) in Room 208.

Please note the participants for the Presidential meeting. Secretary Shultz and Assistant Secretary Motley have been included along with Jeane Kirkpatrick, as the President's personally appointed representative. Jeane's input has been included in the President's talking points. Per instructions, all talking points have been declassified.

RECOMMENDATION

That you initial the memo at Tab I and forward to the President.

Approve

Disapprove

Attachment

Tab I - Briefing Paper for the President

Tab A - Talking Points for the President

cc: Bob Sims
Don Fortier

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8390980 9

RECEIVED 12 AUG 83 12

TO CLARK

FROM NORTH

DOCDATE 10 AUG 83

SAPIA-BOSCH

10 AUG 83

FONTAINE

10 AUG 83

KEYWORDS: CENTRAL AMERICA COMM

SUBJECT BACKGROUND PAPERS FOR AUG 11 NSC BRIEFING FOR NATL BIPARTISAN COMMIS
ON CENTRAL AMERICA

ACTION: NOTED BY CLARK

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

NORTH

SAPIA-BOSCH

FONTAINE

FORTIER

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8390979

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

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National Security Council
The White House

System # _____

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Executive Secretary	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	1	✓	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	2	✓	_____
Judge Clark	3	✓	A
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Executive Secretary	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: 8/11 1130
(Date/Time)

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A

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NATIONAL BIPARTISAN COMMISSION
ON CENTRAL AMERICA

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL BRIEFING
AGENDA

- I. IntroductionWilliam P. Clark
(11:30-11:40)
- II. OverviewOliver L. North
(11:40-11:50) Dep Dir Pol/Mil Affairs
- III. Global PerspectiveDonald R. Fortier
(11:50-12:05) Sen Dir Pol/Mil Affairs
Spec Asst to the Pres
- IV. Regional States Perspective.Roger W. Fontaine
(12:05-12:20) Dep Dir Latin
American Affairs
- V. Positive Indicators.Alfonso Sapia-Bosch
(12:20-12:35) Dir Latin American
Affairs
- VI. Questions and Answers
(12:35-12:50)
- VII. Move to Cabinet Room for Mtg w/President
(12:50-1:00)

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B

POLICY OVERVIEW

U.S. Objectives/Interests

- Simply put, our objectives and interests in Central America are four-fold. Our policy toward the region is designed to:
- Encourage democratic political development and regional harmony as in the best interests of the people there and most conducive to international peace.
 - Assure the continuation of formal and friendly relations with Latin American countries by helping them remain independent and preventing military/subversive cooperation with the Soviet Bloc/Cuba.
 - Work with regional governments to improve living conditions through bilateral and multilateral economic development programs.
 - Prevent the Soviet Bloc, Cuba, Libya, and other anti-U.S. entities from working with extreme leftist regional groups to consolidate power or support subversion targeted against any country in the Western Hemisphere.

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- In short, from the speech that President Reagan will deliver this Saturday in El Paso, Texas: "We want to see the peoples of those nations escape the poverty and oppression of their pasts. We want to see them move toward societies where democratic rights are protected and a decent standard of living is assured..."

Concerns

- Our concerns for the future in this part of the world are based upon its proximity to our own borders, its geo-strategic location along vitally important air/sea lines of communication and the trend toward polarization, repression and a half decade of subversive momentum supported by increasing Soviet Bloc/Cuban military presence in this hemisphere.
- Since 1978 there has been a cumulative Soviet Bloc/Cuban military expansion in Cuba, Grenada, Nicaragua, and Suriname. (Since last December, is least visible to date and being done slowly with deception.)
- The trend has been particularly ominous in Nicaragua where Soviet Bloc deliveries this year will likely exceed \$112M (Chart).

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- In the cases cited; Grenada, Nicaragua, and Suriname--each victory by the extreme left adds to the momentum and resources available to extremist groups in other countries.

- A continuation of this trend could further threaten our vital Caribbean sea and air lines of communication through which passes more than half our international track, 40% of our imported oil, and nearly 50% of our assets dedicated to the reinforcement of Europe in the event of war.

- While the spectre of Soviet missiles planted in Nicaragua--a thought aired publically some months ago--may be to some, extreme--the construction of airfields capable of recovering Soviet backfire bombers throughout the region must now be a part of our strategic equation.

- The Soviet Bloc and Cuba have established a clear pattern of action in Latin America--unify the extreme left; establish deceptive coalitions with some non-Marxist-Leninist groups; use international propaganda; political action; and negotiations to fragment the target governments and isolate them from Western help.

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- During the last four years an ever more effective process of subversive cooperation among regional Marxist-Leninist groups has been established with Cuban/Soviet Bloc guidance. For example, to intimidate the President of Honduras into neutrality, his daughter was kidnapped in Guatemala by a group of Guatemalan and Salvadoran terrorists; and in July 1982 part of the terrorist campaign against Costa Rica was done by Colombian M-19 guerrillas acting under direction from the Nicaraguan Embassy.

- Terror from the extreme left is intended to provoke polarization, repression, and the isolation of the target governments--in fragile societies this is a significant danger. The success of communist subversion in Central America might well pose a major threat to continued political stability in Mexico--a country with significant political strengths and vulnerabilities.

- The continued process of Marxist-Leninist terrorism will produce refugees fleeing the resulting violence and economic decline and will then produce more refugees escaping the new communist regimes. If Mexico were also to be destabilized, the resulting flow of refugees would be enormous, 5-10 million or more.

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- Historically, 8 to 10% of the population will attempt to escape a communist regime. These figures reflect the events in Cuba, South East Asia, Afghanistan, and are being borne out today in Nicaragua by those fleeing the revolution of broken promises.

- The costs of such refugee migration are immense. When one considers that the accomodation, care, feeding, and security of 125,000 Cubans from the Mariel "boatlift" cost this nation more than \$1.8B--the magnitude of the problem takes on a new perspective.

- The staggering costs of such an exodus across our borders go far beyond dollars, however. We can foresee significant demographic and racial problems, security concerns, and the virtual destruction of the economic recovery that is now underway.

World Wide Credibility

- Since 1945, the Soviet Union has fomented, supported, or used indirect political-paramilitary warfare against the West in many regions (Far East, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America).

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- Currently, Moscow is providing weapons, guidance, and other support to anti-Western regimes such as Cuba and Libya which are actively engaged in hostile actions against pro-Western governments in Africa, the Middle East, as well as Latin America.

- Failure of the U.S. to defeat this form of aggression in its own neighborhood would signal to friends and adversaries alike that threatened countries throughout the world have much to fear if they count on our support.

Summary

- In your remaining time, before you meet with the President, we will expand on these thoughts and provide you with a synopsis of how we have attempted to apply the instruments of policy to meet the objectives described earlier--and given the concerns I've just described.

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C

Global Implications of the Central American Crisis

What I will try to do this morning, without taking a lot of your time, is to discuss some of the global political-military implications of the Central American problem.

The first point I would make is that:

1. The pattern of activity we are now seeing in Central America is part of a broader problem: coping with revolutionary political violence in strategic parts of the developing world.

- We see similar struggles being waged on the Horn of Africa, in the Persian Gulf, and in other theaters of the world.

- The specific local circumstances in these conflicts may vary, but common ingredients can be found in each. More often than not:

- 3 o Western interests and valuable resources are at stake;
- o The political legitimacy of traditional ruling elites and values is at issue;
- o Expectations tend to outrun economic possibilities; and
- o The supply of arms and advisors is seen as providing a critical contribution to maintaining, or wresting,

power. It's worth understanding that, in the Developing World, small increments of military aid can often be decisive.

2. One does not have to believe in international conspiracies to see important interconnecting linkages between many of the players involved in this struggle.

- Thus Cuban soldiers who support insurgents in our own hemisphere have recently turned up in Yemen, on the southern border of another oil producer, Saudi Arabia.
- Likewise, the Cubans have joined East German secret police in Ethiopia to strengthen that country's ability to pose a threat to Somalia. The Ethiopian-Somali conflict is indeed an ancient one, but once it became clear that the Horn was vital to Western defense of Persian Gulf oil, we witnessed a vast increase in Soviet and Cuban involvement.
- The same Libyan forces that now prey upon Chad also underwrite violence in the Horn, working to undermine Sudan, and restricting the freedom of action of Egypt. Interestingly enough, the Libyans have undertaken to supply and train Nicaraguan insurgents, Palestinians, and now the Basque terrorists--to the obvious displeasure of the new Spanish government.

Let me say something at this point about perceptions of weakness and strength. Each of the countries in question--Cuba, Libya, Ethiopia, Nicaragua--is obviously quite weak in comparison to the U.S. But more interestingly, each understands the political utility that comes from being able to manipulate that weakness; and each knows how to play on our sense of fairness and proportion, to try to inhibit any forceful counterresponse. Thus any effective U.S. reaction to Libyan lawlessness is likely to be seen as an overreaction, given the prevailing disparities of national power. In common terms, even when we win we lose.

But a threat that may seem insignificant to us can, because of imbalances in local power, seem deadly serious to our friends. The same threats could also prove deadly for us in the long term if inadequately met.

o o o o o

You would probably be disappointed if you did not hear a representative from the NSC talk also about the Soviet connection. I do not intend to disappoint you:

3. There is a Soviet connection, but it is surely not a simple one--either to understand or to respond to:

- The Soviets distance themselves from the participants they support, thereby lowering political costs to themselves. Distance not only blurs the nature of Soviet involvement, it handicaps us in legitimizing our own response.
- Moreover, by remaining at least one step removed, the Soviets can play various factions off against one another and position themselves for success even if a dark horse emerges victorious.
- Yemen is a classic case. Cubans and Soviets are training and arming both sides, secure in the belief that the more instability they engender the more insecure Saudi Arabia will become.

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Let's leave aside arguments about whether the Soviets sparked--or merely piggy-back on--instability in Central America. It's clear that our plight works to Soviet advantage.

4. In fact, the Soviets may have multiple reasons for turning up the heat. Reasons that are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

For example:

- They may see it as a way to foment divisions between the U.S. and its friends, as well as to demonstrate U.S. impotence--an impotence that could be all the more pronounced because the challenge is so close to our own shores, and therefore doubly disturbing to our friends in more distant parts of the world.
- They may see their growing activity as a way to prove that they are, in every sense, a co-equal and dynamic power, able to influence and arbitrate events in all parts of the world. This has long been an important aim of Soviet policy.
 - Looked at in a slightly different light, Soviet efforts in Central America may be intended to rebut the perception they have been weakened internally by economic stagnation and externally by the stalemate in Afghanistan.
- They may also hope to exhaust U.S. will and tie down military assets that could otherwise be employed in theaters like the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean--a point driven home only too vividly by the crisis in Chad.

- Finally, they may hope to draw us into a spheres of influence trap, in the belief that this would give greater implicit legitimacy to their claim in the Persian Gulf and Eastern Europe.

Rather than posing a permanent threat, some believe the purpose of the Soviet presence in Central America is to create pressure and capital that can be traded off for other ends as part of a larger strategic settlement. This may seem less menacing in the abstract, but its hardly benign. What price will we have to pay to remove the threat? Will it be reactivated at a later point, as we have seen in other areas? Moreover, success begets success. Aspirations can change as unforeseen opportunities open up, and the Soviets have a sure eye for opportunities.

5. Some tend to draw optimism from past Soviet failures. This is probably unwise.

- For one thing, it's a mistake to assume that the Soviets haven't learned lessons from their earlier mistakes.
 - First of all, earlier cases were quite different. Egypt, for example, had a history of independence, and institutions to go with it--stretching back for thousands of years.

- But beyond this, the Soviets now insist on greater control over internal sources of power. And, their client advisors give them the means to achieve this end. For example, Germans and Cubans often sit in key ministries, participate in the organization of parties, and train key security and political personnel.

- Soviet methods are not only more sophisticated, they are also more brutal, in ensuring responsive leadership. Afghanistan is a case in point. The fact is that an entrenched Soviet presence is much harder to shake off today than before.

- At the same time, there is a real question about how burdened the Soviets are by the costs of empire. Soviet leaders do face competing priorities and an already strained resource base. Likewise, there is a question about whether we can frame situations--leaving aside for a moment the precise instruments we use--that frustrate the aims of Soviet interventions.

- 6. By now it is also quite clear that the Central American crisis impacts on our allies.

- Up until now, U.S. Central America policy has provided an easy target of criticism for those--like the French--who have a political need to illuminate their differences with us.

- True, this becomes more difficult as the excesses of the Nicaraguans and Cubans become more apparent: moves against the Jewish community in Nicaragua, support for Basque terrorists, etc.

- But the major concern, both in Europe and elsewhere is much deeper and involves the unarticulated fear that we will be distracted from problems, and threats that are of more immediate concern to our friends. This makes it all the more important that we be able to respond to threats outside Central America, as we are doing in Chad, for instance.

- Moreover, as our stake in Central America deepens, it will matter more than ever to our friends that we succeed. They know all too well what implications to draw from a paralysis of policy in Washington.

- The Europeans also now face the serious problem of managing the political fallout from their own peace movements. We are sensitive to this and understand that a Central America policy that could be portrayed as "militaristic" would exacerbate the difficulty. There are independent reasons, though why such a policy would be unwise.

7. The real test, then, is to make our European friends and the American public realize that military and security elements are only part of a larger framework--a framework that embraces a flexible combination of instruments for pursuing peaceful development.

- Force cannot resolve the complex problems of Central America. But given the confusions and contradictions that continue to surround the role of force, I think it is appropriate to address this problem briefly.
- It is in many ways ironic that the U.S. has been criticized for militarizing conflicts in the Developing World.
- In fact it is the U.S.--and the West--that deploy the widest array of incentive. We have the economic strength, the historic concern for human and material development, and the technological expertise to be an effective partner of those favoring peaceful progress. We also have a national style that enables us to work in tandem--and non-patronizingly--with those who need our support.
- The Soviets by contrast lack such attributes, or choose not to apply them. Force for them truly is a comprehensive solution--and worse yet--it is a solution that frequently seems to work. Force has been for us only one element of our policy package--and a responsive element at that.

- The second point I would make is that force does not always have to be used to be effective. A U.S. presence can serve as a backdrop. A backdrop that gives others the confidence to take risks for peace, and that inhibits certain more extreme forms of behavior by others.

- In a sense, ignoring force would also be both arrogant and self-discrediting--particularly to those who see their economic infrastructure ravaged daily and who brave bullets to vote. There are painful human costs in resisting force with force, but the moral costs of inaction can also be quite unacceptable, as the plight of the Vietnamese boat people and the Miskito Indians makes clear.

- Only by helping others to understand that force has a place in--but is not a preoccupation of--U.S. policy can we restore the confidence that is necessary to truly liberate those other resources--economic and otherwise--that are necessary to success.

- The key is to integrate force, diplomacy, and economic power so as to provide the correct mix of incentives. Positive incentives for the parties willing to seek peaceful solutions; and meaningful disincentives for those who persist in believing their aims can be obtained through armed force.

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- Finding the right mix of resources is hard. Local complexities also matter. No formula can be applied mechanistically. Part of the great challenge facing this commission is how to make the resources we do have more suitable to local ends.

But there are additional challenges as well. Among these few are as important as the need to recognize the fundamental relationship between America's democratic values and its policy in Central America. It would make no sense to stand aside, in the name of human rights, while arms are used to establish regimes that we know will systematically eliminate those rights. Our insistence upon elections, upon respect for civil and religious freedoms, and upon reforms that secure the roots of democratic institutions probably will not produce an immediate end to the abuse of human dignity by all sides in Central America. The development of democratic institutions requires painstaking effort, offers no instant results, and certainly guarantees no perfect solutions. Who, though can offer a better way?

Conclusion

Critics assert of course that our approach is simple-minded, and that we see only an East-West conflict and not local complexities. If anything, our concern with the Soviet strategy of intervention

in the Third World has made us more aware of these complexities, more sympathetic to the conditions that give rise to struggle, and more confident of our ability to provide the resources that can help. Rather than being dismayed by the breadth of the challenge, we should focus on its potential reversibility. Rather than assuming that such conflicts need to be bargained over in a larger deal between the U.S. and the Soviet Union--presumably in exchange for other valuable things--we should recognize that we have the imagination and resources to deal with such situations on their own terms.

The last thing I would want to do--the last thing I could lay claim to--is to create the impression that all of the answers are at hand. Like some of you, I am myself only beginning to become involved in this vital question. I believe, though, on the basis of related problems in areas of the world with which I have been more closely involved, that certain patterns repeat themselves. And that is precisely why the work before you is of such transcendent importance.

Donald Fortier

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Part I -- Country by Country Viewpoint:

Guatemala

Guatemala still sees itself as the national leader of Central America -- Captaincy-General of the region. But its political instability and, in recent years, lack of democracy has prevented it from actively being such. It has bilateral problems with Mexico, traditional concern of its northern neighbor's size, and current specific concern that use of Mexico as a sanctuary by Guatemalan insurgent groups.

Guatemala has a traditional claim on Belize as a province of Guatemala. Contemporary concern that Belize used as a funnel for insurgent group resupply. Finally, Guatemala fears a Salvadoran insurgent victory -- The thought of Salvador as a neighboring country.

El Salvador

El Salvador sees itself as an economic leader in Central America despite its small geographic size and limited resources. Since

1979, it has faced a major insurgency which is Soviet bloc supported, and the country, until recently, found itself increasingly isolated in the world and even in the region. Traditionally, its most difficult bilateral problem has been with Honduras. A war was fought between them in 1969. Much of the border remains undemarcated -- a fact which FMLN has taken advantage of. There are recent moves to resolve that issue with Honduras. El Salvador is recently concerned with Nicaragua's support of the FMLN and is increasingly making public denunciation of that issue.

Honduras

Honduras sees itself as a poor, but fledgling, democracy that does not have a history, despite its poverty of social variances as its neighbor, El Salvador, has. Its traditional bilateral concern has been El Salvador. Since Honduras lost the war, their distrust of El Salvador has remained high and has only lessened in recent years. A recent and contemporary concern is Nicaragua. Honduras, more than any country in Central America, feels threatened by Nicaragua's export of revolution and large military machine. Honduras is in forefront, particularly since the inauguration of President Suazo, in the process of constructing a regional alliance isolating Nicaragua.

Costa Rica

Costa sees itself as a small, but stable, peaceful and above all, democratic country. Security traditionally has not rested on an Army which was abolished in 1948, but on regional security agreements and close ties with the U.S. Traditionally, it has been an isolationist in regional matters. Bilaterally, it experienced difficulties with only one country -- Nicaragua -- under the Somozos, particularly the older Somozo. Costa Rica openly suggested the Sandinistas in their 1979 victory over Costa Rica and San Jose's traditional enemy. Costa Rica's recent concern over the Sandinista policies, internal as well as external, are increasingly aggressive within the region in cooperating with other countries against Nicaragua.

Nicaragua

Nicaragua sees itself as a revolutionary state under attack, particularly from Honduras and, by means of Honduras, the U.S. It now has bad bilateral relations with all of its neighbors and near neighbors. It has attempted to focus attention on resolving, in its view, the most important bilateral problem and that is with Honduras and its alleged support of the country revolutionaries. There is lesser but increasing concern in Managua over alleged support for Eden Pastora by Costa Rica.

Part II -- Regional:

The theme is slowly evolving and expanding regional effort at diffusing the problems in Central America. It began with Central America's democratic community, i.e., Costa Rica, Honduras and El Salvador (not Guatemala) -- with our open help -- placing pressure on Nicaragua that evolved into what has been called the Contadora process.

The Contadora process is regional in nature, excluding the U.S. -- although the U.S. is supportive -- involving nine countries. They can be broken down into two groups -- 4 Central American countries which see Nicaragua as the problem, and Nicaragua, which sees them -- particularly Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica -- as the problem, and the Contadora sponsors -- Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and Panama. In contrast to the growing homogeneity of Core Four, the Contadora sponsors are split. On the one hand, Mexico remains an advocate of Nicaragua, Venezuela is supporter of the Core Four, and Colombia and Panama are somewhere in the middle, with Colombia active and Panama passive.

The Contadora process will continue in late August with another Foreign Ministers meeting and is still seeking a formula by which the interests of the various parties can be accommodated.

Core Four have their agenda spelled out from Guatemala City on July 19, the Contadora sponsors have theirs in a so-called Cancun declaration, and thirdly, Nicaragua has their own -- spelled out in Daniel Ortega's July 19 speech.

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POSITIVE INDICATORS

- This Administration early on recognized that the socio-economic inequities that have plagued Central America for centuries had to be reversed.
- At the same time, we recognized that economies, despite whatever help is made available, cannot grow and flourish in war zones.
- We also recognized a trend that has since become more pronounced in the Americas--the return to democratic norms.
- Our program to help Central America encompasses all of these areas and includes an even more important one. It is our fervent hope that we will be able to help bring peace to this area of such great human suffering.
- And, it is clear that we are making progress in this regard. Dick Stone, in carrying out the President's mandate, has met with a representative of the Salvadoran left. Further talks will take place.
- Commandante Ortega on July 19 admitted the need for multilateral negotiations. Fidel Castro followed up on this by offering to withdraw a couple hundred of his several thousand military advisers in Nicaragua.

- The Contadora group also is making progress, and we fully support these efforts, as the President has stated so many times.

- In El Salvador we note a renewed vigor on the part of the army, which now is controlling more of its national territory. They have regained the initiative and, hopefully, this will encourage the guerrillas to be more willing to participate in national elections.

- We are still inspired by the elections that took place in that nation a year ago last month. In the face of death threats from the guerrillas, the people--80 percent of the electorate--voted.

- There remain many deficiencies in El Salvador: people are still abused, for instance, but even the most critical observer will say that things have improved.

- So, we are encouraged by what we see. Our approach has been a principled one, and we have not wavered in our determination to assist those nations that are under attack and have asked for our help.

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