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US Policy Toward the Soviet Union (1 of 8)

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: NSSD FILE

Withdrawer

LOJ 10/27/2006

File Folder NSSD 11-82 [US POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION]
(1 OF 8)

FOIA

F2000-112/1

Box Number 91278

LETTOW

1

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
29368	MEMO	L. PAUL BREMER TO WILLIAM P CLARK, RE DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR AN NSSD <i>R 10/17/2007 NLRRF2000-112/1</i>	1	4/1/1982	B1
29369	NSSD	DRAFT FOR US POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION <i>R 6/30/2008 NLRRF00-112</i>	3	3/25/1982	B1
29370	MEMO	RICHARD PIPES TO MICHAEL WHEELER, TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR AN NSSD <i>R 6/30/2008 NLRRF00-112</i>	1	3/25/1982	B1
29371	MEMO	PIPES TO CLARK, RE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF NSSD ONPOICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION <i>R 6/30/2008 NLRRF00-112</i>	2	3/10/1982	B1
29372	MEMO	PIPES TO CLARK, RE STATEMENT OF US STRATEGY TOWARD SOVIET UNION <i>R 6/30/2008 NLRRF00-112</i>	1	3/5/1982	B1
29373	NSSD	DRAFT SAME TEXT AS 29369 <i>R 6/30/2008 NLRRF00-112</i>	3	3/10/1982	B1
29374	MEMO	DECISION MEMO ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS (SAME AS #14788) <i>R 6/30/2008 NLRRF00-112</i>	5	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 23 MAR 82 14 /

TO CLARK FROM PIPES
 PIPES
 BREMER

DOCDATE 05 MAR 82
 10 MAR 82
 01 APR 82

41510 2

KEYWORDS: USSR NATO JOBERT, MICHEL
 NSSD

SUBJECT: DRAFT TOR FOR NSSD ON US STRATEGY TWDS USSR

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE: STATUS C FILES IFS O

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO
 CLARK BAILEY
 STEARMAN
 RENTSCHLER

COMMENTS INCORPORATES OLD LOG 8201286

REF# LOG 8290411 NSCIFID NSSD11-82 (B / B)

CTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Clark</i>	<i>3/9</i>	<i>Further action</i>		
<i>Clark</i>	<i>3/10</i>	<i>More information</i>		
<i>Whelan</i>	<i>3/23</i>	<i>For further action</i>		
	<i>3/27</i>	<i>Whelan said memo</i>		
	<i>4/1</i>	<i>Rec'd State response</i>		

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

S/S# 8208379

RETURN THIS RECEIPT IMMEDIATELY TO
BT MERCHANT
SITUATION ROOM

REGISTRY NO.
90176

UNCLASSIFIED DESCRIPTION
(Serial No., File No., Subject)

DATE
26 MARCH 1982

INCLOSURES
1 of 4 pages

ADDRESSEE
L PAUL BREMER
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPT OF STATE

Receipt for communication(s) described above is hereby acknowledged by:

ADDRESSEE'S SIGNATURE
S. McElhenny

DATE RECEIVED
3/27/82

TO BE RETURNED TO THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

CLASSIFIED MATERIAL RECEIPT



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEM II
90176

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET~~

April 1, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Draft Terms of Reference for an NSSD on "U.S.
Policy Toward the Soviet Union

REFERENCE: Wheeler-Bremer Memorandum on this topic of March
26, 1982

This is in response to the referenced memorandum which enclosed a draft terms of reference on U.S.-Soviet policy that was volunteered to Under Secretary Eagleburger by Dr. Pipes. The Department notes that a SIG, established last year, produced a lengthy East-West Policy Study, along with an Executive Summary and a draft Presidential Decision Memorandum. Following extensive interagency coordination the Study and accompanying documents were approved by this SIG last summer with the exception of some aspects of East-West economic policy.

The Department believes that the appropriate way to proceed at this juncture is to undertake an interagency review of the existing East-West Policy Study, which may need some updating. We do not believe that new terms of reference are necessary in this regard.


L. Paul Bremer, II
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

NLRR F00-112/1 # 29368

RDS-3 03/31/02

BY GI NARA DATE 10/17/07

~~SECRET~~

4
System II
90176

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

March 26, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Draft Terms of Reference for an NSSD on
"U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union"

As requested by Under Secretary of State Eagleburger, attached are the draft Terms of Reference for an NSSD on the subject of "U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union" to be used for a SIG or IG meeting to be chaired by the Department of State to review this subject in relation to the East-West Policy study already completed.

Michael O. Wheeler
Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary

Attachment

Terms of Reference

~~SECRET~~
Review March 25, 1988

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By 601 NARA, Date 10/27/06

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Proposed National Security Study
Directive Number

DRAFT

U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION

Introduction

A Review will be conducted of long-term U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union. This National Security Study Directive establishes the Terms of Reference for the Review. (S)

Objectives of the Review

To determine:

- The nature of the Soviet threat to U.S. national security;
- The kind of changes in the Soviet system and in Soviet internal and external policies that would best serve U.S. national interests; and
- The means at the disposal of the United States and its Allies to promote such favorable changes and to discourage unfavorable ones. (S)

To produce a paper that would answer these questions for consideration by the National Security Council, and subsequently, for decision by the President. (S)

Scope of the Review

The Review will deal with the following subjects:

1. The long-term interest of the United States in regard to the Soviet Union: whether it is in the interest of the United States to stabilize the political, economic, and social situation in the Soviet Union and its Bloc, or, conversely, to destabilize it. (S)
2. The likelihood of major changes in the Soviet system: to ascertain what realistic expectation one can have of significant changes in the Soviet system and in Soviet policies; whether such changes are likely to make the country more or less threatening. The question of a non-evolutionary (violent) collapse of the system from within and its implications for U.S. security will also be considered. (S)

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Classified/Extended by WPClark

Review March 25, 2002

Reason: NSC 1.13(f)

NLRR 100-112 #29369

BY CN NARA DATE 6/30/08

~~SECRET~~

3. Soviet vulnerabilities: to identify the sources of strains and tensions within the Soviet system:

- Economic (decline in industrial and agricultural productivity; the burden of military expenditures and support of client states; consumer dissatisfaction).
- Political (dissident movements among Russian and minority intellectuals; the succession problem; tensions in the Eastern Bloc and the international Communist movement; imperial overextension).
- Social (unfavorable demographic trends; discontent among various social strata). ~~(S)~~

4. Internal forces making for change: to identify elements in the Soviet ruling elite which desire to change the system in a more liberal as well as in a more conservative direction, and to determine what actions by foreign powers assist each of these two competing groups. (S)

5. Western ability to influence Soviet policies: to ascertain the means at the disposal of the United States and its Allies to influence the evolution of the Soviet regime and Soviet policies in a direction favorable to their interests:

- Economic (technology transfer; assistance in development of industry, agriculture, and energy resources; extension of credit; trade, including grain sales).
- Political (aid to non-Communist and anti-Communist elements in the Soviet Bloc and areas encroached upon by the Soviet Union; international fora).
- Military (the military strategy most likely to neutralize Soviet strategic objectives; assistance to anti-Communist guerrillas; regional commitments of U.S. forces).
- Ideological (the nature and thrust of U.S. informational efforts directed at the Soviet Union). ~~(S)~~

6. Allied cooperation: to determine how best to secure the support and cooperation of our Allies in the pursuit of its policies toward the Soviet Union. ~~(S)~~

Administration

Management of the NSSD -82 Review will be the responsibility of an interagency group that will report its findings no later than April 30, 1982. The group will be chaired by the Department

SECRET

SECRET/SENSITIVE

3

of State, with the Deputy Chairmanship being assumed by a representative of the Department of Defense. It will also include Assistant Secretary-level representation from the National Security Council staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Treasury Department, the Department of Commerce, the International Communication Agency, and the Department of Agriculture. (S)

All matters relating to this NSSD will be classified SECRET or SECRET/SENSITIVE. Dissemination of this NSSD, the subsequent study material, and the resulting draft NSDD will be handled on a strict need-to-know basis. (C)

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Brian,
For dispatch.

Thanks,

Kathy, 3/26

Done
MM
3/27



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE

March 25, 1982

29370

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL O. WHEELER

SIGNED

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference for an NSSD to State

The attached Terms of Reference for an NSSD "U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union" were drafted by me on March 10, 1982, at the request of Judge Clark. They were returned on March 23 with the suggestion that I talk to State and recommend that they initiate a SIG or IG based on the old "East-West Paper" (July, 1981). I talked to Larry Eagleburger yesterday, and he agreed with the idea but asked me to draft and forward a Terms of Reference paper for such an undertaking. John Poindexter agreed. Herewith (Tab I) the Terms of Reference for forwarding to State. Since the whole review is to be completed by April 30, time is of the essence. *(S)*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to Jerry Bremer at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____
as amended

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to Jerry Bremer forwarding Terms of Reference for an NSSD on "U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union"

DECLASSIFIED

NLRREF00-112 #29370

BY CV NARA DATE 6/30/08

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Classified/Extended by WPClark
Review March 25, 2002
Reason: NSC 1.13(f)

National Security Council
The White House

91 16

Package # 90176

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	_____
Staff Secretary	<u>2</u>	<u>MW₂₆</u>	<u>A</u>
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

CY To VP	_____	Show CC	_____
CY To Meese	_____	Show CC	_____
CY To Baker	_____	Show CC	_____
CY To Deaver	_____	Show CC	_____
Other	_____		

COMMENTS

Mike Mullen,
Please see my changes. Tell Dick I think this is a more subtle way. Be quiet unless still in draft TCR. Objective of the meeting would be to get consensus that we need to re-visit this subject. John

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

March 25, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER, III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: *P. 1000* Terms of Reference for an NSSD on "U.S.
Policy Toward the Soviet Union"

As requested by Under Secretary of State Eagleburger, attached
are the Terms of Reference for an NSSD on the subject of
"U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union" to be used for a SIG
or IG meeting to be chaired by the Department of State to
review this subject; ~~the review to be completed by April 30,
1982.~~ (S)

*In relation to the last meeting, already
already completed.*

Michael O. Wheeler
Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary

Attachment:

Terms of Reference

~~SECRET~~

Review March 25, 1988.

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By LOS NARA, Date 10/27/06

National Security Council
The White House

Package # ~~1286~~

90176

02 11 40 P 3. 40

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<i>[Signature]</i>	_____
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<i>[Signature]</i>	_____
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<i>[Signature]</i>	_____
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<i>[Signature]</i>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter	<u>5</u>	<i>[Signature]</i>	_____
Staff Secretary	<u>6</u>	<i>[Signature]</i>	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

A-Action

DISTRIBUTION

CY To VP	_____	Show CC
CY To Meese	_____	Show CC
CY To Baker	_____	Show CC
CY To Deaver	_____	Show CC
Other	_____	_____

Return to Dick Pipes

copy to John: I let's use w. Bud. paper as base & move it up & have Dick have see here with state chair work

COMMENTS

This looks very good. Recommend Dick circulate informally. Recommend state chair at first. A study schedule should be produced as first order of business. If schedule not met, then shift chair to NSC. John

23 MARCH 1982

Mr. Pipes


The attached package is returned to you for further action per WPC & Poindexter notes.

It is transferred into System II under log 90176.

(the old log # 1286 is invalid).

When you have finally completed work on this package, please return the entire file to me.

Thank you.



Brian Merchant
Situation Room

MEMORANDUM

SYSTEM II
90176

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 10, 1982

29371

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference of NSSD on Policy
Toward the Soviet Union

Attached is the draft of Terms of Reference (Tab I) for a NSSD on "U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union" which you have asked me to prepare. As soon as you have approved it, I will consult all the interested agencies and produce a revised draft, which I will send over to State for further action. ~~(S)~~

Two points require your attention:

1. You may be told by State that a new study of U.S. Soviet policy is not necessary because in July 1981 State completed a major interagency review which resulted in an "East-West Policy Study" approved by a Senior Interdepartmental Group (Tab II). This document, however, suffered from two fundamental flaws:

- It heavily centered on the military dimension and the problems of containment, providing no guidance, so important to our Allied relations, as to ultimate U.S. objectives in dealing with the Soviet Union.
- It was a long (80 pages) and unwieldy document which did not lend itself to NSC consideration and could not be made into an NSDD even if the five-page Decision Memorandum were taken as its basis.

I have consulted this document and included some of its points into the Terms of Reference, but essentially my Terms are fresh in approach. ~~(S)~~

2. Although I have assigned the chairmanship of the interagency group dealing with this Study to State, I seriously doubt whether this is a workable arrangement. The differences between State and Defense on the subject of U.S. long-term policies toward the Soviet Union are profound and very hard to reconcile: ultimately the NSC and the President will have to choose between their divergent approaches. The only reason why the "East-West Policy

~~SECRET~~

Classified/Extended by WPClark
Review March 10, 2002
Reason: NSC 1.13(f)

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NIRR FDD-112 #29371

BY C11 NARA DATE 6/30/08

Study" got approval from both State and Defense was due to the fact that it skirted the fundamental questions. It seems to me. that if we are going to be serious about tackling the fundamental questions, rather than confining ourselves to issues where consensus is easy to obtain, then the NSC alone is capable of providing the needed arbitration. (S)

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you approve the Terms of Reference at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

2. That a decision be made on the chairmanship of the inter-agency group that will deal with the Study.

State to chair _____ NSC to chair _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Terms of Reference
- Tab II East-West Policy Study

cc: Norman Bailey
Jim Rentschler
Bill Stearman

National Security Council
The White House

16

Package # 1286

82 MAR 6 P 1:15

90176

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Bud McFarlane		<u>[Signature]</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>2</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>4</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Staff Secretary	<u>5</u>		<u>A</u>
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

CY To VP		Show CC	
CY To Meese		Show CC	
CY To Baker		Show CC	
CY To Deaver		Show CC	

Other _____

Urgent - Must be developed in coord with State
COMMENTS promptly

URGENT

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Proposed National Security Study
Directive Number

U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION

Introduction

A Review will be conducted of long-term U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union. This National Security Study Directive establishes the Terms of Reference for the Review. (S)

Objectives of the Review

To determine:

- The nature of the Soviet threat to U.S. national security;
- The kind of changes in the Soviet system and in Soviet internal and external policies that would best serve U.S. national interests; and
- The means at the disposal of the United States and its Allies to promote such favorable changes and to discourage unfavorable ones. (S)

To produce a paper that would answer these questions for consideration by the National Security Council, and subsequently, for decision by the President. (S)

Scope of the Review

The Review will deal with the following subjects:

1. The long-term interest of the United States in regard to the Soviet Union: whether it is in the interest of the United States to stabilize the political, economic, and social situation in the Soviet Union and its Bloc, or, conversely, to destabilize it. (S)
2. The likelihood of major changes in the Soviet system: to ascertain what realistic expectation one can have of significant changes in the Soviet system and in Soviet policies; whether such changes are likely to make the country more or less threatening. The question of a non-evolutionary (violent) collapse of the system from within and its implications for U.S. security will also be considered. (S)

SECRET/SENSITIVE
Classified/Extended by WPClark
Review March 10, 2002
Reason: NSC 1.13(f)

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 100-112 #29373

BY CN NARADATE 6/30/08

Handwritten

3. Soviet vulnerabilities: to identify the sources of strains and tensions within the Soviet system:

- Economic (decline in industrial and agricultural productivity; the burden of military expenditures and support of client states; consumer dissatisfaction).
- Political (dissident movements among Russian and minority intellectuals; the succession problem; tensions in the Eastern Bloc and the international Communist movement; imperial overextension).
- Social (unfavorable demographic trends; discontent among various social strata). (S)

4. Internal forces making for change: to identify elements in the Soviet ruling elite which desire to change the system in a more liberal as well as in a more conservative direction, and to determine what actions by foreign powers assist each of these two competing groups. (S)

5. Western ability to influence Soviet policies: to ascertain the means at the disposal of the United States and its Allies to influence the evolution of the Soviet regime and Soviet policies in a direction favorable to their interests:

- Economic (technology transfer; assistance in development of industry, agriculture, and energy resources; extension of credit; trade, including grain sales).
- Political (aid to non-Communist and anti-Communist elements in the Soviet Bloc and areas encroached upon by the Soviet Union; international fora).
- Military (the military strategy most likely to neutralize Soviet strategic objectives; assistance to anti-Communist guerrillas; regional commitments of U.S. forces).
- Ideological (the nature and thrust of U.S. informational efforts directed at the Soviet Union). (S)

6. Allied cooperation: to determine how best to secure the support and cooperation of our Allies in the pursuit of its policies toward the Soviet Union. (S)

Administration

Management of the NSSD -82 Review will be the responsibility of an interagency group that will report its findings no later than April 30, 1982. The group will be chaired by the Department

of State, with the Deputy Chairmanship being assumed by a representative of the Department of Defense. It will also include Assistant Secretary-level representation from the National Security Council staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Treasury Department, the Department of Commerce, the International Communication Agency, and the Department of Agriculture. (S)

All matters relating to this NSSD will be classified SECRET or SECRET/SENSITIVE. Dissemination of this NSSD, the subsequent study material, and the resulting draft NSDD will be handled on a strict need-to-know basis. (C)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

S/S 8121136

add

4259

21



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET~~
WITH SENSITIVE ATTACHMENTS

July 14, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN
THE WHITE HOUSE

As agreed at the July 13 Senior Interdepartmental Group meeting on East-West Policy, we are forwarding the final, cleared version of the Decision Memorandum, Executive Summary and full study for early NSC consideration.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Decision Memorandum
2. Executive Summary
3. East-West Policy Study

Dist.:

OVP: Ms. Nancy Beard Dyke
DOD: Mr. Jay Rixse
CIA: Mr. Thomas Cormack
JCS: LTC John Pustay
ACDA: Mr. Norman Terrell
UNA: Amb. Kirkpatrick

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Confidential, July 21, 1997
By WJA NARA, Date 4/5/02

~~SECRET~~
WITH SENSITIVE ATTACHMENTS
GDS 7/14/87

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F00-112 #29374

BY CW NARA DATE 6/30/08

Decision Memorandum on East-West Relations

At the National Security Council meeting held on July 1981, the President made the following decisions concerning U.S. policy on East-West relations. Specifically, the overriding objective of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union will be to blunt and contain Soviet imperialism. This goal involves raising the costs and risks of Soviet expansion and, to the extent feasible, encouraging democratic processes in the USSR. To these ends, the U.S. will:

1. Restore a satisfactory military balance.

a. Nuclear Forces. We must redress the current imbalance through a comprehensive modernization program designed to strengthen deterrence. The Soviets must perceive, in all contingencies, the costs of initiating strategic or theater nuclear attacks as higher than the potential gains.

b. Regional Forces. The U.S. will modernize and expand its conventional force structure by (1) creating over time capabilities adequate to deter the full array of Soviet and regional threats, above all in the Persian Gulf area; (2) reversing the deterioration of regional balances in Europe and Asia; (3) establishing an improved margin of maritime superiority; and (4) improving our arms transfer capability by making additional resources available on a timely basis.

c. Arms Control. The U.S. will pursue a realistic arms control policy aimed at achieving balanced, verifiable agreements that directly enhance national security, limiting those Soviet systems which are most threatening to us and protecting essential force modernization plans. We will set tougher substantive standards and seek to develop Western understanding of the time and bargaining leverage that will be required

before the Soviets will begin to accept significant progress in arms control. Recognizing that prolonged negotiation is better than accepting bad agreements, we will pursue arms control agreements that make tangible contributions to U.S. and allied security. We will not let this serious effort be diluted by the pursuit of agreement for its own sake or for the sake of transitory improvements in political atmosphere.

2. Defend Western Interests in Areas of Instability

a. We will seek to preempt Soviet opportunism through timely diplomacy and constructive economic policies. We should work with our friends to build barriers to Soviet influence in the Third World and should be wary of involving Moscow in the peaceful resolution of regional disputes.

b. The US will adopt a strategy to seize the initiative from the Soviets in the Third World, by opposing them and their proxies, and by calling attention to the failures of the Soviet approach to development. We will seek appropriate opportunities to raise the risks and costs of their involvements in the Third World, exploiting the vulnerabilities of Soviet proxies wherever prudent. This strategy must be carefully tailored in light of regional, political and cultural realities. We will, as possible, pursue this strategy with our major allies and regional friends.

c. This strategy should be applied at once to Afghanistan where, working with other states, we should intensify pressure for a total Soviet withdrawal.

d. In setting priorities among US interests in the Third World the US, its allies and regional friends must be able to defend Western interests in the strategic Persian Gulf and Near East area -- especially Western access to oil -- against direct and indirect Soviet threats.

e. We also must protect our enduring interests in other parts of the developing world, including the Central American area and southern Africa.

3. Improve cooperation with our European and Asian allies and friends.

a. To meet the Soviet threat to US worldwide security interests, US global strategy should join American strength to that of allied and friendly countries. We should draw on an

informal but interlocking coalition of European and Asian allies, our strategic association with China, and our partnerships with key "Third World" countries. The US should be the fulcrum of this structure, providing the leadership needed to integrate Western assets and defend vital Western interests.

b. Europe. The US will work to forge a new alliance consensus for its strategy towards the Soviet Union. We will urge European leaders to work actively toward reducing the political constraints on their defense policies and to join us in competing effectively with Moscow. Our key goals in Europe are: (1) to improve consultation and coordination, particularly on issues outside Europe; (2) to increase the European commitment of resources to the common defense, both in Europe and in areas vital to the alliance; (3) to achieve allied agreement on an arms control strategy, and use our participation in arms control processes to seek agreements based on parity, arms reduction and balanced verifiable arms control, and to demonstrate US commitment to arms control, while ensuring that negotiations do not become an excuse for delaying NATO force modernization and placing the burden on the Soviet Union for resisting effective arms control; (4) to arrest growing European dependence on the Soviet bloc, particularly on energy, to take collective action to prevent emergence of future vulnerabilities and to reinforce Western economic ties; and (5) to achieve greater understanding for US policies by the current and successor generations of Europeans.

C. East Asia.

(1) Japan. While reconfirming our commitment to Japanese security, we will encourage the acquisition of a military capability by Japan to provide for its defense, within its constitutional constraints, and encourage greater Japanese engagement in common alliance diplomacy and economic assistance around the world.

(2) China. We will solidify our developing strategic association with China, strengthen China's ability to resist Soviet intimidation and strengthen Chinese defense capabilities selectively, while maintaining our strong support for the security of Taiwan.

(3) We will strengthen security cooperation with our Korean, Australian, New Zealand and Philippine allies, and bolster support for the ASEAN states.

d. Alliance Problems. We must recognize that it often will be difficult to generate adequate support from our allies and friends, in Europe and Asia, for our policies toward the Soviet Union. This will require some adjustment in US positions and an occasional need for unilateral US action in pursuit of particularly important interests. A Standing Interagency Group is hereby established to ensure proper implementation of the decisions flowing from the East-West study. In addition, an Interagency Group is established and commissioned to conduct a study on major alliance relationships. This study should develop a detailed strategy and tactics for dealing with our allies and friends in the pursuit of major US political, economic and military objectives.

4. Refashion East-West economic relations to make them consistent with broad US political-military objectives.

Future Western economic policy must meet three major criteria:

a. It must not increase the Soviet capacity to wage war. US policy will seek significantly improved control over the transfer of technology important to military production and to industrial sectors that indirectly support military capabilities.

b. It must narrow opportunities for Soviet economic leverage over the West and cap# -- and ultimately reverse -- political vulnerabilities arising from the growth of East-West economic and energy interdependence.

c. It must not ease## general Soviet resource constraints, associated political difficulties or responsibility for East European economic problems.

5. Promote Positive Trends in Eastern Europe.

US policy objectives in Eastern Europe are to work with our allies to support greater internal liberalization, foreign policy autonomy and contacts with the West, while seeking to discourage Soviet intervention to block indigenous reform movements. In the short term, assuming no Soviet intervention in Poland, we should confirm our differentiated approach to East European states, seeking to improve relations and be

* State proposes to delete "cap" and substitute "seek to limit".

** State proposes to delete "ease" and substitute "unduly relieve".

forthcoming with countries that are relatively liberal or independent, while dealing with other East Europeans on the basis of strict reciprocity. (A Soviet invasion of Poland involving East European troops would freeze relations for a protracted period). In the longer-term, we would seek to foster liberalization and autonomy and US influence by intensifying contacts and building increased economic ties with appropriate East European countries.

6. Spotlight the deficiencies of the Soviet system.

We will provide ICA and BIB with increased resources to step up broadcasting activities to the Soviet Union, the satellites, Soviet Third World clients and countries important to U.S. interests. We must pursue policies in the developing world that offer a positive vision of the future and promote peaceful democratic change, in order to underscore the contrast between what East and West have to offer.

7. Maintain Effective Communication with the Soviet Union.

A regular U.S.-Soviet dialogue is not incompatible with our more competitive U.S. East-West policy. We must maintain communication to prevent dangerous misunderstandings, ensure that the USSR neither exaggerates nor underestimates our purpose, and demonstrate our openness to constructive Soviet approaches. We also should preserve options for some positive interaction with the USSR on the basis of reciprocity and U.S. national interests. All proposals for East-West negotiations will be subjected to rigorous review to ensure consistency with clearly defined Western interests.